Criminal Procedure The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.

146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84,

156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No.
A. General matters 146-84 reads:

That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
FIRST DIVISION within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing
fully well that her account with the bank is insufficient, did, then and there, willfully,
G.R. No. 170298 June 26, 2007 unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No.
518672 in the amount of ₱562,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry,
received from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the drawee bank
MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner, for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated
vs. demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said check, accused
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
refused and still refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo
A. Jose in the above-stated amount of ₱562,000.00, Philippine Currency. 4
D EC ISIO N
The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the offense
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: was committed, the number and amount of the check. The pertinent data in the other
informations are as follows:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5) counts of
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and
Marietta M. Isip" to the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel S. Crim. Case Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check
Isip’s conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court No.
(RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended Decision 2 dated 26 October 2005 17 March 1984 518644 ₱50,000.00
denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration. 147-84
30 March 1984 518645 ₱50,000.00
The antecedents are the following: 148-84
12 March 1984 0300865 ₱150,000.00
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of 149-84
the RTC of Cavite City, under the following information:
25 March 1984 518674 ₱95,000.00
155-84
That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
29 March 1984 518646 ₱90,000.00
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received
156-84
from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00,
for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of 1 April 1984 518669 ₱25,000.00
the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the 157-84
herein accused once in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own personal use and follows:
benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
amount of ₱200,000.00, Philippine Currency. 3 confederating together and mutually helping one another, received from one Leonardo
A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings
Petitioner’s wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for seven counts valued at ₱120,000.00, with the obligation of selling the same on commission basis and
of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March
21, 1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by means of Thus, the operation went smoothly – that was before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn,
false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and ibid).
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them
to their own personal use and benefit and paid the same with Check Nos. 518646 and On February 3, 1984, at complainant’s residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant
518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the amount of ₱90,000 spouses received from complainant a 6 carat men’s ring valued at ₱200,000.00 with the
and ₱25,000, respectively, which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored for condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis for
insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. ₱200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the same, they have to return the ring if sold
Jose for the redemption of the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and preju dice on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).
in the abovestated amount of ₱120,000.00, Philippine Currency. 6
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead,
Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively,
and agreed date of return, and the number, date and amount of the checks issued in for ₱50,000.00 each as partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was
payment thereof, the four other informations are similarly worded. The specifics thereof acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
are as follows:
This particular men’s ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while
Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date of Check No./Date Amount
Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30,
Jewelry Receipt Return respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
257-84 030086/03-12-84 ₱150,000
₱150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84 In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainant’s residence
260-84 518647/03-25-84 in₱95,000
Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces
₱95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84 of south sea pearls with diamond worth ₱150,000.00. The condition was that the
261-84 518672/03-27-84 proceeds be turned over to complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn,
₱562,000
ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of turning over the proceeds or return the
₱562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
Choker Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984 for ₱150,000.00 (RCBC
378-84 518644/03-17-84 ₱50,000
check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).
₱200,000 02-03-84 -
518645/03-30-84 ₱50,000
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There
being only one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the cases followed. In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s residence in
Cavite City and got from the latter a men’s ring (7 carats) worth ₱200,000.00. Mr. Isip
The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in signed a receipt with the condition that he return the ring or deliver the proceeds, if
the parties’ respective briefs, are the following: sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an
extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip
defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No.
i) Prosecution Version. – 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel Isip.

Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were introduced to
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by complainant’s father,
Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then engaged in
the buy and sell of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitués (pp.
8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).
Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips convinced
complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant acceded to (p. 14,
ibid).
On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from complainant one
(1) Dome shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds valued at ₱120,000.00. As
with their previous agreement, the item was to be returned or the proceeds of the sale
be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however,
Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March
29, 1984 for ₱90,000.00 and ₱25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped
ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip and
Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta
Isip.
At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of
complainant and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one (1) baguette
necklace worth ₱95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip signed a
receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds thereof be delivered to
complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a
check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of ₱90,000.00 (pp. 3-5,
tsn, October 22, 1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa
against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant informing
him that Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that,
that was the most opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of jewelry were
delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit ‘O’)
acknowledging the value thereof to the tune of ₱562,000.00.
Exhibit ‘O’ contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered
on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit ‘O’, Mrs. Isip issued a
postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of
₱562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22,
1993).
This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and
Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP 22.
All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p.
14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds.
Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his
residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero
Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street,
Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964
(Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and
Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr.,
Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) – appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and trucking business;
while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX goods,
real estate and cars, which she started when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr.,
10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started
obtaining jewelry from losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as
security for financing she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant
Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose
ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo Jose, with
address at the Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem,
13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning early 1983, at complainant’s residence at Plaza
Tower Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband who
participated only as a witness, started having transactions with complainant who, on
different dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended various amounts to her for
which appellant Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and
complainant to be sold on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return
the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions,
appellant Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the
payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had returned
the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of payment for other
jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga,
Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to be registered
in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3,
4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant
have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-39; Tr.,
3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which were initially
dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact,
complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he filed against appellants. Complainant
however failed to return some of the redeemed and/or paid checks issued to him by
appellant Marietta on the pretext that he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20).
Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some default in payment and complainant
suspected that she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for the pledged
jewelry, complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid any
misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do not
comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain good relations with
complainant, appellant Marietta signed the document acknowledging obligations to him
in one sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants
learned that, although all the transactions were entered into in Manila, complainant filed
the cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7
On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
thereof reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M.
Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos.
146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby sentenced
to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and
of Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱120,000.00 for the value of the articles misappropriated;
Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
amount of ₱150,000.00; Crim. Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to Seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as m aximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of
₱562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of ₱200,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of
Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the
amount of ₱200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs. 8
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases
were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose’s
ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau
of Customs where he was connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its
allegations that the transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers
Condominium, and that complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the
testimony of Marietta Isip that the money with which the complainant initially agreed to
finance their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City
further refuted the defense’s claim that the transactions happened in Manila. The trial
court likewise found the defense’s contention, that the obligations were already paid and
set-off with the turnover to complainant of personal and real properties, to be
untenable for it is contrary to human nature to demand payment when the same had
already been made and the alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled
amicably and subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutor’s Office at
the instance of the complainant.
The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of
jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and
violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in Criminal
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner,
the trial court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 finding him to have acted as a mere witness when he signed the receipts
involved in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for
misappropriating a 7-carat diamond men’s ring which he secured from the complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the
following as errors:
-I-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND
DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING
THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN WAS
COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
- II -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES
BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANT MARIETTA M.
ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID
CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR OBLIGATIONS
INCURRED.
- III -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE
PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT LIABILITY
HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE
AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND
SAID APPELLANTS.
- IV -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP
AND MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22
RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM
UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME
FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY
THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY CIVIL. 9
Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby
extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.
In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City
(Branch XVII) –
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the
sentence imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
that the sum of ₱200,000.00 he was ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear
interest at the legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged; and
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged, but ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the sums
of ₱120,000.00, ₱150,000.00, ₱95,000.00, ₱562,000.00 and ₱200,000.00 representing the
amounts involved in said cases, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid. 10
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the venue was properly laid
and that the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or that the transactions
transpired at complainant’s ancestral home in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the
offenses charged took place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta
Isip of the charges on the ground that since the checks involved were issued prior to 8
August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to
Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84),
the Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for
the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found
the defense’s claim of redemption/dacion en pago – that real and personal properties
were conveyed to complainant who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases – to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate court
ruled that though novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise
of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in
court. In these five cases, it ruled that there was novation because complainant accepted
the checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said
cases. Consequently, the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner, 11 but held
them liable to complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s ruling of conviction. It found petitioner’s claims that he did
not receive the jewelry worth ₱200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the
receipt he issued for said jewelry was among those documents which were forced upon
him to sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to
preserve his friendship with complainant, to be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his deceased
wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and
severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84.12
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of Marietta
M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an Amended Decision with
the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par.
3 of the dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as follows:
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED,
accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged and the civil aspect of those cases DISMISSED."13
Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He
raises the following issues:
First – WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED;
Second – WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT
PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE
RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.
On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and conjectural, if not
altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose that any of the essential
elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City.
First, he states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of
the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non sequitur that simply because
complainant had an alleged ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually
lived there and had the transactions there with him when he and his late wife were
actual residents of Manila. Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was entered
into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is
likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was delivered and received
by petitioner and/or where it was to be accounted for that determines venue where
Estafa, if any, may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not
follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs,
the transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite City. He
asserts that there is no competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he
stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the subject of
Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the period from February to April 1984,
coincided with his alleged leave.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. 14
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but is an essential element of jurisdiction. 15 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction
to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within th e territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court m ay validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.16
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the
venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had sufficiently
shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his
ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence 17 from the
Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now
petitioner’s task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was
entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.18
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence
that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife
actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction
was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far
from Manila does not necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can
procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar.
It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once,
but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of
jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioner’s late
wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks in
Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions were not
entered into in Cavite City.
It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves
great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious.
Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner
of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate
properly testimonial evidence. 19 It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the
trial court have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial
court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court. 20 In the case at bar, we find no compelling
reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
and to apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the
particular transaction took place in Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ holding that the
ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received by petitioner is
seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of
the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship with
complainant, the fact remains that there is no showing that the ring was actually
delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no competent evidence that the ring subject
of Criminal Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.
We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported by the evidence on
record. The acknowledgment receipt 21 executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that
he received the ring in question. Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive any ring and
merely executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant
deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and obligation
of what he executed and signed. The following disputable presumptions weigh heavily
against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private
transactions have been fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has
been followed 22 Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that petitioner
understood fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It
devolves upon him then to overcome these presumptions. We, however, find that he
failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation that he signed the receipt to
preserve his friendship with complainant, there is no competent evidence that would
rebut said presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the
acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant in Cavite City.
Petitioner’s argument that he did not receive the subject ring 23 is further belied by the
testimony of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was borrowed by him on 7
March 1984.24 In all, the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same
occurred in Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal
liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-
84, the same was incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished by novation. The
personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than
sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as
shown by the fact that complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not
apply the rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84
because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim that he signed the
receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of prosecution and merely to
preserve their good relations. He claims the Court should not have denied the
application of the rule of novation on said case because the rejected initial claim (that he
did not receive the ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their good relations)
was but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the application of
the novation rule in said case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation 25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case
No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real properties conveyed to
complainant and/or to his family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever
balance remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that the
properties delivered to complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the
dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late
wife. This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties conveyed to
him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his deceased
wife. Complainant testified that the properties he received were in settlement of cases
other than the cases being tried herein. 26 In particular, he said that petitioner and his
spouse settled eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered
properties as payment. 27 It follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and
his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal cases herein tried were filed.
of novation, was that there were checks issued as payment, though subsequently
dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very
clear that neither petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject
ring that could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new obligation.
From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that
petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender
receives the money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return,
the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or
denies receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the
offender return the money or property. 28 All these are present in this case. Petitioner
received from complainant a seven-carat diamond (men’s ring), valued at ₱200,000.00,
for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of
the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or
converted said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the same. Despite
repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the proceeds
of the sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount of
₱200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to
be in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005, respectively, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his (alternative) defense of denial,
is untenable. The main reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said
case was that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to take place,
four essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an
agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old
obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84,
only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals applied the rule
FIRST DIVISION instant case.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349. July 12, 2001.] Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence." The Court, in exercising administrative
BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC, supervision of all lower courts, has not been remised in reminding the members of the
Tacloban City Branch 1, Respondent. bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the development in law and
jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in
R ESO LU T ION 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt with in numerous cases before
the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges should
always be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law so they could
KAPUNAN, J.: discharge their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In recent cases, 1 involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of
In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant Bernadette Mondejar reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the same penalty should be imposed on respondent
charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance judge.
of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case
No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning
Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged that respondent that a repetition of the same and similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
judge issued a "hold departure order" against her on October 23, 1998 in violation of severely.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 which provides that "hold departure orders" shall be
issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial SO ORDERED.
Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an opportunity to be
heard before issuing the questioned order.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge admitted having issued Endnotes:
said order because he was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He
alleged that he was not furnished a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy
only after he instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an 1. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Salvador B. Mendoza, A.M. No. 00-1281-
order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order dated October 23, 1998. As MTJ, September 14, 2000; Issuance of Hold Departure Order of Judge Luisito T.
regards the issue of denial of due process, respondent judge averred that complainant Adaoag, MTC, Camiling, Tarclac, A.M. No. 98-8-12-MTC, September 22, 1999; Hold
and her counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on Departure Order issued by Judge Eusebio M. Barot, MCTC, Branch 2, Aparri, Calayan,
said date. Cagayan, A.M. No. 98-8-108-MTC, August 25, 1999; Re: Hold Departure Order dated
April 13, 1998 issued by Judge Juan C. Nartatez, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 3,
The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge erred in issuing the Davao City, 298 SCRA 710 (1998).
assailed "hold departure order," recommended that he be severely reprimanded with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular
specifically provides that "hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial court." Clearly then, criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the
circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent judge to have issued one in the
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 167764 : October 9, 2009]
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D EC ISIO N
PERALTA, J.:
Before the court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November
24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also
assailed is the CA Resolution 2 dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
In an Information 3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City,
petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel
committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher,
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:
MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of
their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees.
However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation
office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo,
because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health
problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Bu rgos,
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19
last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put
her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma
and must undergo an operation.
Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at
Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo
got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on
their own without his nod as he had one to recommend.
Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital
two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and
defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the
family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a
hole with a catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.
Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left
side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down
because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal
state.
The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of
the company physician.
My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on
your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to
remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the
poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their
patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational
corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the
counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so -called
charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead
of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective,
they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk
is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These
hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to
milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from
manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2,
1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo
City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional
integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and
insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without
foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good
name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon being arraigned 5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision 6 finding petitioners guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz,
Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in
Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1)
Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as
Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.7
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order 8 dated February 20,
1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the
RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution
dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE
"LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF
MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT
ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER
OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE
OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS. 9
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory
imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an
incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the
poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who
sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print,
commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and
such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that
the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good.
They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of
the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and
that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters
of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion
column, which was the columnist's exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the
editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be
held responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable
by this Court in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are
raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every
indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the
weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that
factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless
there appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may
have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered,
may alter the result of the case ? a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do
not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of
libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari . Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging
them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of
Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the
Information dated October 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's
jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and
finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of
the trial court's jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled
that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal
case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the
landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by
the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches,
we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified
the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case. 11
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in
Macasaet v. People12 that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides
the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of
first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties
is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense. 15
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the
time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be
in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in
the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for
convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:
published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies
such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in
Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in
Cebu.???ñr?bl?š

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher,
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."

The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed
that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not
establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a private individual
with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
[Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names,
real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with
malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the
evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart
File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as
Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the
following disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word "published" is
utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants "cause[d] to be published in
'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila." The Information states that
the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in
Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in
general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that
Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 167304 : August 25, 2009]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (third division)
and VICTORIA AMANTE, Respondents.
D EC ISIO N
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28,
2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria
Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province
of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold
of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order
to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection,
which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she
obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22,
1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent
Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two
hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17,
1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsm an for
Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further
investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against
respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the
OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable
cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information 3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing
Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at
Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high -ranking
public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the
City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND
NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received by
reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period
required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine
Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante
filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION
FOR REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of
an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated
and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the
investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of
evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a
local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original
jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition 5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent
Amante's claim of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the
same should be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for
reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended
that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to
the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore,
falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the
OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any
distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution 6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case
against Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the
filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A
CASE INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE
THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE,
BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE
FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner
disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.7
According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine
the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A.
No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment 8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the
way the law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several
exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in
the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to
respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original
jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27
and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the
indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes,
the general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and
higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.
The same respondent proceeded to cite a decision 9 of this Court where it was held that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it
cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived,
enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by
acquiescen ce of the court.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public
officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in
relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of
Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a
background, this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms
of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that
public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. 13
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 14
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2
of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged com mission of the offense, as shown in
the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information
was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. 15 The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in
the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed
by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said
provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not
at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the
present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall
govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249
are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; andcralawlibrary
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire
jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others,
officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.
Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul
and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the
same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante,
being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission
of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following
ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act
of specifically including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended
cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the
Court was referring to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code only because they are the
specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when
they are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they
belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the
offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official
must belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional
or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with
salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a)
(1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she
is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is
not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the
case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in
the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public
officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not
mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a
public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this
Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public
office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the
discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan 16 where this Court
ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as
amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of
salary grade. According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly
constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is
either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the
said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A.
No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official,
this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated
and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in
relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public
officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be
charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses
or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official
or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held
to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office. 17 Thus, in the
case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court
held that:
The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under
said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender - that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with
grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with
aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter
had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner's administration. Clearly, based on
such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioner's official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its
April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his official
duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused's
violent act was precipitated by complainant's criticism of his administration as the
mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latter's privilege speech. It was
his response to private complainant's attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have
said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the
Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention
any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public
officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a
well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 21 unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. 22 The
seology in such a manner is always presumed. 23

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the
filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is
reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the
under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law
had been to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the
Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The
said reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses
involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an element of
the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section
4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the
public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have
been committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused's] office" by referring to
the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to
that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed
in relation to the accused's office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such
that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the
Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show
that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's] respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. x x x20
THIRD DIVISION cralawMAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at
ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059 The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Petitioner,
Resolutions1[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to
Present: quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

cralaw YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J., cralaw
Chairperson,
The Antecedents
- versus - cralawAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

cralaw cralaw CORONA,*

NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of
SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated: the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. January 22, 2008 She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
x- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
D EC ISIO N
December 31, 2000.

REYES, R.T., J.:

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her brother, of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her

swindling government funds? siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3[3]

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4[4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI
as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according
to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5[5] The
succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system -wide alliance of student councils
within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6[6]
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7[7] The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa,
defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her
brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by
falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the
University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall, and for which
purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation
gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION
PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by
accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and
misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite
repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
cralawCONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does
not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as
UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8[8]
has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes
covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers),
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI
(Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped.
Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada,
not from the coffers of the government.10[10]
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented
her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio
capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a
student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was
not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive
funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the
same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
It Sandiganbayan.11[11]
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12[12] It disputed petitioners
interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly
contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that
the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-
blown trial.13[13]
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a
public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the general powers of administration
and exercised the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public
office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is
erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner
was compensated.14[14]
Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners motion for lack of merit.15[15] It ratiocinated:
cralawThe focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over this case.
cralaw
cralawIt is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As
correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to
their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this
Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a
public official in relation to his office.
cralaw
cralawAccused-movants claim that being merely a member
in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under
Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
cralaw
cralaw(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xx xx cralaw
cralaw(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government -
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)
cralawIt is very clear from the aforequoted provision that
the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their
salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of
these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
cralawIs accused-movant included in the contemplated
provision of law?
cralawA meticulous review of the existing Charter of the
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to
which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general
powers of administration and corporate powers in the university,
such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law
such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the
university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact
for the government of the university such general ordinances and
regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes
of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the
President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and
other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours
of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem
proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence under such
regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had.
cralawIt is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of
trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors
or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
cralawIt is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents
of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to
those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This
draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board,
accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public
officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
 cralawIn her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely:
cralawFinally, this court finds that accused-movants
(a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer
contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not
matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on
committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from
the merits of this case.16[16]
President Estrada, not from the government.

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17[17] The

motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18[18] Our Ruling

Issue cralawThe petition cannot be granted.

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION.19[19] We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds.
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice
to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20[20] Remedial
measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon
and often dismissed.21[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to
quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court
appeals in a single action.22[22]
granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
court from further proceeding in the case.

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court ,23[23] the Court clearly explained and In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus: dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to
interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or
dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the
order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be
petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the
case.
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion
quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no
to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the
appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in
certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further
or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the
action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to
not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to
quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or
criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24[24]
a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The
following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule. We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
the case.
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by

R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25[25] She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26[26]
and in her memorandum of authorities.27[27]
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a m ere clerical or typographical error. It
bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.28[28]
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No.
3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief
legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29[29]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.30[30]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following:
cralawSec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
cralawA. cralawViolations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
 cralaw(1) cralawOfficials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
cralaw(a) cralawProvincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
cralaw(b) cralawCity mayor, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(c) cralawOfficials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
cralaw(d) cralawPhilippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
cralaw(e) cralawOfficers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintended or higher;
cralaw(f) cralawCity and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
cralaw(g) cralawPresidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
cralaw(2) cralawMembers of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
cralaw(3) cralawMembers of the judiciary without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution;
cralaw(4) cralawChairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and
cralaw(5) cralawAll other national and local officials
classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. cralawOther offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
C. cralawCivil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
cralawIn cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed
in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
cralawThe Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
cralawThe Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
cralawThe procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to
the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines,
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986.
cralawIn case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public
 officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
cralawAny provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the
filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized:
Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been
filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for
any person having family or close personal relation with any public
official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or
close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other
person having some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government, in which such public official has to
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word close
personal relation shall include close personal friendship, social and
fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to
intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause
any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960.
corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31[31] Pursuant to Section
10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with
the Sandiganbayan.32[32]
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among
petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on
those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,
private individuals. We quote:
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to
the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33[33] Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan
mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34[34] The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every
part of the act is to be taken into view.35[35] In other words, petitioners interpretation
lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under
the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36[36] Optima statuti
interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang
mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
cralawEvidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible
reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No.
1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to
the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.
cralawIn Perlas, Jr. v. People,37[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the
National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held
then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally
as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development
of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive
Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No.
69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F.
Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively
(E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of
Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant
to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained
 under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27,
1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC
as a regular government agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary
or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that
We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,
We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39[39] The 1987
Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc
v. Sandiganbayan.38[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40[40] the Court held that:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred
the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would
by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated,
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
cases and those of the government employees separately charged for
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged,
Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political
as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly
committed by government employees in conspiracy with private
creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such
persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive,
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be
right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said
even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
nonetheless not be possible.

cralawIn Laurel v. Desierto,41[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of

Petitioner UP student regent
a public office:
is a public officer.
 similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45[45] By express
mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so cralawMoreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential
invested is a public officer.42[42]
element of public office.46[46] At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47[47]

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an

salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be

also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48[48]

People,43[43] We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
technical training.49[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares
provision of law.44[44]
no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50[50]

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
The offense charged was committed In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
being then a student regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions,
in relation to public office, according
committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position,
to the Information. with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

cralawPetitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer,
the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office.
cralawClearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this ground.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of
the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her
Source of funds is a defense that should
to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private be raised during trial on the merits.

capacity and not in relation to public office.

cralawIt is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas
private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no
cralawIt is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
leg to stand on.
information.51[51] More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.52[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of defendant or respondent.53[53] cralawWe cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the
Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Under the information, it is averred that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President,
and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).
 cralawAgain, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A
of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57[57]
the merits of the instant case.54[54] The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete
candor and honesty before the courts.58[58]

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his SO ORDERED.

reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules RUBEN T. REYES cralaw
stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55[55] where Atty
Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ram os in connection with a criminal
case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different
from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56[56] Associate Justice
Chairperson
 CERTIFICAT ION

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ cralaw RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Associate Justice
Division.

AT TE ST AT IO N

cralawREYNATO S. PUNO

cralawChief Justice
cralawI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

Endnotes:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 137237 - September 17, 2002
ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY ESQUIVEL,
Petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HERMINIGILDO
EDUARDO, Respondents.
R ESO LU T ION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus 1 with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to annul and set aside:
(1) the Ombudsman resolution 2 dated June 15, 1998 finding prima facie case against
herein petitioners, and (2) the order3 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Further, in their supplemental petition, 4 petitioners assail the Sandiganbayan for taking
cognizance of cases without or beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and
the People of the Philippines as additional parties in this case.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are both residents of
Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and
Investigation Division (RIID), Police Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga. In their respective complaint-affidavits,5 filed before the Philippine National
Police - Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional
Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein
petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel, 6 municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark
Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal
arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats. Also
included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and
LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S
Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal
Police Force of dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30 p.m.
of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parents' house at Sta.
Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu,
SPO2 Almayda, LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons accompanied
them. Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service
pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban
Exemption. They then forced him to board petitioners' vehicle and brought him to the
Jaen Municipal Hall.
PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor
Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor
Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said, "Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita,
aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!" (You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will
create an accident for you. Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the municipal hall,
Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardo inside an
adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying "Patayin mo
na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at report." (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a report.)
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify what happened to his
teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel
then ordered P/S Insp. Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Station to file charges
against PO2 Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape
with a handgun, while Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel was holding the latter. PO2
Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he was
told that he would be released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a
statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was among the
law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the
mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections
to the mayor.7
In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a med ical certificate
showing the injuries he suffered and other documentary evidence. 8
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the
pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate
action.9
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary
investigation and required petitioners and their companions to file their respective
counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit,10 petitioners and their companions
denied the charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a fugitive
from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They further alleged
that the gun confiscated from PO2 Eduardo was the subject of an illegal possession of
firearm complaint.
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the impugned resolution 11
recommending that both Mayor Esquivel and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony "Eboy"
Esquivel be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel
alone for grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below were
dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.
On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the aforesaid
resolution.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No. 2477712 for less
serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and Mark Anthony "Eboy" Esquivel,
and Criminal Case No. 2477813 for grave threats against petitioner mayor, were filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the August 14, 1998
resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As directed by the Sandiganbayan,
they likewise filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation 14 with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP in the assailed
order15 dated December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998, the Ombudsman approved
the OSP's order of denial.
On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not
guilty to the charges.
With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously granted by the
Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the
matter to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents
in rendering the resolution and the order.
On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners' motion 16 reiterating their plea
for the issuance of a TRO directing public respondents to refrain from prosecuting
Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778.17
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION WHEN
HE WAS RELEASED FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN,
NUEVA ECIJA;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS
WHEN PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE ARREST OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST
ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA
UNDER CRIM. CASE NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATION OF GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY; and
3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS.
Petitioners' formulation of the issues may be reduced to the following:
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of the
informations against petitioners?
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction
over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in their favor, namely, the admission of PO2
Eduardo that he was in good physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen,
Nueva Ecija.18 With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that
he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against him and need not be proven in any
other proceeding.19
Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the OSP,
counter that petitioners raise a factual issue which is not a proper subject of a certiorari
action. They further postulate that this is the very same defense advanced by petitioners
in the charges against them and being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be
threshed out in a full-blown trial.20
We find the present petition without merit.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. 21
Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. 22 Said exercise of powers is based upon his
constitutional mandate23 and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and
the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an
information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 24 Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,25 we held that:
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the
determination of the Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided
there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the disputed resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave
abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardo's admission that he was in good physical condition
when he was released from the police headquarters. 26 Such admission was never
brought up during the preliminary investigation. The records show that no such
averment was made in petitioners' counter-affidavit27 nor was there any document
purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as an annex or exhibit.
Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration. 28 In his opposition
to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit signing a document to the effect that he was in
good physical condition when he left the police station. However, the admission merely
applied to the execution of said document and not to the truthfulness of its contents.
Consequently, the admission that petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of
evidence best addressed to the public respondents' appreciation. It is evidentiary in
nature and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits.
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy. As previously held, but
now bears stressing:
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate
the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed
the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. 29
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayan's exercise of jurisdiction
over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners theorize that the latter has no
jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No.
7975.30 As the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned
therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.31
Petitioners' claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,32 Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,33
and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,34 we already held that municipal mayors fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark
Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,35 provides that it
is only in cases where "none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher" 36 that "exclusive original
jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended." 37 Note
that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. 38
Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor
Esquivel, whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over
Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari cannot
issue in petitioners' favor.
For the same reason, petitioners' prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied.
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to
cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. 39 As earlier
discussed, the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly
founded on law.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the
ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are adequate and available. 40 Prohibition is
granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the
petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is
generally held sufficient reason for denying the issuance of the writ. 41 In this case,
petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could have
filed a motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they did not. They
have only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown any
adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for
time to file a motion to quash the informations, during their much delayed
arraignment,42 but its denial is not a proper subject for certiorari or prohibition as said
denial is merely an interlocutory order. 43
Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the
attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to the
alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. 44 The foundation of this rule is the respect and
consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing unnecessary
litigation;45 it cannot be presumed that the lower court would not properly rule on a
jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented to it. 46 The records show that
petitioners only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan
before this Court.
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and
not a discretionary duty. 47 The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. 48 Hence, this Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the
Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of
mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it may be. 49
Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary
course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of law, mandamus
will not lie.50
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NOS. 146646-49. March 11, 2005]
ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, Petitioner, v. . THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D EC ISIO N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, assailing the Resolution 1 dated December 18, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan
(1st Division) and Order2 dated January 11, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.
The instant petition stemmed from the sworn complaint3 of Ana May V. Simbajon
against Judge Rogelio M. Esteban, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Cabanatuan City on September 8, 1997, docketed as I.S. Nos. 9-97-8239.
In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City
Government of Cabanatuan City. Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, upon incessant
request of Presiding Judge Reogelio Esteban, herein petitioner.
After her detail with Branch 1, the item of bookbinder became vacant. Thus, she
applied for the position but petitioner did not take any action on her application. On
July 25, 1997, when she approached petitioner in his chambers to follow up her
application, he told her, 'Ano naman ang magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito? Mula ngayon,
girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw papasok ka dito sa opisina ko, at araw-araw, isang halik. (What can
you offer me in exchange for my signature? From now on, you are my girlfriend. You
will enter this office everyday and everyday, I get one kiss. ') 4 Ana May refused to accede
to his proposal as she considered him like her own father.
Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for appointment. Thereafter, he suddenly
kissed her on her left cheek. She was shocked and left the chambers, swearing never to
return or talk to petitioner.
On August 5, 1997, at around 9:30 in the morning, Virginia S. Medina, court interpreter,
informed Ana May that petitioner wanted to see her in his chambers regarding the
payroll. As a subordinate, she complied. Once inside, petitioner asked her if she has
been receiving her salary as a bookbinder. When she answered in the affirmative, he
said, 'Matagal na pala eh, bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko? Di ba sabi ko say iyo,
girlfriend na kita? (So youve been getting the salary for sometime already. Why didnt you
report here in my office? Didnt I tell you, youre my girlfriend. ') 5 ςrνll
Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is like a father to her and that he is
a married man with two sons.
Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and said, 'Hindi pwede yan, mahal kita.
(I cant allow that for I love you. ') He embraced her, kissing her all over her face and
touching her right breast.
Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers crying. She threw the payroll on
the table of her co-employee, Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter sensed something was
wrong and accompanied Ana May to the restroom. There she told Elizabeth what
happened.
On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for violation of R.A. 7877 (the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Law of 1995) were filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan,
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702.
Also on July 1, 1998, two Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the
same court, docketed as Criminal Cases. 24703-04.
On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness on the ground that he has been placed
four (4) times in jeopardy for the same offense.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the prosecution to
determine if the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were committed in
relation to petitioner's functions as a judge.
On September 3, 1999, the prosecution filed Amended Informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 24703 and 24704 quoted as follows:
Criminal Case No. 24703:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding
Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having
been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands
or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition
for the signing of complainant's permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court,
thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious desire,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek
against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Criminal Case No. 24704
That on or about the 25th day of June 1997 in in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding
Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having
been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands
or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition
for the signing of complainant's permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court,
thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious desire,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek
against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7 ςrνll
On September 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Amended Informations
on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged
considering that they were not committed in relation to his office as a judge.
On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion to quash,
the prosecution filed the following Re-Amended Information in Criminal Case No.
24703:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Cou rt, the above-named
accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding
Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having
been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexu al demands
or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition
for the signing of complainant's permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court,
thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious desire,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab private complainant, kiss
her all over her face and touch her right breast against her will and consent, to her
damage and detriment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8 ςrνll
which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
On December 18, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion to quash the
Amended Informations, holding that 'the act of approving or indorsing the permanent
appointment of complaining witness was certainly a function of the office of the
accused so that his acts are, therefore, committed in relation to his office. 9 ςrνll
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Order dated January 11, 2001.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness filed against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed in
relation to his office as a judge; and the fact that he is a public official is not an essential
element of the crimes charged.
The Ombudsman, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, maintains that
the allegations in the two (2) Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04
indicate a close relationship between petitioner's official functions as a judge and the
commission of acts of lasciviousness.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, 10
reads in part:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
xx x
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
In People v. Montejo,11 we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation
to the office if the offense is 'intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate
relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged
in the Information. 12 This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information.13 Hence, where the information is wanting in specific factual averments to
show the intimate relationship/connection between the offense charged and the
discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case. 14
ςrνll
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987, 15 petitioner, as presiding
judge of MTCC, Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power to recommend
the appointment of Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. As alleged in the Amended
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04, she was constrained to approach
petitioner on June 25, 1997 as she needed his recommendation. But he imposed a
condition before extending such recommendation - she should be his girlfriend and
must report daily to his office for a kiss. There can be no doubt, therefore, that
petitioner used his official position in committing the acts complained of. While it is
true, as petitioner argues, that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact
that as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, he has the
authority to recommend the appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words,
the crimes allegedly committed are intimately connected with his office.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.16 The Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain
allegations showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in
relation to his official function.
Accordingly, we rule that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adm itting the Amended Informations for
acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Sandiganbayan dated December 18, 2000 and January 11, 2001, in Criminal Cases Nos.
24703-04 are AFFIRMED. 'Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D EC ISIO N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. 1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr. 2 assailing the
Decision 3 promulgated on September 16, 2005 and Resolution 4 dated November 8,
2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.
The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the
Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of
the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor
Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the
provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto
A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report 6 dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for
violation of Section 3(e) 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new
President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is
no longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against petitioners. 8
Nonetheless, in an Information 9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Memorandum 10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the
dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to
include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. The Amended
Information 12 reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or]
subsequent thereto, [in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named
accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar,
and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both
having been public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the release from
the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal
Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by Honorable
Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and
thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.’s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused
Ambil’s residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was
done without any court order, thus accused in the performance of official functions had
given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each. 13
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason,
however, that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his
person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to
petitioners, Adalim’s sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners
to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case
after the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to
File Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial 14
but the same was denied.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A.
Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to
2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed the
transfer of Adalim’s detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail
as the primary reason for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter
would be in the company of inmates who were put away by his sister and guards
identified with his political opponents. 15
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of E astern
Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested
while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998.
According to Atty. White, she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after
Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s
safety.16
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar.
He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed
against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim
confirmed Atty. White’s account that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for,
or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a
prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised clenched fist. Sensing danger, he
called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at Am bil, Jr.’s residence for almost
three months before he posted bail after the charge against him was downgraded to
homicide.17
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at home
to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality
of Mayor Adalim’s arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking him for
detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed
him that he was under the governor, in the latter’s capacity as a provincial jailer.
Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governor’s order to
relinquish custody of Adalim. 18
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be
dilapidated and undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of
looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while
an isolation cell of 10 square meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, there were
several nipa huts within the perimeter for use during conjugal visits. 19
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed
Decision 20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to
accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access
to television and other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that
under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be released or
transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. 21
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s transfer was made
to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any
actual threat on Adalim’s life but relied simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The
Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within
the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate
Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s failure to turn over
Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of
Interior and Local Government.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated
the incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced
him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8)
months.
Hence, the present petitions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS
AMENDED, APPLIES TO PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
 II IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER SHOULD BE
PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
NO. 3019, AS AMENDED. UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
III
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE
INTENT, MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED
GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR
SECTION 3(e). ADALIM "UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGE TO THE
PREJUDICE x x x OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST,
SPECULATIVE.23
IV

The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether
AND JAILER UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III,
a provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner;
CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND
and (3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under
SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975 HAS THE
Article 11(5)24 of the RPC.
AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION PRISONER.

V Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can be condensed into two:
(1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR
THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not
apply to his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary
VI nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a
private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the
ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under the Administrative Code of
ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 22 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying circumstance
of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty.
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the Sandiganbayan:
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him
I and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following
the orders of a superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he
invokes immunity from criminal liability.
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR
MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR IN For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of
CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL. jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions
of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it is enough to show that in performing
II their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to
attach under the provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private
party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the unwarranted
benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detention
prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that petitioners were motivated by bad
faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst.
Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of authority to take custody of a
detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not
entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xx xx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must
concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. 26
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers
discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the
Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with
violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249. 28 The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No.
1606, as amended, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;]
xx xx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xx xx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification 29
from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his
position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only
when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner
Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose
position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly
with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over
them – the Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not sim ply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons
may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property." x x x 31
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith
in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is
no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s contention that he is authorized to transfer t he
detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local chief
executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police.—The
extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police
force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective
jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine
hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department of the Interior
and Local Government Act of 1990," and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 6975 32 on the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control over
all city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the
provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by the
National Government for not more than three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. 33 An officer in control lays down the rules
in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. 34
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties." 35 If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power
of supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully
executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. 36 The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down
the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them. 37
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has
authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of
said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the
contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event
that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act
should be done, but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites
Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in
support. Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the province shall be
charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the
same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the government of
provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed
to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer
shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner
in which classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to
all the benefits and privileges of classified employees, except that he shall hold office
only during the term of office of the appointing governor and until a successor in the
office of the jailer is appointed and qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial
governor shall, under the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the
province, supply proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the provincial
board may, in its discretion, let the contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some
other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again,
nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the "provincial jailer,"
or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take personal custody of prisoners.
What is clear from the cited provision is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail
keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the procurement of food and
clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those acts which
are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared
by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it 38 by the Constitution. Therefore,
in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor can only enforce the law but
not supplant it.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section
173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring province
in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial
prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention by legal
process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by
legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the
governor. This was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication 40 dated
October 6, 1998 addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier
received by this Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody Mayor
Francisco "Aising" Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by
virtue by a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of
Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that an arrested person be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the
accused municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power of
supervision vested unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does not,
definitely, include the power to take in custody any person in detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself with in the
bounds of law and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to
avoid legal complications.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer." Said
petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful
defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former political party mate, 41
betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime.
As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing
undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his
official, administrative or judicial functions.
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving
unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with
murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of
petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly
because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses,
permits or other concessions" and he is not such government officer or employee.
Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a
public officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has
obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan 42 where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is
"charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." Following is an
excerpt of what we said in Mejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the
view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e)
is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may
not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as
applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions. 43 (Italics supplied.)
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution for
violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 45
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A.
No. 3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from the government.
Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does
the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners’ case
beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than
"private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning
in legal parlance46 as distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a
human being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public
officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private
person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail
and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to
Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder.
Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim
was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official,
administrative or judicial functions. 48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate
or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.
"Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit
or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority
or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. 49
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other
than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters,
provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television.
Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his
lawyers that the mayor’s life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence
of any risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in having
unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed
fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and
compelling reason to warrant Adalim’s detention outside the provincial jail. For one,
there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used
to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing
repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the
presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court order was still
indispensable for his transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed
by petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any
person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to apply,
two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.50 Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s
case.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he
ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the
resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of
his duty or lawful exercise of his office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience
to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC,
any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply,
the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2)
such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate
to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the first requisite is present in this case.
While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was
then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to
carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar,
petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a
court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable
as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1) 52 of the RPC.
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same
object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it
with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently
independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. 53
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful
cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite
the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind
the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person
under detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor
who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power to
transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr.
resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally responsible as conspirators.
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes a public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019
with imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than
fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same.1avvphi1 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an
incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the
same penalty.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and four (4) months.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO* LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICAT ION
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 149311 : February 11, 2005]
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ,
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION through DIRECTOR
REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS LEO B. DACERA III, MISAEL
M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE P. LAZARO, Petitioners, v. HON.
HERMOGENES R. LIWAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO,
Respondents.
D EC ISIO N
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order
dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued
by the late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934.
The facts are as follows:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics
Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the
Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B.
Aquino, other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her
complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputed to
respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-
76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman
found the complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and thus
required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. On
February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that
the charges against them be dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn
statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by Mary
Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. 1 NBI Director Reynaldo
Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and
private individuals for the following alleged crimes:
A.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang,
James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; andcralawlibrary
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming. 2
In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this recommendation was
made after taking the sworn statements of Mary Ong and other witnesses such as
Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of
these witnesses were attached to the letter. 3
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson,
Aquino and the other persons named in the witnesses' sworn statements. Lacson and
Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit
their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the DOJ Multi-
Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their counsel, manifested in a
letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the
complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the
Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. Furthermore,
they claimed that according to the Court's ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over crim inal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private
respondents.5
The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, on May 28, 2001,
denied the dismissal of the cases before it through an Order that stated the following as
basis of the denial:
It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not allowed
under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]
It appearing further that respondent's rank and/or civil service classification has no
bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property
[or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents' discharge of their official duties;
It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated October 5, 1995,
provides that offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular
courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City
Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality; 6
On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order, the Solicitor General
received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed by Lacson and Aquino before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and
Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They
argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the
Ombudsman's mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v.
Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed prohibiting the
Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson
and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is hereby
GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby ISSUED,
enjoining the respondents and their subordinates, agents[,] and other persons acting in
their behalf, individually and collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in
IS No. 2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the petitioners
to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction over the offenses subject matter of the
investigations before it, or until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as
being committed by the petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.
Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue without bond, as
there is no showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the parties that the respondents will
suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with
Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ, through then Secretary
Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of
prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No.
2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS
DOJ AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 08, SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER
THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE
FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN
ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES,
RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO
DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
AND THE DOJ.
V
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE
SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY
HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE
PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 8
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition puts forth one central
question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint
involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in
the second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed
against the respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts
alleged.
First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.
Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to
reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do so
for the sake of the speedy administration of justice and that this is all the more
compelling, in this case, considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the
PNP and the crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide attention.
Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not
only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the
authorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who may need to clear their names
and reputations of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as
ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice. The rules of
procedure are not to be applied when such application would clearly defeat the very
rationale for their conception and existence. 9
Now, to the merits.
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV,
governing the DOJ, which states:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. 'It is the declared policy of the State to provide the
government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. 'To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall
have the following powers and functions:
.. .
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system;
.. .
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978,
provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of
Justice. - There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under
the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the
Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional
State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter
provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
all cases involving violations of penal laws.
Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction
over the cases filed against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of
Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy
v. Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police
and military officials. They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the
Ombudsman has already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that
there are already pending complaints filed therewith involving the same accused, facts
and circumstances.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; '.10
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect taken over the
investigation of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory
agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag
gave the following rationale:
Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling of this Court that the
respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the same matter
under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the
resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the
Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsman's
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly
allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies
conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the Ombudsman. That is the
situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to meddle with the investigation
of similar cases being investigated by the Ombudsman would put them to a higher
plane than the source of their powers with respect to such cases. This is, of course,
anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to ordinary common sense. It
would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to
be making recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the Ombudsman in
matters being handled by such Office itself. Such recommendation would be pre-
emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman may take over, at
any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as the petitioners.
It is the feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that provision
of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other Government agencies of
preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken
cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken
hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of the proceedings,
the investigation being conducted by another agency. It has the case before it.
Rudimentary common sense and becoming respect for power and authority would thus
require the respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled by the
Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they are deputized prosecutors
by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of
the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular po wer and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must
be recalled.11
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the
Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or non-
feasance of public officers or employees. 12 To discharge its duty effectively, the
Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which puts it
a notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. First and foremost, it
extended independence to the Ombudsman and insulated it from the intrusions of
partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent qualification
requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be
natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and must not have been
candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. 13 The
Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of the
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a
prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of office. 14 They were given
a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment. 15 Upon their cessation from office,
they are prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately succeeding
election.16 Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the Constitution granted the Office
of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy. 17 Clearly, all these measures are intended to
enhance the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as
the principal and primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled
by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the
usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate
complaints against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal
complaint lodged before it. 18 It can inquire into acts of government agencies and public
servants based on reports in the media and those which come to his attention through
sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with the Ombudsman
is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant
is sufficient information detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The
ordinary citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to
minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Vis - à-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power
to investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies.
As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant role played by the
Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said
law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency, the investigation of such cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not
given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is notco-equal with other
investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate the power but the
delegate cannot claim equal power.
Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and
employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the
DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional
independence granted to the Ombudsman.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter,19 the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of
the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.20 Thus, assuming
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct
of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained
freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between
these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is
the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence, it has the
authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual situation similar
to that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG),21 the Court upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No. 1,
issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in
Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over
said cases is not exclusive but a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse
of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that
the Court recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate all ill-gotten wealth cases.22 In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the
PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of
sequestration orders against petitioner's assets.
In Sanchez v. Demetriou,23 the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every
the DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at
of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense.
warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were filed in court by
the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility that the
power to conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him. The Court two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with conflicting
reiterated its previous ruling that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.
public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared authority.
However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public
was filed solely with the DOJ.
funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of Government, inaduplication of
proceedings already started with the Ombudsman.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,24 a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse of
panel of prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The pertinent
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent
issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the said Information Judge.
without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative
and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the
case. Again, it should be noted that the complaint in that case was addressed solely to WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
the provincial prosecutor.
No costs.
The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix 25 and Honasan v. Panel
of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ26 where the letter-complaint against petitioners public SO ORDERED.
officers were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed ahead with the Office of Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous and Garcia, JJ., concur.
exercise of power between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or
orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a complaint against
respondents initially with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
which was immediately acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the
records, she thereafter refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI and the
DOJ.

Not only this.

The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary

investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an orderly
administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a
casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. 27 When one is hailed before an investigative body on
specific charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary investigation
immediately exposes the respondent and his family to anxiety, humiliation and expense.
To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative
bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147097 : June 5, 2009]
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and
ANGELITO A. PELAYO, Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as
OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.
D EC ISIO N
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP)
Resolution 1 dated September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal cases
filed against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein
petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman
Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year
1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his
CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as
Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to
P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales,
Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into
cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution 2 dated May 29, 2000
recommending the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said
Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28) Informations
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114 were filed against herein petitioners
before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the
cases against petitioners.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution 3 dated September
18, 2000. It recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or
insufficiency of evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review
the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum 4 dated October 24, 2000, the OLA
recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to
proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP
Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the
subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of
criminal proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that:
I.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR
ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES. 5
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no
authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners
because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is
clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of proper
cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. They point
out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly
the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity
from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have
no power and authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any liability because the
checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he
made from his personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate MR. COLAYCO:
implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo victims.
Yes.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
MR. MONSOD:
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been
settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman Yes.
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional
infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the
xx x
Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the
Ombudsman.6
MR. RODRIGO:
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall continue to function and
the Ombudsman shall "exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by exercise its powers as provided by law."
law." Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:
MR. COLAYCO:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was
indeed present, the Commission [referring to the Constitutional Commission of 1986] That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe
such other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved MR. RODRIGO:
by the Commission after several amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8,
Section 13, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, which So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.
provides:
MR. COLAYCO:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
That is correct.
xx x
MR. RODRIGO:
Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other functions or duties as may
be provided by law. And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by the
Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as may be provided by law." The sponsors
admitted that the legislature later on might remove some powers from the Tanodbayan
Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties and transfer these to the Ombudsman.
to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during
interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:
MR. COLAYCO:
xx x
Madam President, that is correct.
MR. RODRIGO:
xx x
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the
Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers or perform such functions or duties as may be MR. RODRIGO:
provided by law." So, the legislature may vest him with powers taken away from the
Tanodbayan, may it not?cralawred
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which
has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be
raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be
implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
xx x
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
xx x
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we
are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can
exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance with the
direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this time
we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels
that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be
more effective.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible
disability.7
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under
the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was
explained, thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
as among the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No.
6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office
of the Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
xx x
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function
and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The
underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630
or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of
the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other
powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise
such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is
indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may
remove some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer
them to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other
powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress did
through the passage of R.A. No. 6770. 8
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, 10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its
ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office
of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon
authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. 11
The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on
R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the
decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to prosecute carries
with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been
delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution,
Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the
Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions
of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again,
this contention deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts
in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Co urt thereof.
That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed
to further argument.14 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Corporation,15 the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating
that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice thatwhen a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt
to relitigate the same issue.16
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
"[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons,
otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court
would be immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the
solemn pronouncements dim inished."17 Verily, only upon showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system
from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the
Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not
successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and
supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the
OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of
facts, speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is really whether the
Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of
probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be
stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment. This has been emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals,18 to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the
ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine
and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does
not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error
committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be
remedied by certiorari . An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari . Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this
Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or
substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.19
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable
cause would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which
the Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for
Certiorari should not be given due course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,20 imparting the value of the Ombudsman's
independence, stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute
any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the
Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by substantial evidence.
Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of public
service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from
the three branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any
outside pressure and improper influence. 21
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is
imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that said public official acted with grave abuse
of discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,22 the Court
elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x 23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman acted in a manner
described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770
and properly exercised its power of control and supervision over the OSP when it
disapproved the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.

It should also be noted that the petition does not question any order or action of the
Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have been included as a respondent
in this petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 147723 : August 22, 2008]
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST
LOANS AND/OR PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Petitioners, v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, ALICIA LL. REYES,
LOURDES M. MONTENEGRO, SERAFIN M. MONTENEGRO, BASILIO
LIRAG and FELIX LIRAG, Respondents.
D EC ISIO N
TINGA, J.:
Respondents Lourdes M. Montenegro, Serafin M. Montenegro, Basilio Lirag and Felix
Lirag were all officers or stockholders of Midland Cement Corporation (Midland
Cement), a corporation which was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on 14 June 1963. On 18 January 1968, Midland Cement obtained a foreign
guarantee loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the amount of
USD 18.5M, or an equivalent of P110M. The loan was secured to finance the
acquisition of a brand new cement plant to be supplied and installed by French
contractor Fives Lille-Cail on a turn-key basis. The loan was approved by DBP in Board
Resolution No. 539. At the time the loan was secured in 1968, Basilio and Felix Lirag, as
well as Serafin Montenegro, were among the directors or officers of Midland Cement.
Between 1971 and 1982, Midland Cement and DBP entered into ten successive
agreements for the obtention of additional loans and/or for restructuring of accounts.
In 1972, DBP became the majority stockholder of Midland Cement, and by 1981, it was
already the owner of 92.89% of the shares in the corporation. 1 In 1986, the properties
of Midland Cement were sold by the Assets Privatization Trust (APT) for
P171,825,000.00, even though the outstanding balance of the corporation at that point
was over a billion pesos. 2
On 8 October 1992, then President Fidel Ramos created the Ad Hoc Fact-finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee), petitioner herein, through
Administrative Order No. 13, and broadened the scope of its powers through
Memorandum Order No. 61 dated 9 November 1992. Among the functions tasked by
the said memorandum order to the Ad Hoc Committee is the investigation, inventory
and study of all non-performing loans, including both behest and non-behest loans. It
also established an eight (8)-point criterion for possible utilization "as a frame of
reference in determining a behest loan," namely: (a) it is undercollateralized; (b) the
borrower corporation is under-capitalized; (c) direct or indirect endorsement by high
government officials like the presence of marginal notes; (d) stockholders, officers or
agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; (e) deviation of use of loan
proceeds from the purpose intended; (f) use of corporate layering; (g) non-feasibility of
the project for which financing is being sought; and (h) extraordinary speed in which
the loan release was made. 3 It also stipulated that behest loans may likewise entail
criminal liability in addition to civil liability. 4
On 25 February 1998, the Ad Hoc Committee referred to then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto (Ombudsman Desierto) the accounts of Midland Cement, along with those of
two other corporations, "for preliminary investigation to determine the existence of
probable cause of violation of R.A. No. 3019, banking laws/regulations and/or other
penal statutes."5 The referral letter was accompanied by the Complaint-affidavit6
executed by Atty. Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador), a Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) consultant detailed at the Ad Hoc Committee. The
complaint was docketed as OMB-0-98-0563.
Atty. Salvador averred that at the time the initial loan of P110M was procured from
DBP in 1968, Midland Cement had no sufficient capital to be entitled to that large a
loan since its total assets then amounted to only P77M and its paid-up capital amounted
to only around P9.15M.7 Allegedly, the loan itself was without sufficient collateral. 8 Atty.
Salvador observed that despite these facts, Midland Cement was able to obtain
additional loans from DBP until 1981. 9
According to Atty. Salvador, as of 30 June 1986, Midland Cement had an outstanding
and unpaid balance of P1,027,376,000.00 with a property appraised value of
P329,479,000.00. As the properties of Midland Cement were sold by the APT sometime
in 1987 for only P171,825,000.00, the Philippine government incurred a loss amounting
to P855,551,000.00.10 He further recounted that the cement plant that was constructed
following the loan was leased to the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines for a minimal consideration of P2.00/40-kilogram bag of cement produced,
and that Midland Cement committed misrepresentation when unknown to DBP, it
entered with Fives Lille-Cail into a side agreement whereby Midland Cement bound
itself to sub-contract the civil works on the plant with a local contractor even though
DBP had already guaranteed the supply/construction of the plant on a turn-key basis.11
From these premises, Atty. Salvador asseverated that the loans extended to Midland
Cement were behest loans based on the following criteria:
1. It is under collateralized. That at the time the P110.00 million loan was granted, total
assets including to be acquired amounted to P77,000,000 only;
2. The borrower corporation is under capitalized. That as of December 31, 1967 the
paid-up capital amounted to P9,158,180.00 only;
3. The borrower corporation grossly violated the loan agreement by entering a side
agreement unknown to DBP;
4. The stockholders and/or officers are known cronies of Ex-Pres. F.E. Marcos.12
Atty. Salvador further concluded that the transactions had been entered into in violation
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act), particularly
Section 3(e) and (g) thereof:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practice of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xx x
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
xx x
g. Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
Atty. Salvador identified eight (8) persons who could be made liable for violation of the
loan terms and conditions. Four of them G.S. Licaros, 13 J.V. de Ocampo, Leonides
Virata and respondent Alicia Ll. Reyes (Reyes) were members of the DBP Board of
Governors. The other four respondents Lourdes M. Montenegro, Serafin M.
Montenegro, Basilio Lirag and Felix Lirag 'were officers and principal stockholders of
Midland Cement.14
In its 25 August 1998 Resolution, 15 the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman concluded that the loans extended to Midland
Cement could not be considered behest loans as the proceeds thereof were used for a
business purpose the construction of the cement plant and that there was no deviation
of use of the said proceeds from the intended purpose. The EPIB also observed that
based on the allegations in the complaint, the government did not bear the burden of
satisfying the loan obligation of Midland Cement; that there was no unwarranted benefit
or preference accorded to the respondents since the loan was collateralized; and that the
process of loan evaluation and investigation had been rigorously followed before the
application was finally approved. 16
The EPIB Resolution was elevated for review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman. On 5 October 1998, Special Prosecution Officer III
Orlando I. Ines issued a Memorandum 17 for Ombudsman Desierto containing his
assessment of the complaint. The memorandum recounted the allegations of Atty.
Salvador in the latter's sworn statement, and determined:
[T]here is no doubt that the loans of Midland Cement Corporation are behest loan[s]
based on the following criteria, as follows:
1. It is under collateralized. That at the time the P110.00 million loan was granted, total
assets including those to be acquired amounted only to P77M;
2. The borrower corporation is [under capitalized]. As of December 31, 1967 the [paid -
up] capital amounted only to P9.758M;
3. The borrower corporation grossly violated the loan agreement by entering a side
agreement unknown to DBP;
4. The stockholders and/or officers are known cronies of Ex-Pres. F.E. Marcos.
It appearing from the foregoing facts and circumstances on record, it is beyond doubt
that the respondents violated Sec. 3(e) and (g) of [R.A. No.] 3019.
But could the State still prosecute the offense considering the illegal acts were
committed way back 1968 up to 1982 or more than fifteen (15) years ago? The
complaint was only filed in 1998.
All offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act shall prescribe
in FIFTEEN (15) years. In the case under review, there is no doubt that the offenses
have been committed longer than fifteen (15) years, the earliest began in 1967 and the
latest in 1982 x x x By prescription of the crime, it means the forfeiture or loss of the
right of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain period. Moreover,
except for Ms. Alice Reyes, all the other respondent [sic] - DBP officials, namely [sic]
Gregorio Licaros, J.V. de Ocampo, and Leonides Virata, are already dead. Reliable
reports though not yet confirmed indicate that many of the private respondents are now
dead.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the undersigned recommends the dismissal of
the instant case.18
The recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint on the basis of prescription was
approved by Ombudsman Desierto on 29 January 1999.19
On 11 July 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee, represented by Atty. Salvador, filed before
the EPIB a Motion to Revive/Reinstate20 the instant criminal complaint, citing the 25
October 1999 Decision of this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-finding Committee v. Hon.
Desierto 21 where, according to the Ad Hoc Committee, it was held that it should be given
the fair chance to prove that prescription has not barred the filing of charges against the
respondents.22
It appears that the EPIB issued an order requiring the public and private respondents to
file their counter-affidavits on 4 September 2000. 23 Only Reyes among the respondents
filed a Counter-affidavit,24 wherein she stated that she was a member of the DBP Board
of Governors only from 1980 until 1986, 25 or thus long after the loan was first extended
to Midland Cement in January 1968. She nevertheless asserted that the DBP guarantee
was secured by: (a) a first mortgage on all the assets of Midland Cement worth at least
P77M; (b) an assignment to the DBP of Midland Cement's mining claims and quarry
rights; (c) the pledge to the DBP of common shares of Midland Cement's stockholders
worth at least P9M; (d) the assignment of subscription receivables worth P10M; and (e)
the joint and several signatures with Midland Cement of its stockholders. Thus, claimed
Reyes, DBP was sufficiently protected when it approved the guarantee in favor of
Midland Cement.26
Reyes likewise averred that DBP had taken over Midland Cement in 1972, that it had
became the owner of 92.89% of the corporation's shares in 1981, and that the
succeeding loan transactions after the takeover had been in fact approved by DBP as
the owner of Midland Cement and consummated in order to protect the interests of
both entities.27 She further stated that nothing in the transactions adverted to in the
complaint manifested that she herself had committed any of the acts sanctioned under
Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. 28
On 25 October 2000, the EPIB promulgated the now-assailed Resolution 29
recommending the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. 30
Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on 24 November 2000. 31
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the EPIB, but this was denied for
lack of merit in a Resolution 32 dated 6 February 2001, which was also subsequently
approved by Ombudsman Desierto on 16 February 2001. 33
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners point out that in the 1998 Resolution, the Ombudsman categorically asserted
that "it is beyond doubt that respondents violated Section 3(e) and (g) of [R.A. No.]
3019,"34 even as the complaint was dismissed on the ground of prescription, yet in the
2000 Resolution, "completely deviated, ignored and disregarded his previous
resolution"35 when he ruled that the evidence was insufficient to prosecute respondents.
Such volta face, petitioners claim, constitutes not only grave but palpable gross and
excessive abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. Petitioners adduce as
compelling reason to prosecute respondents the fact that as of 30 June 1986, Midland
Cement had an outstanding and unpaid balance of over P1B, with a property appraisal
value of only around P329M.36
This Court directed respondents to file their respective comments 37 but the resolution
containing the said directive could not be served on respondents Basilio Lirag, Felix
Lirag, Lourdes Montenegro and Serafin Montenegro despite repeated and diligent
efforts on the part of the PCGG to ascertain their present addresses.38 Thus, only the
Office of the Ombudsman and Reyes were able to file their respective comments.
In its Comment, the Office of the Ombudsman adverts to the rule that "it is beyond the
ambit of [the] Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint before it."39 It defends its finding that the loans
were not "behest" in nature and character, citing its findings in the assailed resolution
that the initial loan had been sufficiently collateralized and that the subsequent loans
were approved by DBP in its new capacity as the owner of Midland Cement, to protect
the interests of the two corporations. 40 It points out that after DBP had taken over
Midland Cement, there resulted a merger or confusion of rights whereby the financial
institution assumed not only the management but also the obligations of Midland
Cement; accordingly, the subsequent loans were not really in the nature or character of
loans, much less "behest loans," but transactions necessary to infuse fresh capital into
the newly acquired Midland Cement already being managed by DBP. 41 Reyes, for her
part, defends these findings of the Ombudsman and reiterates her claim that she had
joined DBP long after the initial loan was procured and also after the bank had taken
over Midland Cement. Additionally, she argues that prescription has already barred the
prosecution of the imputed offenses. 42
Our jurisprudence governing the prosecution of behest loan cases reveals two
entrenched principles: first, that the prescription of the crime for violation of R.A. No.
3019 is reckoned from not from the time of the commission of the offense but from
the time of the discovery of the commission 43 and second, that the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances,
should be filed or not, with the Court adopting a policy of non-interference in the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigating and prosecutory powers absent good and
compelling reasons.44
That first principle is beyond contention in this case, even as Reyes offers a minimal
effort to assert that the offense has already prescribed. She concedes that prescription is
reckoned from the time of the discovery of the offense, but argues that there was "clear
and indubitable proof that discovery of the alleged behest loans was made, at the latest,
on February 27, 1987, when the Republic and the [DBP] entered into a Deed of
Transfer whereby DBP ceded to the Government its assets," 45 including Midland
Cement. Thus, she believes that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period should run from
the date of execution of the deed of transfer and that accordingly, the period expired
more than a year before the filing of the charges on 11 March 1998.
Considering that Midland Cement was merely one of the 283 non-performing accounts
transferred by DBP to the Republic through the 1987 Deed of Transfer, it is difficult to
elicit that the execution of the said deed ipso facto bears the imputed anomalous history
of transactions between the bank and the corporation. Given the facts, the more
reasonable conclusion as to when the offense was discovered would be anywhere within
the period following the constitution of the Ad Hoc Committee on 8 October 1992
through Administrative Order No. 13. After all, it is this committee that engaged itself
in the thorough examination on which the charges are based. Absent any more
definitive proof that the alleged anomalous transactions have been uncovered at an
earlier date, there is no basis for us to conclude that the discovery was made prior to 8
October 1992.
Nonetheless, the question of prescription is ultimately immaterial to the case at bar. The
Ombudsman has concluded that the filing of the criminal charges was not warranted,
and following the second principle that governs the behest loan cases, we are wont to
uphold the Ombudsman's conclusions.
Respondents are charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. Act No. 3019.
Under Section 3(e), the elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers
commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation
to their public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. To
determine the culpability of an accused in relation, in turn, to Section 3(g) of the law, it
needs to be established (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 46
There are two clear phases that demarcate the challenged acts, the demarcation line
pertaining to the legal relationship that evolved between DBP and Midland Cemen t.
The first phase encompasses the obtention and approval of the loan by respondents,
excepting Reyes who joined DBP only twelve (12) years after the loan was extended.
This phase covered the period prior to DBP's takeover of Midland Cement, when the
two entities possessed clearly segregate identities and interests. The second phase began
when DBP assumed ownership over Midland Cement, thereby incorporating the latter's
assets and obligations into its own. At that point, DBP's interest in Midland Cement
was no longer confined to seeing to it that the latter repay its loan obligations, but
rather, such interest has expanded to making it a profitable venture.
Using the earlier stated criteria for violations of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, it
is apparent that in theory there can be liability for violating both sections with respect to
the pre-takeover transactions, but there can be liability only for violating Section 3(g)
insofar as the post-takeover transactions are concerned. A material element of Section
3(e) violation is that the injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the private parties who conspired with the public officers. Such element
could no longer exist after DBP's takeover of Midland Cement. The takeover eliminated
the prospect of benefits, advantages or preferences to the stockholders in their private
capacity since they had been already shunted aside in the management of the
corporation they previously controlled. Nonetheless, under Section 3(g) the supply of
benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties is not apposite, the core element
being the engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
The transactions or contracts entered into by the DBP Board of Governors after the
takeover may, in theory, form the basis of liability of the board, yet the standard for
initiating criminal prosecutions in this jurisdiction is not confined to the theoretical
plausibility that the accused committed the crime alleged. There must exist prima facie
evidence that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. A prima facie
case is one which is supported by sufficient evidence and will support a finding of guilt
in the absence of controverting evidence.
Our analysis of the level of prima facie evidence with respect to the behest loan cases is
strongly guided by the recent wealth of cases 47 that have charted the necessary standard
to pursue prosecution. To repeat, the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether
a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be filed or not, with the Court
adopting a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigating
and prosecutory powers absent good and compelling reasons. In short, the Court would
be ill-advised to institute a finding of prima facie evidence if the Ombudsman concludes
that none exists.
The 2000 Resolution provides a detailed explanation behind the Ombudsman's
determination that the evidence was wanting to sustain the prosecution of respondents,
to wit:
After careful review of the records of the instant case, the undersigned finds the factual
allegations in the sworn statement of Orlando Salvador and its supporting documents
wanting of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to indict the respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A.[No.] 3019, as amended.
Complaint endorsed the loan account of borrower-firm Midland Cement Corporation
(MCC) primarily because it is under-collateralized and under-capitalized. As to the issue
of collateral, the initial foreign guarantee loan in the amount of $18.5 million or an
equivalent of P110.00 million was sufficiently secured as shown in the Board Resolution
approving the said loan. It is stated there in no uncertain terms that the said DBP
guarantee loan would be secured by the following: (a) a first mortgage on all the assets
of MCC worth at least P77,000,000.00; (b) an assignment to the DBP of MCC's mining
claims and quarry rights; (c) by pledge to the DBP of common shares of MCC's
stockholders worth at least P9 million; (d) by assignment of subscription receivables
worth P10 million; and (e) by the joint and several signatures put up by the borrower
corporation, we reached the conclusion that these are more than enough to ensure for
the amount of the foreign guarantee loan applied for, hence, it cannot be said that it is
under-collateralized.
It can not also be said that the borrower-corporation is under-capitalized at the time the
foreign guarantee loan was approved on January 18, 1968. It is true that the paid -up
capital of MCC as of December 31, 1968 amounted only to P9,158,180.00. However,
the assets of the borrower corporation at the time was already worth P77,000,000.00,
hence the gap between the foreign guaranteed loan in the amount of P110,000,000.00
and the amount of the capital of the borrower-corporation at the time is not that
substantial so as to qualify said loan to be undercapitalized.
The additional loan obtained by MCC from DBP to restructure its loan accounts for the
period covering 1972 up to August 25, 1981 were also alleged to be without sufficient
collaterals and adequate capital. It is worth to note that as early as 1972, DBP already
took 'over MCC. As a result of which DBP became its major stockholder. In fact, by
1981, DBP's ownership over MCC was already 92.89%. Thus, the so called additional
loans obtained by MCC in order to restructure its loan accounts were in fact
transactions approved by DBP not in its capacity as a lending institution but as owner
of MCC to protect both the interest of DBP and MCC. In other words, these additional
loans are no longer loans in its strictest sense, so there are no more behest loans to talk
about in this case.
From the foregoing, it is established that the MCC project which was financed by the
foreign guaranteed loan was established to be a viable project, adequately secured and
capitalized in accordance with DBP's lending guidelines thereby negating any violations
of Section 3(e) and (g) or R.A. [No.] 3019, as amended. 48
In a number of cases also involving behest loans as alleged by the very same petitioners,
this Court has upheld the Ombudsman's determination that the loans questioned
therein were not, in fact, undercollateralized, based upon an examination of the various
securities that had been offered to secure the respective loans. 49 To take one example, in
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,50 the Court accepted the analysis of
the Ombudsman that there was no undercollateralization in the instance where the
borrowing corporation offered as collateral a mortgage on its existing assets and assets
still to be acquired, and its mining claims, lease contracts and/or patents. The
Ombudsman in the said case similarly considered the fact that Midland Cement had
offered, as collateral for the initial loan, a mortgage on all its assets, an assignment of all
its mining rights and claims, the pledge of common shares of its stockholders and the
assignment of subscription receivables. There really is no basis for the Court to
countermand the Ombudsman's finding of sufficient collateralization when it has
accepted similar findings in the past.
These cases reveal that this Court has repeatedly yielded to the determination of the
Ombudsman of whether the imputed behest loans were indeed undercollateralized. In
order to grant the present petition, the Court will have to deviate from its consistent
deferential stance on this issue. In short, there must exist a satisfactory justification that
warrants the treatment of this case differently from that accorded to previous similar
cases wherein we upheld the Ombudsman. No such justification is offered, and we are
not inclined to chart a different course here.
Petitioners' arguments are further weakened by the fact that in 1972, DBP acquired
majority ownership over Midland Cement. That development significantly changed the
complexion of the previous and succeeding loan transactions. It would be incorrect to
invoke the Civil Code provisions on confusion or merger, as the Ombudsman does in
his comment, since DBP and Midland Cement retained their separate juridical
personality even after the takeover. But what cannot be denied is that DBP, as the new
owner of Midland Cement, indirectly assumed responsibility for the outstanding
obligations of the company. It could thus not allow Midland Cement to simply flounder
without causing prejudice to its own interests. At this point, the infusion of fresh capital
by DBP into Midland Cement cannot be deemed as a reckless hand-out designed to
favor a private enterprise at the expense of the public coffers. Instead, it can be
reasonably seen as an attempt by DBP to salvage its investment, which could not stand
a chance to earn a return unless it is sustained as it were by new capital. If petitioners
seriously believe that the only lawful thing DBP could have done was to leave Midland
Cement to flounder by itself and not avail of a viable opportunity to recoup the extant
losses to the government, it would only go to show that their position is divorced from
the realities in the business world. It would be arbitrary even.
Indeed, any accountability on the part of the respondents for violation of R.A. No. 3019
will have to stem from the initial extension of the loan in 1968 (the original sin, as it
were), an act which created the legal relationship between DBP and Midland Cement
and ultimately, tied DBP to the fortunes of Midland Cement. This conclusion would
necessarily exonerate respondent Reyes from liability, as she had no hand at all in
binding DBP to Midland Cement and her subsequent participation was limited only to
the attempts to salvage DBP's investment in the failing company.
Petitioners make hay over the fact that in the 1998 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman, it was asserted that "it is beyond doubt that the respondents violated Sec.
3(e) and (g) of [R.A. No.] 3019,"51 yet in the 2000 Resolution of the same Office, the
contrary conclusion was reached that there was "wanting of sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) and (g)
of [R.A. No.] 3019, as amended."52 But there is a manifest difference between the facts
in hand leading to the 1998 Resolution and those which informed the 2000 Resolution.
As the Ombudsman admits, his "initial evaluation was premised only on petitioner's
complaint-affidavit and its supporting annexes. The complexion of OMB-0-98-0563,
however, changed when private respondent Reyes submitted her counter-affidavit and
controverting evidence."53
Under our rules of criminal procedure, respondents to criminal charges are allowed to
submit counter-affidavits executed by themselves and by their witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents relied upon for defense. 54 Similarly, under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, 55 the investigating officer tasked with
evaluating a criminal complaint can refer said complaint to the respondent for
comment,56 or subject the same to a preliminary investigation wherein the respondent
would be similarly directed to comment. 57 It is hardly beyond the pale that the
submission of controverting evidence by a person charged with a criminal offense could
cause the prosecutor to reverse an initial finding of probable cause. In fact, a
prosecution that is pursued only after the respondent has been allowed to air his side
before the prosecuting officer is more assured in footing than one that is pursued
without the respondent having had the opportunity yet to air his defenses.
We observe that the 1998 Resolution upon which petitioners heavily rely has taken into
account only the allegations submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee, and no other
contrary version or theory, when the initial conclusion was reached that "it is beyond
doubt that the respondents violated Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019." 58 It is quite
easy to reach such a conclusion if only the side of the complainant is heard, as what
appears to have happened prior to the rendition of the 1998 Resolution. The fact that
Reyes filed a counter-affidavit is by no means determinative of the case, or of such
coercive character as to impel the dismissal of the complaint. What it does is provide
additional context which should guide the Ombudsman in his determination of whether
the criminal complaint should be pursued. The admission in the assailed resolution that
Reyes's counter-affidavit did bear influence in its recommendation is hardly basis to
impugn the findings therein, respondents being precisely entitled under the rules and as
part of due process to explain their side towards securing a favorable factual
determination or adjudication.
Finally, it is worth taking into account the legal mandate of DBP in order to supply the
fuller context of its loan arrangements with Midland Cement. DBP was constituted in
1946 as the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, and subsequently reorganized as a
bank, with the mandate of "providing credit facilities for the rehabilitation and
development and expansion of agriculture and industry," and "the broadening and
diversification of the national economy."59 It is empowered to grant loans "for the
rehabilitation, establishment or development of any agricultural and/or industrial
enterprise, including public utilities, mining, livestock [and] industry'. " 60
It is evident that among the designated missions of DBP is to finance private enterprises
in starting up their businesses, in the expectation that the success of the business will
redound to the benefit of national growth. This function inherently bears risks since not
all enterprises actually become successful and quite a number of them ultimately flame
out. In the same way that there is no guarantee that every business will end up
profitable, there is no certainty that DBP will not sustain losses resulting from its loan
transactions with a particular company. It would be foolhardy to impute criminal
liability against the DBP officers because of the damage sustained from such
unsuccessful loan transactions.
Distressing as may be the ultimate loss to the Government resulting from DBP's loan
transactions with Midland Cement, bad business judgment on the part of the DBP
officers does not necessarily translate to criminal liability under R.A. No. 3019. To
warrant prosecution, there must be evident deliberation on the part of the bank officials
to unlawfully dispense favors or relax regulations for the benefit of the those private
individuals or enterprises who transact with DBP. Absent evidence to that effect, the
Ombudsman cannot be faulted for not finding a prima facie case against respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 163586 : January 27, 2009]
SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner, v. HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA-Region VI, represented by its
Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
D EC ISIO N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution 2
which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an
Information which reads, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the
Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, a public officer, being
the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as
such, was in the custody and possession of public funds in the amou nt of P556,681.53,
Philippine Currency, representing the value of her collections and other accountabilities,
for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position,
with deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own
personal use and benefit said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands
made upon her account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to
allege her salary grade - - a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 4 petitioner further argued that as she was a public
employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and
may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.5
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held
that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of
petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. 7
Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in the case,
pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the
Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution
expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman
in cases cognizable by the RTC.
The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it
was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the Information. 8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which the RTC denied in its December
18, 2001 Order.10
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the
petition in the Decision under review.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 12 was also denied.
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for
Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to
file the same in light of this Supreme Court's ruling in the First "Uy v. Sandiganbayan"
case, which declared that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated
February 22, 2001 in the Uy v. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the
Petitioner-Accused, without violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws
and denial of the accused to due process. 13
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of the
Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the
Resolution of the Court in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the
Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the
investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the Ombudsman
beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable,
notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of
the Court in said case. Hence, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void
for at that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over
the case.
The petition lacks merit.
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, 14 wherein accused Ruben
Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to
dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that were filed against them by the Ombudsman
before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the
Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated
on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has
powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law
does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission
of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly
in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the
Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers
and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible
with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by
public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by
the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees
during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with
the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against
officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the
law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law
likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordan ce with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of
Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with
the regular prosecutors.
law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous
legislative intent of that law. 18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy
interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its
effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal
interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed
under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its
interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the
mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the
declaration can only have a prospective application. 19 But where no law is invalidated
nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed
incorporated at the moment of its legislation. 20
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of
unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and
relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of
the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its
effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to validate investigatory and
prosecutorial processes conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing of the
Information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.
19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97)
are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

No costs.
Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva,16 in which, citing
the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was
filed before it by the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, "given the Court's SO ORDERED.
Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court's assailed Orders x x x are,
in hindsight, without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside."

It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman
has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal
information filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the
operative ruling on the issue.

Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have
retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is
constitutionally proscribed."17

Petitioner is grasping at straws.

A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of

that law as of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 144492 : December 18, 2008]
LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO, Petitioner, v. HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, ROSALITA T. NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, JUDGE
ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, PEDRO G. NALANGAN, ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA,
JULIO C. DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA, Respondents.
D EC ISIO N
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman Luwalhati R. Antonino
(petitioner) of the First Congressional District of South Cotabato which includes
General Santos City (city), assailing that portion of the Resolution 2 dated January 20,
1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing the case against
private respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez (Mayor Nuñez), Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive Director for
Region XI Augustus L. Momongan (Momongan), Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
Abednego O. Adre (Judge Adre), former City Legal Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III
(Nalangan), Register of Deeds Asteria E. Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management
Officer III of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of
South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional Technical Director of the DENR for
Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga) (respondents).
The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal
on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision of which states that:
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and health
resort site purposes, under the administration of the municipality of General Santos,
subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the said municipality and more particularly described as follows:
Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation
The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park
A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the barrio of Dadiangas,
Municipality of General Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x containing an area of
52,678 square meters.
On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 25-26), known as the
"Charter of the City of General Santos" was enacted creating the City of General Santos
where it is provided that "The National Government hereby cedes to the City of
General Santos the ownership and possession to all lands of the public domain within
the city." Later, said Act was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on August 16, 1971
(Record, pp. 27-28) wherein it read that "The disposition of all lands of the public
domain within the city shall be in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth
Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, as amended: Provided, That all incomes and
receipts derived from such disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as provided in
this Act."
On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was
thereafter subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square
meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters,
or a total of 52,678 square meters which is still equivalent to the original area.
However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168 (Record, pp. 29-31), which
provides that:
do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 168 dated October 3, 1963,
which established the recreational and health resort reservation situated in the
Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao, certain
portions of the land embraced therein and declare the same open to disposition under
the provisions of the Public Land Act, which parcels of land are more particularly
described as follows:
Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the
Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x
containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE
(18,695) SQUARE METERS. x x x
Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the
Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x
containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-
THREE (18,963) SQUARE METERS. x x x
Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is
therefore reserved for recreational and health resort site purposes.
As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent with issued another Order [assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in the above-cited three
the District Land Office and consequently Certificates of Title were issued sometime in cases, stating that:
1983. In 1984, two cases were filed by the local governm ent of General Santos City
against the said Heirs of Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the other ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and jurisprudence, the motion
hand, the Heirs of Kusop filed a case against the said local government for Injunction for exclusion of Lot X, MR-1160-D comprising an area of 15,020 SQUARE METERS
and Damages. The said three cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of is GRANTED. The movants heirs of Kusop are, however, enjoined to donate to the
General Santos City, Branch 22, presided by respondent Judge Abednego Adre. City of General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise
agreement.
On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City passed
Resolution No. 87, Series of 1991, entitled "Resolution Approving the Compromise On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales
Agreement to be entered into by and between the City Government of General Santos Patent over portions of Lot X, to be divided as follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp.
represented by the City Mayor and the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park" 60-75):
(Record, pp. 1506-1507). Significant provisions of the said Compromise Agreement
(Record, pp. 33-39) state that:
Applicants Area applied
1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-1160-D and Y-2, MR-1160-D 1. Mad Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
with combined area of THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY- 2. Oliver Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
EIGHT (37,658) SQUARE METERS, and from this the HEIRS AND 3. Jonathan Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
BENEFICIARIES shall receive a total net area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000)
SQUARE METERS and to the CITY shall pertain the remainder of SEVENTEEN 4. Alex Guaybar - 999 sq. m.;
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT (17,658) SQUARE METERS which if 5. Jack Guiwan - 999 sq. m.;
added to Lot X, MR-1160-D, previously donated to the CITY as stated in par. 7 of the 6. Nicolas Ynot - 999 sq. m.;
WHEREAS clause, with an area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND TWENTY (15,020)
SQUARE METERS (located in between Lots Y-1 and Y-2), the CITY shall retain a 7. Carlito Flaviano III - 999 sq. m.;
total area of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT 8. Jolito Poralan - 999 sq. m.;
(32,678) SQUARE METERS.
9. Miguela Cabi-ao - 999 sq. m.;
10. Jose Rommel Saludar - 999 sq. m.;
Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor Rosalita Nuñez,
assisted by respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and the heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo 11. Joel Teves - 999 sq. m.;
Kusop. 12. Rico Altizo - 999 sq. m.;
13. Johnny Medillo - 999 sq. m.;
As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement, respondent Judge Abednego
14. Martin Saycon - 999 sq. m.;
Adre issued an Order (Record, pp. 40-52), covering the three pending cases, on May 6,
1992, the dispositive portion of which states: 15. Arsenio delos Reyes, Jr. - 510 sq. m.; and,
16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m.
ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing "Compromise Agreement" in conformity with
Article 6 in correlation with Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the same The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar Jonillo, as Deputy Land
is hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED as judgment in these cases. The parties are
Management Inspector, recommended for the approval of the survey authority
enjoined to faithfully comply therewith.
requested by the above-named private respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418).

A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28, 1995.

Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to private respondents by public
respondent CENR Officer Renato Rivera (Record, p. 419). As a result of which, Lot X
However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the "Motion for Exclusion of an Extraneous was subdivided into 16 lots (refer to subdivision plan, Record, p. 32).
Subject from the Coverage of the Judgment thereof" and the "Motion for Issuance of
Clarificatory Order" submitted by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR
Officer and Regional Technical Director of DENR, respectively, respondent Judge
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuñez, assisted by respondent 10. Jose Rommel Saludar P-6388 X-10 107-109;
City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issued 1st Indorsements (refer to application
11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;
documents, Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X
applied by private respondents and stated therein that "this office interposes no objection to 12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115;
whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue on application covering portions thereof after the 13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117;
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120;
coverage of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said court's order dated July 22, 1997."
15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123;
Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor Leonardo Dinopol, 16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127.
together with recommendation for approval from respondent Rivera, submitted an
appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16 stating therein the appraisal amount of P100.00 per square Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6, X-7, X-15 and X-16, the
meter and existing improvements of residential light house per lot with an appraised above-named registered owners sold their lots, through their attorney-in-fact,
value ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to application papers, Record, pp. respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System
421-500). (AFP-RSBS) in the amount of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand
Pesos (P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). Then, Transfer
Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a letter-report Certificate of Title Nos. T-81051 to 81062 were issued in the name of the vendee on
addressed to the Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16) September 25, 1997 (Record, pp. 151-173).
applicants recommending for the private sale of the subject lots to the above-named
applicants-respondents, without public auction (refer to sample letter-report of On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed
recommendation in favor of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer, of Exchange with AFP-RSBS, represented by respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting
Renato Rivera, also issued recommendation letters for each of the sixteen applicants to the exchange of lots X-6 and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the
addressed to the PENR Officer for the approval of the appraisal of the subject lots and latter two lots being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While lots X-15 and
of the private sale (please refer to sample recommendation letter in favor of Rico X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be given or ceded to
Altiz[o], Record, p. 78). respondent Nilo Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).3

A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the same date stating Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit4 before the
therein that on September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be sold (Record, p. 79). Ombudsman against the respondents together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato
Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack
On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles were issued by the Register Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose
of Deeds of General Santos City, respondent Asteria Cruzabra, which titles were also Rommel Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de
signed by respondent Augustus Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive Director, to los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr.
wit: (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano)
(indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.)
Name of Owner OCT No. Lot No. Record Page No. No. 3019,5 as amended, and for malversation of public funds or property through
falsification of public documents.
1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85; The Ombudsman's Ruling
3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91; In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the Ombudsman held that Mayor
Nuñez and Nalangan, among others, entered into the Compromise Agreement on
5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
behalf of the city and pursuant to the authority granted to them by the Sangguniang
6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97; Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of
7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100; Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, the
Ombudsman opined that the validity of the Compromise Agreement had been settled
8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103;
when the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the RTC found it to be in order.
9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106; The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with
the facts of the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to
have regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against the
respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the
following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are
probably guilty thereof:
1. CESAR JONILLO - sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document to the
sixteen (16) recommendation reports submitted;
2. RENATO RIVERA - sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public document relative
to the sixteen (16) reports submitted, all dated August 4, 1997;
3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX
GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT,
JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, JOEL
TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON, ARSENIO
DE LOS REYES, and JOSE BOMEZ in conspiracy with public respondents CESAR
JONILLO and RENATO RIVERA' one (1) count each for private respondents and
sixteen (16) counts each for public respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019;
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO - as
conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents relative to the
twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX
GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE
ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO,
MARTIN SAYSON - one (1) count each as conspirator in the falsification of public
document relative to the corresponding unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent
in their behalf;
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO FLAVIANO - twelve
(12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government
inn the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS;
andcralawlibrary
7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR, ALEX
GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE
ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO,
MARTIN SAYSON - one (1) count each of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 as
conspirator in short-changing the government in the payment of taxes for the sale of
Lot-X to AFP-RSBS.
Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned respondents be filed with
the proper courts.
Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUÑEZ, AUGUSTUS MOMONGAN,
ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO
DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the
filing of criminal cases against private respondents, for offenses committed not in
conspiracy with the herein public respondents, by the proper parties-in-interest.
SO RESOLVED.6
On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the Ombudsman in his Order 7 dated April 26, 2000. The
Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were already filed against the
aforementioned indicted and the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan
and the regular courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction
over the said case.
The Sole Issue
Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:
THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE
EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE
CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE
ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN
VIOLATION OF LAW AND ITS CHARTER.8
Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence pointing to the
existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents and those indicted, which led to the
illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park. To prove her claim of
a grand conspiracy, petitioner outlines the individual participation, cooperation and
involvement of each respondent, as follows:
1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22, 1997 was part of the grand
scheme and was made the basis for the filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of
Mad Guaybar and his companions. The same Order was likewise used by Mayor Nu ñez
and Nalangan as the reason for interposing no objection to the said applications. The
assailed RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre almost five (5) years after his Judgment
based on the Compromise Agreement had long become final; thus, it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion and in gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre, therefore,
violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
2. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by reason of their
respective offices and as administrators of the properties of the city, that Lot X of the
Magsaysay Park is owned by the city and reserved as health and recreation site. Yet,
Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the assailed RTC Order, stated
that per verification, there was no existing donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to
the city. Likewise, in their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing
the applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan
endorsed the same and interposed no objection thereto. Said Indorsement was part of
the grand conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the resale of the said property to
AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the city. Petitioner submits that Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan
also violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
3. After Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997
and after Jonillo submitted his falsified report on August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the same
date, scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad Guaybar and his companions on September 5,
1997. Thus, Diaz issued notices of sale of the subdivided lots of Lot X on September 5,
1997 without public auction and at the disadvantageous price recommended by Rivera.
Therefore, Diaz, as a co-conspirator, should be similarly charged with Jonillo and Rivera
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for falsification of public documents.
4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the Motion for Issuance of a
Clarificatory Order before Judge Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the
assailed RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera likewise represented to the RTC that upon
verification, they did not find in the records any deed of donation executed by the Heirs
of Cabalo Kusop. Borinaga should be held liable as an active participant in a grand
scheme to defraud the city.
5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not disposable and
alienable and is, therefore, not a proper subject of a sales patent application. Despite
such knowledge and based on the falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan
allowed Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad Guaybar and his companions by
approving their miscellaneous sales application and issuing the Original Certificates of
Title (OCTs) covering the subdivided lots of Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his
own the false reports, and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage to Mad Guaybar
and his companions, to the injury of the city.
6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of documents and titles may be
considered as ministerial, the circumstances under which the titles were issued in the
names of Mad Guaybar and his companions and eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS,
indicate that Cruzabra was aware and was part of the grand conspiracy to defraud the
city. Each of the sixteen (16) OCTs was transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on
September 22, 1997. On the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners'
copies of the OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a Joint Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to be their attorney-in-fact, for the
purpose of selling their respective lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said SPA
in their respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty. Flaviano registered with
Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the same day the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax due thereon. On the same day, Cruzabra canceled the OCTs
and issued, in lieu thereof, twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of
AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots were transferred and registered in the name of
AFP-RSBS on October 10, 1997 by virtue of deeds of exchange executed by the
registered owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits that Cruzabra could not
have been unaware of the restrictions; instead, she allowed the transfer and registration
of the said lots to AFP-RSBS so swiftly, that it could only be interpreted as part of the
scheme to defraud the city. 9
In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of his investigatory and prosecutory functions, by completely ignoring and disregard ing
the pieces of substantial evidence which clearly establish the existence of a common
design among the respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and disposition
of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park.
On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective defenses against
petitioner's claims, as follows:
1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), contends that,
in effect, petitioner is asking this Court to review the pieces of evidence gathered by the
Ombudsman during the preliminary investigation. This is not proper. In Espinosa v.
Office of the Ombudsman 10 and Young v. Office of the Ombudsman, 11 this Court accorded
highest respect for the factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case of grave
abuse of discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse
of discretion because the respondents, based on their counter-affidavits, have valid and
legal justifications, sufficient for the Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges. 12
2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists between her and other
respondents charged before the Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to
Cruzabra refer to recorded transactions which are legal acts. Such allegations did not
discuss how the alleged conspiracy was committed; they are merely conjectures and bare
allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed, and there is no convincing
evidence to support such allegations, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs do not contain any
restriction to transfer the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As such, Cruzabra submits that
it would be most unfair if she would be made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply
because she exercised her ministerial functions as Register of Deeds. 13
3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional Executive Director of the DENR,
he is duly authorized to sign patents and reconstituted patents. Since the standard
procedure and processes were complied with, Momongan simply relied on his
subordinates and on their good faith. He argues that he acted in accordance with law,
department guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to require him to scrutinize every
phase of a report of a subordinate is a very tall order. 14
4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution 15 of the Senate Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and National
Defense and Security, dated December 23, 1998, not one of the respondents was
recommended for prosecution in connection with the irregularity involving the
Magsaysay Park. Judge Adre claims that he acted properly, and even sought the opinion
of the OSG before the Compromise Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre
narrated that due to the vagaries of politics, the judgment lay dormant, as no motion for
execution was filed by then Mayor Adelbert Antonino, husband of petitioner, after
Mayor Nuñez lost in the elections. Subsequently, the writ was not issued as the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop did not execute any deed of donation in favor of the city. He declared
that the RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the case when the Motions for Clarification
and Exclusion were filed; thus, the issuance of the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X
andenjoining the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop from donating the same to the city in keeping
with the intent and spirit of the compromise agreement, was proper. 16
5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need not be disturbed, as they
are not attended by grave abuse of discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance
with law; that as the Regional Technical Director is not required to go to the premises
of the land subject of miscellaneous applications, and he may rely on the data submitted
by the CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO. 17 Moreover, Borinaga argues that the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution was
filed out of time.18 The Certification 19 dated October 1, 2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto,
Records Officer IV of the Office of the Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was
personally served with a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999 by Jose
Ruel Bermejo, Process Server, and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on
February 4, 2000.
6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he participated in a
grand scheme to unlawfully dispose of the lots covered by Lot X. He vouches that
when he issued the notice of sale, he did so on the basis of the requisite documents
submitted to his office. 20
7. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuñez did not violate the Charter
of the City, because when she entered into the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs
of Cabalo Kusop, she was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution
No. 87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of committee and public hearings. The
same was also referred to the OSG, which recommended its approval. When the Heirs
of Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan had no recourse but
to tell the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of donation made in favor of the city.
While they admit to have issued Indorsements, they made it clear that the DENR shall
undertake only what is legally feasible. Mayor Nuñez and Nalangan asseverate that they
had no intention of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as they even filed a case
against Mad Guaybar and his companions. 21
Our Ruling
The instant Petition lacks merit.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) 22 provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she received
through counsel the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she
failed to establish that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and
thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the aforementioned
Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution on
February 24, 1999. There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed
in the interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any
explanation at all for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration. After the
respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond and meet the
issue head-on. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for
reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration the
assailed Resolution was already final.
Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant Petition ought to be
dismissed. And on the substantive issue raised, the petition is likewise bereft of merit.
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A.
No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. 23 Well-settled is the rule that this Courtwill not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based
not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary
rule would encourage innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts would be
swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant. 24
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the
petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,25 where we
laid down the following exceptions to the rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. 26
The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found wanting in
this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule. We concur
with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing the charges against
respondents, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, thus:
Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is constrained to limit its
evaluation of the issue on the participation of each respondent in the titling of Lot X,
whether the same would constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other illegal acts.
1. Respondent Abednego Adre - His participation extends only to his issuance of an
Order excluding Lot-X from the coverage of the Compromise Agreement.
A review of the terms and conditions of the subject Compromise Agreemen t confirms
the Order of the respondent that indeed Lot X was excluded. The Order of respondent
judge was made in accordance with the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy that
respondent judge assisted in preserving the claim of the government of General Santos
City over Lot X by enjoining the donation of said property by the private respondents.
2. Respondents Nuñez and Nalangan - Said respondents' participation in the titling of
Lot-X was when they issued or caused the issuance of Indorsements stating therein that
"this office (Office of the Mayor) interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings your (CENRO)
office may pursue on the application covering portions thereof (Lot -X)."
The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be constru ed as a waiver on
the part of General Santos City on its claim over Lot-X. On the contrary, it has given
DENR the authority to take the necessary legal proceedings relative to the titling of the
property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR has the responsibility,
authority and the power to grant alienable and disposable lands to deserving claimants.
Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove that respondents Nuñez
and Nalangan gave unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing said Indorsements.
In fact, they protected the interest of the government over Lot-X by immediately filing
a case for nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances thereof.
xx x
[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga, Augustus L. Momongan,
Asteria E. Cruzabra - Based on the evidences on record, these respondents were in the
regular performance of their official functions. Their participation in the titling of Lot-X
was due to the fact that the documents for titling were submitted to their respective
offices as a matter of course, and there is nothing that they can do but to follow the
established procedure upon finding that all the documents for titling were submitted. 27
Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable
cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was
gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this
Court. In this respect, petitioner fails. 28
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under
Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
former; criminal complaint against respondents.

(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance o f his or WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
her official duties, or in relation to his or her public functions;
SO ORDERED.
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a
private party;

(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
to such parties; andcralawlibrary

(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable neglect.29

Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the
accused that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with
gross inexcusable negligence. Bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable
under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral
judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest, or ill
will for ulterior purposes. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner
displaying a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons may be
affected.30

As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no showing of evident
bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective acts of the respondents. It must be
stressed that it is good faith, not bad faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on Human
Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which
springs from the fountain of good conscience. 31

Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and those indicted.
However, as found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was
not supported by ample evidence. At best, the evidence adduced was not clear as to
respondents' participation in the acts in question. Actori incumbit onus probandi - the
burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the prosecution. The inherent weakness of
complainant's case is not a ground for the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary
investigation.32 For it is fundamental that conspiracy cannot be presumed. Conspiracy
must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design. 33
This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish.
SECOND DIVISION
A. M. No. MTJ-05-1581 - February 28, 2005
PETER L. SESBREÑO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE GLORIA B. AGLUGUB, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro,
Laguna, Respondent.
R ESO LU T ION
TINGA, J.:
Peter L. Sesbreño filed a Verified Complaint 1 dated March 2, 2004 against respondent
judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to
Criminal Case No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.
It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints against Enrique
Marcelino (Marcelino), Susan Nuñez (Nuñez), Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely
Carunungan (Carunungan), all from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro,
Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3)
cases were assigned to respondent judges branch and subsequently consolidated for
disposition.
After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued a Consolidated Resolution
dated May 6, 2003, dismissing the cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of
probable cause, and setting for arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority.
Except for Marcelino who failed to appear during the arraignment, all of the accused
were arraigned. Respondent judge issued a warrant for Marcelinos arrest.
Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants Urgent Manifestation 3 dated
February 6, 2004 alleging that the accused were also charged with violation of Republic
Act No. 10 4 (R.A. 10) and praying that warrants of arrest be likewise issued against all
of the accused.
Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued an Order 5 dated February 12,
2004 stating that a charge for violation of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint
for Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved due to oversight. However, since the
statute only applies to members of seditious organizations engaged in subversive
activities pursuant to People v. Lidres, 6 and considering that the complaint failed to allege
this element, respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed the charge for
violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied complainants prayer for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for review.
Thereafter, complainants counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreño (Atty. Sesbreño), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against Non-
Appearing Accused. Respondent judge, however, did not act on these motions allegedly
because the court had already lost jurisdiction over the case by then.
The PPO affirmed respondents order and remanded the case to the court for further
proceedings on the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nuñez
did not appear. Atty. Sesbreño, however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the scheduled hearing.
The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the instant administrative
complaint.
Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules
when she refused to issue warrants of arrest against the accused. Complainant also faults
respondent judge for allegedly motu proprio reconsidering her Consolidated Resolution dated
May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to the Office of the Ombudsman within
ten (10) days.
In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative Complaint 7 dated March 26,
2 2004, respondent judge counters that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary
upon the judge. Since she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she
found it unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has been designated as the
Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. The PPO can take action on similar cases for
review and appropriate action. Thus, she acted in accordance with law when she
forwarded the records of the case to the PPO for review and not to the Office of the
Ombudsman as complainant insists.
Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty. Sesbreño of falsification, and
the latter of violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly, the affidavit which was attached to the instant verified
complaint was not notarized by Atty. Raul Corro as indicated therein. Further, Atty.
Sesbreño was allegedly convicted of Homicide and may have been suspended from the
practice of law.
Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainants Reply To Respondents Comment
Dated March 26, 2004 8 dated May 11, 2004. He further contends that there is no
provision in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 specifically deputizing the PPO to be the
"Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor" as respondent judge contends. He adds that
respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 8 since she has yet to
forward her resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman.
Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to his complaint was
notarized by Atty. Corro as certified by a member of the latters staff. Complainant also
disproves respondent judges allegation that Atty. Sesbreño is in the habit of filing
administrative complaints against judges, explaining that the latter merely acted as
counsel for litigants who filed administrative complaints against certain judges.
In another Verified Complaint 9 filed on March 18, 2004, complainant further charges
respondent with violating Sec. 9(b), Rule 112 of the Rules.
Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint 10
dated May 7, 2004 clarifying that contrary to complainants allegation, she did not
conduct a preliminary investigation in the case for Usurpation of Authority. What was
submitted for preliminary investigation was the charge for violation of R.A. 10. It was
her resolution dismissing the charge for violation of R.A. 10 which was transmitted to
the PPO for appropriate action. However, since the charges for violation of R.A. 10 and
Usurpation of Authority were contained in a single complaint, respondent judge
deemed it proper to forward the entire records to the PPO.
Complainant filed a Complainants Reply To Respondents Comment Dated May 7, 2004 11 dated
May 20, 2004 substantially reiterating his allegations.
The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a supplemental complaint
per the notation in the Memorandum 12 dated June 25, 2004.
In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in conducting a preliminary
investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest
for failure of the accused to appear during trial; in issuing her Order dated February 12,
2004 dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in transmitting the records
of the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the instant complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit but that respondent judge should be remin ded to be more
circumspect in the performance of her duties. 13 It made the following findings:
A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules reveals that there is
nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant of
arrest for the non-appearance of the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests
on the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private
prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such warrant.
As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who, with or without
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to the Government, or to
any person in authority or public officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall
be punished with imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10)
years. Violation thereof is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court but subject to
preliminary investigation.
Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she conducted the
preliminary examination of the complaints. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case,
respondent Judge found no probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the case.
Therefore, when respondent Judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case for
lack of probable cause, she was acting in accordance with the procedure on preliminary
investigation laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutors Office on review. Sec. 5 of Rule 112 provides that the resolution
of the Investigating Judge is subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor, or
the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be.
It is respondent Judges contention that the resolution shall be reviewed by the
Provincial Prosecutor. She explained that pursuant to the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charge of Violation of
R.A. No. 10.
However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" provides
that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the Ombudsman to act as special investigator or
prosecutor only on certain cases. Such provision is not applicable to the issue at hand.
Therefore, respondent Judge erred when she forwarded the case for review to the
Provincial Prosecutors Office. Nonetheless, complainant failed to show that respondent
Judge was motivated by bad faith when she issued the assailed order. At most, she is
guilty of judicial error for which she could not be held administratively accountable
absent any proof of fraud or other evil motive. 14
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information
for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. 15 Thus, a preliminary investigation is
not required nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the
Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. 16
This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said section provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court.If the complaint or information is filed with the
Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this
section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10)
days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause
after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and
under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of
additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the existence
of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional
evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of said period,
dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial.
However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under
custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest.
Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed directly with the
Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid down in Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall
be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issu e a warrant of arrest,
or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold the latter for
trial. However, the judge is given the discretion to merely issue summons instead of a
warrant of arrest if he does not find it necessary to place the accused under custody.
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused even after having personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions for the determination
of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judges sound judgment.
17
Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the case to the prosecutor
for review.
In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure, found probable caus e
to hold the accused for trial for the charge of Usurpation of Authority and forthwith set
their arraignment and the pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the course of action
taken by respondent judge.
Neither is there merit in complainants contention that respondent judge should have
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused for their failure to appear during the initial
presentation of evidence for the prosecution for the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial is
discretionary upon the judge. Indeed, there is nothing in the Rules which requires a
judge to issue a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused during trial.
Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she failed to rule on the
charge of violation of R.A. 10 in her Consolidated Resolution dated May 6, 2003.
Nonetheless, she asserts in her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint 18
dated May 7, 2004 that she conducted a preliminary investigation for the charge of
violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the charge after taking into consideration the
affidavits and evidence presented. Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a
preliminary investigation was conducted for this charge. 19 Thus, when respondent judge
dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to correct an
oversight.
Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it was the dismissal of the
charge for violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated to the PPO for review. It was
imprudent, however, for respondent judge to transmit the entire records of the case to
the PPO knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in the
records of the case. Respondent judge should have ensured that at least one complete
set of the records remained in her sala so that the prosecution for Usurpation of
Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though her actuation was, we do not agree
with complainant that respondent judge was motivated by an evil intent to delay the
case.
This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have transmitted her Order
dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of
the Ombudsman instead of the PPO. Complainant asserts that since the charge of
violation of R.A. 10 is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman
has the primary jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.
This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 20 entitled Clarifying and Modifying
Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides "that all prosecutors are now
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors." Moreover, "[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases 21
against public officers and employees prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall
be submitted to the Provincial or City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward
the same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the
approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final
action thereon, including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the
dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision correccional or
lower, or fine of not more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving offenses
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy
Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman."
Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with
law when she forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the
PPO remanded the case to the court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the
same to the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite
another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have taken the necessary steps to
remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the disposition of the case.
In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to
be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be established that he was moved by bad
faith, dishonesty or some other like motive. Respondent judges actuations are hardly
indicative of bad faith or any motive to delay the case which characterizes the offense of
gross ignorance of the law. 22

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of

merit. Respondent Judge Gloria B. Aglugub is ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 158543 - July 21, 2004
ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN and RAINIER PUNZALAN,
Petitioners, vs. DENCIO DELA PEÑA and ROBERT CAGARA, Respondents.
D EC ISIO N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
June 6, 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals and its May 23, 2003 Resolution which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City.
At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the
Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan,
Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others
arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero
mo?"2 Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako."3 Irked by the
response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the mouth.
The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted,
"Yariin na yan!"4 Thereafter, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him
with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group chased him.
While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas family driver, who was
carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing
him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to
wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier
Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latters
house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and when they got to the
Platas house, shouted, "Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!"5 Dela
Peña, Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the
police station to seek assistance.
As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael
Plata for Attempted Homicide6 and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of
Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges7 for grave
oral defamation, grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries
against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Peña against
Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S. No. 97-11528); and one for
Grave Threats filed by Dela Peña against Alex "Toto" Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).
In their counter-affidavit,8 the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were
fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and
Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara,
respectively.
Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation,
docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging
that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City,
Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, "Hoy
Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng
trabaho."9 In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the alleged defamatory
statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, 10 holding that Cagara
failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered by Rosalinda in a
state of distress and, hence, were not actionable. 11 The charge of Attempted Murder
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor
because complainant Dela Peñas claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of
the defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainier
against the latter.12
Dela Peña and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of Justice. On March 23,
2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28,
1998 Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others (1)
that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded
to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier,
Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and (3) that the charge
of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City is directed to file information for three (3) counts of slight oral
defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for two (2) counts [of] other light
threats against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; information for attempted homicide against
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano,
Lito dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio,
Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua,
Edwin Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information for malicious mischief and theft
against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo,
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Herson Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino
"Bobby" Serrano, and John Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their co -
respondents, filed separate motions for reconsideration. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary
of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the
Informations against the movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation
case should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered
without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. Anent the
Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Peña against Rainier, the Secretary held that the
allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted
Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Peña failed to
prove that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The
resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City is directed to withdraw the separate informations for slight oral defamation, other
light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all respondents
and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.14
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but the
same was denied in a Resolution dated October 11, 2000. 15
On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong be directed to file one count
of Slight Oral Defamation against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against
Rainier, Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against Alex
"Toto" Ofrin.16
On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the questioned
Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 are set aside
insofar as it directed the withdrawal of informations for slight oral defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan and attempted homicide against the respondents Alexander "Toto"
Ofrin, Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la Cruz,
Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez,
Vicente "Joven" Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar,
and Raymond Poliquit.
The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby affirmed insofar as it
directed the withdrawal of information for two (2) counts of other light threats against
Alexander "Toto" Ofrin.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. 18 Hence, the instant petition raising
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND
OCTOBER 11, 2000.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY
THAN NOT, SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND
WAS COMMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES,
WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
INTENT TO KILL SUCH THAT PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER
PUNZALAN MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE. 19
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding of probable cause against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral
Defamation and against petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted
Homicide.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the
error is in the judges findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law
and fact, appeal is the remedy. 20
Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished thus: the respondent
acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case;
where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps
his authority as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his
jurisdiction.21 In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan,22 it was held that grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power,
abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave. 23
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in
his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000. Under the Revised
Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. "Supervision and
control" includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve,
revise or modify acts and decision of subordinate officials or units. 24
In the case of People v. Peralta,25 we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests
the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,26 we
declared that:
A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a
criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient
evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner.
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the
prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action
where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the
averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after
investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be
prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the
discharge of this function.
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the
functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted
homicide against the other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative
of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.
First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory
remarks were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City.
The Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on the stand. The
City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the occurrence of the incident, is the
best person to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and
determine probable cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within
the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no
sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Resolution affirmed the
decision of the City Prosecutor.
As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein petitioners other than
Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolved to dismiss the complaint because it
was in the nature of a countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated
June 18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Peña be likewise investigated for
the charge of attempted homicide in connection with the shooting incident that
occurred on August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan.
This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein
respondent Dencio Dela Peña should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the
shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of herein petitioner Rainier
Punzalan.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of
discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent
case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona27 that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against
an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been
made with grave abuse.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2003 denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, directing the withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and
attempted homicide against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 171175 : October 30, 2009]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ARTURO F. DUCA, Respondent.
D EC ISIO N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the Decision 1 dated November 23, 2005
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
The CA decision reversed the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-D3 which affirmed an earlier decision 4
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting
respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:
It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged of
the crime of Falsification of Official Document defined and penalized under Article
172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information
which reads:
"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court , the said
accused confederating together and mutually abiding each other, with intent to cause
damage, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation
of a Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow type residential house covered by
Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the Municipal Assessor's Office of San
Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that the signature appearing on the sworn
statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not
because the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines only on
December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature
thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private complainant Pedro
Calanayan."
Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded 'not guilty'. Then trial on the merits
ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan
(hereinafter "Calanayan"), private complainant herein, filed an action for ejectment and
damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca
before the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor of
Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed by the aforesaid defendants, the said
decision became final and executory. On November 22, 1999, a writ of execution was
issued by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the money
judgment was likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca
covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor
of Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.
On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of
Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining
order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre
Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected
on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of
such claim she presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At
the back of the said exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair
market value of the property, which is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature
affixed on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca and subscribed and sworn to
before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on
December 10, 2001. The signature on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is
that of Arturo Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that the
signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at that time. Aldrin
arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a certification
from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it appear that his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that
of his brother Aldrin. That because of the misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were
able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza
and the policemen ordering them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property
in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified
that she had no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that time.
On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was
his. However, he intersposed the defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to
procure the said tax declaration.
On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term of two years,
four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of
P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is acquitted for lack of evidence.
The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness actual
damages in the amount of P60,000.00 moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.
SO ORDERED."
Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of
Dagupan City, Branch 44, rendered a decision, disposing the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of the
crime of Falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code and imposing upon said accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and
one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and ordering
him to pay to the complaining witness actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED.
x x x.
SO ORDERED."5
Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a Petition
for Review . On November 23, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision
acquitting Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held:
However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly
authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the contrary, the defense was
able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a
tax declaration on the house erected on the land registered under their mother's name.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified
the Tax Declaration of Real Property under Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1
(Exhibit "B") by making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated in the
accomplishment of the said document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of
the latter. It must be noted that as early as June 2001, Arturo has already been
authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the house in the latter's name as he
cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of Arturo was confirmed by the
latter's execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002 confirming the procurement of
the said tax declaration (Exhibit "6") as well as a Special Power of attorney executed on
June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7"). Thus, what appeared to be defective from the beginning
had already been cured so much so that the said document became valid and binding as
an official act of Arturo.
If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was signing, this
deficiency was cured by Aldrin's subsequent execution of Exhibits "6" and "7".
The RTC's conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere
afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any criminal liability has no basis since
from the very start, it has been duly established by the defense that Aldrin had verbally
instructed Arturo to cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering
his house constructed on his mother's lot for taxation purposes. 6
Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT
RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCA'S APPEAL
WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD THEREON.7
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved
the respondent's appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor
General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the
CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it
acted on respondent's appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be
considered void for being violative of due process.
In his Comment, 8 respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because
the prosecution was properly represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
and a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence under the control
and supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision
conferred on the private prosecutor by the Provincial Prosecutor had not been
withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim that the prosecution was not afforded
a chance to be heard in the CA. According to the respondent, he should not be
prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutor's failure to inform the Solicitor General of the
pendency of the appeal.
The petition is impressed with m erit.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the
Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section
35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly
provides, viz.:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party. (emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De
Castro,9 it was held:
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the
authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under
Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was
to "represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without
doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal
cases.10
Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina, 11 the Court made the following
pronouncement:
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses
before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal
circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are
brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must
represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal. 12
And in Labaro v. Panay, 13 the Court held:
The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the
Government or the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or commission
in any matter, action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General,
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. 14
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given
the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA
failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca's petition. A copy of
the CA Resolution 15 dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was
served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel
for private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it
shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution.
The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the
prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.
Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.16 ruled as follows:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
its right to due process is thereby violated (Uy v. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May
29, 1974]; Serino v. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People v. Gomez, L-
22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People v. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 [Aug.
31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdiction issue (Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen v. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. v. Enage, L-
30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen v.
Flores, supra).17
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine
consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is
void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. 18
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor
General the chance to file his comment on the Petition for Review clearly deprived the
State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the
CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon, 19 we held:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been
wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a
denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must
be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and
offended party, on the other. 20
Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and
3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of
the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the
clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the
amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse
party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which
to file the Petition for Review . No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section
1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his Petition for Review upon the
adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent
failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City. 21 The service of a copy of the petition on
the People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the
reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the
Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondent's failure
to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines, through the
OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the
petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing respondent's petition, proceeded to
resolve the petition and even acquitted respondent without the Solicitor General's
comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed decision.
On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is
settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ
of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors. 22 This rule, however, is not without
exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals, 23 we held:
However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that
while generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to
certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule
admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition
sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or where the error is patent or
the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those
already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court. 24 (emphasis supplied)
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for
certiorari without a motion for reconsideration is justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is
REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case
with dispatch.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180010 July 30, 2010
CENITA M. CARIAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D EC ISIO N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.
By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29514, "People of the Philippines v. Cenita Cariaga," dismissed the appeal
of Cenita Cariaga (petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24,
was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with
three counts of malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Information in the first case, Criminal Case No. 1293, reads:
That on or about the year 1993 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the
Municipality of Cabatuan, Province of Isabela, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, [C]ENITA M. CARIAGA, a public
officer, being the Municipal Treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela, and as such is accountable
for taxes, fees and monies collected and/or received by her by reason of her position,
acting in relation to her office and taking advantage of the same, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate and convert to her personal
use the amount of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE PESOS
(P2,785.00) representing the remittance of the Municipality of Cabatuan to the
Provincial Government of Isabela as the latter’s share in the real property taxes
collected, which amount was not received by the Provincial Government of Isabela, to
the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 (underscoring supplied)
The two other Informations in the second and third crim inal cases, Nos. 1294 and
1295, contain the same allegations except the malversed amounts which are ₱25,627.38
and ₱20,735.13, respectively.2
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22, 2004, 3 convicted
petitioner in the three cases, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused CENITA M. CARIAGA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MALVERSATION for which she is charged in the
three (3) separate informations and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences her to suffer:
1. In Crim. Case No. Br.20-1293, an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to
SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as maximum and its accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine of Two Thousand Seven Hu ndred Eighty Five
(P2,785.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
2. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1294, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine of Twenty Five
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos. She is ordered to
indemnify the Provincial Government of Isabela Twenty Five Thousand Six
Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
3. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1295, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum, and to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of Twenty Thousand Seven
Hundred Thirty (P20,730.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. The bailbonds are cancelled. Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he intended to
appeal the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals.
By Resolution of May 28, 2007, 4 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction thereon. Held the appellate court:
Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the Regional Trial Court
considering that the position of Municipal Treasu rer corresponds to a salary grade
below 27. Pursuant to Section 4 of [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8249], it is the Sandiganbayan, to the exclusion of all others, which
enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the offense. Evidently, the appeal to this Court of the
conviction for malversation of public funds was improperly and improvidently made.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of September 27,
2007.5 Hence, the present petition for review, petitioner defining the issues as follows:
I. WHETHER . . ., CONSIDERING THE CLEAR AND GRAVE ERROR
COMMITTED BY COUNSEL OF [PETITIONER] AND OTHER
EXTRA-ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE APPEAL OF…
[PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT…OR BE ENDORSED AND
TRANSMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL
SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.
II. WHETHER . . ., IN CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED TO THE
PETITIONER TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(ALTERNATIVELY IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) SO THAT
CRUCIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER…BE ADMITTED. 6
Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by her former counsel,
implores the Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her
appeal on the merits and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the records of the
cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 1606,7 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs: 8
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:
xx xx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided . x x x (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied).
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived
of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates against the Court’s dispensation of justice,
the Court grants petitioner’s plea for a relaxation of the Rules.1avvphi1
For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice,
such that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending
to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. 9
In Ulep v. People,10 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found
that
x x x petitioner’s failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent.
The omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had
more to lose had that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of
jurisdiction – which was exactly what happened in the CA.
The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to
the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned
ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice
of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27
are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should
have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have known when appeals
are to be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He
should have conscientiously and carefully observed this responsibility specially in cases
such as this where a person’s liberty was at stake. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The slapdash work of petitioner’s former counsel and the trial court’s apparent
ignorance of the law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to
question her conviction. 11
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made
exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its application will result in
outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or where the interests of justice
so require. 12 It can not be gainsaid that the case of petitioner can fall under any of these
exceptions.
Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution
and defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present
case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided
scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.

29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the
Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.

The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional
Trial Court is warned against committing the same procedural error, under pain of
administrative sanction.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICAT ION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 164631 June 26, 2009

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RENE RALLA BELISTA, Respondent.
D EC ISIO N
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner), seeking to annul and set aside
the May 26, 2004 Decision 1 and the July 28, 2004 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81096.
The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8)
parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista, the herein
private respondent.
The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR,
for brevity) under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228). Consequently, private
respondent claimed payment of just compensation over said agricultural lands.
It further appears that the DAR's evaluation of the subject farms was only ₱227,582.58,
while petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at
₱317,259.31.
Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, private respondent, on 11
November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation
against petitioning bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V
(RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-005.
On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a Decision, in favor of herein private
respondent, the fallo of which reads:
Wherefore, just compensation for the subject areas is hereby preliminarily fixed at TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND and FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 (₱2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land Bank of the Philippines,
Legaspi City, is hereby ordered to pay herein petitioner said amount pursuant to existing
rules and guidelines, minus the sum already remitted per Order dated January 2, 2003.
SO ORDERED.
As both parties interposed their respective motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V
eventually issued an Order dated 8 October 2003, the decretal portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Decision dated July 7, 2003 is MODIFIED, fixing the valuation claim of
petitioner herein with respect to her due share in the above lots to the tune of Two
Million Five Hundred Forty Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven and 58/100
(₱2,540,211.58) Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi City is hereby ordered to pay herein
petitioner said amount pursuant to existing rules and guidelines, minus the sum already
paid per Order dated January 2, 2003.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October 2003, filed an original Petition for
Determination of Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian
Case No. 03-06.
The court a quo motu propio dismissed the case when it issued the herein first assailed
Order dated 12 November 2003 "for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or
comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, "that the
DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB
Case and that the ground for dismissal of the case is not among the instances when a
court may dismiss a case on its motion."
As the court a quo denied its Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 28
November 2003, petitioner LBP elevated the case before the Tribunal through the
present Petition for Review, theorizing:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE
MOTU PROPIO ON THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5, 6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE DARAB
2003 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES FILED AND PENDING
BEFORE THE DARAB OR ITS ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVITY
AND TO CASES FILED AND PENDING WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN
COURTS.3
On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision dismissing the petition.
The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure,
an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution shall be filed before the DARAB and not
before the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the case before the RTC without first seeking
the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The CA found that petitioner's petition for determination of
just compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February 8, 2003, and under its
transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003 Rules shall govern all cases filed on or
after its effectivity; and, since an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be
filed with the DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err
in dismissing petitioner's petition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated
July 28, 2004.
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW CONSIDERING THAT THE LBP DID NOT
VIOLATE THE "DOCTRINE OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES" WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL PETITION FOR
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO
WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
APPLICABLE RULE IS THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER
11, 2002.4
Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation
was filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on
November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that
under the transitory provision of the 2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the
Board and the adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed
by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from the transitory
provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is governed by the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the date of filing of the petition with the
DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the reckoning date of the applicability of the
2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994
DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just
compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator on land valuation
and preliminary determination of just compensation shall not be appealable to the
Board, but shall be brought
directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that
petitioner brought the adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.
In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the RTC is an original
action and, since the case was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office
was already provided in the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the
RTC correctly dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.
Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.
The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just
compensation under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator
must first be appealed to the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as
SAC.
The court rules in the negative.
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
xx x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive
jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners
and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all
criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provisions of §50 must be construed in
harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just
compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the
plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction.
The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases.
Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valuation of
property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies, while in Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a
law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for
violations of the Industrial Peace Act. 6
In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions for determination of just compensation to
landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 7 the Court upheld the RTC's jurisdiction
over Wycoco's petition for determination of just compensation even where no summary
administrative proceedings was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction
over the determination of land valuation. The Court held:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for
determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s
re-evaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court
properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction over
determination of just compensation, thus –
… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be
undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in
compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the
decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from
Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the
original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be con trary to Sec.
57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian
Court] by private respondent is valid.
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s
complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no
summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to
perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant
to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990.8 x x x
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, 9 wherein Land Bank questioned the
alleged failure of private respondents to seek reconsideration of the DAR's valuation,
but instead filed a petition to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing
contradictory between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of
just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to
administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.1avvphi1
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested
in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands
taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of
just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice. 10
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, 11 where the issue was whether the SAC erred
in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's petition for determination of just
compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the
DARAB, the Court stated that:
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for
determination of just compensation. 12
The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just compensation relying
on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may
bring the matter to the Board by filing with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of
Appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion
is denied, the aggrieved party may file the appeal within the remaining period, but in no
case shall it be less than five (5) days.
Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to
contest the resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period
provided shall be deemed a concurrence by such party with the land valuation, hence
said valuation shall become final and executory.
Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final
Determination. The party who disagrees with the decision of the Board may contest the
same by filing an original action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having
jurisdiction over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the
Board's decision.

Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from Section 11, Rule XIII of the
1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board,
but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be
entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation cases for the
taking of lands under RA 6657 is a power vested in the courts. 13 Although Section 5,
Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation
cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not
change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes
direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just
compensation.14 In accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the
petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law. 15 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on
courts and administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot. 16

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision

dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without
delay petitioner's petition for the determination of just compensation.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice