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Reference Citation Form: Richard L. Lanigan
Reference Citation Form: Richard L. Lanigan
Richard L. Lanigan,
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© 2018, Richard L Lanigan
International Communicology Institute
Washington, DC, USA
Richard L. Lanigan
International Communicology Institute
In the classic Greek conception, axiology is the study of values or decisions dis-
played in behavior (ethics, aesthetics, politics, rhetoric). Whereas, dialogue is the
study of discourse or choices displayed in judgement (dialectic, sophistic, rheto-
ric, maieutic). I examine, in a preliminary way, the dynamics of human com-
municology (decision choices) wherein the method of semiotic phenomenology
accounts for Husserl’s (1929; 1933) maxim that “subjectivity is intersubjectivity”
(155). The primary methodology for this analysis is the chiasm logic of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, identifying middle
voice [G. gērys] as the essence of the human.
1. Introduction
doi 10.1075/ds.30.09lan
© 2018 John Benjamins Publishing Company
216 Richard L. Lanigan
Speaking requires that thinking simultaneously distinguish self from other on the
basis of similarity and difference. In French semiotic phenomenology (Lanigan
1992, 110–111; Gusdorf 1953; Descombes 1979; Group Mu 1970), this tropic logic
(Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm) is the double articulated aphorism/chiasm le même et
l’autre that must be translated as the typology logic ratio of Self : Other : : Same
: Different [: = “is to” and :: = “as”]and illustrated by the typology rhetoric ratio
Parole : Discours : : Langue : Langage (Jakobson 1954; Holenstein 1974a,b).
By tradition, the French terms for linguistic registers are used for precision
of reference. Parole means individual speaking and is generalized to the spoken
discourse of a group as Discours. A more difficult distinction for English speakers
is Langue, the language system as spoken (e.g., dialect of: English, French), in com-
parison to Langage, the human faculty or cognitive capacity for using the linguistic
system as a semiotic ability (e.g., semantics, syntactics, pragmatics) (Hagège 1985,
7). In English, langage is often translated as “competence” [where “performance”
is langue], “symbolic capacity”, “symbology”, and (as in Jacques Lacan’s work)
“the symbolic.”
We shall be concerned with the communicological hierarchy (Figure 1) that
Merleau-Ponty describes ontologically as the “tacit cogito and speaking subject…
in a milieu of communication” (1964, 175; 1995). The linear quadratic system ex-
ists (1) at four levels of dialogue as linguistics registers that (2) are transformed
into a curvilinear tetradic system of dialogue as communication exchange (Figure 2)
as first outlined in Lanigan (1988, 184–193; see also Kopperschmidt 1973, 161;
Watzlawick 1978, 73–77; White 1978). As context, I need to specify that I am deal-
ing with a discourse-based tropic logic (semiotic/logic square; Norbert Wiener’s
communication theory; Ehring 2011), and not a mathematical algorithm (“qua-
dratic equation; completing the square”; Claude Shannon’s information theory),
which in philosophy of language is known as the “theory of types/theory of de-
scriptions” in the Russell-Whitehead Principia Mathematica (3 vols., 1910, 1912,
1913; see Lanigan 1972, 60–64).
Categories:
1. Morality:
Judgments, decisions about your Self where Consciousness (personal semiotic) is
a sense of conscience and responsibility [maieutic dialogue as the voice of care with
concern].
2. Ethics:
Judgments, decisions about the Other(s) where Consciousness (social grammar)
is a sense of social norms and the common good [rhetoric dialogue as the voice of
regard with respect].
3. Politics:
Judgments, decisions about both the Self and Other where Consciousness (social
rhetoric) is a sense of cultural mores and duty [dialectic dialogue as the voice of
interest with engagement].
4. Aesthetics:
Judgments, decisions about Events and Objects where Consciousness (cultural
logic) is a sense of cultural beauty and taste [sophistic dialogue as the voice of dis-
cernment with appreciation].
Metacategory:
5. Rhetoric:
Judgments, decisions voiced as:
Both (5a) Speech [parole] / Discourse [discours] meaning
[Medieval Logos: Tropes of Speaking];
And (5b) Language [langage] / Dialect [langue] signification
[Medieval Lexis: Figures of Writing] where: Consciousness is a sense of inten-
tionality for both subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
Husserl’s explication of this consciousness is to find the immanent (object/no-
ema of subjectivity) in the transcendent (subject/noesis of intersubjectivity). He
is thinking of the essence of communication, i.e., the chora or moment/place of
existential emergence of the referent in dialogue (Morot-Sir 1993/1995, 2, 21).
This emergence of voice is the “revelatory phrase” or “slip of the tongue/slip of
the pen” constituting the existential revelation Sigmund Freud called “the talking
cure.” An ironic contemporary example here is the “slip” created when the auto-
correct speller on your computer or phone sends a message with an embarrassing
word you did not write! This is an existential confrontation with the problematic
of authorship made thematic.
LANGUAGE UNIVERSALS
LANGAGE = Cultural LOGIC
“Intertextuality” as Translation
History: Public Narrative
Syntax Rules (Either/Or)
Inter-Group Communication
*Writing* {Lexis}
DENOTATION
DENOTATION
English used in the World
A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE
LANGUE = Social GRAMMAR
Intra-Group Communication
SOCIAL COMMUNICATION
DISCOURS = Social RHETORIC
“Transpositionality” as Translation
Inter-Personal Communication
RHETORIC: Trope of Speech
Semantic Rules (Both/And)
CONNOTATION
INDIVIDUAL SPEECH
Only one additional theoretical concept is required, i.e., the logic that operates
within rhetoric. Recall our discussion of Aristotle, judgments are by genus/species
which is a familiar logic of distinction by opposition: Either/Or choices where two
things are negatively contrasted [A versus B, so A contrasts with B; a “window”
metaphor for linear inside/outside]. What is less familiar is the Platonic genus/dif-
ferentia logic of combination by apposition: Both/And choices where three things
are positively compared [A versus C because C versus B, so A compares to B; a
“mirror” metaphor for curvilinear reversibility of inside/outside]. We need to note
that the trope of chiasm is the essence of dialogue where a value system creates a
reversible discourse hierarchy of “double chiasm”, i.e., the four parts of Being are
reversible with the four parts of Speaking (Figure 2; Jakobson 1954; Holenstein
1974b). As Merleau-Ponty (1964, 215, 264–265; Watzlawick 1978, 73–77; Thomas-
Fogiel 2014) writes about le même et l’autre, the aphorism as chiasm is an “inter-
twining,” “a mediation through reversal” of “co-functioning” where:
We function as one unique body. The chiasm is not only a me other exchange (the
messages he receives reach me, the messages I receive reach him), it is also an
exchange between me and the world, between the phenomenal body and the “ob-
jective” body, between the perceiving and the perceived: What begins as a thing
ends as consciousness of the thing, what begins as a “state of consciousness” ends
as a thing. One cannot account for this double “chiasm” by the cut of the For Itself
and the cut of the In Itself. A relation of Being is needed that would form itself
within Being.
The chiasm, reversibility, is the idea that every perception is doubled with
a counter-perception (Kant’s real opposition) as an act with two faces, one no
longer knows who speaks and who listens. Speaking-listening, seeing-being seen,
perceiving-being perceived circularity (it is because of it that it seems to us that
perception forms itself in the things themselves).
SELF OTHER
A B
C D
SAME DIFFERENT
Legend: F = function(s).
= All Equal To
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958).
Anthorpologic Structurale (Paris, FR: Pion), trans, by Claire
Jacobson and Broke Groundfest Schoepf as Structural Anthropology
(New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc, Publisher, 1963). p. 228.
Lanigan (2015a, b, c) details the history of the chiasm model as the human science
logic structure for the analysis of interpersonal communication in its applied form
as the Perspectives Model (variously known in psychology as the “Johari Window”
and in semiotics as the “Semiotic Square”). Figure 5 offers a summary of the basic
application of the model as a semiotic phenomenology that incorporates tropic
logics (Fisher 2001, 2009; Ehring 2011) for discourse analysis that is commonly
labeled as “General Rhetoric” (see Figure 2, 5 and 14). Also as a matter of histori-
cal insight, we need to acknowledge that the perspectives or “window pane” model
[two by two matrix] derives from General Semantics research by Elwood Murray
at the University of Denver (1937, Figure 1 : Four Types of Egocentric Speaking,
74; Brownell 2014; see Murray et al. 1953).
SELF OTHER
Synecdoche PAROLE
(PART) (WHOLE)
SAME OTHER
Metaphor DISCOURS
(SUBSTANCE) (WHOLE)
SAME DIFFERENT
Metonymy LANGUE
(SUBSTANCE) (ATTRIBUTE)
levels are best illustrated in the famous Semiotic Square (Greimas 1966, 1979;
Lanigan 2015a). Thus, in the double-chiasm, there are four basic axioms:
1. Le Même et L’Autre Axiom: Self [A] : Other [B] : : Same [a] : Different [b]
Lévi-Strauss Formula (Figure 3): Self [A] : Other [B] : : Same [C] : Different [D]
Morot-Sir Formula: Perception : Conception : : Memory : Judgment; Intuition
: Subjectivation : : Objectivation : Reflection
2. Discourse Axiom: Parole : Discours : : Langue : Langage
3. Greek Chora Axiom: Maieutic : Rhetoric : : Dialectic : Sophistic
4. Communicology Axiom: Both : (Both / And) : : And : (Either / \ Or)
PAROLE LANGUE
A B
SELF OTHER
SAME LANGAGE
a b
DISCOURS DIFFERENT
Figure 6. Chiasm: Dialogic being and speaking
These formulations derive from classical Greek and Roman rhetoric and are usu-
ally depicted as the dynamic process in Figure 7 (see the static version in Figure 5
tropes) with a slight rotation to emphasize process (on the diagonal) in the three-
order logic (an axonometric style introduced by Foucault; Lanigan 2015c). Also
relevant to the logic process involved in the use of the chiasm mode, especially by
Lévi-Strauss, Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault, are the ontological dynamics of rheto-
ric (presence/absence/analytic/synthetic). The symbolic process (conjunction/
disjunction/convergence/divergence) must account for the ontological movement
of discourse embodiment (linear culture logic from curvilinear discourse logic),
commonly known as the “Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis” (Whorf 1952). The key point
is that the symbol is an ontological source of constitution (Foucault’s “birth” trope)
called (1) the chora [logic level 1: Elements of description], in turn linking (2) the
ontic (“is”) [logic level 2: Isomorphisms of reduction], and, (3) the deontic (“ought”)
[logic level 3: Transformations of interpretation] in value choices (Figure 8). The
associated methodological human science issues involved in applied communica-
tion research are detailed in Lanigan (2013).
[Attribution
[Element (Digit) or
(light) or
Combicution (Analogue)]
[Self ] proposition
Question (Analogue)] Question
Maieutic
[Specification] [Same]
Question Answer
Question Answer
[Different] [Representation]
Rhetoric
[articulation]
Answer Answer
[substitution] [Other]
Figure 7. Classical Greek discourse model of communicology (Lanigan 1992, 94)
CONVERGENCE CONJUNCTION
SELF
SO
PH
IST TIC
IC EU
AI
M
CURVILINEA
LINEAR
CHORA
DI
IC AL
R EC
TO TIC
ABSENCE
R HE
SAME
DISJUNCTION DIVERGENCE
OTHER DIFFERENT
Figure 8. The tropic logic of value choices in symbolic process
maieutic dialogue of Self conscience with responsibility for the Other (Figure 9; see
Figure 2 and 6 for context).
MORALITY
SELF OTHER
Parole Langue
SAME DIFFERENT
Discours Langage
Figure 9. The maieutic morality value system
So, we begin with Cicero’s view. Morality is a judgment about the Self. In the Greek
world of other people, morality is constituted in maieutic dialogue. The moral form
of dialogue between the Self and Other is an exchange of questions, then answers.
Conjunction (Figure 8) embodied as Self establishes a similarity of perspective
(caring of interpersonal communication) as a sameness of Self judgment (concern
of intrapersonal communication). Dialogue, as a give and take activity, creates a
subjective/existential consciousness (Questions concerning) in two persons that is
the same condition for judgment as embodied speaking (caring Answers). We call
the condition conscience (as a subjective criterion) and personal responsibility (as
an intersubjective criterion). The standard general rhetoric formulation is:
Maieutic Dialogue: Questions gives / takes Answers = Same Value constituted.
Personal Ethics: Conscience with Responsibility.
In short, morality consists of existential choices and decisions communicated in
practice as behavior (activity: “ask” question/“say” answer) and comportment (ca-
pacity: “can do” answer/“will do” question) by two persons in dialogue that define
themselves and each other (A : B :: b : a). Alfred Schütz (Lanigan 1988, 215) called
this dialogue a value choice between the “because motive” (pluperfect “what had
been” caring) and the “in-order-to motive” (future perfect “what shall have been”
concern). The chiasm example of maieutic dialogue consists of the question of Self
conscience embodied in the answer of speaking (parole) with responsibility.
that define this maieutic dialogue process experienced by both persons in the con-
versation. From each person’s existential perspective (Self/parole: Figure 9) of em-
bodied speaking, there is a double chiasm:
Morality:
1. An Apposition Decision about Other (Conjunction of both SAME and
DIFFERENT) allows
2. An Opposition Choice about the Self (Disjunction of either SELF or OTHER).
Maieutic:
3. An Apposition Decision about Langue (Conjunction of both DISCOURS and
LANGAGE) allows
4. An Opposition Choice about the Parole (Disjunction of either PAROLE or
LANGUE).
The evidence to be taken (capta) from a dialogue centered on morality depicts
the convergence of meaning (“same value”) that both speakers abstract from the
dialogue they experience in everyday life [Lebenswelt]. Merleau-Ponty defines
this moral value as authenticity, i.e., meaning (existential choice) as “Authentic
Speaking” [parole parlante; speech speaking; rhétorique générale] in the process
of communication with the other in a shared world (être-au-monde). This ma-
ieutic approach is better known as the “Socratic Method” of definition by genus
and differentia.
After judgments about the Self, human beings turn their attention to Other peo-
ple. Those persons who fail at morality tend toward egotistical behavior and ex-
hibit selfish comportment. Yet, moral persons tend toward altruism exhibiting a
genuine regard for the well being and situated respect for the welfare of others,
especially as a social group typified by the family unit. Here, we may begin with
the Greek concept of ethos defined as a person’s character displayed by embodied
habit among others in the dyad or peer group. Heraclitus is often quoted to de-
fine ethical judgments: “A man’s ethos [character] is his daimon [spirit]”. Respect
comes from regard. Ethics is a judgment about the Other. That judgment of regard
derives from the observation of habitual behavior which comes to constitute an
interpretation of character, the propensity for decisions valued as respect in an
interpersonal and social manner of acting for good or ill.
In the modern sense, Pierre Bourdieu (1972, 1980) best explicates ethos by his
definitions of (1) habitus as an action that is unconscious behavior as habit (a prac-
tice that is known, but not named in praesentia) and (2) hexis as a disposition that
ETHICS
SELF OTHER
Parole Langue
SAME DIFFERENT
Discours Langage
Figure 10. The rhetorical ethics value system
The ethical form of dialogue between the Self and Other is an exchange of answers,
then questions to establish a difference of perspective (regard as intrapersonal com-
munication), a difference to be found in an Other judgment (respect as interper-
sonal communication). Dialogue, as a give and take activity, creates a subjective/
existential consciousness (Answers regarding) in two persons that is a different
condition for judgment for each one (Questions respecting). Your answer poses a
question in me. We call the condition a situation in which social norms (as a sub-
jective criterion) and the common good (as an intersubjective criterion) are com-
pared and contrasted. The standard general rhetoric formulation is:
Rhetoric Dialogue: Answers gives / takes Questions = Different Value constituted.
Social Ethics: Social Norms as the Public Good.
To summarize, ethics consists of existential choices and decisions communicated
in practice as behavior (activity: “ask”/“say”) and comportment (capacity: “can
do”/“will do”) by two persons in dialogue that define themselves and each other.
The chiasm example of rhetoric dialogue consists of the answer of social norms
(langue) that is embodied in the Other by the question of the common good.
The common understanding of politics as a value concept is that it accounts for the
regulation and control of the interests of individual people [Lebenswelt] engaged
POLITICS
SELF OTHER
Parole Langue
SAME DIFFERENT
Discours Langage
The political form of dialectic dialogue between the Self and Other is an exchange
of questions raising further questions to establish a sameness of perspective (inter-
personal communication as engagement) contextualizing a difference abstracted
from the discours containing an Other judgment (intrapersonal communication
as interest). Dialogue, as a give and take activity, creates a subjective/existential
consciousness (Questions of interest) in two persons that is a same condition for
judgment for each one (Questions of engagement). Your question poses a question
in me. We call the condition a dialectical situation in which cultural mores (as a
subjective engagement) and the need for public duty (as an intersubjective inter-
est) are compared and contrasted by interrogation. The standard general rhetoric
formulation is:
Dialectic Dialogue: Questions gives / takes Questions = Other Value constituted.
Public Ethics: Cultural Mores of Public Duty.
To summarize, politics consists of existential choices and decisions communicated
in practice as behavior (activity: “ask”) and comportment (capacity: “can do”) by
two persons in dialogue that define themselves and each other. The chiasm ex-
ample of dialectic dialogue consists of the question of cultural mores (discours) that
is embodied as the Same by the question of duty.
The dialectic logic expresses a metaphysical condition of the Same found in dis-
cours, i.e., the ethical form of dialogue allows a similarity of value to emerge an
interest. Interrogation by the Self as the conversational dialectic with interrogation
of the Other converges in signification, thus allowing divergence of compatible
meaning as a sense of cultural mores [Weltanschauung].
Each person in the dialogue comes to a sense of duty found in the mutual
engagement of cultural obligation. There are four steps to this political dialogue
process, experienced by both persons in the conversation. From each person’s
existential perspective (Same/discours: Figure 11) as embodied speaking, there
is a double chiasm:
Politics:
1. An Apposition Decision about Self (Convergence of both OTHER and
DIFFERENT) allows
2. An Opposition Choice about the Same (Divergence of either SAME or
DIFFERENT)
Dialectic:
3. An Apposition Decision about Parole (Convergence of both LANGUE and
LANGAGE) allows
4. An Opposition Choice about the Discours (Divergence of either DISCOURS
or LANGAGE)
The evidence to be taken (capta) from a dialectic dialogue centered on politics
describes the convergence of meaning (“same value” interest) that both speakers
abstract from the discours. They experience cultural mores held in common for
John Dewey suggests that the search for a community of values in any political
democracy has its foundation in our ability to discern aesthetic communication.
The function of art has always been to break through the crust of conventionaliza-
tion and routine consciousness [Foucault’s rupture]. Common things, a flower, a
glean of moonlight, the song of a bird, not things rare and remote, are means with
which the deeper levels of life are touched so that they spring up as desire and
thought [Foucault’s power]. This is the process of art. Poetry, the drama, the novel,
are proofs that the problem of presentation [communication] is insoluble. Artists
have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening
in itself which is new, but the kindling by it [Merleau-Ponty’s witness] of emotion,
perception and appreciation’ (1927, 183–184; my inserts and emphasis).
Merleau-Ponty contrasts events and objects so that he can compare Self and Other
perspectives. He is concerned with aesthetic values learned in social perception
by comparison of an initial embodied perception (to witness) and the later em-
bodied expression (to signature, i.e., autobiographical impression). He helps us to
discern what (intrapersonal object) we witness by pointing out how we appreciate
our existential insertion in the moment (interpersonal event). Taste becomes the
movement from habitus to hexis by discerning a different langage to signify ap-
preciation, a cultural logic named as Beauty [G. kallos] or in later classical thought,
the sublime [L. sublimis].
Recall that (1) Objects signify habitus as an action that is unconscious be-
havior as habit (a practice that is known, but not named in praesentia) and (2)
Events signify hexis as a disposition that is a preconscious habit as comportment
(a praxis that is named, but not known in absentia). We are Witness to Objects
(Answers discern) because Events are our Signature (Answers appreciate); we wit-
ness what is absent from us (different), yet we signature how we live the event as
present (langage). As Merleau-Ponty (1954, 311) suggests “Seeing is that strange
way of rendering ourselves present while keeping our distance and, without par-
ticipating, transforming others into visible things.” The standard general rhetoric
formulation is:
Sophistic Dialogue: Answers gives / takes Answers = Self Value constituted.
Cultural Ethics: Taste establishes Beauty.
To summarize, aesthetics consists of existential choices and decisions communi-
cated in practice as behavior (activity: “say”) and comportment (capacity: “can
do”) by two persons in dialogue that define themselves and each other. The chiasm
example of sophistic dialogue consists of the answer of taste that is embodied as the
Different by the answer of beauty.
We must be careful to note that with aesthetics, there is (in the Answer/Answer
sophistic dialogue form) the creation of an analogue choice (Both/And; moving
from the true to the more true; Plato’s maieutic philosopher). This analogue is
itself a context for a secondary digital choice (Either/Or; the true or false; Plato’s
dialectic rhetorician). Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s “feeling for ambiguity” is to adopt
problematic contingency in langage as thematic, to adopt a context (both true and
more true) for a (new, unexpected) different secondary digital choice (Either/Or;
the true or the more true). This is the foundation of non-Aristotelian logics such
as those detailed in General Semantics (Berman 1989) and is one explication of
the Communicology Axiom [Both (Both/and) And (Either/Or)] (see Figure 2).
Note this logic is how rhetoric overtakes grammar to allow such Aristotelian
grammatical “category mistake” value choices as “perfect” versus “more perfect.”
Simply put, an analogue deontic choice (should be more or less) is substituted
for a digital ontic choice (is true or false). To get a practical sense of the aesthetic
value system [good vs. more good; moral vs. more moral] at work here, just sub-
stitute, in “the context of eating,” the terms “satisfied” for “good” and “gluttony”
for “more good.”
Returning to aesthetics, expression by the Self is the conversational dialectic
wherein expression of the Other converges in a signification of taste (discernment)
thus allowing divergence of compatible significations (appreciation) as a sense of
beauty [Weltanschauung].
AESTHETICS
SELF OTHER
Parole Langue
SAME DIFFERENT
Discours Langage
There are four steps to this sophistic dialogue process, experienced positively
by both persons in the conversation. From each person’s existential perspective
(Different/langage: Figure 12) as embodied speaking, there is a double chiasm:
Aesthetics:
1. An Apposition Decision about Other (Convergence of both SELF and SAME)
allows
2. An Opposition Choice about the Different (Divergence of either SAME or
DIFFERENT).
Sophistic:
3. An Apposition Decision about Langue (Convergence of both PAROLE and
DISCOURS) allows
4. An Opposition Choice about the Langage (Divergence of either DISCOURS or
LANGAGE).
Merleau-Ponty (1954) gives a sense of sophistic dialogue by suggesting that taste
can be exemplified as an object in the guise of an event: the news item [les faits
divers, literally “divergent facts”] in the daily newspaper. Whereas beauty will be
found as a literary event in the guise of an object: the novel. On the existential
side, news items are glanced (description), gazed (reduction), witnessed (appeal
for interpretation): “True little incidents are not life’s débris, but signs, emblems,
and appeals” (313).
Yet there is more and less in the novel than there is in true little incidents [news
items]. It foreshadows momentary speech and gesture, and comments on them.
The author lends herself to the character, makes us enter her inner monologue.
The novel gives the context. The news item on the contrary strikes us because
it is life’s invasion of those who were unaware of it. The new item calls things
by their name [true]; the novel names them only through what the characters
perceive… The novel is truer, because it gives a totality, and because a lie can be
created from details which are all true. The news item is truer because it wounds
us [glance = signs] and is not pretty to look at [gaze = emblems]. They meet only
in the greatest, who find [witness = appeal], as has been said, the ‘poetry of truth’.
(1954, 313; my emphasis and inserts)
Merleau-Ponty is reducing the analogue object of taste (from news item to novel,
from story to history), while he is explicating the digital event of beauty (either
true or truer; either narrate the public/inauthentic value, or, voice the authentic
personal value). The news item begins with a habitus governed by intuition (the
auto-reference of a glance at the unnamed object), or subjectivation (the glimpse of
a stranger, in our prevue, taken as true). The item continues as a hereto-reference
of objectivation (the objective gaze, with time, becoming subjective as familiar
and nameable – more true). The item comes to rest as a hexis governed by reflec-
tion (the object turned event in “public narrative” and finally registered in “per-
sonal narrative” as the truer event by the witness) (Morot-Sir 1993/1995, 2: 11,
21; see Figure 3).
The witness “personal narrative” always has the truer event account of the ob-
ject of perception, just as the reader of the novel can witness himself or herself in
the “public narrative” voice (a good novel) or not (a bad novel). A successful novel
both tells a story (personal narrative/time) and offers a possible history (public
narrative/space). Some novels are marginal, having only one narrative success
in moment or place (Kristeva’s intertextuality). Bad novels fail at narrative. The
achievement of the sublime novel is the creation of a narrative voice that com-
bines auto- and hetero-reference as writer expressed (Barthes’ “modern scriptor”)
and reader perceived as author (Eco’s lector in fabula; Kristeva’s transpositionality)
(Lanigan 2001).
The fundamental aesthetic criterion of difference in langage accounts for the
constitution of Self values by finding answers (discernment) within answers (ap-
preciation) as a standard sophistic logic (Figures 8 and 12). This approach to dis-
course analysis through a logic of values grounded in metaphysics is precisely why
Immanuel Kant privileges poetic (as aesthetics) over rhetoric (as politics), and,
maieutic (as ethics) over sophistic (negatively valued as immorality) as a manner
of taste (Lanigan 2016, 2017a). Ironically, Kant’s objection to sophistic oratory
(versus appreciation for rhetoric as logical discernment) may be applied to mod-
ern analytic philosophy which takes “language use” and “speech acts” to be value
free objects (ideal “objects”) in epistemology. Here, Kant would call this absence of
metaphysical commitment in logic and language to be immoral, unethical, impoli-
tic, and ugly. Perhaps, Donald Trump is again a case in point.
By way of summary, let us recall that in the classic Greek conception, axiology is
the study of values (ethics, aesthetics, politics, rhetoric) or decisions displayed in
behavior. Whereas, dialogue is the study of discourse (dialectic, sophistic, rhetoric,
maieutic,) or choices displayed in judgement. I examine, in a preliminary way, the
dynamics of human communicology (decision choices) wherein the method of
semiotic phenomenology accounts for Husserl’s maxim that “subjectivity is in-
tersubjectivity.” The primary methodology for this analysis is the chiasm logic of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault.
Figures 13 and 14 (see Figure 5) provide a summary depiction of the axiologi-
cal system of semiotic phenomenology used by Merleau-Ponty as a tropic logic
(chiasm) approach to communicology. By custom in Europe (Port-Royal General
Grammar of 1660; Port-Royal General Logic of 1662), the tropic logic thematic
is called General Rhetoric, while the discourse problematic is termed General
Grammar (in the tradition of the Trivium, Figure 15; Dominik and Hall 2007). This
thematic and problematic serve (White 1978), in turn, as a rhetorical methodolo-
gy for Michel Foucault’s progressive program in the study of discourse as progres-
sively archaeology (description), genealogy (reduction), and critical method (in-
terpretation). The technical abductive logic derives from Louis Hjelmslev’s (1943)
MERLEAU-PONTY’S CHIASM
Barthes-Hjelmslev Model
©2017 R.L.LANIGAN
Sign function Sr: Rhetoric Sd: Ideology
phenomenology (Nameless Voice*) (Voiceless Name**)
Connotation Sr Sd # Sr # Sd
(Reflexivity)
A a B b
[ Substance ] [ Attribute] [Whole] [Part]
Step1:
Description
of the SIGN METONYMY SYNECDOCHE
REGISTER
Sr Sd Sr Sd
Denotation A B b a
( Reversibilty) [ Substance ] [Whole] [Part] [ Attribute]
Le Méme et
CHIASM (the 4 term structure of contingency)
L’ Autre
Sr {Signifying SignifieR} {Signifying SignifieD} Sd
Real
(Reflectivity)
A [ a+B ] B [ b+a ]
account of communication (see Fig 2). This is the work on which Roland Barthes
(1964, 1970) and Roman Jakobson (1954; Holenstein 1974a,b), subsequently
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958), also rely in their respective theory construction.
Let me conclude with an axiological discourse example. Wazlawick (1978, 76)
attributes the example to Oscar Wilde: “The only difference between (1) a sinner
and (2) a saint is that every saint has (3) a past and every sinner has (4) a future.”
While humorous, the example provides us with an explication of an aphoristic
chiasm. It expresses the discourse movement from: (1) morality as the caring voice
of concern in the Self; to (2) ethics as the voice of regard and respect for the Other;
to (3) politics as the Same voice of interest engagement; and, to (4) aesthetics as the
Different voice of discerning appreciation. As Merleau-Ponty (1953, 58) remarks,
“Since philosophy is expression in act, it comes to itself only by ceasing to coincide
with what is expressed, and by taking its distance in order to see meaning.”
Roman Jakobson
TRIVIUM — The Greek / Latin Model of French Discourse ELEMENTS
© 2017 Richard L Lanigan adaequatio rei et intellectus [ agreement between things and mind ] (Functions)
Syncategorematic [ Metaphor ]
LOGOS Sēmeion [Sign EXPRESSION] (Semantic Meaning) { Simile / Irony }
Speaking = Discours [Inflection, Articulation, Meaning] Prosopopoeia
[ signans ]
Greek “Active Voice” Practices / Codes = Parole [ Nameless Voice ]
( Teleology: Coal-lntcndcd; Absent Presence ) { Greek “Active Voice” }
Categorematic [ Metonymy ]
LEXIS Symbolon [Symbol PERCEPTION] {Synecdoche}
(Syntactic Signification)
Writing = Langage [Inscription, Punctuation, Signification] Asyndeton
[ signatum ]
Greek “Passive Voice” Symbolizes /Signifies = Langue [ Voiceless Name ]
( Telenomy: Goal-Directed; Present Absence) { Greek “Passive Voice” }
Rhétorique How does the intellect use Mode of Event / Occurrence Contact
TRIVIUM MINORUM
(Phatic /
Spéciale speech (parole) to symbolize reality? [ medium fluxus ]
Punctuating)
Langage READER
TYPOLOGY
as Authority
a [Simile /
[ “Animal” ] (Lector in Fabula)
Irony]
[Reader Response]
SELF WRITER
Langage TYPE as Authority
b (Memoir)
[Synecdoche] [ “Dog” ]
[ “Scriptor” ]
Discours WRITER
TOKEN
B Other as Authority
[Metonomy] [ “Pet” ] (Biography)
AUTHOR
Parole TONE
A Self as Authority
[Metaphor] [ “Sport” ] (Auto-Biography)
LOGOS Oration Declamation
↑
CHIASM [Asyndeton = [ “Concrete ( Personal Narrative)
Nameless Meaning” =
[L’histoire = Story ]
Voice ] “Un-Speakable”]
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