Petitioner 1

TEAM CODE - 1810
12TH NALSAR B.R.SAWHNY MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2018
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE SUPREME OF VYALIKAVAL
IN THE MATTER OF
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. *** OF 2018
THE STATE OF MAGRATHEA V. VYALIKAVAL GOVERNMENT
(PETITIONER) (RESPONDENT)
Clubbed with
THE STATE OF MAGRATHEA V. MR. ZAAKIBHASSAIN&
MS. BHARTIRANJAN
(PETITIONER) (RESPONDENT)
ON THE SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF VYALIKAVAL
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
i
MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................... vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................................... ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................ x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... xiii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................... 1
A. THE COMPLAINT INSTITUTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF VYALIKAVAL

IS MAINTAINABLE. ........................................................................................................... 1
A.1. THAT THERE EXIST EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. ............................... 1
A.2. THAT GRAVE INJUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE. .................................................... 2
A.3. THAT THE MATTER INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW. ... 2
A.3.1. THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW IS A MATTER OF

GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE. .......................................................................... 3
A.4. THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS WIDE DISCRETIONARY POWERS

UNDER ARTICLE 136 ..................................................................................................... 4
A.4.1. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES ARE NO BAR (ARGUENDO). ........................ 4
B. THAT THE TADRI FORMULA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL .................................... 5
B.1. THAT THIS COURT HAS THE POWER TO HOLD TADRI FORMULA
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ................................................................................................... 5
B.2. THE FORMULA IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 .......................................... 6
B.3. THAT THERE HAS BEEN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 ................................... 6
B.3.1. FORMULA IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 BECAUSE OF

ARBITRARINESS ........................................................................................................ 7
B.3.2. FORMULA WAS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 BECAUSE OF

UNREASONABLENESS ............................................................................................. 8
ii
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
B.4. DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY IS APPLICABLE .............................................. 9
C. THE SUPREME COURT CAN AND SHOULD DIRECT THE VYALIKAVAL

GOVERNMENT TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY GRANTS TO MAGRATHEA. .......... 10
C.1. THERE EXISTS A PUBLIC PURPOSE IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR WHICH
THE DISCRETIONARY GRANT IS ASKED FOR. ..................................................... 10
C.2. THE DISCRETION EXERCISED IN THE PRESENT CASE IS ARBITRARY

AND UNREASONABLE AND HENCE IT IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 ..... 11
D. MPTA IS INTRA VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF VYALIKAVAL .................. 12
D.1. STATE OF MAGRATHEA HAS LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE TO ENACT

SUCH ACT ...................................................................................................................... 12
D.1.1. STATE HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION TO LEGISLATE ................. 12
D.1.2. DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS APPLIES ...................................... 13
D.1.2.1 THERE IS A REAL TERRITORIAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE PERSON

SOUGHT TO BE TAXED AND THE STATE SEEKING TO TAX HIM ............ 13
D.1.2.2 THE LIABILITY SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED IS PERTINENT TO

THAT CONNECTION ............................................................................................ 14
D.1.3 MPTA IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 246 ...................................... 14
D.1.3.1 ACT IS NOT A COLOURABLE LEGISLATION .................................... 15
D.1.4 MPTA IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 276 ...................................... 16
D.2 THE ACT IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ........... 16
D.2.1 GOVERNMENTAL ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14 OF THE

CONSTITUTION ........................................................................................................ 16
D.2.1.1. MPTA IS NOT ARBITRARY ................................................................... 17
D.2.1.2 THE CLASSIFICATION IS REASONABLE. .......................................... 17
D.2.1.3. DOCTRINE OF PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY APPLIES

.................................................................................................................................. 18
D.2.2 GOVERNMENTAL ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 19 ............ 18
D.2.2.1 TAX NOT INVALID IF IT CAUSES HARDSHIP TO FEW

INDIVIDUALS........................................................................................................ 19
iii
D.3 THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 21. ................................................... 19
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................................xii
iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION ACTUAL TERM

¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
All. Allahabad
Art. Article
All ER All England Law Reports (United Kingdom)
Cr.L.J Criminal Law Journal
Kant. Karnataka
MPTA Magrathea Professional Tax Act
Prop. Proposition
SCALE Supreme Court Almanac
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCJ Supreme Court Journal
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
SCW Supreme Court Weekly
Sec. Section
Supdt. Superintendent
UOI Union of India
VYR Vyalikaval Rupee
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
A.P. Agarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2000) 1 S.C.C. 600 .................................................. 8

Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487. ...................... 17
All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India, (2007) 7 S.C.C. 527.................. 16
Amarjit Kaur v. Harbhajan Singh, (2003) 10 S.C.C. 228. ........................................................ 1
Babita v. State of Bihar, (1993) 25 ATC 598 ............................................................................ 7
Balaji v. I.T.O A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 123(128). ............................................................................... 18
Balaji v. I.T.O, A.I.R. 1962 A.I.R. 123. .................................................................................. 18
Bengal Chemical and Phamaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 633 ........... 4
Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation Board and Ors., A.I.R. 2007
S.C. 2276.............................................................................................................................. 17
Chattisgarh Rural Agriculture Extension Officers Assn. v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 2004 S.C.
2020...................................................................................................................................... 17
Chintamanrao v. State of MP, (1950) S.C.J 571 ........................................................................ 8
Chiranjit Lal Choudhari v. Union of India, 1951 A.I.R 41. .................................................... 18
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT West Bengal A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65. ................................. 4
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520. ............................................. 4
East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank., 1992 (Supp-2) S.C.C. 29. ...................................... 4
Esher Singh v. Andra Pradesh, (2004) 11 S.C.C. 585. .............................................................. 4
Fed.of Hotels v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.C. 634. ............................................................ 19
Gulam v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1185. .............................................................. 18
Hoechst v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 S.C.C. 45. ........................................................................ 18
India pharmaceutical corporation ltd., v. Sharamik Sena A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2577. ................... 6
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1780. ...................... 2
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 498. .......................................................... 6
J.B. Chopra and Others v. UOI , (1987) 1 S.C.C. 422 .............................................................. 5
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, (2004) 3 S.C.C. 214 ...................................... 3
Janshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, (2004) 3 S.C.C. 214. ...................................... 4
Javeed v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057................................................................... 8
Kailash Nath v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 790. ............................................................... 18
Kamla Prasad v. Executive Officer, A.I.R. 1974 S.C.C. 440. ................................................. 16
vi
Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 925................................................... 13
Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. CST, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 488....................................... 4
M. Janardhana Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 324. .................... 3
Nazeria Moto Servicer v. State of A.P, (1969) 2 S.C.C. 576. ................................................. 19
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 S.C.C. 386 ................................................................... 8
Omkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 2562 ...................................................... 7
Penu Balakrishna and Ors. v. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer and Ors., A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 195. ..... 3
Pritam Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169. ............................................................................. 1
Ram Bachan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1404. ........................................................... 16
Ram Piari v. Bhagwant, (1990) 3 S.C.C. 364. ........................................................................... 1
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. (2002) 4 S.C.C. 388............................................ 2
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 S.C.C. 179. ................................................... 2
Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 715........................................................ 2
Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322 ......................................................... 7
Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322. ..................................................... 17
Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar v. State of Gujrat, (1994) 5 S.C.C. 459................................ 13
Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314.
................................................................................................................................................ 3
State of A.P v. National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. .............................................................. 13
State of Bombay v Rusy, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 391. ......................................................................... 4
State of Bombay v. R.M.D Chamarbaugwalla, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 699............................... 13, 14
State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 699. .................................... 13
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 1963 A.I.R. 1241. ..................................................... 12
Sub-Inspector Rooplal v. Lt. Governor, (2000) I S.C.C. 644 .................................................... 9
Sub-Inspector Rooplal v. Lt. Governor, (2000) I S.C.C. 644. ................................................... 9
Sushil Chander v. State [1969] A.I.R. All. 317, F.B. ............................................................. 16
Valamma Paul v. Cochin University, (1996) 3 S.C.C. 545. ...................................................... 7
Venkateswarer v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1947 .......................................................... 17
International Cases
Gulf Ry. v. Ellis, (1897) 163 US 150. ...................................................................................... 27

Missouri Ry. v. Humes,(1885) 115 US 512. ............................................................................ 27
vii
Books & Articles
DURGA DAS BASU , COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 8TH EDITION ................. 23, 24
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,9TH EDN.,VOL. 2 ............ 27
M.P. JAIN, A TREATISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,Ch. XXI, page 999..................... 16
M.P. JAIN, A TREATISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, I, CH. XVIII ................................................. 15
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN ADM. LAW—CASES & MATERIALS, II, CH.X. ................................................ 15
MP JAIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6TH EDITION 2003 Ch. XLI. .................................. 17
MP. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTION LAW, 6TH EDITION 2013, CH. XXI………………………. 15
Statutes
Constitution of Vyalikaval…………………………………………………………………..3
viii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is humbly submitted that the petitioners have approaches the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of
Vyalikaval invoking its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of Vyalikaval.
Article 136 empowers the Supreme Court to grant in discretion Special leave to Appeal from
any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.
ix
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Democratic Republic of Vyalikaval :
Vyalikaval is a nation which adopted a Constitution that was in parimateria with the
Constitution of India. It was composed of 9 states and like with India, a Finance Commission
was constituted every 5 years to recommend the division of Union revenue in accordance
with the Constitution.
Division of Revenue:
The union revenues were divided among states on the Deekayashi Formula- where 50% of all
Union tax revenue were divided among the states based on weight including – income
distance, the total area of the state, forest cover, population of the state and fiscal discipline of
the state government.
The 14th Finance Commission
The recommendation of the 13th Finance Commission was accepted in toto by the Vyalikaval
government and was implemented for the next 5 years. The 14th finance commission was
constituted in 2021 and in 2022, it published Tadri Formula for distribution of revenue
among states based on certain factors and weights a) Ratio population of the state b)
Reduction in total fertility rate of state c) Average per capita income growth in the state)
Annual increase in forest cover.
Changes by the Commission
The changes suggested that the budget of Magrathea and Uttam Pradesh would decrease by
an average of 30%. The changes left the above revenue-strapped states with even less money
on the three criteria. The 14th finance commission stated in its report that States should
overcome deficits by increasing taxation and if there would be any shortfall, the Union
government could always make up for it with Discretionary grants.
Recommendations of the Commission
The Commission also recommended the government to remove all limits on the State‘s
power to levy taxes on professions. The Constitution of Vyalikaval was amended. States were
free to levy as much professional tax as they chose to. Subsequently, the state of Magrathea
x
passed the MPTA 2002 levying a tax on all person practicing a profession. All advocates
registered with the Magrathea Bar council had to pay a professional tax.
MPTA declared invalid
Mr. ZakibHassain who was enrolled in Magrathea Bar Council, filed a writ petition before
the Magrathea HC, challenging the Constitutional validity of MPTA. Ms.BhartiRanjan who
was enrolled in Trisolian Bar Council was engaged to appear in Magrathea HC. She received
a notice from tax authorities in Magrathea to pay the flat tax. A suit was filed by her and the
Trisolian HC set aside the notice holding that the State of Magrathea had no power to levy an
extraterritorial tax. MPTA was struck down by Magrathea HC on the grounds that it was a
tax on income and amounted to a violation of Article 21. The government of Magrathea filed
an appeal to the SC of Vyalikaval under Article 136 of the Constitution. A leave to appeal
was granted by the SC.
Request for discretionary grants
There was a revenue shortfall of nearly 40% for which a request was made by the State
government to the Union government to make discretionary grants. The request was denied
by the Union Government.
The suit
Magrathea filed a suit against the Vyalikaval government, seeking a declaration that the Tadri
formula was unConstitutional. Refusal of Vyalikaval to give discretionary grants is a
violation of the rights of the residents of the Magrathea. The Supreme Court of Vyalikaval
decided to tag this suit along with the pending appeals.
xi
QUESTIONS RAISED
A)
WHETHER THE COMPLAINT INSTITUTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF

VYALIKAVAL IS MAINTAINABLE.
B)
WHETHER THE TADRI FORMULA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
C)
WHETHER THE SC CAN AND SHOULD DIRECT THE VYALIKAVAL
GOVERNMENT TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY GRANTS TO MAGRATHEA.
D)
WHETHER MPTA IS INTRA VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF VYALIKVAL.
xii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. THE COMPLAINT INSTITUTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF

This Hon‘ble court has jurisdiction over this matter under Article 136 of the Constitution of
Vyalikaval as the complaint instituted against the government of Vyalikaval is maintainable
as this case involves exceptional circumstances. Hence, leave should be granted as the High
court of Magrathea and Trisolaria committed a serious violation of the law. Secondly, grave
injustice has been done because the judgment given by both the courts were unreasonable.
Also by implementing Tadri formula grave injustice has been done. This matter involves a
substantial question of law and is a matter of general public importance. The power of the
SC is not subject to any Constitutional limitation and alternative remedies are no bar under
Article 136. Hence, this Hon‘ble court has jurisdiction over the present case.
B. THAT THE TADRI FORMULA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Tadri formula formulated by the 14th finance commission is unconstitutional and this
court has the power to hold the formula unconstitutional, by exercising the power of judicial
review. The formula is in violation of Article 13 as it contravenes one of the Fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It has violated Article 14 of the Constitution as there
has been a violation of the principle of Equality. The yardstick imposed by the formula was
unreasonable in nature and the formula was arbitrary in its soul. It was unreasonable as the
grounds which were set out were not justified. The Doctrine of Severability is applicable in
the present case as it was inconsistent with the fundamental right and the formula was in
violation of the fundamental right.
C. THE SC CAN AND SHOULD DIRECT THE VYALIKAVAL GOVERNMENT

TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY GRANTS TO MAGRATHEA
Central Assistance to a State, apart from tax sharing and fiscal need grants also flows in the
form of discretionary grants provided for under Article 282 of the Constitution.This provision
vests in the centre, a very broad power of granting funds for any specific public purpose. The
objective of the request made by the State Government of Magrathea is to fill the revenue
deficits by the way of discretionary grants. The same encompass a public purpose. The
discretion of the central government with respect to discretionary grants should not be
xiii
arbitrary or vague. In the present case, there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness in the
action of the central government in not allowing discretionary grants.
D. MPTA IS INTRA VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF VYALIKVAL
The state of Magrathea has legislative competence to enact MPTA under Article 245, 246
and 276 of the Constitution of Vyalikaval. It has territorial jurisdiction as well as the doctrine
of territorial nexus applies to this case. The act is not a colourable legislation and is in
accordance with Article 246.
The act is not in violation of any fundamental right as the governmental action does not
violate Article 14 since it is not arbitrary and has made a reasonable classification. The
doctrine of Constitutionality applies in this case and it is presumed that the legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the need of the people. The act done by the state
government is not in violation of Article 19 and is imposed by the authority of law. The
MPTA also is not in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of Vyalikaval.
xiv
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
A. THE COMPLAINT INSTITUTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon‘ble Supreme Court of Vyalikavalthat this court
has jurisdiction over the concerned matter under Article 136 of the Constitution of
Vyalikaval. The submissions have been put forth under four limbs i.e., (A.1)thatthe case
involves exceptional circumstances(A.2) thatgrave injustice has been done (A.3) that the
matter involves substantial question of law (A.4) that the Hon‘ble court has wide
discretionary powers to accept and hear this petition of the Magrathea government.
A.1. THAT THERE EXIST EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
It is most humbly submitted thatArticle 1361 confers a special power over the apex court
which is to be exercised under exceptional circumstances.2 Leave is granted where the HC
committed a serious and flagrant violation of law3 and where the lower court‘s findings are
recorded by erroneous application of the principle of law, which consequently results in a
miscarriage of justice.4
In the present case, the order of High Court of Magrathea whichheld that the state had no
power to enact such law and declared MPTA as unconstitutional results in miscarriage of
justice because the act is not violation of the Constitution and the state has the power to enact
such a law.The High Court of Trisolaria heldthat the state government had no power to levy
the extraterritorial tax. There exist exceptional circumstances as there has been a grave
violation of the law as the State of Magrathea has a territorial nexus to levy an extraterritorial
tax.
Further, the Tadriformula recommended by 14th finance commission5 was in violation of

basic structure of the Constitution of Vyalikaval. The system that was in existence since 1956
1
VyalikavalConst., Art 136. The Constitution of Vyalikaval is parimateria to the Constitution of India.
2
Pritam Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169.
3
Amarjit Kaur v. Harbhajan Singh, (2003) 10 S.C.C. 228.
4
Ram Piari v. Bhagwant, (1990) 3 S.C.C. 364.
5
Moot prop, ¶ 12.
1
was acceptable to every state and no gross violation of the rights of the citizens was done. No
one state raised an objection to the Deekayashi formula that was in existence since 1956.6
Henceforth, it is humbly stated that because of the implementation of the Tadri formula there
has arisen a situation of exceptional circumstances which in turn was affecting the revenue-
strapped states.
A.2. THAT GRAVE INJUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE.
Special leave is granted where the impugned order is unreasonable or perverse which has
resulted in manifest injustice, the fundamental flaw in the law.7 Leave is also granted in cases
where the decision challenged has disregarded the form of legal process or there is some
violation of principles of natural justice, and substantial and grave injustice had been done,8
therefore it is submitted that leave should be granted to prevent substantial injustice.
In the present case, the judgments given by the High Court of Magrathea were perverse as the
MagratheaHigh Court struck down the MPTA act.9 The state was competent enough to levy
taxes on professionals. The judgment given by theHigh Court of Trisolaria was unreasonable
because the state was competent to formulate laws on the subject matter. Further, a grave
injustice has been done as the Tadri formula that was formulated left the revenue-strapped
states with even less money and gave other states which already had higher shares,10 a greater
share of the union‘s tax revenues. Henceforth, a grave injustice has been done in all the three
circumstances.
A.3. THAT THE MATTER INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW.
When a matter of general or public importance is involved or there is injustice resulting from
the impugned order or judgment, it comes under Article 136 of the Constitution.11 To be
substantial, a question of law must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if
answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it is concerned.12
6
Moot proposition, ¶ 6.
7
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr.(2002) 4 S.C.C. 388.
8
Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 715.
9
10
11
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1780.
12
SantoshHazari v. PurushottamTiwari, (2001) 3 S.C.C. 179.
2
It is submitted that in Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd,13
this Court had laid down the following tests to determine whether a substantial question of
law is involved. The tests are: (1) whether directly or indirectly it affects substantial rights of
the parties, or (2) the question is of generalpublic importance, or (3) whether it is an open
question in the sense that there is no scope for interference by the High Court with a finding
recorded when such a finding could be treated to be a finding of fact.14
In the present case, the issue before the High Court was whether the MPTA violates Art. 21
of the Constitutionof Vyalikaval15 also whether the state of Magrathea had the power to make
and implement such act.16 It is submitted that what is impugned are substantial questions of
law as the Hon‘ble court hasn‘t conclusively settled this question of law;hence, the present
special leave petition should be entertained.
A.3.1. THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW IS A MATTER OF GENERAL

PUBLIC IMPORTANCE.
It has been held by this Hon‘ble court that when a question of law of general public
importance arises, or a decision shocks the conscience of the court, its jurisdiction can always
be invoked.17Article 136 is the residuary power of the Supreme Court to do justice where the
court is satisfied that there is an injustice.18
It is humbly submitted, in the present case, the matter of striking MPTA is a violation of
general public importance as govt. imposes taxes on the citizens as a means of raising
revenue to meet the public and budgetary demands, thus this is a matter of general public
importance. The Tadri formula which came into existence did not take the matter of general
public importance into consideration as due to its implementation, the budget of Magrathea
government showed revenue shortfall of nearly 40 percent.19 Hence, the substantial question
of law is a matter of general public importance.
13
Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314.
14
M. JanardhanaRao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 324.
15
Moot Proposition, ¶ 33.
16
Moot Proposition, ¶ 32.
17
JamshedHormusjiWadia v. Board of Trustees, (2004) 3 S.C.C. 214.
18
PenuBalakrishna and Ors.v. Ariya M. RamaswamiIyer and Ors., A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 195.
19
Moot prop, ¶ 36.
3
A.4. THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS WIDE DISCRETIONARY POWERS
UNDER ARTICLE 136
It is most humbly submitted that this Hon‘ble court has previously emphasized that the
jurisdiction under Article 136 is such that it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limits, when
it chases injustice, is the sky itself.20 The power of this Hon‘ble court under this Article to
grant special leave to appeal from the decision of any court or tribunal is not subject to any
Constitutional limitation21 and is left entirely to the discretion of the court22 to interfere in
exceptional cases.23
It is humbly submitted that the present case of the appeals of the judgments of the High
Courts regarding the unconstitutionality of MPTA and power of the state regarding the same
should be entertained by the court, as the power of the court is not subject to any
Constitutional limitation.
A.4.1. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES ARE NO BAR (ARGUENDO).
The power under Article 136 is an extraordinary power, which is not subject to any
Constitutional limitations.24Where the alternative remedy is of no avail, i.e., where the HC
has already taken a particular view on the question in issue, a direct approach to the SC is
maintainable.25It has been upheld that this Hon‘ble Court would never do injustice nor allow
injustice being perpetrated for the sake of upholding technicalities.26
Thus, the mere existence of alternative relief is not a bar for granting leave under Article
136.27 Hence, it is humbly submitted that in the present case mere technicality of obtaining a
certificate from High Courtcould not stop this Hon‘ble court to hear this matter involving on
a substantial question of law.
20
Esher Singh v. Andra Pradesh, (2004) 11 S.C.C. 585.
21
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT West Bengal A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65.
22
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520.
23
Bengal Chemical and Phamaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 633; State of Bombay v
Rusy, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 391.
24
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 S.C.C. 666; Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT
West Bengal, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65.
25
Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. CST, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 488.
26
JanshedHormusjiWadia v. Board of Trustees, (2004) 3 S.C.C. 214.
27
East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank., 1992 (Supp-2) S.C.C. 29.
4
B. THAT THE TADRI FORMULA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
This is most humbly submitted before the Hon‘ble Supreme Court that the Tadri formula by
the 14th finance commission is unconstitutional. Article 14 confers to all citizens the equality
before the law and equal protection of the law.28When a statute vests unguided and
unrestricted power in an authority, it would be affected by the vice of discrimination.29Where
statutory provision is plainly in violation of Article 14, having conferred unguided and
unfettered power on the executive, the court cannot uphold its Constitutionality.30
The submissions have been put under four limbs, i.e. that (a)that the court has the power to
hold Tadri formula unonstitutional (b) it is in violation of Article 13, (c) it has violated art.14
of the Constitution, (d) that the doctrine of severability applies.
B.1. THAT THIS COURT HAS THE POWER TO HOLD TADRI FORMULA
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The power of the court to declare legislative enactments invalid is expressively provided by
the Constitution under Article 13.31Any law or order of legislature and executive deems to be
void if it is found to be in conflict with the Constitution of the land. Judicial review thereby,
refers to the power of judiciary to interpret the Constitution and declare the validity of the
same.32 The power to exercise judicial review rests with the Supreme Court and the High
Court but the ultimate power to determine the validity of any law rests in the hand of the
Supreme Court.33
In this case, the Supreme Court by the virtue of Article 136 has the power to hold Tadri
formula unconstitutional as Tadri formula was arbitrary and violated Article 14 of the
Constitution of Vyalikaval. It has the power to declare any law or order of legislature as well
as executive void when it is in violation of the Constitution. The weights proposed by Tadri
formula were arbitrary, unreasonable and treated unequals, equally. Thus, this Hon‘ble court
has the power to hold the formula unconstitutional.
28
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTION LAW, 6TH EDITION 2013, CH. XXI.
29
M.P. JAIN, A TREATISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, I, CH. XVIII; M.P. JAIN, INDIAN ADM. LAW—CASES &
MATERIALS, II, CH.X.
30
J.B. Chopra &Ors. v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 422.
31
VyalikavalConst.Art. 13.
32
Vyalikaval Const. Art.32, 136, 226, 227.
33
Id.
5
B.2. THE FORMULA IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13
Any ―law‖ which is illegal and offending the root of the Constitution cannot be allowed to
perpetuate even by a Constitutional amendment and neither Parliament nor State Legislature
can pass any such law.34 ―The reason is that the very adoption of a written Constitution with
a Bill of Right and Judicial Review implies that the Courts shall have the power to strike
down a law which contravenes a fundamental right or some other limitation imposed by the
Constitution.‖35
In the present case, the fundamental rights of the citizens of Vyalikaval are getting violated as
the parameters which were laid down in the Tadri Formula were in violation of the
fundamental rights of the citizens. Article 13 aims at only one of the grounds of
unconstitutionality, i.e. contravention of any of the fundamental rights as included in Part III
of the Constitution.36The criteria were in violation of the fundamental rights, they are
henceforth in violation of the Constitution.37
B.3. THAT THERE HAS BEEN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14
The Constitution of India guarantees the right to equality before the law under Article 14.38
Even the instrumentalities of the state have an obligation to confirm the requirements of
Article 14 for its action.39
The principle of equality is emphasized in the Preamble and is basic to the Indian
Constitution.40A legislature cannot transgress this basic feature of the Constitution while
making a law.41 The Constitution through its preamble, fundamental rights and directive
principles created a state based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination, striking
34
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 498.
35
Vide Author‘s Tagore Law Lectures on Limited Government and JUDICIAL Review
36
DURGA DASBASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 8TH EDITION 2007, PAGE 696.
37
38
M.P. JAIN, A TREATISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,Ch. XXI, page 999.
39
India pharmaceutical corporation ltd., v. SharamikSena A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2577.
40
VyalikavalConst.Preamble.
41
MP JAIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6TH EDITION 2003 Ch. XLI.
6
a balance between the rights of the individual and the duty and the commitment of the state to
establish an egalitarian social order. 42.
In the present case, there has been a violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens of
Vyalikaval mentioned in Part III of the Constitution. The weights proposed in the Tadri
formula were arbitrary and unreasonable in nature. This issue will be dealt under two heads –
(a) violation of Article 14 because of arbitrariness and (b) violation of Article 14 because of
unreasonableness.
B.3.1. FORMULA IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 BECAUSE OF

ARBITRARINESS
The misapplication of mind is a character for the arbitrary use of power.43The expression
―arbitrary‖ means unreasonable and undefined manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at
pleasure, without adequately determining principle not founded on the nature of things,
irrational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment depending on the will alone –
This is the purpose of Article 14.44 If the action of the State can be proved to be arbitrary in
nature in the court, then, notwithstanding any classification per se it would offend Article 14
and would be liable to be struck down.45
In the present case, the weights proposed by the Tadri formula are violating the fundamental
rights of the citizens of the democratic republic of Vyalikaval.46 The Tadri formula was
arbitrary in nature as it lacked objectivity in its very foundation and did not intend for an
equal and balanced economic growth in the states. The formula did not ensure a proper
balance in distribution. The changes brought about by the Tadri formula caused widespread
consternation in the states of Magrathea and Uttam Pradesh,47 as by applying this formula,
the budgets of these two state governments would decrease by an average of 30% over the
42
Valamma Paul v. Cochin University, (1996) 3 S.C.C. 545.
43
Omkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 2562.
44
Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322.
45
Babita v. State of Bihar, (1993) 25 A.T.C. 598.
46
47
7
next five years.48 Henceforth, the yardsticks proposed by the finance commission in the Tadri
formula were arbitrary in its soul.
B.3.2. FORMULA WAS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 BECAUSE OF

UNREASONABLENESS
The requirement of ―reasonableness‖ acts as the basic block of the entire fabric of
fundamental rights.49 It is most humbly submitted before the Hon‘ble court that, there is
arbitrariness in state action, whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an
―authority‖ under Article 12.50
―The word ‘reasonable’ enables the Court to determine not only whether the impugned
restrictive law is, in fact, in the interests of any such ground as enumerated but also whether
the restriction sought to be imposed by the legislation is reasonable, having regard to the
objective test i.e. whether the restriction has a reasonable relation to the authorized purpose
or is an arbitrary abridgment of the freedom guaranteed by the Article under the cloak of any
of the exceptions.‖51Arbitrary action by the administration is defined as one which is not
based on valid reasons and ground and that is based on the ground of irrationality and also is
tainted with unreasonableness.52 In order to sustain a state action, it must not be vulnerable to
the carnality of arbitrariness. This, all in all, is the essence of Article 14.53
In the present case, the formula was unreasonable because the grounds of dividing the pool of
revenue was not justified in entirety as there were states which were poorer or more
backward than the others and therefore required central finances on a much larger scale than
the others. There was not a set of firm objective criteria for the distribution of central
assistance which would lead to the development of the states as a whole just like the right
promised in Article 14 in the Constitution of Vyalikaval.
The formula left the revenue-strapped states such as Magratheaand Uttam Pradesh with even
less money because of the three criteria, i.e., ratio of population, reduction in the total fertility
48
Id.
49
Javeed v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057.
50
A.P Agarwal v. Gov. of NCT of Delhi, (2000) 1 S.C.C. 600.
51
Chintamanrao v. State of MP, (1950) S.C.J. 571.
52
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 S.C.C. 386.
53
A.P. Agarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2000) 1 S.C.C. 600.
8
rate and the annual increase in forest cover as mentioned in the weights of the Tadri
formula.54 The formula did not pay heed to the needs and requirements of all the states while
formulating the formula. It laid down the formula in a very capricious and erratic manner.
Henceforth, the council would like to plead that the weights proposed were unreasonable in
its core crux.
B.4. DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY IS APPLICABLE
Article 13(1)55 stipulates that existing laws which are inconsistent with the provision of Part-
III shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency. A law which is inconsistent with a
fundamental right is not void as a whole; it will be void only to the extent of the
inconsistency. It henceforth means that the doctrine of severability has to be applied and the
offending portion of the law has to be struck down from the valid portion.56
In the present case, the Tadri formula which came into existence violated the fundamental
rights of the citizens of Vyalikaval. The fundamental right casts the shape of the Vyalikaval
democracy. The formula was discriminatory as the objective which was for a uniform growth
was not achieved as the demographic profile, total fertility rate, income growth as well as an
increase in forest cover was tainted with unreasonableness. By the above-statedfacts, it is
clear that the formula was more or less inconsistent with the fundamental right. Hence, the
formula was against the principle of Severability.
54
55
Vyalikaval Const. Art. 13
56
Sub-Inspector Rooplal v. Lt. Governor, (2000) I S.C.C. 644.
9
C. THE SUPREME COURT CAN AND SHOULD DIRECT THE VYALIKAVAL
GOVERNMENT TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY GRANTS TO MAGRATHEA.
Central assistance to a state, apart from tax sharing and fiscal need grants also flows in the
form of discretionary grants provided for under Article 282.57 This provision vests in the
centre a very broad power of granting funds for any specific public purpose.58 However, the
courts do not interfere in this matter and leave it to the discretion of the central government59
as the proper place to criticize any grant which is given or not given by the government is the
legislature and the not the courts60.
These grants are known as discretionary grants as the centre is under no obligation to give
these grants to any state. The centre may give such a grant to one state and not the other and
the matter lies solely with the centre's discretion61. Article 282 allows money to be defrayed
by the central government for any public purpose to the state62.
C.1. THERE EXISTS A PUBLIC PURPOSE IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR WHICH
THE DISCRETIONARY GRANT IS ASKED FOR.
It is firmly established from the above paragraph that discretionary grants under Article 282
are made by the central government in the ends of some public purpose. The very objective
of the request made by the state government of Magrathea63 is to fill the revenue deficits by
the way of the discretionary grants.64Public purpose is defined to be a purpose wherein even a
fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited65.
The same does encompass a public purpose as the request for grant is in order to fill the
revenue deficits of the state - in the presence of which the interests of the communities
residing in the state will suffer. Thus, it is in order to cover the revenue deficits, the ultimate
57
Vyalikaval Const. Art. 282.
58
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (7th Edition, Lexis Nexis), 678.
59
Id.
60
K.N. Subba Reddy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 Kant. 66
61
Pritam Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169.
62
Bhim Singh v. Union of India, (2010) 15 S.C.C. 503.
63
64
65
SooramPratap Reddy and Others v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist and Other, (2008) 9 S.C.C. 552.
10
benefit of which will flow to the residents of the state of Magrathea that the request for
discretionary grants was made. Thus, in the form of an interest on the part of the community
or public, there exists a public purpose in the present case.
C.2. THE DISCRETION EXERCISED IN THE PRESENT CASE IS ARBITRARY

AND UNREASONABLE AND HENCE IT IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14
Even though the central government has the discretion with respect to discretionary grants it
is an established principle of law that the discretion when exercised by any authority should
not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful but legal and regular.66 Every action even a change of
policy in any realm of state activity has to be informed fair and non-arbitrary.67 The
expression ―arbitrarily‖ means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at
pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-
rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.68
Thus, in the present case, there is very resplendent arbitrariness and unreasonableness in the
very act of the central government in not allowing the discretionary grant especially when the
central government already knows about the financial paucity in the state coupled with the
reduction in the share of the state under the Tadri formula.
The very reason why the central government has refused the discretionary grant in the present
case shows complete lack of reason as it is Article 282 of the Constitutionof Vyalikaval
which itself provides for the discretionary grant by the central government to the states. The
reasoning of the central government in not allowing the grant i.e. it does not have the power
to grant such a grant is therefore devoid of reasoning and thus not a valid reason and hints at
arbitrariness and unreasonableness in the exercise of the discretion by the central
government.
66
KumaonMandalVikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors., (2001) 1 S.C.C. 182.
67
E. P. Royappa v.State Of Tamil Nadu &Anr.,1974 A.I.R. 555.
68
M/S Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P. &Ors., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322.
11
D. MPTA IS INTRA VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF VYALIKAVAL
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon‘ble SC that Magrathea Professional Tax Act is
not ultra vires to the Constitution of Vyalikaval as it is the state who has an exclusive legal
right to legislate upon taxes on profession, trade, callings,and employment69(D.1), and the act
does not violate any fundamental right granted to the citizens of Vyalikaval(D.2).
D.1. STATE OF MAGRATHEA HAS LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE TO ENACT

SUCH ACT
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon‘ble SC that it has been clearly mentioned in Art.
245, 246 & 27670 that the state has the exclusive power to make laws regarding the taxes on
the profession. Art. 246 in Part XI of the Constitution demarcates the legislative fields with
precision and emphasizes the exclusive power of the union and the states to make laws in
respect of the matters enumerated in the lists in the seventh schedule and allotted to the union
or the states, as the case may be.71An exclusive power on the states to make laws with respect
to the matter pertaining to state list is enumerated in Article 246 (3).72
In the present case, the state of Magrathea has an exclusive power to make law for the whole
or any part of the state. Therefore, this matter falls within the exclusive competence of the
State of Magrathea, i.e., List II of Seventh Schedule.
Article 276 authorizes a state or other local authority in a state to levy a tax on professions,
trades, callings, and employment.73 Thus, state of Magrathea is authorized to levy a tax on
professionals by virtue of Article 276.
D.1.1. STATE HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION TO LEGISLATE
Subject to the provision of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any
part of the territory of India, and the legislature of a state may make laws for the whole or
any part of the state.74
69
70
71
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 1963 A.I.R. 1241.
72
73
Id.
74
12
In the present case, the state of Magrathea passed the Magrathea Professional Tax Act, 2022
which inter alia levied a tax on all people practicing a profession with the amount payable
being levied to be determined by the income of the person practicing the profession. 75 The
power to enact such law vests with the state since it has territorial jurisdiction.
D.1.2. DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS APPLIES
A taxing statute is not invalid if it affects person or activities outside the territorial limits of
the state legislature provided76doctrine of territorial nexus says that laws made by a state
legislature are not applicable outside of the state, except (1) the connection (nexus) must be
real and not illusionary (2) The liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that
connection.77 The act has to satisfy the principles of territorial nexus which are essentially
discernible from the factual application of the provisions of the act. 78 If the above two
conditions are satisfied, any further examination of the sufficiency of Nexus cannot be a
matter of consideration before the courts.79
D.1.2.1 THERE IS A REAL TERRITORIAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE PERSON

SOUGHT TO BE TAXED AND THE STATE SEEKING TO TAX HIM
To invoke the doctrine of territorial nexus the connection or nexus between state and subject-
matter of the law must be real and not illusionary80, that is the application or operation of the
act may extend to persons, objects or activities (as the case may be) outside the State if law
selects some facts which provide some relation or connection with the state and adopts that as
a ground for its interference.
The state legislature‘s jurisdiction is, on the face of it, confined to persons and objects which
fall withinthe territorial limit of the state. However, the jurisdiction can be extended by the
application of doctrine of territorial nexus.81The application extends to persons, objects or
activities outside the state when the state legislature is competent to legislate and has some
75
76
State of Bombay v. R.M.D Chamarbaugwalla, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 699.
77
Id.
78
ShrikantBhalchandraKarulkar v. State of Gujrat, (1994) 5 S.C.C. 459.
79
Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 925.
80
State of A.P v. National Thermal Power Corpn.Ltd., (2002) 5 S.C.C. 203.
81
DURGADASBASU , COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 8TH EDITION REPRINT 2012, PAGE 8734
13
connection with persons, objects and activities outside the state. The liability imposed must
be pertinent to that connection.82
In the present case, state of Magrathea levied a tax on all advocates,83 irrespective of where
they were enrolled, who appeared before any court in Magrathea.84 The operation of the act
extends to advocates who appear in any court in Magrathea, the relation and connection with
the state that of the advocates who appear in any court in Magrathea is real and not
illusionary, thus the state of Magrathea through doctrine of territorial nexus is justified and
Ms. Ranjan was rightly taxed as there was sufficient nexus between the state of Magrathea
and the person sought to be taxed.
D.1.2.2 THE LIABILITY SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED IS PERTINENT TO THAT

CONNECTION
The liability imposed must be pertinent to that connection85. To invoke the doctrine of
territorial nexus the liability imposed must be apposite to the connection being established.
This means that state can impose a tax on extra-territorial grounds if there is a real connection
and such a tax imposed is material to that connection.
In the present case, the tax imposed on all advocates who appeared before any court in
Magrathea,86 the relation is real and liability on advocates is imposed is pertinent to this
relation.
D.1.3 MPTA IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 246
The state legislature has exclusive power to legislate with respect to matters in List II.87 The
state legislature has exclusive power to make laws for such state or any part thereof with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the seventh schedule.88The entries in the
82
Id.
83
84
85
State of Bombay v. R.M.D Chamarbaugwalla,A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 699.
86
87
Subrammiyam v. Muttuswami, A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 47.
88
Vyalikaval Const. Schedule VII.
14
lists of the seventh schedule are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of
legislative competence of the union and state legislature.89
In the present case, the government of Magrathea enjoys full legislative competency and the
enactment of the MPTA is within its authority as provided under list II of the seventh
schedule by entry 60.90
D.1.3.1 ACT IS NOT A COLOURABLE LEGISLATION
The doctrine of colourable legislation is based on the principle that no legislation can violate
Constitutional prohibitions by employing an impermissible method.91For invoking the
doctrine of ‗colourable legislation‘ the legislature must have transgressed the limits of
Constitutional power, patently, manifestly and directly.92 It is only when a legislature which
has no power to legislate or the legislation is camouflaged in such a way as to appear to be
within its competence when it knows it is not, then alone it can be said that the legislation so
enacted is a colourable legislation and that there is no legislative competence.93
It has been clearly indicatedthat there exists a distinction between tax on income and tax on
profession.94 A tax which is charged on the basis of a persons earning is income tax and is
irrespective of his profession. A professional tax is charged on a persons capacity of
practicing a profession. The same could be a fixed sum or a graduated amount depending
upon the income.95
In the present case, the state legislature enjoys the full legislative power to enact MPTA as
provided under list II of the seventh schedule by entry 60.96Further, the objectives of the act
are completely clear as it levies a tax on profession and not on income thus, the act does not
seek to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, and is therefore not a colourable legislation.
89
M\s. R.S. Rekhchand v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 6 S.C.C. 12.
90
91
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 8TH EDITION REPRINT 2012, PAGE 8683.
92
State of Kerala v.People‘s Union for Civil Liberties (2009) 8 S.C.C. 46.
93
Assistant Director of Inspection Investigation v. A.B Shanhti, (2002) 6 S.C.C. 259.
94
District Board, Farukkabad v. PragDutt, AIR 1948 All. 382.
95
Id.
96
15
D.1.4 MPTA IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 276
No law of the legislature of a state pertaining to taxes which is for the benefit of the state or
of a municipality, district board, local board or other local authority therein and which is in
respect to professions, trades, callings or employments shall not be invalid on the ground that
it relates to a tax on income.97
A tax on profession is irrespective of the question of income as it is imposed if a person

carries out a profession98act does not cease to be a profession tax even though the employee
is already paying income tax99, or the taxable income is computed according to the provisions
of Income Tax Act 100 as tax on profession is irrespective of income.101
In the present case, the tax levied on all professionals under MPTA with the amount payable
being levied to be determined by the income of the person practicing the profession. Even if
the tax on the profession is determined by the income102 it does not make it a tax on income
as a tax on the profession is imposed if a person carries out a profession. In a tax on income,
the income is the subject of taxation, in a tax on profession, the income is only a measure of
taxation. Hence, the state of Magrathea possesses such power to enact such an act and hence,
MPTA is not unconstitutional.
D.2 THE ACT IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The counsel on behalf of the state of Magrathea contends that the state governmental action
of passing MPTA for the state of Magrathea is not in violation of fundamental rights of
people of the state of Magrathea. It is contended so for the reason that such governmental
action is not in violation of Article 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of Vyalikaval.
D.2.1 GOVERNMENTAL ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14 OF THE

CONSTITUTION
The MPTA does not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. To declare an act ultra vires under
Art. 14, the court must be satisfied in respect of substantive unreasonableness in the
97
98
All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India, (2007) 7 S.C.C. 527.
99
Kamla Prasad v. Executive Officer, A.I.R. 1974 S.C.C. 440.
100
Ram Bachan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1404.
101
SushilChander v. State(1969) A.I.R. All. 317, F.B.
102
16
statute.103 Whenever there is arbitrariness in state action, whether it is the legislature or the
executive, Art. 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such state action.104 This
act is good in the eyes of law on the basis of the following grounds: 1) that the MPTA is not
arbitrary. 2)that it has made a reasonable classification.
D.2.1.1. MPTA IS NOT ARBITRARY
The expression ‗arbitrarily‘ means in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously

or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in nature of things, non-
rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on will alone.105
The MPTA is not arbitrary in nature and is not irrational, the act levies a professional tax on
all professionals106 and that state legislature has the power to levy a tax on professionals by
the virtue of Article 276.107 The state has not done anything in an unreasonable manner
because it has levied taxes on professionals to overcome fiscal crunch the state action is
reasonable and justified as the levying of taxes is for the benefit of the public.
D.2.1.2 THE CLASSIFICATION IS REASONABLE.
The Hon‘ble Supreme Court of India108 has held that differential treatment varies from statute
to statute, fact to fact, situation to situation and subject matter to subject matter. A
classification is reasonable when it is not on arbitrary selection109 but rests on ‗differences
pertinent to the subject in respect of which the classification is made.‘110 Further, the object
of the classification is lawful.111 Further, The Supreme Court112has held that as long as the
classification is not ‗palpable arbitrary‘, no action can lie against the act.
103
Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation Board and Ors., A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 2276.
104
Ajay Hasia&Ors.v. Khalid MujibSehravardi&Ors., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 487.
105
Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 322.
106
107
Vyalikaval Const. 276.
108
Chattisgarh Rural Agriculture Extension Officers Assn. v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 2020.
109
Gulf Ry. v. Ellis, (1897) 163 U.S. 150.
110
Missouri Ry. v. Humes, (1885) 115 U.S. 512.
111
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,9TH EDN.,VOL. 2, p.2133.
112
Venkateswarer v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1947; DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 9TH EDN., VOL. 2, p.2127.
17
In the present case, MPTA has levied a professional tax on all professionals. But the rate of
tax imposed on the different profession is different113 per se because the income generated by
each profession is different. If the rate of tax will not be different, the same will lead to social
inequality.
D.2.1.3. DOCTRINE OF PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY APPLIES
There is always a presumption in favour of the Constitutionality of the enactment and the
burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the
Constitutional provisions.114 It must be presumed that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made
manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.115
It is most humbly submitted that, in the present case the classification that was proposed was
based on reasonable grounds and that the objective of the legislature while propounding the
classification was based on adequate grounds. The legislature appreciated the need and wants
of the citizens while formulating the classification.
D.2.2 GOVERNMENTAL ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 19
In the matter of taxation, the court must defer to the legislative judgment and policy.116 A tax
117
imposed without authority violates the fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g). No tax
118
should be imposed or levied without authority of law. The legislature should be competent
119
to levy such a tax. The enactment of the law must be valid which means, it must be enacted
by a proper body which has the legislative competence to enact such a law.120
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon‘ble court that in the present case, the state
legislature is competent to levy a tax on the profession by the virtue of Article 245,246 and
113
114
ChiranjitLalChoudhari v. Union of India, 1951 A.I.R 41.
115
Id.
116
Hoechst v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 S.C.C. 45.
117
Kailash Nath v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 790.
118
119
Balaji v. I.T.O, 1962 S.C.R. (2) 983.
120
Gulam v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1185.
18
276 of the Constitution. MPTA is enacted by a proper body which has the legislative power
to enact it.
D.2.2.1 TAX NOT INVALID IF IT CAUSES HARDSHIP TO FEW INDIVIDUALS
The mere fact that the implementation of the policy of the tax would cause hardship to a few
individuals or tend towards the diminution of the earnings or profits of the person of
incidence, would not, without more, constitute a violation of Art 19(1)(g).121 If the evident
intent and the general operation of the tax legislation is to adjust the burden with a fair and
reasonable degree of equality, the Constitutional requirement is satisfied.122
In the present case, if such a tax levied on all professions but has caused distress only on
advocates, thus, not rendering the act unconstitutional as it does not violate 19(1)(g).
D.3 THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 21.
Access to justice is a facet of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.123
The citizen‘s inability to access courts or any other adjudicatory mechanism provided a
determination of rights and obligations is bound to result in denial of the guarantee contained
in Article 14 and 21 of theConstitution.124
In the present case, there has been no violation of Article 21 as the tax imposed on advocates
is not prohibiting the exercise of the fundamental right to legal counsel and access to justice.
There has been no denial of legal counsel to the citizens of Vyalikaval as mere imposing of
taxes on the advocates125 will not affect the citizens to their right to legal counsel. Also, their
right to justice is not being violated as the mechanism to seek justice still stands there upright
for the citizens and is in no way discriminatory or violating the right to life as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution.
121
Fed.of Hotels v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.C. 634.
122
Nazeria Moto Servicer v. State of A.P, (1969) 2 S.C.C. 576.
123
Anita Kushwaha v. Pushp Sudan, (2016) 8 S.C.C. 509.
124
Id.
125
19
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the lights of facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments
advanced, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon‘ble Court to adjudge and
declare –
 That the Special Leave Petition is maintainable.

 That the Tadri formula is unconstitutional and against the basic structure of the
Constitution of Vyalikaval.
 That the Discretionary Grants should be granted to the State of Magrathea.
 That the Magrathea Professional Tax Act, 2022 is constitutional and is not in violation
of any fundamental right.
And pass any other order as it deems fit in the interest of equity, justice and good conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
All of which is respectfully submitted
Counsel for the Petitioners
xii
MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONER

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TEAM CODE - 1810

12TH NALSAR B.R.SAWHNY MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2018

THE HONORABLE SUPREME OF VYALIKAVAL

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. *** OF 2018

THE STATE OF MAGRATHEA V. VYALIKAVAL GOVERNMENT

THE STATE OF MAGRATHEA V. MR. ZAAKIBHASSAIN&

ON THE SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF VYALIKAVAL

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................................ii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................... vi

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................ x

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................... xiii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................... 1

A. THE COMPLAINT INSTITUTED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF VYALIKAVAL

A.1. THAT THERE EXIST EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. ............................... 1

A.2. THAT GRAVE INJUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE. .................................................... 2

A.3. THAT THE MATTER INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW. ... 2

A.3.1. THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW IS A MATTER OF

A.4. THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS WIDE DISCRETIONARY POWERS

A.4.1. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES ARE NO BAR (ARGUENDO). ........................ 4

B. THAT THE TADRI FORMULA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL .................................... 5

B.2. THE FORMULA IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 .......................................... 6

B.3. THAT THERE HAS BEEN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 ................................... 6

B.3.1. FORMULA IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 BECAUSE OF

B.3.2. FORMULA WAS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 BECAUSE OF

C. THE SUPREME COURT CAN AND SHOULD DIRECT THE VYALIKAVAL

C.2. THE DISCRETION EXERCISED IN THE PRESENT CASE IS ARBITRARY

D. MPTA IS INTRA VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION OF VYALIKAVAL .................. 12

D.1. STATE OF MAGRATHEA HAS LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE TO ENACT

D.1.1. STATE HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION TO LEGISLATE ................. 12

D.1.2. DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS APPLIES ...................................... 13

D.1.2.1 THERE IS A REAL TERRITORIAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE PERSON

D.1.2.2 THE LIABILITY SOUGHT TO BE IMPOSED IS PERTINENT TO

D.1.3 MPTA IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 246 ...................................... 14

D.1.3.1 ACT IS NOT A COLOURABLE LEGISLATION .................................... 15

D.1.4 MPTA IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 276 ...................................... 16

D.2 THE ACT IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF ANY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ........... 16

D.2.1 GOVERNMENTAL ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14 OF THE

D.2.1.1. MPTA IS NOT ARBITRARY ................................................................... 17

D.2.1.2 THE CLASSIFICATION IS REASONABLE. .......................................... 17

D.2.1.3. DOCTRINE OF PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY APPLIES

D.2.2 GOVERNMENTAL ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 19 ............ 18

D.2.2.1 TAX NOT INVALID IF IT CAUSES HARDSHIP TO FEW

ABBREVIATION ACTUAL TERM

AIR All India Reporter

All ER All England Law Reports (United Kingdom)

Cr.L.J Criminal Law Journal

MPTA Magrathea Professional Tax Act

SCALE Supreme Court Almanac

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCJ Supreme Court Journal

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

SCW Supreme Court Weekly

UOI Union of India

VYR Vyalikaval Rupee

A.P. Agarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2000) 1 S.C.C. 600 .................................................. 8

Gulf Ry. v. Ellis, (1897) 163 US 150. ...................................................................................... 27

The Democratic Republic of Vyalikaval :

The 14th Finance Commission

Changes by the Commission

Recommendations of the Commission