JUNE 2015 While pinned down, De Leon was hit on the face by Randolf with a stove and gas
s hit on the face by Randolf with a stove and gas tank he
[ G.R. No. 205316, June 29, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO DE CASTRO
AND RANDOLF[1] PABANIL, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the May 23, 2012 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 04343 affirming appellants' conviction for the crime of murder.
The factual antecedents:
Eric De Castro (Eric), Roland Pabanil (Roland) and appellants Romeo De Castro (Romeo)
and Randolf Pabanil (Randolf) were charged with Murder under the following Information:
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with LPG tank,
conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, abuse of superior strength and insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hit on the head with the said LPG Tank one Senior Police
Officer II (SPOII) Orlando De Leon, a police officer, while in the performance of his official
duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic and fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution established that at around 3:00 a.m. of August 16, 2006, Edwin
Lonzame (Lonzame), who works as a baker at AMM Bakery at Apolinario Street, Bangkal,
Makati City, saw the victim SPOII Orlando De Leon (De Leon) at their bakery buying milk
and bread. A man later identified as Randolf also came to buy from the bakery. Shortly,
another man arrived and punched Randolf. De Leon pacified them until the man ran away but
he continued talking with Randolf and they had an altercation. At this point, another man,
later identified as Romeo, arrived and hit De Leon on the head. De Leon fell and was mauled
by Randolf, Romeo, Eric and Roland, the latter two are familiar with Lonzame as they used
to stand-by at the bakery almost everyday being car wash boys in the car wash area near the
bakery.[4]
took from a nearby store. De Leon tried to stand up but Romeo prevented him from doing so
and they grappled for possession of De Leon's service firearm. The said gun went off, and
shortly Romeo again took it and pointed the gun at De Leon. When the gun did not fire,
Romeo hit De Leon's head with the gun, dragged him to the street and left. De Leon was
again mauled by Randolf, Eric and Roland who took turns in hitting him with a gas stove.
When Romeo returned, he picked up the gas tank and dropped it on De Leon's face.[5]
In the morning of the same day, all four accused were arrested and De Leon's service firearm
was surrendered to the arresting officer, Randy Laman Ozo.[6]
In the meantime, Eric died and the case against him was dismissed.[7]
Dr. Voltaire Nulud of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory testified that, based
on his autopsy and medico-legal report, De Leon died of intracranial hemorrhages and
sustained traumatic head injuries caused by a heavy, solid material.[8]
The defense gave a different version of the incident. Randolf testified that in the morning of
August 16, 2006, he was drinking with his brother, Roland and cousins Romeo and Eric, and
with another friend they call "Kabayo" in the interior of Apolinario Street. Around 2:30 a.m.,
he went out to buy cigarettes at AMM Bakery and saw a man (De Leon) talking to Liezl, the
bakery's saleslady who is his (Randolf s) textmate. When Liezl finally attended to him,
another man in white sando approached and hit him at the back of his ear and ran away. He
went after said man but he met De Leon who told him "Siga ka ba rito?" De Leon then poked
his gun at him, kicked him and told him to go home. He went back to his drinking session
and told Romeo that he was punched at the bakery. Romeo went to the place of the punching
incident and he tried to stop Romeo, warning the latter that one of the men at the bakery had
a gun. After five minutes, he followed Romeo and saw him infront of the bakery having an
altercation with De Leon who was trying to draw his gun. He then approached De Leon
slowly from the side so De Leon would not see him, thinking that De Leon would shoot
Romeo. De Leon fell after he hit him. Romeo then held De Leon's hand and he punched the
man three times. The gun fired and he hit De Leon with a gas tank. When he was about to hit
De Leon a third time, Roland arrived, took the gas tank from him, and told him to go
home.[9] He then stood up and took the gun from Eric. They left De Leon unconscious and
bloodied.
Romeo gave similar statements as that of Randolf. He had a heated conversation with De
Leon, they were hurling invectives. He testified that Randolf approached De Leon as the
latter was trying to pull his gun.[10]

On the part of Roland, he testified that he had nothing to do with the killing but merely
pacified De Leon and his brother Randolf whom he saw trying to hit De Leon with a gas
tank. However, he failed to submit his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation.
In its Decision[11] dated December 4, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 06-1675, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, found appellants guilty of murder. They were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay De Leon's heirs
P12,000 as burial expenses, P50,000 as life indemnity, P50,000 as moral and exemplary
damages, and costs. Roland Pabanil was acquitted.[12]
In their appeal before the CA, appellants argued that the RTC erred in considering the
qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and disregard of the respect due on
account of De Leon's rank.[13] They pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. They claimed that Randolf punched
De Leon as he thought the latter was about to shoot Romeo. When De Leon fell and drew his
gun, Randolf was forced to get the LPG tank and hit De Leon with it. Appellants also argue
that at the time of the incident, they did not know that De Leon is a police officer.[14]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. The fallo of the
assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 4,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66 in Crim. Case No. 06-1675,
which found ROMEO DE CASTRO alias "Omeng" and RANDOLF PABANIL alias "Oloy"
GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the amount of P12,000.00 as
interment and burial expenses to be awarded [to] the heirs of Sr. Police Officer II Orlando De
Leon shall be DELETED. The amount of civil indemnity to be awarded [to] the heirs of SPO
II De Leon shall also be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In addition, Appellants
ROMEO DE CASTRO and RANDOLF PABANIL are ORDERED to pay the heirs of SPO
II De Leon moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00 and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. All awards shall further
incur interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The CA agreed with the RTC that appellants failed to prove the elements of defense of a
relative. The CA noted that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of De Leon. In fact,
Randolf hit De Leon because he thought that De Leon was with the man who punched him
and not because he was threatened by De Leon's gun. And if it was indeed the threat of a gun
which prompted appellants to hit De Leon, there was no more unlawful aggression when
Randolf repeatedly attacked De Leon. The CA also said that Romeo admitted he already had
possession of the gun when appellant Randolf repeatedly hit De Leon with a gas tank. If De
Leon was the aggressor, De Leon's aggression ceased the moment he was disarmed. When
Randolf repeatedly hit De Leon who had no more weapon and had fallen, there is thus no
more self-defense or defense of a relative, said the CA. The CA further noted that De Leon's
skull was broken into small pieces and held that the severity of De Leon's injuries reveals
that the force used against him by appellants was not reasonable to disarm him or prevent
him from harming others.
But while the CA agreed with appellants that the prosecution failed to prove the circumstance
of disregard of the respect due on account of De Leon's rank, it nevertheless ruled that abuse
of superior strength is present in this case. The CA said that De Leon was already helpless
when he was repeatedly attacked with a gas tank.
Hence, this appeal. Appellants filed a manifestation in lieu of supplemental brief.[16]
Did the CA err in affirming appellants' conviction for the crime of murder?
We rule in the negative.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines the crime of murder, to wit:
ART. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and (4) the killing
neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.[17]
In this case, the foregoing elements of the crime of murder were duly established. De Leon
was killed. Appellants killed him. De Leon's killing was attended by abuse of superior
strength, one of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. De Leon's killing is not parricide or infanticide. In fact, appellants do not A-
dispute the first, second and fourth elements. They merely questioned the second element, the Nabitawan ko yong baril.
presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Q-
Mr. Witness, you said that the man wearing leather jacket was able to draw the gun and you
To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use excessive force, out of proportion said that you were able to get hold of this, you likewise stated that Mr. Randolf Pabanil
to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[18] We agree with the CA that the punched him while he was still holding the gun, now what happened after this?
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present in this case. As aptly pointed A-
out by the CA, De Leon was already helpless when he was repeatedly attacked with a gas The gun went-off sir.
tank. Appellants clearly used excessive force against the already unarmed and defenseless De Q-
Leon. This is clear from Romeo's own testimony: Now, was there anything that was hit by this gunshot?
Q- A-
You said that your cousin Randolf Pabanil came, where did he come from? None, sir.
A- Q-
From behind, sir. Now, after the gun went-off what happened next?
Q- A-
From behind of whom? The man dropped his gun and then Randolf got the gas tank and hit him on his neck.
A- Q-
Behind the man wearing leather jacket, sir. Q - After the gun was dropped what did you do next Mr. Witness?
xxxx A-
Q- I took the gun, sir.
xxx what did Randolf do to this man? Q-
A- Now, while you are holding the gun what was Mr. Randolf Pabanil doing?
He suddenly punched the man behind his ear, sir. A-
Q- He hit the man another (sic) times, sir.
So what happened to the man wearing leather jacket? Q-
A- What did he hit the man with?
He went off balance but he was able to draw his gun. A-
Q- LPG gas tank, sir.
Now, what did you do next, Mr. Witness? Q-
A- So all in all how many time[s] did Randolf Pabanil hit the man with the LPG gas tank?
I was able to grab the gun and then Randolf punched the man 3 times. A-
Q- Twice, sir.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
You said you were able to get hold the gun and you also said that Randolf was able to punch And as testified to by Lonzame, after the accused left, appellant Romeo returned, picked up
that man, how many times he punched that man? the gas tank and dropped it to De Leon.[20]
A-
Two or three times, sir. Indeed, the justifying circumstances of self-defense or defense of a relative cannot be
Q- appreciated in favor of appellants. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads:
Now what happened after Mr. Randolf Pabanil punched him 2 to 3 times, what happened ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
next, Mr. Witness?
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following award of 6% interest per annum on the monetary awards from the date of finality of this
circumstances concur: Decision until fully paid is also correct.[23]

First. Unlawful aggression; WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the May 23, 2012 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04343.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
With costs against the accused-appellants.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
SO ORDERED.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, [ G.R. No. 209338, June 29, 2015 ]
or legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters or of his relatives by affinity in the same PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BIENVENIDO
degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and MIRANDA Y FELICIANO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further
requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making DECISION
defense had no part therein. VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

xxxx Before this Court is an appeal from the May 16, 2013 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self- (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04547, which affirmed the May 13, 2010 Decision[2] of the
defense and defense of a relative.[21] Here, we agree with the CA that there was no unlawful Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, finding accused-appellant
aggression on the part of De Leon. Randolf himself testified that he hit De Leon because he Bienvenido Miranda y Feliciano (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
thought that De Leon was with the man who punched him and not because he was threatened Sections 5[3] and 11,[4] Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.[5]
by De Leon's gun, to wit:
Atty. Villalon: The case stemmed from two Informations both dated July 14, 2003, charging appellant with
Why did you hit him, Mr. Witness? the crimes of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal sale and
Witness: possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, the accusatory portions of which
Because I thought he was with the guy who punched me, sir. read as follows:
xxxx Criminal Case No. DC-03-316
Atty. Villalon:
So what did you think when you saw Mr. Orlando de Leon holding his gun and cursing your That on or about the 11th day of July, 2003, in the municipality of Mabalacat, province of
cousin and telling him not to come near him, what did you think? Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Witness: accused, not having [been] lawfully authorized and/or permitted, did then and there
Nothing, sir, I just thought of hitting him, sir. [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody Seven
Atty. Villalon: Hundred Fifty Nine Ten Thousandth (0.0759) of a gram of methylamphetamine
Why? hydrochloride, (shabu), a dangerous drug.
Witness:
Because I thought that he was the one who ordered that I would be hit, sir.[22] Contrary to law.[6]
As to the award of damages, the CA correctly awarded P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000
as moral damages, P30,000 as exemplary damages and P25,000 as temperate damages. The Criminal Case No. DC-03-317
That on or about the 11th day of July, 2003, in the municipality of Mabalacat, province of
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO not having been lawfully authorized
and/or permitted for and in consideration of the sum of Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to a poseur buyer Three Hundred Sixty Three Ten Thousandth (0.0363) of a gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.[7]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
At the pre-trial, stipulations were made: (1) as to the identity of the appellant; (2) that the
appellant was also known as Dawie; (3) that the substance was given to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination pursuant to the letter request
coming from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region III Office; (4) that
the PNP Crime Laboratory issued a Chemistry Report with regard to the examination; and (5)
that as per the Chemistry Report,[8] the substance examined turned out to be positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.[9]
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, through the testimonies of witnesses Police Chief Inspector Manuel Chica
(P/CI Chica) of PDEA-Region 3 and Barangay Chairman Marcelino Cruz (Chairman Cruz)
of San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga, established the following:
Based on a tip from a confidential informant that a certain alias “Dawie” who would later on
be identified as the herein appellant is actively engaged in the selling of shabu in Purok
Roxas, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, P/CI Chica immediately formed a team composed of
Chairman Cruz and Police Officer 2 Richard Lambino (PO2 Lambino) to conduct a buy-bust
operation on July 11, 2003. P/CI Chica himself was designated as the poseur-buyer. He
prepared the buy-bust money consisting of two (2) one hundred peso bills[10] which he
marked by placing a dot on the forehead of the picture of the late President Manuel A. Roxas
printed on the said bills.[11]
At around 4:30 p.m. of the same date, the team proceeded to the target area.[12] The
members of the team strategically positioned themselves around the area as P/CI Chica and
the informant approached appellant. The informant introduced P/CI Chica to appellant as the
buyer of shabu. Appellant readily handed to P/CI Chica a plastic sachet containing suspected
shabu and in return, P/CI Chica paid appellant the marked money. When P/CI Chica made
the pre-arranged signal, the other members of the team rushed to the scene. He then
introduced himself as a police officer to appellant. Appellant tried to flee, but Chairman Cruz
was able to grab him by his left hand and recover another plastic sachet of suspected shabu.
Then the police officers asked appellant to empty his pockets and they recovered the marked
money from him. Thereafter, they immediately brought appellant together with the seized
drugs to the PDEA office for investigation.[13]
At the PDEA office, P/CI Chica and Chairman Cruz, among others, prepared the Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscations[14] which appellant refused to sign. P/CI Chica marked the
sachet bought from appellant with the markings “MCC[15] BFM[16] Exhibit A” while the
sachet recovered by Chairman Cruz from appellant was marked as “MCC BFM B.”[17] P/CI
Chica also prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination[18] dated July 11, 2003
indicating that “MCC BFM Exhibit A” weighed at approximately 0.0363 gram while “MCC
BFM B” weighed at approximately 0.0759 gram. PO2 Lambino brought the said Request and
the two specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory.[19] The result of the laboratory
examination of the submitted two (2) specimens as contained in Chemistry Report No. D-
324-2003[20] dated July 12, 2003 yielded a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Chairman Cruz also testified that he was deputized by PDEA-Region 3 to assist in anti-drug
operations in its area of responsibility. He corroborated P/CI Chica’s testimony on the details
and circumstances of the aforementioned buy-bust operation.[21]
On the other hand, the defense gave a different version of the story.
Appellant denied the offenses charged. He narrated that while he was on his way home from
his work at Dau Supermart, Marina Arcade at around 4:00 p.m. of July 11, 2003, he saw the
two (2) cars from which the persons who arrested him alighted when he reached the corner of
Roxas Street. He recognized one of those who handcuffed him as one Major Chica. He asked
Major Chica the reason for his arrest, and the latter replied that the police officers were able
to buy shabu from him. He posited that it was not possible for him to have sold shabu to them
because he had just come from work and that he saw them only at the corner of Roxas Street.
Appellant stressed that there were several people who witnessed the incident, but they were
afraid of narrating the actual events because the police officers poked their guns at them. He
added that even the barangay chairman of Roxas, Dau, one Dominador “Doming” Paniza,
saw the incident but he, too, was afraid of the police officers. Appellant added that he was
subsequently detained at a PDEA safehouse in Barangay San Francisco, Mabalacat,
Pampanga and was later charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.[22]

On May 13, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision[23] holding that the narration of P/CI Chica
as corroborated by Chairman Cruz proved that appellant indeed committed the crimes and
that all the elements thereof are present. The RTC opined that the appellant’s sole defense of
denial cannot prevail over the positive and direct assertions of the prosecution witnesses. The
RTC also noted that the appellant failed to show the motive of the police officers when they
arrested him. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court finds accused BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
in Criminal Case No. DC 03-317 for Violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165 and a fine of Php
500,000.00.
Accused BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO is also sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS, as maximum, of Reclusion Temporal and a fine of Php 300,000.00 for
Violation of Section 11, in Criminal Case No. DC 03-316 of R.A. 9165.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Appellant through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) sought recourse from the CA.[25] The
PAO averred, among others, that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
contradictory and conflicting; that it appears from the testimony of P/CI Chica that the one
who determined the propriety of conducting the buy-bust operation was the civilian
informant; that the prosecution failed to present any document proving that indeed Chairman
Cruz is a duly designated agent of the PDEA; and that appellant’s guilt was tainted with
reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to prove that the sachets allegedly
confiscated from him were the same ones submitted to the forensic chemist for examination.
The PAO also averred that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody
over the evidence. The PAO stressed that, other than the marking made by P/CI Chica on the
specimens, there was no testimony that the specimens were photographed in the presence of
the appellant, a member of the media, a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, and an
elective government official. Likewise, the marking was not done immediately upon seizure
as the specimens were marked only upon arrival at the PDEA office. The PAO also
highlighted the inability of Chairman Cruz to identify the specimens during his testimony.
Lastly, PO2 Lambino who allegedly delivered the specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory
did not testify as to how he handled the items while in his custody.[26]
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintained that the prosecution was
able to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering that all the essential
elements of the crimes of illegal sale and possession of drugs were duly established in this
case. The OSG asserted that the chain of custody was not broken as P/CI Chica positively
identified the sachet of shabu which he himself bought from the appellant and the additional
sachet of shabu which was recovered from the latter at the time of his arrest, made the proper
markings thereon, prepared an inventory and request for examination and submitted the same
to the PNP Crime Laboratory through PO2 Lambino. The OSG pointed out that laboratory
results revealed that the specimens were found to be shabu and that said specimens were
presented and identified by P/CI Chica during trial.[27]
On May 16, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision, holding, among others, that the
inconsistencies noted by the defense are minor in nature and were not crucial to establish the
offenses committed by the appellant. The CA found that all the essential elements of illegal
sale and possession of shabu are present in this case. Affirming the factual findings of the
RTC, the CA opined that P/CI Chica and Chairman Cruz testified in a straightforward and
definite manner and that their testimonies jibe with the pieces of physical evidence.
Hence, this appeal.[28]
On June 2, 2014, the Court issued a Resolution[29] requiring the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Both the OSG[30] and the appellant as represented by the
PAO[31] manifested that they would just adopt their respective briefs filed before the CA as
their supplemental briefs.
Hence, the issues before this Court are the same ones raised before and disposed of by the
CA. Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve the sole issue of whether or not the appellant’s
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs if the
following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto.[32]
We hold that the prosecution sufficiently discharged the burden of establishing the elements
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
In this case, the prosecution duly established the identity of the buyer and the seller, appellant
being the seller and P/CI Chica as the poseur-buyer. The object of the transaction was a
sachet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu marked as “MCC BFM Exhibit A”
weighing approximately 0.0363 gram and the consideration was the P200 marked money.
Through the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution both the
object and consideration have also been sufficiently established. As to the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor, P/CI Chica categorically testified that he caught
appellant in flagrante delicto selling and delivering the shabu during a buy-bust operation. He
also personally handed to appellant the marked money as payment for the same. Clearly, the
aforementioned elements are present in this case.
It bears stressing that the sale of the illegal drugs in this case was brought about by a buy-
bust operation – a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals.
It is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers,
provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. Time and again, this
Court has ruled that a buy-bust operation is employed to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto.[33]
Parenthetically, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the elements are: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.[34]
These elements are also present in this case. P/CI Chica testified that after the appellant sold
him shabu, another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance was recovered by
Chairman Cruz from appellant at the time of his arrest. This too was marked as “MCC BFM
B” weighing at approximately 0.0759 gram and submitted to the crime laboratory for
analysis, and was positively found to contain shabu.
We note that P/CI Chica identified in court the sachet marked as “MCC BFM Exhibit A” as
the very sachet he bought from appellant and the sachet marked as “MCC BFM B” as the
sachet recovered by Chairman Cruz from appellant at the time of his arrest. The seized items,
proven positive to be shabu, were properly identified and presented before the court.
The Court gives full faith and credence to the testimonies of the police officers and upholds
the presumption of regularity in the apprehending officers’ performance of official duty. It is
a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given
to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.[35]
On the other hand, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. Except for his bare
allegation of denial, nothing supports his claim that the police officers were impelled by
improper motives to testify against him. In fact, in his cross-examination, appellant cannot
think of any reason why the police officers would fabricate stories against him and charge
him with two serious offenses.[36]
This Court has invariably viewed with disfavor the defense of denial. Denial is inherently a
weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution. Negative
and self-serving denial deserves no weight in law when unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Such defense of denial, like frame-up, is a common and standard line
of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[37]
Moreover, it bears stressing that in weighing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis-
à-vis those of the defense, the RTC gave more credence to the version of the prosecution.
This Court finds no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court’s evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.[38] Prosecutions involving illegal
drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conduct the “buy-bust”
operation and appellate courts, upon established precedents and of necessity, rely on the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial courts which have the unique
opportunity, unavailable to the appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination.[39]
Lastly, appellant questions the failure of the buy-bust team to immediately mark the seized
drugs and take photographs of the said items in the presence of the appellant, a member of
the media, a DOJ representative, and an elective government official, as required under
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. He argues that as a result of this failure, there is doubt as to the
identity and integrity of the drugs and that there was a break in the chain of custody of the
evidence.
Such argument cannot prosper.
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 pertinently
provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the law itself lays down exceptions to its requirements. Thus, non-compliance
with the above-mentioned requirements is not fatal. In fact it has been ruled time and again
that non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible.
Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. “What is essential is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Here, the records reveal that the
police officers substantially complied with the process of preserving the integrity of the
seized shabu.[40]
The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of
the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the
seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the
court.[41]
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[42] defines chain of custody as
follows:
b. “Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]
We have laid down the following links that must be established in the chain of custody in a
buy-bust situation:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.[43]
In this case, the chain of custody was duly established through the following links: (1) P/CI
Chica marked the seized sachet subject of the buy-bust operation as “MCC BFM Exhibit A”
and the sachet recovered by Chairman Cruz as “MCC BFM B”; (2) a request for laboratory
examination of the seized items so marked was signed by P/CI Chica; (3) the request and the
marked items seized, which were personally delivered by PO2 Lambino, were received by
the PNP Crime Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-324-2003 confirmed that the
marked items seized from appellant were methylamphetamine hydrochloride; and (5) the
marked items were offered in evidence.
As the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved, this Court,
therefore, finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC that the drugs seized from
appellant were the same ones presented during trial.
In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the RTC and CA in convicting appellant of
illegal sale and possession of drugs as to warrant the modification much less the reversal
thereof. It is hornbook doctrine that the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial
court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.[44] This case is no exception to the rule.
All told, this Court thus sustains the RTC’s conviction of the appellant for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as affirmed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The May 16, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04547 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 211027, June 29, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE BRONIOLA @
“ASOT”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated September 24, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)-
Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00805-MIN affirming with modification the
Judgment[2] dated September 30, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kidapawan
City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 207-2000. The RTC found appellant Jose Broniola
alias “Asot” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8353[3], Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the victim, AAA,[4] the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Antecedent Facts
AAA, a Grade VI pupil, left her house for school in the morning of February 28, 2000. She
did not return home that day. Her lifeless body was found on February 29, 2000 in a grassy
lot near an uninhabited farm hut at Sitio Kabanatian, Barangay Tumanding, Arakan,
Cotabato.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar D. Bayog filed the following Information[5] charging
appellant with the crime of rape with homicide:
That on or about February 28, 2000, in the Municipality of Arakan, Province of Cotabato,
Philippines, the said accused, armed with a bolo (Lagaraw), did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, have a carnal knowledge
with [AAA], minor, 13 years old, against her will, that after the occasion, accused with intent
to kill, attack, assault, hack and use physical violence to the above-named victim, thus
inflicting upon her hack wounds on the different parts of her body, which is the direct and
proximate cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 28, 2000, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Alfredo Abag[6] (Abag), a resident of
Sitio Kabanatian,[7] Bgy. Tumanding, was on his way home bringing some “Taiwan” fish to
sell when he met the appellant at a shortcut road passable only to people and animals. He
noticed that appellant had scratches on his face and his hand was holding a lagaraw[8] (bolo)
with blood on it. Appellant asked for the price of the fish but he did not buy and just left.
From what he had observed, appellant was restless and uneasy.[9]
Meanwhile, AAA’s father, BBB, reported to the barangay authorities that his daughter was
missing. In the morning of February 29, 2000, he, together with Abag and two barangay
officials, began to search for AAA. They found her already dead, lying on a grassy area near
a farm hut owned by Jhonefer Q. Darantinao[10]. AAA’s body bore several hack wounds,
blood oozed from her mouth, her one hand and one finger were cut off. He knows appellant
because they are neighbors. Their families had a rift because appellant’s father was killed by
his son-in-law, Lito Miguel.[11]
Dr. Sofronio T. Edu, Jr., Municipal Health Officer of Arakan, conducted a post-mortem
examination on the cadaver of AAA. He submitted a Post-Mortem Report[12] with the
following findings:
Multiple hacked wounds:
Left face mandibular area, partial transection
Left neck area lateral and anterior area, partial transection extending into the vertebra
Left hand completely transected at the midpalmar area
Right thumb completely transected
Right hand partially transected at the palmar area, medial
Right wrist, partially transected anterior
Perineal and internal examination:
Blood stained white underwear
Lacerated hymen at 3, 9 and 11 o’clock position
Whitish discharge sent to Arakan, Valley District Hospital Antipas, Cotabato for sperm
analysis
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio-Respiratory Arrest secondary to hemorrhage secondary to multiple hacked wounds
According to Dr. Edu, the probable cause of death was loss of blood due to the hack wounds.
He also opined that the genital injury could have been caused by a penetrating penis or any
blunt object.[13]
Version of the Defense
In the morning of February 28, 2000, appellant was plowing his farm located adjacent to
their house. After having lunch, he worked in the fishpond just beside their house until 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon. Thereafter, he stayed inside their house together with his mother,
wife and children. Pelita[14] Antac, who is a niece of her mother, and Jessie Panesales who
is the husband of his younger sister, were also there in the house. He denied having left the
house at that time and meeting Abag at Sitio Kabanatian.[15]
Appellant claimed he does not know Abag, AAA or BBB. He admitted that his family has a
land in Sitio Kabanatian but after the death of his father, he does not go there anymore. When
BBB testified in this case, it was only then he learned that BBB is the father-in-law of Lito
Miguel who reportedly killed his (appellant) father. He denied having grudges with the
family of BBB and he does not have any knowledge regarding the amicable settlement
between their families in connection with the killing of his father. At present, Lito Miguel is
now his co-inmate at the provincial jail and they are now friends. Lito Miguel told him that
Lito killed his father because they had a quarrel. When Lito Miguel asked him about this case
of rape with homicide, he told Lito Miguel that he did not do it.[16]
Pelita Antac stayed in appellant’s house from February 23, 2000 until the second week of
March, because it was planting season. She corroborated the testimony of appellant, who is
her cousin, that he never left the house on February 28, 2000 and just worked in his farm in
Bgy. Tumanding.[17]
Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found the testimony of Abag to be straightforward, categorical and
convincing, which established that appellant went to Sitio Kabanatian where Abag met him
coming from the shortcut road in the afternoon of February 28, 2000 carrying a blood-stained
lagaraw. Said court gave no credence to appellant’s defense of denial and alibi as it failed to
show the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime and to rebut the prosecution’s
circumstantial evidence proving that he committed the rape and killing of AAA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA found no merit in appellant’s argument that the circumstantial evidence failed to
prove he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. It noted that the timing
of witness Abag’s encounter with appellant who was then holding a lagaraw stained with
blood, restless and with scratches on his face, coincides with the time when the victim was
missing, and the place was near the spot where the dead victim was found the next day. As to
appellant’s alibi, the CA also was not convinced and held that the rule that alibi and denial
are weak defenses applies even where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence.
The fallo of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch 17 of Kidapawan City in Criminal Case
No. 207-2000 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA is imposed without the possibility of parole. In addition to the P100,000.00 civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages shall also be awarded in the amount of
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00) PESOS and THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS, respectively. An interest at the rate of six percent (6%) period shall be
applied to the award of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages from the finality of
the judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
Appellant was charged and convicted of rape with homicide. The felony of rape with
homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse.[19] In rape
with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge
of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.[20]
In this case, nobody witnessed the actual rape and killing of AAA. Appellant, however, may
still be proven as the culprit despite the absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a
condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden.[21] As we held in People v. Pascual[22]:
It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the
homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the
crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the
victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of
rape with homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes
of rape with homicide, as here, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable.[23]
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which
the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.[24] Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules of Evidence, as amended, sets
forth the requirements of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient for conviction, viz:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The RTC and CA found the following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
as sufficient for the conviction of appellant: First, witness Abag met the appellant on a
shortcut road near the place where AAA’s dead body was found, at about the same time
(5:30 p.m.) AAA went missing as she failed to return home that day, February 28, 2000;
Second, appellant had scratches on his face and he was holding a lagaraw a type of bolo used
in the rural areas, which was stained with blood, and he was restless and uneasy; Third, in the
morning of the following day, February 29, 2000, AAA’s lifeless body was found with
several hack wounds inflicted on her face, neck and extremities, one hand and one finger
were totally severed; Fourth, the post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Edu confirmed
that AAA died from loss of blood due to multiple hack wounds, her underwear was blood-
stained, she had hymenal lacerations and a whitish discharge was found in her vagina; Fifth,
appellant had the motive to commit the crime against AAA considering that it was BBB’s
son-in-law, Lito Miguel, who killed appellant’s father; and Sixth, appellant was evasive
when being questioned on his knowledge of the identity of his father’s killer and the latter’s
relationship to the family of AAA, and the amicable settlement executed by his mother in
behalf of appellant’s family.
We concur with the CA and RTC.
Considering all the circumstances mentioned and in light of previous rulings, we are satisfied
that the evidence adduced against appellant constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the one
fair and reasonable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. It is doctrinal
that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only
moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.[25] This was adequately established in the case at bar.
As regards the penalty imposed, R.A. No. 8353 provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346 or “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines” provides:
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides, “[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason
of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”
The CA thus correctly modified the RTC judgment by declaring that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is without the possibility of parole, in accordance with the law.
Conformably with People v. Gambao,[26] we sustain the award of P100,000 as civil
indemnity and increase the awards of moral and exemplary damages to P100,000 each. In
addition, we award P25,000 to the victim’s heirs as temperate damages in lieu of unproven
actual damages.[27] The CA correctly added that damages assessed in this case shall be
subject to interest at six percent (6%) per annum.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated September 24, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00805-MIN is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
increased to P100,000 each and that temperate damages of P25,000 is awarded to the heirs of
AAA.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 171284, June 29, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO DULIN Y
NARAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The accused is guilty only of homicide in a prosecution for murder where the record does not
substantiate the attendance of treachery. But he may not benefit from the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense if there was no unlawful aggression from
the victim.
The Case
Alfredo Dulin y Narag appeals the decision promulgated on August 26, 2005,[1] whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification his conviction for the murder of Francisco
Batulan rendered on December 29, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.[2] In convicting him, the RTC had appreciated the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and had then sentenced him to “suffer
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17
years and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years.” On appeal, the CA prescribed reclusion perpetua.
Antecedents
The information filed on January 7, 1991 averred as follows:
That on or about August 22, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Alfredo Dulin y Narag
alias Freddie, armed with a sharp blade(d) instrument, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one, Francisco Batulan, inflicting upon him several stab wounds on
the different parts of his body which caused his death.
Contrary to law.[3]
During the trial, the Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: (a) Dr. Nelson
Macaraniag, (b) Alexander Tamayao, (c) Romulo Cabalza and (d) Estelita Batulan. Their
version follows.
Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in
the evening of August 22, 1990 when a young man came running from the house of Vicente
Danao towards the house of Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had been
stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own
house, and there he saw Dulin stabbing Batulan who was already prostrate face down. Dulin
was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the ground. Dulin was
holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter with his
right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the
victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident. He went home afterwards.
Tamayao mentioned of the long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing
them fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two occasions: He will soon have
his day and I will kill him.[4]
Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August
22, 1990 when he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his house. It was
Carolina, Danao’s daughter, screaming for help. He thus sought out a fellow barangay tanod.
On his return to the scene, he found Batulan at the door of Danao’s house, with Dulin
wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches long. Fearing for his safety, he rushed
to the Barangay Hall to seek the assistance of Edwin Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to
bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao.[5]
Estelita recalled that Tamayao went to her house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening of
August 22, 1990 to inform her that Dulin had stabbed her husband in Danao’s house. She
rushed to Danao’s house but fainted on the way. Upon regaining consciousness, she learned
that her husband had been rushed to the hospital. On her way to the hospital, she met
Barangay Captain Loreto Meman, who told her: Finally, Freddie Dulin killed your husband
as he vowed to do. At the hospital, she was told that her husband had sustained two wounds
in the back and several stab wounds in the front, and was being attended to at the hospital’s
intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.
Estelita said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake and repeated what he
had said to her about Dulin. But when she later on sought out Barangay Captain Meman to
ask him to confirm what he had told her about Dulin’s vowing to kill her husband, Barangay
Captain Meman’s response was: I’m sorry I cannot go and declare what I have stated because
I am afraid of FREDDIE and he will kill all those persons who will testify in their favor.[6]
Estelita mentioned of the heated discussion between her husband and his nephew, Seong
Bancud, in front of Danao’s house in April 1990. On that occasion, Dulin wielded a knife
with which he tried to stab her husband. Dulin was pacified only when she went to the aid of
her husband, but she then heard Dulin saying: You will soon have your day, I will kill
you.[7]
Batulan was attended to at the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital on August 22, 1990 by Dr.
Macaraniag, who said that the victim was in a state of shock from his 12 stab wounds. Dr.
Macaraniag was part of the three teams that conducted the surgery on Batulan. He issued the
Medico-Legal Certificate[8] attesting that Batulan died on August 24, 1990 at 12:15 a.m.;
and that Batulan had sustained several injuries, as follows:
Multiple stab wounds #12
(1) Lacerated wound, sternum, 1 cm.
(2) Lacerated wound, 4th ICS, 2 cm. MCL
(3) Lacerated wound, 1 cm. post axillary line
(4) Lacerated wound, 3 x 2 cm. 3 cm below scapula
(5) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect, left hand
(6) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, left hand
(7) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. anterior aspect, about 3 cm. from elbow, left
(8) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. middle third, left forearm
(9) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. posterior aspect left forearm 4 cm. from left wrist
(10) Lacerated wound, 3 cm. lateral aspect of left foot
(11) Lacerated wound, 4 cm. lateral aspect, left thigh
(12) Lacerated wound, 2 cm. scapular area.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x.[9]
Dr. Macaraniag stated the cause of death to be “Hypovolemic shock secondary to Massive
Hemothorax secondary to Multiple stab wounds.”[10] He clarified in court that there were
clerical errors in the preparation of the Medico-Legal Certificate because his handwritten
records indicated that Batulan had sustained stab instead of lacerated wounds. He surmised
that one of the clerks could have misread his handwriting in the process of transcription.[11]
Estelita declared that her late husband had earned a living from buying pigs, deriving a
monthly income of P8,000.00; that their marriage bore only one child; that she spent more or
less P6,500.00 for Batulan’s hospitalization, including his medicines, and P36,000.00 for
Batulan’s 10-day wake, his burial attire and his coffin; that during the wake she butchered
one cow worth P6,800.00 and six pigs worth P15,000.00; that his death caused her and her
family so much pain; and that she and her family expended a total of P70,000.00, plus the
P20,000.00 for the counsel’s services in bringing the criminal charge against Dulin.[12]
In his defense, Dulin testified that in the evening of August 22, 1990, he was in his house in
Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao, Cagayan with Doming Narag, Imelda Danao, Jun Danao,
Carolina Dulin and Caridad Narag; that Nicanor Annariao and Raymund Soriano arrived at
his house to see the fighting cocks being sold by Alberto Eugenio (Alberto); that Alberto was
not yet around, arriving only at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening to talk with Raymund and
Nicanor about the price of the fighting cocks; that after their transaction, Alberto served
Nicanor and Raymund food, and he (Dulin) and Jun Danao thereafter accompanied Raymund
and Nicanor to the highway to get a tricycle ride, but on their way, they passed Angel
Bancud who called out to him: that he (Dulin) asked the others to go ahead, and he would
just catch up with them; that as he (Dulin) approached Bancud, Batulan, the cousin of his
(Dulin) mother, stabbed him on the right side of his body and in the left hand; that he
complained to Batulan: Uncle, you hit me (Dinisgrasya nakun), but Batulan replied: I will
really kill you; that he (Dulin) ran to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house, pursued by
Batulan who stabbed him again several times; that they grappled for the weapon until he
(Dulin) was able to wrest it from Batulan; that he (Dulin) stabbed Batulan with the weapon,
and they struggled until he (Dulin) felt weak, eventually falling to the ground; and that he
(Dulin) regained consciousness only the next day at the hospital.
Dulin insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan, but interjected that the
barangay captain would summon him to bring Batulan home each time the latter got drunk at
night.
Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, authenticated the hospital records showing that Dulin had also been injured.[13]
Judgment of the RTC
On December 29, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder,[14] to
wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Alfredo Dulin guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and appreciating the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense and no aggravating circumstance, this Court hereby
lowers the penalty of said crime by two degrees and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of imprisonment ranging from 17 years
and 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of P36,000.00 and moral damages for
P40,000.00.
Without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Decision of the CA
In his appeal, Dulin contended that his crime should be homicide instead of murder,
considering the RTC’s appreciation of incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating
circumstance; and that even if self-defense should be unavailing, he could be found guilty
only of homicide because it was the victim who had first attacked by stabbing him, and that
the multiple wounds inflicted on the victim did not mean that he had not been justified in
killing the victim. He argued that the penalty imposed on him was incorrect considering the
absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
On August 26, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction subject to the modification of the civil
liability, decreeing:
The Court agrees with the OSG representing the State that the penalty requires modification.
The Court a quo committed error in the imposition of the proper penalty. The crime
committed by appellant in the case at bench is murder qualified by treachery. There being no
aggravating and no mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Where
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the medium
period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed by the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification of the penalty and awards of damages. Appellant ALFREDO DULIN y
NARAG is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of
P36,000 actual damages is DELETED. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Francisco
Batulan P20,000 as temperate damages and P50,000 by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[16]
On January 12, 2006, the CA denied Dulin’s motion for reconsideration.[17]
Issues
In this appeal, Dulin submits the following issues for our review and consideration, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
SELF-DEFENSE AS A PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IN THE EVENT
THAT THE APPRECIATION OF A COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IS UNAVAILING.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE KILLING OF
FRANCISCO.[18]
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
I.
There was no self-defense
The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of
proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and convincing
evidence the concurrence of the following elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[19] The most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression,[20] which is the
condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Unless the
victim committed unlawful aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, should not be appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-defense
would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.
Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly
described in People v. Nugas,[21] as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing
in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim,
such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
Dulin argues that the CA should have appreciated the justifying circumstance of self-defense
in his favor because all its elements had been present in the commission of the crime.
In rejecting Dulin’s argument, the CA observed that although Batulan had initiated the attack
against Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin had
wrested the weapon from the latter. The CA thus found and held in its assailed decision:
Appellant testified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take possession
of the weapon and ran towards the second level of the house of Vicente Danao, away from
FRANCISCO. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him effectively ceased. When
FRANCISCO and appellant again grappled for possession of the weapon, appellant now
became the armed protagonist, and FRANCISCO’s act of trying to wrest the weapon cannot
be considered as unlawful aggression. At that moment, appellant no longer faced any
imminent or immediate danger to his life and limb from FRANCISCO.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that FRANCISCO could no longer be considered as
unlawful aggressor. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, appellant’s theory that he was
merely defending himself when he killed FRANCISCO is unavailing. A fortiori, there would
be no basis for the second requisite of self-defense.[22]
We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against
Dulin, ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Even
if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where they
again grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not amount to
aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that point.
Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted
retaliation against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked
him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the
aggressor.[23] As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his
fatal stabbing by Dulin.
Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial aggression employed by Batulan did not cease
because the latter followed him into Danao’s house with the singular purpose of ending his
life; and that there was no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan.[24]
The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and then
running away from him. With the aggression by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not
anymore pose any imminent threat against Dulin. Hence, Batulan was not committing any
aggression when Dulin fatally stabbed him.
It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have
sustained twelve stab wounds[25] confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The
numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to
kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not defending himself.[26]
II.
Incomplete self-defense was not proved
Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law. For this purpose, the accused must prove the existence of the majority of the elements
for self-defense, but unlawful aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present.
Either or both of the other requisites may be absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.[27]
Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances indicated that his acts constituted incomplete
self-defense, and must be appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance.[28]
Dulin’s position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense, Dulin should prove the elements
of incomplete self-defense by first credibly establishing that the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against him. With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased from the
moment that Dulin divested Batulan of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-
defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in
order to defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to inflict injury on Batulan.
III.
The RTC and CA erred in appreciating the attendance of treachery
Murder is the unlawful killing of any person attended by any of the circumstances listed
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Treachery, which was alleged in the information, is
one such qualifying circumstance.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.[29] Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated,
namely: one, the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the
criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted by the assailant.[30] Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and
competently and clearly proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to the category of
murder.[31]
Based on the established facts, Dulin and Batulan grappled for control of the weapon Batulan
had initially wielded against Dulin, who divested Batulan of it and ran with it into the house
of Danao, with Batulan in immediate pursuit. They continued to grapple for the weapon
inside the house of Danao, and it was at that point when Dulin stabbed Batulan several times.
Under the circumstances, treachery should not be appreciated in the killing of Batulan
because the stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise due to his having been
sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s impending assault,[32] and being thus afforded the
opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover control of the weapon from
Dulin. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or is done in a
swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim.[33] The mode of attack must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.
Consequently, Dulin should be liable only for homicide, the penalty for which is reclusion
temporal.[34] There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty is
imposed in its medium period (i.e., 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four
months). The indeterminate sentence of Dulin is, therefore, eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with
full credit of his preventive imprisonment, if any.
Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to the heirs of Batulan
P20,000.00 as temperate damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We modify the awards,
and grant to the heirs of Batulan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Indeed, the current judicial policy sets the
civil indemnity for death caused by a crime at P50,000.00. In addition, the heirs of the victim
are entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00. The civil indemnity and moral damages are
allowed even without allegation and proof, it being a certainty that the victim’s heirs were
entitled thereto as a matter of law. Temperate damages of P25,000.00 should further be
granted to the heirs of the victim for they were presumed to have spent for his interment. It
would be unjust to deny them this amount for the reason that they were not able to establish
the actual expenditure for his interment with certainty.[35]
In line with recent jurisprudence,[36] interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the
items of the civil liability fixed and imposed herein, computed from the date of the finality of
this decision until the items of the civil liability shall be fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the judgment promulgated on August 26, 2005 by
finding ALFREDO DULIN Y NARAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE, and
SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate sentence of EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY
OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND
ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, with full credit of his preventive imprisonment;
ORDERS him to pay to the heirs of Francisco Batulan P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest of 6% per
annum on each item reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 207815, June 22, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE SALVADOR
A.K.A. "FELIX", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal[1] from the January 9, 2013 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 34484 which affirmed with modification appellant Jose Salvador's
conviction for the crime of rape as defined under Article 266-A(2)[3] of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) in Criminal Case No. 4112.
AAA, BBB[4] and CCC are daughters of appellant, a tricycle driver. On February 5, 2009,
appellant was charged with the crime of rape[5] against BBB before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 96, Baler, Aurora. The Information[6] read:
[CRIM. CASE NO. 4112 FOR RAPE IN RELATION TO R.A. No. 7610:]
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, upon the sworn complaint of [BBB], a 15 years
(sic) old minor, assisted by her sister [AAA], Ms. Celestina Abellera of the MSWD and PO2
Myra Novilla of the WCPD of the PNP, Dipaculao, Aurora, accuses Jose Salvador @ Felix
of the crime of Rape in relation to R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That sometimes (sic) July 2007 and even prior thereto, in their house at Brgy. [XXX],
Dipaculao, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, with carnal lust, force (sic) [BBB] to have sexual intercourse with him by inserting
his finger and sexual organ into her, taking advantage of the latter['s] weakness, minority and
moral ascendancy over the victim, being her father, feloniously, criminally, unlawfully,
illegally had carnal knowledge upon said [BBB], such bestial act may impaired (sic) or tend
to be prejudicial to the development of the child victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was at the same time charged[7] with the crime of acts of lasciviousness against
CCC.
On arraignment,[8] appellant pleaded not guilty for both crimes. Joint trial ensued after pre-
trial.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of BBB, Celestina Abellera, PO3 Myra Novilla
and Dr. Arturo A. Parilla, Jr. as evidence.
BBB[9] testified that she executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[10] on July 11, 2007 when she
was 15 years old and in 2nd year high school. BBB cried when she was asked to recount her
experience and read her affidavit. She nonetheless affirmed the contents of her affidavit and
identified appellant as the person who sexually assaulted her. In her affidavit, BBB stated
that the appellant, her father, physically violated her when she was in Grade VI. She said that
appellant touched and inserted his finger in her vagina and that she felt pain. The following
day, appellant asked for a massage where he was only wearing his underwear. At this point
BBB stated that appellant raped her inside his room. When asked why she delayed in
reporting the incident, BBB answered that she was afraid that appellant might kill them
because appellant owned a "pamalo" and a gun. On cross-examination, BBB clarified that
when she said that appellant raped her, appellant was not actually able to insert his penis in
her vagina.
Abellera, the Municipal Social Welfare Officer testified that she aided PO3 Novilla in taking
the statements of BBB and CCC. She affirmed that both BBB and CCC were minors and
presented the certified true copies of their birth certificates[11] issued by the local civil
registrar. She conducted further interview for a social case study report.[12]
PO3 Novilla, Women and Children Protection Desk Officer of the Philippine National
Police, Dipaculao, Aurora, stated that she took and recorded the sworn statements of BBB
and CCC. When the court clarified AAA's role in the whole proceeding, PO3 Novilla said
that AAA filed a statement with the Department of Social Welfare and Development and
with the police that she had also been raped by appellant and begot a child. AAA however for
her own reasons did not file charges against appellant.[13]
Dr. Parilla, Jr., Municipal Health Officer of Dipaculao, Aurora, testified that he conducted
the physical examination[14] of BBB and consequently issued a Medico-Legal Report[15]
where he found "no evident injury at the time of exam" nor was there any discharge
found.[16] On the lower portion of the report, he noted that the "medical evaluation does not
exclude sexual abuse".[17]
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Appellant claimed that, while in prison,
his daughter AAA came to visit him and confided that the complaints of BBB and CCC were
fabrications. Appellant posited that AAA urged her sisters to file false complaints against
him to extort money from him in order to fund her husband's overseas job application. He
also said that AAA took particular advantage of BBB's resentment against him because of his
strict attitude towards dating.
In its July 22, 2011 Decision,[18] the RTC found appellant guilty of rape by sexual assault
but acquitted him of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. The RTC gave credence to BBB's
testimony because it was delivered in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner. On the other hand, it noted that appellant's defense was unsupported by evidence. It
also stated that while the medico-legal report did not contain any finding of injury, the same
is not necessary to prove the commission of rape. There being uncertainty of whether there
was actual touching of the penis to the labia, the RTC said that the crime committed was only
sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC as amended, thus:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused Jose Salvador @ "Felix", with
the required quantum of evidence in Criminal Case No. 4113, the Court hereby ACQUITS
him of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness; and
Finding accused JOSE SALVADOR @ "Felix" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 4112 for RAPE defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 (sexual assault)
and punished under 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum, and to pay [BBB] the amount of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
[P]50,000.00 as moral damages, and [P]25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's July 22, 2011 Decision.[20] The
CA did not find any error in the RTC's appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case
since "exactness, detailedness and flawlessness [of] recollection"[21] cannot be imposed on
minor victims. Moreover, the CA stated that appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome
BBB's affirmative and categorical declarations of his culpability. It, however, modified the
penalty pursuant to Article 266-B[22] of the RPC.
Since it was established that appellant was BBB's father and that BBB was below 18 years of
age, the CA concluded that the crime committed was qualified rape. Consequently, the CA
increased the penalty imposed as well as the award of damages. The CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The July 22, 2011
Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora in CRIM. CASE No.
4112, finding the herein appellant Jose Salvador a.k.a. "Felix" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape committed against [BBB], is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS
that the penalty to be imposed upon him must be reclusion perpetua with no eligibility of
parole and the award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Hence, this appeal.
The lone issue for our consideration is whether appellant's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant contests the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC and CA
contending that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crime of rape. Moreover,
he states that the witnesses presented gave inconsistent testimonies. Lastly, appellant
reiterates that the medico-legal report does not support the finding of rape.
 On cross-examination, BBB stated categorically what appellant had done to her. She
We dismiss the appeal but modify the penalty imposed. recounted her experience:
ATTY. TORREGOSA
EVALUATION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IS BEST LEFT TO THE TRIAL
COURTS Can you recall how did he do that to you?

This Court has reiterated that the credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed by the A He placed his finger into my vagina, Ma'am.
trial court because of its opportunity to observe their demeanor while testifying on the stand:
an opportunity denied to the appellate courts.[24] Absent any substantial reason to justify the THE COURT:
reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, the reviewing court is generally bound
by the former's findings, especially when no significant fact nor circumstance is shown to And thereafter, what else did he do to you?
have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered could affect the outcome of the
case.[25] The rule is strictly applied when the appellate court affirms the finding of the lower A After that, no more, your Honor.
court.
THE COURT:
This Court has acknowledged that it is difficult to have corroborating testimonies in rape
cases since in majority of the cases only the offended party's testimony is available. The You mean to say, he did not place his penis into your vagina?
Court has affirmed a conviction of rape as long as it is supported by a conclusive, logical and
probable testimony by the offended party.[26] A Yes, Your Honor.

Here, BBB affirmed her Sinumpaang Salaysay in open court. There she narrated what started
out as innocent teasing, escalated into a situation where appellant, her father, inserted his
finger in her vagina. She stated that:
04.
T:
Maaari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari sa sinasabi mong panghahalay sa iyo ng
iyong tatay na si JOSE SALVADOR @ FELIX.
S:
Ganito [po] yon, noong una binibiro-biro po ako ni tatay FELIX sa pamamagitan ng
paghihihipo niya sa aking pepe (vagina) at suso (breast). Pagkatapos ay nagpapahilot na siya
sa akin simula sa kamay hanggang sa katawan na nakabrief o nakashorts. Pagkatapos ay
sinasabihan na niya ako na ipapasok na ang daliri niya sa ari ko at sabi ko ay hwag pero
ipinasok na niya at umiiyak ako at nasaktan ako at hindi ko kaya. Pagkatapos ng ilang araw
ay nagpahilot uli siya at doon na [nangyari] ang unang paghalay niya sa akin sa [loob] ng
kwarto niya. Nasaktan ako at umiiyak ako at sinabi nya na huli na iyon. Pero naulit ng
maraming beses sa tuwing hapon kapag nasa biyahe ang aking ina na si MARINA. Noong
dumating ang aking ate na si [AAA] ay pinagtapat niya ako kung ano ang ginagawa ni Tatay
FELIX sa akin ay nagsabi na ako sa kanya na ako ay hinahalay na ni tatay ng maraming
beses.[27]
THE COURT:
How come you said awhile ago, and in fact it was stated in your affidavit that at first, your
father placed his fingers into your vagina and thereafter he raped you many times. When you
said "hinalay", did he place his penis into your vagina? Tell us the truth?
A He did not insert his penis, but he just "itinutok" (pointed) his penis into my vagina,
Your Honor.
THE COURT:
You mean to say his penis was placed into your vagina although it was not inserted?
A Yes, Your Honor.[28]
The appellant's only defense was to deny that he had sexually abused his daughter. This
Court has often stated that to be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of
non-culpability otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without merit.[29] Here, appellant
interposes an extortion scheme masterminded by his eldest daughter, AAA. However, he did
not present any evidence to support his contention. Thus, in the face of a categorical
testimony by BBB, appellant's defense of denial must fail absent any evidence of his non-
culpability.
Crime committed was Rape by Sexual Assault
This Court has stated that under Article 266-A of the RPC there are two ways by which the
crime of rape may be committed: by sexual intercourse or by sexual assault.[30]
Rape by sexual intercourse is defined under Article 266-A(l) where it is committed by a man
who shall have carnal knowledge with a woman under a certain set of circumstances
enumerated in the provision. When a person is found guilty of rape by sexual intercourse, the
perpetrator is ordinarily punished by reclusion perpetua.[31]
Rape by sexual assault, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, under the same
set of circumstances in Article 266-A(l), inserts his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Article
266-A(2) provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
xxxx
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
(Emphasis supplied)
Unlike rape by sexual intercourse, Article 266-B prescribes prision mayor as the penalty if
found guilty of rape by sexual assault or reclusion temporal if there are qualifying
circumstances present.
In both cases either in rape by sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, only the fact of
penetration need be established under either. It must be stated though that under rape by
sexual intercourse, there must be proof that his penis touched the labia of the victim or slid
into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his
conviction.[32]
In Flordeliz v. People,[33] this Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for the crime of
rape by sexual assault committed by a father who inserted his finger in his minor daughter's
vagina. There we noted that it is "not uncommon x x x for the accused to claim that the case
is a mere fabrication, and that the victim was moved by familial discord and influence,
hostility, or revenge."[34] We said:
xxx when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this case, courts are
inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed
if the matter about which they testified were not true.[35]
Here, what was established by the testimony of BBB was that appellant inserted his finger in
her vagina. By his act of inserting his finger in BBB's organ, the crime of rape by sexual
assault has been consummated. The RTC and the CA therefore correctly ruled that appellant
should be found guilty of rape as defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC. Thus the
fact that there were no injuries found in the medical exam deserves scant attention. As
correctly stated by the RTC and the CA, the finding of any injury as yielded by the physical
exam is not a requirement in rape cases.[36]
Penalty and Damages
As mentioned, Article 266-B of the RPC imposes different penalties for rape committed
under paragraph 1 or rape by sexual intercourse and under paragraph 2 or rape by sexual
assault. Article 266-B prescribes:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
xxxx
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from Article 266-B that generally the penalty for rape through sexual assault is
prision mayor. If qualifying circumstances have attended the crime and the same have been
properly alleged in the information the penalty imposed would be increased to reclusion
temporal.
In this case, the crime committed was rape through sexual assault. It having been established
that BBB was under 18 years of age at the time of the crime and that appellant is her father, a
qualifying circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed should be reclusion temporal. We
are, therefore, constrained to modify the penalty imposed by the CA since it imposed the
penalty suited for the crime of qualified rape by sexual intercourse as opposed to qualified
rape by sexual assault. In this respect, the penalty that must be imposed is an indeterminate
penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
We also agree with the RTC and the CA that BBB is entitled to damages. Indeed, in People
v. Buclao,[37] we reiterated that in rape cases, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory
upon proof of the commission of rape, whereas moral damages are automatically awarded
without the need to prove mental and physical suffering and that exemplary damages are also
imposed, as example for the public good and to protect minors from all forms of sexual
abuse. However, to conform with current jurisprudence on the award of damages respecting
the crime of qualified rape by sexual assault, we modify the award to BBB of P30,000.00 as
civil indemnity upon the finding of the fact of rape, P30,000.00 as moral- damages
automatically awarded in rape case without need of proof and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[38]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The January 9, 2013 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34484 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Jose Salvador a.k.a "Felix" is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and
is accordingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to pay BBB P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral
damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RUDY NUYOK,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Rape can be committed in a cramped dwelling despite the probable presence of other
occupants because seclusion is not an element of the crime. Its commission can be
established by circumstantial evidence even if the victim, being the sole witness, was
rendered unconscious during its commission.
Antecedents
AAA,[1] having been born on May 5, 1992 to the Spouses ABC and DEF as evidenced by
her certificate of live birth,[2] was 13 years old when the accused committed the rapes in
June, July, August and September of 2005. At the time, she resided in the house of her
grandmother, BBB, in Babac, Poblacion, Malalag, Davao del Sur. The accused, her paternal
uncle, also lived in the same house.[3]
At 9:00 o'clock in the evening of June 25, 2005, as AAA was about to sleep, the accused laid
down beside her. Sensing fear, she tried to escape, but he pulled her by the hair, slapped her,
and punched her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness,
she noticed that her sando was already raised up to her neck, and her panties had blood. She
felt pain in her vagina. She saw the accused putting on his pants. He warned her not to reveal
the incident to anyone, threatening to kill her and her family if she did so. Despite her fear
she related the incident to BBB and her elder sister CCC, but her report fell on deaf ears.[4]
He raped her again in July 2005. On that occasion, she was sleeping in BBB's house when he
crept up to her side, pulled her hair, took off her panties, laid on top of her and inserted his
penis into her. She resisted, and tried to kick him away but missed. He overpowered her and
succeeded in gratifying his lust.[5]
The accused committed the third rape in August 2005. On that occasion, he punched AAA in
the stomach and in the forehead, and then had carnal knowledge of her. AAA again told BBB
and CCC about the rape immediately afterwards, but BBB and CCC did not do anything
except to promise to AAA that they would be more wary of him from then on. On her part,
AAA just waited for them to help her, but that help never came.[6] The fourth rape took
place one evening in September 2005. The accused roused AAA from sleep and threatened
her with a scythe. He removed her shorts and panties, and had carnal knowledge of her.[7]
AAA finally reported the four rapes to her mother, ABC, in October 2005. ABC immediately
brought AAA back to Maasin in Saranggani Province, where ABC lived. Upon learning of
AAA being moved to Maasin, the accused strongly opposed on the pretext that her transfer
would affect her schooling.[8] Nonetheless, AAA moved to Maasin, where Ann Sari, an
official of Barangay Lumatin, aided her in bringing rape charges against the accused. AAA
related her ordeal to the police authorities of Malalag,[9] and met with the personnel of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).[10] She executed a sworn
statement against her uncle.[11]
On October 24, 2005, AAA submitted to a medical examination by Dr. Jaileen D. Milar, the
Municipal Health Doctor in Maasin, Saranggani Province. The medical examination showed:
(a) healed laceration of AAA's hymen at the 5:00 to 7:00 o'clock positions; (b) AAA's vagina
admitting two fingers with ease; and (c) her being in a non-virgin state physically.[12]
At the trial, the Prosecution presented AAA, ABC, and Dr. Millar.
In his defense, the accused and BBB, his mother, testified. He denied having raped AAA, and
imputed ill motives to ABC, insisting that ABC had wanted to get back at him after he had
told his brother DEF, AAA's father and ABC's husband, that he had caught ABC with a
paramour. He stated that upon learning about ABC's affair, DEF had a fight with ABC; that
ABC had in turn confronted the accused, and attacked him in the presence of FFF, his sister,
and DEF; that the house where they lived measured eight feet wide and 12 feet long, and had
an extended balcony; that the house was made of wood and had only one room; that his
nephews and nieces (i.e., AAA, CCC, DDD and EEE) all slept in the same room, while he
and BBB slept in the balcony; that there was never any instance when he and AAA had been
left alone in the house; and that FFF lived nearby.[13]
BBB admitted that the accused and AAA lived with her in the same house, but denied
leaving her house for any number of days as to leave the accused and AAA alone; and that
AAA's older sister, CCC, and the latter's children also lived in the same house.[14]
Decision of the RTC
In its decision rendered on October 31, 2008,[15] the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18, in Digos City, Davao del Sur, found and pronounced the accused guilty of four counts of
rape, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds accused Rudy Nuyok GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for four (4) counts of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each and every charge of rape presently lodged against him. Accused
Nuyok is likewise sentenced to pay civil indemnity to the private complainant AAA in the
total amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) considering that
private complainant was 13 years old when the crime was committed against her and she was
the niece of the accused and clearly they are relatives within the third degree.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Judgment of the CA
On October 5, 2010,[17] the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated its judgment affirming the
convictions subject to modifications, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The private offended party is awarded P50,000.00 (as civil indemnity)
and P50,000.00 (as moral damages), for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Issues
In this appeal, the accused contends that:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE MINORITY OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT INDICATED IN THE
INFORMATION.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit because we do not find or see any reason to reverse or modify the
findings of the RTC, which the CA affirmed.
In almost all cases of sexual abuse, the credibility of the victim's testimony is crucial because
more often than not, only the persons involved can testify as to its occurrence. Whenever the
question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the Prosecution and the Defense is
worthier of belief, therefore, the assessment by the trial court is generally given respect, if not
finality. The assigning of values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who has the unique and unmatched opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and assess their credibility.
We follow the same path herein.
To start with, the accused claims that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of rape despite the
fatal defects of the informations, arguing that three of the informations (Criminal Case No.
FC-32-06, Criminal Case No. FC-33-06, and Criminal Case No. FC-34-06) having only
stated "in July 2005," "in August 2005" and "in September 2005," respectively, did not
specify the dates of commission of the rapes. He asserts that such failure to specify the
definite dates affected the veracity of the allegations therein, as well as the credibility of
AAA as the victim.
The argument of the accused is unwarranted.
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due process requires
that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; hence,
any accused not clearly charged in the complaint or information for the offense could not be
convicted of it, for to convict him so would be to violate his constitutional right.[19] In view
of his innocence being presumed, he should likewise be presumed not to know anything
about the crime he was being charged of committing. The information must then aver the
facts and circumstances bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. However, it is not necessary for the
information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless
such date and time are essential ingredients of the offenses charged.
The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso
facto render the informations defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of
rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of
a female against her will through force or intimidation. Precision as to the time when the rape
is committed has no bearing on its commission. Consequently, the date or the time of the
commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute
accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was
committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.[20]
Secondly, the Prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt the charges of rape
against the accused.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 266-A - Rape, When and How Committed- Rape is committed—
1.) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination of grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another's mouth, or anal orifice of
any instrument of object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (RA 8353 which
took effect on October 22, 1997).
AAA positively identified the accused as her rapist. Her account of his crimes was candid,
and her demeanor revealing. She could not control herself but cried in the course of her
testimony whenever she was made to recall her traumatic experiences at his hands.
Moreover, her recollections about the four rapes were corroborated by the medical findings
of Dr. Milar, who identified the Medico Legal Report of AAA, thusly:
PROS. CABARDO:
Q:
In your examination of the victim, what is your finding with respect to the hymen of said
AAA?
A:
There is healed laceration at 5 to 7 o'clock position.
Q:
Is this consistent with the victim of rape cases?
A:
I cannot say it is rape. But the findings suggest that there was a previous penetration.
Q:
How about the internal examination you conducted, what is your finding with respect to that?
A:
The internal examination of the patient shows that the vagina admits two fingers.
Q:
What is the impression when the vagina admits two fingers?
A:
The patient has previous penetration.[21]
The testimony of a rape victim that is consistent with the medical findings constitutes
sufficient basis to conclude that carnal knowledge occurred.[22] As a result, the accused can
be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim for as long as such testimony is credible,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[23]
Thirdly, the accused asserts that the State did not establish the carnal knowledge on June 25,
2005; and that the trial court simply assumed its occurrence. He bases his assertion on AAA
testifying that she was rendered unconscious at the time of that rape, and that all that she
noticed upon regaining consciousness was that her sando was already on her neck and her
panties had blood.
The assertion of the accused is unwarranted.
Despite the lack of testimony on how the accused had carnal knowledge of his victim on June
25, 2005, his guilt was nonetheless shown beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for rape
may rest on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Thus, an accused like him can be
declared guilty of rape even if the sole witness against him was the victim who had been
rendered unconscious at the time of the consummation of carnal knowledge provided
sufficient circumstantial evidence existed showing that the victim was violated, and that it
was the accused and no other who had committed the violation.[24] To disallow such
showing is to obstruct the successful prosecution of a rapist who renders his victim
unconscious before the consummation.
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence,[25] consists of
proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. It is sufficient to sustain a conviction
if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were
derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[26] All the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.[27] In other words, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the perpetrator.[28]
The Prosecution successfully established the following facts and circumstances that, when
taken together, very well constituted evidence of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, to wit: (a) he and AAA lived in the same house; (b) while AAA was sleeping at 9:00
o'clock in the evening of June 25, 2005 in the same house, he crawled up and laid down
beside her; (c) AAA tried to escape; (d) he then pulled AAA's hair, slapped her and punched
her in the stomach; (e) AAA was rendered unconscious; (f) when AAA regained
consciousness, she found blood in her panties, and her sando was already raised up to her
neck; (g) AAA felt pain in her vagina; (h) AAA saw him in the act of putting on his pants; (i)
he threatened to kill AAA if she would reveal the incident to anyone else; and (J) AAA
sustained hymenal laceration. These circumstances, coupled with AAA's positive testimony
that was corroborated by the examining physician's physical findings on her, lead to the
inescapable conclusion that he raped AAA against her will on that occasion.
Fourthly, the accused contends that AAA gave self-serving testimonies; and that she really
had no proof of his having raped her.
The contention of the accused fails scrutiny.
The RTC found sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. Being
the trial court, it was in the best and unique position to pass upon and assess the credibility of
the witnesses and of their testimonies by virtue of its direct opportunity to observe the
witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under rigorous
examination that were significant in evaluating their sincerity as witnesses and determining
the credibility of their testimonies. Considering that the RTC's findings were adopted by the
CA, the Court is now bound by such findings unless the accused or the record turns up
compelling reasons to disregard the findings,[29] like their being unnatural, or improbable, or
devoid of evidentiary support. Yet, no such reasons were advanced by him, or turned up on
the record.
Almost always, the victim's credibility assumes primordial consideration. Her testimony
passes the test of credibility if it is convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things or events, and unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency.
The accused may be convicted solely on the basis of her lone testimony.[30] To reiterate,
both the RTC and the CA unanimously found AAA's testimony as credible. Thus, the Court
must not depart from their unanimous findings.
The accused attacks AAA's credibility as doubtful because: (a) BBB and AAA's elder sister
did not do anything even after having been told about the rape; (b) AAA allowed herself to
be vulnerable to the subsequent rapes by continuing to live in the same house where he also
lived; (c) the house had other occupants; (d) the victim's mother harbored a grudge against
him for exposing her with infidelity, resulting in the mother's initiating the trumped-up rape
charges against him.
The attack against AAA's credibility is untenable.
The lack of response on the part of BBB and the victim's elder sister and the fact that AAA
continued to live in the same house where the accused lived did not diminish the veracity or
reliability of AAA's incriminating testimony. It was obvious that AAA did not leave her
grandmother's house because she did not have money or other means to live elsewhere. Also,
she was forced to submit to his lewdness out of fear that he would harm her and her family.
Being a minor and under the immediate care of her grandmother, who was also his mother,
she could not just leave her care to go elsewhere for safety. A youthful victim of serial rapes
like her could not be expected to think and act like a composed adult victim.[31] At any rate,
we have no standard of behavior for all rape victims in the aftermath of their defilement, for
people react differently to emotional stress.[32] Some may exhibit signs of stress, while
others may act nonchalantly. We are assured of the untenability of his attack because, in the
end, she did not hesitate to denounce his crimes against her once her own mother had arrived
at the grandmother's home.
The presence of others as occupants in the same house where the accused and AAA lived did
not necessarily deter him from committing the rapes. The crowded situation in any small
house would sometimes be held to minimize the opportunity for committing rape, but it has
been shown repeatedly by experience that many instances of rape were committed not in
seclusion but in very public circumstances. Cramped spaces of habitation have not halted the
criminal from imposing himself on the weaker victim, for privacy is not a hallmark of the
crime of rape. Based on the manner by which AAA described his commission of the rapes,
the accused really made sure that the likelihood of the other occupants seeing him when he
raped his victim would be minimal. In that respect, his boldness to commit his crimes in the
midst of other occupants, if any of them was then really around, should not prejudice the
victim finally denouncing his crimes in order to ensure justice for herself and her honor.
The accused insinuates that the accusation for rape was impelled by the ill-motives of AAA's
mother. We reject the insinuation, for the records do not disclose anything about AAA being
a mere instrument of her mother's vengefulness against him. He had the burden to prove his
insinuation, but he did not discharge such burden by simply claiming that her mother had
such malice towards him. His insinuation is also improbable in light of the tendency of the
accusation for very serious crimes against him exposing all of them to public ridicule and
humiliation considering their close relationship as members of the same family.[33] Lastly,
no mother would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to the
prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the person
responsible for her child's defilement incarcerated.[34]
Although the minority under 18 years of AAA at the time of the rapes, and the fact that the
accused was her paternal uncle were established during the trial, the RTC nonetheless
correctly convicted him only of four counts of simple rape instead of qualified rape because
the special qualifying circumstance of minority was not alleged in the informations. The
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur to
qualify the crime of rape,[35] but only her relationship to the accused was alleged and
proved. The trial court was precluded from considering the attendance of such qualifying or
aggravating circumstances in the judgment because of the failure to properly allege them.[36]
This conforms to Section 8 and Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the stature, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation
of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statue but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well
as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment.
Anent the civil liability, the CA ordered the accused to pay to AAA civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 for each count of rape.[37] Civil indemnity is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape, while moral damages are proper without need
of proof other than the fact of rape by virtue of the undeniable moral suffering of AAA due to
the rape. The amounts awarded are all in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.[38] However,
the Court should award to AAA exemplary damages of P30,000.00 for each count of rape on
account of the attendance of the circumstances of minority and relationship despite such
circumstances not being considered in raising the criminal liability. Under Article 2230 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at least one aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime, which circumstance need not be specifically alleged in
the information. It did not matter that the aggravating circumstance is a qualifying or
attendant circumstance like minority and relationship. As the Court has said in People v.
Catubig:[39]
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense
has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon
the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award
of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[40]
In addition, the accused is liable to pay interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the
monetary awards for damages from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards
are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 5, 2010 subject to
the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall further be awarded
for each count of rape; (b) all the items of civil liability shall earn interest of 6% per annum
from the fmality of this decision until fully paid; and (c) the accused shall pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 194129, June 15, 2015 ]
PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO Y SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30957 dated 23 April 2010 and Resolution[2] dated 13 October 2010. The CA affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated 10 May 2006 in Criminal Case No. 00-
183183, finding accused-appellant Police Officer 1 (PO1) Crispin Ocampo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
On 01 June 2001, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information reads:
That on or about May 27, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused, with intent to
kill, did [then] and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one MARIO DE LUNA y HALLARE, by then and there firing his service
firearm, .9 mm Barreta Pistol with Serial No. M19498Z, hitting the said Mario De Luna y
Hallare on the chest and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds
which were necessarily fatal and mortal and which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.[3]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[4]
The prosecution's version of the events as narrated by the CA is as follows:
On May 27, 2000, at about seven o'clock in the evening, Mario De Luna, Emil Hipolito and
Florentino Magante were having a drinking session at Mario's house located at Panday Pira
Street, Tondo, Manila.
At about 8:30 in the evening, the three, together with Edwin Hipolito and Jaime Mabugat
continued their drinking session at the house of Edwin, also at Panday Pira Street, Tondo,
Manila. While drinking thereat, they noticed that another group, with appellant (accused-
appellant), was also having a drinking session along Panday Pira Street which was about
three to four arms length from Edwin's place.
Emil, Mario, Jaime and Florante joined the group in their drinking session. While drinking,
appellant (accused-appellant) poked a gun at Jaime and told him "wag kang magulo,
babarilin kita." Jaime retorted, "san, bakit," and was then approached by her sister who asked
him to go home to which he acceded. Thereafter, appellant (accused-appellant) called on
Mario De Luna and fired several shots at him. Mario de Luna fell down to the ground. He
was then immediately brought to the hospital by his mother and sister where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Emmanuel Arenas, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body of Mario De Luna and
found that the victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds on the chest and different parts
of his body.[5]
For his part, accused-appellant admitted to having shot the victim to death, but claimed to
have done so in self-defense.[6] In support of this claim, defense witness Marita averred that
the shooting incident was precipitated by the victim's unprovoked knife attack upon accused-
appellant. The latter was allegedly left with no other recourse but to use his service firearm to
neutralize the aggressor.[7] As testified to by witness Marita:
On May 27, 2000, at about 10:00 p.m., she was in front of their house at 1663 Interior 24, F.
Varona, Tondo, Manila, when she saw Ferdie Tapang, her nephew, and four others having a
drinking spree beside a lighted electric post. Shortly thereafter, she noticed appellant
(accused-appellant) pass by. Then Jaime together with Mario arrived at the scene and
approached the group of Ferdie Tapang, uttering the words: "Gusto nyo itaob ko long
lamesang ito." Sensing trouble upon seeing two of Ferdie Tapang's drinking buddies rise
from the bench where they were seated, Marita rushed to the house of appellant (accused-
appellant) to ask for his help in preventing a confrontation between the two groups.
Appellant (accused-appellant) had just arrived from his duty as police officer at the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit of the Western Police District and was changing into
civilian clothes when Marita came and apprised him of the situation. Together with Marita,
he proceeded to the site of the drinking spree. Noticing the group was becoming rowdy,
appellant (accused-appellant) approached Mario and asked if the latter knew him. When
Mario replied yes, appellant (accused-appellant) went on to tell the group to put an end to
their drinking session. Mario and Jaime immediately left the scene while the others
voluntarily dispersed.
Minutes later, Mario and Jaime went back to the locus. While standing beside appellant
(accused-appellant), Marita heard Mario shout towards their direction the words: "Walang
pulis-pulis sa akin!" Appellant (accused-appellant) likewise heard Mario's utterances:
"Walang pulis-pulis sa amin! Anong akala mo sa amin, basta-basta mo na lang pauuwiin."
Mario then pulled out a knife and lunged at appellant (accused-appellant) who evaded the
first thrust. Mario tried to stab appellant (accused-appellant) a second time but the latter
dodged the knife, drew his pistol and fired two successive shots at Mario. Appellant
(accused-appellant) was leaning backwards when he fired at Mario. Fatally hit, the latter
slumped to the ground.
Having immediately left the crime scene after hearing the first gunshot, Marita failed to
witness what transpired thereafter.[8]
On 28 May 2008, accused-appellant, accompanied by Police Senior Inspector (PS/Insp.)
Rosauro Dalisay, arrived at the Western Police District and surrendered his service
firearm.[9]
On 10 May 2006, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of homicide. The dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of
Homicide and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to pay the heirs of Mario De Luna the amount of Php1,600,000.00 as loss of
earning capacity; Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php2,577.00 as hospital expenses; and
Php300.00 as funeral expenses; and Php250,000 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant, but modified some of the
monetary damages awarded. It affirmed the P50,000 civil indemnity in favor of the victim's
heirs.[11] But instead of the actual damages in the total amount of P2,877 (P2,577 for
hospital expense plus P300 for funeral expenses), temperate damages of P25,000 were
awarded in their favor.[12] The appellate court deleted the award of P1,600,000 for loss of
earning capacity on the ground of lack of competent proof to substantiate the claim and
reduced the attorney's fees from P250,000 to P100,000.[13] It affirmed the factual findings of
the RTC and the latter's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.[14] The CA likewise
found that the trial court did not err in overruling accused-appellant's plea of self-
defense.[15]
Hence, this appeal.
The sole issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove accused-appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court has carefully reviewed the case records and finds accused-appellant's conviction
proper.
It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve
a high degree of respect.[16] Having observed their deportment in court, the trial judge is in a
better position to determine the issue of credibility.[17] For this reason, the findings of trial
judges will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that they have
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that could have altered the conviction of appellants.[18] In the case at bar, the
circumstances pointed out by accused-appellant are too trivial to affect the assessment and
the eventual findings of the trial court that he indeed committed the crime.
The Court therefore finds that the courts a quo have correctly appreciated the facts. Their
Decisions are fully supported by evidence on record including the transcript of stenographic
notes, which are extant and complete.

We are convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. We note that he admitted to
having killed the victim albeit in self-defense. The rule consistently adhered to in this
jurisdiction is that when the accused admit that they are the authors of the death of the victim,
and their defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon them to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.[19]
Self-defense is a time-worn excuse resorted to by assailants in criminal cases.[20] We have
held in a host of instances that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must be
met: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person engaged in self-defense.[21]
In this case, accused-appellant has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first
element of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[22] Appellant showed
no attack or assault that had placed his life in imminent or actual danger.[23] As aptly ruled
by the CA:
[A]ppellant's tale of self-defense is negated by the physical evidence, specifically the
trajectory of the bullets that penetrated the victim's body. Medico-Legal Report No. W-359-
2000, the autopsy report, showed that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the
base of his neck and another in the chest area. In both injuries, after penetrating the victim's
body, the bullets traveled from left side downward to the right portion of his body. Xxx
xxxx
The graphic representation of the travel path of the bullets from the entry to the exit points is
shown in prosecution's Exhibit "B-5." On the basis of the bullet's trajectory, Dr. Aranas
concluded that the shooter must have been positioned higher than the victim when the shots
were fired. Thus, the trial court concluded that the results of the autopsy disproves appellant's
claim that he fired the shots while leaning backward after the victim tried to stab him a
second time.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks higher in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.[25] In criminal cases such as murder/homicide or
rape, in which the accused stand to lose their liberty if found guilty, this Court has, on many
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.[26] Where the
physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the
physical evidence must be upheld.[27]
Ineluctably, the victim in this case cannot be considered as the aggressor. For one, an
eyewitness attested that accused-appellant shot the victim without any provocation.[28] Also,
as correctly noted by the trial court, there was failure to impute ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness who had implicated accused-appellant in the fatal shooting of the victim.[29]
Jurisprudence holds that when there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part
of the witness to testify falsely against the accused or to pervert the truth, the logical
conclusion is that no such motive exists, and that the former's testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.[30]
With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court finds that the means employed
by accused-appellant was grossly disproportionate to the victim's alleged unlawful
aggression. The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in his chest and different parts of
his body.[31] Besides, the Advance Information prepared by Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)
Virgo Villareal, the investigator of the case, reveals that there was no mention of either a
stabbing incident that happened or a knife that was recovered from the crime scene.[32]
Suffice it to say that a plea of self-defense is belied by the "nature, number, and location of
the wounds" inflicted on the victim, "since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a
determined effort to kill and not just to defend."[33] Here, the wounds sustained by the
victim clearly show the intent of accused-appellant to kill and not merely to prevent or repel
an attack. Verily, since the means employed by the latter were unreasonable and excessive,
his plea of self-defense is unacceptable.
We, therefore, find no reversible error in the Decisions of the CA and the RTC as to the guilt
of accused-appellant.
Anent the appropriate penalty, we affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA: an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum[34] to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for the
crime of homicide.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal.[35] Considering that there is one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
and no aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty, pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.[36] This being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law[37] is
applicable. Accordingly, accused-appellant can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum[38] of which shall be within the range of prision mayor and the maximum[39] of
which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being one
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance.
With regard to the appropriate indemnity and damages, the CA retained the award of P50,000
as civil indemnity and modified other monetary damages as follows: (a) P25,000 as
temperate damages; (b) P50,000 as moral damages; and (c) P100,000 as attorney's fees.[40]
As correctly ruled by the CA, an award for civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim
must be automatically imposed against the accused without need of proof other than the fact
of the commission of murder or homicide.[41] Based on recent jurisprudence,[42] however,
the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000 for the heirs of Mario de Luna is in order.
With respect to other compensatory damages, the Court in People v. Agudez[43] declared
that competent evidence must likewise be presented to support the claim for those damages.
In this case, the heirs of Mario de Luna claimed that they spent P2,577 for hospital expense
and P300 for funeral expenses. However, when actual damages substantiated by receipts
presented during trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of P25,000 as temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount, is justified.[44]
The award for moral damages by the CA shall be adjusted from P50,000 to P75,000 to
conform to the prevailing jurisprudence.[45]
We also depart from the CA and the RTC rulings awarding the heirs of the victim attorney's
fees, as none of the grounds therefor under Article 2208[46] of the Civil Code is present in
this case.
Finally, the Court also imposes interest on all the monetary awards for damages at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.[47]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Manila in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30957 dated 23 April 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that accused-appellant PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Mario de Luna
the amounts of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as
temperate damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 200942, June 16, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JORIE WAHIMAN Y
RAYOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of murder for the
death of Jose Buensuceso (Buensuceso). During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not
guilty.[1] Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the evening,
Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils, in Malaybalay City, was on his way back
to the company staff house on board his Isuzu pick-up after attending a despedida for one of
his employees.
While he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned down by persons
riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty, David Azucena (Azucena), who
was then opening the gate, identified one of the assailants as herein appellant.
During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant
taken during the preliminary investigation of the case, admitting to the killing of Buensuceso.
However, when it was appellant's turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he
was at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-
in-law.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
On February 16, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision[2] finding appellant guilty as charged,
viz.:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is issued finding the accused Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposes upon him the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and directing him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as
moral damages, P75,000.00 [as] civil indemnity and actual damages as follows:
P59,280,000.00 lost earning capacity of the deceased; WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 16, [2009] decision rendered by Branch
[8], Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, is hereby AFFIRMED in
[P]25,000.00 actual damages; no receipt was presented for P220,000[;] toto.

P1,500.00 Appearance fee; and SO ORDERED.[5]

P50,000.00 Attorney's fee.
He shall serve his penalty in the National Penitentiary of Davao Penal [C]olony.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In his appeal, appellant argued that when his supposed extrajudicial confession was being
taken, Atty. Michael Florentino Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao), the lawyer who supposedly assisted
him, was not around. He arrived only when appellant was about to sign the extrajudicial
confession. Appellant also insisted that Azucena, the prosecution's alleged eyewitness, did
not actually see him shooting the victim.
Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
We totally agree with the RTC and the CA in finding that the guilt of appellant for the crime
of murder was proved beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that on April 2, 2003, at
around 10 o'clock in the evening, appellant shot Buensuceso while the latter was about to
enter the gate of the staff house of Stanfilco-Dole in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Moreover,
we agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that appellant's extrajudicial confession[6]
was voluntarily and duly executed and replete with details that only appellant could supply,
viz.:
xxx But before proceeding in questioning you, I am informing you that under our new
constitution, you have the right to the following:

Appellant's contentions were, however, disregarded by the CA. A. You have the right to remain silent and not answer xxx my questions; it might be that I
might use your answers as evidence against you or favorable to you.
In its Decision[4] dated October 13, 2011, the CA found no reason to depart from the trial 1.
court's findings. It held that appellant's contention that he lacked legal intervention and QUESTION:
assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial confession was totally belied by the Do you understand your right?
testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he rendered assistance to the appellant throughout the entire ANSWER:
proceedings and carefully explained to the latter the consequences of his admission. Besides, Yes[,] Sir.
the voluntariness of the execution of the extrajudicial confession was apparent considering 2.
that it is replete with details that only appellant would know. The appellate court brushed QUESTION:
aside appellant's assertion of torture, the same being unsupported by medical certificate or Are you going to use your right?
marks of physical abuse. In any case, he never bothered to narrate how he was tortured or to ANSWER:
identify his alleged tormentors. Moreover, the ballistic examination proved that the slugs I would rather not[,] sir[,] because I would tell the truth as to what had happened.
used in killing Buensuceso were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from appellant. B. You have the right to avail [of] the services of a counsel of your choice to help you in this
The CA also found no merit in appellant's claim that Azucena did not actually see him shoot investigation, and if you can't afford to hire the services of a lawyer, the government will
the victim. The CA opined that although Azucena did not see appellant actually shoot the provide you with free legal services of a lawyer from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
victim, he nonetheless saw appellant within seconds from hearing the gunshots fleeing from (IBP).
the immediate vicinity of the crime scene aboard a motorcycle with a gun in hand. Based on 03.
the foregoing, the appellate court found appellant's denial and alibi undeserving of credence. QUESTION:
Do you understand your right? - ANSWER: Yes[,] sir.
The dispositive portion of the CA's Decision reads: 04:
QUESTION:
Are you going to use your right?
ANSWER:
I have my own lawyer, he is Atty. Michael Florentino Dumlao III, we already had a talk and
he made me understand xxx my rights, and he also made me understand about this
investigation where I will voluntarily narrate what I x x x [know].
05.
QUESTION:
Did anybody give you money or promised to give you a reward, or did anybody intimidate
you in giving this affidavit?
ANSWER:
Nobody[,] sir.
06.
QUESTION:
Did you understand your rights that I told you?
ANSWER:
Yes[,] sir.[7]
Appellant then proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Alex Laranjo (Laranjo) and Kid
Canadilla (Canadilla), for and in behalf of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro,
Valencia, to kill the victim for a fee. According to appellant, Alonzo wanted the victim killed
because the latter withheld the release of his collectibles from Stanfilco-Dole. Appellant then
narrated how he met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo; how he received payments and
instructions; how he planned the killing; and how he executed the plan. Appellant signed his
extrajudicial confession, with the assistance of Arty. Dumlao, and subscribed the same before
Atty. Dennis B. Caayupan at the Office of the Clerk of Court.[8]
Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to appellant all
throughout the proceedings and carefully explained to him the ramifications of his admission.
He informed appellant of his rights and that anything he says may be used in evidence
against him. Notwithstanding, appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.[9]
In any event, it must be stressed that appellant's conviction was not based solely on his
extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of
Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw appellant about 5
meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a
black motorcycle and was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs
found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from the appellant.
Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
The RTC and the CA thus properly found appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, it must be stated that appellant is not
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
Anent the damages awarded, we find that modification is in order.
Regarding the award for lost earnings, the general rule is that there must be documentary
proof to support indemnity for loss of earning capacity. Admittedly, there are exceptions to
this rule, viz.:
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws.[10]
Notably, this case does not fall under any of the exceptions. The deceased victim could not
be considered as a self-employed earning less than the minimum wage; neither could he be
considered employed as a daily wage worker. However, we are inclined to award lost
earnings considering that the deceased, as testified by his widow, was the manager of
Stanfilco-Dole, Phils, in Malaybalay City and was receiving a monthly salary of P95,000.00.
He was 54 years of age when gunned down by appellant. This testimony was not objected to
by appellant or questioned during cross-examination or on appeal. Clearly, the existence of
factual basis of the award has been satisfactorily established. However, the amount of the
award for lost earnings must be modified following the formula [2/3 x 80 - age] x [gross
annual income - necessary expenses equivalent to 50% of the gross annual income]. Thus:
[2/3 x (80-54)] [(P95,000 x 12) - 50% (P95,000 x 12)] = P9,878,100.00.
In addition, the awards of actual damages in the amount of P25,000.00 must be deleted for
lack of proof; in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded.
The awards of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, and moral damages in the
amount of P75,000.00, are in line with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, the heirs of the
victim are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. Finally, all damages
awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this resolution
until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is not
eligible for parole; the award for lost earnings is reduced to P9,878,100.00; the award of
actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
P25,000.00 as temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED
[ G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015 ]
BERNARDO U. MESINA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 120, in Caloocan City convicting the petitioner of malversation as defined and
penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
Antecedents
On July 9, 1998, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner with qualified
theft. Upon his motion, he was granted a reinvestigation. On September 17, 1998, after the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed charging him instead with malversation of
public funds, the amended information alleging thusly:
That on or about the 6th day of July 1998, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said above-named accused, being then an employee
of [the] City Treasurer’s Office, Caloocan City, and acting as Cashier of said office, and as
such was accountable for the public funds collected and received by him (sic) reason of his
position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and embezzled and convert to his own personal use and benefit said funds in the
sum of P167,876.90, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Caloocan in the
aforementioned amount of P167,876.90.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The CA adopted the RTC’s summary of the facts, as follows:
x x x that in the afternoon of July 6, 1998 between 1:00 and 2:00 o’clock, herein accused
Bernardo Mesina then Local Treasurer Officer I of the Local Government of Caloocan City
went to the so called Mini City Hall located at Camarin Road, District I, Caloocan City for
purposes of collection. While thereat, Ms. Rosalinda Baclit, Officer-In-Charge of collection
at said office, turned over/remitted to Mesina the weeks’ collection for the period covering
the month of June 1998 representing, among others, the Market Fees’ collection,
Miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, Community Tax Receipts (cedula) and the ‘Patubig’
(local water system) collection all amounting to P468,394.46 (Exhs. ‘K’ and ‘K-2’, ‘L’ – ‘L-
2’, ‘M’, ‘M-2’, ‘N’ – ‘N-2’, ‘O’ – ‘O-2’, ‘P’ – ‘P-2’, ‘Q’ – ‘Q-2’, ‘R’, ‘R-2’, ‘S’ – ‘S-2’, ‘T’
– ‘TO-2’, ‘U’ – ‘U-2’, ‘V’ – ‘V-2’, ‘W’, ‘W-2’, ‘X’ – ‘X-2’, and ‘Y’ – ‘Y-2’). After counting
the cash money, the (sic) were bundled and placed inside separate envelopes together with
their respective liquidation statements numbering about thirteen (13) pieces signed by both
Ms. Irene Manalang, OIC of the Cash Receipt Division, and herein accused Mesina
acknowledging receipt and collection thereof (Exhs, ‘K-1’, ‘M-3’, ‘N-3’, ‘P-3’, ‘Q-3’, ‘R-3’,
T-3’, ‘U-3’, ‘V-3’, ‘W-3’, ‘X-3’, and ‘Y-3’). Thereafter, Bernardo Mesina together with his
driver left the Mini City Hall and proceeded to City Hall Main.
Later that same afternoon, Ms. Baclit received several phone calls coming from the Main
City Hall. At around 3:00 o’clock, Mrs. Josie Sanilla, secretary of City Treasurer Carolo V.
Santos, called up the Mini City Hall confirming the collection of the ‘Patubig’ by Mr.
Bernardo Mesina. Thirty (30) minutes thereafter, Mrs. Elvira Coleto, Local Treasurer
Operation Officer II of the Main City Hall called up to inform Ms. Baclit that the supposed
‘Patubig’ collection amounting to P167,870.90 (Exh. ‘K-2’) was not remitted. Also,
Bernardo Mesina phoned Ms. Baclit telling the latter that he did not receive the ‘Patubig’
collection. Alarmed by these telephone calls she just received, Ms. Baclit then immediately
consulted the documents/liquidation statements supposedly signed by Mesina acknowledging
receipt and collection thereof, however, all efforts to locate and retrieved (sic) these records
proved futile at that moment.
Meanwhile, City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, after having been informed by Mrs. Irene
Manalang of the discrepancy in the collection, summoned both Ms. Baclit and Bernardo
Mesina to his office at the Main City Hall for an inquiry relative to the missing P167,870.90
‘Patubig’ collection. And as the two (2), Baclit and Mesina, insisted on their respective
versions during said confrontation, City Treasurer Santos, in the presence of the Chief of the
Cash Disbursement Division, Administrative Officers and Local Treasurer’s Operation
Officer II Mrs. Coleto, then ordered Mesina’s vault sealed pending further investigation.
The following morning July 7, 1998, Caloocan City Mayor Reynaldo O. Malonzo called for
an immediate probe of the matter. Present during the investigation at the Mayor’s Office
were Ms. Baclit, accused Bernardo Mesina, City Auditor Chito Ramirez, City Treasurer
Santos as well as the representative from the different offices concerned. Again, when asked
by Mayor Malonzo as to whether or not [t]he ‘Patubig’ collection was collected and/or
remitted, Mesina stood fast in his denial of having received the same; Ms. Baclit on the other
hand positively asserted the remittance and collection thereof by Bernardo Mesina.
Thereafter, they all proceeded to the cashier’s room where Mesina had his safe and thereat, in
the presence of COA State Auditor III Panchito Fadera, Cashier IV-CTO Fe. F. Sanchez,
Administrative Officer IV Lourdes Jose, LTOO II Elvira M. Coleto, accused Bernardo
Mesina and LTOO II Rosalinda Baclit, Mesina’s vault was opened and a cash count and/or
physical count of the contents thereof was conducted. Found inside were the following, to
wit: 1) coins amounting to P107.15; 2) coins amounting to P50.47; 3) coins amounting to
P127.00; 4) coins amounting to P64.10; 5) cash with tape amounting to P770.00; 6) spoiled
bills amounting to P440.00; 7) bundled bills amounting to P20,500.00. Also found inside
were the Report of Collection by the Liquidating Officer (RCLO) in the amount of
P123,885.55 as well as the original and duplicate copies of the daily sum of collections of
accountable form under the name of one Racquel Ona dated March 31, 1998 amounting to
P123,885.55 (six (6) copies of vales/chits) Exhs. ‘Z’, ‘Z-1’ and ‘Z-2’). In addition thereto,
the cash amount of P67,900.00 then withheld by the City Cashier pending this investigation,
was turned over to the said auditing team, thus, the total cash money audited against accused
Mesina amounted to P89,965.72 (sic) (Exhs. ‘BB’ and ‘BB-1’).
In the afternoon of July 7, 1998, at about 5:00 o’clock, Mses. Rosalinda Baclit and Maria
Luisa Canas all went to the SID Caloocan City Police Station to have their separate sworn
statements taken (Exhs. ‘E’, ‘E-1’, ‘D’, ‘D-1’, ‘F’, and ‘F-1’). Mmes. Lorna Palomo-Cabal,
Divina Dimacali-Sarile and Victoria Salita Vda. De Puyat likewise executed a joint sworn
affidavit (Exhs. ‘G’, ‘G-1’, ‘G-2’, and ‘G-3’) in preparation for the filing of appropriate
criminal charge against Bernardo Mesina.
The following day, July 8, 1998, Mamerto M. Manahan, Panchito Fadera and Carolo V.
Santos also executed their respective affidavits in relation to the incidents at bar (Exhs. ‘A’,
‘A-1’, ‘A-2’; Exhs. ‘B’, and ‘B-1’; Exhs. ‘C’, and ‘C-1’). Meanwhile, the statement of
collection supposedly signed by accused Mesina was finally recovered at Rosalinda Baclit’s
desk hidden under a pile of other documents. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)[4]
The Defense presented the oral testimony of the petitioner and documentary evidence.[5] He
admitted collecting the total amount of P468,394.46 from Baclit, including the subject
patubig collection totaling to P167,976.90, but adamantly denied misappropriating,
misapplying, and embezzling the patubig collection, maintaining that the patubig collection
was found complete in his vault during the inspection. He explained that he deliberately kept
the collection in his vault upon learning that his wife had suffered a heart attack and had been
rushed to the hospital for immediate medical treatment. He believed that he did not yet need
to remit the amount to the OIC of the Cash Receipt Division because it was still to be re-
counted. He claimed that when he returned to the Main City Hall that same day his vault was
already sealed.[6] He said that the accusation was politically motivated. In support of his
claim of innocence, he cited his numerous awards and citations for honesty and dedicated
public service.[7]
On November 8, 2001, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of malversation, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused BERNARDO MESINA Y
UMALI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation as defined and
penalized under Article 217 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The Court further imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office and a
fine of P167,876.90 upon the accused.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On July 24, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, with modification as to the amount of
fine imposed,[9] decreeing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated November 8, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-54217 is affirmed
with modification in the sense that the fine is reduced from P167,876.98 to P37,876.98. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In his appeal, the petitioner submits for consideration the following:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING WITH
MODIFICATION THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT:
it had admitted in evidence the testimony of prosecution witness ELVIRA COLITO that she
saw, when accused-appellant’s vault was opened, to have seen (sic) the bundles of the
missing Patubig collections of more than Ps130,000.00 (sic), and thus, in effect, there was no
misappropriation, as one of the elements of the crime of malversation;
that it erred and completely misapprehended and failed to appreciate the true meaning of the
testimony of the said witness of seeing inside the vault more than Ps130,000.00 in bundles by
treating/and/or (sic) appreciating the same as exactly Ps130,000.00 flat without appreciating
the words more than, thus guilty of erroneous inference surmises and conjectures;
that it overlooked and completely disregarded that inside the vault was the sum of
Ps20,500.00 in bundles also [Exh. “BB and B-1”] regarding contents of the vault or the total
sum of Ps22,065.72 testified to by Panchito Madera (sic), Head of the Audit Team;
the Court of Appeals gravely erred to surmise and at least look on the lack from the lists of
inventories of the vault the more than Ps130,000.00 in bundles and why it was not listed
among the moneys found inside the accused-appellant’s vault;
doubts and inconsistencies existing threrefrom shall remained (sic) favorable to the accused-
appellant pursuant to applicable jurisprudence;
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A (SIC) QUESTIONS OF LAW, THAT
THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE GROUP OF MAYOR MALONZO, THE
TREASURER, THE ADMINISTRATOR, THE CITY AUDITOR, CHIEF OF DIVISIONS
AND THE AUDIT PROCEEDINGS ARE NULL AND VOID DUE:
Accused-appellant was not informed of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel as
mandated by the Constitution;
The audit proceedings did not comply strictly with the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers
and Auditors and other Guidelines, thus null and void;
Thus, the presumption of juris tantum in Art. 127 of the Revised Penal Code is overcome
firmly supported by the discovery of the missing money and further the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals was against established jurisprudence enunciated in the case of TINGA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, No. L-57650, [160 SCRA 483];
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FATALLY WRONG IN NOT APPLYING
EVIDENCE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER TO ACQUIT AND EXONERATE
PETITIONER ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 130, SEC. 46, OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
Notwithstanding, not only are the evidence weak, but its findings or discovery of more than
Ps130,000.00 inside the vault is subject to double interpretations, and/or double alternative or
probabilities, thus the presumption of innocence will be adopted.[10]
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
The crime of malversation of public funds charged herein is defined and penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of malversation. – Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds
or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property shall suffer:
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If
the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total
value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by
R.A. No. 1060)
The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that the
offender is a public officer; (b) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (c) that the funds or property were public funds or property
for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.[11]
The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the petitioner.

The Prosecution proved, firstly, that the petitioner was a public officer with the position of
Local Treasurer Officer I of Caloocan City; secondly, that by reason of his position, he was
tasked to collect fees and taxes regularly levied by the Mini City Hall, including market fees,
miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, and the subject patubig collection; and, thirdly, that
all of the fees and taxes collected were unquestionably public funds for which he was
accountable.
As to the fourth element of misappropriation, the petitioner did not rebut the presumption
that he had misappropriated the patubig collection to his personal use. He had earlier feigned
ignorance of having received the patubig collection when he phoned Ms. Baclit to tell her
that he did not receive the collection. He still insisted that he had not received the sum from
Ms. Baclit when the City Treasurer summoned them both. His denial continued until the next
day when City Mayor Malonzo himself asked them both about the matter. Only after the
petitioner’s vault was finally opened did he declare that the collection was intact inside his
vault. Even then, the actual amount found therein was short by P37,876.98. Conformably
with Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, supra, the failure of the petitioner to have the
patubig collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer was prima
facie evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal use. Although the showing was
merely prima facie, and, therefore, rebuttable, he did not rebut it, considering that he not only
did not account for the collection upon demand but even steadfastly denied having received it
up to the time of the inspection of the sealed vault. Under the circumstances, he was guilty of
the misappropriation of the collection.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa is only
a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode
proved, the same offense of malversation is still committed; hence, a conviction is
proper.[12] All that is necessary for a conviction is sufficient proof that the accused
accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of his
failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal
misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the
inability to produce or any shortage in his accounts.[13] Accordingly, with the evidence
adduced by the State being entirely incompatible with the petitioner’s claim of innocence, we
uphold the CA’s affirmance of the conviction, for, indeed, the proof of his guilt was beyond
reasonable doubt.
The petitioner bewails the deprivation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights during the
investigation. He posits that a custodial investigation was what really transpired, and insists
that the failure to inform him of his Miranda rights rendered the whole investigation null and
void.
We disagree with the petitioner’s position.
According to People v. Marra,[14] custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated
by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial
investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into
a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused on a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions
that tend to elicit incriminating statements. The situation contemplated is more precisely
described as one where –
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which
at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and unfamiliar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it,
out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in
such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence x x x.[15]
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the fact that he was one of those being investigated did not
by itself define the nature of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was
still a general inquiry to ascertain the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its
nature, the inquiry had to involve persons who had direct supervision over the issue,
including the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the representative from different concerned
offices, and even the City Mayor. What was conducted was not an investigation that already
focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the missing city
funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement
office.
Even as we affirm the CA, we have to clarify the penalty imposed in terms of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law states that an indeterminate sentence is imposed
on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.[16] The maximum term
is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code after considering any
attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed.
Conformably with the instructions on the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law in malversation reiterated in Zafra v. People:[17] (a) the penalties provided under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (b) considering that the
penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are not composed of three
periods, the time included in the prescribed penalty should be divided into three equal
portions, each portion forming a period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal
Code.[18] With the amount of P37,876.98 ultimately found and declared by the CA to have
been misappropriated exceeding the P22,000.00 threshold, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua (that is, 17 years, four months and one
day to reclusion perpetua), the minimum period of which is 17 years, four months and one to
18 years and eight months, the medium period of which is 18 years, eight months and one
day to 20 years, and the maximum period is reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of the petitioner is the medium
period in view of the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, while the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the penalty next lower, which is
reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods (i.e., from 12 years and one day to 17
years and four months). Hence, the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner is modified to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In addition, the Court notes that both lower courts did not require the petitioner to pay the
amount of P37,876.98 subject of the malversation. That omission was plain error that we
should now likewise correct as a matter of course, for there is no denying that pursuant to
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. The omission, if unchecked and unrevised, would permanently deprive the City
of Caloocan of the misappropriated amount. Such prejudice to the public coffers should be
avoided.
The Court has justifiably bewailed the omissions by the lower courts in this respect, and has
seen fit to point out in Zafra v. People:
One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their
failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally
misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count
was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the
same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the CA should
have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People, it was
“imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and
determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation
of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery,” explaining the reason for
doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction,
state: “(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages
caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived.” Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at
any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and
obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such
rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and
equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and
set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining
victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless
the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.[19]
Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.[20] Given that his
obligation requires the payment of the amount misappropriated to the City of Caloocan, the
indemnification for damages is through legal interest of 6% per annum on the amount
malversed, reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.[21]
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003 finding
petitioner BERNARDO U. MESINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of
public funds subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) he shall suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and pay a fine of P37,876.98; and
(b) he shall further pay to the City of Caloocan the amount of P37,876.98, plus interest
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision until the
amount is fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO AND
MIGUEL ARAMBULO, JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] dated
5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009, respectively of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 86353 which effectively suspended the criminal proceedings in
Criminal Case No. C-62784, an estafa case against respondents before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City.
Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab,
Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes
(Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc.
(Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties
of the estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.
Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc.
(Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa against Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr.
(Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that Victoria
failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the commercial
apartments was transferred to Anaped.
On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A. Almora recommended the filing of an
Information against respondents. On 1 June 2001, respondents were charged with estafa
committed as follow:
That on [or] about the period from December, 1994 to June, 1997, in the City of Caloocan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, and with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
after having received rentals from IMF International Corporation, in the total amount of
THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT
(P319,888.00) PESOS, under the express obligation of turning over or remitting the same to
ANAPED ESTATE INCORPORATED, once in possession of the said amount and far from
complying with their obligation aforesaid and despite notice [to] that effect, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply, and
convert the said amount to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of
ANAPED ESTATE, INC., in the sum above-aforementioned.[3]
On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a
prejudicial question in view of the pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before the
RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is a petition filed by
Victoria’s brother Oscar for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped,
annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages.[4] SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a
petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo and Domingo questioning the authority
of their elder sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab, as well as the Anaped
Board of Directors and officers, including private complainant Buban to act for and in behalf
of the corporation.[5]
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC
cases in their favor particularly the issues of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are
the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they are duly authorized to make a
demand for remittance would necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.
On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted
the motion for suspension of the proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the issue in the
SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in behalf of the
corporation, has a direct link to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa, thus:
For indeed, if the aforesaid issues are resolved in the [respondent’s] favor, they cannot be
held liable for misappropriation for they possess the authority to collect rentals and hold the
same on behalf of the firm. They would then be justified in not remitting the collections to
the group of Jose Buban who would be then deemed as mere usurpers of authority.[6]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the trial court issued an Order
dated 19 February 2004 setting aside its 28 August 2003 Order and setting the case for pre-
trial. The trial court noted that respondents failed to file an opposition to the motion for
reconsideration.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be allowed to file their
Comment/Opposition to the motion for reconsideration and that the pre-trial be held in
abeyance. Respondents claimed that the Order of the trial court to file comment/opposition
was served on respondents themselves and not on their counsel.
On 23 June 2004, the trial court denied respondents’ Omnibus Motion. The trial court
stressed that even if the order was served upon respondents and not upon their counsel,
records show that a copy of the motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail
upon counsel. Thus, the trial court stated that respondents’ counsel was well aware of the
existence of the motion for reconsideration, thus he could have taken the initiative to file his
comment thereto without waiting for any directive from the court.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals asserting
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied them the opportunity
to file their comment; when it ruled that respondents’ counsel should have filed the comment
as he was furnished a copy of the motion for reconsideration; and when it granted petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
On 5 February 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the respondent Judge dated February 19, 2004 and
July 23, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and she is hereby enjoined from hearing the
Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the termination of the SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. The
August 28, 2003 Order of the respondent Judge is hereby REINSTATED.[7]
Preliminarily, on the procedural question, the Court of Appeals pointed out that respondents
were given the opportunity to present their side in their motion to suspend proceedings. The
appellate court treated respondents’ arguments in said motion as their Comment/Opposition
to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. That is correct.
The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259:
[T]he issue is the legality of the election of Anaped Board of Directors, as well as the
authority of its officers, which include private complainant Jose Buban, to act for and in
behalf of the corporation. Clearly, it involves facts that are intimately related to those upon
which the criminal case is based. The resolution of the issues raised in this intra-corporate
dispute will ultimately determine the guilt or innocence of [respondents] in the crime of
estafa initiated by Jose Buban. It must be remembered that one of the elements of the crime
of estafa with abuse of confidence under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code is a demand made by the offended party to the offender. A valid demand must therefore
be made by an offended party to the offender.[8]
The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then
the validity of Buban’s demand to turn over or remit the rentals is put in question. The
appellate court concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found to be defective, it
is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated 27
February 2009.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the lone ground of whether the Court
of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.
Petitioner argues that any decision of the trial court in the SEC cases with respect to the
question of who are the lawful officers or directors of Anaped is not determinative of the
liability of respondents to remit the rental collections in favor of Anaped. Petitioner proffers
that a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.
Petitioner emphasizes that at the time the demand for remittance of the rental collections was
made against respondents, Buban was an officer of Anaped and until such time that his
authority is validly revoked, all his previous acts are valid and binding. Moreover, petitioner
avers that the duty of respondents to remit the collection still subsists even during the
pendency of the SEC cases as the money remitted goes directly to the corporation and not to
the person who demanded the remittance. Finally, petitioner opines that question pertaining
to the authority of Buban to demand remittance may only be considered as a defense in the
estafa case and not as a ground to suspend the proceedings.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.[9]
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes the elements that
must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the
final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.[10]
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a
prejudicial question to the criminal case for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all
corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and
damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged
free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that an accounting of
corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would
result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding
that a prejudicial question exists. The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the
nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially,
the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation.
On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to whether respondents committed
estafa. Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of
confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the offender.[11]
The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance to the validity or invalidity of
the authority of Anaped directors and officers. In Omictin v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held
that since the alleged offended party is the corporation, the validity of the demand for the
delivery rests upon the authority of the person making such a demand on the company’s
behalf. If the supposed authority of the person making the demand is found to be defective, it
is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. The Court
added that mere failure to return the thing received for administration or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same or deliver the value thereof to the
owner could only give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa.[13]
It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proves misappropriation or conversion by the
accused of the money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa,
demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion.[14] The
phrase, “to misappropriate to one’s own use” has been said to include “not only conversion to
one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right.”[15] In this case, the resolution of the issue of misappropriation by
respondents depends upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC
case that the present Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent
Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the essential
element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this case.
In this connection, we find important the fact, noted by the CA, that:
It appears from the record of the case that Victoria Arambulo for the last twenty (20) years
had been tasked with the management and collection of rentals of the real properties the
Reyes siblings inherited from their parents, Ana and Pedro Reyes.[16]
As earlier mentioned, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by Victoria and her
brothers Domingo and Reynaldo questioning the very authority of their elder siblings
Rodrigo and Emerenciana, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and Officers, including
Buban to act for and in behalf of the corporation. We find this issue consonant with the
provisions of the Corporation Code which provides in Section 23 that:
Sec. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. - Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business
conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors
or trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from
among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year and until their
successors are elected and qualified.
In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa,[17] we said that:
The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that the business and affairs of the
corporation must be governed by a board of directors whose members have stood for
election, and who have actually been elected by the stockholders, on an annual basis. Only in
that way can the directors’ continued accountability to shareholders, and the legitimacy of
their decisions that bind the corporation’s stockholders, be assured. The shareholder vote is
critical to the theory that legitimizes the exercise of power by the directors or officers over
properties that they do not own.
From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-
99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in behalf of Anaped which is
the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the
rentals on the property and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals to
Buban.
Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of
respondents in the criminal case for estafa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009 enjoining the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 121 from hearing Criminal Case No. C-62784 until the termination of
SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BERNABE P. PALANAS
ALIAS "ABE", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Bernabe P. Palanas alias
"Abe" (Palanas) assailing the Decision[2] dated January 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04925, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated October 20,
2010, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
133352-H finding Palanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
An Information[4] was filed before the RTC charging Palanas of the murder of SPO2 Ramon
Borre y Orio (SPO2 Borre), viz.:
On or about March 26, 2006, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused [Palanas], acting in conspiracy with one male person who is at-large,
whose true identity and whereabout[s] are still unknown acted as co-principal in the killing of
one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio, committed as follows: said male person, armed with a gun,
with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
shot one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio on his head and different parts of his body which
directly caused his death, and thereafter, took the firearm of the said victim, boarded a
motorcycle driven by the accused who thereafter, drove the motorcycle away from the scene
of the crime.
Contrary to Law.[5]
The prosecution presents the following version of the facts:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-month-old
grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig
City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3 Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was
watching television when four (4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through
the open door of SPO2 Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers
standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2
Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a
motorcycle.[6]
PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2
Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil
and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor,
Palanas -who shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre
(Resurreccion), who followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of
even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his head and trunk.[7]
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on March 25,
2006 he was in Parafiaque City attending to the needs of his sick father. The next day, he
went to a baptism in Tondo, Manila and stayed there from morning until 9 o'clock in the
evening, after which he returned to his father in Parafiaque City. He maintained that he was
not aware of the death of SPO2 Borre until he was informed by a neighbor that Resurreccion
was accusing him of killing her husband. He also denied any knowledge why Resurreccion
would blame him for SPO2 Borre's death.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[9] dated October 20, 2010, the RTC convicted Palanas of the crime of Murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay the
heirs of SPO2 Borre the amounts of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) P2,464,865.07[10] as actual
damages.[11]
The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas
and his companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through the positive identification
of the eyewitnesses to the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements that Palanas shot him
constituted an ante mortem statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible
as evidence against Palanas. It further opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borre's killing as
he had no inkling that the attack would take place, and that he was in no position to mount
any feasible defense.[12] The RTC, however, did not appreciate evident premeditation
because of the absence of the following elements: (a) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to
allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[13]
On the other hand, the RTC gave no credence to Palanas's defense of alibi. It observed that it
was not physically impossible for Palanas to be at the locus criminis as his own witness even
stated that the distance between Pasig City and Paranaque City could be traversed in less than
one (1) hour.[14]
Dissatisfied, Palanas appealed his conviction to the CA.[15]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[16] dated January 16, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with
modification increasing the amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre to P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The C A found all the elements of the crime of Murder to be present, giving probative weight
to the dying declaration of SPO2 Borre that it was Palanas who shot him. It also found the
presence of treachery as SPO2 Borre was in no position to defend himself when he was
successively shot.[17]
Aggrieved, Palanas filed the instant appeal.[18]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Palanas's conviction for the crime of
Murder should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
No. (RA) 7659,[19] as follows:
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxxx
Treachery is a well-established concept in criminal law. "There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."[20] There are two
(2) conditions therefore that must be met for treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment
of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[21]
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, granting the victim no chance to resist or escape. The attack must be
sudden and unexpected rendering the victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense.[22]
With the foregoing in mind, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that
Pal anas killed SPO2 Borre, and that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
same. The records show that SPO2 Borre was outside carrying his grandson when two (2)
assailants shot him. During the attack, SPO2 Borre had no opportunity to raise any
meaningful defense against his assailants; and consequently, he suffered multiple gunshot
wounds on his head and trunk, causing his death.[23]
The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre's statements on his way to the hospital as
evidence, both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

For a dying declaration[24] to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule,[25] four
(4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness;
and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where
the declarant is the victim.[26] On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of
the res gestae,[27] and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence,
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.[28]
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they
pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the
number and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same
under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent.[29] This declaration is
considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.[30] Verily,
because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and
when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.[31]
In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res
gestae. "Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous
with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration,
or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that
it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony."[32] In this case, SPO2
Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his
companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it
identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre,
perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.[33]
On the other hand, the Court does not find credence in Palanas's defense of alibi. It is
axiomatic that alibi is an inherently weak defense,[34] and may only be considered if the
following circumstances are shown: (a) he was somewhere else when the crime occurred;
and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
alleged crime.[35] In this case, the RTC correctly observed that aside from the admission that
travel from Paranaque City to Pasig City only takes about one (1) hour, the incident occurred
on a Sunday when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas had access to a motorcycle
that allowed him to travel faster on the date and time of the incident.[36] Under the
circumstances, there is the possibility that Palanas could have been present at the locus
criminis at the time of the shooting. Accordingly, his defense of alibi must fall.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon Palanas, Section 3 of RA 9346[37] provides
that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
Pursuant thereto, Palanas should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.[38]
Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the amounts of
damages awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre, as follows: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,[39] all with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until
the same are fully paid.[40]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04925 finding accused-appellant Bernabe P. Palanas alias
"Abe", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, and ordered to pay the heirs of SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P2,464,865.07 as actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015 ]
HERMAN MEDINA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the January 7, 2008 Decision[1] and April 21, 2008 Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29634, which affirmed in toto the March 31,
2005 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela, in
Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner Herman Medina (Medina) of the crime of
simple theft, defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, Paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Information[4] filed against Medina states:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for sometime thereafter, in the City of
Santiago, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away the
following to wit: one (1) unit alternator worth Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00,
battery worth Php2,500.00[,] and two (2) sets of tire 2.75 x 15 with mugs worth
Php10,000.00 all valued at Php22,500.00, owned by HENRY LIM, represented by PURTTA
LIM[,] to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total amount of
Php22,500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW[.]
The factual antecedents appear as follows:
Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered
owner of a Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an
accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27, 2002, he engaged the services
of Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City,
Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina's shop, it was still in running condition
and serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels,
steering wheels and other parts were still functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of
September 4, 2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim's sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to
retrieve the jeep from Medina's shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the
vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its
alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth P5,000.00, P5,000.00, P2,500.00,
and P10,000.00, respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him.that he
took and installed them on Lim's another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being
repaired in the shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get
the jeep, but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop.
Before placing the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully
repaired and put back in good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint[5] for simple theft was filed by Purita,
representing her brother. The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Medina.[6]
Subsequently, an Information was filed before the court a quo.
In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.[7] No settlement, stipulation or admission
was made by the parties during the pre-trial.[8] During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were
presented as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a
former barangay kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense. Eventually,
the case was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the
defense.[9]
The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo
of the March 31, 2005 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, and considering the absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify Henry Lim the
total amount of P22,500.00. No imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina. While the trial court was not
convinced with Medina's justification that he installed the jeep's missing parts to the pick-up
also owned by Lim, the CA opined that his excuse is "so lame and flimsy." The CA agreed
with the lower court's findings that Medina admitted that the jeep is more valuable than the
pick-up; that unlike the pick-up, the needed repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that
Medina failed to prove that the pick-up was completely repaired and was placed in good
running condition; and that he failed to prove that the pick-up is owned by Lim. The CA also
held that the positive testimony of Beltran deserves merit in contrast with the self-serving
testimony of Medina. Finally, no credence was given to Medina's assertion that the missing
auto parts were turned over to Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of Lim.
For the CA, the trial court correctly ruled that such claim was unsubstantiated in view of
Medina's failure to formally offer in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt.
Assuming that the exception in Mato v. CA[11] is taken into account, the receipt could not
still be considered because it was not incorporated in the records of the case.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed this petition which alleges the
following errors:
I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECUTION ONLY PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THEIR
ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. WORST, IT SPECIFICALLY ADVANCED ONLY ONE SINGLE
CIRCUMSTANCE] THAT IS[,] THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
DANILO BELTRAN THAT THE STARTER, [ALTERNATOR], BATTERY[,] AND TWO
(2) PIECES [OF] TIRES WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE KORANDO JEEP
WERE SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,] NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION
RELIED NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE BUT ON THE WEAKNESS OF
THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN
PHILIPPINES VS. ALVARIO.
III.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
[AFFIRMED] THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT
[THAT] THERE WAS NO FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN
THE CRIMINAL SENSE, CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF AT ALL, WAS
WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE. PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ABUNDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. AND THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE
FOR THE DEFENSE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT "2" FOR THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS
EXHIBIT "C" FOR THE PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT FORMALLY
OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ONE
OF THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.[12]
We deny.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter's consent.[13] As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there
was taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done
with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking
was accomplished without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force,
upon things.[14] Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.[15] Although proof as to
motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to
gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property
appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of
the perpetrator.[16] As to the concept of "taking" —
The only requirement for a personal property to be the objeGt of theft under the penal code is
that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined
as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the
penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take"' in the
Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which x x x may be
committed through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device x x
x.[17]
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep's alternator,
starter, battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were
installed in the pick-up owned by Lim.[18] With such admission, the burden of evidence is
shifted on him to prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of
the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged
the burden. Even bearing in mind the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate,
through the presentation of supporting documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the
claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were
exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or
impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare
parts from, the jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina adduce any
justifying[19] or exempting[20] circumstance to avoid criminal liability.
On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep's repair it was
still in running condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went
missing by the time the vehicle was recovered from the auto shop.[21] Likewise, the
testimony of Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that he was not able to get
the jeep in the morning of September 4, 2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two
tires with rims could not be found, and that when he asked Medina as to their whereabouts
the latter told him that he took them, placed the starter in Lim's pick-up while the alternator
was in the repair shop.[22] Medina informed him that the jeep's missing parts were actually
installed to Lim's other vehicle which was also being repaired at the time.[23] However,
Beltran did not know or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina's shop.[24] In
the afternoon of the same day, he was able to get the jeep but not its missing parts.[25] He
concluded that they were lost because he inspected the jeep.[26]
Abundo v. Sandiganbayan,[27] which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said
case, the element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since
the records showed that Abundo made a request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep
chassis among the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum
receipt was issued and signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no
furtive taking or unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk
chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request, with the consent or acquiescence of the
owner, the Government, represented by the public officials who had legal and physical
possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession; therefore,
there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. The
Court agreed with the observation of the Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for
permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the
owner of the property is not felonious.[28]
Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt[29] that he
and Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. According to
his testimony, Mendoza came to his (Medina's) place and saw the subject auto parts while
being transferred from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina even called
barangay officials and let them signed a document to bear witness on the matter.[30] The
document, dated July 25, 2002, which was marked as Exhibit "2," was signed by Mendoza,
Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim's chief mechanic), Mario Pascual (said to be Medina's helper),
and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads). Ostensibly, they signed
the document while facing each#other in front of Medina's house.[31]
In Mato v. CA,[32] which referred to People v. Napat-a,[33] citing People v. Mate,[34] We
relaxed the application of Section 34, Rule 132[35] of the Rules of Court by allowing the
admission of evidence not formally offered. To be admissible, however, two essential
conditions must concur: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.[36]
As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court
because it was not formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense
testimony that was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case records.
For its part, the CA opined that nowhere from the case records does Medina's
acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon examinatipn, it appears that the July 25, 2002
acknowledgment receipt was attached as Annex "3" of Medina's Appellant's Brief.[37]
Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this piece of document, especially so since the
prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the trial proper that said receipt be marked
as Exhibit "C."[38]
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt, the same
would still not exonerate Medina. This is due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and
Bautista did not actually see him remove the alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims
from the jeep and put the same to the pick-up.[39] Likewise, while Medina asserted that
Mendoza came to his place and was shown that the missing auto parts were transferred from
the jeep to the pick-up, the latter was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm such
expedient claim.
As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Medina's
mere denials cannot prevail for being self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is considered
with suspicion and always received with caution because it is inherently weak and unreliable,
easily fabricated and concocted.[40]
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the
fact. Thus, courts - both trial and appellate have generally viewed the defense of denial in
criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude
comes from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its
being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of
consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The
accused cannot solely rely on her negative and self-serving negations, for denial carries no
weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value" than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.[41]
Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution
witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[42]
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual
findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept
that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon Us.[43] It is only in exceptional circumstances,
such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that We will
re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below.[44] As held in Co Kiat v.
Court of Appeals:[45]
It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and authority (Macua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA
29) and that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of
facts being conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737).
In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is
confined to reviewing questions of law, unless the factual findings are totally bereft of
support in the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion (Canete, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 13).
Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher,
appeals to the Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and are
allowed only on questions of law and only when there are special and important reasons,
which we do not find in this case (Balde vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365).[46]
Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court:
Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of simple theft when the value of the
stolen property exceeds P22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the
thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.[47]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that
which, taking into consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the RPC.[48] As the value of the auto parts stolen from Lim is in excess of P22,000.00,
the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309, which
is the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since the penalty
prescribed is composed of only two periods, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division into
three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three
portions. Thus, the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Minimum - 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months
Medium - 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
Maximum - 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 10 years
The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime.[49] In this case, the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense is prisicn correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, or anywhere from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One
(1) day to Six (6) years.
Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced Medina to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six (6) months and Twenty-One (21) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.[50]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 7, 2008 Decision
and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29634, which
affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35,
Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the
crime of simple theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 213383, June 22, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERNIE INCIONG Y
ORENSE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Ernie Inciong y Orense (accused-
appellant) from the Decision[2] dated December 5, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05549 affirming his conviction for the crime of Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The Facts
At around 11:30 in the morning of July 18, 2008, accused-appellant was having a drinking
spree with a certain Bico[3] and Eman in a restaurant or carinderia located at Banay-Banay
II, San Jose, Batangas opposite the building of Metro Batangas Concrete Mix Corporation.[4]
Sometime thereafter, victim Jumar Lumbera (Lumbera) crossed the street going to the
carinderia and, as he reached the other side, he encountered accused-appellant who suddenly
poked him with an iron pipe, which turned out to be a homemade firearm or sumpak. Then,
accused-appellant fired the sumpak, hitting Lumbera in the stomach, causing him to slowly
fall down to the ground. Apparently not satisfied, accused-appellant approached the fallen
Lumbera and hit the latter's head twice with the sumpak. Thereafter, accused-appellant
hastily left.[5]
Unfortunately, while Lumbera was immediately brought to the hospital for medical
treatment, he died as a result of the gunshot wound in his abdomen, as well as traumatic head
injuries.[6]
Prosecution witness Elena Villa de Leon (de Leon) witnessed the incident as she happened to
be near Lumbera while crossing the street headed towards the side of the carinderia. Upon
reaching the side of the road, they met accused-appellant, whom she duly identified in open
court as the person who poked and shot Lumbera with an iron pipe.[7]
Finally, Thelma Mendoza Lumbera, the victim's widow, testified that she spent P11,500.00
for hospital bills, P2,033.00 for the wake, P1,500.00 for the flowers, P28,000.00 for funeral
expenses, and P3,500.00 for autopsy services.[8]
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with Murder in an Information[9] dated
September 8, 2008, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of July, 2008, at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, at
Barangay Banay-Banay 2nd, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Batangas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an
unlicensed firearm (sumpak), with intent to kill, with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and cruelty and without any justifiable cause, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearm one
Jumar Lumbera y Ramos, suddenly and without warning and thereafter hit him twice on his
head, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wound, abdomen and traumatic head injury
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
For his part, accused-appellant admitted having shot Lumbera but claimed self-defense,
explaining that he shot the latter because he lost his mind due to anger, "Nagdilim na po ang
aking paningin at doon ko po ipinutok."[10] He averred that on the date and time in question,
he was at the tricycle terminal near the Metro Batangas Concrete Mix Corporation where
Lumbera worked when the latter suddenly approached, boxed, and threatened to kill him. He
was about to retaliate but someone pacified him. Thereafter, Lumbera went inside his office.
Then, someone shouted that Lumbera was making his way back and when accused-appellant
looked behind him, he saw Lumbera pointing a sumpak at him. They struggled for the
possession of the weapon and it was when accused-appellant finally took hold of it that he
fired at Lumbera. When accused-appellant saw that Lumbera had fallen to the ground, he
immediately left the place and went into hiding until he was finally arrested in Tanay,
Rizal.[11]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[12] dated February 27, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of Pallocan West,
Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC) found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as
to pay the heirs of Lumbera the following amounts: (1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
P44,500.00 as actual damages; (3) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[13]
In convicting accused-appellant, the RTC found that he failed to satisfy the first and most
important element of self-defense, i.e., unlawful aggression. Taking into consideration the
version of the facts as narrated by accused-appellant that it was Lumbera who first boxed him
and subsequently, pointed a sumpak at him and that they grappled for the possession thereof,
the RTC opined that it was not sufficient to establish unlawful aggression. Moreover, the
manner of shooting Lumbera and the injuries on his head showed a determined effort to kill
which, thus, belies self-defense.[14]
Likewise, the RTC held that treachery attended the killing, as Lumbera was not given the
time to flee or to prepare a defense or at the least, offer any resistance against the sudden
attack. Parenthetically, the RTC ruled that even if the attack had been frontally made, it did
not preclude the attendance of treachery, the attack being no less unexpected and sudden.[15]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[16] dated December 5, 2013, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-
appellant upon a finding that he failed to establish the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.[17] The CA held that no unlawful aggression emanated from
Lumbera as in fact, it was accused-appellant who was the aggressor, having shot Lumbera
without any warning. Moreover, when Lumbera had already fallen to the ground, accused-
appellant even hit his head twice. Corollarily, the number, location, and severity of the
wounds inflicted upon Lumbera effectively negated accused-appellant's claim of self-
defense, which, by and large, was also uncorroborated and unsubstantiated.[18]
Neither did the CA give credence to accused-appellant's insistence that the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation was present in the killing of Lumbera. To reiterate,
records show that Lumbera did not do anything that would have reasonably incited accused-
appellant to attack him. Nor could accused-appellant properly claim that he lost his mind due
to anger as would have pushed him to shoot Lumbera.[19]
Finally, the CA upheld the amounts of damages awarded by the RTC.[20]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the CA erred in upholding accused-
appellant's conviction for the crime of Murder.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be able to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[21] An accused who
invokes self-defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements, the most important of
which is unlawful aggression. Being the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense,[22]
unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded,
whether complete or incomplete.[23] No self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression
since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel.[24]
In this case, the requisite unlawful aggression from the victim, Lumbera, is patently absent.
The evidence failed to establish that accused-appellant's life was in danger when he
encountered Lumbera. Instead, and as aptly pointed out by the CA, it was accused-appellant
who was the aggressor, having fired the sumpak at Lumbera when they crossed paths by the
side of the road, and when the latter had fallen to the ground, hit his head twice with the said
weapon. The entire incident was witnessed by de Leon, whose testimony was correctly given
probative weight and value by the RTC and the CA, being a disinterested witness and bereft
of ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant.[25] Accused-appellant, having failed
to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression, the Court therefore affirms the
finding of the RTC and the CA that he did not act in self-defense.
Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[26] In this case, a credible eyewitness account established that accused-appellant,
upon meeting Lumbera by the roadside, suddenly fired a sumpak against the latter, leaving
him unable to defend himself or evade the attack. The assault on Lumbera ensured that
accused-appellant would be able to consummate the crime without risk to his own person,
hence, the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Finally, with regard to the use of an
unlicensed firearm, a circumstance alleged in the information, the Court shall no longer delve
upon its significance in this case, the same not having been appreciated by the courts a quo.
On this score, this Court has stated that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a
conviction, it generally defers to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
especially if such findings are affirmed by the CA. This must be so since the trial courts are
in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed first-hand their deportment and manner of testifying under
grueling examination.[27]
In view of the foregoing, the RTC and the CA correctly sentenced accused-appellant to
reclusion perpetua, However, pursuant to Section 3[28] of Republic Act No. 9346,[29]
accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole.[30]
Also, the Court finds it necessary to modify the amounts of civil indemnity and moral
damages awarded in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.[31] Hence, there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in this case, accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of
Lumbera. Likewise, the total amount of actual damages awarded, as evidenced by the
receipts on record,[32] should be P44,345.50 instead of P44,500.00. Meanwhile, the award of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is affirmed. In addition, the Court imposes, on all
monetary awards for damages, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.[33]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated December 5, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05549 finding accused-appellant Ernie Inciong y
Orense (accused-appellant) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION sentencing accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Jumar
Lumbera the following amounts: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P44,345.50 as actual damages; and (d) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
damages awarded in this case shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 201836, June 22, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALLAN BRITANICO
AND JOJO BRITANICO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Three brothers, namely Allan, Rolly and Jojo, and their father, Francisco, all surnamed
Britanico, were charged with murder for the death of Segundo Toralde y Belmonte
(Segundo). The Information[1] alleged that at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of August 23,
2003, in barangay Libtong, municipality of Libon, province of Albay, all four accused
conspired to kill the victim, and with the use of bladed weapons, with treachery and evident
premeditation, hacked the victim several times hitting him on different parts of his body,
resulting in his instantaneous death. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ligao, Albay, Branch 13 which issued a warrant of arrest[2] against the four accused.
However, only Allan and Rolly were initially apprehended and eventually detained at the
Polangui District Jail in Polangui, Albay. Both were arraigned on. December 10, 2003 where
they entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.[3]
A few days after, or on January 28, 2004, Francisco was apprehended[4] and imprisoned
with his sons, Rolly and Allan, in detention at Polangui District Jail in Albay.[5] As
manifested by the Jail Warden, and based on the evaluation of the Municipal Health Officer,
Francisco was suffering from severe anemia when committed to the jail facility.[6] Thus, the
Jail Warden requested the RTC to allow Francisco to be confined at a hospital. However, the
court a quo did not permit Francisco's confinement in a hospital; instead, he was allowed to
undergo medical examination with a proviso that he be returned to the City Jail after every
consultation.[7] On February 20, 2004, Francisco was arraigned where he entered a plea of
not guilty.[8] On March 11, 2004, Francisco was brought to the Josefina Belmonte Duran
Memorial District Hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.[9] Consequently, the charge
against Francisco was dismissed.[10]
Jojo was the last accused to be apprehended.[11] On October 27, 2004, he was ordered
committed at the Polangui District Jail together with Alan and Rolly.[12] On December 8,
2004, he was arraigned where he entered a plea of not guilty.[13]
In the meantime, Rolly who was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was
released on recognizance to the custody of his mother.[14] Thereafter, and in the course of
the trial, the defense filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Against Minor Accused Rolly
Britanico.[15] Citing Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile: Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
which raised the minimum age of criminal responsibility from nine to 15 years, and
considering that Rolly was only 14 years of age when the crime was committed on August
23, 2003, having been born on October 29, 1988, the defense prayed that the charge against
Rolly be dismissed. Finding merit in the motion, the RTC granted the same in an Order[16]
dated April 16, 2009 and accordingly dismissed the case against Rolly.
Consequently, only Allan and Jojo, hereinafter collectively referred to as appellants,
remained out of the four accused.
On December 7, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment[17] finding appellants guilty as
charged. The court a quo lent credence to the eyewitness account of Rolando Toralde
(Rolando) who narrated that in the afternoon of August 23, 2003, he was on his way to the
house of his uncle, Segundo. However, when he was about to pass by the house of Francisco,
he saw the latter and his sons, Rolly, Allan, and Jojo, hack Segundo with the use of bladed
weapons. Fearing for his life, he hid in the grassy portion for about 10 minutes. Upon seeing
his uncle fall to the ground, Rolando left and immediately informed his cousin, Alma, about
the misfortune that befell her father. When placed on the witness stand, Alma testified that it
was Rolando who informed her about the hacking incident. She claimed that Francisco is her
uncle, being the brother of her mother, while Jojo, Allan and Rolly are her cousins.
Appellants could only offer denial and alibi. Allan claimed that on August 23, 2003, he was
at San Antonio, Iriga City overseeing the fishpond of Flor Epres. For his part, Jojo averred
that at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of August 23, 2003, he went to barangay Amuguis in
Polangui to fetch his wife. Teresita Britanico (Teresita), the mother of appellants, also
testified. She alleged that in the afternoon of August 23, 2003, Segundo passed by their house
and had an argument with her husband, Francisco. The altercation became heated and both
parties exchanged hacking blows. Teresita and her daughter Maricel left in order to seek
help. However, considering that the nearest house is 200 meters away, they decided to return
whereupon they saw Segundo running away and being chased by Francisco. When Francisco
returned, his shirt was stained with blood and in answer to her query, Francisco admitted
having killed Segundo. Fearing retaliation from the family of the deceased, Francisco and
Teresita, together with their children Rolly and Ronald, left their house and proceeded to
Anilao, Libon, Albay.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court did not lend credence to the denial and alibi of appellants in view of their
positive identification by prosecution eyewitness Rolando. Moreover, the trial court noted
that both failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. Besides, the prosecution was able to refute the testimony
of Allan by presenting Emilio Toralde who saw Allan leave the fishpond on August 23,
2003. On the other hand, the trial court found Jojo's alibi to be self-serving and
uncorroborated.
Finding the qualifying circumstance of treachery to have attended the commission of the
crime, the RTC found appellants guilty of the crime of murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ALLAN BRITANICO and JOJO BRITANICO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659.
Accordingly, said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On the civil liability of the accused, judgment is hereby rendered ordering accused Allan
Britanico and Jojo Britanico to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Segundo Toralde, jointly
and severally, the following: (a) the sum of P75,000.00, as civil indemnity; (b) the sum of
P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P16,818.50 as actual damages and (d) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellants appealed to the CA. In their Brief,[19] they claimed that the trial court erred in
lending credence to the narration of Rolando as the same was fraught with inconsistencies
and improbabilities. They contended that it was unnatural for Rolando to simply watch for 10
minutes while his uncle was being hacked to death. They believed that when faced with such
situation, Rolando would naturally shout to distract his uncle's assailants or to seek help.
Moreover, they insisted that Rolando should have immediately reported the incident to the
authorities, and not just to his cousin, Alma. Further, the number of wounds sustained by the
victim did not tally with the number of blows supposedly delivered by the assailants as
testified to by Rolando. For the defense, all these make Rolando's credibility highly suspect.
The CA found the appeal lacking in merit. In its November 17, 2011 Decision,[20] it
affirmed in full the ruling of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
In a July 16, 2012 Resolution,[21] we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. Only the appellants complied; the Office of the Solicitor General opted
not to file its supplemental brief considering that all the issues were already discussed in the
brief it filed before the CA.
In their Supplemental Brief,[22] appellants merely reiterated the arguments they raised
before the CA. They maintain that Rolando's testimony is unreliable and could not be used as
basis for their conviction; that it was unnatural for Rolando to watch for 10 minutes the
hacking of his uncle and not seek for help; that it defies reason why Rolando did not
immediately report the incident to the authorities; and that the number of wounds sustained
by the victim did not match the number of blows supposedly received by the victim.
We dismiss the appeal for utter lack of merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the issues raised by the appellants before this Court
are the same arguments brought on appeal, and already resolved, by the CA. In short, these
are recycled and rehashed arguments. In any case, we find that contrary to appellants'
contention, we find no material inconsistencies or improbabilities in the testimony of
Rolando. We thus affirm both the RTC and the CA in finding Rolando's testimony to be
credible.
It is a settled principle that people react differently when confronted with a startling and
dangerous experience. For example, a person who witnessed a hacking incident may faint,
act with nonchalance, or may hide out of fear for his life; on the other hand, he may also act
with bravery by coming to the aid and succor of the victim, most especially if the latter is a
relative; or, he may act cautiously and seek the help of other people. The list is not all-
encompassing because people do not act similarly to a given situation. Hence, we do not find
it unnatural, as the appellants claim, for Rolando to hide in the grassy area upon witnessing
the hacking of his uncle, Segundo, by the appellants. Rolando also admitted that he got
scared which is also a reasonable and logical reaction to such a startling event.
The failure of Rolando to immediately report the incident to the authorities did not diminish
his credibility. According to Rolando, upon seeing his uncle fall to the ground, he left his
hiding place and proceeded directly to the house of his cousin, Alma, the daughter of the
deceased, and informed her of what happened to her father. Thereafter, he went home as it
was already nighttime. However, appellants assail this reaction on the part of Rolando;
according to them, if Rolando indeed saw the incident, then he should have lost no time in
reporting the same to the authorities. We are not persuaded. Rolando's actuations should not
be measured against the expectations of appellants. It is possible that as far as Rolando is
concerned, he already did his share. And considering that he already divulged the incident to
the family of the deceased, then it was up to them to decide on the next possible course of
action. Surprisingly, appellants did not question the failure of Alma (as well as her mother
and brother) to immediately inform the police authorities about the fate of her father. Records
show that upon being informed about the incident, Alma and her brother proceeded to the
house of the Britanicos to avenge their father. Upon their arrival thereat, nobody was around
but they saw bloodstains in the yard. In fact, they even thought, and hoped, that their father
was able to escape and that he was still alive. Without reporting the incident yet to the police
authorities, they returned home. It was only upon the discovery of the decomposing body of
their father that they decided to disclose the incident to the police.
The credibility of the eyewitness account of Rolando was not diminished just because the
number of wounds sustained by the victim did not match the number of blows delivered to
Segundo as surmised by Rolando. For one, this does not negate the fact that appellants
hacked the victim. In any event, Rolando testified that he did not consciously count the
number of blows delivered by the victim's assailants. He only surmised that the number of
wounds sustained by Segundo is four because he saw Francisco, Rolly, Allan and Jojo each
deliver a hacking blow on the victim. The medico-legal officer found a gaping wound on the
victim's forehead; his neck was slashed and his head almost got detached from his body; and
both his hands were cut when he tried to parry the blows. It is also possible that the victim
sustained other injuries but were no longer detected since his body was already in a state of
decomposition.
In fine, we find that the trial court and the CA properly found appellants guilty of the crime
of murder qualified by treachery. Appellants were thus properly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, they are not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3
of Republic Act No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines.
The RTC and the CA properly awarded the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount
of P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00. However, the award of
exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. The
award of actual damages in the sum of P16,818.50 is deleted and in lieu thereof, temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded. This is pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Villanueva[23] which states that "when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages of
P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount." Finally, all damages
awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment
until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the assailed November 17, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 04267 finding appellants, Allan Britanico and Jojo Britanico, guilty of the
crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellants are not eligible for parole; the award of
actual damages is deleted and, in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 is awarded; the award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and all
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015 ]
GUILLERMO WACOY Y BITOL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 213886]
JAMES QUIBAC Y RAFAEL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated
December 6, 2013 and the Resolution[3] dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol
(Wacoy) and James Quibac y Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide.
The Facts
In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before
the Regional Trial Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick
the stomach of one ELNER ARO y LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic
injuries which directly caused his death thereafter.
That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior
strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the
afternoon of April 11, 2004, he was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis
Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby establishment.
Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already
sprawled on the ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice,
after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As
Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and cry in pain.
Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.[5]
At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury
to the jejunum" and was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a
perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines meet, that caused
intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid
contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while
he was revived through cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the
operation.[6] Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the
doctor's orders and eventually, died the next day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that
the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and
generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an autopsy performed on his remains revealed
that the cause of his death was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic injuries."[7]
In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They
averred that while playing pool, they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became
unruly and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a stone to
throw at Aro but Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a
2x3 piece of wood if not for Quibac's intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then
tripped and fell to the ground. Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion, followed Wacoy
to the waiting shed nearby, cornered and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a fist fight.
Quibac came over to pacify the two and told Wacoy to go home.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[9] dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of
the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered them to pay
Aro's heirs the amounts of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
ex delicto, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.[10]
The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that
Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither
categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to
his death.[11] In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the
prosecution has failed to show the extent and effect of injury [that Wacoy and Quibac]
personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his death x x x," Wacoy and Quibac should be held
criminally liable for the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray and not for
Homicide.[12]
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.[13]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction
to that of Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their prison term to an
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA also
imposed a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the damages awarded by the RTC
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[15]
In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony.
In this relation, it observed that the mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate
against his credibility since there was no proof that his testimony was driven by any ill
motive.[16] However, contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac
should not be convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there
were only (2) persons who inflicted harm on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous
affray involving several persons. Instead, they were convicted of the crime of Homicide, with
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong appreciated as it
was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to maltreat or inflict physical
harm on him.[17]
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration.[18] In a Resolution[19]
dated July 21, 2014, the CA denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration;[20] hence, the
instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and
Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.[21]
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and
Quibac's conviction from Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will
be explained hereunder.
Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the
course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified,
such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon
all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be
several persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and
assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in
the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased;
and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence
can be identified.[22] Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel
occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the
course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.[23]
On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
RPC, which reads:
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed
him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.[24]
In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course
of which Aro died. On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two
(2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked
him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no
confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that
fateful incident.[25] Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted
Aro, the latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray.[26]
Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac's act of mauling Aro was the
proximate cause[27] of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable
therefor, specifically for the crime of Homicide.
On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent
only to inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding
penalty therefor in its maximum period,[28] pursuant to Article 49 of the RPC. The said
provision reads:
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different
from that intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the
offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed.
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the
offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall
be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the
one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts
committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another
crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the
penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in the maximum
period.
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is
different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error
in personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender
result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem),[29] as in this case. It is well-settled that if
the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.[30] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because
with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.[31]
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum
period due to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly
appreciated by the CA. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be
considered that since intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the
accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and external overt acts.[32] In this case,
the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of
evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the stomach, something else
had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm,
and not to end the life of Aro.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of
P50,000.00 each are increased to P75,000.00 each in order to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.[33] All other awards, as well as the imposition of interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment
until the same are fully paid, are retained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the
Resolution dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and
James Quibac y Rafael are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of
the same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the
heirs of Elner Aro the amounts of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and P75,000.00 as moral damages, all with interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 191197, June 22, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RODRIGO LAPORE,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the conviction of accused-appellant RODRIGO LAPORE (Lapore) of rape as
defined in Article 266-A and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed against AAA.[1] The Decision[2] dated 20 March 2007, rendered by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Puerto Princesa City, in Criminal Case No.
15286 was affirmed by the Decision[3] dated 12 October 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 02771.
The Information
That sometime in the month of October, (sic) 1998, at Barangay Berong (sic) Municipality of
Quezon, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused with force, threat, violence and intimidation and with lewd designed,
(sic) did and (sic) then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have (sic) carnal
knowledge with one AAA, a girl of 13 years of age, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.[4]
While a warrant of arrest was issued on 26 January 1999, Lapore remained at large until his
arrest on 11 February 2000. During his arraignment, Lapore pleaded not guilty to the crime.
Trial on the merits then ensued.
The Prosecution Evidence
The victim, AAA, is thirteen (13) years old and illiterate. She lives with her parents in
Barangay Berong, Municipality of Quezon, Palawan. On 1 October 1998, when AAA's
parents went to Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, AAA was left at their house with her older
brother, two (2) younger siblings, and accused-appellant Lapore who was staying at their
house as a guest. Lapore was a pastor in their church.[5]
One evening, AAA's older brother left the house to go fishing while AAA was asleep. Lapore
went inside AAA's room and removed AAA's panty. Lapore then removed his underwear and
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA cried. When she tried to shout, Lapore pointed a
knife at her neck and threatened to kill her.
With his penis still insider her vagina, Lapore made push and pull movements and then
left.[6]
On 20 October 1998, when AAA's parents returned home, AAA reported her ordeal to her
parents. When AAA's parents confronted Lapore, Lapore admitted to the rape and promised
to marry AAA. After the confrontation, Lapore left. Three (3) months passed. Lapore failed
to return. Thus, AAA and her mother reported the incident to the Barangay Chairman and to
the police. AAA was brought to Dr. Josieveline M. Abiog-Damalerio, the Municipal Health
Officer of Quezon, Palawan, for medical examination. On 23 December 1998, AAA filed the
instant criminal complaint for the crime of rape against Lapore.[7]
AAA's mother, BBB, testified and presented AAA's Birth Certificate to prove that AAA was
born on 16 December 1984. The authenticity of the certificate was admitted by the
defense.[8]
Dr. Alma Feliciano-Rivera testified and interpreted the Medical Certificate issued by Dr.
Josieveline M. Abiog-Damalerio. The Medical Certificate revealed that AAA was diagnosed
with healed lacerations, which may have been sustained a week prior to the examination and
that AAA's physical virginity was lost.[9]
The Evidence of the Defense
Lapore first knew AAA in April 1999 when he began helping AAA's family by doing
apostolic work for them for six (6) months. In the evening of one Sunday, while the mother,
BBB, was having a drink with the locals, AAA approached Lapore. They talked for several
hours. After the conversation, AAA offered herself to Lapore in marriage but he advised
AAA to instead pray. Since then, AAA offered herself to Lapore for marriage for two (2)
more occasions.

On the first two attempts, Lapore pitied AAA. However, on her third attempt, Lapore finally
accepted AAA's proposal but told her that they had to wait until AAA gives birth as she was
four (4) months pregnant then.[10]
Lapore spoke to AAA's parents regarding their plan to marry, but the marriage did not pursue
because AAA filed a criminal case accusing Lapore of rape. According to Lapore, the
criminal complaint was a personal vendetta because he reprimanded AAA's mother, BBB,
for having vices, such as drinking and selling alcohol. Because of their anger, they told
Lapore to leave and never to return. Also, Lapore insinuated that it was AAA's boyfriend, in
the person of a certain Julio Flores, who impregnated AAA. Lapore averred that AAA was
already pregnant when he saw her, and because he pitied her, he agreed to marry her only
after she has given birth.[11]
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found Lapore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The
pertinent portion of the dispositive of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
RODRIGO LAPORE @ "DIGING" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape,
as defined and penalized under Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 8353. In view of the presence of the special aggravating circumstance of
the use of a deadly weapon and the generic aggravating circumstance of the abuse of
confidence or obvious ungratefulness, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs. He is likewise ordered to pay the victim
AAA the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity and
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.[12]
As defense, Lapore alleged that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as the
perpetrator of the crime. According to Lapore, AAA was inconsistent in identifying the
accused:
Q:
You did not see his face?
A:
No, Sir.
Q:
When he started to rape you, how did you notice that it was Lapore?
A:
Because I lighted a lamp.
Q:
While you were being raped?
A:
There is a light coming from his room.
Q:
But the room of Lapore is separated by a wall from your room, is it not?
A:
Our rooms are beside each other.
Q:
So it means that you did not light a lamp?
A:
I did not, Sir.[13] (Emphases supplied)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Contrary to the defense's allegation, the Court of Appeals resolved that AAA positively
identified Lapore as the man who perpetrated the crime because AAA's account of the
incident was clearly expressed in a straightforward manner. The inconsistency in AAA's
testimony is minor and inconsequential in nature. As resolved by the Court of Appeals,
"[w]hat is controlling is that AAA remained intractable and consistent in identifying the
accused as the person who raped her."
Furthermore, AAA's testimony is corroborated by a medical examination which revealed that
AAA had healed lacerations and that her physical virginity was lost. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated that "hymenal laceration is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence of
forcible defloration."[14] Further, the medical certificate belied Lapore's allegation that AAA
was five (5) months pregnant with AAA's boyfriend.[15]
With regard to the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by
the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse
of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon cannot be
appreciated to qualify the crime from simple rape to qualified rape. According to the Court of
Appeals, "to justify the imposition of death penalty, the two qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship must concur as provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code and must be alleged in the information and duly proven during the trial by the quantum
of proof required for conviction".[16] Thus, there being no modifying circumstances to be
appreciated, the Court of Appeals ruled that the crime committed is only simple rape,
punishable by reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the RTC Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused is
further ordered to pay P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Our Ruling
We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
The inconsistencies in AAA's testimony are minor. These inconsistencies add to the veracity
of her already truthful account of her ordeal in the hands of Lapore. Besides, Lapore's
conviction is not based solely on AAA's positive identification of Lapore as the perpetrator
of the crime. Her testimony was corroborated by the medical examination and testimony of
witnesses, Dr. Feliciano Rivera, the medico-legal expert, who interpreted the medical
certificate, and BBB, AAA's mother, who testified that AAA was mentally retarded and
narrated the incident that occurred when they went home from Puerto Princesa City to
Quezon, Palawan. The prosecution has gone beyond the principle, where, the sole testimony
of a witness, if found credible, would suffice to sustain a conviction.[18]
With regard to the presence of abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, minority, and
use of a deadly weapon, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Although the
prosecution has duly proved the presence of abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness,
minority, and use of a deadly weapon, they may not be appreciated to qualify the crime from
simple rape to qualified rape.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that for qualifying
and aggravating circumstances to be appreciated, it must be alleged in the complaint or
information.[19] This is in line with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[20] Even if the prosecution has duly
proven the presence of the circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they were
not alleged in the Information. Hence, although the prosecution has duly established the
presence of the aforesaid circumstances, which, however, were not alleged in the
Information, this Court cannot appreciate the same. Notably, these circumstances are not
among those which qualify a crime from simple rape to qualified rape as defined under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Thus even if duly alleged and proven,
the crime would still be simple rape.
Therefore, as all the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for simple rape are present:
(1) that Lapore had carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) that said act was accomplished
through the use of force or intimidation,[21] we find Lapore guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of simple rape.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 October 2009 in CA-G.R. CR
H.C. No. 02771, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo Lapore alias 'Diging'" finding
accused-appellant Rodrigo Lapore GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
as defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to the civil
damages.
1. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity;
2. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and
3. Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is likewise imposed on all the damages
awarded in this case from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALVIN ESUGON Y
AVILA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's
competency as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the conviction of the appellant for the composite crime of
robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in
Mandaluyong City through its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006.[2]
Antecedents
The information charged the appellant with robbery with homicide, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to
P13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter; that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon
said JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries
which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The CA adopted the RTC's summation of the evidence of the Prosecution, to wit:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he,
his younger sister Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of
their house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother
with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through a chair. Although there was no light at the
ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the
appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother's lower chest. His father then brought her
to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their
house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant
took money from his father's pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the
perpetrator because there was no light (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-23, 28, 30-32).
Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his
mother was stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor,
which illumined the ground floor through the stairway (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 33-34).
Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the victim's death was
hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound. The wound was located at the epigastric region,
measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm. 4 cm from left of the anterior midline, 13 cm deep, directed posterior
and upward, piercing the right ventricle of the heart, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left
lung (TSN, April 21, 2004, pp. 1, 6; Exh. "I," Records, p. 103).
Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he and the victim were
married for nine years before the incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years
old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m.
on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby,
while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m.,
his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty
minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e turned on the light and saw that
their door was open. He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he
returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood on her
back. He shouted for help and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital
where she eventually died. He spent P23,000.00 for the funeral and P44,500.00 for the wake
and burial. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who
stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw
the appellant (TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 3-12; October 6, 2004, pp. 5-6; November 17,
2004, pp. 3-4).
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs
when they were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis' cry
for help. She saw that there was blood on the victim's chest. After the victim was brought to
the hospital, she noticed that the victim's children were trembling in fear and were crying.
They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front of their house. She took Carl and had
him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone but
she did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the police asked
Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated how
his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was present in
the vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said "siya po yung pumas ok sa bahay namin."
As a resident there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the
television at the house of the victim (TSN, February 9, 2005, pp. 3-14).
PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident,
he went to the hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later,
Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and
robbed them of their money. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station (TSN,
March 16, 2005, pp. 2, 5-6).
PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning people in the area, Carl
pointed to them the suspect who was one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions
when he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their house and stabbed his
mother. They invited the appellant to the police station but the latter denied having
committed the crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their basis in arresting
appellant was the information relayed by Carl (TSN, April 27, 2005, pp. 2, 12-17; June 15,
2005, p. 5).[4]
In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him, he had frequented the victim's
billiard hall, which was situated only four houses away from where he lived, and, on the
evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard hall at 11 o'clock p.m. and had
then gone home. He recalled that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help
around two o'clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for the key to the door; that he had
then gone outside where he learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had later
on approached him to inquire what he knew about the killing because they told him that Carl,
the young son of the victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the primary
suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to do with the crime; and that he had
assured the police officers that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his years of
living in the neighborhood.
The appellant's mother corroborated his version.[5]
Judgment of the RTC
As mentioned, the RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the crime charged under its
judgment rendered on January 27, 2006,[6] disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA @
"NONOY" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE under Article 293 and punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the court hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA as follows:
1) P50,000.00 civil indemnity;
2) P57,500.00 as actual damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of
Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his
imagination.[8]
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the child witness, and opining that his
inconsistencies did not discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the appellant,[9]
ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 27,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in Crim. Case No.
MC03-7597, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the award of
P57.500.00 as actual damages should be DELETED and in lieu thereof, temperate damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 should be AWARDED the heirs of Josephine Castro y Barrera.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Issues
In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony of the 5-year old Carl, being
filled with inconsistencies, was not credible, but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who
were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused from sleep; that contrary to Carl's
recollection, the place was not even dark when the stabbing attack on the victim occurred
because his father said that he had turned the light on upon hearing somebody shouting
"Magnanakaw!;" and that his father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.[11]
Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution did not prove that violence or
intimidation was employed in the course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held
liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that the culprit had neither broken
any wall, roof, floor, door or window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house through
an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he could be liable only for the separate crimes
of theft and homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with homicide.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence showed that the
appellant's principal intent had been to rob the victim's house, with the homicide being
perpetrated as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl positively identified the appellant
as the person who had stabbed the victim, his identification bearing "all the earmarks of
credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about the identity of the accused."[13]
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The most important task of the State in the successful prosecution of the accused is his
credible and competent identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this appeal turns
on whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with
homicide was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-
year old lad, whose sole testimony positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the
person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and
events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may
and may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (18a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to
qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as
listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is
apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.[14]
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness
with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased.
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December
2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when substantial
doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court,
motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.[15]
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court.[16] All
questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by
virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses' deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of
actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and findings of
fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify
the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the former's findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court has concurred with the trial court.[17]
The appellant did not object to Carl's competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of
perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic
qualifications of a competent witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct examination
of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that
the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the
Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to
communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by Carl. That is apparently not
disputed. However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his
testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the elements of the composite crime
charged but related only to minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not negate the positive
identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help
upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his mother to death did not destroy his
credibility. For sure, he could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like an
adult. Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of
perception, the determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to communicate
their perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual
issue and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or
misappreciation on the part of the trial court.[18]
It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens the record of the trial bare and
open. Even so, the finding of facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect
especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.[19] This great respect for such findings rests
mainly on the trial court's direct and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its
presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during
intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting
and prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC and the CA sharing the
conviction on Carl's credibility, his capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his
perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion. Moreover, according credence
to Carl's testimony despite his tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v.
Mendiola,[20] the Court considered a 6-year-old victim competent, and regarded her
testimony against the accused credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals,[21] the testimony of the
three-year-old victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl's testimony was entitled to full
probative weight.
Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the investigation and during the
trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not have been mistaken about his identification of
him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a daily presence in the billiard
room maintained by the child's family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly
showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and stabbed the victim.
The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that to sustain
a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as conclusively as
the other essential element of the crime; and that it was not established that the taking of
personal property was achieved by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or
by using force upon things.
The contention lacks persuasion.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the Prosecution must prove the
concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging
to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and (4) the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery.[22] A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is
the main objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.[23]
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed weapon. The fact that the
appellant was armed with the long-bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a deadly weapon,
competently proved the presence of violence or intimidation against persons that qualified
the offense as robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant was
originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being committed only in the course or on the
occasion of the perpetration of the robbery. As the records show, Dennis was awakened by
someone shouting "Magnanakaw!" The shout was most probably made by the victim, whom
the appellant then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that the original
criminal design to rob had been consummated with the taking of the money amounting to
P13,000.00, the killing of the victim under the circumstances rendered the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special complex crime. It is
composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique
offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.[24] A composite crime is truly distinct and
different from a complex or compound crime. In a composite crime, the composition of the
offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the
offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being
the necessary means to commit the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified
combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that
corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light
felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be made the
subject of a separate information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are not appreciated to raise the
penalty to be imposed because the information did not specifically allege them. But they
should be appreciated in order to justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence.[25] Under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at least one
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The aggravating
circumstance for this purpose need not be specifically alleged in the information, and can be
either a qualifying or attendant circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:[26]
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense
has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon
the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award
of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[27]
In line with current jurisprudence,[28] we increase the civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and the
moral damages to P75,000.00.

In addition to the damages awarded by the CA, the appellant should be liable to pay the heirs
of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for
damages from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010 subject to
the MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to
the heirs of the late Josephine Castro y Barrera civil indemnity of P75,000.00; moral
damages of P75,000.00; exemplary damages of P30,000.00; temperate damages of
P25,000.00; and interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all monetary awards for
damages reckoned from the date of the finality of this decision until the awards are fully
paid, plus the costs of suit.
The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 204095, June 15, 2015 ]
DR. JAIME T. CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. FELICISIMO V. AGAS, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 22,
2012 Decision[1] and October 18, 2012 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. SP No. 111910, which affirmed the March 2, 2007[3] and September 23, 2009[4]
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The said resolutions let stand the February 16, 2004
Resolution of the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City, dismissing the complaint of
petitioner Dr. Jaime T. Cruz (Dr. Cruz) for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence and Medical Malpractice against respondent, Dr. Felicisimo V. Agas, Jr. (Dr.
Agas).
The Antecedents
In his Complaint-Affidavit[5] for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and
Medical Malpractice against Dr. Agas, Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that sometime in
May 2003, he engaged the services of St. Luke's Medical Center (SLMC) for a medical
check-up; that after being admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003, he underwent stool, urine,
blood, and other body fluid tests conducted by the employees and doctors of the said
hospital; that on May 29, 2003, he was sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a
scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because the specialist assigned to perform the
procedure was nowhere to be found, he gave the colonoscopy results to the attending female
anesthesiologist for the information and consideration of the assigned specialist; that,
thereafter, he was sedated and the endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he
regained consciousness, he felt that something went wrong during the procedure because he
felt dizzy, had cold clammy perspiration and experienced breathing difficulty; that he could
not stand or sit upright because he felt so exhausted and so much pain in his abdomen; that
when he was about to urinate in the comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the
specialist who performed the colonoscopy but he was nowhere to be found; and that his
cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario, was able to observe his critical condition and
immediately referred him to the surgical department which suspected that he had hemorrhage
in his abdomen and advised him to undergo an emergency surgical operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon waking up at the ICU on
May 30, 2003, he found out that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy because of the
internal bleeding; that he learned that the doctors cut a portion of the left side of his colon
measuring 6-8 inches because it had a partial tear of the colonic wall which caused the
internal bleeding; that despite the painkillers, he was under tremendous pain in the incision
area during his recovery period in the ICU and had fever; and that he had intravenous tubes
attached to his arms, subclavian artery on the left part of his chest and a nasogastric tube
through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who performed the colonoscopy
procedure but the latter insisted that nothing went wrong. On June 7, 2003, he was
discharged from SLMC. Nevertheless, he complained that he had a hard time digesting his
food; that he was frequently fed every two hours because he easily got full; that he had fresh
blood stools every time he moved his bowel; that he had lost his appetite and had gastric
acidity; that he slept most of the day; and that he was in good physical condition before the
colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was still
weak, tired and in pain.
Defense of Dr. Agas
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove the basic elements of
reckless imprudence or negligence. He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear that he
did not know that he would perform the procedure. He explained that before the start of the
colonoscopy procedure, he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and review his medical history
which was taken earlier by a fellow gastrointestinal physician. He claimed that the
gastroscopy and colonoscopy procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were completely successful
considering that the latter did not manifest any significant adverse reaction or body resistance
during the procedures and that his vital signs were normal throughout the procedure.[6]
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements were submitted by the Assistant
Medical Director for Professional Services, the Director of the Institute of Digestive
Diseases, the anesthesiologist, and the hospital nurse attesting to the fact that the
intraperitonial bleeding which developed after the colonoscopy procedure, was immediately
recognized, evaluated, carefully managed, and corrected; that he provided an adequate and
reasonable standard of care to Dr. Cruz; that the endoscopist followed all precautionary
measures; that the colonoscopy procedure was done properly; that he was not negligent or
reckless in conducting the colonoscopy procedure; that he did not deviate from any standard
medical norm, practice or procedure; and that he exercised competence and diligence in
rendering medical services to Dr. Cruz.[7]
Antecedents at the Prosecution Level
On February 16, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued a resolution dismissing
the complaint for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical
Malpractice. Aggrieved, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) but the same was dismissed in its March 2, 2007 Resolution. Dr. Cruz filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied by the DOJ in its September 23, 2009 Resolution.[8]
At the Court of Appeals
Not satisfied, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the
unfavorable DOJ resolutions. On May 22, 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the
said DOJ resolutions. The CA explained that, as a matter of sound judicial policy, courts
would not interfere with the public prosecutor's wide discretion of determining probable
cause in a preliminary investigation unless such executive determination was tainted with
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. It stated that the public prosecutor's finding of
lack of probable cause against Dr. Agas was in accordance with law and that his alleged
negligence was not adequately established by Dr. Cruz.
The CA also declared that Dr. Cruz failed to state in his Complaint-Affidavit the specific
procedures that Dr. Agas failed to do which a reasonable prudent doctor would have done, or
specific norms he failed to observe which a reasonably prudent doctor would have complied
with. The CA pointed out that Dr. Agas was able to satisfactorily explain in his Counter-
Affidavit that the complications suffered by Dr. Cruz was not caused by his negligence or
was the result of medical malpractice. Dr. Agas explained as follows:
That the complication was due to the abnormal condition and configuration of the digestive
system, colon in particular, of the complainant and not from any negligent act in connection
with the conduct of colonoscopy. The surgical findings (xxx) revealed marked adhesions in
the sigmoid colon which is not and never within my control. That the tear in the serosa (the
outermost layer of the colonic wall which has 4 layers) happened likely because of the
marked interloop adhesions and tortuousity of the sigmoid segment of the colon. These
adhesions that connect the serosa to the peritoneal lining of each loop detached from the
serosa during the procedure. It is not possible to detect the presence of marked adhesions
prior to the endoscopic procedure because no clinical findings, laboratory tests or diagnostic
imaging such as x-ray, ultrasound or computed tomography (CT scan) of the abdomen can
diagnose these conditions. This can only be detected by surgically opening up the abdomen.
Moreover, marked adhesions and serosal tear, in particular, cannot likewise be detected by
colonoscopy because they are in the outer wall of the colon and only the inner lining of the
colon is within the view of the colonoscope (camera).[9]
The CA further wrote that the counter-affidavit of Dr. Agas was supported by the sworn
affidavit of Dr. Jennifel S. Bustos, an anesthesiologist at the SLMC and the affidavit of
Evelyn E. Daulat, a nurse at SLMC, both swearing under oath that Dr. Agas was not
negligent in conducting a gastroscopy and colonoscopy procedure on Dr. Cruz and the
certification issued by the Hospital Ethics Committee which stated that Dr. Cruz was given
an adequate and reasonable standard of care; that Dr. Agas followed all precautionary
measures in safeguarding Dr. Cruz from any possible complications; and that the
colonoscopy was done properly.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA WAS CORRECT IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE DOJ THAT NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR FILING AN INFORMATION
AGAINST THE RESPONDENT, THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
AND THAT THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
Non-interference with Executive Determination of Probable Cause in Preliminary
Investigations
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to directly decide on matters
over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the
Government, or to substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive Branch,
represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will
not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an
Information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Medical Negligence and Malpractice Not Established
In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in
finding that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas
for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the doctor,
like in this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have
done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and
such failure or action caused injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and
that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach,
injury and proximate causation.[10]
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas.
Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the
serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr. Agas's negligent and
reckless conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and
explain that particular negligent or reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated
differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on
the part of Dr. Agas.
Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine
Not Applicable Against Respondent
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference
or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.[11]
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence
of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of
the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not
have happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the
absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is
the control and management of the thing which caused the injury.[12]
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that his purported negligence in performing the
colonoscopy on Dr. Cruz was not immediately apparent to a layman to justify the application
of res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding sustained by Dr. Cruz was due to the
abnormal condition and configuration of his sigmoid colon which was beyond his control
considering that the said condition could not be detected before a colonoscopic procedure.
Dr. Agas adequately explained that no clinical findings, laboratory tests, or diagnostic
imaging, such as x-rays, ultrasound or computed tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen,
could have detected this condition prior to an endoscopic procedure. Specifically, Dr. Agas
wrote:
On the other hand, in the present case, the correlation between petitioner's injury, i.e., tear in
the serosa of sigmoid colon, and the colonoscopy conducted by respondent to the petitioner
clearly requires the presentation of an expert opinion considering that no perforation of the
sigmoid colon was ever noted during the laparotomy. It cannot be overemphasized that the
colonoscope inserted by the respondent only passed through the inside of petitioner's sigmoid
colon while the damaged tissue, i.e., serosa, which caused the bleeding, is located in the
outermost layer of the colon. It is therefore impossible for the colonoscope to touch, scratch,
or even tear the serosa since the said membrane is beyond reach of the colonoscope in the
absence of perforation on the colon.[13]
Dr. Cruz failed to rebut this.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.