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STOREX CONTROL SYSTEM UPGRADE PROJECT MAEE475

GAP ANALYSIS - HAZOP AND SIL REPORTS

Introduction:

“Gap Analysis” is the comparison of past reports relevant to a particular plant or system with the
latest report to be prepared or already prepared. It helps to ensure consistency of the information
utilised in the reports. It also helps to identify incomplete, incorrect or inconsistent information that
may be / have been used and hence help the organization to improve the report accordingly.

This process was initiated to ensure that the information utilised for the SIL Workshop was
consistent with the HAZOP conducted in the past. Any inconsistency identified shall be notified to
ADGAS / PMC and updated accordingly in the SIL Workshop Report.

Documents reviewed:
• LNG / LPG Storage Systems HAZOP Study, dated April 1985

• HAZOP Study Report for Plant 48 Boil Off Gas Compressor System (DAS-A3-RP-286, dated
Dec 21, 1992)

• HAZOP Report for BOG / SRU Project (BS-100-A4Z-0-75012, dated Jun 21, 2004)

• Internal Mini-HAZOP Worksheet for the LNG Tanks

• SIL Workshop Report (UTS Kent Document No: MAEE475-J88-9662)

• SIL Verification Report (MAEE475-J88-9661)

Procedure:

1. The various HAZOP reports were reviewed with respect to the systems covered under the
Storex Control System Upgrade Project and the consequences accepted by the HAZOP
team for the various deviations were noted.

2. The safeguards identified to minimise or prevent the consequences were noted.

3. The tabulated list of Signals used as part of the SIL Workshop was reviewed to ensure that
all the relevant safeguards identified in the HAZOP were included.

4. The Consequences accepted by the SIL Team as part of the SIL Workshop was reviewed
with respect to the consequences recorded in the HAZOP.

5. Finding and conclusion recorded

Findings:

1. The approach to HAZOP for Plant 48 Boil Off Gas (BOG) Compressor System taken by the
teams was found to be different from the present approach utilised in the Mini-HAZOP as
well as the SIL Workshop conducted by UTS Kent. The HAZOP team had taken into account
the flare system and safeguards present while developing the consequences as a result of
which the severity of the consequences were found to be much lower as compared to those
considered by the Mini-HAZOP / SIL team.

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STOREX CONTROL SYSTEM UPGRADE PROJECT MAEE475
GAP ANALYSIS - HAZOP AND SIL REPORTS
2. HAZOP Report for BOG / SRU Project was found to be more in line with the approach taken
for SIL Workshop but again the consequences considered by the HAZOP team were found
to be immediate or short term (for e.g. increase in pressure or potential hazard to personnel,
etc) and not the worst case scenario as considered by the Mini-HAZOP / SIL team. As a
result the severities of these consequences were found to be much lower than those
considered for the SIL Workshop.

3. The scenarios considered as part of the SIL Workshop were found to be the worst case
scenario, providing a much higher severity hence a more conservative Risk approach.

Conclusion:

Based on the gap analysis it is concluded that the SIL Workshop conducted was comprehensive
and has adequately covered all the relevant SIFs. There is a difference in the scenarios considered
as part of evaluating the severity and risk in the past HAZOPs and the latest SIL study, but as the
SIL team has considered the worst case scenarios it is safe to assume that the finding are on the
conservative side. There may be a slight financial implication with respect to the procurement of
some of the new instrumentation / maintenance regime due to the conservative approach taken as
part of the SIL workshop.

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