Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 24116-17 August 22, 1968

CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, CEBU, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Tomas P. Matic, Jr. and Lorenzo R. Mosqueda for plaintiff-appellant.

Fernan, Osmeña and Bellaflor for defendants-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

In two separate actions, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the
validity of the distraint and thereafter the sale at public auction by the principal defendant-appellee,
Municipality of Naga, Cebu, of 100,000 bags of cement for the purpose of satisfying its alleged
deficiency in the payment of the municipal license tax for 1960, municipal license tax for 1961 as
well as the penalty, all in the total sum of P204,300.00. The lower court rendered a joint decision
sustaining the validity of the action taken by defendant-appellee Municipality of Naga. The case is
now before us on appeal. We affirm.

According to the appealed decision: "From all the evidence, mostly documentary, adduced during
the hearing the following facts have been established. The efforts of the defendant Treasurer to
collect from the plaintiff the municipal license tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Series of
1959 on cement factories located within the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, have met with rebuff time
and again. The demands made on the taxpayer ... have not been entirely successful. Finally, the
defendant Treasurer decided on June 26, 1961 to avail of the Civil remedies provided for under
Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period of ten days from
receipt thereof within which to settle the account, computed as follows ...: Deficiency Municipal
License Tax for 1960 — P80,250.00; Municipal License Tax for 1961 — P90,000.00; and 20%
Penalty — P34,050.00, stating in exasperation, "This is our last recourse as we had exhausted all
efforts for an amicable solution of our problem." "1

It was further shown: "On July 6, 1961, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant Treasurer notified the Plant
Manager of the plaintiff that he was "distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of your
delinquency in municipal license taxes in the total amount of P204,300.00" ... This notice was
received by the acting officer in charge of the plaintiff's plant, Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his
own admission. At first, he was not in accord with the said letter, asking the defendant Treasurer for
time to study the same, but in the afternoon he [acknowledged the] distraint ..." 2

As was noted in the decision, the defendant Treasurer in turn "signed the receipt for goods, articles
or effects seized under authority of Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code, certifying that
he has constructively distrained on July 6, 1961 from the Cebu Portland Cement Company at its
plant at Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, 100,000 bags of Apo cement in tanks, and that "the said articles or
goods will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, and the proceeds thereof
will be utilized in part satisfaction of the account of the said company in municipal licenses and
penalties in the total amount of P204,300.00 due the Municipality of Naga Province of Cebu" ..."3
The lower court likewise found as a fact that on the same day, July 6, 1961, the municipal treasurer
posted the notice of sale to the effect that pursuant to the provisions of Section 2305 of the Revised
Administrative Code, he would sell at public auction for cash to the highest bidder at the main
entrance of the municipal building of the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines on the
27th day of July, 1961, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the property seized and distrained or levied upon
from the Cebu Portland Cement Company in satisfaction of the municipal license taxes and
penalties in the amount of P204,300.00, specifying that what was to be sold was 100,000 bags of
Apo cement.4 No sale, as thus announced, was held on July 27, 1961. It was likewise stated in the
appealed decision that there was stipulation by the parties to this effect: "1. The auction sale took
place on January 30, 1962, ..."5

In this appeal from the above joint decision, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company
upholds the view that the distraint of the 100,000 bags of cement as well as the sale at public
auction thereafter made ran counter to the law. As earlier noted, we do not see it that way.

1. On the validity of the distraint — In the first two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant submits as
illegal the distraint of 100,000 bags of cement made on July 6, 1961. Its contention is premised on
the fact that in the letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26, 1961, requiring plaintiff-appellant to
settle its account of P204,300.00, it was given a period of 10 days from receipt within which it could
pay, failure to do so being the occasion for the distraint of its property. It is now alleged that the 10-
day period of grace was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.

It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language of the law. According to
the Revised Administrative Code: "The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon the failure
of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the
municipal treasurer may seize and distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any
property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together
with any increment thereto incident to delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint."6

The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. The municipal treasurer "may
seize and distrain any personal property" of the individual or entity subject to the tax upon failure "to
pay the same, at the time required ..." There was such a failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant to
pay the municipal tax at the time required. The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with
the above provision therefore came into play. 1äwphï1.ñët

Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or
amend the law it has to be enforced as written. That was what the lower court did. What was done
then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the statutory provision requires.
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. That was what occurred in this case.7

2. On the validity of the auction sale — The validity of the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 is
challenged in the next two errors assigned as allegedly committed by the lower court. Plaintiff-
appellant's argument is predicated on the fact that it was not until January 16, 1962 that it was
notified that the public auction sale was to take place on January 29, 1962. It is its view that under
the Revised Administrative Code8 the sale of the distrained property cannot take place "less than
twenty days after notice to the owner or possessor of the property [distrained] ... and the publication
or posting of such notice."

Why such a contention could not prosper is explained clearly by the lower court in the appealed
decision. Thus: "With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 pursuant to
the distraint was null and void for being contrary to law because not more than twenty days have
elapsed from the date of notice, it is believed that the defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal
Treasurer of Naga have substantially complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305
of the Revised Administrative Code. From the time that the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint
on July 6, 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30, 1962, certainly, more than twenty days
have elapsed. If the sale did not take place, as advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only on January 30,
1962, it was due to the requests for deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly delayed the
proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain
that the required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the tax collector was already well-
publicized for many months."9 The reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court
cannot be disputed. Under the circumstances, the allegation that there was no observance of the
twenty-day period hardly carries conviction.

The point is further made that the auction sale took place not on January 29, 1962, as stated in the
notice of sale, but on the next day, January 30, 1962. According to plaintiff-appellant: "On this score
alone, the sale ..., was illegal as it was not made on the time stated in the notice." 10

There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of the lower court is otherwise. Thus: "On
January 16, 1962, the defendant Treasurer informed Garaygay that he would cause the
readvertisement for sale at public auction of the 100,000 bags of Apo cement which were under
constructive distraint ... On January 19, 1962, the said defendant issued the corresponding notice of
sale, which fixed January 30, 1962, at 10:00 A.M., as the date of sale, posting the said notice in
public places and delivering copies thereof to the interested parties in the previous notice, ...
Ultimately, the bidding was conducted on that day, January 30, 1962, with the representatives of the
Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer present. Only two bidders submitted sealed bids. After
the bidding, the defendant-treasurer informed the plaintiff that an award was given to the winning
bidder, ..." 11

This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff-appellant must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive
what the lower court found as established by the evidence, only questions of law being brought to us
for review. It is the established rule that when a party appeals directly to this Court, he is deemed to
have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the court below. 12

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated 23, 1964, is affirmed in toto. With costs against
plaintiff-appellant.
1äw phï1.ñët

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26712-16 December 27, 1969

UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY, UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD

MINISTERS, BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSION OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA,
BOARD OF MISSION OF THE EVANGELICAL UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
COMMISSION OF ECUMENICAL MISSION ON RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH, petitioners,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

Sedfrey A. Ordoñez for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete
and Solicitor Buenaventura J. Guerrero for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In this appeal from an order of the Social Security Commission, we uphold the Commission's Order
dismissing the petition before it, on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the
Social Security Act1 vesting in the Commission the power to condone penalties, it has no legal
authority to condone, waive or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily
imposed under the Social Security Act.

The five petitioners originally filed on November 20, 1964 separate petitions with respondent
Commission, contesting the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious
missionary work in the Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners. After
several hearings, however, petitioners commendably desisted from further contesting said coverage,
manifesting that they had adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities in its
program of social amelioration, with which they are in complete accord. They instead filed their
consolidated amended petition dated May 7, 1966, praying for condonation of assessed penalties
against them for delayed social security premium remittances in the aggregate amount of
P69,446.42 for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963.

In support of their request for condonation, petitioners alleged that they had labored under the
impression that as international organizations, they were not subject to coverage under the
Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice by certain Social Security System officials, they
paid to the System in October, 1963, the total amount of P81,341.80, representing their back
premiums for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963. They further claimed that the
penalties assessed against them appear to be inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent
Commission which in the past allegedly permitted condonation of such penalties.

On May 25, 1966, respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that "the Social
Security Commission has no power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance, to
which petitioners filed their opposition of June 15, 1966, and in turn, respondent filed its reply thereto
of June 22, 1966.
Respondent Commission set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing and oral argument on July 20, 1966.
At the hearing, petitioners' counsel made no appearance but submitted their Memorandum in lieu of
oral argument. Upon petition of the System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further
period of fifteen days to submit their Memorandum consolidating their arguments, after which the
motion would be deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners stood on their original memorandum,
and respondent System filed its memorandum on August 4, 1966.

On September 22, 1966, respondent Commission issued its Order dismissing the petition, as
follows:

Considering all of the foregoing, this Commission finds, and so holds, that in the absence of
an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to
condone penalties, it cannot legally do so. The policy enunciated in Commission Resolution
No. 536, series of 1964, cited by the parties, in their respective pleadings, has been
reiterated in Commission Resolution No. 878, dated August 18, 1966, wherein the
Commission adopting the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Matters and
Legislation of the Social Security Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone, waive
or relinquish the penalties for late premium remittances which may be imposed under the
Social Security Act."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the
respondent System, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order, the amount of
P69,446.42 representing the penalties payable by them, broken down as follows:

United Christian Missionary Society P5,253.53

Board of Mission of the Evangelical United Brothers 7,891.74

Church

United Church Board for World Ministers 12,353.75

Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations 33,019.36

Board of Foreign Mission of the Reformed Church in 10,928.04

America

TOTAL P 69,446.42

Upon failure of the petitioners to comply with this Order within the period specified herein, a
warrant shall be issued to the Sheriff of the Province of Rizal to levy and sell so much of the
property of the petitioners as may be necessary to satisfy the aforestated liability of the
petitioners to the System.

This Court is thus confronted on appeal with this question of first impression as to whether or not
respondent Commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to
condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premium remittances.

We find no error in the Commission's action.

1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly rule out
petitioners' posture that the respondent Commission should assume, as against the mandatory
imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances, the discretionary
authority of condoning, waiving or relinquishing such penalty.

The pertinent portion of Section 22 (a) of the Social Security Act peremptorily provides that:

SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. — (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding
sections shall be remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month
following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may
prescribe. "Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contribution shall be liable
for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the system, as herein prescribed, he
shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per month from the
date the contribution falls due until paid . . .2

No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement of the law's

mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums to the
System within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed
penalty is evidently of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers do
not take lightly the State's exercise of the police power in the implementation of the Republic's
declared policy "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be
suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to
employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."3 In this concept, good faith
or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law makes no distinction between an employer who
professes good reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately
disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the moment the
remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium
payments by force of law.

2. Petitioners contend that in the exercise of the respondent Commission's power of direction and
control over the system, as provided in Section 3 of the Act, it does have the authority to condone
the penalty for late payment under Section 4 (1), whereby it is empowered to "perform such other
acts as it may deem appropriate for the proper enforcement of this Act." The law does not bear out
this contention. Section 4 of the Social Security Act precisely enumerates the powers of the
Commission. Nowhere from said powers of the Commission may it be shown that the Commission is
granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Act.

3. Moreover, the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law have already been held by us
to be "funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government."4 Being a
mere trustee of the funds of the System which actually belong to the members, respondent
Commission cannot legally perform any acts affecting the same, including condonation of penalties,
that would diminish the property rights of the owners and beneficiaries of such funds without an
express or specific authority therefor.

4. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no
room for interpretation and construction of the statute. The Court is therefore bound to uphold
respondent Commission's refusal to arrogate unto itself the authority to condone penalties for late
payment of social security premiums, for otherwise we would be sanctioning the Commission's
reading into the law discretionary powers that are not actually provided therein, and hindering and
defeating the plain purpose and intent of the legislature.

5. Petitioners cite fourteen instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted
condonation of penalties on delayed premium payments. They charge the Commission with grave
abuse of discretion in not having uniformly applied to their cases its former policy of granting
condonation of penalties. They invoke more compelling considerations of equity in their cases, in
that they are non-profit religious organizations who minister to the spiritual needs of the Filipino
people, and that their delay in the payment of their premiums was not of a contumacious or
deliberate defiance of the law but was prompted by a well-founded belief that the Social Security Act
did not apply to their missionaries.

The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission are not, however, before the
Court, and the unilateral conclusion asserted by petitioners that the Commission had granted such
condonations would be of no avail, without a review of the pertinent records of said cases.
Nevertheless, assuming such conclusion to be correct, the Commission, in its appealed Order of
September 22, 1966 makes of record that since its Resolution No. 536, series of 1964, which it
reiterated in another resolution dated August 18, 1966, it had definitely taken the legal stand,
pursuant to the recommendation of its Committee on Legal Matters and Legislation, that in the
absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to
condone penalties, it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium
remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act."

6. The Commission cannot be faulted for this correct legal position. Granting that it had erred in the
past in granting condonation of penalties without legal authority, the Court has held time and again
that "it is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers
do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the Government is never
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents."5 Petitioners' lack of intent to deliberately
violate the law may be conceded, and was borne out by their later withdrawal in May, 1966 of their
original petitions in November, 1964 contesting their social security coverage. The point, however, is
that they followed the wrong procedure in questioning the applicability of the Social Security Act to
them, in that they failed for five years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and thus incurred the
3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late payment. The proper procedure
would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their liability therefor, thereby preventing the
penalty from attaching. This would have been the prudent course, considering that the Act provides
in Section 22 (b) thereof that the premiums which the employer refuses or neglects to pay may be
collected by the System in the same manner as taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code,
and that at the time they instituted their petitions in 1964 contesting their coverage, the Court had
already ruled in effect against their contest three years earlier, when it held in Roman Catholic
Archbishop vs. Social Security Commission6 that the legislature had clearly intended to include
charitable and religious institutions and other non-profit institutions, such as petitioners, within the
scope and coverage of the Social Security Act.

7. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by the Commission in issuing its Order
dismissing the petition for condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums, as claimed by
petitioners in their second and last error assigned. Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission
and were given due opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as in fact they filed their
Memorandum in lieu of oral argument and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum.
The mere fact that there was a pending appeal in the Court of Appeals from an identical ruling of the
Commission in an earlier case as to its lack of authority to condone penalties does not mean, as
petitioners contend, that the Commission was thereby shorn of its authority and discretion to dismiss
their petition on the same legal ground.7 The Commission's action has thus paved the way for a final
ruling of the Court on the matter.

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26419 October 16, 1970

GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T. QUIJANO, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, respondents-appellees.

J. Alaric P. Acosta for petitioners-appellant.

Esperanza Valenzoga for respondents-appellees.

BARREDO, J.:.

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in its Special Civil
Case No. 2519, dismissing the petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
filed therein by the herein petitioners-appellants Gedeon G. Quijano and Eugenio T. Quijano to
compel the herein respondent-appellee Development Bank of the Philippines to accept said
petitioners-appellants' back pay certificate payment of their loan from the said appellee Bank, and to
restrain the herein respondent-appellee ex-oficio sheriff of the province of Misamis Occidental from
proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure sale of the real properties the above-named appellant
spouses had mortgaged with the Development Bank of the Philippines to secure the loan
aforementioned.

The said appealed decision was based on the following:

STIPULATION OF FACTS.

The undersigned parties, thru counsels, hereby submit the foregoing stipulation of
facts, to wit:

I. That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the herein
respondent-bank, in the amount of P19,500.00;

II. That the petitioners' urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board
Resolution No. 2533 on April 30, 1953;

III. That the mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of the
respondent-bank on March 23, 1954;

IV. That the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be received by the petitioners in several
releases, subject among others, to the following conditions:.
 "(1) That the amount of P4,200.00 shall be released only after:.

"(a) the execution and registration of the mortgage

contract;

"(b) the presentation of a duly approved building

permit;

"(c) the construction has been started and the value of

the work done amounted to P6,500.00;.

"(d) the submission of the certificate of title covering

Psu-136173, free form any encumbrance and

"(e) the submission of evidence showing full payment

of current estate taxes;

(2) That the subsequent releases shall not be more than 100% of the
value of the construction completed in excess of P6,500.00; that all
releases shall be made against the payroll of workers engaged in the
project, receipts of all materials used and that there are no unpaid
labor or unpaid materials;

(3) That a sufficient amount may be withheld until the building is

completed and painted and found in accordance with the plans and
specifications submitted;

(4) That the amount of insurance of the building, when completed,

shall not be less than P18,000.00, which shall be secured by the
mortgagee, in accordance with its Board Resolution No. 3395, series
of 1947;

(5) That the construction and painting of the building shall be

completed within 120 days from the date of the mortgage contract;

(6) That the release of this loan is subject to the availability of funds;

(7) That the lien appearing on the face of the title shall be cancelled,
otherwise, Luciana Jimenez shall sign as co-mortgagor; that this
mortgage contract was registered on March 23, 1954 with the
Register of Deeds of Misamis Occidental at Oroquieta;

"V. That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other
releases were made subsequent thereafter;

"VI. That as of July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the petitioners with the
respondent-bank, including interests, was P13,983.59;

"VII. That on July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano, as holder of Acknowledgment
No. 10181, wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of
 P14,000.00 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank, out of the
proceeds of his back pay pursuant to Republic Act No. 897;

"VIII. That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the
non-acceptance of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or
subsisting on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved;

"IX. That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis City Branch, filed on October 14,
1965, an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the
petitioners, and that acting on the application of the respondent-bank, the Provincial
Sheriff, thru his deputies, scheduled the public auction sale for January 18, 1966,
after advising petitioner Gedeon Quijano of the application for foreclosure filed by the
respondent-bank;

"X. That the parties herein agree to transfer the auction sale scheduled for January
16, 1966 to February 18, 1966, without the necessity of republication of the notice of
sale."

Upon these facts and the submission of the parties that the only issue is whether or not the
obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897, the
Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic Act 304, the original back pay law, the trial court
dismissed the petition, as already stated, and directed respondent sheriff to proceed and continue
with the public auction sale of the property mortgaged in accordance with the foreclosure application
of respondent Development Bank of the Philippines after due notice to petitioners. In their appeal,
petitioners' sole assignment of error is that: "The trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the
petitioners-appellants was not subsisting when Republic Act No. 897 was enacted on June 20,
1953."

The appeal has no merit.

The pertinent portions of the controlling provisions of the aforementioned Back Pay Law, as
amended by Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953,1 read as follows:.

SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons
specified in section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this
Amendatory Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by
the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the
right to the Salaries and wages as provided in section one hereof and notice of such
acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total amount of
such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the
Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance
without interests: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and
regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of
indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole
or a part of the total salaries and wages the right to which has been duly
acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such certificate of
indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the
payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Amendatory
Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its
branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or controlled by the
Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation
 organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same
for such settlement; ...

It is indeed settled that under the above provisions, the Government or any of its agencies does not
have any discretion in the acceptance of back pay certificates, 2 when they are used by the applicants or original
holders themselves for the settlement of any of the obligations or liabilities specifically enumerated in the law. 3
It is equally clear,
however, that the same provisions expressly require that the obligations — for which certificates of
indebtedness may be accepted as payments of — must be subsistingat the time of the approval of
Republic Act No. 897; hence when, as in the instant case, such back pay certificates are offered in
payment to a government-owned corporation of an obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time
of the enactment of said amendatory Act on June 20, 1953, which corporation may not, legally be
compelled to accept the certificates.

It is true that appellants' application for an urban real estate loan was approved by appellee bank on
April 80, 1953. It appears, however, that appellants did not avail of it until much later, as in fact, they
executed the mortgage contract only on March 23, 1954, and furthermore, that the release of the
amount of the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in installments and subject to compliance
with certain conditions by said appellants. Under these circumstances, Our ruling in the case
of Rodriguez vs. Development Bank of the Philippines 4 is controlling.

In that case, Rodriguez obtained a loan from the said Development Bank of the Philippines to be
received by him in several releases and to be paid later in installments, under the terms and
conditions specified in the loan agreement. Pursuant to said agreement, Rodriguez received the first
release in the sum of P5,000.00 on May 27, 1953, while the subsequent releases covering the
P9,000.00 — balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him later than June, 1953.
Later, Rodriguez paid the installments as they fell due. When a balance of about P10,000.00
remained unpaid, Rodriguez offered to pay the said outstanding balance of the loan with his back
pay certificate. The Bank refused at first to accept the said tender of payment in certificate, and
when it accepted the same later, it limited its acceptance only to the amount of P5,000.00
representing the portion of the loan released before the passage of Republic Act No. 897, although
the amount of the back pay certificate offered by Rodriguez was more than sufficient to cover the
total unpaid balance of the loan. So, Rodriguez instituted an action for mandamus in the Court of
First Instance of Davao to compel the Bank to accept his back pay certificate in payment of his
whole outstanding obligation or, in other words, even for the portions of the loan corresponding to
the releases made after June 20, 1953. This action was dismissed by the trial court and upon appeal
to this Court, the dismissal was affirmed upon the following rationale:.

It can not be said that appellant became indebted to the Bank for the total amount of
P14,000.00 from the date of the agreement. The releases of the balance of the
agreed loan were made dependent on certain conditions (see additional conditions
mentioned in paragraph 4 of the stipulation of facts, supra) among which is the
availability of funds. Non-compliance with any of these conditions will not entitle the
appellant to the release of the balance of the agreed loan and conversely, will not
entitle the bank to hold the appellant liable for the unreleased amounts.
Consequently, we hold, as did the trial court, that:.

"... the amounts released in July, 1953 and thereafter cannot be

considered as obligations subsisting in June, 1953. The defendant
may be compelled to accept a back pay certificate in payment of
obligations subsisting when the Amendatory Act was approved (Sec.
2, Republic Act 897). Republic Act 897 was approved on June 20,
têñ.£îhqw â£

1953. The defendant may not be compelled to accept plaintiff's back

 pay certificate in payment of the amounts released after June 20,
1953."

The case of Sabelino v. RFC (G.R. No. L-11790, Sept. 30, 1958) relied upon by
appellant is irrelevant, as the mortgage indebtedness sought to be paid with
appellee's back pay certificate therein, appears to have subsisted prior to the
approval of Republic Act No. 897. ...

Herein appellants' situation is even worse than that of Rodriguez. Here appellants actually availed of
their approved loan only about nine (9) months after the enactment of Republic Act 897 and the
corresponding releases thereof were received by appellants only after the execution of the mortgage
contract on March 23, 1954. Undoubtedly, notwithstanding the approval by the appellee
Development Bank of the Philippines (RFC) of appellants' loan application on April 30, 1953,
appellants did not thereby incur any obligation to pay the same; only after the corresponding
amounts were released to appellants after March 23, 1954 did such obligation attach; and it cannot,
therefore, be said that the said loan was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of
Republic Act No. 897 on June 20, 1953.

It may be truly said, as contended by appellants, that when their application for the loan was
approved by the appellee Bank on April 30, 1953, an agreement was perfected between them and
said Bank, but it should be noted that under such agreement the only enforceable obligation that
was created was that of the Bank to grant the loan applied for, whereas the obligation of appellants
to pay the same could not have arisen until after the amount of the loan has been actually released
to them; and said release was even subject to their compliance with certain conditions specified in
the mortgage contract executed after the approval already of Republic Act 897. Appellants' appeal
that a more liberal construction of the law would enable "many crippled or disabled veterans, or their
wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or another unselfishly sacrificed or contributed to
the cause of the last war" to take advantage of their back pay certificates, does deserve sympathy,
for indeed, among the avowed purposes of the said law are: "First, to serve as a source of financial
aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives and orphans. Secondly,
to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who
have given their all for the cause of the last war." (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th
Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74, as quoted in Florentino, et al. vs. PNB, 98 Phil. 959, 961-
963). On the other hand, however, We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the
têñ.£îhqwâ£

clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to
its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible.5 No
process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to here a provision of law peremptorily calls for
application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is
left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.6 Thus, even before the amendment of the
Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at
the time of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations contracted after its enactment on
June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.

Since the debt of appellants was contracted on November 24, 1948, they could not
validly seek to discharge it by application of their back pay certificate under Republic
Act 304, on June 18, 1948, because that Act, in terms, limited any such application to
"obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act". (Sec. 2)7

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Act. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
OSG v. Ayala Land Inc.
GR No. 177056 – Sept 18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondents operate or lease out shopping malls that have parking facilities. The people that use said
facilities are required to pay parking fees by the respondents. Senate committees conducted an
investigation to determine the legality of said practice which the same found to be against the National
Building Code. Respondents then received an information from various government agencies
enjoining them from collecting parking fees and later a civil case against them. Respondents argued
that the same constitutes undue taking of private property. OSG argues that the same is implemented
in view of public welfare more specifically to ease traffic congestion. The RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents. Hence petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are obligated to provide for free parking to its consumers and the
public.

RULING:

No. Respondents are not obligated to provide for free parking to the people.

Article 1158 of the Civil Code provides that “Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only
those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated
by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the
provisions of this Book”.

The court does not agree to the petitioner’s reliance on the National Building Code as the same does
not expressly provide that respondents are required to provide free parking to the public. Moreover,
the court holds that the code regulates buildings and not traffic congestion. Police power is a power to
regulate but not to confiscate. The OSG’s contention is a deprivation of private property and falls under
eminent domain which requires just compensation. Thus, the RTC decision is affirmed and petition is
dismissed for lack of merit.

* Case digest by Ariel Acopiado, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES
(Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,

vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
 (a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in
this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of
Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00
(for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it
was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of
the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail
to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes,
and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;

(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a

necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
 (c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under
the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the
former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision
(Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of
any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which
constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for
the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus
acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words
of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que

hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
 We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso

de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito

mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran

los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period
to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the
acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal
Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead
of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed
 by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable
to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is
charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant
of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of
the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only
a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing
with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a
bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in
a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift
to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal
Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of
March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said
warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days,
as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable
to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.

Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.

Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously
intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.

Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued
to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy,
which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).

It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.

The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.

The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But
where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed
of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded
from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had
authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of
constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case,
habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31
SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].

The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.

While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.

The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42

Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director
of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].

The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was
"restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so
repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a
settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas
Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion
may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into
existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.

I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.

I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.

First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.

Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational
cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine
re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.

Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandezdoctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.

Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.

And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers
results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
means for' the commission of rebellion.

This argument is puerile.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-
enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.

The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial
Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme
Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-
known Supreme Court ruling.

All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-
existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible,
make it conform to the law.

A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the
Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed
from their arrest for a non-existent crime.

The principle bears repeating:

Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have
ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its
duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from
Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of
 ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision,
an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the
judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other
two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality,
logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then
should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in
the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of
Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing
paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought
was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the
law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-
26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA
226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-
Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])

I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of
rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.

I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.

The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the
former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.

The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing
of probable cause must be shown.

In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb
had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United
States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group
picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.

The Court in Salonga stressed:

 The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation
is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due
process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in
the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it
is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case
may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in
given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its
mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)

Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may
rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.

The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more
severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.

I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.

I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of
law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines
the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together,
would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces
of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these
modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ],
maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees?Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.

The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under
the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article
8, Civil Code).

The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as
of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine
of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative
acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is
that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt
whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming
the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in
terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48
(e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it
appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandezdoctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second
clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here
proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or
counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in
view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.

Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.

I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.

To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in
the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).

The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an
offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter,
the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be
deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal
Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what
is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the
rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.

The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous

events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime
provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed
against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from
the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.

The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A
coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.

I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.

BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the
remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.

I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
which is bailable. Consequently,habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view
thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon
us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.

It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused
before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others,
for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits
of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to
bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith
be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).

Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was
penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.

As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes
and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3whether committed in furtherance,
of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may
be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms
because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.

I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4

At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I
take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty"
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional
liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."

I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while
charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as
charging simple rebellion."

The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez
had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to
the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with
an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.

And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an
multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on
which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective,even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).

I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file
an entirely new and properinformation, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of
the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.

Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.

Paras, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.

I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.

Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously
intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.

Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued
to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy,
which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).

It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.

The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.

The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But
where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed
of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded
from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had
authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of
constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case,
habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31
SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.

While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.

The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42

Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director
of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].

The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.

If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was
"restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so
repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a
settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas
Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion
may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into
existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.

I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.

I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.

First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational
cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine
re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.

Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandezdoctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.

Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.

And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers
results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
means for' the commission of rebellion.

This argument is puerile.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-
enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.

The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial
Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme
Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-
known Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-
existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible,
make it conform to the law.

A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the
Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed
from their arrest for a non-existent crime.

The principle bears repeating:

Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have
ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its
duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from
Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of
ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision,
an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the
judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other
two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality,
logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then
should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in
the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of
Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing
paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought
was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by
tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the
law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-
26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA
226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-
Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])

I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of
rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.

I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the
former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.

The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing
of probable cause must be shown.

In Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb
had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United
States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group
picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.

The Court in Salonga stressed:

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,

malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation
is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due
process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in
the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it
is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case
may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in
given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its
mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)

Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may
rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.

The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more
severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.

I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.

I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of
law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines
the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together,
would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces
of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these
modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ],
maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees?Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.

The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under
the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article
8, Civil Code).

The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as
of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine
of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative
acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is
that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).

It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt
whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming
the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in
terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48
(e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it
appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandezdoctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second
clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here
proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or
counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in
view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.

Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.

I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.

To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in
the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).

The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.

With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an
offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter,
the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be
deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal
Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what
is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the
rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.

The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous

events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime
provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed
against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from
the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A
coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.

I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.

BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the
remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.

I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
which is bailable. Consequently,habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view
thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon
us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.

It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused
before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others,
for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits
of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to
bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith
be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).

Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was
penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.

As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes
and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3whether committed in furtherance,
of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may
be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms
because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.

I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4

At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
amendment will not alter its substance.

I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I
take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty"
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional
liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."

I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while
charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as
charging simple rebellion."

The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez
had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to
the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with
an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.

And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an
multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on
which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective,even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).

I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file
an entirely new and properinformation, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of
the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.

Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.

Paras, J., concurs.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR.,
CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S.
FLORESCA;

LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ
and TOMAS MARTINEZ;

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;

LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed
LANUZA;

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.

Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its
men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
 xxx xxx xxx

9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with
gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the
required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working
underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block
43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and
rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its
4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure,
approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied
by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a
matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber
supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all
avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to,
including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs
herein;

10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's
mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22
were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those
referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate,
notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive,
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant
PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden
legal and moral duties in the premises;

xxx xxx xxx

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations
duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special
Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B'
hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the
necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had
vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating
income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its
llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets
totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31, 1966;

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 42-44, rec.)

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said
motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-
delict.

(b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible
for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant

acted with gross negligence.

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27,
1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent
Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed
Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was
opposed by petitioners.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that
in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has
exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or
injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding
that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall,
pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to
50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS'

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
 AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT.

In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause
of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly
Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the
court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed
admitted.

In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that
workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or
death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or
negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners
pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence
resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the same.

On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under
the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and remedies granted by this

Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury ...

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have

exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...

Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all
claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of
employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission,"
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the
exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of
the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex
voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in
behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are
entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara,
now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and
Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections,
formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter,
submitted their respective memoranda.

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:

Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his
death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative,
that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the
limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether
they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's
right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the
employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees
or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts.

There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee
or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of
negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise.
He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is
exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's
position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death
have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the
employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty.
Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no
longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action
for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the
resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners
are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.

WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of
their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate
failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in
occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or
a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or
allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual
relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad
faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages.
The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith,
read:

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages
if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who
acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as
assessed by the court.

The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in
giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made
as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the
harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not
based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for
loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even
if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On
the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It
is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or
relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).

The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured
employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the
burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551;
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that
unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the
heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos
plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred
(Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50%
if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances
or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A,
Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his
employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code,
the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation
Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social
legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his
death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in
the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts
set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.

In Pacaña WE said:

In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of
Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue
third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking
for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative
advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an
ordinary action.

As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages
against the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No.
44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he filed
this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the
damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should
not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially
free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity
obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the
burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the
resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues
that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes
on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at
least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway,
 under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker Company
recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the
compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the
latter.

Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party
tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.

Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been
dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by
Philex and the said heirs.

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14,
1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for
compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have
been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be
paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but
they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before
they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded
by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19,
1967 only (p. 76, rec.).

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case.
The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then
secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of
the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201,
2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.

To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
 Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and
minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between
labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration (Art. XIV).

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to
guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and
employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9,
Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of

the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor
Code, thus:

Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford protection to labor,

promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security
of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).

The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New
Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on
June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30,
1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the
workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights
of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the
liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.

The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution
are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert
Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic
eloquence, enunciated:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New
Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and
employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that
"all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the
laborer."

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act provided:

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act
to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis supplied).

Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply
exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in
and during the performance of the duties of the employment; and all service
contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include
such agreement.

Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act
to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws, because of said injury.

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply
to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the
right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place
where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them (As amended
by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions
of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
 payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered
One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred
ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the
period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis
supplied).

As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No.
610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered
by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor
Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore
quoted.

It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence,
is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New
Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines
the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security
System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the
law of the land.

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system.
These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the
laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of
the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application
or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).

WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it
was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor
of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5
was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu
Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to
recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue
both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied
Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969
ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958
case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said
Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando and Villamor.

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer,
neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the
cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3)
cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.

It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American
Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the
restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the
range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil
Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6
of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.

The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The
right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the
employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to
provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are
inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to
recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without
due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton
neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for
the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such
attitude is un-Christian.

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making,
but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.

The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.

The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are
retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith
enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964),
which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution
that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin
of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are
dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is
now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who
profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's
keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert
otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150
reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of
economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic
reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates
man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and
utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and
dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation
from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do
himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so
much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth;
its spirit giveth life."

It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.

That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
"

Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain
instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in
the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity
to anticipate all situations.

But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American
Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply
the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.

'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies
that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist,
Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is
even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).

Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief
Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to
say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice
Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907,
quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice
Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only
between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In
the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint
of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts
breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books."

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused
by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no
fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New
Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable
negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life,
limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to
pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even
if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances
decreed by the law to protect the employee.

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of
judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established
in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation
21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).

Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a
cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they
are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204
1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845,
852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come to the
fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a
certain latitude or our government could not go on.

To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would
be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine
which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail.

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and
executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into waterlight
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it
is, or that the Constitution requires.

True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly
concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such
law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include
Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer,
Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or
legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law,
or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of
such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave
rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest
or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.

On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them
is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372
US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial
investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it
protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are
not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the
American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was
developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy
(see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have
been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in
Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is
the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration
thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed
by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58
Phil. 851-853).

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537)
as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of
Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause
means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal
facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.

De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.

Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46
Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working
women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no
longer the rule.

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice
Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due
process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The
law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in
the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American
Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum
wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for
women employees.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political
questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions
(Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs.
Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate
concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political
question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine
Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation
of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine
jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking
American precedents.

Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in
the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or
executive act.

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A
GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE
PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining
Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides
for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found
in Title XVIII-Damages that:

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF

DEATH, INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil.
582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play
on words. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act
772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded for a personal
injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. ...

By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply
to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be
no other than the Workmen's Compensation

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the
majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will
preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to them
under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".

There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise
the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's
Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because
those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".

In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of
remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to
avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in
disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.

B.

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding
"the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took
effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some
sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter
209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's
Compensation Act, p. 2]

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under
the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266,
267.

Sec. 112. Hawaii

 Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial
employment' and employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections
7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)

Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to

injure himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)

When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p.
714.)

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this

Act to an employee

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation

shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer

under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and
emphasis supplied)

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the
law-making body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read
and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious
significations, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced
or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-
making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its
correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]

3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply
exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in
and during the performance of the duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act,
subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.

4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within
the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:

SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his
 employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; ... (Emphasis supplied)

If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to
sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first
paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the
legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.

5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if
entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code
nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when
the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies
under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.

(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply
(exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in
and during the performance of the duties of the employment (and all service
contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such
agreement).

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the
elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of
the paragraph:

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such
law be more favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that
time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that
the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code,
should the latter be more favorable to him.

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured
employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The
compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689
[1938]).

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation,
caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the
employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June
20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case
there was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the
legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer,
to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again
given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or
under the Civil Code.

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court
is unjustifiably legislating.

It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts
would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's
compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove
the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.

Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years
of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.

Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort
suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer
and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could
employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses
available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted
employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030)
decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.

The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in
protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact
of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made
compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the
employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious,
inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if
not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a
major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate.
Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In
return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the
right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the
injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the
total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer
is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:

An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an

understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.

By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both
the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was
faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the
dangers of modern industry. If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to
the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered some measure of
redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the
employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there
could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed officially at the
employer or his agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. The
witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn between
friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the
injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of
his claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of
the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer
against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while only a
part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents. The
employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.

xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services-
should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the
manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is
subordinated to broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of
accident loss only initially; it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the
stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among
the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is
uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation
principle.

In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all
parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be
fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the
 industry affected. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from
the broad economic viewpoint. ....

Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important
respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and
compensation payable according to a definitely limited schedule is substituted for
damages. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes, irrespective of
how they may differ in other particulars.

Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee

represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order
to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. The
employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at
fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts
instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.

The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be

overemphasized. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of
balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length of the period
during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning which the acts differ
considerably. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced
greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the
Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be
tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation
that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme
conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so
interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much of
the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the
various jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's
Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the
premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many
other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in
to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed.
The basic theory has to be followed.

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of
the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am
personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive
employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was
precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this

Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the

State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and
public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have
to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary.
The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees
are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining
Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides
for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found
in Title XVIII-Damages that:

COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF

DEATH, INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.

Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muñoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil.
582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:

Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play
on words. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act
772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded for a personal
injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. ...

By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply
to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be
no other than the Workmen's Compensation

Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the
majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will
preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to them
under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".

There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise
the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's
Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because
those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".

In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of
remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to
avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in
disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.

B.

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding
"the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took
effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some
sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter
209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's
Compensation Act, p. 2]

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under
the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266,
267.

Sec. 112. Hawaii

Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial

employment' and employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections
7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)

Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to

injure himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)

When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p.
714.)

2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this

Act to an employee

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation

 shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer

under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and
emphasis supplied)

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the
law-making body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read
and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious
significations, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced
or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-
making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its
correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]

3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply
exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in
and during the performance of the duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act,
subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.

4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within
the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:

SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his
employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; ... (Emphasis supplied)

If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to
sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first
paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the
legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.

5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if
entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code
nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when
the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies
under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply
(exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in
and during the performance of the duties of the employment (and all service
contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such
agreement).

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the
elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of
the paragraph:

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such
law be more favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that
time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that
the employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code,
should the latter be more favorable to him.

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured
employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The
compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689
[1938]).

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation,
caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the
employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June
20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case
there was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the
legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer,
to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.

On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again
given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or
under the Civil Code.

When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court
is unjustifiably legislating.

It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts
would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's
compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove
the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.

Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years
of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.

Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort
suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer
and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could
employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses
available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted
employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030)
decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.

The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in
protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact
of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.

The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made
compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the
employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious,
inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if
not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.

Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a
major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate.
Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.

I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In
return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the
right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the
injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the
total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer
is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.

The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:

An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an

understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.

By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both
the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was
faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the
dangers of modern industry. If the accident was avoidable and could be attributed to
the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered some measure of
redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the
employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there
could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed officially at the
employer or his agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain. The
witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn between
friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the
injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of
his claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of
the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer
against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while only a
part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents. The
employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.

xxx xxx xxx

Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services-
should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the
manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is
subordinated to broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of
accident loss only initially; it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the
stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among
the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is
uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation
principle.

In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all
parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be
fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the
industry affected. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from
the broad economic viewpoint. ....

Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important
respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and
compensation payable according to a definitely limited schedule is substituted for
damages. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes, irrespective of
how they may differ in other particulars.

Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee

represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order
to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. The
employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not at
fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts
instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
 The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be
overemphasized. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of
balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length of the period
during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning which the acts differ
considerably. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced
greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the
Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be
tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation
that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme
conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so
interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much of
the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the
various jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's
Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).

The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the
premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many
other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in
to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed.
The basic theory has to be followed.

If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of
the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am
personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive
employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was
precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this

Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury. ...

Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:

ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.—Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the

State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and
public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have
to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary.
The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees
are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.