RULE 7
the Carloses, informing them that Cruz’s loan had been
PARTS OF A PLEADING
Section 1. Caption.
The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title
of the action, and the docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the
parties. They shall all be named in the original
complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it
shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on
each side be stated with an appropriate indication
when there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be
indicated.
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Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February 15,
2000
Topic: Rule 7, Section 1. Caption
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This petition for review on certiorari arose from an action for
reformation of instrument and damages originally filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, the
decision on which was reviewed and reversed by the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, Supreme
Court reversed the CA and upheld lower RTC’s decision.
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FACTS:
Petitioners were the registered owners of a 225-square
meter parcel of land located in Antipolo, Rizal and the same
property was mortgaged to Florencio and Nestor Carlos in
the amount of P150,000.00.
About a year later, the mortgage obligation had increased to
P500,000.00 and fearing foreclosure of the property,
petitioners asked their son-in-law, herein private respondent
Ricardo delos Reyes, for help in redeeming their property.
Private respondent delos Reyes agreed to redeem the
property but because he allegedly had no money then for
the purpose he solicited the assistance of private
respondent Josefina Cruz, a family friend of the delos
Reyeses and an employee of the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale
conveying the mortgaged property in favor of private
respondent Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing
loan with Land Bank, using the subject property as collateral.
It was further agreed that out of the proceeds of the loan,
P500,000.00 will be paid to the Carloses as mortgagees, and
any such balance will be applied by petitioners for capital
gains tax, expenses for the cancellation of the mortgage to
the Carloses, transfer of title to Josefina Cruz, and
registration of a mortgage in favor of Land Bank. Moreover,
the monthly amortization on the housing loan which was
supposed to be deducted from the salary of private
respondent Cruz will be reimbursed by private respondent
delos Reyes.
Eventually, Land Bank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of
approved and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 165009 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 229891 in the
name of Josefina Cruz. The mortgage was discharged.
Now, sometime in 1993, petitioners notified private
respondent delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the
property but the offer was refused. Aggrieved, petitioners
filed a complaint for reformation of instrument and damages
with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner averred that the
deed was merely a formality to meet the requirements of
the bank for the housing loan, and that the real intention of
the parties in securing the loan was to apply the proceeds
thereof for the payment of the mortgage obligation.
Furthermore, they alleged that the deed of sale did not
reflect the true intention of the parties, and that the
transaction was not an absolute sale but an equitable
mortgage, considering that the price of the sale was
inadequate considering the market value of the subject
property and because they continued paying the real estate
taxes thereto even after the execution of the said deed of
sale.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
They decided that (1) the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
October 21, 1992 did not reflect the true intention of the
parties, and (2) the transaction entered into between
petitioners and Cruz was not an absolute sale but an
equitable mortgage, considering that the price stated in
the Deed of Absolute Sale was insufficient compared to the
value of the property, petitioners are still in possession of
the property, and petitioners had continued to pay the real
estate taxes thereon after the execution of the said deed of
sale.
CA reversed the above decision, finding that private
respondents were denied due process by the refusal of the
trial court to lift the order of default against them, and that
the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was one of
absolute sale, not of equitable mortgage. Also, the Court
of Appeals found petitioners’ action for reformation
unmeritorious because there was no showing that the
failure of the deed of sale to express the parties’ true
intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct, or accident. It also held the RTC decision to be
constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based. Thus,
petitioner brought the case to Supreme Court.
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ISSUE:
Whether the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was
one of absolute sale or of equitable mortgage.
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RULINGS:
The true arrangement between petitioners and private
respondent Cruz was an equitable mortgage.
Based on the provision found under Article 1602 of the Civil
Code, the Court finds that the true intention between the
parties for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to
convey ownership of the property in question but merely to
secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a
direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to be
immediately applied to their outstanding mortgage
obligation to the Carloses.
Also, it will be recalled that the instant petition originated as
a complaint for reformation filed before the RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal. The Court of Appeals found petitioners’ action for
reformation unmeritorious because there was no showing
that the failure of the deed of sale to express the parties’
true intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct, or accident. Indeed, under the facts of the present
case, reformation may not be proper for failure to fully meet
the requisites in Article 1359 of the Civil Code, and because
as the evidence eventually bore out the contested Deed of
Absolute Sale was not intended to reflect the true
agreement between the parties but was merely to comply
with the collateral requirements of Land Bank. However,
the fact that the complaint filed by petitioners before the
trial court was categorized to be one for reformation of
instrument should not preclude the Court from passing
upon the issue of whether the transaction was in fact an
equitable mortgage as the same has been squarely raised
in the complaint and had been the subject of arguments
and evidence of the parties. Thus, SC held that it is not the
caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that
determine the nature of the action, and the Court shall
grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof
even if no such relief is prayed for.
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Sec. 2. The body.
The body of the pleading sets forth its designation,
the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the
relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading.
(a) Paragraphs. - The allegations in the body of a
pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so
numbered as to be readily identified, each of which
shall contain a statement of a single set of
circumstances so far as that can be done with
convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its
number in all succeeding pleadings.
(b) Headings. - When two or more causes of action
are joined, the statement of the first shall be prefaced
by the words "first cause of action," of the second by
"second cause of action," and so on for the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are
addressed to one of several causes of action in the
complaint, they shall be prefaced by the words
"answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the
second cause of action" and so on; and when one or
more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to
several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by
words to that effect.
(c) Relief. - The pleading shall specify the relief
sought, but it may add a general prayer for such
further or other relief as may be deemed just or
equitable.
(d) Date. - Every pleading shall be dated.
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PHIL CHARTER vs. PNC CORP
G.R. NO. 185066 OCTOBER 2, 2009
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FACTS:
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)
conducted a public bidding for the supply of labor, materials,
tools, supervision, equipment, and other incidentals
necessary for the fabrication and delivery of 27 tollbooths to
be used for the automation of toll collection along the
expressways. Orlando Kalingo (Kalingo) won in the bidding
and was awarded the contract. conducted a public bidding
for the supply of labor, materials, tools, supervision,
equipment, and other incidentals necessary for the
fabrication and delivery of 27 tollbooths to be used for the
automation of toll collection along the expressways. Orlando
Kalingo (Kalingo) won in the bidding and was awarded the
contract.
On November 13, 1997, PNCC issued – in favor of Kalingo –
Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 71024L for 25 units of tollbooths
for a total of P2,100,000.00, and P.O. No. 71025L for two
units of tollbooths amounting to P168,000.00. These
issuances were subject to the condition, among others, that
each P.O. shall be covered by a surety bond equivalent to
100% of the total down payment (50% of the total cost
reflected on the P.O.), and that the surety bond shall
continue in full force until the supplier shall have complied
with all the undertakings and covenants to the full
satisfaction of PNCC.
Kalingo, hence, posted surety bonds – Surety Bond Nos.
27546 and 27547.
Both surety bonds contain the following conditions: (1) the
liability of PCIC under the bonds expires on March 16, 1998;
and (2) a written extrajudicial demand must first be
tendered to the surety, PCIC, within 15 days from the
expiration date; otherwise PCIC shall not be liable
thereunder and the obligee waives the right to claim or file
any court action to collect on the bond.
On March 3, 4, and 5, 1998, Kalingo made partial/initial
delivery of four units of tollbooths under P.O. No. 71024L.
However, the tollbooths delivered were incomplete or were
not fabricated according to PNCC specifications. Kalingo
failed to deliver the other 23 tollbooths up to the time of
filing of the complaint; despite demands, he failed and
refused to comply with his obligation under the POs.
On March 9, 1998, six days before the expiration of the
surety bonds and after the expiration of the delivery period
provided for under the award, PNCC filed a written
extrajudicial claim against PCIC notifying it of Kalingo’s
default and demanding the repayment of the down payment
on P.O. No. 71024L as secured by PCIC Bond No. 27547, in
the amount ofP1,050,000.00. The claim went unheeded
despite repeated demands. For this reason, on April 24,
2001, PNCC filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Mandaluyong City a complaint for collection of a sum of
money against Kalingo and PCIC.
PCIC, in its answer, argued that the partial delivery of four
out of the 25 units of tollbooth by Kalingo under P.O. No.
71024L should reduce Kalingo's obligation.
The trial court ruled in favor of PNCC and made no ruling on
PCIC’s liability under PCIC Bond No. 27546, a claim that was
not pleaded in the complaint.
On appeal, the CA, by Decision of January 7, 2008, held that
the RTC erred in ruling that PCIC's liability is limited only to
the payment of P1,050,000.00 under PCIC Bond No. 27547
which secured the down payment on P.O. No. 71024L. The
appellate court held that PCIC, as surety, is liable jointly and
severally with Kalingo for the amount of the two bonds.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not PCIC is liable for payment of the security
bond not alleged in the complaint for collection of money.
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HELD:
No.
The issue before us calls for a discussion of a court’s basic
appreciation of allegations in a complaint. The fundamental
rule is that reliefs granted a litigant are limited to those
specifically prayed for in the complaint; other reliefs prayed
for may be granted only when related to the specific
prayer(s) in the pleadings and supported by the evidence on
record. Necessarily, any such relief may be granted only
where a cause of action therefor exists, based on the
complaint, the pleadings, and the evidence on record.
Each of the surety bonds issued by PCIC created a right in
favor of PNCC to collect the repayment of the bonded down
payments made on the two POs if contractor Kalingo
defaults on his obligation under the award to fabricate and
deliver to PNCC the tollbooths contracted for.
Concomitantly, PCIC, as surety, had the obligation to comply
with its undertaking under the bonds to repay PNCC the
down payments the latter made on the POs if Kalingo
defaults.
It must be borne in mind that each of the two bonds is a
distinct contract by itself, subject to its own terms and
conditions. They each contain a provision that the surety,
PCIC, will not be liable for any claim not presented to it in
writing within 15 days from the expiration of the bond, and
that the obligee (PNCC) thereby waives its right to claim or
file any court action against the surety (PCIC) after the
termination of 15 days from the time its cause of action
accrues. This written claim provision creates a condition
precedent for the accrual of: (1) PCIC’s obligation to comply
with its promise under the particular bond, and of (2) PNCC's
right to collect or sue on these bonds. PCIC’s liability to
repay the bonded down payments arises only upon PNCC's
filing of a written claim – notifying PCIC of principal Kalingo’s
default and demanding collection under the bond – within
15 days from the bond’s expiry date. PNCC’s failure to
comply with the written claim provision has the effect of
extinguishing PCIC’s liability and constitutes a waiver by
PNCC of the right to claim or sue under the bond.
The records reveal that PNCC complied with the written
claim provision, but only with respect to PCIC Bond No.
27547.
Under the circumstances, PNCC’s cause of action with
respect to PCIC Bond No. 27546 did not and cannot exist,
such that no relief for collection thereunder may be validly
awarded.
Hence, the trial court’s decision finding PCIC liable solely
under PCIC Bond No. 27547 is correct – not only because
collection under the other bond, PCIC Bond No. 27546, was
not raised or pleaded in the complaint, but for the more
important reason that no cause of action arose in PNCC’s
favor with respect to this bond. Consequently, the appellate
court was in error for including liability under PCIC Bond No.
27546.
PNCC might be alluding to Section 2(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that a pleading shall specify the relief
sought, but may add a general prayer for such further or
other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under
this rule, a court can grant the relief warranted by the
allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought
by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may
justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with
the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.
We find PNCC’s argument to be misplaced. A general prayer
for "other reliefs just and equitable" appearing on a
complaint or pleading normally enables the court to award
reliefs supported by the complaint or other pleadings, by the
facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by
the parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed
for in the complaint. We cannot, however, grant PNCC the
"other relief" of recovering under PCIC Bond No. 27546
because of the respect due the contractual stipulations of
the parties. While it is true that PCIC’s liability under PCIC
Bond No. 27546 would have been clear under ordinary
circumstances (considering that Kalingo's default under his
contract with PNCC is now beyond dispute), it cannot be
denied that the bond contains a written claim provision, and
compliance with it is essential for the accrual of PCIC’s
liability and PNCC’s right to collect under the bond.
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Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013
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Facts:
On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of
P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square
meter property located in
Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate
ofTitle (TCT) No. V-12296. When the debt became due,
respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand.
BODY OF THE COMPLAINT
The RTC filed a Complaint praying that respondents be
ordered:
(a)To pay [petitioner] the principal obligation of P45,000.00,
with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, from 02
March 1991 until the full obligation is paid.
(b) To pay [petitioner] actual damages as may be proven
during the trial but shall in no case be less than P10,000.00;
P25,000.00 by way of attorney’s fee, plus P2,000.00 per
hearing as appearance fee.

(c)To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public
auction of the aforementioned parcel of land, and for the
disposition of the proceeds [thereof] in accordance with
law, upon failure of the
[respondents] to fully pay [petitioner] within the period set
by law the sums set forth in this complaint.
(d) Costs of this suit.
Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the
premises are likewise prayed for.
Respondents were served with summons thru respondent
Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny)
Despite the requested extension, however, respondents
failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed
petitioner
to present her evidence ex parte
The RTC granted petitioner’s Complaint and awarded a
monthly interest of 5% per annum. Respondents then filed a
Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside
Execution Sale
dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not
agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner
merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her
Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly
interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full
payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the
exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001
ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.
In an Order dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted
respondents’ motion and accordingly modified the interest
rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can grant relief not
prayed for in the complaint?
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HELD:
NO.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in
the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the
party. They cannot also grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due
process considerations require thatjudgments must conform
to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence
presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines
v. Teston, this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to
the proposed relief. The fundamental
purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint
must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise
to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the
right to due process of a defendant who
was declared in default than of a defendant who
participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to
the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties
under the Rules.
But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared
in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by
the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint.
It provides:
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award
unliquidated damages.
The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be
granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant
would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in
default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a
relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in
the Complaint.
No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due
process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment.
This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of
due process. It embodies “the sporting idea of fair play” and
forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant
was not given the opportunity to be heard In the case at
bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not
supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the
evidence on record. The Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include
any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her
Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents
borrowed from her “the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum”and sought payment thereof. She did not allege
or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did
she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the
RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks
basis and disregards due process.
It violated the due process requirement because
respondents were not informed of the possibility that the
RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting
evidence as they were made to believe that the
complainant [petitioner] was seeking for what she merely
stated in her Complaint.
Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be
considered subsumed by petitioner’s general prayer for
“*o+ther reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the
premises x x x.”
To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what
has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto,
supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of
action.
Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or
60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven
during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and
ought to be
equitably reduced in accordance with applicable
jurisprudence. It is understandable for the respondents not
to contest the default order for, as alleged in their
Comment, “it is not their intention to impugn or run away
from their just and valid obligation.”
Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never
be construed as waiver to contest patently erroneous award
which already transgresses their right to due process, as well
as applicable jurisprudence.
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Sec. 3. Signature and address.
Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him, stating in either case his address
which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect.
However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such
deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the
same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended
for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule,
or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or
fails to promptly report to the court a change of his
address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action.
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Navarro v. Jarson Development, G.R. No. 142627, January
28, 2008
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FACTS:
Spouses Mariano
and Estrella Najarro (spouses Najarro), petitioners, are the
registered owners of a residential building constructed on
Lot 1394-C of the Banilad Friar Lands located on V. Sotto
Street, Cebu City. Respondent Jarson Development
Corporation (JDC), on the other hand, is a corporation
registered and existing under Philippine laws. It is engaged
in the business, among others, of acquiring and managing
real estate, buildings and other
structures. Among JDC’s various projects is the develop
ment of RichmondPlaza, a 12-story commercial building
located at Lot 1394-B, also of the Banilad Friar Lands,
adjacent to Lot 1394-C owned by petitioners.Jose
P. Mabugat and Engineer Eliseo C. Galang, respondents, are
the project designer and the project engineer, respectively,
of the Richmond Plaza project.
Sometime in November 1993, respondent JDC
started excavation and construction works on
the Richmond Plaza project. However, during the
excavation, slippages or cave-ins of soil occurred
on Lot 1394-C causing massive cracks on the wall and floor
of petitioners’ residential building. It became unsafe for
human habitation. Hence, petitioners left the same.On May
26, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 58, Cebu City, a petition for injunction with damages
against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 60680.
Before the start of the hearing on July 1, 1994,
the parties agreed to dispense with the issue of injunction in
view of respondents’ undertaking to reconstruct petitioners’
damaged residential building and to completely restore the
foundation of the soil that caved-in to its original condition.
On August 28, 1995, petitioners filed a motion
for execution of the July 11, 1994 Order. However, it was
denied by the trial court in its Order of November 23,
1995 on the ground that the motion should be resolved
when the case shall be decided.On February 22, 2000, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
On December 12, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion
for Entry of Finality of Judgment. Respondents filed their
Opposition thereto alleging that they and their counsel did
not receive a copy of the February 17, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals.
On March 17, 2006, the appellate court rendered
a Resolution granting petitioners’ Motion for Entry of
Finality of Judgment and declaring that its Decision dated
February 17, 2005 has become final and executory and
ordering that such judgment be entered in the book of
entries of judgments.
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ISSUE: WON the decision dated February 17, 2005 has
become final and executory.
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HELD: the Court of Appeals found that copies of the Notice
of Judgment and its Decision were sent through registered
rd
mail to petitioners’ counsel at M.B. MahinayBldg. (3 Floor),
F. Sotto St., Cebu City. Said counsel received the same. The
latter admitted that through inadvertence, he did not file
with the Court of Appeals a formal notice of his change of
address.
The Court of Appeals, in granting respondents’ Motion for
Entry of Finality of Judgment, held:
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:
Sec. 3. Signature and address. – Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in
either case his address which should not be a post office
box.
xxx
Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs
a pleading in violation of this Rule or alleges scandalous or
indecent matters therein, or fails to promptly report to the
court a change of his address, shall be subject to
appropriate disciplinary action.
Clearly, it is the duty of the counsel to promptly inform the
court of a change of his address. The contention of
defendants-appellants’ counsel that his failure to inform the
Court of his change of address was due to the fault of his
legal secretary in not including the instant case in the
inventory of his cases is a lame excuse and deserves no
consideration. It has to be stressed that it devolves upon
every counsel to take full responsibility in supervising the
work in his office with respect to all the cases he handles
and he should not delegate this responsibility to his legal
secretary.
x x x
Sad to say, the negligence of defendants-appellants’ counsel
in failing to inform the Court of his change of address which
resulted to his non-receipt of Our Decision when the same
was served to him in his old address, which is the address of
record when the said judgment was promulgated, binds
defendants-appellants.
xxx
The service of our Decision to defendants-appellants’
counsel at his address of record on March 2, 2005 was valid.
It follows that the reglementary period of fifteen days within
which the defendants-appellants may file a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court on Our Decision shall be counted from such
date or defendants-appellants had only until March 17, 2005
to file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review on
certiorari to the Supreme Court. Apparently, when
plaintiffs-appellees filed the motion for entry of finality of
judgment on December 12, 2005, Our Decision had already
attained finality as no motion for reconsideration or petition
for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court was ever filed
by defendants-appellants within the reglementary period, or
on or before March 17, 2005.
xxx
Suffice it to state at this point that the Court of Appeals did
not err in granting petitioners’ motion. They and their
counsel are deemed to have received a copy of its
Decision. Indeed, the latter’s failure to file with the Court of
Appeals a notice of change of address is fatal to petitioners’
case.
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Sec. 4. Verification.
Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant
has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief," or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
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G.R. No. 191906 June 2, 2014
JOSELITO MA. P. JACINTO (Formerly President of F. Jacinto
Group, Inc.), Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO* GUMARU, JR., Respondent.
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"When a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond
1
review", and "there are no more proceedings to speak of
inasmuch as these were terminated by the satisfaction of
2
the judgment."
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Facts:
On December 6, 2004, a Decision was rendered in favor of
respondent Eduardo Gumaru, Jr. and against petitioner
Joselito Ma. P. Jacinto and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. Petitioner
and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. filed an appeal with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). However, the appeal
was not perfected for failure to post the proper cash or
surety bond. Thus, the December 6, 2004 Decision became
final and executory. a Writ of Execution was issued in the
labor case. By virtue of such alias writ, real property
belonging to petitioner was levied upon, and was scheduled
to be sold at auction on June 27, 2008 or July 4, 2008. The
Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying petitioner’s Extremely
Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul Levy on Execution.
Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s June 26,2008 Order
to the NLRC, which, set aside the same. Petitioner went up
to the CA on certiorari, assailing the November 28, 2008 and
July 27, 2009 Resolutions of the NLRC. the CA issued the first
assailed Resolution, which denied and dismiss the petition.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
a verification signed by counsel constitutes adequate and
substantial compliance under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; verification is merely a formal,
and not jurisdictional, requisite such that an improper
verification or certification against forum-shopping is not a
fatal defect. Petitioner attached a copy of an Affidavit.
attesting that he caused the preparation of the CA Petition,
and that he read the contents of the CA Petition and affirm
that they are true and correct and undisputed based on his
own personal knowledge and on authentic records. In said
Affidavit, petitioner further certified that he has not
commenced any other action or proceeding, or filed any
claims involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or any Division thereof, or in any other court,
tribunal or agency; to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action, proceeding, or claim is pending before the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any division thereof, or
in any court, tribunal or agency; if there is any other action
or proceeding which is either pending or may have been
terminated, he will state the status thereof; if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action, proceeding or claim
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, or any division thereof, or in any court, tribunal
or agency, he undertakes to promptly report the fact within
five days from notice thereof. Petitioner explained further
that he was out of the country, and could not return on
account of his physical condition, which thus constrained
him to resort to the execution of a sworn statement in lieu
of his actual verification and certification as required under
the Rules. Petitioner likewise ratified Atty. Daos’s acts done
on his behalf relative to the labor case and the filing of the
CA Petition, and implored the appellate court to reconsider
its November 5, 2009 Resolution and excuse his procedural
oversight in respect of the improper verification and
certification in his CA Petition.
respondent contends that with the dismissal of petitioner’s
certiorari petition by the CA, it is for all intents and purposes
deemed to have never been filed, and thus may not be
corrected by resorting to a Petition for Review under Rule
45. Respondent reiterates the view taken by the CA that
certiorari under Rule 65 is a prerogative writ that is not
demandable as a matter of right.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE: whether or not THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT
HAVE DISMISSED THE SUBJECT PETITION
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Ruling: The Court finds that the Petition has become moot
and academic.
It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for reasonable or
justifiable reasons he is unable to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition, he
may execute a special power of attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign the Petition on his behalf.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in
capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already
reflected above respecting noncompliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction
or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed
by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those
who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense,
the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. H,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.30 (Emphasis supplied)
However, while the Court takes the petitioner's side with
regard to the procedural issue dealing with verification and
the certification against forum shopping, it nonetheless
appears that the Petition has been overtaken by events. In a
May 24, 2011 Manifestation, respondent informed this
Court that the judgment award has been satisfied in full. The
petitioner does not dispute this claim, in which case, the
labor case is now deemed ended. "It is axiomatic that after a
judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed
terminated once and for all."And "when a judgment has
been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being
the last act and the end of the proceedings, and payment or
satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces
permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment
debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the
judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Mahinay v. Gako, G.R. No. 165338, November 28,
2011
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Facts:
Constantina H. Sanchez, Josefina H. Lopez and Susan
Honoridez are the registered owners (the owners) of a
parcel of land known as Lot 5. Mahinay filed a
 [11]
complaint for specific performance against the owners and
one Felimon Suarez (Suarez), to compel them to
convey Lot 5 to him. This is based on allegation that the
owners violate Mahinay’s preferential right by selling the
property to Suarez.
The court ruled in favour of Mahinay. The owners and
[22]
Suarez moved for reconsideration. On November 22,
1996, however, the RTC denied the same.
Whereupon, Mahinay filed a Motion to Issue an Order
Directing Sorensen (the current holder of the title) to Turn
Over the title to him. This drew Sorensen’s Opposition.
On December 12, 2003, Judge Gako issued the assailed
Resolution denying Mahinay’s motion. Mahinay filed a
reiteratory motion. Apparently persuaded by Mahinay’s
formulations, Judge Gako granted his Reiteratory
Motion. Soseren appealed.
[55]
In a Resolution promulgated on April 24, 2007, however,
the CA outrightly dismissed Sorensen’s petition for her
failure to state that the allegations in her petition are true
and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but
also based on authentic records.
[56]
Sorensen filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to
remedy the defect in her petition submitted an Amended
[57]
Petition with corrected verification. But the CA was not
moved by Sorensen’s subsequent compliance and,
consequently, denied her motion. Hence this petition.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Issue:
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FOR FAILING TO STATE IN ITS VERIFICATION PORTION
THE PHRASE ‘OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS’ AS REQUIRED
IN SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE AS
AMENDED BY AM NO. 00-2-10-SC [E]SPECIALLY SO WHEN
PETITIONER HAD ALREADY FILED AN AMENDED PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI WITH THE CORRECTED VERIFICATION PORTION THIS
TIME CONTAINING THE PHRASE “BASED ON AUTHENTIC
RECORDS”;
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Ruling:
The rule requiring certain pleadings to be verified is
embodied in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It
reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise
specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant
has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based
on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on “information and belief,” or upon
“knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any
legal importance. It is intended to secure an assurance that
the allegations contained in the pleading are true and
correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have
[81]
been made in good faith. A pleading may be verified by
stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in their
petition and that the same are true and correct based either
on theirpersonal knowledge or authentic records, or based
both on their personal knowledge and authentic
records. While the rule gives the pleaders several ways of
verifying their pleading, the use of the phrase personal
knowledge or authentic records is not without any legal
signification and the pleaders are not at liberty to choose
any of these phrases fancifully. Hun Hyung Park v. Eung
[82]
Won Choi teaches us when to properly use authentic
records in verifying a pleading:
“*A+uthentic” records as a basis for verification bear
significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the
allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in
the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on
the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate,
petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his
personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his
petition before the CA that at the pre-trial conference
respondent admitted having received the letter of demand,
because he (petitioner) was not present during the
conference. Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records
to confirm its veracity.
[84]
Nonetheless, the Rules and jurisprudence on the matter
have it that the court may allow such deficiency to be
[85]
remedied. In Altres v. Empleo, this Court pronounced for
the guidance of the bench and the bar that “non-compliance
x x x or a defect [in the verification] does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order
its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with
the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the needs of
justice may be served thereby.”
Pitted against this test, we sustain the CA for not taking a
liberal stance in resolving Sorensen’s petition for certiorari as
the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect her substantive
rights.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Vallacar v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2012
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and
the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No.
T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as
a regular bus driver of petitioner.
On January 27, 1994, respondent’s husband, Quintin
Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete
City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee,
Teddy Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving
the motorcycle. While approaching a curve at kilometers 59
and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler
cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was
then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by
Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction. When the two
vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown from
the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was
thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the
hospital. On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide in Criminal
Case No. M-15-94 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of
Negros Oriental. After preliminary investigation, the MCTC
issued a Resolution on December 22, 1994, dismissing the
criminal charge against Cabanilla. It found that Cabanilla was
not criminally liable for the deaths of Catubig and Emperado,
because there was no negligence, not even contributory, on
Cabanilla’s part.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Damages against petitioner.
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim, contended that
the proximate cause of the vehicular collision, which
resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the
sole negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook
another vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane of
the road. As a special and affirmative defense, petitioner
asked for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for not
being verified and/or for failure to state a cause of action, as
there was no allegation that petitioner was negligent in the
selection or supervision of its employee driver.
On January 26, 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision
favoring petitioner. Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court held that both Catubig and
Cabanilla were negligent in driving their respective vehicles.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration
of petitioner.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s complaint for damages is
dismissible on the ground of the latter’s failure to verify the
same.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Rulings:
No. Respondent filed her complaint for damages against
petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the 1964 Rules of Court
was still in effect. Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules of
Court provided:
SEC. 6. Verification.—A pleading is verified only by an
affidavit stating that the person verifying has read the
pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own
knowledge.
Verifications based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," shall be deemed
insufficient.
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure took effect.
The foregoing provision was carried on, with a few
amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, viz:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on “information and belief,” or upon
“knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”
The same provision was again amended by A.M. No.
00-2-10, which became effective on May 1, 2000. It now
reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on “information and belief” or upon
“knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its amendment by
A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides that a pleading lacking
proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect. However, it also just as
clearly states that “*e+xcept when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.” No such law or rule
specifically requires that respondent’s complaint for
damages should have been verified.
In the case before us, we stress that as a general rule, a
pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule
specifically requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that
require verification are: (1) all pleadings filed in civil cases
under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; (2)
petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the
Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule 41,
Section 2; (3) petition for review of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42,
Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition
for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section
1; (6) petition for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7) complaint for
injunction under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under
Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a
receiver under Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for
support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition
for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of constitutional commissions under Rule 64,
Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for
quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint for
expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for
indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the
1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions involving
intra- corporate controversies under the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; (17) complaint
or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment
under the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and
(18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well as
petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required by the
rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are
true and correct and not of mere speculation. When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may thereby be served.
 Facts:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Salvador v. Angeles, G.R. No. 171219, September 3,
2012
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Facts:
Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered
owners of a parcel of land. The subject parcel of land was
occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993,
as a lessee. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged
that she bought on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of
land from GALIGA.ANGELES, sent a letter to SALVADOR
demanding that the latter vacate the subject property,
which was not heeded by SALVADOR. ANGELES, thru one
Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment in
MeTC.
The complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of
respondent, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the
verification and certification dated October 12, 1994,
alleging therein that he was respondent's attorney-in-fact.
There was, however, no copy of any document attached to
the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding the
authority supposedly granted to him.
In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she
alleged, among others, that DIAZ, who filed the complaint
for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from
respondent-appellee ANGELES at the time of filing of the
suit.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Issue:
Effect of Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure
to present proof of his authority to represent respondent
(plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Ruling:
InTamondong v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically
stated that "[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the
plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint
does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff." This ruling
was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper
Insurance Company, where the Court went on to say that
"[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose of the
case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be
bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the
court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was
ever filed with the [MeTC], the same did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondent [plaintiff before
the lower court]."
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Estel v. Diego, G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
The present petition originated from a Complaint for
Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order filed by herein respondents
Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr. with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Gingoog City,
Misamis Oriental.
Respondents alleged that on April 16, 1991, they entered
into a contract of sale of a 306 –square-meter parcel of land
with petitioner; after receiving the amount of P17,000.00 as
downpayment, petitioner voluntarily delivered the physical
and material possession of the subject property to
respondents and had been in actual, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of the subject lot.
At around 8:30 in the morning of July 20, 1995, petitioner,
together with her two grown-up sons and five other
persons, uprooted the fence surrounding the disputed lot,
after which they entered its premises and then cut and
destroyed the trees and plants found therein.
Respondents prayed for the restoration of their possession,
for the issuance of a permanent injunction against petitioner
as well as payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs of
suit.
On July 26, 1995, the MTCC issued a Temporary Restraining
Order against petitioner and any person acting in her
behalf.
In her Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims, petitioner denied the material allegations in
the Complaint contending that respondents were never in
physical, actual, public, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the subject lot; full possession and absolute
ownership of the disputed parcel of land, with all
improvements thereon, had always been that of petitioner
and her daughter; the agreement she entered into with the
wife of respondent Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. for the sale of the
subject lot had been abrogated; she even offered to return
the amount she received from respondents, but the latter
refused to accept the same and instead offered an
additional amount of P12,000.00 as part of the purchase
price but she also refused to accept their offer; the subject
of the deed of sale between petitioner and respondents and
what has been delivered to respondents was actually Lot 16
which is adjacent to the disputed Lot 19; that they did not
destroy the improvements found on the subject lot and, in
fact, any improvements therein were planted by petitioner's
5
parents.
On February 16, 2002, the MTCC rendered a Decision in
favor of the plaintiffs [herein respondents], dismissing
defendant's [herein petitioner's] counterclaim.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC of Gingoog City
and rendered its Decision affirming the assailed Decision of
the MTCC.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA
wherein it affirmed the Decision of the RTC.Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated August 10, 2006.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Issue:
Whether or not a verification should be based on personal
knowledge or authentic record and not simply upon
“knowledge, information and belief.”
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Ruling :
The Court does not agree.
Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court
again notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC.
Even granting that this matter was properly raised before
the court a quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural
defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of
respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the
requirement regarding verification.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 00-2-10-SC provides:
Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read
the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief" or upon
"knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
A reading of respondents’ verification reveals that they
complied with the abovequoted procedural rule.
Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in
the Complaint which were true and correct based on their
personal knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best"
before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not
violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being
sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations
in the complaint are true and correct based on their
personal knowledge.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as
in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Spoused Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 192615,
January 30, 2013
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
On January 26, 1999, respondent Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, a complaint for collection of
money with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
petitioners. The verification and certification against forum-
shopping attached to the complaint were signed by
Francisco R. Ramos (Ramos), then BPI Assistant Vice-
President and Mindanao Region Lending Head.
On April 22, 1999, the petitioners moved to dismiss BPI’s
complaint on the ground that there was a pending action for
foreclosure proceedings before the RTC of Ozamis City, filed
by BPI against Philcompak,. The RTC found that the present
complaint and the pending action for foreclosure
proceedings involved different causes of action; hence, the
4
RTC denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On May 26, 2008, the petitioners filed another motion to
dismiss, this time, on the ground that there had been a fatal
defect in the verification and certification against forum
shopping attached to BPI’s complaint. They argued that the
verification and certification did not state or declare that
Ramos was filing the subject complaint in a representative
capacity or as an authorized officer of BPI; nor did it state
that Ramos was authorized by BPI’s Board of Directors to file
the complaint through a board resolution made specifically
for the purpose.
The RTC denied the petitioners’ second motion to
9
dismiss and the subsequent motion for
10
reconsideration. The petitioners assailed these orders of
11
denial in the petition for certiorari they filed with the CA.
12
In a decision dated February 26, 2010, the CA dismissed
the petitioners’ certiorari petition. The petitioners moved to
reconsider the assailed decision but the CA denied their
motion, hence, the filing of the present petition for review
13
on certiorari with this Court.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUES:
a. whether the CA gravely erred when it affirmed
the RTC in not dismissing BPI’s complaint against
the petitioners due to the alleged lack of
authority of Francisco R. Ramos to file the BPI
complaint and sign its attached verification and
certification against forum shopping;
b. whether the Special Power of Attorney and
Corporate Secretary’s Certificate that BPI
belatedly submitted constituted substantial
compliance with the requirements under the
rules on verification and certification.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
RULING:
We note that, at the time the complaint against the
petitioners was filed, Ramos also held the position of
Assistant Vice-President for BPI Northern Mindanao and was
then the highest official representing the bank in the
23
Northern Mindanao area. This position and his standing in
the BPI hierachy, to our mind, place him in a sufficiently high
and authoritative position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the subject complaint, to
justify his authority in filing the complaint and to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping.
Whatever is lacking, from the strictly corporate point of
view, was cured when BPI subsequently (although belatedly)
issued the appropriate SPA.1âwphi1
In any case, it is settled that the requirements of verification
and certification against forum shopping are not
24
jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely
25
speculative. Non-compliance with the verification
requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
26
defective, and is substantially complied with when signed
by one who has ample knowledge of the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
27
true and correct. On the other hand, the certification
against forum shopping is required based on the principle
that a party-litigant should not be allowed to purse
28
simultaneous remedies in different for a. While the
certification requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a
defect in the certification could be cured by its subsequent
correction or submission under special circumstances or
compelling reasons, or on the ground of "substantial
compliance.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Swedish Match v. Treasurer, v. G.R. No. 181277, July
3, 2013
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
On 20 October 2001, petitioner paid business taxes in the
total amount of P470,932.21. The assessed amount was
based on Sections 14 and 21 of Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, as amended
by Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011. Out of that
amount, P164,552.04 corresponded to the payment under
Section 21.
Assenting that it was not liable to pay taxes under Section
21, petitioner wrote a letter dated 17 September 2003 to
herein respondent claiming a refund of business taxes the
former had paid pursuant to the said provision. Petitioner
argued that payment under Section 21 constituted double
taxation in view of its payment under Section 14.
On 17 October 2003, for the alleged failure of respondent to
act on its claim for a refund, petitioner filed a Petition for
Refund of Taxes with the RTC of Manila in accordance with
Section 196 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The
Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-108163.
On 14 June 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21
of Manila rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 03-108163
dismissing the Petition for the failure of petitioner to plead
the latter’s capacity to sue and to state the authority of
Tiarra T. Batilaran-Beleno (Ms. Beleno), who had executed
the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
In denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC
went on to say that Sections 14 and 21 pertained to taxes of
a different nature and, thus, the elements of double taxation
were wanting in this case.
On appeal, the CTA Second Division affirmed the RTC’s
dismissal of the Petition for Refund of Taxes on the ground
that petitioner had failed to state the authority of Ms.
Beleno to institute the suit.
The CTA En Banc likewise denied the Petition for Review,
ruling as follows:
In this case, the plaintiff is the Swedish Match Philippines,
Inc. However, as found by the RTC as well as the Court in
Division, the signatory of the verification and/or certification
of non-forum shopping is Ms. Beleno, the company’s
Finance Manager, and that there was no board resolution or
secretary's certificate showing proof of Ms. Beleno’s
authority in acting in behalf of the corporation at the time
the initiatory pleading was filed in the RTC. It is therefore,
correct that the case be dismissed.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE: (Related to the topic RULE 7, SEC. 4 VERIFICATION)
Whether Ms. Beleno was authorized to file the Petition for
Refund of Taxes with the RTC
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
HELD:
YES. Ms. Belino was authorized to file the Petition for Refund
of Taxes with the RTC.
Anent the procedural issue, petitioner argues that there can
be no dispute that Ms. Beleno was acting within her
authority when she instituted the Petition for Refund before
the RTC, notwithstanding that the Petition was not
accompanied by a Secretary’s Certificate. Her authority was
ratified by the Board in its Resolution adopted on 19 May
2004. Thus, even if she was not authorized to execute the
Verification and Certification at the time of the filing of the
Petition, the ratification by the board of directors
retroactively applied to the date of her signing.
On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner
failed to establish the authority of Ms. Beleno to institute
the present action on behalf of the corporation. Citing
Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (PAL v. FASAP), respondent
avers that the required certification of non-forum shopping
should have been valid at the time of the filing of the
Petition. The Petition, therefore, was defective due to the
flawed Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, which were insufficient in form and therefore a
clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Consequently, a verification signed without an authority
from the board of directors is defective. However, the
requirement of verification is simply a condition affecting
the form of the pleading and non-compliance does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may in fact order the correction of the pleading if
verification is lacking or, it may act on the pleading although
it may not have been verified, where it is made evident that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with so
that the ends of justice may be served.
A distinction between noncompliance and substantial
compliance with the requirements of a certificate of non-
forum shopping and verification as provided in the Rules of
22
Court must be made. In this case, it is undisputed that the
Petition filed with the RTC was accompanied by a
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping signed
by Ms. Beleno, although without proof of authority from the
board. However, the Supreme Court finds that the belated
submission of the Secretary’s Certificate constitutes
substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
Clearly, this is not an ordinary case of belated submission of
proof of authority from the board of directors. Petitioner-
corporation ratified the authority of Ms. Beleno to represent
it in the Petition filed before the RTC, particularly in Civil
Case No. 03-108163, and consequently to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping on
behalf of the corporation. This fact confirms and affirms her
authority and gives Supreme Court all the more reason to
uphold that authority.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting
a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements
shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5,
2014 (Supra.)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
THE FACTS
4 Clearly, the petitioners failed to establish any clear and
On August 28, 1997, the CA ruled that among the Plaza
siblings, namely: Aureliano, Emiliana, Vidal, Marciano, and
Barbara, Barbara was the owner of the subject agricultural
land.
The decision became final and executory and Barbara's
successors, respondents Guillermo Lustiva, Eleodora Vda. de
Martinez and Vicky Sayson Goloseno, have continued
occupying the property.
They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from
unlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the
subject property.
According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from
Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and
winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of
Butuan on December 27, 1996.
Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee, was
disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section
89 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
5
As Tuazon’s participation in the sale was void, she could
have not transferred ownership to the petitioners.
Equally important, the petitioners merely falsified the
property tax declaration by inserting the name of the
petitioners’ father, making him appear as a co-owner of the
auctioned land.
THE RTC’S RULING
6
In its December 14, 1999 order, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5, reconsidered its earlier
7
order, denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and ordered that the possession and occupation
of the land be returned to the respondents.
The RTC found that the auction sale was tainted with
irregularity as the bidder was a government employee
disqualified in accordance with Section 89 of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The petitioners are not buyers in good faith either. On the
contrary, they were in bad faith for having falsified the tax
declaration they redeemed the property with.
THE CA’S RULING
While the petition for review on certiorari was pending
before the CA, the petitioners filed an action for specific
8
performance against the City Government of Butuan.
According to the petitioners, they acquired possession and
ownership over the auctioned property when they
redeemed it from Tuazon. The City Government of Butuan
9
must therefore issue them a certificate of sale.
The CA, after legal analysis, similarly concluded that for
being disqualified to bid under Section 89 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, Tuazon never obtained
ownership over the property; much less transmit any
proprietary rights to the petitioners.
unmistakable right enforceable by the injunctive relief.:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE:
ARE THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING?
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
THE COURT’S RULING
YES!
The petitioners are guilty
of forum shopping
We agree with the CA that the petitioners committed forum
shopping when they filed the specific performance case
despite the pendency of the present case before the CA.
In the recent case of Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, etc., et al. v.
26
Matilde S. Palicte, the Court laid down the three ways
forum shopping may be committed:
1) through litis pendentia — filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet;
2) through res judicata — filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case
having been finally resolved; and
3) splitting of causes of action — filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action but with different prayers —
the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res
judicata.
"The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions;
(b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other."
27
Noticeable among these three types of forum shopping is
the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed.
Cause of action is "the act or omission by which a party
28
violates the right of another."
The cause of action in the present case (and the main case)
is the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the land when they
bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or
from Tuazon.
This ownership is the petitioners’ basis in enjoining the
respondents from dispossessing them of the property.
On the other hand, the specific performance case prayed
that the City Government of Butuan be ordered to issue the
petitioners the certificate of sale grounded on the
petitioners’ ownership of the land when they had bought it,
either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon.
While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the
present injunction case is different from what was prayed
for in the specific performance case, the cause of action
which serves as the basis for the reliefs remains the same —
the petitioners’ alleged ownership of the property after its
purchase in a public auction.
Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific
performance action is forum shopping of the third kind-
splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers.
As the Court has held in the past, "there is still forum
shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are
different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same
29
issues."
Similarly, the CA correctly found that the petitioners and
their counsel were guilty of forum shopping based on litis
pendentia.
Not only were the parties in both cases the same insofar as
the City Government of Butuan is concerned, there was also
identity of rights asserted and identity of facts alleged.
The cause of action in the specific performance case had
already been ruled upon in the present case, although it was
still pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the prayer
sought in the specific performance case-for the City
Government of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of
the petitioners - had been indirectly ruled upon in the
present case when the R TC declared that no certificate of
sale could be issued because there had been no valid sale.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Mediserv v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161368, April
5, 2010
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
On September 20, 1994, petitioner Mediserv, Inc.
executed a real estate mortgage in favor of China Banking
Corporation as security for a loan. The mortgage was
constituted on a 500-square meter lot with
improvements. Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with
Chinabank and the real estate mortgage was foreclosed. At
the public auction sale, private respondent Landheights
Development Corporation won as the highest bidder.
Sometime in April 1998, Landheights filed with
the RTC of Manila an “Application for Possession of Real
Estate Property Purchased at an Auction Sale under Act
No. 3135.” The title of the property was consolidated in
favor of Landheights and a TCT was issued to
them. Landheights then filed a verified complaint for
ejectment against Mediserv before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC).
MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
Landheights. Aggrieved, Mediserv appealed the decision to
the RTC. RTC rendered a decision which reversed and set
aside the MeTC’s order. Landheights’ motion for
reconsideration was denied. Accordingly, Landheights filed a
Petition for Review with the CA, which however dismissed
the petition. Landheights seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration and subsequently submitted a Secretary’s
Certificate executed by its Corporate Secretary, stating that
the Board of Directors affirms the authority of Mr. Tan to file
the Petition for Review.
CA issued a Resolution granting Landheights a
new period of 10 days within which to correct and rectify
the deficiencies in the petition. Mediserv filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that the Resolution which dismissed
the petition, be reinstated. On even date, Landheights filed
its Manifestation of Compliance.
Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the appellate court, petitioner is now before the
SC via the present recourse.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in allowing private respondent
to rectify its deficiency in the certification of forum-
shopping.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
HELD:
No.
Unquestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential
basis to hold that Landheights has substantially complied
with the verification and certification requirements. We
have held in a catena of cases with similar factual
circumstances that there is substantial compliance with
the Rules of Court when there is a belated submission or
filing of the secretary’s certificate through a motion for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing
the petition for certiorari.
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, this
Court acknowledged that it has relaxed, under justifiable
circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of these
certifications and has applied the rule of substantial
compliance under justifiable circumstances with respect to
the contents of the certification. It also conceded that if this
Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification
against forum shopping for compelling reasons in previous
rulings, with more reason should it sanction the timely
submission of such certification though the proof of the
signatory’s authority was submitted thereafter.
The Court is aware of the necessity for a
certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions
for certiorari as this is required under Section 1, Rule 65,
in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. When the petitioner is a
corporation, the certification should obviously be executed
by a natural person to whom the power to execute such
certification has been validly conferred by the corporate
board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and
agents. Generally, the petition is subject to dismissal if a
certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the
signatory’s authority.
However, we must make a distinction between
non-compliance with the requirements for certificate of
non-forum shopping and verification and substantial
compliance with the requirements as provided in the Rules
of Court. The Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification on the justification that such act constitutes
substantial compliance. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. CA, the
Court allowed the filing of the certification fourteen (14)
days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Land Bank
of the Philippines, the Court reinstated a petition on the
ground of substantial compliance even though the
verification and certification were submitted only after the
petition had already been originally dismissed. In Havtor
Management Phils. Inc. v. NLRC, we acknowledged
substantial compliance when the lacking secretary’s
certificate was submitted by the petitioners as an
attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking
reversal of the original decision dismissing the petition for its
earlier failure to submit such requirement.
In the present case, Landheights rectified its
failure to submit proof of Mr. Dickson Tan’s authority to sign
the verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its
behalf when the required document was subsequently
submitted to the Court of Appeals. The admission of these
documents, and consequently, the reinstatement of the
petition itself, is in line with the cases we have cited. In such
circumstances, we deem it more in accord with substantive
justice that the case be decided on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DISMISSED. The September 16, 2003 and November 7,
2003 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
 On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose
(Margarita) sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to
respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional
sale two parcels of land.
 They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon
the execution of the deed and the balance of
P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land
under the Torrens System and that should Margarita
become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact,
Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter,
petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the
payment of the balance and proceed with the
application for registration.
 After Margarita died and with Juvenal having
predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendor’s
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did
not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the properties
by dumping filling materials therein with the intention
of converting the parcels of land into a residential or
industrial subdivision.
 Javellana commenced an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages against her in
the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97.
 Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the
complaint was already barred by prescription; and that
the complaint did not state a cause of action.
 On June 24, 1999. RTC upon Priscilla’s Motion for
Reconsideration granted her Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that 1. that Javellana had no cause of action,
2. no evidence showing the payment of the balance; 3.
that he had never demanded the registration of the
 land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for
specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal.
 On June 21, 2000 Javellana’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
 Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from
[14]
the June 21, 2000 order, which the RTC gave due
course to, and the records were elevated to the Court
of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259).
 It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the
June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his
complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455).

[17]
the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the orders. the CA promulgated its decision
[18]
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259, reversing and setting
aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and
remanding the records to the RTC “for further
proceedings in accordance with law.”
 Priscilla brought an appeal, one of the grounds is
Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the
CA a petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the
RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending
in the CA.
 Javellana countered that he was not guilty of forum
shopping because at the time he filed the petition
for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in
C.A.-G.R.CV No. 68259, and because the issue of
ownership raised in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 was
different from the issue of grave abuse of discretion
raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE:
WON Javellana is guilty of forum shopping?
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
RULING:
No forum shopping was committed
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum
shopping by filing a notice of appeal and a petition
for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier noted, he
denies that his doing so violated the policy against forum
shopping.
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose
of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of
Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title In Lieu of Those Lost,
[30]
Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:
Forum shopping is the act of a party
litigant against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari, or the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause or supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum
shopping happens when, in the two or more
pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity
of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other, there is
forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a)
identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist,
both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and
circumstances and must raise identical
causes of action, subject matter and
issues. Clearly, it does not exist where
different orders were questioned, two
distinct causes of action and issues were
raised, and two objectives were sought.
Should Javellana’s present appeal now be held
barred by his filing of the petition for certiorari in the CA
when his appeal in that court was yet pending?
[31]
We are aware that in Young v. Sy, in which the
petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the orders
concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to the
CA and a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the same
orders four months later, the Court ruled that the successive
filings of the notice of appeal and the petition
for certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying the
trial court’s dismissal orders constituted forum shopping
that warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by
filing an ordinary appeal and a petition
for certiorari with the CA,
engaged in forum shopping. When
the petitioner commenced
the appeal, only four months had
elapsed prior to her filing with the CA
the Petition for Certiorariunder Rule
65 and which eventually came up to
this Court by way of the instant
Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements
of litis pendentia are present between
the two suits. As the CA, through its
Thirteenth Division, correctly noted,
both suits are founded on exactly the
same facts and refer to the same
subject matter—
the RTC Orders which dismissed Ci
vil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for
failure to prosecute. In both cases,
the petitioner is seeking the reversal
of the RTC orders. The parties, the
rights asserted, the issues professed,
and the reliefs prayed for, are all the
same. It is evident that the judgment
of one forum may amount to res
judicata in the other.
 xxxx
The remedies of appeal
and certiorari under Rule 65 are
mutually exclusive and not alternative
or cumulative. This is a firm judicial
policy. The petitioner cannot hedge
her case by wagering two or more
appeals, and, in the event that the
ordinary appeal lags significantly
behind the others, she cannot post
facto validate this circumstance as a
demonstration that the
ordinary appeal had not been speedy
or adequate enough, in order to justify
the recourse to Rule 65. This practice,
if adopted, would sanction the filing of
multiple suits in multiplefora, where
each one, as the petitioner couches it,
becomes a “precautionary measure”
for the rest, thereby increasing the
chances of a favorable decision. This is
the very evil that the proscription
on forum shopping seeks to put right.
In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao,
the Court stated that the grave evil
sought to be avoided by the rule
against forum shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals
of two separate and contradictory
decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety
of competent tribunals, may
repeatedly try their luck in several
different fora until a favorable result is
reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres strictly
to the rules against forum shopping,
and any violation of these rules results
[32]
in the dismissal of the case.
The same result was reached in Zosa v.
[33]
Estrella, which likewise involved the successive filing of a
notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari to challenge the
same orders, with the Court upholding the CA’s dismissals of
the appeal and the petition forcertiorari through separate
decisions.
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v.
Estrella is unjust here even if the orders of the RTC being
challenged through appeal and the petition
for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists because
the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought
different objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
68259, Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous
dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his
judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and
determined in due course by the RTC; but his petition
for certiorari had the ostensible objective “to prevent
(Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from
proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is
finally resolved,” as the CA explicitly determined in its
[34]
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the
judicial policy against forum shopping designed to prevent
or to eliminate attendant. The first danger, i.e., the
multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action,
would not materialize considering that the appeal was a
continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e.,
the unethical malpractice of shopping for a friendly court
or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not
getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had
not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of
the petition for certiorari.
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two
inconsistent remedial approaches to be the result of the
tactical misjudgment by Javellana’s counsel on the efficacy
of the appeal to stave off his caretaker’s eviction from the
parcels of land and to prevent the development of them into
a residential or commercial subdivision pending the appeal.
In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly averred that
his appeal was “inadequate and not speedy to prevent
private respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee
xxx from developing and disposing of the subject property to
other parties to the total deprivation of petitioner’s rights of
possession and ownership over the subject property,” and
that the dismissal by the RTC had “emboldened private
respondents to fully develop the property and for
respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment case against
[35]
petitioner’s overseer xxx.” Thereby, it became far-fetched
that Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation
of the policy against forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 20, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
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Barba v. Liceo de Cagayan, G.R. No. 193857,
November 28, 2012
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Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Ma. Mercedes L. Barba was the Dean of the
College of Physical Therapy of respondent Liceo de Cagayan
University, Inc., a private educational institution with school
campus located at Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City Petitioner
started working for respondent on July 8, 1993 as medical
officer/school physician for a period of one school year or
until March 31, 1994. In July 1994, she was chosen by
respondent to be the recipient of a scholarship grant to
pursue a three-year residency training in Rehabilitation
Medicine at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center
(VMMC). The
After completing her residency training with VMMC in June
1997 petitioner returned to continue working for
respondent. She was appointed as Acting Dean of the
College of Physical Therapy and at the same time designated
as Doctor-In-Charge of the Rehabilitation Clinic of the
Rodolfo
Petitioner’s appointment as Doctor-In-Charge of the
Rehabilitation Clinic was renewed and she was appointed as
Dean of the College of Physical Therapy by respondent’s
President, Dr. Jose Ma. R. Golez.
In the school year 2003 to 2004, the College of Physical
Therapy suffered a dramatic decline in the number of
enrollees from a total of 1,121 students in the school year
1995 to 1996 to only 29 students in the first semester of
school year 2003 to 2004. This worsened in the next year or
in school year 2004 to 2005 where a total of only 20
students enrolled.
Due to the low number of enrollees, respondent decided to
freeze the operation of the College of Physical Therapy
indefinitely.
Thereafter, the College of Physical Therapy ceased
operations on March 31, 2005, and petitioner went on leave
without pay starting on April 9, 2005. Barba was ordered to
returned to work but as a professor in the college of
Nursing.
Barba filed a case for constructive dismissal.
He filed two cases, the issue of the first case was whether
there was constructive dismissal committed by respondent.
On the other hand, the issue in the civil case pending before
the RTC is whether petitioner was guilty of breach of
contract
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Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of forum
shopping.
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Sc ruling:
Yes, the respondent was not guilty of forum shopping.
The respondents failed to inform the appellate court of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 2009- 320, a complaint for breach
of contract filed by respondent against petitioner, we rule in
the negative. Forum shopping exists when the elements of
litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as those
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
While there is identity of parties in the two cases, the causes
of action and the reliefs sought are different. The issue
raised in the present case is whether there was constructive
dismissal committed by respondent. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil case pending before the RTC is whether
petitioner was guilty of breach of contract. Hence,
respondent is not guilty of forum shopping
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Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128550, March 16, 2000
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Facts:
On December 14, 1994, private respondent Asian High
Technology Corp. filed a complaint against petitioner Digital
Microwave Corp. for a sum of money and damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig city. Petitioner moved for
the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court denied the
motion, as well as petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then initiated a special civil action
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. However,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to
comply with Revised Circular No. 28-91, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Said circular requires the
petition filed before the Court of Appeals to be accompanied
by a sworn certification against forum shopping, signed by
petitioner himself.
Petitioner’s certification was signed by counsel; the petition
was, thus, dismissed. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the dismissal and submitted a sworn
certification against forum shopping duly signed by one of
its senior officers. The motion was, however, denied, with
the Court of Appeals stating that
"In the present case, absent any compelling reason for
petitioner’s failure to comply, at first instance, with Revised
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, the Court cannot
therefore, accept its subsequent compliance.
Petitioner contends that in the case of a corporation as
petitioner, the certification against forum shopping may be
signed by a natural person authorized to do so and with
knowledge of the required facts. The authorized person may
be anyone authorized by the corporation, not necessarily an
officer thereof. In such a case, petitioner argues, the counsel
of record has the authority to execute the certification on
behalf of the corporation, particularly considering that under
the Rules of Court, counsel’s authority to represent his client
is presumed. No written power of attorney is required for
counsel to appear for his client.
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ISSUE: w/n the certification of non- forum shopping may be
signed by the counsel?
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Held;
No. The reason the certification against forum
shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner
himself is because only the petitioner himself has actual
knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions
or proceedings in different courts or agencies.
We disagree with petitioner that a corporation
cannot possibly hope to comply with the requirement laid
down by Revised Circular No. 28-91 because it is a juridical
entity and not a natural person. If this were so, then it would
have been impossible for a corporation to do anything at all.
Needless to say, this is the reason why corporations have
directors and officers, to represent it in its transactions with
others. The same is true for the certification against forum
shopping. It could easily have been made by a duly
authorized director or officer of the corporation. That
petitioner did not in the first instance comply with the
requirement of revised Circular No. 28-91 by having the
certification against forum shopping signed by one of its
officers, as it did after its petition before the Court of
Appeals had been dismissed, is beyond our comprehension.
In the recent case of Spouses Valentin Ortiz and Camilla
Milan Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, et al., 299 SCRA 708, 711-
712 (1998), we ruled that
"Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not
suffice in a matter involving strict observance as provided
for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit
the Court’s consideration, petitioners here must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must convince the court that
the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice."
In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its
failure to have the certification against forum shopping
signed by one of its officers.
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Spouses Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11,
2004
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Facts:
Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez
are sisters.[3] Rosemarie lives with her husband, petitioner
Manuel Wee, in Balanga, Bataan, while Rosario resides in
New York, U.S.A. The present controversy stemmed from an
investment agreement between the two sisters, which had
gone sour along the way.
On April 20, 1999, Rosario, represented by Grace Galvez as
her attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint before the RTC of
Quezon City to collect a sum of money from Manuel and
Rosemarie Wee. The amount for collection was US$20,000
at the exchange rate of P38.30 per dollar. The complaint,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, alleged
that Rosario and Rosemarie entered into an agreement
whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of
said amount to be deposited in a savings account while the
balance could be invested in the money market. The
interest to be earned therefrom would be given to Rosario’s
son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance.
In accordance with her agreement with Rosario, Rosemarie
gave Manolito his monthly allowance ranging from P2,000 to
P4,000 a month from 1993 to January 1999. However,
sometime in 1995, Rosario asked for the return of the
US$20,000 and for an accounting. Rosemarie promised to
comply with the demand but failed to do so.
In January 1999, Rosario, through her attorney-in-fact, Grace
Galvez, sent Rosemarie a written demand for her US$20,000
and an accounting. Again, Rosemarie ignored the demand,
thus causing Rosario to file suit.
On May 18, 1999, the Wees moved to dismiss Civil Case No.
Q-99-37372 on the following grounds: (1) the lack of
allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made in accordance with Article
151[5] of the Family Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of
action, the action being premature in the absence of
previous earnest efforts toward a compromise; and (3) the
certification against forum shopping was defective, having
been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the plaintiff,
as required by Rule 7, Section 5[6] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Issue: Whether or not The pleading is defective due to errors
in verification?
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Ruling:
The answer is in the Negative.
Respondent in the instant case is already a resident of the
United States, and not of the Philippines. Hence, it was
proper for her to appoint her daughter, Grace Galvez, to act
as her attorney-in-fact in the Philippines. The Special Power
of Attorney granted by the respondent to her attorney-in-
fact, Grace Galvez, categorically and clearly authorizes the
latter to do the following:
1. To ask, demand and claim any sum of money that is
duly [due] from any person natural, juridical and/or
corporation in the Philippines;
2. To file criminal and/or civil complaints before the courts
of justice in the Philippines to enforce my rights and
interest[s];
3. To attend hearings and/or Preliminary Conference[s], to
make stipulations, adjust claims, to settle and/or enter into
Compromise Agreement[s], to litigate and to terminate such
proceedings; [and]
4. To sign all papers, documents and pleadings necessary
for the accomplishment of the above purposes.
From the foregoing, it is indisputable that Grace Galvez, as
attorney-in-fact of the respondent, was duly authorized and
empowered not just to initiate complaints, whether criminal
or civil, to enforce and protect the respondent’s rights,
claims, and interests in this jurisdiction, but is specifically
authorized to sign all “papers, documents, and pleadings”
necessarily connected with the filing of a complaint.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which
extended the requirement of a certification on non-forum
shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, as well as Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil procedure, the aforementioned papers
and documents, which Grace Galvez was authorized and
empowered to sign, must necessarily include the
certification on non-forum shopping. To conclude
otherwise would render nugatory the Special Power of
Attorney and also render respondent’s constitution of an
attorney-in-fact inutile.
Forum shopping “occurs when a party attempts to have his
action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he
feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
verdict.” In our jurisdiction, it has taken the form of filing
multiple petitions or complaints involving the same issues
before two or more tribunals or agencies in the hope that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
There is also forum shopping when, because of an adverse
decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The rationale
against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora.
Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of
court processes, which tends to degrade the administration
of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and
adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of
the courts. Thus, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks
to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and
their clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to
promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent
undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the
precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the
embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same
issue. It is in this light that we must look at the propriety and
correctness of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed
by Grace Galvez on the respondent’s behalf. We have
examined said Certificate and find that under the
circumstances, it does not negate but instead serves the
purpose of the rule against forum shopping, namely to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, requires that the
certification should be signed by the “petitioner or principal
party” himself. The rationale behind this is “because only the
petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not
he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different
courts or agencies.” However, the rationale does not apply
where, as in this case, it is the attorney-in-fact who
instituted the action. The Special Power of Attorney in this
instance was constituted precisely to authorize Grace Galvez
to file and prosecute suits on behalf of respondent, who was
no longer resident of the Philippines but of New York, U.S.A.
As respondent points out, it is Grace Galvez, as attorney-in-
fact for her, who has actual and personal knowledge
whether she initiated similar actions or proceedings before
various courts on the same issue on respondent’s behalf.
Said circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to allow the
attorney-in-fact, and not the respondent, as plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-99-37372 to personally sign the Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping. Under the circumstances of this case,
we hold that there has been proper compliance with the
rule proscribing forum shopping. As we previously held
concerning Administrative Circular No. 04-94:
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied
with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it
cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether
disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is now incorporated in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as Rule 7, Section 5. It is basic
that the Rules “shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.”Otherwise put, the rule requiring a certification
of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading,
“should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as
to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.”
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COA v. Paler, G.R. No. 172623, March 10, 2010
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FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the decision dated December 20, 2005
and resolution dated April 27, 2005 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90360.
Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative
Staff Officer II (SG-24) with the Technical Support Service of
the Commission on Appointments. On April 8, 2003, he
submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days -
from August 1,2003 to November 14, 2003. In a
memorandum dated April 22, 2003, Ramon C. Nghuatco,
Director III of Technical Support Service, submitted to the
Commission Secretary his
comments/recommendation on Paler's application.
Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July
30, 2003, Paler left for the United States on June 8, 2003,
without verifying whether his application for leave (for
August 1 - November 14, 2003) was approved or denied.
In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission
Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from
the roll of employees effective said date, due to his
continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance
with Section 63, Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999. Paler's son received
the letter on September 23, 2003.
Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on
February 20, 2004, on the ground that it was filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period. The denial was received by
Paler's son on March 18, 2004.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission
Chairman's decision dated September 16, 2003 per
resolution 04-1214 dated November 9, 2004.
The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but this
was denied by the CSC per resolution No. 050833 dated June
23, 2005.
This constrained petitioner to file with the CA a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Since Paler had in the meantime already reached the
compulsory age of retirement on July 28, 2005 and was no
longer entitled to reinstatement, the CA affirmed with
modification CSC resolution 04-1214 dated November 9,
2004 and resolution No. 050833 dated June 23, 2005.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was
denied by the CA in the assailed resolution dated April 27,
2005.
Hence, this petition
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ISSUE:
Paler questions the authority of the Commission Secretary
to file the petition and sign the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping in behalf of the Commission
Chairman.
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RULING:
Authority to File Petition
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on
Appointments, a government entity created by the
Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no
need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew
the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the
verification. With regard, however, to the certification of
non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be
executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and
not by counsel. In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he
was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the
petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove
such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert
Paler's allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the
petition dismissible.
Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it merely
restates the arguments presented before the CSC and CA. It
does not advance any cogent reason that will convince this
Court to deviate from the rulings of both tribunals.
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