Labor law; Workmen's compensation and employer's liability

Question: Employee A, a seafarer, met an accident during a general lifeboat drill when a crank
handle hit and injured his left elbow and lower back. As a result, A was repatriated on August
15, 2014 and referred to a company-designated physician for further treatment and therapy. The
company-designated physician, in a Medical Report dated March 3, 2015, assessed petitioner an
interim disability grading of "Grade 11 pursuant to the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Unsure of his true condition as he
was not restored to his pre-injury health status despite surgery and physiotherapy, A consulted an
independent physician who, in a Medical Report dated April 13, 2015, declared him unfit in any
capacity for further sea duties. On the other hand, the company-designated physician, in a
Medical Report dated April 14, 2015 pointed out that A's condition was only temporary.
Claiming that his injury impaired his work-efficiency and rendered him incapable of resuming
work for more than 240 days from the time he was repatriated A filed a complaint for total and
permanent disability benefits Is A entitled to permanent total disability benefits?
Answer: Yes. When a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness in the course of
employment, the employer is obligated to refer the latter to a company-designated
physician who, in turn, has the responsibility to arrive at a definite assessment of the
former's fitness or degree of disability within a period of 120 days from repatriation. Failure of
the company-designated physician to comply with his or her duty to issue a definite assessment
of the seafarer's fitness or unfitness to resume work within the prescribed period shall transform
the latter's temporary total disability into one of total and permanent by operation of
law. However, if the 120-day period is exceeded and no definitive declaration is made because
the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within
this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. Since the last Medical
Report dated April 14, 2015 issued by the company-designated physician was beyond the 240-
day period within which to make a final assessment of petitioner's fitness or disability, the latter's
condition was conclusively presumed by law to be permanent and total. (G.R. No. 238842,
Pastor v. Bibby Shipping Philippines, November 19, 2018)
Labor Law; Contract of adhesion
Question: Employee A maintains in his complaint for illegal dismissal that the retainership
agreements offered to him which contains the employer’s signature that said signature signified
the validity of the subject agreements. Can A use the retainership agreement as evidence against
the employer company.
Answer: No. It bears emphasis that in contracts of adhesion, "[o]ne party prepares the stipulation
in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his 'adhesion' thereto.
Besides, "[t]he one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres,
he gives his consent." In this case, however, it cannot be denied that in the retainership
agreements provided, his signature or "adherence" is notably absent. As a result, said retainership
agreements remain ineffectual and cannot be used as evidence against respondents. (G.R. No.
227098, Apelano v. Deboneville, November 14, 2018)
Labor law; Execution pending appeal
Question: Does the law authorized execution of decisions reinstating dismissed employees in
labor cases pending appeal
Answer: In Aris (Phil.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[41] this Court explained
the reasons for authorizing execution of decisions reinstating dismissed employees in labor cases
pending appeal:

Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6716, Article 223 of the Labor Code already
allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment.

In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor
Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a
compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the workingman. (G.R. No. 229579, Pacios v. Tahanang Walang
Hagdanan et.al, November 14, 2018)

Legal Ethics; Conflict of interest

Question: Attorney A filed a formal entry of appearance stating that he was acting as
collaborating counsel for one of the defendants in a case (Malino). More than a month later, he
filed with the purportedly executed by Gabriel appointing him as her attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiff in the said case. Complainant filed the instant complaint accusing A of representing
conflicting interests by appearing as collaborating counsel for Malino, and thereafter, acting as
attorney-in-fact for Gabriel. Should A be administratively sanctioned for the acts complained of?
Answer: Yes. An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty
of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client. (A.C. No. 9422, Legaspi v. Fajardo, November 19, 2018)
Legal Ethics; Counsel’s authority to act for his client
Question: Should a client be bound by his previous counsel's gross mistake in invoking self-
defense as the latter did not explain the nature and concept of such defense to him.
Answer: It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and
mistakes in handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. An exception to this rule is consistently
enunciated in a number of cases, and that is when the negligence of counsel had been so
egregious that it prejudiced his client's interest and denied him his day in court. (GR. No.
234217, Yap v. People, November 14, 2018)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Voluntary Appearance

Question: People's General Insurance Corporation filed a Complaint for a sum of money and
damages against Guansing and Lizaso. The sheriff served the summons on Guansing's brother,
Reynaldo Guansing and did not explain why summons was served on his brother instead of
Guansing. Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He alleged that he did not personally receive the summons. The Regional Trial Court
denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Guansing filed a one (1)-page Answer containing
a general denial of the material allegations and causes of action in People's General Insurance
Corporation's Complaint. He also reiterated that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction
over his person. Did the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Guansing?
Answer: Yes. By filing his answer and other pleadings, respondent Guansing is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Generally, defendants voluntarily
submit to the court's jurisdiction when they participate in the proceedings despite improper
service of summons. In Navale et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.:
Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filing of an answer to the
complaint. A defendant [cannot] be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court by
objecting to the court's jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and acceding
to jurisdiction over its person if and when the judgment sustains its defense.
Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, is equivalent
to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person. (G.R. No. 204759, People's General Insurance Corporation v. Guansing, November
14, 2018)
Remedial Law; Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Question: Does the lack of personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings upon the
mortgagor renders the same null and void.
Answer: No. As a general rule, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extra-judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgages only requires the 1) posting of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in
three public places; and 2) publication of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation.
Nevertheless, jurisprudence is replete with Our pronouncement that despite the above provisions
of the law, the parties to a mortgage contract are not precluded from imposing additional
stipulations.[16] This includes the requirement of personal notification to the mortgagor of any
action relative to the mortgage contract, such as the institution of an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding.[17]
Thus, the exception to the rule is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally
required to be given the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders
the foreclosure proceedings null and void. (G.R. No. 207976, Planters Development Bank v.
Lubiya Agro Industrial Corporation, November 14, 2018)

Remedial Law; Due Process

Question: A complaint was filed by PSP Development Corporation. According to complainant,

Pasco engaged the legal services of respondent to file a case. It claimed that respondent accepted
the engagement and billed it P65,000.00 as professional fees. It insisted that, despite such payment
and its repeated follow-ups, respondent failed and refused to file the necessary case in court to the
prejudice of complainant. In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five (5) years. The
Investigating Commissioner declared that, despite notice, respondent failed to file his answer to
the Complaint. The Investigating Commissioner further stressed that the notice (to file answer)
sent to respondent was returned with the notation "moved with no forwarding address." She added
that complainant never inquired about the status of the case. Did the respondent committed
misconduct and for which reason, he must be suspended from the practice of law.

Answer: No. In such instance when a party is declared in default, he or she waives only one's right
to be heard and to present evidence and no other. To ensure due process, it remains important that,
even if a party is in default, any judgment must be anchored on established facts and applicable
law. Note that in this case respondent failed to file his answer. There being no other pleading
submitted, the recommendation to suspend respondent was solely pursuant to the Complaint.
However, on the basis alone of the allegations in the Complaint, we find that complainant failed
to convince us, much more discharge the necessary burden to prove by substantial evidence that
respondent committed the accusations against him. Keeping in mind the above-discussed
requirement of due process as well as the fact that the power to disbar (including the power to
suspend) must be exercised with great caution,[11] we hold that there is no sufficient basis for a
disciplinary action against respondent. (A.C. No. 12220 (formerly CBD Case No. 07-1970), PSP
Development Corporation v. Arma, November 13, 2018)

Remedial Law; Certification and Verification of Non-forum shopping

Question: Can a complaint be dismissed on the sole basis of mere technicality that the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not supported with the Special Power
of Attorney
Answer: Yes. For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the
jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum
shopping:
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons".
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by
his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign,
he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification against forum shopping
must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or the
principal knows better than anyone, whether a petition has previously been filed involving the
same case or substantially the same issues.[26] If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign
the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. (G.R. No. 222737,
Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cebrero et. Al, November 12, 2018)
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Modes of Appeal
Question: Does the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing outright an appeal from
the judgment of RTC raising only questions of law
Answer: Yes. Corollary, under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal under Rule 41
taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, as issues purely of
law are not reviewable by the said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
petition for review from the appellate judgment of an RTC shall be dismissed.

The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory language, in establishing the rule
that an appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to the CA shall not be transferred
to the appropriate court, but shall be dismissed outright. (G.R. No. 196058, Pfleider v. CA,
November 12, 2018)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure

Question: Agustin and his wife Florence Apilis-Javellana filed a Complaint against Lavaje for
unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court. Agustin also claimed that there is still an unpaid
balance as rentals for the use and occupancy of the leased property. Consequently, albeit the
pendency of the unlawful detainer cases, Agustin and his wife also filed a Complaint for
collection of sum of money representing the deficiency in rentals paid . Di Agustin committed a
violation of the rules on forum shopping, on splitting of a single cause of action, and on litis
pendentia when he filed the complaint for collection of sum of money during the pendency of the
unlawful detainer cases?
Answer: No. In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur, to reiterate: "(a)
[there is] identity of parties, or at least, such parties who represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) [there is] identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) [that] the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case."
In the instant case, a perusal of the records shows that the second and third requirements are
lacking. While the complaints appear to involve the the same parties and properties, we find,
however, no identity of causes of action. In the unlawful detainer cases filed by Agustin, in view
of Lajave's failure to vacate the subject properties and non-payment of rentals, his cause of action
stemmed from the prejudice he suffered due to the loss of possession of his properties and the
damages incurred after the dispossession. Meanwhile, in the complaint for collection of sum of
money, the same was founded upon alleged violation of Lajave, as lessee, of certain stipulations
with regard to payment of the lease, i.e., whether' Lajave correctly paid the rental fees for the
subject period as stipulated in the lease agreement. (G.R. No. 223785, Lajave Agricultural
Management and Development Enterprises, Inc., v. Spouses JavellanaNovember 07, 2018)

Criminal Law; Drug cases

Question: Does the failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
results in their failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Answer: Yes. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. In all drugs cases,
therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows
such operation.
In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several glaring procedural lapses in the conduct
of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which thus create reasonable
doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and consequently, reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused. (G.R. No. 225786, People v. Rivera, November 14, 2018)
Criminal law; Drug cases; Chain of custody procedure
Question: Can the deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by the representatives from the DOJ and the media result to the
conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value.
Answer: Yes. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an
acquittal.
To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able
to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime. The law further requires that the said inventory
and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses. (G.R. No. 238617,
People v. Carvajal, November 14, 2018)
Criminal law; Chain custody rule; Three-witness rule
Question: Can the accused be acquitted based on reasonable doubt due to the prosecution's
failure to comply with the requirements of the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA
9165
Answer: Yes. Section 21 of RA 9165 states that:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In People v. Ocampo, this Court ruled that the presence of the three witnesses is required to
guarantee against the unlawful planting of evidence and of frame-up. The three witnesses are
necessary to remove any taint of irregularity or illegitimacy in the conduct of the apprehension of
the accused in the buy-bust operation. (G.R. No. 227873, People v. Pascua, November 14, 2018)
Criminal Law; Legal Disqualification
Question: Does legal disqualification under Article 244 of the RPC includes temporary
disqualification such as the one-year prohibition provided under Section 6, Article IX-B of the
Constitution and Section 94(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
Answer: Yes. Legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means
disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibit losing candidates within one year
after such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. Legal disqualification cannot be read as
excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under
Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94 (b) of the Local Government Code
of 1991.(G.R. No. 219352, Anacta v. Sandiganbayan, November 14, 2018)

Taxation Law; Non-estoppel of the Government

Question: Petitioner CIR, in a case, moved for the resetting of the scheduled initial presentation
of her evidence which was granted by the CTA with a warning. Despite this, the petitioner
moved for resetting again on May 2, 2011. The CTA granted the said motion with a final
warning to the petitioner's counsel. On June 1, 2011, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Reset Hearing, alleging that she will not be able to present her evidence on June 6, 2011 due to
the heavy volume of work and that she has yet to communicate with her witnesses, who are
revenue examiners mostly doing field work. CIR filed a motion. The petitioner failed to attend
the scheduled hearing on June 6, 2011. Thus, upon motion of private counsel, the petitioner was
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. CIR filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
For Leave to Re-Open Case but was denies by CTA. Was the denial proper?
Answer: Yes. The Court does not agree that the petitioner can seek the disregard of our rules on
the argument that the State is not bound by the neglect of its agents and officers for "[t]he rule on
non-estoppel of the government is not designed to perpetrate an injustice." While it is recognized
that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its agents and officials, such
general rule admits of exceptions as the Court has established in Republic v. CA: Estoppels
against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual
circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. (G.R. No. 203403, CIR v. CTA Third Division
and Wintelecom, November 14, 2018)
Taxation; Injunctive Relief
Question: Is a petition for declaratory relief applicable to contest tax assessments.
Answer: No. The injunctive relief is not available as a remedy to assail the collection of a tax.
Section 218 of the NIRC expressly provides that "[n]o court shall have the authority to grant an
injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed
by th[e] [NIRC]."[14]Also, pursuant to Section 11[15] of R.A. No. 1125, as amended, the decisions
or rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, assessing any tax, or levying,
or distraining, or selling any property of taxpayers for the satisfaction of their tax liabilities are
immediately executory, and their enforcement is not to be suspended by any appeals thereof to
the Court of Tax Appeals unless "in the opinion of the Court [of Tax Appeals] the collection by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs may jeopardize the interest of
the Government and/or the taxpayer," in which case the Court of Tax Appeals "at any stage of
the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the
amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount." (G.R. No. 219340,
CIR v. Standard Insurance Co. Inc., November 07, 2018)

Political law; Election law; Appreciation of ballots; Idem Sonans Rule

Question: Did the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it credited the ballot marked as Exhibit "I" wherein the name "Nanie
G" written on the space allotted for Punong Barangay in the questioned ballot was credited to
private respondent as it undoubtedly sounds like the name of private respondent, i.e., "Ranie".
Answer: No. The Court begs to differ. The COMELEC En Banc correctly credited the contested
ballot in favor of private respondent based on the Idem Sonans Rule. The aforesaid rule states
that when a name or surname incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound similar to the
name or surname of a candidate when correctly written shall be counted in such candidate's
favor. (G.R. No. 227797, Sevilla v. COMELEC, November 13, 2018)
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain
Question: On August 9, 2005, after a series of negotiations, respondent and the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land. On November 15, 2006, respondent filed a
Complaint before the RTC. It alleged that the subject parcel of land was taken by the DPWH
sometime in 1957; it made verbal and written demands to petitioner for the payment of interest
from 1957; and it had a right to receive interest because the DPWH had not paid just
compensation when it occupied the property in 1957. Is petitioner entitled to receive payment of
interest notwithstanding the absence of any stipulation in the deed of absolute sale?
Answer: No. The award of legal interest in cases where the government acquires private property
through voluntary sale is not a matter of law. Unlike in cases where the state exercises its power
of eminent domain or a party initiates expropriation proceedings and other similar actions, in
negotiated sale, there is an existing contract that governs the relations of the parties and
determines their respective rights and obligations. In turn, these contractual stipulations should
be complied with in good faith, unless they are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policies. Hence, the laws relating to contracts should govern in case of
controversy in their application. It is worth highlighting that the Deed of Absolute Sale between
petitioner and respondent does not contain any provision or stipulation for the payment of
interest. Neither did respondent make any reservation for it to claim interest.
(G.R. No. 218732, Republic v. Jose- Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, November 12,
2018)

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Original registration

Question: SPPI filed with the MCTC an Application or original registration of a 7,691-square
meter (sq. m.) parcel of land. MCTC granted SPPI's application for original registration.
Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that the MCTC erred in granting SPPI's application for
land registration despite the latter's failure to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest were in
open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945, since the earliest possession was shown to have started only in
1955, and it failed to identify its predecessors prior to that time. Is the CA correct in upholding
the MCTC's grant of SPPI's application for land registration?
Answer: No. For purposes of land registration under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, proof of specific
acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, SPPI presented several testimony. However, such
testimony was insufficient to establish possession in the nature and character required by law that
would give right to ownership. In sum, the Court finds that SPPI's unsubstantiated and self-
serving assertions of possession and occupation do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence of possession and occupation of the subject land of the nature and duration required by
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529. Accordingly, the CA erred in affirming the MCTC's grant of SPPI's
application for original registration of its imperfect title over the subject land. (G.R. No. 237714,
Republic v. Science Park of the Philippines, November 12, 2018)
Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds
Question: Can an application for registration of title solely rely on the CENRO Certification to
prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable?
Answer: No. To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable
public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property
Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified
true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
[I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. (G.R. No. 211664, Republic v. Bautista, November 12,
2018)
Civil Law; Unconscionable Interest
Question: Petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it declared that
the stipulated 7.5% and 7% monthly interest rates imposed on Loan 1 and Loan 2, respectively,
are valid must be reversed and set aside, as it is contrary to the jurisprudential pronouncements
of this Court that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month or higher are unconscionable and
contrary to morals. Is the contention meritorious?
Answer: Yes. In this case, the first loan had a 7.5% monthly interest rate or 90% interest per
annum, while the second loan had a 7% monthly interest rate or 84% interest per annum, which
rates are very much higher than the 3% monthly interest rate imposed in Ruiz v. Court of
Appeals[33] and the 5% monthly interest rate imposed in Sps. Albos v. Sps. Embisan,
et al.[34] Based on the ruling of the Spouses Albos case, the Court holds that the interest rates of
7.5% and 7% are excessive, unconscionable, iniquitous, and contrary to law and morals; and,
therefore, void ab initio. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the imposition of the
said interest rates. (G.R. No. 211206, Rey v. Anson, November 07, 2018)