Tanada vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)

TITLE: Tanada v Tuvera

CITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it “would be granted to a private individual only
in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular
right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved”.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the
reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land.

ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article
2 “unless otherwise provided”.

HELD:

“Unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become
effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is
necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions
and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code “Ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith”.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
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Case Digest: Tañada vs. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985

Tañada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,

and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general

orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders
is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

© legally g_law_rious

Tañada vs. TuveraG.R. No. L-63915146 SCRA 446

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Tanada vs Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446

Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In
the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some
of these decrees, orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect. The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of
that decision. Specifically, they ask the What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general
applicability”? Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
What is meant by “publication”? Where is the publication to be made? When is the publication to be
made? the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette

Issue:

(1) Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and Newspaper of General
Circulation is a mandatory requirement of the Constitution?
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw
library

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall
become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.cralawnad

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It
is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
De Roy vs Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757

FACTS:
In A Motion for Extension of time to file a Motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners with the Court
of Appeals, the CA denied the same contending that the 15-day period for appealing or for filing a
Motion for Reconsideration cannot be extended (HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES INC., VS. JAPZON, 136 SCRA
46)

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the above case should not be made to apply to them
owing to the non-publication of the HABALUYAS decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the
subject decision of the CA was promulgated.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner's contention meritorious?

HELD:
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decision of the Supreme
Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Courts Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals

ANOTHER SOURCE: De Roy vs Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 757

Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa Perdosa De Roy, collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal, Sr., et al., resulting in injuries to their
family and death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop but the former failed to do so.

Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of tie to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. They again filed for a
motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

Petitioner filed for a special civic action for certiorari to declare null and void the previous decision and
claimed that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion. They contended that the rule
enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. Also they argued that the petitioners had
the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the shop.

Issues: Whether or not the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-day period for appealing
or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, could be applied to the case at bar.

Held: The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to the case at bar, notwithstanding the
non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.

Ratio:

 There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of the
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court,
which are published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and in
pubications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
 The ruling in the Habaluyas case was that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. Such motion may be filed only in cases pending in the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which in its discretion may grant or deny the
extension requested. Such decision was given prospective application to subsequent cases like
Lacsamana vs Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court and Bacaya vs
Intermediate Appellate Court.
 With regard to the contention on the “last clear chance” of private respondents to avoid the
accident, this should be disregarded, since the doctrine of “last clear chance”, wich has been
applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
 Philippine Veterans Bank vs Vega, 360 SCRA 33

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine
Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter,
petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement
upon reopening the bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the
liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on
March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it
into law on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent
publication was not necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have
general application thus it took effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked
by the petitioners. The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days
following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as
indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

ANOTHER SOURCE: VETERANS BANK VS. VEGA

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. VS. HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA,

THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE LIQUIDATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE
VETERANS BANK

G.R. No. 105364*, June 28, 2001

Facts:

In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). Thereafter, the Philippine
Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E. (petitioner) filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages
and benefits with said court. After lengthy proceedings, partial payments to the employees were made.
However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid. Petitioners then moved to
disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. Central Bank also issued a certificate of
authority allowing the PVB to reopen.

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued with
the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that respondents were set to order
the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while petitioners’ claims
have been frozen to their prejudice.

Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and no
longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.

Issue:

May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the PVB when Congress had mandated its
rehabilitation and reopening?
Ruling:

No. SC ruled in favor of the Petitioner.

Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic
Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes" provides in part for the
reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years
from the date of the reopening of the head office. The law likewise provides for the creation of a
rehabilitation committee to facilitate the implementation of its provisions.

Pursuant to said R.A. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the
PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a motion to terminate the liquidation
proceedings with the respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated
in view of the passage of R.A. 7169. The Monetary Board then approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted
by the Rehabilitation Committee. Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing
PVB to reopen. On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed a motion for the termination of the liquidation
proceedings of PVB with the respondent judge. In a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, this court (SC) issued
a temporary restraining order in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with
the liquidation of PVB. Thus, on August 3, 1992, the PVB opened its doors to the public and started regular
banking operations.

Clearly, the enactment of R.A. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments stated above, has rendered
the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped of the authority to
issue orders involving acts of liquidation.

[In relation to Corp Law… you may skip this part]

Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. It is the
winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the process
of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss. On the other end of the
spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a
continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former
position of successful operation and solvency.

It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of
rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings
to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

[In relation to our topic in Consti…]

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. 7169 became effective only
on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette, the Court is of the view that such
contention is bereft of merit.

While as a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to
provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It
is undisputed that R.A. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992.
Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. 7169, then it
became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official
Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby given due course and granted. Respondent judge is hereby
permanently enjoined from further proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.
RIETA vs People

GR 147817, 436 SCRA 273, August 12, 2004

Taxation Law, Criminal Law

Facts:

The authorities intercepted a cargo truck containing 305 cases of “blue-seal” or untaxed cigarettes,
which was escorted by a toyota car loaded with firearms. The cargo truck was driven by a civilian who
managed to escape. Among those caught in the act and charged with violations were two policemen
who accompanied the driver in the cargo truck, and another civilian and three policemen manning the
toyota car. Some of the policemen were found to be personnel of COSAC or Constabulary Off-Shore
Anti Crime battalion who have no mission orders. They were apprehended, charged with smuggling, and
the confiscated cigarettes were entrusted to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.

On appeal, the accused contended that the existence of the blue-seal cigarettes was not established
because the prosecution had not presented them as evidence, and that there was no crime because the
corpus delicti was never proven during the trial.

Issue 1: W/N the fact of the crime was sufficiently established

Held:

Yes. Corpus delicti may be proven by credible testimony of witnesses, not necessarily by physical
evidence. This means that the confiscated “blue-seal” cigarettes need not be presented as evidence in
court to prove smuggling. In this case, a custody receipt issued by the BOC was presented and the
testimonies of the apprehending authorities identifying the contraband items were found credible. Such
are sufficient to prove the fact of the crime.

Issue 2: W/N the accused committed smuggling

Held: Yes. Under Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code, persons found to be in possession of
smuggled items are presumed to be engaged in smuggling. In this case, the defendants were shown to
have had possession of illegally imported merchandise without offering any satisfactory explanations.
Hence, conviction is proper since they were not able to rebut the presumption

ANOTHER SOURCE: RIETA vs PEOPLE

FELICISIMO RIETA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 147817 August 12, 2004

Facts: After a car chase, Col. Lacson and his men searched a vehicle and found several firearms.
The persons in the car belonged to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be
equipped with mission orders. During that same incident, when the cargo truck which was
accompanied by the car during the car chase was searched, 305 cases of blue seal or untaxed
cigarettes were found inside.

Rieta, one of the passengers of the seized cargo truck, denied any knowledge of the alleged
smuggling of the blue-seal cigarettes. He alleged that the cargo truck was not opened in their
presence, nor were the contents thereof shown to them upon their apprehension. These
allegations were corroborated by one of his companions during the incident.

RTC and CA found Rieta guilty of smuggling.

Issue: Were the evidence obtained against the accused inadmissible in evidence because
petitioner and his co-accused were arrested without a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and
seizure order (ASSO) which was subsequently declared illegal and invalid by this Honorable
Supreme Court?

Held: The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute,
there is an imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact
negating the acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done
while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly recognized and
presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No.
60 -- long before our Decision in Tañada and the arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that
can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.

The search and seizure of goods, suspected to have been introduced into the country in violation
of customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
provision. Such provision mandates that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge who has personally determined the existence of probable cause.

Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest may be made even without a
warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly
obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or
search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or
any person on board; or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

Morales, David Gil A. 3-Manresa

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SAN ROQUE POWER CORP.

G.R. No. 187485 February 12, 2013
707 SCRA 66 Supreme Court En Banc

FACTS:
 On October 11, 1997, San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) entered into a Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the National Power Corporation (NPC) by building the San
Roque Multi-Purpose Project in San Manuel, Pangasinan.
 The San Roque Multi-Purpose Project allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of
P559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed
for the same year.
 San Roque duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, amounting to P559,709,337.54,
representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for taxable year 2001.
 However, on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year
2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT To the amount of P560,200,283.14. San Roque
filed with the BIR on the same date, separate amended claims for refund in the aggregate
amount of P560,200,283.14.
 On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the CIR
on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.
 CIR alleged that the claim by San Roque was prematurely filed with the CTA.

ISSUE:
 WON San Roque is entitled to tax refund? – NO.

HELD:
 No. San Roque is not entitled to a tax refund because it failed to comply with the mandatory
and jurisdictional requirement of waiting 120 days before filing its judicial claim.
 On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the CIR
on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA, which showed that
San Roque did not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim.
 Compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional, under RA
8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Failure to comply renders the petition void.
 It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the petition
premature and without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire
jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s petition.
 Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity."
 Thus, San Roque’s petition with the CTA is a mere scrap of paper.
 Well-settled is the rule that tax refunds or credits, just like tax exemptions, are strictly
construed against the taxpayer.
 Whether the Atlas doctrine or the Mirant doctrine is applied to San Roque is immaterial
because what is at issue in the present case is San Roque’s non-compliance with the 120-day
mandatory and jurisdictional period, which is counted from the date it filed its administrative
claim with the CIR. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year prescriptive period,
as long as the administrative claim is filed within the two-year prescriptive period. However,
San Roque’s fatal mistake is that it did not wait for the CIR to decide within the 120-day period,
a mandatory period whether the Atlas or the Mirant doctrine is applied.
 Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear, unequivocal, and categorical that the CIR has
120 days to act on an administrative claim. The taxpayer can file the judicial claim
(1) Only within 30 days after the CIR partially or fully denies the claim within the 120-
day period, or
(2) only within 30 days from the expiration of the 120- day period if the CIR does not act
within the 120-day period.
 Even if, contrary to all principles of statutory construction as well as plain common sense, we
gratuitously apply now Section 4.106-2(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, still San Roque
 cannot recover any refund or credit because San Roque did not wait for the 60-day period
to lapse, contrary to the express requirement in Section 4.106-2(c).
 SC granted the petition of CIR to deny the tax refund or credit claim of San Roque.