Mission Command Essay

General Patton at The Battle of The Bulge

CPT Luz
Team 1
LOG-C3 Class 18-004
29 May 2018
 The Battle of The Bulge, fought between December 16, 1944, and January, 25,

1945, was one of the most important battles during the World War II where the German

loses determined the end of the war months later. General George S. Patton, during the

Battle of The Bulge in the Ardennes, commanded the Third Army with offensive

strategies and leadership opening a corridor to Bastogne to relief and resupply the

101st Airborne and pushing the German’s 5th Panzer Army and 7th Army back to the

Our River, roughly where they stood before the offensive begin. Patton’s leadership

among his subordinates, with strategic and tactical war knowledge offensive attitude

actions before and during the battle where crucial for its outcome. Despite the fact that

he failed in apply the principles of accepting prudent risk and provide the commander’s

intent in two occasions, his execution of those principles in other moments of the battle

with the principles of create a shared understanding and build a cohesive team through

mutual trust led the Third Army to a counteroffensive attack and repeal the German’s

offensive.

Three days after the battle begin, on December 19, in the meeting with General

of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, Lieutenant

General Jacob L. Devers, some Brits, and Brigadier General Kenneth Strong to discuss

what to do about the Bulge, Patton’s accept a prudent risk when he said that the Third

Army would be able to be in position to strike north ward with three divisions in forty-

eight hours. The decision surprised everybody in the room because of the distance and

the weather. The Historian and author Leo Barron described this moment:

“Fortunately, Patton’s Third Army was in position to strike northward. “How soon
will you be able to go, George?” Bradley asked his subordinate.
Patton’s answer stunned many in the room. “Forty-eight hours.”

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 According to Patton, his statement stunned many in the room “created a ripple of
excitement. Some people thought I was boasting and others seemed to be
pleased.”1

The decision to make that move not only affected the maneuver troops, but also a great

challenge for the logisticians, as the Historian and Author Carlo D’Este explained:

Suddenly to turn Third Army ninety degrees to the north along icy roads is terrible
winter weather when its supply dumps where located to support drive to the
Westwall was a logistician’s worst nightmare. It posed equally dauting challenges
to Patton’s subordinate commanders, but the months of training and experience
in combat now paid off handsomely.2

Patton never moved so fast before, he had to disengage two corps and travel more than

100 miles over treacherous roads and terrible winter weather. His orders to his

subordinate commanders and staff to plan e prepare to move before the meeting with

Eisenhower was a prudent risk, because he didn’t know the exact situation of the

enemy and his decision was based on his G-2 reports. Meanwhile, the decision proved

right and created various opportunities, which affected the battle outcome in favor of the

Allies.

Later in the Battle, on December 22, Patton failed in accept prudent risk when he

directed day and night attacks in a bad weather and without previous reconnaissance,

unfollowing his owns rules, and the Historian and Author John Nelson Rickard

described the moment when Patton ordered the attack:

To retain the initiative gained on the first day, Patton directed attacks to continue
through the night. This was no surprising. In April 1944 he had declared that
tanks “can and must attack at night,” but they “must be preceded by meticulous
day reconnaissance.” That had not taken place on December 22. Other than
Americans’ poor situational awareness of the enemy, one of the biggest risks of
continuing the advance at night was that it stretched the endurance of the tired
and cold troops, who were already starting to suffer from frostbite. To retain the
initiative gained on the first day, Patton directed attacks to continue through the
night. This was no surprising. In April 1944 he had declared that tanks “can and
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 must attack at night,” but they “must be preceded by meticulous day
reconnaissance.” That had not taken place on December 22. Other than
Americans’ poor situational awareness of the enemy, one of the biggest risks of
continuing the advance at night was that it stretched the endurance of the tired
and cold troops, who were already starting to suffer from frostbite. 3

Two days later, Patton realized that his decision was wrong, as we can see in his own

notes presents in Martin Blumenson’s book:

This has been a very bad Christmas Eve. All along our line we have received
violent counterattacks, one of which forced Dager of the 4th Armored back some
miles with the loss of 10 tanks. This was probably my fault, because I had been
insisting on day and night attacks. This is all right on the first or second day of the
battle and when we had the enemy surprised but after that the men get too tired.
Furthermore, in this bad weather, it is very difficult for armored outfits to operate
at night.4

Patton’s decision to accept prudent risk was wrong and forced the 4th Armored back

and lost 10 tanks. This decision affected the battle because delayed the race to

Bastogne where they only got there two days later, on December 26. The weather

conditions improved on December 25 and the 101st Airborne received the supply by air.

If the weather conditions remained bad, maybe the 101st Airborne did not hold the

position and the Germans would get the city of Bastogne.

The Third Army only moved fast because Patton informed his intent in the early

moment, right after the meeting with Eisenhower. He knew that his subordinates should

know what he was planning to do to accomplish what he said in the meeting. The

Historian and Author Hubert Essame shows this moment in his book:

Raising the telephone to speak to Gay, his Chief of Staff, he told him to get the
26th Division and the 4th Armored Division moving on Arlon via Longwy and the
80th Division on Luxembourg via Thionville. The main effort he said would be by
III Corps um the Arlon-Bastogne road; XII Corps would take over north of
Luxembourg.5

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From this moment, Patton’s subordinates could start the race to Bastogne and be able

to engage as soon as possible. And we can see that they clearly understood the

commanders intend and did what he wanted they do. This decision to provide the

commander’s intent at that moment proved decisive to later events in the battle and its

results.

However, later in the battle, on December 29, Patton failed in provide the

commander’s intent principle when he did not explain what he wanted to Major General

Troy H. Middleton. In that moment, Middleton expressed reservations about Patton’s

plan and called him for permission to alter the scheme of maneuver. Rickard describes

in his book the Patton’s answer:

Gay relayed Patton’s reply that he “didn’t care how” the attack was made, but
Middleton “must make it, and he must take the objective.” Patton was seemingly
granting Middleton considerable flexibility to fight his corps – something that all
commanders appreciate; however, commanders also require sufficient direction
to fight their battles effectively and in harmony with the higher commander’s
intent.6

At this moment we can see that Patton did not provide his intend. Six days later, on

January 4, the lack of guidance caused a negative effect in the battle, because

Middleton changed the plan and it was a wrong decision. Rickard also described this

moment in his book:

Patton refused, citing his long-held conviction that once an attack was planned, it
should proceed, and his mission was to destroy Germans. However, he seems to
have had some concerns about VIII Corps. He sent Gay to see Bradley, who
thought VIII Corps should be launched from Bastogne to Houffalize because it
was the direct route. Gay suggested that this had been the original concept, but
Middleton had changed it, and it was to late to alter it now. This strongly suggests
that Patton’s lack of specific direction to Middleton when he called Third Army on
December 29 was now having a negative effect on operations.7

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Patton’s answer to Middleton wasn’t the best decision. Despite the fact that he trusted in

his subordinate, the commander must be always willing to hear what his subordinate

has to say, especially during a war. In this situation, the Patton’s attitude proved wrong

and he failed in fulfill the principle of command of provide de commander’s intent,

affecting negatively the operations.

Patton as commander liked to inform his subordinates about everything that was

happening, and he used to give orders with all subordinates together to make all

understand all the situation. On December 19, a day after his meeting with Bradley and

hours before the meeting with Eisenhower in Verdun, he met with his subordinate

commanders and staff to inform about the events and prepare them for the next days.

Essame explained in his book what happened there:

The meeting began in true Patton style. Plans, he informed them, had been
changed; while he knew they were accustomed to rapid movement, they were
now to have the privilege of moving even faster. In general he explained that he
proposed to strike due north to hit underbelly of German penetration where it
hurt, using VIII Corps and III Corps on any two of three possible axis: the first due
north from Diekirch, the second from Arlon on Bastogne and the third on the
Neufchâteau-Bastogne road against the tip of the Bulge-wherever that might be.
In the next hour he and his staff planned in outline three distinct operations and
arranged a simple code using which he could telephone Gay, his Chief of Staff,
from Verdun to say which was to be implemented.8

From this moment the Patton’s subordinate commanders could start the planning and

give warning orders about the next operation. This was fundamental to quickly move the

Third army from the south to the north in only two days, because Patton created a

shared understanding among his subordinates increasing their situational

understanding and allowing them to assess the progression of operations.

During the battle, Patton used to ride in an open armored jeep to see and be

seen by his troops, and to endure the same wretched situations. This attitude made his

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soldiers trust him and was and incentive to them keep fight even tired and in the worst

conditions. Barron described in his book the effect of Patton’s presence among his

soldiers:

For Peterson and the rest of the GIs, Patton’s visit was a boon to morale. The
driver later said, “It gave us all a little more pep after that.” It impressed Peterson
that Patton was willing to face the same dangers and share the same sacrifices
as the men. The half-track operator recalled that artillery was still falling when
Patton arrived, and that did not deter him from seeing the troops.9

The soldiers were facing a terrible weather and fighting for three days. In their minds

Patton would never order them to do something that he wouldn’t do. Patton’s presence

affected their morale and forged a unity of effort to reach Bastogne in the next day, and

this was one of the turning points of the battle. The Third Army had an impressive willing

to fight and this was due to Patton’s mentality and leadership in building a cohesive

team through mutual trust.

The Battle of The Bulge caused big losses in casualties and material to both

sides, while the Allies were able to replace in two weeks, the Germans could not build

anymore, and that was the last Hitler’s tactical reserve. Patton’s contribution to victory in

The Bulge was considerable. He performed partially the principles of mission command

of provide a clear commander’s intent and accept prudent risk, and perfectly the

principles of mission command of create a shared understanding and build cohesive

teams through mutual trust. Every future commander should study this battle and learn

with Patton, his ability to lead men is undeniable. The quick move to Bastogne was only

possible because he trusted in his subordinate commanders and staff and them trusted

him, he kept them always informed about the operations and they knew his intents,

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showing that the Third Army’s strength came from the Patton’s ability to make them

work as a team prepared to win.

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 Endnotes

1. Leo Barron, Patton at The Battle of The Bulge: how the general’s tanks turned
the tide at Bastogne (New York: Penguin Group, November 2014), Page 59.

2. Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: HarperCollins Publishers:
1995), Page 608-681.

3. John Nelson Rickard, Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in The

Bulge (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), Page 158.

4. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers: 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton, 1974),

Page 605.

5. Hubert Essame, Patton: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s

Sons: 1974), Page 222-223.

6. Rickard, 214.

7. Ibid., 254.

8. Essame, 221.

9. Barron, 260.

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 Bibliography

Barron, Leo. Patton at The Battle of The Bulge: how the general’s tanks turned the tide
at Bastogne. New York: Penguin Group, November 2014.

Blumenson, Martin. The Patton Papers: 1940-1945. Boston: Houghton, 1974.

D’Este, Carlo. Patton: A Genius for War. New York: HarperCollins Publishers: 1995.

Essame, Hubert. Patton: A Study in Command. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons:
1974.

Rickard, John Nelson, Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in The Bulge.
Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2011.