SUBJECT
● Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. NO. 128055 | Legislative privileges, inhibitions, and
disqualifications
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Public Officers; Preventive Suspension; Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; Sandiganbayan;
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial
duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination
of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information
is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems
to be “no ifs and buts about it.” In issuing the preventive suspension
of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in
which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
● Congressional Discipline; The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution.—The order of
suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution
which provides that each—“x x x house may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.” The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, upon an erring member.
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged—the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies
to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only
the particular office under which he stands accused.
FACTS
● PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Sandiganbayan.
● "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a
public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of the aliens in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused."
● Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555
and No. 91-94897.
● Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
"Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said
information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution
filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an
order suspending petitioner.
G01-2023 1
● On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of
the prosecution to suspend her.
● The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of
the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day
preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines.
RULING
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day
preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines. YES.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court
(Sandiganbayan) to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
court (Sandiganbayan) is bound to issue an order of suspension as a
matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court
has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree
the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged—the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies
to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only
the particular office under which he stands accused.
In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks.
Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the
power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members
for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a
vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification
that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed
sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from
the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the Congress.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698
has been decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06
December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
G01-2023 2
 nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future
guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE POSITION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G01-2023 3