VIRGINIA GARCIA FULEvs.CA,PRECIOSA B.
is granted by law or by the constitution and
GARCIAandAGUSTINAB.GARCIA,74SCRA189
(1976)(SpecPro2016)
Posted onJUNE 29, 2016
FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate
sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a
petition for letters of administration alleging
“that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real
estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the
same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratix over
the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of
the
deceased, contending that
1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3
months before his death as shown by his
death certificate and therefore have an
improper venue.
1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to
2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction
over the petition.
CFI denied the motion.
CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa
the administratix.
Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on
appeal by certiorari.
ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same?
How can it be determined in the present
case?
b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised
Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix
of the estate?
Held:
try, hear and decide a case base on the
merits or the substance of the facts. It is a
substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It
cannot be waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court
define venue as the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein real
property involved or a portion thereof is
situated. Venue is the location of the court
with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience
purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of
the case. In some cases it may be waived or
stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate.
1. “Resides” should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary.
1. In the present case, SC ruled that the last
place of residence of the deceased should be
the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia
was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna base on his death certificate. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his
death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative
that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition
for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B.
Garcia was granted as a special
administratix.
Eusebio vs. Eusebio
In the matter of the Intestate of the
deceased Andres Eusebio. Eugenio
Eusebio, petitioner and appellee, vs.
Amanda Eusebio, Virginia Eusebio, Juan
Eusebio, et al., oppositors and appellants.
December 28, 1956 | Concepcion
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed
with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of
his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that
his father, who died on November 28, 1952,
resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings
(Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente
and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate
children of Andres, opposed the petition and
alleged that Andres was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the
case be dismissed upon the ground that
venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition
and overruled his siblings’ objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly
laid in Rizal?
Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to
October 29, 1952, was and had always been
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He
only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana
Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr.
Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at
No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even
before he was able to transfer to the house
he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was
forced to live in his son’s residence. It is
well settled that “domicile is not commonly
changed by presence in a place merely for
one own’s health” even if coupled with
“knowledge that one will never again be
able, on account of illness, to return home.
Having resided for over seventy years in
Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres
retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in
Quezon City permanently. There is no direct
evidence of such intent – Andres did not
manifest his desire to live in Quezon City
indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon;
and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to
testify on the matter. Andres did not part
with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Some of his children remained in
that municipality. In the deed of sale of his
house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave
San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence.
The marriage contract signed by Andres
when he was married in articulo mortis to
Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his
death stated that his residence is San
Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile
include (1) capacity to choose and freedom
of choice, (2) physical presence at the place
chosen, (3) intention to stay therein
permanently. Although Andres complied
with the first two requisites, there is no
change of domicile because the third
requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants
submitted themselves to the authority of the
CFI of Rizal because they introduced
evidence on the residence of the decedent, it
must be noted that appellants specifically
made of record that they were NOT
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court, except for the purpose only of
assailing the same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at
the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal
had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased,
the venue having been laid improperly.
Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is
retained until a new domicile is gained. It is
not changed by presence in a place for one’s
own health.
JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 128314. May 29, 2002.
Facts:
Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private
Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the
deceased Spouses Ignacio and Andrea Jao
who died intestate in 1988 and 1989.
Private respondent filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in the
RTC of Quezon City over the estate of his
parents. Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, private respondent Perico
moved that he be appointed as special
administrator, alleging that petitioner
Rodolfo was dissipating the assets of the
estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of
the petition on the ground of improper venue.
He alleged that his parents did not reside in
Quezon City during their lifetime but in
Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted
documentary evidence showing that his
deceased parents were residents of Angeles
City, Pampanga.
Private respondent Perico countered
that his parents resides in Quezon City and in
fact, actually resided in petitioner’s house as
shown in the death certificate presented
before the court. Petitioner argued that his
parents stay in Quezon City was merely
transitory and that the death certificates could
not be deemed conclusive evidence of the
decedents’ residence.
The trial court ruled in favor of
private respondent Perico. The CA affirmed
in toto the trial court’s decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the settlement
proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.
Held:
Yes. The settlement proceeding was
properly laid in Quezon City.
As provided for under the Rules of
Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the
Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court
located in the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death.
The Rules of Court refers to residence
at the time of death, not to the permanent
residence or domicile. In the case of Garcia-
Fule vs CA, it was held that the term resides
connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as
distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. xxx resides should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence and
also an intention to make it one’s domicile.
No particular length of time is required;
however, the residence must me more than
temporary.
In the case at bar, it was found that the
decedents’ have been living in Quezon City
at the time of their death and some time prior
thereto, and as was also shown in the death
certificate presented by private respondent.
Thus, the venue for the settlement of the
decedents’ intestate was properly laid in the
Quezon City.
12 Malig vs. Bush, 28 SCRA 449 , No. L-
22761 May 31, 1969
Facts: the plaintiffs filed the complaint,
alleging that they were the acknowledged
natural children and the only heirs in the
direct line of the deceased John T. Bush.
They prayed that They prayed that the
project of partition be annulled; that the
defendant be ordered to submit a complete
inventory and accounting of all the
properties left by the deceased and another
project of partition adjudicating to the
plaintiffs their legal participation in the said
estate and/or in the event that the defendant
had disposed of all or part of the estate, that
she be ordered to pay them the market value
thereof; and that the defendant be ordered to
pay for the value of the fruits received,
damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging
lack of cause of action, res judicata and
statute of limitations.
After the issues were joined the case was set
for hearing, but on the date thereof the
hearing was postponed upon the defendant's
manifestation that she would file a written
motion to dismiss. The motion, when filed,
challenged the jurisdiction of the court,
stating that since the action was one to annul
a project of partition duly approved by the
probate court it was that court alone which
could take cognizance of the case, citing
Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted
the motion and dismissed the complaint, not
on the ground relied upon by the defendant
but because the action had prescribed. The
plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were
turned down; hence, this appeal.
Issue: The procedural question posed by
appellants is: May the lower court dismiss
an action on a ground not alleged in the
motion to dismiss?
Held: No. The Court should not dismiss a
case based on a ground not alleged in the
motion to dismiss because it is tantamount to
depriving the opposing party of their right to
respond or argue the case.
Uriarte vs, Court of First Instance
33 SCRA 252
May 29, 1970
Facts of the Case:
Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain
and he left reasonable properties in the
Philippines. Vicente Uriarte, who is
claiming to be the son and sole heir of the
deceased, filed a petition for the intestate
settlement of the estate of the deceased in
the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. However, said petition was
opposed by the nephews of Juan stating that
there is a valid will left by the deceased in
Spain, a copy of which is being requested.
Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the
estate in the court of Manila, on the basis of
the alleged will of the deceased.
Vicente filed an opposition to the
settlement of estate in the court of Manila
stating that the court of Negros Occidental
has already acquired original jurisdiction
over the case. The opposition of Vicente was
dismissed together with the intestate
settlement In the CFI of Negros.
Hence, Vicente filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the dismissal of the
intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros.
Issue:
Whether or not the intestate
settlement should be dismissed.

Ruling of the Case:
The Supreme Court held that the
dismissal of the intestate proceeding is
proper. Under the Rules on the settlement of
estate of the deceased person, testate
proceedings enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate
settlement was filed prior to the finding of
the will of the deceased, then the intestate
proceedings shall be dismissed to give
priority to the testate proceeding.
[G.R. No. 75773. April 17, 1990.]
TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION
JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ,
ANTONIO JIMENEZ, AMADEO
JIMENEZ, MODESTO JIMENEZ and
VIRGINIA JIMENEZ, Petitioners, v.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, HON. AMANDA
VALERA-CABIGAO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch XXXVII, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and
CORAZON JIMENEZ, Respondents.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja, for Petitioners.
Bitty S. Viliran for Private Respondents.
Leonardo B. Jimenez, Jr. for Respondents.
Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition,
inasmuch as they are children of the union
of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson
The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual
and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva
1aw library
Caolboy and because they have already
received their inheritance consisting of five
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez
(5) parcels of lands in Salomague, Bugallon,
and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4)
Pangasinan. 3
children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr.,
Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence
On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia
of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five
Jimenez was appointed administrator of the
(5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon,
Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and
Pangasinan.
Genoveva Caolboy. 4 On May 21, 1981, she
filed an inventory of the estate of the
After the death of Consolacion Ungson,
spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva
Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom
Caolboy wherein she included the five (5)
he begot the seven petitioners herein:
parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon,
Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio,
Pangasinan. As a consequence, Leonardo
Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia, all
Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of
surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died on
these properties from the inventory on the
August 11, 1951 while Genoveva Caolboy
ground that these had already been
died on November 21, 1978.
adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto,
Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez
father Lino Jimenez. Private respondent
filed a petition before the Court of First
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented testimonial
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, docketed
and documentary evidence in support of his
as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying to
motion while petitioner Virginia Jimenez,
be appointed as administratrix of the
other than cross-examining the witnesses of
properties of the deceased spouses Lino and
Leonardo, presented no evidence of her
Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were
own, oral or documentary.chanrobles.com :
the supposed heirs of the deceased spouses
virtual law library
which included herein co-petitioners and the
four children of Lino Jimenez by
On September 29, 1981, the probate court
Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife. 2
ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels
of land from the inventory on the basis of
In October, 1979, herein private respondent
the evidence of private respondent Leonardo
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo
Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among others
Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the exclusion
of: (1) Tax Declaration showing that the
of his father’s name and those of Alberto,
subject properties were acquired during the
conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and
Consolacion Ungson; and, (2) a Deed of
Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva
Caolboy stated, that the subject properties
had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his
children by a previous marriage, namely:
Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles.
5 The motion for reconsideration of said
order was denied on January 26, 1982. 6
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the
Court of Appeals on a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed
thereat as CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking
the annulment of the order dated September
29, 1981 as well as the order of January 26,
1982. On November 18, 1982, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition because (1)
Genoveva Caolboy, petitioners’ mother, had
admitted that the subject parcels of land had
been adjudicated to the children of the
previous nuptial; (2) the subject properties
could not have been acquired during the
marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva
Caolboy because they were already titled in
the name of Lino Jimenez even prior to
1921, long before Lino’s marriage to
Genoveva in 1940; (3) the claim of Virginia
Jimenez was barred by prescription because
it was only in 1981 when they questioned
the adjudication of the subject properties,
more than ten (10) years after Genoveva had
admitted such adjudication in a public
document in 1964; and, (4) petitioner
Virginia Jimenez was guilty of laches. This
decision became final and executory. 7
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an
amended complaint dated December 10,
1984 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed
thereat as Civil Case No. 16111, to recover
possession ownership of the subject five (5)
parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino
Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order
private respondents to render an accounting
of the produce therefrom. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds that the action was
barred by prior judgment in CA-G.R. No.
SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by
prescription and laches. However,
petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
contending that (1) the action was not barred
by prior judgment because the probate court
had no jurisdiction to determine with finality
the question of ownership of the lots which
must be ventilated in a separate action; and,
(2) the action instituted in 1981 was not
barred by prescription or laches because
private respondents’ forcible acquisition of
the subject properties occurred only after the
death of petitioners’ mother, Genoveva
Caolboy in 1978.
On February 13, 1985, the trial court
resolved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. 8 On May 31, 1985,
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
resolution was denied. As earlier intimated,
the petition for certiorari and mandamus
filed by petitioners before the appellate court
was likewise denied due course and
dismissed in a decision dated May 29, 1986.
9 to resort to an ordinary action for a final
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether in a
settlement proceeding (testate or intestate)
the lower court has jurisdiction to settle
questions of ownership and whether res
judicata exists as to bar petitioners’ present
action for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In
the negative, is the present action for
reconveyance barred by prescription and/or
laches?.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We reverse. Petitioners’ present action for
recovery of possession and ownership is
appropriately filed because as a general rule,
a probate court can only pass upon questions
of title provisionally. Since the probate
court’s findings are not conclusive, being
prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is
necessary to establish the ownership of the
five (5) parcels of land. 11
The patent reason is the probate court’s
limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result
in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action. 12
All that the said court could do as regards
said properties is determine whether they
should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is
a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have
determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.
13

The provisional character of the inclusion in
the inventory of a contested property was
again reiterated in the following cases: Pio
Barreto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 14 Junquera v. Borromeo, 15
Borromeo v. Canonoy, 16 Recto v. de la
Rosa. 17 It has also been held that in a
special proceeding for the probate of a will,
the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. 18 This
pronouncement no doubt applies with equal
force to an intestate proceeding as in the
case at bar.
Res judicata 19 does not exist because of the
difference in the causes of actions.
Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action was
for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy while
Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for the
recovery of possession and ownership of the
five (5) parcels of land. Moreover, while
admittedly, the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No. 5346 had
jurisdiction, the same was merely limited
jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said
court as to title is not conclusive and could
still be attacked in a separate proceeding.
Civil Case No. 16111, on the other hand,
was lodged before the Regional Trial Court
of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the
exercise of the court’s general jurisdiction. It
was, in fact, such "separate or ordinary
proceedings" contemplated by the rules for a
final determination of the issue of ownership
of the disputed properties. To repeat, since
the determination of the question of title to
the subject properties in S.P. 5346 was not being indubitable, the trial court
merely provisional, petitioners are not committed grave abuse of discretion in
barred from instituting the appropriate action dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
in Civil Case No. 16111. 16111.
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of
respondents in their motion to dismiss do not the respondent appellate court is hereby
appear to be indubitable. Res judicata has REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is
been shown here to be unavailable and the reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of
other grounds of prescription and laches Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to
pleaded by private respondents are seriously proceed in said case with dispatch.
disputed. The allegation in the complaint is
that the heirs of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr. SO ORDERED.
(referring to private respondents) forcibly
intruded into and took possession of the Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
disputed properties only in 1978, after the
death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since the Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave
action for reconveyance was instituted in
1984, it would appear that the same has not
MARCOS II vs. CA
yet prescribed or otherwise barred by
273 SCRA 47, GR No. 120880, June 5,
laches.cralawnad
1997
Facts:
There are a number of factual issues raised
Bongbong Marcos sought for the reversal of
by petitioners before the lower court which
the ruling of the Court of Appeals to grant
cannot be resolved without the presentation
CIR's petition to levy the properties of the
of evidence at a full-blown trial and which
late Pres. Marcos to cover the payment of
make the grounds for dismissal dubitable.
his tax delinquencies during the period of his
Among others, the alleged admission made
exile in the US. The Marcos family was
by petitioners’ mother in the deed of sale is
assessed by the BIR after it failed to file
vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself
estate tax returns. However the assessment
of adjudication, there being no showing that
were not protested administratively by Mrs.
the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez
Marcos and the heirs of the late president so
and Consolacion Ungson had been
that they became final and unappealable
liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial
after the period for filing of opposition has
settlement of the estate of Lino Jimenez was
prescribed. Marcos contends that the
undertaken whereby such adjudication could
properties could not be levied to cover the
have been effected.
tax dues because they are still pending
probate with the court, and settlement of tax
The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss
deficiencies could not be had, unless there is
an order by the probate court or until the
probate proceedings are terminated.
Petitioner also pointed out that applying
Memorandum Circular No. 38-68, the BIR's
Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties
were issued beyond the allowed period, and
are therefore null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the contentions of Bongbong
Marcos are correct
Ruling:
No. The deficiency income tax assessments
and estate tax assessment are already final
and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy
of real properties is a tax remedy resorted to
by the government, sanctioned by Section
213 and 218 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is
distinct and separate from the other tax
remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and
Criminal actions), and is not affected or
precluded by the pendency of any other tax
remedies instituted by the government.
The approval of the court, sitting in probate,
or as a settlement tribunal over the
deceased's estate is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the
NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court
which is bidden not to authorize the executor
or judicial administrator of the decedent's
estate to deliver any distributive share to any
party interested in the estate, unless it is
shown a Certification by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes
have been paid. This provision disproves the
petitioner's contention that it is the probate
court which approves the assessment and
collection of the estate tax.
On the issue of prescription, the omission to
file an estate tax return, and the subsequent
failure to contest or appeal the assessment
made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's
cause, as under Sec.223 of the NIRC, in case
of failure to file a return, the tax may be
assessed at anytime within 10 years after the
omission, and any tax so assessed may be
collected by levy upon real property within 3
years (now 5 years) following the
assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax
assessment had become final and
unappealable by the petitioner's default as
regards protesting the validity of the said
assessment, there is no reason why the BIR
cannot continue with the collection of the
said tax.
Alipio vs. Court of Appeals
Joint Lessee (D) vs. Lessor (P)
GR 134100
Summary: A lease was executed by a husband
and his wife together with another couple. Then,
the husband died. The lessor is suing the
surviving wife as a solidary debtor.
Rule of Law: Spouses sued for the enforcement
of an obligation entered into by them are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of
the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply.
Facts: Romeo Jaring (P) subleased a fishpond
to spouses Alipio (D) and spouses Bienvenido
and Remedios Manuel for P485,600 payable in
two installments. The first installment was paid,
but the second was only partly paid. Despite due
demand, the balance remain unpaid. Jaring (P)
filed a case to collect the balance from the
spouses Alipio (D) and spouses Manuel with a
prayer for the alternative of rescission. Purita
Alipio (D) moved to dismiss the case because her
husband died and thus, dissolving their conjugal
partnership. Alipio (D) contended that the
proper action for Jaring (P) is to file a claim in
the settlement of the estate.
The trial court denied Alipio's (D) motion on the
ground that since she was herself a party to the
sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with spouses
Manuel and that the death of her husband
merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.
On appeal, the court applied the ruling on
Climaco vs. Siy Uy finding the surviving spouse
solidary liable.
Issues: Is the surviving spouse a solidary debtor
for a lease she and her late husband entered
into?
Ruling: No. For marriages governed by the
rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an
obligation entered into by the husband and wife
is chargeable against their conjugal partnership
and it is the partnership which is primarily
bound for its repayment. (Rules of Court, Rule
79, §2) Thus, when the spouses are sued for the
enforcement of an obligation entered into by
them, they are being impleaded in their capacity
as representatives of the conjugal partnership
and not as independent debtors such that the
concept of joint or solidary liability, as between
them, does not apply.
A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a
decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
collection of a sum of money chargeable against
the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the
settlement of estate of the decedent.
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of
two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation does not imply that each one of the
former has a right to demand, or that each one of
the latter is bound to render, entire compliance
with the prestations. There is a solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, or
when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity.
—Article 1207, Civil Code
If from the law or the nature or the wording of
the obligation the contrary does not appear, an
obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the
debt is divided into as many equal shares as
there are debtors, each debt being considered
distinct from one another. (Article 1208, Civil
Code)
However,
Should the lessees or sub-lessees refuse to vacate
the leased property after the expiration of the
lease period and despite due demands by the
lessor, they can be held jointly and severally
liable to pay for the use of the property. The
basis of their solidary liability is not the contract
of lease or sublease but the fact that they have
become joint tortfeasors.
—Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, GR 106029, Oct.
19, 1999.
Reading the pertinent portion of the contract, it
is clear that the liability of the sublessees is
merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel
and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their
respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid
balance should be divided into two.
G.R. No. 77660 July 28, 1988
ELADIO DILLENA petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA
CARREON, respondents.
Mario A. Batongbacal for petitioner.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates for
respondent Aurora Carreon.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
NOVEMBER 14, 1986 of the respondent Court of Appeals which
dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 08404) filed
by herein petitioner Eladio Dillena to nullify the orders dated
August 10, 1984, September 13, 1984 and October 28, 1985 of
the RTC, Branch 84, Quezon City, sitting as a probate court in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378. The said orders annulled the sale of
fishponds under administration, executed by private respondent
Aurora Carreon, as administratrix of the estate under
administration in favor of petitioner, for the reason that said sale
was made without authority from and/or approval of the probate
court.
The facts of this case as found by the Court of
Appeals are as follows:
Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino
Carreon died on March 7, 1974 and August
21, 1974, in Quezon City and Manila,
respectively, leaving an adopted daughter
Aurora Carreon, private respondent herein.
On October 21, 1974, Fausta Carreon
Herrera, sister of the deceased Rufino
Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378
entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
the Deceased Spouses Rufino B. Carreon and
Dolores Sebastian — Petition for Letters of
Administration" before the then CFI, Branch
XXXI, Quezon City. On November 7, 1974,
the said court appointed Fausta Carreon
Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the
purpose of receiving and collecting all sums of
money due and payable to the estate, in
addition to the powers and duties provided for
under Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court.
On October 3, 1975, private respondent
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of the deceased spouses, adjudicating
to herself all the real properties of the said
spouses.
On October 14, 1975, private respondent filed
a motion to revoke the letters of administration
issued to Fausta Carreon Herrera.
Accordingly, the lower court, on March 31,
1976, granted the motion and allowed private
respondent to administer the properties of the
estate. Thereafter, private respondent acted
as administratrix of the estate although it was
only on June 27, 1980 that the appointment of
private respondent was formalized and she
was granted letters of administration on July
1, 1980.
Meanwhile, on November 8, 1978, private
respondent, while being the administratrix of
the estate, executed an extrajudicial
adjudication of the three (3) fishpond
properties of the deceased spouses in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. By virtue of said
extrajudicial adjudication, Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 140243, 140244 and 140245 in
the names of the deceased spouses were
cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificates of Title were issued in the name of
private respondent.
On November 13, 1978, private respondent
sold in favor of petitioner the three fishponds
in question without the knowledge and
approval of the probate court. Prior to the
sale, petitioner had been leasing these
fishponds for several years. As a result of the
sale, transfer certificates of title over the said
properties were issued in favor of petitioner.
Aside from the aforesaid sale, petitioner
previously sold real properties of the estate to
Luisa S. Rodriguez on July 19, 1977 and to
the Starlight Industrial Co., Inc. on December
7, 1977. Both sales were likewise made
without the approval of the probate court. The
said court, having learned of the aforesaid
transfers of the real properties without its
approval, issued an order dated September
22, 1981 requiring the three vendees to
appear on October 23, 1981 and to explain
why the deeds of sale, as well as the transfer
certificates of title issued as a consequence
thereof, should not be cancelled for having
been executed without court approval.
The aforesaid vendees were duly furnished
with copies of the order dated September 22,
1981. Only Starlight Industries, Co., Inc.
appeared on October 23, 1981. Again, the
vendees were required to submit their
respective explanations and the hearing on
the incident was re-set to November 11, 1981.
Petitioner was again duly served with a copy
of said order.
At the scheduled hearing, Starlight Industries
Co., Inc. submitted an explanation, thus, the
sale in its favor was approved and confirmed
by the probate court. However, vendees Luisa
S. Rodriguez and petitioner Eladio Dillena
neither appeared at the scheduled hearing nor
submitted their explanations as to why the
sales in their favor should not be cancelled for
having been executed without court approval.
On August 10, 1984, acting on the claim of
Atty. Eugenio Balatbat for attorney's fees on
account of his legal services rendered to
private respondent and to the estate, the
probate court approved the payment of said
fees to be paid out of the properties of the
estate. The same was ordered annotated as a
lien on the transfer certificates of title of the
real properties of the estate, including those
properties transferred by private respondent
without court approval.
On September 13, 1984, the lower court, on
motion of Atty. Balatbat for a definitive ruling
as to the validity of the sale made by
administratrix-private respondent to Luisa S.
Rodriguez and petitioner, declared that the
transfers in favor of the aforesaid vendees are
null and void and without force and effect for
having been made without court authority and
approval. Petitioner was served with a copy of
the said order on December 13, 1984.
On July 25, 1985, or after seven (7) months
from the time the order of September 13, 1984
was received by petitioner, the latter filed a
petition before the probate court in the same
Sp. Proc No. Q-19378 by way of special
appearance alleging that said court, in view of
its limited jurisdiction as a probate court, has
no power to annul the sale of the fishponds in
question; that the orders annulling the sale are
void because he is not a party to Sp. Proc.
No. Q-19378; that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the res, which are located in
Bulacan province.
After hearing the petition and the opposition
therein, the lower court, on October 28, 1985,
denied the petition and ordered petitioner to
return physical possession of the fishponds to
private respondent. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the aforesaid order which
was denied.
On February 20, 1986, a petition for certiorari
was instituted by petitioner before the
respondent Court of Appeals and as earlier
mentioned, the said court, on November 14,
1986, dismissed the petition. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied on March 2, 1987; hence, this petition.
In the present petition, petitioner sets forth as
issues the following: 1) that the Court of
Appeals in upholding the order of the trial
court, deprived him of his property without due
process of law because he was not a proper
party in the court a quo; 2) that the Court of
Appeals violated the rule that the jurisdiction
of a court, when acting in the settlement of the
estate, is limited and cannot encroach upon
questions of ownership; and 3) that the
nullification and revocation of the transfer
certificates of title were brought about by the
dictate of the probate court to annotate an
attorney's lien thereon, an order which is
discordant with law and jurisprudence.
After a careful examination of the entire record
of the case, We find the instant Petition devoid
of merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner postulates that
he was deprived of the questioned fishponds
without due process; and that not being an
original party before the probate court, he was
not summoned thereto.
We are not persuaded. The probate court in
its order dated September 22, 1981 issued in
the exercise of its probate jurisdiction (Sec. 3,
Rule 730, required petitioner to appear before
it on October 23, 1 981 to explain why the
deed of sale in favor of petitioner, as well as
the transfer certificates of title issued as a
consequence thereof should not be cancelled
for having been executed without authority
from and approval of the court. Petitioner,
despite receipt of the aforesaid order, failed to
appear on the scheduled date. However, the
probate court still gave him fifteen (15) days to
submit the required explanation and the case
was re-set to November 11, 1981. But then
again, petitioner, despite receipt of the second
notice requiring his appearance, chose not to
appear and totally ignored the order of the
probate court to submit the explanation. One
who was given full opportunity to present his
evidence and who failed to do so cannot
complain that he was denied due process
when the court rendered its decision (Ganadin
vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613).
As found out by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner was afforded every opportunity to
present his explanation but he repeatedly
failed to appear on the two scheduled
hearings for the purpose. As said
in Municipality of Daet vs. Hidalgo
Enterprises, 138 SCRA 265, and re-echoed in
Divine Word High School vs. NLRC, 143
SCRA 346, there is no denial of due process
where petitioner was afforded an opportunity
to present his case.
Moreover, petitioner, on July 25, 1985, filed a
petition before the probate court, by way of
special appearance, precisely questioning the
power of the said court to declare null and
void the sale of the fishponds involved herein.
As has been stated, the lower court after
hearing the petition and the opposition thereto
denied the same.
Clearly, petitioner was given full opportunity to
present his case. Thus, We give no credence
to petitioner's assertion that he was denied
due process of law.
On the second issue, petitioner asseverates
that the probate court, in view of its limited
jurisdiction, cannot declare as null and void,
the sale of the questioned properties.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the
questioned properties (fishponds) were
included in the inventory of properties of the
estate submitted by then administratrix Fausta
Carreon Herrera on November 14, 1974.
Private respondent was appointed as
administratrix of the estate on March 31, 1976
in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On
November 13, 1978, the questioned deed of
sale of the fishponds was executed between
petitioner and private respondent without
notice to and approval of the probate court.
Even after the said sale, administratrix Aurora
Carreon still included the three fishponds as
among the real properties of the estate in her
inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In
fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner, at the time of the sale of the
fishponds in question, knew that the same
were part of the estate under administration.
Said the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, Dillena himself had
knowledge that the fishponds
are included in the inventory of
properties in the estate of the
deceased spouses and that
they are under special
proceedings, hence, no
 singular act of Aurora Carreon
could bind these fishponds
more so as Dillena had been
leasing these fishponds for
years. (Court of Appeals
Decision, p. 7).
The evidence shows that when the questioned
properties were sold without court approval by
private respondent to petitioner, the same
were under administration. The subject
properties therefore are under the jurisdiction
of the probate court which according to our
settled jurisprudence has the authority to
approve any disposition regarding properties
under administration.
An administratrix of an estate already subject
of a special proceeding pending before the
probate court cannot enjoy blanket authority to
dispose of real properties as she pleases.
More emphatic is the declaration We made in
Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 767)
wherein We stated that when the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the
probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 174), We held
that the sale of an immovable property
belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a
special proceeding, needs court approval,
thus:
Although the Rules of Court do
not specifically state that the
sale of an immovable property
belonging to an estate of a
decedent, in a special
proceeding, should be made
with the approval of the court,
this authority is necessarily
included in its capacity as a
probate court.
This pronouncement finds support in the
previous case of Dolores Vda. de Gil vs.
Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We
emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a
probate court to approve the sale of properties
of a deceased person by his prospective heirs
before final adjudication. Consequently, it is
error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.
It being settled that property under
administration needs the approval of the
probate court before it can be disposed of,
any unauthorized disposition does not bind
the estate and is null and void. As early as
1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42
Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that a sale
by an administrator of property of the
deceased, which is not authorized by the
probate court is null and void and title does
not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate
court can declare null and void the disposition
of the property under administration, made by
private respondent, the same having been
effected without authority from the said court.
It is the probate court that has the power to
authorize and/or approve the sale (Sections 4
and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said
court that can declare it null and void for as
long as the proceedings had not been closed
or terminated. To uphold petitioner's
contention that the probate court cannot annul
the unauthorized sale, would render
meaningless the power pertaining to the said
court. Sales of properties under administration
which do not comply with the requisites under
sections 4 and 7 of Rule 89 are null and void
(Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755).
On the third issue, petitioner questions the
order of the probate court allowing the
annotation of an attorney's lien on the transfer
certificate of title of the estate subject of the
special proceedings. Again, the issue raised
does not deserve any consideration because
it is already settled that the application to fix
attorney's fees may be made before and
passed upon by the probate court in the same
proceedings where attorney's services were
rendered (Palanca vs. Pecson, et al., 94 Phil.
419).
Finally, it may not be amiss to point out that
the order dated September 13, 1984 of the
probate court nullifying the deed of sale
between petitioner and private respondent
was received by the former on December 17,
1984. However, petitioner did not appeal from
said order to the appellate court. Instead, on
July 25, 1985 or about seven (7) months
thereafter, petitioner filed a petition before the
probate court questioning the power of the
said court to nullify the deed of sale which
petition was likewise denied on October 25,
1985.
In view thereof, the order dated September
13, 1984, nullifying the deed of sale had long
become final and executory for failure of
petitioner to appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period. On this score alone, the
petition for certiorari which was belatedly filed
by petitioner before the Court of Appeals on
February 20, 1986 should have been
dismissed outright because the remedy of
certiorari does not lie where appeal has been
lost. certiorari cannot take the place of an
appeal (Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 152
SCRA 378; De la Cruz vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 134 SCRA 417; Santiago vs.
Castro, 128 SCRA 545).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.