People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662
Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the
Crim Pro - Rule 110
Facts:
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this
instant case allegedly issued 9 checks with the
aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of
Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos'
presentment of the said checks, they were
dishonored. So, on Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed
an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of
BP 22 against Pangilinan.
On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a
civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial
documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against
Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later,
Pangilinan also filed on December 10, 1997, a
"Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground
of Prejudicial Question".
On March 2, 1998, Assistant City
Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos, then,
raised the matter before the DOJ.
On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin
Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the
informations for violation of BP 22 in connection
with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the
charges involving the other checks were
dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22,
both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed against
Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of
Quezon City.
On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an
"Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and
to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest”
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging
that the criminal liability has been extinguished
by reason of prescription. The motion was
granted.
RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC.
According to the RTC, the offense has not yet
prescribed "considering the appropriate
complaint that started the proceedings having
been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on
16 September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan
raised the matter to the Supreme Court for
review but it was referred to the CA "for
appropriate action".
On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and recognized Feb. 3, 2000
as the date of the filing of the informations.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September
1997 interrupted the period of prescription of
such offense.
Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which
is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases,
“[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall,
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules:… after
four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two
years.” Under Section 2 of the same Act, “[t]he
prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one year or by a fine
for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4)
years in accordance with the aforecited law. The
running of the prescriptive period, however,
should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were
filed against respondent on 16 September 1997.
The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only
on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor
for suspension of proceedings on the ground of
“prejudicial question”. The matter was raised
before the Secretary of Justice after the City
Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of
Justice so ordered that the informations for the
violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC
of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings, which
motion she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in court of the
1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION
represented by its manager and authorized
representative Norma Tan, petitioner, vs . HON.
JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA , SR., Presiding Judge
of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio
City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG,
“JOHN DOES” and “PETER DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
FACTS: Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance
003-2000, was authorized to render any motor
vehicle immobilized by placing its wheels in a
clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Balajadia
and the other respondents dismantled, took and
carried away the clamps attached to the wheel
of the vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003.
Jadewell filed a complaint for robbery against
the respondents with the Office of the City
Prosecutor on May 23, 2003. However, the
Informations were filed with the MTC on
October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed a motion to
quash.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: The MTC granted the
motion to quash and dismissed the case and
Jadewell‟s subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Jadewell‟s petition for
certiorari with RTC was likewise denied. Their
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
CONTENTION OF JADEWELL: They argued that
the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not
the filing of the criminal information before
Court, is the reckoning point in determining
whether or not the criminal action had
prescribed.
CONTENTION OF BALAJADIA: Respondents
argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the
proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings
. Thus, the SC, in
Zaldivia , held that the filing of the Complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was
not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period
commenced from the alleged date of the
commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and
ended two months after on July 7, 2003.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolled the prescription period of the commission
of the offense
HELD: No. As provided in the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where
the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
The respondent judge was correct when he
applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia
v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of a
municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also
featured similar facts and issues with the present
case. In that case, the offense was committed on
May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on
May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on
October 2, 1990.

When the representatives of the petitioner filed

the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor
of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the
Information. They had two months to file the
Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the
Municipal Trial Court. The failure of the
prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is
unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the
case against the private respondents. It stands
that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to
ordinances and their prescription period. It also
upholds the necessity of filing the Information in
court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has
this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above
interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor‟s office if, intentionally or not, he
delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the
applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of
the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
problem here sought to be corrected.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED