Roque vs. People 444 SCRA 98, G.R. No.

138954, November 25, 2004 Qualified Theft

FACTS:

One Antonio Salazar is a depositor of the Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc.
(BABSLA). He disclosed that around July 1990 he heard that the funds of other depositors were missing
inside the BABSLA and were supposedly clandestinely circulating around the base. Prodded by this news,
and considering that the balance in his passbook was P46,000, he went to the BABSLA to withdraw
P40,000, but was informed that his balance at the BABSLA was insufficient to cover the withdrawal. He
was not allowed to withdraw. Rosalina de Lazo, the general manager, informed him that several
withdrawals were made on his account amounting to P30,500, as evidenced by three (3) withdrawal
slips. Included among these withdrawal slips is one with the amount of P10,000. Salazar claimed that the
signature appearing on said withdrawal slip was not his signature. He does not personally know who
made the withdrawal of P10,000. Salazar assumed that the one in control of the funds made the
withdrawal. Asuncion Galang Roque, being then employed as teller of the BABSLA, and as such was
authorized and reposed with the responsibility to receive and collect capital contributions from its
member/contributors of said corporation, and having collected and received in her capacity as teller of
the BABSLA the sum P10,000.00, said accused, with intent of gain, with grave abuse of confidence and
without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, took, stole and carried away the amount of
P10,000.00, by making it appear that a certain depositor Antonio Salazar withdrew from his savings
account, when in truth and in fact Salazar did not withdraw the said amount.

She was then convicted of the crime of qualified theft by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision, hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the lawful
possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony?

2. Whether or not the elements of qualified theft were proven?

HELD:

1. No. A person tasked to receive and collect capital contributions and having collected and
received in her capacity as teller as alleged in the information cannot be guilty of theft. In the present
case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity of a bank teller. The Court considers
deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller.
This interpretation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a
business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical
possession remains with the bank.

2. No. The elements of qualified theft include the elements of theft and any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The elements of theft, which is defined in
Artilce 308 of the RPC, are the following:
“there are five essential elements which constitute the crime of theft, namely: (1) Taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that said taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that, further, it be done without the owner's consent; and (5) finally, that it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things.”

The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the information indicated
was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Hence, to warrant a conviction, the
prosecution should have proven the following elements: 1. Taking of personal property. 2. That the said
property belongs to another. 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain. 4. That it be done
without the owner's consent. 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things. 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. Regarding
the first element, the taking of personal property, the prosecution was not able to present direct
evidence that petitioner took the P10,000. The prosecution attempted to prove the taking through
circumstantial evidence. One of the pieces of evidence that the prosecution adduced and the trial court
and Court of Appeals relied on heavily for the conviction was the withdrawal slip for P10,000. Antonio
Salazar disowned the signature on the withdrawal slip. However, he also indicated that he did not know
who made the withdrawal. Rosalina de Lazo, the general manager testified that the initial on the
withdrawal slip, was the customary signature of petitioner. She, however, did not intimate the
significance of petitioner's initial on the withdrawal slip. A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips,
including the withdrawal slip stated above, shows that the date and the initial of petitioner were written
across the stamped word "paid." This indicates that petitioner's initial was placed in her capacity as a
teller which, therefore, only proves that this transaction passed through her hands in such capacity. It
does not in any manner show that petitioner prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the
withdrawal increased her patrimony. In the presumption availed of by the lower courts the property
found in the possession of the accused, which is the withdrawal slip, is not stolen property.
Furthermore, the presumption the lower court made was not that the petitioner stole anything, but
rather that the petitioner was the maker of the withdrawal slip. Consequently, there is no basis for the
finding that the withdrawal slip was prepared by the petitioner.

From the foregoing discussion it is plain that the prosecution failed to prove by direct or
sufficient circumstantial evidence that there was a taking of personal property by petitioner. A
discussion of the other elements of qualified theft mentioned above is not necessary. Even if the other
elements were satisfactorily proven, the first and most basic element of qualified theft was not
established. The prosecution was, therefore, unsuccessful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner committed the crime of qualified theft. Therefore, the accused was acquitted
People v CFI of Quezon G.R. No. L-46772. February 13, 1992 Theft of Logs

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined
in the law.

The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered, collected or
removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest products cut, gathered,
collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or
permit granted by the state.

Facts:

This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI of Quezon dismissing the information filed
therein. The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and
punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to
wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form. The Trial court dismissed the information on the grounds
invoked and the reconsideration sought was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WoN the information charged an offense.

Held:

YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the information substantially alleged all the elements of
the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705. While it was admitted that the
information did not precisely allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the consent of
the state," nevertheless, said information expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take,
steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species…". Since only the state
can grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including
timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was "without any
authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking
of the logs was without the consent of the state. When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the
sufficiency of the Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law. The failure of the information
to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. The fact that only the state can grant
a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber
products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. While it is only
the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does
not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest
products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land
includes everything found on its surface. Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as
defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of
the forest products is not material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any
authority or license from the government.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing the
information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

BONIFACIO CIOBAL Y PABRUA, EUSEBIO EBREO Y RINGOR, ESTER PAJIMOLA Y EBREO, RICARDO LIM,
RICARDO MIRANDA and EDDIE PAJIMOLA

G.R. No. 86220 April 20, 1990

Facts:

This is the case of six (6) employees who were each sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly
pilfering gas in the gasoline station of their employer based on the sole uncorroborated testimony of the
latter.

1973, Benjamin Galvez started the operation of the Ben's Petron Service Center in San Fernando, La
Union as operator and manager. The appellants were his employees. Upon noticing that he was losing
money in the business, on May 27, 1981, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, he went to the station to
ascertain why he was losing money.

After investigating he found out that his employees have been pilfering gasoline through an admission
of some of said employees.

An auditor was hired and it was found out that the incurred loss totals to P118,855.21.

Issue:

WoN qualified theft?

Held:

No. There is no question that said appellants are trusted employees of Galvez in this gas station so the
fiduciary relationship between them categorizes the offense committed, if proved, to be qualified theft.

However, the prosecution had not satisfactorily established the nature and value of the property
allegedly stolen. In the criminal complaint the amount of the loss alleged was only P7,246.00 while in
the information the figure is P118,855.21. Galvez testified that his investment in the business was
P60,000 in 1973; and he added another P20,000 three years later, thus, an investment in the total
amount of P80,000.00; and that the losses he suffered covered from 1973 to 1981. On the other hand,
his auditor, estimated the loss of the inventory of the various petroleum products to be P118,855.21
based on his affidavit dated December 18, 1981 but its admission was rejected by the trial court as
hearsay and not being the best evidence. The documents, invoices and evidence of transactions
analyzed by him during the period were not presented in court as they are missing. Moreover, the audit
mentioned covered the years 1980 to 1981. Galvez testified that his losses covered the period 1973 to
1981, amounting to P80,000. In the light of the discrepancies, inconsistencies, the inherent weaknesses
and insufficiencies of the testimonies of complainant Benjamin Galvez and his auditor, the prosecution
has failed to establish the loss and its correct amount which is an essential element of the offense of
qualified theft.
No doubt the prosecution was remiss in its duty to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. It attempted to present the employee who admitted to the crime as a state witness
but it changed its mind. The prosecution backed out from a signal opportunity to fortify its case. As it is,
the testimony of the offended party Benjamin Galvez standing alone cannot stand scrutiny. A conviction
for such a serious offense on such slender evidence should be out of the question.

Acquitted.