CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

File No. 3

4. GOVERNMENT

a) Definition, distinguished from administration

Government - is the agency of instrumentality through which the will

of the State is formulated, expressed and realized.

Administration – is distinguished from government, as the aggregate

the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reigns of government are for
the time being (the Chief ministries or heads of departments. But the
terms are often interchanged.

Government of the Republic of the Philippines - is the corporate

governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including the various arms which
political authority is made effective, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city or barangay subdivisions or
other forms of local government (Sec. 2 (10, E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code
of 1987).

CASES

• We understand, in modern political science... by the term

“government”, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which
an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action
which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which
are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is
the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By “administration”
, we understand... the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the
reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or
heads of departments. But the Court adds that the terms
“government” and “administration” are often used interchangeably
(US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332).

• The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree No. 361. Its

purpose is akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in
 the military service. Its enabling law further mandates that the
System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through
an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and
organized by him and subject to such rules and regulations
governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time.
Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by
the Chief of Staff of the AFP with the approval of the Secretary of the
Secretary of the National Defense. While it may be true that there
have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-
RSBS, the Government is not precluded from later on adding to the
funds in order to provide additional benefits to the men in uniform.
These above considerations indicate that the character and
operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As
such, the Court held that the same is government entity and its
funds are in the nature of public funds (People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR
145951, August 12, 2003).

• Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary

functions. The Court held that ACA is a government office or agency
engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions
may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent"
(as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the
maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating
property and property rights, those relating to the administration of
justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those
relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this
traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by
the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter
functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the
part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society,
however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions
of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which
used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it
was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet
the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces (ACCFA vs. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649).
• An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in
political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and
the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to
the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of
power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner
workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims
and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the
Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access
to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant
to the Constitution. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly,
the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions
involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law."As observed in Legaspi: In determining whether or
not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term
that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
the public (Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256).

b) Classification

i) de jure or de facto

De Jure - has a rightful title but no power or control, either because

the same has been withdrawn from it or because it has not yet actually
entered into the exercise thereof.

De Facto - actually exercises power or control but without legal title

(Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, GR No 73748, May 22, 1986).

i. De facto proper – government that gets possession

and control of, or usurps, by force or by the vice of the majority,
 the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will
of the latter,

ii. Government of paramount force – established

and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war; and

iii. Independent government – established by the

inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection against the
parent state (Ko Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113).

ii) u
nitary or federal

Federal government – is formed when a group of political units, such as

states or provinces or together in a federation, surrendering their
individual sovereignty and many powers to the central government.
While retaining or reserving other limited powers. As a result, two or
more levels of government exist within an established geographic
territory. The body of law of the common central government is the
federal law. Federal law is a body of law created by the federal
government of a country.

iii)
onarchy, oligarchy, theocracy,
democracy

Monarchy – is a form of government in which supreme power is

absolutely or nominally lodged with an individual, who is the head of
state, often for life or until abdication, and “is wholly set apart from all
other members of the state.” The person who heads a monarchy is called
Monarch.

Oligarchy – is a form of government where power effectively rests with a

small elite segment of society distinguished by royal, wealth, family,
military or religious hegemony. The word oligarchy is from the Greek
words for “few” and “rule. Such states are often controlled by politically
powerful families whose children are heavily conditioned and monitored
to be heirs of the power of the oligarchy. Oligarchies have been
tyrannical throughout history, being completely a public servitude to
exist.

Theocrary – is a form of government in which a god or deity is

recognized as the State’s supreme civil rules, or in a broader sense, a
form of government in which a state is governed by immediate divine
guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided. For
believers, theocracy is a form of government in which divine power
governs a earhy human state, either in a personal incarnation or more
often, via religious institutional representatives (i.e. church), replacing or
dominating civil government. Theocratic government enact theonomic
laws.

Democracy – is a form of government in which state power is held by the

majority of citizens within a country or a state. It is derived from the
Greek “popular government”, which was coined from “people” and “rule,
strength” in the middle of the fifth-fourth century BC to denote the
political systems then existing in some Greek City – states.

iv)
residential or Parliamentary

Presidential form of Government

Ø It is first adopted under the 1935 Constitution and

borrowed from American system.
Ø Its principal identifying feature is what is called
the “separation of powers.” Legislative power is given to the
Legislature; executive power is given to a separate Executive; and
judicial power is held independent Judiciary.
Ø The system is founded on the belief that, by
establishing equilibrium among the three power holders, harmony
will result, power will not to concentrated, and thus tyranny will be
avoided.
Ø Because of the prominent position, however, which
the system gives to the President as chief executive, it is designated
as a presidential form of government.

Parliamentary form of Government

Ø It is the original 1973 Constitution that has adopted a

still-born parliamentary system.
Ø The difference lies in certain essential features which are
found in all varieties of the parliamentary form, such as the following:

1. The members of the government or cabinet or the

executive arm are, simultaneously members of the legislature.
2. The government or cabinet, consisting of the political
leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also members
of the legislature.
 3. The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at
the apex of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent.
4. The government or cabinet remains in power only for as
long as it enjoy the support of majority of the legislature.
5. Both government and legislature are possessed o
control devices with which each can demand of the other immediate
political responsibility.

Ø In the hands of the legislature is the vote of non-

confidence (censure) whereby the government may be ousted. In
hands of the government is the power to dissolve the legislature and
call for new elections.

Ø Briefly, therefore, while the presidential system embodies

interdependence by separation and coordination. Parliamentarism
embodies interdependence by integration.

v) O
thers

CASES

• The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable

matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government (In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160).

• It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts

and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial department
of a de facto government are good and valid.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or

government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that
gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself
against the will of the latter, such government of England under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as
Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
 course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount
force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British
possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied
during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And
the third is that established as an independent government of the
Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of
secession (Co Kim Chao vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil 113).

c) Historical survey of Philippine government

CASES

• Under the American Regime: The Government of the Philippine

Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of
the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories
into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however,
operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the
Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting
through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the
same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the
limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the
orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of
Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from
the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress,
instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies back of
American constitutions. The power to legislate upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it
exercises such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines
the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United
States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is

a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and
judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to
such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in
most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the
doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate
exercises executive powers, and the President to some extent controls
legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor is not a
member of the legislative body, but the veto power enables him to
 exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the
head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a
member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no
veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on
the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven
best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the
protection of individual rights and privileges (US vs. Bull, 15 Phil 259).

• It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities,

that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision. (16 C. J.S 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle
of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term
is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities
are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on
this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political
departments of the government (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1).

• Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the
validity of Presidential Decree 73.Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73
purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue
on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the
Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly
provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases
involving said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to

submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention.
Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue
Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on
January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for
the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite
ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should
the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper
parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.
 Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a
submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for
amendment of the Constitution. Held [3]: Said question has not been
adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would
not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the
most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances (Planas
vs. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105).

• It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute —

Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The
interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of
these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that
personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said
funds.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a

judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of
the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly,
the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and
submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033
to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,
the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and
effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the
validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the
new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by
the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or
law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in
the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers
to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not
the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power
to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would
merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may
be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.

Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or

not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review,
but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested
that power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a
posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the
people.

As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose

amendments to the Constitution in the absence of a grant of such
constituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. If
the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot
validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA
333).
• Pres. Marcos’ term was supposed to end on June 30, 1987.
However, he submitted a letter of conditional resignation claiming
that he would vacate his position effective only when election’s held &
after winner’s proclaimed & qualified as Pres by taking his oath of
office 10 days after his proclamation. He claims that he is calling for
the new elections to seek a new mandate to assess his policies &
programs as demanded by the opposition. He further stressed that
his term will be shortened but in the name of public accountability
he believes that the final settlement of these issues can only be done
thru a presidential election.

B.P. Blg. 883: enacted by the Batasang Pambansa calling for special
national elections on Feb. 7, 1986 for Pres & VP.

Different sectors were against the special elections. Among the

contentions are:

1. Such is unconstitutional because there was no vacancy in the

presidency thus there’s no need to call for a special election. This is
pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which requires an
actual vacancy before an special election can be called and in such
cases, the Speaker of the House will be the Acting Pres until a new
one has been elected.

2. Unconstitutional because it allows the Pres to continue holding

office after calling of the special election. Cutting his term short is
valid but he should actually vacate the office. The Supreme Court
voted 7 to dismiss petitions and deny prayer for issuance of
injunction restraining respondents from holding election and 5
declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the injunction.
Since there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883
unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs prayed
for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a resolution
was issued.

The Supreme Court voted 7 to dismiss petitions & deny prayer for
issuance of injunction restraining respondents from holding election
and 5 declared BP 883 unconstitutional & voted to grant the
injunction. Since there are less than the required 10 votes to declare
BP 883 unconstitutional, petitions are considered dismissed & writs
prayed for denied. Justices filed separate opinions since only a
resolution was issued (PBA vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455).

• The lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a

supervening event – would have normally rendered this case moot
 and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts
were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no
guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued.
The transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be
“evaded;” they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional
aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar

as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence
discussed earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving
the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related
to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President;
and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint
on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also
rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public
interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order
issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed
to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the military and
the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” But
the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been
legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be
deemed deleted from the said G.O. While “terrorism” has been
denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the
military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the
AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5 (David vs.
Macapagal – Arroyo, GR 171396, May 3, 2006).

d) Democratic and republican government

Republican State – it is one wherein all government authority emanates

form the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the people.

Democratic State – this merely emphasizes that the Philippines has

some aspect of direct democracy such as initiative and referendum.
 i) Nemo est supra
leges – “No one is above the Law”

CASES

• The primary question is: Shall the judiciary permit a government of

the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine
Islands? The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted
for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October
16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period,
the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of
Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. The
women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they
were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they
wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. With this situation, a
court would next expect to resolve the question. By authority of what
law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting
by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality
within the Philippine Islands? One can search in vain for any law,
order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the
city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands and these women, despite their being in a sense
lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the
contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778).

ii) Universal suffrage

(right and duty), popular election, rule of
the majority

iii) Bill of rights

Bill of Rights – is a set prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil
and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the
powers of the government as a leans of securing the enjoyment of those
rights.

Classification of Rights:

1. Political rights – granted by law to members of community in

relation to their direct or indirect participation in the establishment
or administration of the government.
2. Civil rights – rights which municipal law will enforce at the
instance of private individuals for the purpose of securing them the
enjoyment of their means of happiness;
3. Social and economic rights; and
4. Human rights.

iv) Accountability of
Public Officials

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and

employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive

power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is

filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same
shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same

official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall
be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than

removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to

effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.

Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the

Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the
Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law.

Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the

Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law,
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under this Constitution.

Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born

citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at
least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and
members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates
for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The
Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same

disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section 2 of
Article 1X-A of this Constitution.

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by

the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every
vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no
confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after
they occur.

Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional
Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not
be decreased during their term of office.

Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term
of seven years without reappointment. They shall not be qualified to
run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their
cessation from office.

Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the

people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and
the result thereof.

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
 agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public

official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform
and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,
and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action

against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,

and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and

information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and
to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when

circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,

mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and
make recommendations for their elimination and the observance
of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such

other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.

Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal

autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully

acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches,
or estoppel.

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial

accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly
or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or
entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of

office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In
the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law.

v) Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws

vi) Separation of
Powers

Purpose of the separation of powers: to prevent the concentration of

authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to
irreparable error or abuse in the exercise to the detriment of republican
institution.

CASES

• The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system

of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the
enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that
a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President
to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case
may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On
the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the
Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and
the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The Court held:

1. That the government established by the Constitution follows

fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the legislative,
the executive and the judicial.

2. That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of

functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the
powers granted.

3. That in cases of conflict between the several departments and

among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

4. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in

actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
5. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the government.

6. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests

relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.

7. That under the organic law prevailing before the present

Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.

8. That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers

previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to
the Electoral Commission.

9. That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral

Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

10. That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral

Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass
upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

11. That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed

not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section
478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election
of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse
party,and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs
and expenses of contest.

12. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the

election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may
 discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.

13. That confirmation by the National Assembly of the

election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior
to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protest against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139).

• Issue: Is Pres. Nixon's right to safeguard certain information,

using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely immune
from judicial review? No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of
separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of
high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute,
unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was
a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs,
but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of
law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president
must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents.
Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes (US vs Nixon, 418
US 683).

v Principle of Blending of Powers

Instance when powers are not confined exclusively within one

department but are assigned to or shared by shared by several
departments.

v Principle of Checks and Balances

Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives
or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments.

CASES

• Issue: Did President Truman have the constitutional

authority to seize and operate the steel mills? In a 6-to-3 decision,
the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue
such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional
statute that authorized the President to take possession of private
property. The Court also held that the President's military power as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor
 disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker (Youngstown Co, vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 96 L.Ed. 1153).”

• The Congress cannot control the execution of its laws; since it

doesn’t possess this power, it can’t delegate it to its agents. The CG is
an agent of the Legislature because Congress can remove him by a
process other than impeachment. The CG exercises executive power.
Thus, the Act is unconstitutional.The CG’s function under the Act is
the “very essence” of execution of the laws since (1) it entails
interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary
calculations are required and (2) the CG commands the President to
carry out, without variation, the CG’s directive regarding the budget
resolutions. Interpreting a law enacted by Congress is the “very
essence” of executions of the laws. Once Congress passes legislation,
it can only influence its execution by passing new laws or through
impeachment. The Constitution only explicitly provides Congress the
power to remove executive officers by impeachment. Also, the
Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected language that would
have permitted impeachment for “maladministration,” with Madison
arguing that “so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during
pleasure of the Senate.” Thus, Congress can only remove a member of
the executive branch through impeachment (Bowsher vs. Synar, 478 US
714).

• Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the

executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why
it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however,
allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For what republican
theory did accomplish?was to reverse the old presumption in favor of
secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it
with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. Resort to any means then by which officials of
the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be
presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the
power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government,
but we shall have given up something of much greater value ? our
right as a people to take part in government (Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464),
GR 169777).
 vii) Non-delegation of
powers

• The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he

issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative
power, just as he was under the original 1973 Constitution, when he
issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the
power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the
power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it
became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it
through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President
did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate
the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific
instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No.
857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or
decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by
the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District
(Philippine Interisland Shipping Ass'n vs. CA, GR 100481, Jan. 22, 1997).”

v General Rule: Potestas delegate non potest delegare

Premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not
only a right but also a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another.

v Permissible Delegation

• The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 which provides for a

system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are
convicted of crime is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That
said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2)
that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3)
that it denies the equal protection of the laws.

As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power

exclusively in the Chief Executive. But, probation and pardon are not
coterminous; nor are they the same. In probation, the probationer is
in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment
which the law inflicts. The Court held that the Probation Act does
not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning
 power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,
remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been
enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus
place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.

The power to make laws or the legislative power is vested in a

bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral
National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of
the Philippines. The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly
may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest. The rule, however, which forbids the
delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to
local authorities. In testing whether a statute constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether
the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment
of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature (People vs. Vera, 65
Phil 56).

a. Tariff Powers to the President (Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI;

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix

within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.

b. Emergency Powers to the President (Section 23 (2), Art VI)

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress

may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
• Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the
duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought
for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. Article VI of the
Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be
"for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in
duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used in the
Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an
emergency."

The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would
not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different
law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the
delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet
a temporary emergency may become permanent law,"; for Congress
might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not
meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be
able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly
that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the
law.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the

Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its
authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies
operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the
emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while
Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the
anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could
repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during
congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the
same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the
latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it
materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best
interests of the country as they saw them, a former President
promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had
vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present
 Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after
Congress had refused to approve the measure.

What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the

same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer.
He said he issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless
against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on
January 1, 1942." It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met
in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos.
62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In so far
as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive
authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of
his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts
have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the
proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent
or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under
review.

After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if

the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was
desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the
Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total
emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to
the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the
enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government,
principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The
state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with
which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The
war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have
necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a
position to operate (First Emergency Powers Cases, 84 Phil 368).

• As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional

provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended
it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has
not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation
of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would
be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may
wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the
President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President
or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite
duration of the delegation of legislative powers, ? in palpable
repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder
must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself
and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the
Congress or the President.

Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and
did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally
declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that
the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would
lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress
might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to
recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back.
This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."

Insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a

given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had
been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must
be declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice
of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been
approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the
Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the
result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed
to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to
withdraw the same from the President. Shelter may not be sought in
the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise
emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the
interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the
Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective,
our Government is democratic in form and based on the system of
separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall
have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be
prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in
disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and
executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to
have prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic
processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one
man or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the
Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing
delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period
"in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus
entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty of coping
 with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it
alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not
create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation
lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their
faithful adherence to the Constitution (2nd Emergency Powers Cases, 92
Phil 603).

c. Delegation to the People (Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, Art X; Sec. 2,
Art. XVII; RA 6735);

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a

system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve
or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be

created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of

this right.

d. Delegation to Local Government Units (Art. X; RA 7160);

e. Delegation to the Administrative Bodies

1.1.1 Power of Subordinate Legislation

CASES

• The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules

and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment. The questioned administrative orders are reasonably
directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under
which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount
interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity
and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are
sustained, and their force and effect upheld (Miners Assn vs. Factoran, GR
98332, Jan. 16, 1995).

1.1.2 Principle of Sub-delegation of Powers

1.1.3 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego

Principle

• Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when performed

and promulgated in the regular course of business or unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive are presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v. Sec’y of Interior, 67 Phil 451).

f. Tests for valid delegation

1.1.1 Completeness Test

• Law must be complete in all its essential terms and

conditions so that there is nothing for the delegate to do except to
enforce it.

1.1.2 Sufficient Standard Test

• Maps out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by

defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under
which it is to be pursued.
 CASES

• The minimum requirements of due process are notice and

hearing which may not be dispensed with because they are intended
as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. This
is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for,
to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions in view of the
nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect
the general welfare from a clear and present danger. The protection
of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power
which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police
power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By
reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is
described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain (Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659).

1.1.3 Legislative standard need

not be expressed

CASES

• Did the President's executive orders and the power

delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans
and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth
Amendment which restrains discriminatory legislation by Congress
as amounts to denial of due process? The Court found the
President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be
constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court,
took into account the great importance of military installations and
weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the
"solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their
motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions
served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny
relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court
viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial
discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having
ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of
danger than those of a different ancestry (Hirabayashi vs US, 320 US 81).”
•
The creation and subsequent reorganization of
administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to
authority granted to him by law. The choice of the President as
delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments
but also the direction of executive departments which the law
requires should have regional offices. The regions themselves are not
territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power

in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient
standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the
power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is
included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. On the
question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It
may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law
challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same
subject as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions,

the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant
to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the
Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs
consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the
public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative
regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to
suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the
withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now
constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to
reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative
regions (Chionbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253).