1.

156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the
appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and
confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

Categories: 156 SCRA 549, Constitutional Law 1

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2.

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
“repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed
(by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject
of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted
their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however
did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund
Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances
of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices
of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to
them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no
power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to
the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority
to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in
the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot
be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto
the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which
pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations
to the other departments of the government.
3.

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork
barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide
development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot
specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the
function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994,
neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada
and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against
Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1)
the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2)
the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for
the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and
that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions
and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more
properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot
validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president
herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found
that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the
legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance
of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already
funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund
Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual
obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The
SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can
be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and
30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from
the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The
veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore,
being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered
by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged
in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained
the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation
benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special
Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant
to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by
the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said
existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads
of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established
principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed
by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the
Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the
President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional
or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such
statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in
accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their
local districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national
government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen
are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
4.
It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took
over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The
motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon
Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may
unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right
to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and
that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to
have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require
their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights,
and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal
nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et
al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive
relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated
the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy
to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence,
the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is
to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears
more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may
take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
 5.

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
 Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify
and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been
born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a
Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
 Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen
thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate
of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident
of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May
2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
 While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never
actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a
period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section
39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
 Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to
the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
 Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to
comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed
to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
 Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
 Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and
subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to
filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts:
(1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA,
an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz,
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty
applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the
Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which
he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured
another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6,
 Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March
2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
 He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and
he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more
than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of
Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May
2007.[7]
 The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3
and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof.
 Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October
2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in
compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying
public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the
armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen
 Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that
he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at
least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has
lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has
been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least
one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate
of candidacy.
 The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a
favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition
for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
discretion for dismissing the petition.
 Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and
28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a
new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to
declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar.
 Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already
found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court
cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-
entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty
 candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at
bar.
 . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before
a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

 The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for
election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective
positions.

RULING:

Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
 It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-
born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a
foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No.
9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
 There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May
2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary,
the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other
countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local
elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the
fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed
intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
 Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year
residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is
able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for
election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the
present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May
2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a
candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.

 To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon
failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the
instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.
6.

109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to
Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations
were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the
lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered
in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline
its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.
7.

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of

its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication
of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to
place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of
the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was
published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
8.

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to
this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power
to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and
in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies
and their effective implementation.
9. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest
G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious
crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute.
The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that
it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function
of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to
allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even
without the signature of the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also
the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's
foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties
but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for
the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations,
to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.