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The Issue of Globalization through the Theory of Imperialism and the Periodization
of Modes of Production
Spyros Sakellaropoulos
Crit Sociol 2009 35: 57
DOI: 10.1177/0896920508098657

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Critical Sociology 35(1) 57-78

http://crs.sagepub.com

The Issue of Globalization through the Theory of

Imperialism and the Periodization of Modes of Production

Spyros Sakellaropoulos
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece

Abstract
The aim of this article is to illustrate why the notions of mode of production and of social formation
are still necessary for understanding the transformations taking place in the modern phase of imperi-
alism. The basic object is to demonstrate the enduring significance of the Leninist theory of imperi-
alism as a method used to analyse the current era of the capitalist development. What we have been
witnessing over the last years is not the emergence of a new mode of production or the transition to
a new stage of capitalism, so-called globalization, but merely imperialism in its modern phase.

Keywords
globalization, imperialism, Marxism, modes of production, nation state

Introductory and Methodological Remarks

The question of the concept, not to mention the existence or non-existence, of global-
ization has perhaps been the most widely discussed subject in recent years in the social
sciences. Adoption of this term from the end of the 1980s brought into existence a the-
oretical current, the so-called globalists, who considered that entry into globalization
marks the transition to a new, qualitatively different, phase of human history.
Globalization is a transformational trend towards a more unified world, where an event
in one area affects developments in other areas (Giddens, 1990). This entails a time-space
compression – in essence a change in the notion of the relationship between space and
locality, signifying a shrinking form of the world (Harvey, 1990).
There is an extensive, rapid and unprecedented flow of capital, assets and merchandise
around the globe, its origins traceable to the liberation of markets and opening of frontiers
(Dichen, 1998). The consequences of this are, on one hand, a new global division of labor,
on the other hand, erosion of state sovereignty, the rise of the supranational organizations
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58 Critical Sociology 35(1)

and the emergence of a multilayered global governance. Given that national governments
are embedded in this system of global governance, their roles are radically limited by the
imperatives of economic globalization (Rosenau, 1997; Sassen, 1996). The open markets,
with corresponding ability of capital to move freely across the globe, have obliged govern-
ments to adopt similar neo-liberal policies to attract foreign investors (Hoogvelt, 1997;
Shaw, 1997). The intensification of global competition induced national governments to
reject programmes of social protection and the institutions of the welfare state for fear of
jeopardizing the competitiveness of their national economies.
Ideology and civilization, from this standpoint, have lost their national character to
the advantage of a more global and common world-wide way of thinking and behaving.
What has come to predominate is a cosmopolitan global culture transcending fixed
national identities. The circulation of cultural goods across the globe creates the basis for
a transnational civil society (Held and McGrew, 2000).
A number of important objections have been raised to all of these arguments by
another theoretical current, the so-called sceptics. They claim that there is nothing either
global (Hirst, 1997) or unprecedented (Hirst and Thompson, 1999) about globalization.
The world economy has entered an internationalized phase in the course of which the
states of the Triad (US, EU, Japan) undergo more economic and social changes than in
the near past but fewer than in the pre-World War I era (Ruigrok and Van Tulder, 1995;
Weiss, 1998). The main characteristic of that era was internationalization of the economy,
making the first wave of globalization in many respects more important than its modern
counterpart. The so-called ‘multinationals’ are in fact nothing more than national corpo-
rations operating internationally (Hu, 1992). Even in the financial sector the degree of
economic integration is quite limited (Zevin, 1992). Last but not least, immigration rates
were higher during the 19th century than in our day (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999).
The role of nation states remains very significant given that it is still the case that most
nation states themselves choose which kinds of policies are appropriate for their own
areas of jurisdiction. The fact that states are legitimized by their people constitutes an
important factor in the international settlement. Far from adopting a common global
policy, each state, with its own specific national political traditions, shapes in its own way
the form and the content of the state’s sovereignty.
As far as ‘global’ culture is concerned it does not seem that any important changes are
really taking place. The national mass media and their associated institutions still play a cen-
tral role in formation of national identity. Education retains its nation-centred content and
the media assign importance to local news and local events (Thompson, 1995). Moreover,
as globalism sceptics single-mindedly stress, there is no global culture or global history. Nor
is there a common set of memories that can give rise to a global way of thinking.
Even though my position has much in common with the views of the sceptics, I find
it impossible to overlook the fact that there are a number of methodological weaknesses
that necessitate a different view of the data. What are these theoretical weaknesses? The
most fundamental of them is that everything is approached in a descriptive manner, in keep-
ing with the conception of the neutrality of social development. What is present is economic
development, the activity of states, technological progress, changes in culture, etc. What is

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 59

absent is the concept of conflicting social interests, an approach to the state that sees it
as a terrain for the exercise of a specific class of politics, and culture a construction com-
prised of elements of the dominant ideology. In essence, these are views which do not
penetrate the content of developments but remain at the level of their external form.
Thus these views remain at a low level of abstraction and are limited to two areas. The
first has to do with historical sources and exposition of the statistical data. This approach
examines which data appear more credible and how world trade or foreign investments
can be calculated. The second relates to the methodological approach to the changes
presently under way in the most significant areas of human life. Can we speak of a com-
pression of space and time as a result of the new technologies, especially the use of com-
puters, or must we consider, from the point of view of social diffusion, the invention of
the telegraph as starting point for the modern era, given that the telegraph is the basis for
production of the telephone, the telephone for the radio, the radio for the television, the
television for the internet, etc?
What conceivable alternative viewpoint might there be? It is to be expected that there
would be a different approach from the Marxist current in which the concept of global-
ization would be questioned not through lack of empirical data but because its adoption
marks a suppression of questions such as the historical development of the relations of
exploitation within the capitalist system and the specific role of imperialism as a theoret-
ical and historical parameter in the interpretation of developments. Unfortunately, what
seems to prevail is a confusion in relation to the question. One group of theorists, includ-
ing, most notably, W. Robinson and his collaborators (Burbach and Robinson, 1999;
Robinson, 2001; Robinson and Harris, 2003), considers that globalization is a reality and
that because of it a transnational bourgeois has been brought into existence. However,
most Marxists insist on the conceptual and analytical importance of the term ‘imperial-
ism’ (Harvey, 2003; Panitch and Gindin, 2004; Went, 2002/3; Wood, 2003) and many
of them have rejected the majority of the arguments put forward by globalists: the
allegedly unprecedented nature of the phenomenon, the integration of national
economies into a single world economy, global culture, the failure of state power (Petras,
1999; Ruccio, 2003). The main problem with all these positions is their acceptance, or
rather non-rejection, of the term ‘globalization’. According to these Marxists, both impe-
rialism and globalization are legitimate and viable concepts. Globalization may perhaps
be a new form of imperialism. Or an inherent element in imperialism. Or something par-
allel to imperialism. None contests the usefulness of the term. They adopt the concept of
globalization but at the same time acknowledge the continuing importance of nation
states and recognize imperialism in its present-day form.
It is undoubtedly a hopeful sign that over the last years the critique of imperialism
has made a theoretical comeback and is not merely considered outdated. But a genuine
renewal of the critique of imperialism requires theoretical negation of the very notion
of globalization. My claim, and this is addressed to all who make assertions on ‘global-
ization’, is that such views overlook the crucial question of how the phenomena ascribed
to globalization can be explained, and theorized. Scientific explanation entails emer-
gence of a theoretical structure (or articulation of concepts) capable of specifying what

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60 Critical Sociology 35(1)

it is that deems such phenomena (or empirical data) necessary. In fact ‘globalization’ has
yet to qualify as a theoretical concept: a fully developed theory of a global social system
at work. Until such time, we are quite entitled from a theoretical viewpoint to treat
‘globalization’ as an ideological notion, denoting a reality substantially at odds with its
literal meaning. If neither global capital (nor a global power block) nor a global prole-
tariat exist, then no globalization exists either, in the strictest sense of a uniform global
system of social relations.
At this point, of course, a question might be raised as to the significance such a
discussion might have above and beyond the plane of pure theory. My position is that
in fact it has the most explicit of implications for political strategies and corresponding
planning. If we accept the concept of globalization we must reassess a great deal of
what has been viewed as established fact and it is interesting that this particular group
of Marxists, with Robinson at their head, who accept the concept of globalization, have
been led along that road. From the moment that there is transnational capital there is
a transnational bourgeoisie and a corresponding transnational working class. Capitalist
planning thus takes place at the transnational level and the corresponding anti-capital-
ist struggles must similarly be enacted at the transnational level. It is thus a structurally
determined reality that the USA now finds itself in a phase of decline as its position is
gradually being taken by the power of transnational capital, and first and foremost
finance capital. From this perspective, viewpoints like those of Petras or Harvey, who
consider that the rise of finance capital is an indication of the weakness of the USA,
converge with elements of the rhetoric of globalization, given that it remains unclear
as to which other state emerges as the beneficiary from this process. My position is that
the capitalist mode of production is reproduced within national social formations,
which are interlinked as unequal partners in the imperialist chain. Many aspects of
social reality are internationalized but this internationalization bears the stamp of class
because it takes place under the hegemony of the most powerful national imperialistic
formations and the corresponding national bourgeoisies, with the American bour-
geoisie in the leading position. Any other approach accepting the existence of global-
ization leads us to analytical schemata approximating the concept of ultra-imperialism
as espoused by Kautsky (1914).
One prerequisite, for all the above to become comprehensible, is that there should
be an extensive representation of the terms mode of production, social formation, capi-
talist mode of production. From that point onward, the guiding principle should be the
development of the capitalist system, with insistence on the pertinence of imperialism
and exposure of the theoretical weakness of the globalization concept. My position is
that the social framework since Lenin’s era has not changed insofar as its fundamental
elements are concerned. This is not to say that no changes have occurred at all.
Capitalism today is not the same as it was in the industrial revolution. Some remark-
able mutations have occurred over the last century so that it is possible to speak of two
phases in the imperialistic/monopolistic stage. The first phase of imperialism (enlarged
reproduction) lasted from the end of the 19th century until the oil crisis of 1973. The

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 61

second phase, dating from 1973, immediately following the oil crisis, can be defined
as the attempted exit from that crisis. All the new phenomena (capitalist restructuring,
postfordism, reinforcement of financial capital, creation of new intergovernmental
organizations, etc.), occurred in this phase; but in any case the new phase does not con-
stitute a brief bout of globalization but a sub-period of imperialism. Thus, what we
have been witnessing over the last years is not the emergence of a new mode of pro-
duction or the transition to a new stage of capitalism, but merely imperialism in its
modern phase.

Mode of Production and Social Formation: The Case of the

Capitalist Mode of Production
The Mode of Production
In our effort to comprehend these developments, perhaps our first task is to establish a
definition of the mode of production. Our thesis is that the mode of production
emerges from a combination of productive forces and productive relations, along with
the mechanisms and laws of motion that derive from these productive forces and rela-
tions (Balibar, 1970). More precisely, the mode of production (MP) comprises a specific
nuclear structure of social relations characterized by the function of ‘internal’ laws of
motion of the dominant social contradiction, in the case of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction the conflict of capital and labour (Milios, 1988: 101). This is immutable. It
cannot be changed because if it were, it would have to be described as a different mode
of production. What can be transformed as a result of class struggle is the structure of
social power within a specific social formation (SF), in other words, the external deter-
minations of the laws of motion shaping the dominant social contradiction (Milios,
1988: 107). At the level of a social formation, the mode of production can be divided
into stages, which are in turn similarly divisible into equivalent phases. The notion of
‘stage’ implies more structural forms and a higher level of abstraction. ‘Phase’ denotes
forms and features within stages and consequently a lower level of abstraction. There are
also transitional conjunctures between stages and between phases (Poulantzas, 1979a:
21–3). Every MP forms a spherical structure, constituted by three peripheral structures:
the economic, the judicial-political and the ideological. Within every MP there is one
structure which is dominant over the others. What this structure will be at any given
time is ultimately determined by the economic structure (Harnacker, 1974: 136–40).
Moving at such a high level of abstraction, the notion of mode of production cannot
be transformed in any precise way, constituting as it does a structure functioning with-
out impediments or distortions. What exists in reality is the formation of a mode of pro-
duction, with the ‘tough’ structure of the ideotypical mode (the ‘internal’ rules of
functioning) and the special characteristics (‘external’ rules of functioning) brought about
by the class struggle within a specific social formation.

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62 Critical Sociology 35(1)

The Social Formation (SF)

A SF corresponds to a specific and geographically defined social entity. It consists of:

a) an economic structure in which different systems of production coexist, more

correctly modes and forms of production, like the simple commodity production
which does not belong to any specific MP; the more powerful among these dominate
the others and define the general framework of economic functioning;
b) an ideological structure within which are reflected the ideological perceptions corresponding
with the different economic systems that exist in the economic infrastructure; and
c) a judicial-political structure, which is formed in order to safeguard the interests of
the dominant system of production and assure its reproduction.
In any case, what should become clear is that within a given SF the dominant MP
presents options (its so-called ‘external’ characteristics) which differ from its abstract ideal
type. This occurs for two reasons: firstly because the class struggle has introduced coun-
tertrends and thus modified some secondary aspects of a mode of production (for exam-
ple, the duration of the working day differs from formation to formation). Secondly,
because what exists in reality is the articulation of different modes of production, result-
ing in overpowering the dynamics of reproduction of the dominant MP, but only in
combination with preservation of the unity of the SF (Lipietz, 1977: 20–21).

The Capitalist Mode of Production (CMP)

The CMP is distinguished by a series of elements which, as a whole and in co-articulation,
make it different from all former modes of production.
The economic structure is characterized by:

a) appropriation of means of production from direct producers;

b) inability of producers themselves to secure control of the means of production
(sanctity of private property); and
c) realization of relations of distribution on the basis of products’ exchange value,
expressed through money.
Relations of exploitation thus take the form of the wage relationship, with the process
of production embodied primarily in private units of production in which a social and
technical division of labor applies. The surplus-product is extracted from workers in the
form of surplus value while exchange relations are subordinated to the law of value, as is
the workforce. Finally, private production is transformed into a social process through
exchange of commodities (Michailides, 1986: 56–7).
Co-ideologically we have the specific formation of the bourgeois state, comprising at
the institutional level a material crystallization of the contradiction between capital and

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 63

labor. The fact of direct producers’ total deprivation of means of production enables dis-
tinctive separation of the state from the economic sphere and ability to dispense with
non-economic methods for extraction of surplus value. But irrespective of this, the state
plays an intensively active role by exercising a series of functions:

1) political functions, guaranteeing the dominance and hegemony of the bourgeois class;
2) economic functions, ensuring and often itself undertaking a whole spectrum of tasks
prerequisite for maintaining continuity of production; and
3) ideological functions, by means of the ideological state apparatus (ISA), see
Althusser (1976), which codifies and disseminates the dominant ideology.
Another point that it is also important to make clear in relation to the capitalist state, in
conjunction with all the rhetoric about globalization, is that capital as such, as a blind ten-
dency towards unfettered accumulation, knows no borders. Capitalist social relations, on
the other hand, require borders. They cannot be reproduced without the nation state,
which is not an ‘essential’ political form but the outcome of the historical process that cul-
minated in its emergence. The development of capitalism is an uneven process, subject to
various determinations and the different forms and rhythms of the class struggle. This gen-
erates a fragmentation into different loci of reproduction of capitalist relations, into differ-
ent national territories. To put it differently, it is important to understand the specific
character of geographic space in reproduction of the capital relation, something which will
subsequently help us to understand the importance of the manner of constitution and the
functioning of the imperialist chain. Space is nothing more than the site of social (class)
practices and is characterized first and foremost by its national dimension (Milios, 1985:
63–4). Thus the site of functioning of the capitalist mode of production is the national for-
mation, whose borders and cohesion/homogenization is underwritten by the state. The
state is the institution which, with a view to serving the long-term interests of bourgeois
power, elaborates strategies for political management of the labour force, intervenes in the
process of securing the profits of national capital and promotes its expansion into interna-
tional space. This results in fragmentation of the territory of the world into separate regions
of capitalist domination and reproduction of the social relations of capital (Milios, 1988).

On the Subject of Social Classes in the Capitalist Mode of Production

What we have said about the key role of the state in the reproduction of capitalist rela-
tions of domination and exploitation also helps us to understand why there is not, and
why there cannot be, either a global bourgeoisie or a global proletariat, given the incon-
ceivability of constituting social classes outside the framework of a specific national social
formation (Palaios, 1987: 107). As Althusser has shown (Althusser, 1979: 30) social
classes may be created only through class struggle and class struggle in the capitalist mode
of production is conducted within national formations. Consequently the bourgeoisie
and the working class are generated and evolve precisely because of the existence of the

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64 Critical Sociology 35(1)

opposite social pole. This means that exploitation of the working class by the bourgeoisie
leads to reproduction of the capitalist system. There could not be a bourgeoisie if there
were not a corresponding proletariat. The specific conditions of exploitation existing
within each national formation also bring about reproduction of the polarities between
classes. There are no classes outside national formations. Even in instances where
bourgeoisies develop international activities, their ability to do this is a product of their
exploitation of the working class in their own country.
In the light of these conclusions, what happens in reality is that each national bourgeoisie
has first and foremost to contend with its own national working class so as to be able to
secure a larger share of the surplus value and secondarily to manage to compete as an equal
with the other national bourgeoisies in the international arena. From the moment it suc-
ceeds in penetrating other social formations also, it takes on the characteristics of a national
bourgeoisie of the national formation in question. There is thus no global bourgeois class
comprising capitalists with common global interests. The basic elements with every capi-
talist are the rate of profit he extracts from his workers, the level reached by the collective
worker and the average rate of profit that prevails in the specific national economy. There
is similarly no global proletariat with common global interests. The members of the work-
ing class live under different conditions of exploitation from one formation to another.

Sketch of Periodization of Social Formations Pertaining to the CMP

The Liberal Stage
The predominance of the CMP over pre-capitalist modes of production reaches a climax
in the liberal stage. The basic characteristics of this stage are the extension of the CMP,
the freeing of trade, the creation of the bourgeois state and the elaboration of bourgeois
ideology. At the economic level, the first manifestations of real subordination of labor
appear, while at the same time the production process is undergoing gradual automation.
At the political level, the creation of the bourgeois state will be accompanied by the emer-
gence of significant labor struggles (historically, this occurred firstly with the Chartists and
later with the revolutions of 1848) that will result in the broadening of the franchise.
Finally, at the ideological level, the consolidation of bourgeois ideology is effected
through the creation of two basic ideological subsets:

a) the notion of the individual citizen, and

b) the formation of a national ideology through the unification of populations with
different ethnic traits and through the creation of a national history.

The Monopolistic Stage

The consummation of the transition from the liberal to the monopolistic stage brought
with it a new series of common traits, which govern the functioning of the CMP within
the developed SFs.

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 65

To be precise, real subordination of labour to capital is generalized, with relative sur-

plus value established as dominant, as a way of exploitation of labour. The advent of cer-
tain important technological developments may be attributed to generalized use of
electricity as a form of energy, expanded employment of the internal combustion engine
and growth of the chemical industry. The result is a collective tendency towards automa-
tion of the production process, and all that this entails: a rise in productivity and fall in
prices and consequently in the cost of reproduction of the workforce along with aug-
mentation of the profitability of capital. At the same time, the phenomena of concen-
tration (with the creation of conglomerates) and centralization (incorporation of smaller
units into larger, fusion of industrial and banking capital) are intensified. At the supra-
national level, there is a continuation of the process of internationalization of investment,
commodities and money capital. These are developments which serve to reproduce com-
petition between capitals (both individual and ‘national’) and consequently intra-
imperialistic conflicts. Finally, the function of the ISA is generalized, the nuclear family
is reconstituted, managerial classes develop and a new petit-bourgeois class flourishes.
The monopolistic stage has also been called by Lenin (1982: 89) the imperialistic
stage. The use of this term is not accidental. The term imperialism was coined because of
capitalism’s development to the monopolistic stage. The emergence of certain quantita-
tive and qualitative prerequisites facilitated constitution of the substructure upon which
the superstructure of imperialism was to be erected. These characteristics were:

a) the centralization of infrastructure and capital to such a degree as to engender

monopolies;
b) fusion of industrial and bank capital and formation of financial capital;
c) increase in export capitals;
d) creation of multinationals; and
e) completion of the division of the world among the most powerful capitalist states.

What is interesting in Lenin’s definition is that it does not confine itself to an

economy-centerd approach to the phenomenon but also underlines the importance of
the specific political and military power that makes possible the division of the world
among the most developed states.
It becomes much easier in this light to understand the wording of the thesis con-
cerning the formation of the imperialistic chain. The increasing internationalization
to be noted between the years 1870 and 1914 through the export of capital, invest-
ments and commodities, and the creation of multinational companies was to con-
tribute to the multileveled complexity of the different social formations and to the
shaping of the imperialistic chain. The term ‘multileveled’ is used for purposes of
making it clear that we are not talking about a pyramid, with the economically
advanced countries in the highest positions and the economically backward ones in
the lowest. In reality, the chain serves a twofold function involving both its hierarchy
and the incorporation of formations within it. The transition to the monopolistic
stage in a series of specific social formations opens up opportunities for economic and

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66 Critical Sociology 35(1)

geographic expansion of capital. Of course, important divergences exist between

developed social formations, as of course they do between the different components
of the international state system as a whole. Their incorporation into the imperialis-
tic chain did not come as a result of some immanent transformation at the interna-
tional level, but in consequence of the pressures of one state on another. These
pressures were economic, reflecting differences in productivity related to differences
in the level of evolution of each state. They were also geopolitical and military, reflect-
ing the disproportionate power of some states. The association of these states by virtue
of the above mentioned procedures (another current term might be ‘unilateral inter-
dependence’) resulted in the formation of the imperialistic chain, in which all capi-
talist states participate: their level of development is not predicated on their
participation but on the position they occupy within the chain. A state may thus not
yet have made the transition to the monopolistic stage and nevertheless participate in
the imperialist chain, at a lower level than other formations that are already in the
monopolistic stage. On the other hand, for a country (or a social formation) to be
ranked in the imperialistic chain, not only the entirety of its political and military
power but also its level of economic development must be factored in. Which of the
two elements has more weight depends in each case on the evolution of class struggle
at an international level as well as at a local level (Poulantzas, 1979a: 24). In other
words, what appears to be decisive in relations among the states in the chain is uneven
development (Poulantzas, 1979b: 49–50), leading to different, hierarchically unequal,
positions.
The conclusion emerging from all the above is that the forging of the imperialist chain
should not be equated with the entry of national social formations into the imperialist-
monopolist stage. Certainly, the fact that in a number of developed capitalist countries
monopoly capital should acquire ascendancy as the hegemonic fraction of the
bourgeoisie – generating an intense internationalization of capitalist activity – is a sine
qua non for formation of the imperialist chain. But beyond that they are two quite dif-
ferent things. The imperialist chain includes all the national capitalist formations and its
form is affected by intra-imperialist conflicts taking place within it. Inside the national
formations regroupments may occur. The hegemonic position may be occupied succes-
sively by different bourgeois fractions, monopolistic and non-monopolistic, and in cer-
tain cases (as shown by the experience of actually existing socialism) there may be
departures from the imperialist chain on the part of specific national formations.
Up to this point we have been occupied with a general consideration of the terms
of transition to the monopolistic/imperialistic stage as well as with the constitution of
basic presuppositions for its functioning. In the following section I propose to exam-
ine the periodization of this stage into two separate phases, that of the expanded repro-
duction of imperialism, and that of the efforts of exit from the crisis. My aim is to
make clear the differences and the similarities and to shed light on why the debate
about globalization cannot be incorporated into the framework of the debate on cre-
ation of a new stage.

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 67

Phase of Enlarged Reproduction of Imperialism

This concerns a period of time that began when World War I ended and was completed
with the outbreak of the crisis of over-accumulation in 1973. At the level of production,
units of mass production are created, manufacturing commodities that can be stored for
extended periods of time. This procedure is characterized by the hiring of well-paid semi-
qualified workers, the systematization of the process of extraction of experience and skills
from the direct producers, the codification of the latter by scientific and managerial staff,
and the fragmentation of the process of production into simple standardized duties, such
as those that require a low level of experience and specialization and that can be quanti-
fied both in terms of working pace and in terms of the amount of work produced.
At the same time, the verticalization of production creates the necessity to upgrade the
role of the managerial strata, thus increasing the bureaucratization of organizational
forms. All this is carried out against a backdrop of ongoing tendencies of concentration
and centralization of capital and internationalization of the economy at every level
(investments, commodities, and money capital).
The role of the state in the economic sphere is enlarged. It undertakes crucial parts of
the productive and reproductive process, and also of the sphere of circulation through
expanding national enterprises and taking over those which function with low-to-
negative profit rates (to the extent that the continuation of its activities is a prerequisite
for reproduction of basic conditions of capitalistic production).
Besides all the above, this phase entailed the crystallization of a certain hierarchy in
the imperialistic chain through consolidation of American hegemony, which also estab-
lished its clear preponderance both at the level of productivity and at the political and
military level, especially after the American victory in World War II and the establish-
ment of America’s role as leader of opposition to the Eastern bloc in the Cold War.
As far as the political level is concerned, new elements include the consolidation of mass
parties, generalization of the right to vote, formation of the first catch-all parties and a clos-
ing off of relations between parliamentarians and the executive. At the same time, the
expansion of the right to vote undercut popular reaction, normalizing the operations of lib-
eral democracy. Bourgeois political parties now function as mechanisms for co-optation of
popular demands, agents of stabilization of social peace. No danger for the bourgeoisie was
posed by immoderate dispensation of the right to vote. On the one hand, there was dis-
placement of real power from parliament to government, the relative autonomy of parlia-
mentarians disappearing. On the other hand, the hard core of the state (‘repressive state
apparatus’) was at all times in a position to put an end to ‘excessive’ popular demands (char-
acteristic examples being Spain 1936, Guatemala 1954, Greece 1967).
At the ideological level the predominant conceptions were: development, progress,
faith in parliamentary democracy, trust in the institutions of the state, social mobility,
change in social status. All these constituted various forms of investment in the normal
operation of capitalist imperatives. Taken together with activity at the state level they
made a significant contribution to consolidating the power of the bourgeois class.
Another important factor was the mass media, with its fast-growing influence and note-

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68 Critical Sociology 35(1)

worthy capacities, along with family and education, for diffusing the dominant ideology.
Last but not least, the consolidation of the Soviet bloc and its transformation after World
War II into the common enemy of all citizens of ‘the West’ was a prominent factor in
forging consensus with the popular strata.

The Phase of the Effort to Exit from the Crisis and the Importance of
the Policy of Capitalist Restructuring
The outbreak of the crisis in 1973 signaled the transition to a new phase in the monop-
olistic/imperialistic stage, one which remains uncompleted to this day. Its basic element
is the endeavour to create countertrends to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and
to find a solution to the crisis of over-accumulation.
The initial strategy adopted for overcoming the crisis of 1973 involved the application
of counter-cyclical policies, with the state seeking to take over the running of enterprises
with low rates of profit and continue existing policies of redistribution. The second oil
crisis of 1979 was to reveal the limits of this policy. Against a backdrop of declining pop-
ular struggles throughout the 1970s, the capitalistic ruling classes were obliged to read-
just their policies of exit from the crisis. The policy that was to be chosen was what was
called by many ‘neo-liberalism’, ‘Thatcherism’ or ‘Reaganism’. Its basic element was
unconstrained implementation of policies of ‘rationalization’: rejection of capitals
exhibiting low levels of profitability, augmentation of unemployment so that it might
function as a means of holding labour costs down and disciplining the laboring class,
redistribution of incomes in favour of capital, limitation of labour rights, return to pri-
vate capital or closing down of all enterprises the state had taken over.
One problem with this policy was that it did not contribute to the rise of new social
strata which could profit from the changes being implemented, in this way bringing into
existence the necessary social alliances. This would have multiple repercussions, ranging
from the rise of social democratic parties to power, to (on the other hand) a discovery of
the impossibility of activating all latent productive capital, thus impeding the creation of
trends to counter the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and precluding national
economies from finding a route to exit from the crisis. The impasse would also be clearly
illustrated in the rapid increase of unemployment, something that had not occurred on
this scale since the crisis of 1929 (Walker, 2001: 4), and in the precipitate rise in the
exchange rate of the dollar, reducing the competitiveness of goods produced in dollar-
based economies. The result was that in 1982 profits would come to only 57% of the
average for the period 1956–1965 (Duménil and Lévy, 2001: 7).
During the 1980s a new strategy was adopted, within the framework of the same phase
of the monopolistic/imperialistic stage, its aim being to overcome the crisis of over-accumu-
lation through a series of very important transformations not only at the economic but also
at the political and ideological level. It was a strategy for capitalist restructuring, which we
judge will continue until rates of profit return to former levels. Only 65% of the fall from
the levels of profitability prevailing between 1956 and 1965 has so far been covered

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 69

(Duménil and Lévy, 2001: 7), and this despite a fall of 15% in the share of GNP accruing
to wages (alongside a 36% fall in the productivity of capital) (Duménil and Lévy, 1999: 83).
The basic directions of the capitalistic restructuring are:

• adoption of policies of austerity;

• changes in working relations which take the form of total flexibilization of the labour
process;
• alterations in the process of production which are related to (i) changes in the
organization of labour, (ii) changes in the level of education and in the skills of the
collective worker as well as promotion of programmes of continuous retraining, so
that constant technological changes can be monitored, (iii) with the incorporation of
working people into acceptance of the company’s goals, the intensification of
workplace authoritarianism, etc.;
• the worsening of conditions of negotiation on behalf of working people through (i)
the defeat of the trade union movement, on the one hand due to the osmosis that
characterized its relations with social-democracy, on the other due to its focus on
demands for wage increases rather than changes at the level of working relations
(Ioakeimoglou, 1990: 29–30), (ii) the regime of increasing unemployment and (iii)
pressures deriving from the generalization of part time employment.

As far as the political level is concerned, the most important developments have to
do with the transformation of political parties into mere transmission belts for state
power, a phenomenon resulting from the dominance of the dynamics of re-structur-
ing. The results are policies in which the satisfaction of the material interests of the
dominated classes (primarily the urban working classes and agricultural strata but also
corresponding petit-bourgeois layers whose collaboration is not necessitated by the
dynamics of restructuring) plays no role. This impels the parties on the one hand to
homogenization and on the other to an inability to represent satisfactorily the interests
of popular and petit-bourgeois classes. As a result, the image of the party as a collec-
tive with a specific width of vertical and horizontal organization, complementing rela-
tions of representation through trade union structures, is in crisis (Mancini, 1999:
235). In the traditional social-democratic milieu in particular, these developments
manifest themselves with particular intensity: the importance of the party apparatus is
being downgraded, the new governmental cadres are not representatives of regional
and local organizations but mostly cadres of business enterprises (in which a continu-
ous process of osmosis and interweaving is ascertained, in some cases culminating in
accusations of corruption, or violation of terms of competition, and so on). The media
are the chosen channels of diffusion of the party line; the centre of formal political
speech is displaced in an effort, albeit often distorted, to represent popular interests in
peripheral areas such as the quantity and effectiveness of governmental work, trans-
parency in the functioning of institutions, etc. At the same time, there is further dis-
placement of real power not only from the legislature to the executive and from there to

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70 Critical Sociology 35(1)

the administration (Feraghioli, 1985: 41–4; Poulantzas, 1978: 243–53; Poulantzas,

1979b: 187–8;), but also towards a variety of committees, organizations, banks and
councils which function as the most authentic representatives of the powerful monop-
olistic parts of domestic and international capital, precisely because they do not reflect,
even in a distorted way, the presence of popular strata. This is an apparatus hermeti-
cally sealed against the influence of popular classes, elaborating the planning of state
policy as well as the networks by means of which it is interlinked with the correspon-
ding apparatus of the different intergovernmental institutions.
At the same time, and in contrast with current idle talk, there is an observable increase
in government interventionism in the economy, not in the form of withdrawal of direct
investments, but by means of a dual movement involving, on the one hand, creation of
conditions for boosting enterprise profitability (indirect or direct privatization of the
apparatus of labour force reproduction, development of infrastructures, implementation
of state provisioning of a wide range of financial inputs, adoption of policies of austerity
and enactment of flexible working relations), and, on the other hand, more centrally,
increasing concern with regulating currency frameworks, levels of interest rates, money
production, income distribution, etc. (Vergopoulos, 1996: 326–8).
At the ideological level, the first noteworthy change concerns the transition from the
collective identity of the worker, student or member of a political party to an individu-
alized understanding of reality, a phenomenon to which the media greatly contribute,
addressing themselves as they do to the individual consumer. In this way, a comprehen-
sive de-ideologized individualism becomes the norm, ideologies customarily having been
inserted into a collective rubric and the preference now being for ‘non-ideology’ or ‘the
end of ideologies’, notions which themselves in effect offer the advantage of strengthen-
ing fragmentation and isolation as social practices. Also visible as an element in these ten-
dencies is a certain displacement within the dominant ideology in favor of acceptance of
technocracy and competitiveness, moving beyond ideological concomitants such as
development, (Tsoukalas, 1997: 16) potentially conducive to abolition of inequalities,
containing as they do the seeds of social compromise, albeit unilateral.

Changes in Imperialism
Transition to the phase of attempted exit from the crisis is something that can be
observed not only at the level of changes occurring within the social formations involved
in it, but also at that of the changes taking place within the imperialist chain, as well as
in the ways in which developments at both levels are interrelated.
It is indisputable that very important modifications have taken place in the function
of the imperialist chain, especially in the last 10 to 15 years. To understand their size and
importance what has to be kept in mind at all times is the overall historic framework as
shaped by the creation of the USSR. The coming into existence of the Soviet Union and,
some decades later, the Warsaw Pact, was to divide the world into two camps in constant
conflict. Only in light of the changes to the foundations brought about by the fall of the

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 71

Eastern coalition can we understand the transformations that have taken place in the
imperialist chain.
The first point to consider is that of the increasing internationalization of economies.
This has a bearing both on the flow of financial capital and on exports of investments
and goods. Growth in the mass of exchange and investments is to a large extent attrib-
utable to the impact of the over-accumulation crisis and to the need for capital to be
invested where the highest profit levels may be anticipated. At the same time, the impos-
sibility of finding a definitive exit from the crisis will impel some quite important
fractions of capital into the financial sphere, where it is judged that maximum returns are
to be secured.
An important factor behind this tendency to channel capital into the financial sector
is the reality of much more rapid circulation of capital there because of the unrivalled
opportunities opened up by technological progress. However, it should be clarified that
this is not so much a technological as a class issue, in the sense of being a strategy elabo-
rated on the part of the bourgeois class. Apart from the indisputable speculative and prof-
iteering element in it, the mass orientation of capital towards the stock exchanges signals
a burgeoning capitalist and imperialist confidence in relation to capital-importing coun-
tries. Within this framework, direct withdrawal of capital, an instrument increasingly
efficacious because of changing assessments of the dynamics of economies in specific
areas, functions as a mechanism for transference of pressures from one link of the impe-
rialist chain to the next. These are pressures related to a need for improvement in the
terms of reproduction of capitalist relations and also in the rate of profit. In any case, the
prospective of mass withdrawal of capital, even as an unspoken threat, functions as a lever
for enforcing the political priorities of the most powerful imperialist countries.
The second point is a consequence of what was described above and concerns the ten-
dency towards increasing internationalization of state functions, something manifested in
the first instance in endeavors to effect supranational integration but also more generally
in the greater international presence of the state.
As far as the issue of the supranational organizations is concerned, it should be under-
lined that what is at stake is the free movement of capital, commodities and investments
in specified geographical areas through political and institutional agreements between the
states interested. Political coordination of these attempts at integration, for which the
European Union provides the most developed example, represents a certain kind of gam-
ble but it does not seem possible that in the foreseeable future discussions will be able to
focus on the bringing into existence of a uniform state mechanism. It might be more
appropriate to talk about endeavors to take advantage of the dynamic of capitalist accu-
mulation and the necessity of transcending national borders with a view to reversing the
tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
At the same time, the state is a participant in the various bodies that come together
in international symposia, undertaking representation of the special interests of its spe-
cific bourgeois class. Given that there has been a proliferation of such initiatives
in recent years, it is undeniable that a significant proportion of the energies of modern
states are consumed in activities of this kind. Does this justify references to a

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72 Critical Sociology 35(1)

‘transnational state’? Are the changes quantitative or qualitative? Is the question then
how many public officials participate in international negotiations, how many work-
ing hours are funded for that purpose and what percentage of public revenues is
expended on them? Is the state internationalized from the moment they exceed a cer-
tain limit, and, prior to that, not?
Obviously a different approach to the question would yield different answers. As indi-
cated previously, the internationalization of certain types of economic activities which is
currently under way in specific geographical areas has led the most powerful sectors of
the relevant national bourgeois classes to embark on a series of international initiatives.
The state, as the collective capitalist, established to secure the interests of the bourgeois
class, participates in all such bodies precisely to defend these special interests. That is its
role and its mission, deriving from its nature. It is not something which happens inci-
dentally or as a by-product of something else. The state is internationalized because by
so doing it corresponds to the social interests it structurally represents. From the moment
that the domestic bourgeois class judges that the process of internationalization is not in
its interest, the state will cease to be internationalized. There is no predestined route
which the state in the nature of things must traverse, merely a social and historically
defined, but open-ended trajectory.
The third point has to do with the military interventions that have been carried out
over the last decade. It is worth underlining that there is nothing accidental about the
choice of areas. A calculated decision is made in favour of engagement in social for-
mations where instability is observed that is judged potentially painful for the interests
of countries that are in a hegemonic position in the imperialist chain. Imperialist inter-
ventions, of course, do not take place on neutral territory but in areas racked by inter-
nal disputes, which, in turn, are sharpened by the external interventions, making
peaceful solutions much more difficult. In essence, the ‘indigenous’ opposing sides
aim at achieving predominance as rapidly as possible so as to be in a more favorable
position at the moment that the external intervention occurs, something regarded
as certain.
The final point has to do with how at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
regimes of the East, the position of the USA has been strengthened as the hegemonic
leader in the imperialist chain. The improvement in the American economy, the victori-
ous outcome of the conflict with the opposing military bloc, along with the inability of
any other state to confront the USA politically or militarily, testify to the dimensions of
its comparative advantage against any possible challenger. At the same time, for the pur-
poses of further expansion of its influence, American military doctrines will be reshaped,
decisions will be taken in favour of engagement in certain local crises regarded as impor-
tant and, possibly most importantly, there will be a conscious effort to upgrade NATO
as the primary agency of collective security, with simultaneous extension into areas of
Eastern Europe at the expense of other organizations (OSCE, Europol). The outcome of
developments in Bosnia is the touchstone for this viewpoint, where following the failure
of European efforts to organize a settlement, only American intervention was able to
yield such a ‘solution’ in accordance with imperialist interests. Exactly the same sequence

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 73

of developments was then seen in Kosovo, where after a failed attempt to secure the con-
sent of the UN Security Council for a military intervention, NATO was employed to
establish American influence there. The most recent, and worst, case has been that of
Iraq, where, without even the consent of NATO, the USA has nevertheless proceeded to
intervene. The result is the creation of protectorates, dependent states whose only func-
tion is to secure the geopolitical and military interests first and foremost of the USA and
then of the remainder of the NATO countries.

Globalization and Imperialism: Two Incompatible Notions

At the theoretical level what has been said in relation to the concepts of mode of pro-
duction, social formation, constitution of social classes, role of the state in capitalism and
creation of the imperialist chain all helps us to understand why imperialism and global-
ization cannot coexist in a coherent theoretical model. The fact is that if there is neither
global capital (a global capitalist power block) nor a global proletariat, then there is no
globalization in the strict sense of a unified global system of social relations. It is true that
capital as such is governed by a tendency towards endless and unfettered accumulation,
and as such knows of no borders. But this is only capital in its most simple and abstract
form as self-valorized value. The notion of the capitalist mode of production is a much
more complex theoretical abstraction of economic, political and ideological practices, struc-
tures and institutions which make possible the reproduction of capitalist social relations.
The reproduction of capitalist social-productive relations requires the emergence of the cap-
italist mode of production and its reproduction in specific social formations. The nation
state was the concrete political form that proved to be the most effective, in contrast to oth-
ers that were also tried, like the colonial corporation (for example the Dutch East India
Company or the English East India Company), the empire, the colonial empire, the city-
state, the network of commercial cities (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1990: 122).
If we accept this then an alternative periodization would be possible only if we could
point to a specific turning point that marks the possibility of a global social formation, or
at least of a transnational social formation, that is if we could theorize the reproduction of
the capitalist mode of production on a global scale. This should include a theory of the
formation of a transnational power block and the specific forms of transnational class
struggle (including the formation of a possible transnational popular alliance). All other
arguments in favour of ‘globalization’ either in the form of the tendency of capital to
transcend national barriers or in the form of increased communication and cultural
exchange, simply miss the point. And the same goes for any ‘eclectic’ theoretical approach
which attempts to bring together globalization, the continuing importance of nation
states and current forms of imperialism.
At a lower level of abstraction, the question of changes in imperialism also leads us to
a series of conclusions which also diverge from notions concerning globalization. The
breaking away of some states from the imperialist chain was arrested with the crisis of the
Eastern regimes and their return to capitalism. This development represents a signifi-

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74 Critical Sociology 35(1)

cant capitalist victory over an alternative form of social organization, but it does not con-
stitute globalization.
If anything in the relatively recent past deserves to be noted as an important change, it is
the economic strengthening of certain states which are securing significant shares of inter-
national markets. We refer to the cases of the countries of South-East Asia and China with
the turn to the free market it has carried out in recent years. But not even this constitutes
globalization. It may mean upgrading of certain national formations and a probable intensi-
fication of economic antagonisms. It does not, however, mean globalization. In the past there
was the so-called socialist bloc that functioned as a political counterweight to the capitalist
states with the result that there were a minimum of concessions to the popular strata in
Western countries. Conversely, the hyper-exploitation to which the popular classes of the
Asian states are subjected is a mechanism exerting pressure on the working classes of the
advanced capitalist states. This does not, however, constitute globalization because these
pressures are integrated differently within each separate national formation. It is for this rea-
son that there exists neither a specific international rate of profit, nor a specific international
basic wage nor specific international working conditions. In particular, in what concerns
multinational enterprises, what we should note is that they are forced to adapt to the condi-
tions of the national formation in which they are investing.
In reality the whole problematic of globalization brings us back to an older problematic
of Kautsky on ultra-imperialism. Recall that, according to Kautsky (1914), sooner or later
the capitalists in the imperialist states would realize that war brings nothing but destruction.
This realization will lead to a new phase of ultra-imperialism, in the sense of a federation
between the leading capitalist states and the abandonment of the arms race. In other words,
therefore, on the basis of this reasoning, Kautsky excluded the recourse to war as a means of
resolving intra-imperialist differences. The point is not how mistaken Kautsky was in his pre-
dictions, given that the text in question was published just after the outbreak of World War
I. The question is that the whole rhetoric of globalization appears to exclude the possibility
of new wars between the key imperialist states, given that market forces, above and beyond
the states, are leading the globalizing processes. But such possibilities cannot be excluded.
Even if empirically, since the Second World War, there has been no instance of inter-impe-
rialist warfare, the basic element to be retained from the dynamics of the imperialist chain is
antagonism between national formations with the potential to find expression in warfare.
Modern history is filled with examples of conflicts at the periphery and there is always the
possibility of these conflicts being resolved in other ways too. In any case without the con-
cept of antagonism between states, a plethora of facts from the disputes over the function-
ing of the World Trade Organization to today’s differences in approach to the prospect of
military intervention in Iran, remain outside any framework of interpretation.
As far as the USA is concerned, we have explained why it remains the undisputed
hegemonic force in the imperialist chain, notwithstanding anything that might be
asserted about its economic difficulties (e.g. by Arrighi, 2005). Nevertheless, apart from
anything asserted above, it is important to make an additional point. This point relates
to the connection between the USA and the upgrading of the role of finance capital. The
fact that a much larger proportion of capital than in the past is being channelled towards

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 75

the sector of finance is more or less indisputable. But it is not a development spawned by
non-existent globalization. It represents a conscious move by the American bourgeoisie,
and the American state, who both stand to gain from such changes. Specifically, the
biggest banks and the biggest companies in the stock exchange are American, while at the
same time American finance houses predominate in international capital movements, the
management of privatization and the derivatives markets. Deregulation of capital flows
in conjunction with the supremacy of the dollar as the international currency which
enables the USA to continue to borrow large amounts of money every year. The politi-
cal and military power of the USA enables them to ignore the threat of sanctions from
international institutions. The global role of the dollar secures for Americans the ability
to acquire rights from its use, to pay off the (large) public debt of the USA through its
central bank by issuing dollars. It also provides very wide margins for manoeuvre and
considerable autonomy in the planning of domestic monetary policy.
Simultaneously with all this, the USA frequently comes into conflict with other coun-
tries in relation to distribution of profits from financial sector activities. A characteristic
example of this is the Asian crisis of 1997–8, during which the USA made considerable
efforts to curb the role of Japan in solving the crisis when the latter country sought to
finance a way out of the crisis with proposals for creation of a separate fund for the man-
agement of the region’s financial flows, imposing utilization of the dollar for handling the
crisis and promoting a number of measures that would benefit American companies
(Lapavitsas, 2002, 2006: 137).
To conclude, in contrast to the views postulating uncontrolled globalized financial
markets or downgrading of the position of the USA, the fact is that the fall in prof-
itability in the industrial sector brings capital into the financial sphere under the hege-
mony of the American state and the American bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, this
development does not signify the advent of a new type of capital accumulation. On the
contrary, what can be asserted is that the USA instrumentalizes the overall situation so as
to be able to press for imposition of ‘discipline’ on the salaries and social rights of work-
ing people, sacrificing them at the altar of neo-liberalism, deregulation, the rule of the
markets and the free movement of capital (Rude, 2005).
To sum up, what we should retain is that in the period we are now passing through,
the class struggle is being articulated within the national social formation, and through
mediation of the national states also makes its entrance into the imperialist chain. There
continue to be hegemonic imperialist states elaborating long-term strategies for repre-
sentation of imperialist capitalist interests just as there continues to be resistance to these
policies which, for the most part, takes place within the national formations, exerting –
secondarily – its influence within the imperialist chain.

Conclusion
The object of this article was to show why the notions of mode of production and of
social formation are still necessary for understanding the transformations taking place in

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76 Critical Sociology 35(1)

the modern phase of imperialism. The basic aim was to demonstrate the enduring sig-
nificance of the Leninist theory of imperialism as a method to analyse the current era of
capitalist development.
It was demonstrated that the five basic elements of imperialism (formation of monop-
olies, creation of financial capital, increased export of capital assets, formation of multi-
national enterprises, division of the world among the most powerful states) retain their
importance to this day and that the characteristics of modern capitalism are correspond-
ingly derivable from the basic elements of imperialism. Formation of the imperialist
chain does not signify the appearance of a globalized stage. The concept of imperialism
underlines the importance of the law of uneven development between states. Every state
has its own specific economic, political, military and cultural power, through deployment
of which it seeks to realize its objectives. Powerful states have greater opportunities for
imposing their strategies to a greater or lesser extent. This helps us to understand how the
most important element in imperialism is not ‘homogenization’ or ‘globalization’ but the
transfer of pressures from one formation to another. Such processes create a range of
characteristic features in the functioning of the capitalist system which are common to
states at the same level of development. At the beginning of the 20th century, the devel-
oped states (those with high levels of productivity and military power) divided up the
world into their respective spheres of influence. It was this that created the imperialist
chain in which all nations participated independently, each in accordance with its own
particular level of capitalist development. Thus, national formations which had not pro-
gressed to the imperialistic stage were also implicated in the imperialist chain.
Transformations at the international level were contingent on the balance of power
between the participant states.
The creation of the socialist camp at the end of the Second World War signaled the
appearance of two parallel networks of social relations. This transformation created the
impression that the world was divided. After the collapse of real existing socialism, the
appearance of a single and uniform world was recreated. Undoubtedly, from a geographic
viewpoint, there is one world and one planet, but socially, economically, and politically
the reality is that many national capitalisms are unilaterally connected. The most devel-
oped of them have proceeded to the phase of attempted exit from the crisis, applying the
policies of capitalist restructuring. These policies, in conjunction with removal of the
threat of genuinely existing socialism and the downturn in labor struggles, signify a
strengthening of the power of the most influential countries and are accompanied by a
growth in inequalities between the classes in each country as well as between the richest
and the poorest countries of the world.

Acknowledgements
I thank Panagiotis Sotiris and two anonymous reviewers for their useful remarks on
previous drafts of this essay.

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 Sakellaropoulos: The Issue of Globalization 77

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For correspondence: Spyros Sakellaropoulos, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences,
L. Alexandras 60, 11473, Athens, Greece. Email: sgsakell@vivodinet.gr and sgsakell@upatras.gr

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