EVIDENCE

Judicial Admission ............................................................................................................................................................... 1

Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil 48 .......................................................................................................................................... 2
Torres vs CA 131 SCRA 24 ................................................................................................................................................ 2
Bitong vs CA 292 SCRA 503 .............................................................................................................................................. 2
Rule 130, Section 1-2 ............................................................................................................................................................ 4
People vs Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Sison vs People, 250 SCRA 58 ......................................................................................................................................... 2
Adamczuk vs. Holloway, 13 A.2d 2 .................................................................................................................................... 2
State vs Tatum, 360 P2d 754 ............................................................................................................................................. 2
Anti-Wire Tapping Act .......................................................................................................................................................... 4
Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 ........................................................................................................................................ 2
Salcedo Ortanez vs CA, 235 SCRA 111 ............................................................................................................................. 2
Ramirez vs CA, 248 SCRA 590 .......................................................................................................................................... 2
Best Evidence Rule ............................................................................................................................................................... 4
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 ........................................................................................................................... 2
Meyers v. United States, 171 F .2d 800 ............................................................................................................................. 2
People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 ............................................................................................................................................ 2
Seiler v. Lucas Film, Ltd., 797 F .2d1504 ........................................................................................................................... 2
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 98 ....................................................................................................................................... 2
U.S. v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 ............................................................................................................................................ 2
Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes, 55 Phil 905 ........................................................................................................................ 2
Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 ........................................................................................................... 2
Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers, 77 SCRA 24 .................................................................................................. 2
Villa Rey Transit v. Ferrer 25 SCRA 845 ........................................................................................................................... 2
Michael & Co. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 ............................................................................................................................... 2
De Vera v. Aguilar, 281 SCRA 602 ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Parol Evidence ...................................................................................................................................................................... 4

Enriquez vs Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 ...................................................................................................................................... 2

Canuto vs Mariano, 37 Phil 840 .......................................................................................................................................... 2
Yu Tek vs Gonzales, 29 Phil 384 ....................................................................................................................................... 2
Land Settlement & Dev. Corp vs Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA 750 ...................................................................................... 2
 JUDICIAL ADMISSION
LEONARD LUCIDO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GELASIO
CALUPITAN, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
G.R. No. L-8200 March 17, 1914
FACTS:
1. On February 10, 1903, some chattels and real estate
belonging to the plaintiff, Lucido, were regularly sold
at an execution sale, to Rosales, who the next day
transferred a one-half interest in the property of
Zolaivar.
2. On March 30, 1903, a public document was executed
and signed by all of the above parties and the
defendant, Gelasio Calupitan, wherein it was stated
that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido,
sold all their rights and obligation pertaining to the
property in question to Calupitan for the amount of the
purchase price
3. On the same day, Lucido and Calupitan executed a
document, which the lower court held to constitute a
sale with the right to conventional redemption.
4. To prove that the transaction was, in fact, a sale,
plaintiff offered as evidence defendant’s original
answer to the complaint. Defendant objected,
claiming that its admission was not proper, especially
in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan
himself, who was the time acting as his own attorney.
ISSUE: WON the original answer to the complaint may be
offered as evidence.
RULING: YES.
Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this
transaction as a sale with the right to conventional redemption
is to be found in his original answer to the complaint. In this
original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was
one of sale with the right to repurchase governed by the
provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code.
Jones on evidence (secs. 272, 273), after remarking that the
earlier cases were not in harmony on the point, says:
Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as
admissions were based on the theory that most of the
allegations were merely pleader's matter -- fiction stated by
counsel and sanctioned by the courts. The whole modern
tendency is to reject this view and to treat pleadings as
statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as
admissions of the parties, having weight according to the
circumstances of each case. But some of the authorities still
hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should
be some proof that he has authorized it. virtual law library
On the same principles where amended pleadings have been
filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible,
but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect,
unless formally offered in evidence.
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN,
ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO
NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and
ADELINA NARCISO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
FACTS:
1. Margarita Torres was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente
and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died
leaving Margarita a widow.
2. After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres
cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit of
marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria
Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was born.
3. Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo,
Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria
(married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario
Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso.
4. Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms.,
had been leased temporarily by the Government to
Margarita who was the actual occupant of the lot.
5. On December 13, 1910, the Government, through the
Director of Lands, issued to Margarita, Sale Certificate No.
222 (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at the price of P428.80,
payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each.
6. On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death,
Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial deed all his
rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No.
551 in favor of petitioner, for the sum of P300.00.
7. On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit
claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and asking for the
issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the
Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau of Lands
issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal
heirs of Margarita Torres.
8. On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint
against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had
entered a portion of Lot No. 551 without their consent,
constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon demand.
9. For her part, petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of
the lot in question, being one of the daughters of Margarita
10. Petitioner argued that the lot was conjugal property of
Leon and Margarita and that she has a right over it since
she is their legitimated child; Respondents, on the other
hand, alleged that the lot was paraphernal property of
Margarita and that they are the only heirs.
CFI Cavite: Macaria Torres is a legitimated child
The certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also shows that Macaria
Torres was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also the
family name of her father. Such being the case, Macaria
possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And
when her parents were married on June 7, 1909, she became
the legitimated daughter of on Arbole and Margarita Torres.
CA: Reversed.
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter, not having
been legally acknowledged before or after the marriage of her
parents. The fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and
reared by her parents until they died, and that the certificate of
baptism (Exhibit "C") shows that she was given the family
name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status of an
acknowledged natural child.
11. A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated
April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In support thereof,
petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement of
spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres,
acknowledging Macaria Torres as their legitimated child.
12. The reason given for the non-production of the notarial
document during trial was that the same was only found
by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A. Bautista, among the
personal belongings of private respondent, Vicente
Santillan after his death and who may have attempted to
suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued
against new trial, and contended that it is not newly
discovered evidence which could not have been produced
during the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
13. Petitioner argued that in the original complaint, private
respondent’s made an admission of her legitimation.
ISSUE:
1. WON the admission made in the original complaint is
admissible as evidence. NO
2. WON the Sworn Statement constitutes newly discovered
evidence which could produce a new trial. YES
RULING:
1. NO. In the Amended Complaint filed by private
respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined
portion was deleted. In virtue thereof, the Amended
Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is
regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further
function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer
forms part of the record.
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original
complaint she should have offered it in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its
character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence,
required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's
submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by
extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for
failure to offer it in evidence.
2. YES. Private respondents stress that since petitioner
signed as a witness to the document she should be
chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and,
therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly discovered
evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably
qualify as newly discovered evidence, which could not
have been produced during the trial even with the exercise
of due diligence; specially if it really had been in the
possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who, it
was alleged, suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be
conducted by respondent Appellate Court, now
empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
NORA A. BITONG, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION), EUGENIA D.
APOSTOL, JOSE A. APOSTOL, MR. & MS. PUBLISHING
CO., LETTY J. MAGSANOC, AND ADORACION G.
NUYDA, respondents.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Nora Bitong had been the Treasurer and a
Member of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. Publishing
Co., Inc. from the time it was incorporated on 29 Oct 1976
to 11 April 1989, and was the registered owner of 1,000
shares of stock out of the 4,088 total outstanding shares.
2. She complained of the irregularities committed from 1983
to 1987 by Eugenia D. Apostol, President and Chairperson
of the Board of Directors, claiming that the transactions
and agreements entered into by Mr. & Ms. with Philippine
Daily Inquirer were not supported by any bond and/or
stockholders' resolution.
3. Despite the fact that the advances made by Mr. & Ms. to
PDI were booked as advances to an affiliate, there existed
no board or stockholders' resolution, contract nor any
other document which could legally authorize the creation
of and support to an affiliate.
4. Petitioner then filed a derivative suit before the Securities
and Exchange Commission to hold respondent spouses
Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol liable for fraud,
misrepresentation, disloyalty, evident bad faith, conflict of
interest and mismanagement in directing the affairs of Mr.
& Ms. to the damage and prejudice of Mr. & Ms. and its
stockholders, including petitioner.
5. After trial on the merits, the SEC Hearing Panel dismissed
the derivative suit and dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction barring private respondents from disposing of
their PDI shares and any of Mr. & Ms. assets.
6. SEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Hearing Panel
and ordered private respondents to account for, return and
deliver to Mr. & Ms. any and all funds and assets that they
disbursed from the coffers of the corporation.
7. Court of Appeals: reversed the SEC En Banc and held
that from the evidence on record petitioner was not the
owner of any share of stock in Mr. & Ms. and therefore not
the real party-in-interest to prosecute the complaint she
had instituted against private respondents. Accordingly,
petitioner alone and by herself as an agent could not file a
derivative suit in behalf of her principal.
8. Petitioner submits that in paragraph 1 under the caption "I.
The Parties" of her Amended Petition before the SEC, she
stated that she was a stockholder and director of Mr. &
Ms. In par. 1 under the caption "II. The Facts" she
declared that she "is the registered owner of 1,000 shares
of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the latter's 4,088 total
outstanding shares" and that she was a member of the
Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. and treasurer from its
inception until 11 April 1989. Petitioner contends that
private respondents did not deny the above allegations in
their answer and therefore they are conclusively bound by
this judicial admission.
9. Consequently, private respondents' admission that
petitioner has 1,000 shares of stock registered in her
name in the books of Mr. & Ms. forecloses any question
on her status and right to bring a derivative suit on behalf
of Mr. & Ms.
ISSUE: WON private respondents’ Amended Answer may be
considered as judicial admission.
RULING: NO.
A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission
against interest is entitled to overcome by evidence the
apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for the party
against whom the pleading is offered to show that the
statements were inadvertently made or were made under
a mistake of fact. In addition, a party against whom a
single clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may
have the right to introduce other paragraphs which tend to
destroy the admission in the paragraph offered by the
adversary.
The answer of private respondents shows that there was
no judicial admission that petitioner was a stockholder of
Mr. & Ms. to entitle her to file a derivative suit on behalf of
the corporation. Where the statements of the private
respondents were qualified with phrases such as, "insofar
as they are limited, qualified and/or expanded by," "the
truth being as stated in the Affirmative
Allegations/Defenses of this Answer" they cannot be
considered definite and certain enough, cannot be
construed as judicial admissions.
More so, the affirmative defenses of private respondents
directly refute the representation of petitioner that she is a
true and genuine stockholder of Mr. & Ms. by stating
unequivocally that petitioner is not the true party to the
case but JAKA which continues to be the true stockholder
of Mr. & Ms. In fact, one of the reliefs which private
respondents prayed for was the dismissal of the petition
on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal interest
to initiate and prosecute the same.
When taken in its totality, the Amended Answer to the
Amended Petition, or even the Answer to the Amended
Petition alone, clearly raises an issue as to the legal
personality of petitioner to file the complaint. Every alleged
admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which makes
for the one side with the qualifications which limit, modify
or destroy its effect on the other side. The reason for this
is, where part of a statement of a party is used against
him as an admission, the court should weigh any
other portion connected with the statement, which
tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is
against interest.
The certificate of stock itself once issued is a continuing
affirmation or representation that the stock described therein is
valid and genuine and is at least prima facie evidence that it
was legally issued in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
However, this presumption may be rebutted. Similarly, books
and records of a corporation which include even the stock and
transfer book are generally admissible in evidence in favor of
or against the corporation and its members to prove the
corporate acts, its financial status and other matters including
one's status as a stockholder. They are ordinarily the best
evidence of corporate acts and proceedings.
However, the books and records of a corporation are not
conclusive even against the corporation but areprima
facie evidence only. Parol evidence may be admitted to supply
omissions in the records, explain ambiguities, or show what
transpired where no records were kept, or in some cases
where such records were contradicted. The effect of entries in
the books of the corporation which purport to be regular
records of the proceedings of its board of directors or
stockholders can be destroyed by testimony of a more
conclusive character than mere suspicion that there was an
irregularity in the manner in which the books were kept.
The foregoing considerations are founded on the basic
principle that stock issued without authority and in violation of
law is void and confers no rights on the person to whom it is
issued and subjects him to no liabilities. Where there is an
inherent lack of power in the corporation to issue the stock,
neither the corporation nor the person to whom the stock is
issued is estopped to question its validity since an estopped
cannot operate to create stock which under the law cannot
have existence.

In other words, while the admission is admissible in

evidence, its probative value is to be determined from
the whole statement and others intimately related or
connected therewith as an integrated unit. Although
acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be
contradicted, however, evidence aliunde can be presented
to show that the admission was made through palpable
mistake. 8 The rule is always in favor of liberality in
construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute
may be submitted to the judgment of the court.

Petitioner then contends that she was a holder of the

proper certificates of shares of stock and that the
transfer was recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book
of Mr. & Ms. Petitioner alleges that even in the absence of
a stock certificate, a stockholder solely on the strength of
the recording in the stock and transfer book can exercise
all the rights as stockholder, including the right to file a
derivative suit in the name of the corporation.
 BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Meyers v. United States, 171 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
FACTS:
1. Meyers was an officer in the United States Army. In 1939,
while stationed at Wright Field, near Dayton, Ohio, he
organized under the laws of Ohio a corporation called
Aviation Electric Corporation, and paid into its treasury
the sum of $500 to cover its authorized capital consisting
of 250 shares of common stock having a par value of $2
2. At his direction, a certificate for 224 shares was issued to
Miss June Ballaou, an employee at Wright Field, and the
remaining shares were divided between one David
Johnson and one Robert L. Pine.
3. The newly organized company engaged in manufacturing
parts and accessories for airplanes, and soon had on
hand orders from the Signal Corps of the United States
Army aggregating about $20,000.
4. The appellant had become acquainted with Lamarre and
his wife as early as 1936 or 1937 and apparently was fond
of them. In 1940, Lamarre was made secretary-treasurer
of the corporation and the Ballaou certificate for 224
shares was transferred to him without valuable
consideration. A few months thereafter he became
president of the company.
5. Large profits were earned as long as the war continued,
but the termination of actual hostilities so reduced the
demand for its products that the corporation was dissolved
in September, 1946.
6. Desiring to ascertain whether there had been instances of
waste, fraud, corruption, mismanagement, excessive
profits or inefficiency in the nation's war effort, entailing as
it did the hurried expenditure of billions of dollars for
national defense, the United States Senate created the
investigating committee.
7. In the course of an inquiry into government contracts with
a large airplane supplier, the appellant testified.
8. Three of the indictment's counts charged that Lamarre: (1)
knowingly and willfully testified falsely that Meyers "was
not financially interested in or connected with the Aviation
Electric Corporation of Dayton and Vandalia, Ohio," during
the years 1940 to 1947, inclusive; (2) knowingly and
willfully testified falsely that a Cadillac automobile
purchased in Washington by Meyers, and paid for by
Aviation Electric Corporation, was purchased for the
corporation and for its use; (3) knowingly and willfully
testified falsely that the sum of $10,000, paid by means of
Aviation Electric's checks, for decorating and furnishing
Meyers' Washington apartment "was a gift from himself,
Bleriot H. Lamarre."
9. Bleriot H. Lamarre and the appellant, Bennett E. Meyers,
were jointly indicted for violating the District of Columbia
statute which denounces perjury and subornation thereof.
10. Lamarre pleaded guilty to all three charges when he was
arraigned on December 19, 1947, while Meyers entered a
plea of not guilty and was tried before a jury in the District
Court of the United States for the District of Columbia
Meyer’s argument: Lamarre did not testify before the
subcommittee that Meyers was not financially interested in
or connected with Aviation Electric; but that, quite to the
contrary, Lamarre told the subcommittee Meyers actually
owned the business. If that contention be well founded, it
is a complete defense to the charge that Meyers suborned
the perjury alleged in the first count. It is elementary that
one cannot be convicted of suborning a perjury which was
not in fact committed; that is to say, there can be no
subornation of perjury if there was no perjury.
Whether Lamarre represented to the subcommittee that
Meyers was not financially interested in or connected with
the company is to be determined by finding the meaning
or significance which is fairly attributable to all Lamarre's
testimony before the subcommittee. A stenographically
reported record of that testimony was put in evidence
and is before us.
ISSUE: WON a stenographic transcript serves as the best
evidence of a testimony.
RULING:
That theory is, in our view, based upon a misconception of
the best evidence rule. As applied generally in federal
courts, the rule is limited to cases where the contents of a
writing are to be proved.[11] Here there was no attempt to
prove the contents of a writing; the issue was what
Lamarre had said, not what the transcript contained. The
transcript made from shorthand notes of his testimony
was, to be sure, evidence of what he had said, but it was
not the only admissible evidence concerning it. Rogers'
testimony was equally competent, and was admissible
whether given before or after the transcript was received
in evidence. Statements alleged to be perjurious may be
proved by any person who heard them, as well as by a
reporter who recorded them in shorthand.
As we have pointed out, there was no issue as to the
contents of the transcript, and the government was not
attempting to prove what it contained; the issue was what
Lamarre actually had said. Rogers was not asked what the
transcript contained but what Lamarre's testimony had
been.
With the best evidence rule shown to be inapplicable, it is
clearly seen that it was neither "preposterously unfair", as
the appellant asserts, nor unfair at all, to permit the
transcript of Lamarre's evidence to be introduced after
Rogers had testified. Since both methods of proving the
perjury were permissible, the prosecution could present its
proof in any order it chose.
The rationale of the so-called "best evidence rule" requires
that a party having available evidence which is relatively
certain may not submit evidence which is far less certain.
The law is concerned with the true fact, and with that
alone; its procedures are directed to that objective, and to
that alone. It should permit no procedure the sole use of
which is to obscure and confuse that which is otherwise
plain and certain.
Dissenting:
It may be remarked at this point that the transcript in the
case at bar is a document, not challenged for inaccuracy
or alteration. It possesses every characteristic which the
most literal devotee of established rules of evidence could
ascribe to written evidence of a contract as justification for
preference of such writing over the recollection of the
parties.
In my view, the court iterates an error when it says that the
best evidence rule is limited to cases where the contents
of a writing are to be proved. The purpose of offering in
evidence a "written contract" is not to prove the contents
of the writing. The writing is not the contract; it is merely
evidence of the contract. The contract itself is the
agreement between the parties. Statutes such as the
statute of frauds do not provide that a contract be in
 writing; they provide that the contract be evidenced by a
writing, or that a written memorandum of it be made. The
writing is offered as evidence of an agreement, not for the
purpose of proving its own contents. A deed to real estate
is different, being actually the instrument of conveyance,
although there is authority that it too is merely evidence of
the agreement between the parties.
The doctrine that stenographic notes are not the best
evidence of testimony was established when stenography
was not an accurate science. The basis for the decisions
is succinctly stated in the 1892 case quoted as leading by
Professor Wigmore: "Stenographers are no more infallible
than any other human beings, and while as a rule they
may be accurate, intelligent, and honest, they are not
always so; and therefore it will not do to lay down as a rule
that the stenographer's notes when translated by him are
the best evidence of what a witness has said, in such a
sense as to exclude the testimony of an intelligent
bystander who has heard and paid particular attention to
the testimony of the witness."
But we have before us no such situation. Stenographic
reporting has become highly developed, and official
stenographic reports are relied upon in many of the most
important affairs of life. Even as early as 1909, a court
referred to "Experience having demonstrated the
impartiality and almost absolute accuracy of the notes of
court stenographers" as the reason for legislation making
admissible as evidence a court stenographer's report. [8] In
the present instance, at least, no one has disputed the
correctness of the transcript.
From the theoretical point of view, the case poses this
question: Given both (1) an accurate stenographic
transcription of a witness' testimony during a two-day
hearing and (2) the recollection of one of the complainants
as to the substance of that testimony, is the latter
admissible as evidence in a trial of the witness for perjury?
I think not. To say that it is, is to apply a meaningless
formula and ignore crystal-clear actualities. The transcript
is, as a matter of simple, indisputable fact, the best
evidence. The principle and not the rote of the law ought
to be applied.
I do not suggest that a stenographer's report is
unimpeachable; that question is not here.
1. Respondents Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others are
charged with the crime of falsification of public documents,
in their capacities as public officials and employees, by
having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or
merchandise were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-
Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers,
in such quantities and at such prices and from such
business establishments or persons as are made to
appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in
truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as
valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Madrigal
Gonzalez in the public and official documents had ever
been made.
2. In order to prove the charge of falsification, the
prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of receipts,
which was marked Exh. "D", containing blue invoices
numbered 101301 to 101400 of the Metro Drug
Corporation, Magallanes corner Jakosalem, Cebu City.
3. The booklet contained the triplicate copies, and according
to said witness the original invoices were sent to the
Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the
customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in the
booklet.
4. Witness further explained that in preparing receipts for
sales, two carbons were used between the three sheets,
the original, the duplicate and the triplicate, so that the
duplicates and the triplicates were filled out by the used of
the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of
the originals.
5. Hon. Bienvenido M. Tan, then presiding in the court below,
interrupted the proceeding holding that the triplicates are
not admissible unless it is first proven that the originals
were lost and can not be produced.
ISSUE: Whether the triplicate copies, that were produced with
the use of carbon sheets, were admissible as evidence.

[G.R. No. L-14257. July 31, 1959.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON.

BIENVENIDO A. TAN as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Br. XIII, PACITA MADRIGAL-
GONZALES, ANGELITA CENTENO, JULIA CARPIO,
CALIXTO HERMOSA, and CRISPULA R. PAGARAN alias
PULA, Respondents.

DOCTRINE: If the documents or papers to be introduced in

evidence were produced by the use of carbon sheets, and
which thereby produced a facsimile of the originals including
the figures and the signatures on the originals, they are
regarded as duplicate originals and may be introduced as
such, even without accounting for the non-production of the
other originals.

FACTS;