33.

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID AND PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro Hernandez are the President and CEO,
Senior Manager and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation (“Marcopper”), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the
base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end which caused the tailings to gushed out
of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067),
National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942),
and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the ground that the Informations were
"duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act.

Issue:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand.

Held:

NO. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges simply means a
single complaint or information charges more than one offense. A complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule 110). There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges
when a single Information charges more than one offense.
Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information
charging only one offense.
The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for
more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." Here, double jeopardy is not
at issue because not all of its elements are present.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such
as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal
intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting
them.