Workplace collective bargaining and
managerial prerogatives
by Dr. John Storey
Senior Lecturer in Industrial Sociology,
Trent Polytechnic, England.
THE question of managerial prerogatives (also
variously known as managerial 'functions' and
'rights') could be claimed as a central issue in the
study of Industrial Relations.' For example, Bey-
non observes that "This conflict over 'rights' is a
fundamental one and permeates union-
management relations."* I n so far as these 'rights'
relate to rule-making, Bain and Clegg also make
the issue central in their search for a definition of
the subject of Industrial Relations which "may be
defined as the study of all aspects ofjob regulation
- the making and administering of rules. . ."3
Thus. at the very heart of the employment
relationship lies the question of control, and of
discretion. What 'rights' does the employer (or his
agents) have in this relationship? What 'rights' the
employee? How much discretion is implicitly
allowed to either side when labour is hired?
This article examines the conceptual base upon
which discussion in this area is usually built and,
within the framework of analysis then derived,
1 Despite its centrality. the issue has been curiously neglected in Brmsh
literature. lhovgh more widely discussed m America Examples 01 the
American dsbals include Oerber. M.. Chalmers. W E and Slagnsr. R ,
"Collectwe Bargaining and Management Funciions: An Empirical Study".
Journal of Business. 1958 pp. 107-120: Oerber, M et 81. "Union
Partripation in Plant Decision Making". Industrial and Labor Relaeons
Rswew. Vol 15. 1961. Derber. M et al Labor - Management Relatrons m
Illml C W . Universily 01 IIIIMIIS. 1953. (2 wls.l: Slichter. S H , HeaIy. J J
and Lwernash. E R , The Impact of Collsctiwe Bsrgarnrng on Mansg,ment.
The Brookins Inslitute. Washington DC. 1960; Chander. Margaret K ,
Management Rights and Umon fnterests. McGtewHill. New York. 1964.
Chamberlain. N W , The Union Challenge to ManagemenI Contml. Harper
and Row. New York. 1948. Young, Stanley. "The O u e s t m 01 Menagerial
Prerogalwes". Indusrndl and Labor Relarions Rer,ew. 1963. 16(2). pp.
240-53
2 Beynon. H , Workmg lorFord Allen Lane. Harmondsworth. 1973. p
144
3 B a n G S and Clegg. H A , "A Strategy lor Industrial Relations
Research m Great 8rltam". Entwh Journal of IndustrUI Relalrons. March
1974. p. 95
This dehnition is, howeve,. rathsr limited, $1 reflects the tradition
established by Dunlop and then Flanders The wider p n p e c t w e more in
tune with rkent t h w g h l ia indicated by nyman's detinmon: "industrial
relations IS the study 01 Ihe processes of conriol over work relations"
Hyman. R , Industrial Relat,ons A Marxist Introduction. Macmillan. 1975.
P 12
4 This irsludes the question 01 what demands can be made on the
employee In terms of sped. lob content. elliciencv. working conditions. etc.
The slruggle over one 01 Ihese isaues. the question of speed. has been
graphically dIustraied' "Some control was obtamad by a straightlorward
ralusal to obey An agreement had to bm reached and management
concedwd lo the stewards the right 10 hold the key that locked Ihe assembly
line" Bevnon. H . OP cot. p 139
40 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, WmtsrVol.7 No 3
presents the results of a recent empirical study.
The intention is to make an assessment of the
impact of workplace collective bargaining upon
managerial prerogatives and to investigate the
circumstances in which these prerogatives appear
to be most circumscribed.
This is a fruitful area for research, for. as
Goldthorpe notes, "the employment contract is
typically. indeed almost invariably, of an incom-
plete and inexplicit nature. While it gives manage-
ment the right of command, it does so only in a
generalised way. It does not determine just what
tasks an employee is required to undertake. just
how he shall d o them, just how much effort he
shall expend on them . . ."5
The impact of organised labour on these
"silences'" in the employment contract may in fact
be viewed at two main levels: the level of national
bargaining, and the level of the workplace (though
as we shall see this latter contains within itself a
number of 'levels'). It has long been held that
recognition of trade unions as external agents to
the factory. and the observance of national level
agreements. is less of a threat to managerial
authority than internal lay representation and
domestic negotiation. With the recent almost uni-
versally7 acknowledged growth in workplace bar-
gaining. the question now arises as to its actual
impact on the above issues of workplace power
and discretion. It can be reasonably hypothesised
that workplace collective action will tend to be
much wider in its scope of impact than other levels
of employer-union bargaining. There are a
number of different ways in which the state of
control in the employment situation could be
researched. For example. some have turned their
attention to macro-indicators such as statistics on
5 Goldthorpe. J . H.. lnduatrlal Relar#onsIn Grear Britam A Critique 01
Rslotmism."PolltlcsandSoc~elv.VoI 4. No 4, 1974. p 428
6 l b i d , p 429
7 For a summary of views from the 'Tory'. IibemLpIwalist and radical
perspsct~eson this point. see Goldthorpe libid1 pp. 4 2 0 and 429 H 4
obsefver that "Workers can now often pfavenl managemenl from w n g 111
power in an entirely arbitrary or summary lashson. they t a n compel
managements to negotiate and bargain woth them on a wtdenmg range 01
issuea: and in lhsae and other ways lhay afe able to call wo questlo"
managerial 'prerogatwss' ( p A291 The errenr 01 lhcs challenge
however. still cries out lor emplrtcalanalysnr
0 19761 7 7 Mercury nouss Publealions Ltd , London
the 'causes of strikes' in order to diagnose a shift in
the types of issues now being fought over? (Part of
the rationale for this is the view that "a union's
strength may be roughly gauged by the issues on
which it fights.'*) Others have broadened the
canvas so as to take in the distribution of power in
society at large - indeed, with the decline in
influence of the so-called Oxford School of Indus-
trial Relations and its replacement by a more
radical perspective. this approach is rapidly be-
coming the new orthodoxy in Industrial Relations
theory.
Another line of enquiry, and one with much
promise, would be to seek how certain issues
become defined as 'negotiable' while others d o
not. 'Negotiability' does to some extent vary be-
tween workplaces: a newcomer must learn how it
is defined i n his new situation, yet at the same time
he. too. will have an impact in shaping the
evolving definition. Research could be aimed at
tracing the source of these definitions - an
endeavour which tends to lead back. however. to
an examination of the situations and settings
within which ideas are generated.IO
The focus here is on workplace collective action
because it is at this level that a wider range of
issues come under scrutiny and here where man-
agerial power and managerial action have their
immediate (felt) application. Whilst the focus is on
8 Examples of this approach can be laund in Turner. H A et al. Labour
Relations m the Motor Industry. Allen & Unwtn. 1967. p 334, Coater. K ,
fed1 Democracy m rhe Motor Industry. Institute for Worksts' Control. 1969.
~6
9 Goodrich. C L , Ths F r o n t m 01 Control A Srudy m Workshop Politrcs.
Bell & Sons. 1920. p 16
10 Even David Silverman accepts of course that. "Only by recagnising
such Cont.¶its do we manage to find more or less stable meanings in human
activttv% talk !I unintelligible without the provision of some context"
He does. however. go on to clam that these meanings are only available to
YI through '~Interprettvework by which we remedy the indaftnits pssibilicy
of interpretations available on any social scene". (Sllverman. People and
Organrratronr. Course Unit 16. p 561 However. in many circumstances the
recognmon of what a particular scene rapresmrr is surely not so unfathom-
able ar ethnomethodolagrsts would sometimes have us believs There ns,
perhaps. a sulficient basis of common understanding (this need not m p l y a
consensus of values. the common understanding mlghl equally be one of
confl!ctl as to make elaborate 'mterpralattons' 01 some situations a tedious
bore The argument here 1s rhac incsrpretive work most deftnitely her a
place. but its value depends upon the questtons to bs asked. and upon a
recognmon that the strategic use 01 other forms 01 enquiry. rather than the
tndarminate adoption 01 the takenothingfor-granted stance. also has a
piace
relations at this level, an adequate sociological
analysis must nevertheless be mindful of the wider
social and historical context within which such
relations occur.11
The analysis begins, therefore, with considera-
tion of an ideological concept which has been
powerfully influential in industrial relations prac-
tice.
MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVES
'Managerial Prerogatives' is an emotive term
and can thus lead to wide misunderstandings.
When used in trade union circles, it can raise
suspicions and protests that the user is implying
support of unilateral managerial rights: when used
in management circles, it can raise contrary fears
that an attack is being prepared on management's
'right' to manage. For these reasons alone, it may
well be wise simply to avoid the term altogether.
However, if it can be used to indicate an area of
decision-making over which management believes
it should have (and acts as if it does have) sole and
exclusive rights of determination and upon which
it strenuously resists any interference, then the
term may serve as a useful shorthand phrase for an
important element in many collective bargaining
situations. There is the further point that, despite
the apprehensions connected with its use noted
above. it is a concept used by participants on both
sides, participants whose behaviour we wish to
understand.
The 'prerogative' in question can be seen as
relating to certain 'rights' and 'functions' claimed
by management. As we shall observe, the 'rights'
aspect is often asserted as deriving from property
rights of ownership (of plant and materials). The
call for the preservation of management 'functions'
on the other hand. is somewhat akin to a demarca-
tion claim. I t relates to those functional tasks. the
possession of which helps give this occupational
group its distinctiveness. I t is no accident of course
that these tasks typically relate to the control
11 And be mindlui. too. ofthe union structure wlthm whKh work#ace
sclion has to operate. lhls indmd has been the theme 01 two recent books.
Herding. R ,Job Conrrol and Union Sfruclure. Rotterdam Univerrity Press.
1972; Boranton, I , ClsgQ, H . and Rimmer. M . . Workplace & Unmn.
Heinemann. London. 1975
41
Workplace collective bargainingand managerialprerogatives
function and that therefore this occupational
group is marked-off not only horizontally but
vertically. thus maintaining a hierarchical division
of labour.
Since the ‘frontier of control’ is pitched-out
differently according to the situation. it is difficult
to give universal examples of the types of decisions
falling solely within the pale of managerial hege-
mony. the examples given by A. I. Marsh in his
“Dictionary of Industrial Relations”. viz. hiring.
firing. promotions, discipline. manning, produc-
tion control, and decisions on overtime. can. in
certain workplaces be found to be either jointly
regulated or subject to workers’ unilateral job
control.
I n all, the status of managerial prerogative is at
present highly uncertain.I2 Many workers and
their representatives clearly d o accept some r6le for
management to manage. The TUC itself has
expressed this view, stating it “is management’s job
to lead . . . what is required is not a diminution in
managerial authority but a new conception of how
this authority should be exerci~ed”.’~
Indeed. the aphorism that it “is management’s
job to manage” is not only a defensive statement
on management’s part but also an assertive one by
those trade unions anxious to place full responsi-
bility upon management whilst retaining the right
to be able to challenge whatever decisions are then
made. Hugh Clegg’s writing on this matter is
well-known. I t contains the pluralist notion of the
“permanent opposition”. Conversely, there is that
position which denies any exclusive rble for a
managerial strata.
Arising from either position, it is not surprising.
therefore, to find constant documentary evidence
of the assertion of managerial rights, whilst en-
countering daily practical challenges to manage-
ment’s attempted exercise of these claimed rights.
The Threlfalls (Liverpool) agreement is typical of
12 McCaRhy and Parker lound “diugrwmenl bslwaen atwords and
members about the existence 01 issues which the stewards wan1 to uttle
wath management but which management rngerds as its own right to
dsctde” McCarthy. W. E J and Parker. S A . Shop Slewads and
Workshop Relationr. Raearch Paper 10. Row1 Cornmimion on Trade
Unwns and Employers’ Associations. 1968. p 2 2 Unsurprlsingly.
stewards were more aware 01 such issues than wore mambwrs.
1 3 Ttadw Unlon Congress. Trade Union#srn. London. 1967. 2nd edition.
p 101
42
many: the union ostensibly “recognises the com-
pany’s responsibility to plan, organise and manage
the operation of each department in order to
achieve maximum efficiency in the operation of
the plant”.
The prevailing situation may be seen as some-
what akin to management’s ‘pretence’ relating to
the unitary perspective. The ‘right to manage’ is
perhaps a case of self deception, with reality a
situation of ‘autocracy tempered by insurgency’.
More traditionally, managerial prerogatives
would be seen as the residue of discretionary
powers left to management after the application of
such constraining factors as law14 and collective
bargaining have taken their toll. Nichols indicates
some of these factors. “An enfranchised electorate.
the increasing rble of government in economic
affairs, and not least full employment are all
factors which impose limiting condition^."^^
The extent and effectiveness of such conditions
is, however, open to debate. The employment
contract, for example, is shown to be an unusual
sort of contract, one imbued with “a set of implied
terms reserving full authority of direction and
control to the e m p l ~ y e r ” . ’Full
~ application of the
notion of contract. with the implementation, for
example, of detailed terms. would not have met
the needs of the employer, rather, these were met
by “infusing the employment contract with tradi-
tional laws of master and servant, thereby giving
them a legal basis for the prerogatives they de-
manded”.”
Restrictions on the full arbitrary exercise of
these prerogatives are, however, offered internally.
On many matters which managers will claim are
unilaterally theirs to decide, instances can be
14 There is a whole range 01 fragmentary legtslalton whch 8% relevant
here. lor example: The Contrxts 01 Employment Act 1963. The Rndun-
dancy Pavment Act 1965: Tha Empioymmt Protectton Ac1 1 9 7 5 inCiudM
measures relating 10 unfair dismissal, the recognition 01 lrsde unwna and
ahop slward8. the provision 01 shop steward lacilitbs. and Ihe d i r l a u r n of
information There are obligations under the Saleiy and Health at Work
Act to nteMish MSCIV committees il so requested by u l a t y reprwent8li~s.
The new Industry Bill and Ihe propold Planning Agreements nlw illualrate
the impact 01 l8w.
1 5 Nichols. Thm. Ownership. Conlrol and Ideology. Allen (L Unwin,
London. 1969. p 1 5 0
16 Fox. A , Bevond Contract. Work. Power md Truxt Rdalions. Fabwr.
London. 1 9 7 4 . p 3 1 5
17 ibid , p. 185.
found of informal agreements and 'understand-
ings'. Hence, when considering the challenge to
managerial preorgatives at the workplace level we
are concerned with negotiations and 'bargaining'
in their widest sense. For example. aspects of
custom and practice, unilateral job control. and
so-called restrictive practices,1s lie on the margins
of workplace bargaining and understandings.
Some elements of unilateral job control result
from managerial expediency. The two processes of
bargaining and job control merge. and at some
point along the line become indistinguishable.
MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE AND
IDEOLOGY
I t would appear that contemporary apologists of
managerial prerogatives base their arguments on
two pillars: the property rights concept, and
superior ability to manage.
Managerial authority is seen as sustained not
only by the historical master-servant aspect of the
law but also by property right. T o this day, the law
remains sufficiently supportive of employer power
so as to require careful amendment of company
law even to cope with the industrial democracy
proposals emanating from the EEC.
The second argument seeking to justify man-
agerial prerogative makes claim to a superior
ability to manage from which all may derive
benefit - nation. shareholders, consumers and
workers alike - because 'management's way' is
the more ' e f f ~ c i e n t ' . ~ ~
Miller and Form elaborate on this aspect of the
ideology of top management - "a highly self-
conscious group whose ethnocentricism leads them
to believe that they have special gifts and attributes
not generally shared by the population. The
greatest of these is the ability to manage and
I 8 O n e lurihef p a n t I S worth notmg here, 11workers can be w d to be
'legohmising' tha managerla1 authority system by co-operatmg in 01s
continued e x l r l e r ~ e equally. managemenl can be sald 10 be 'lagitimising'
workerr' control ovwr workshop praclces. by loleratmg the contonuance of
workers' influence ~nmatters not gamed by them an formal negotiatbons
19 Management sees 11s power as legilimmed by "tha erpecclat1on that
management will be competent and that Ihafe wtll be an idenlrty 01 merest
between managers and other employees in g w n g management the power 01
needs 10 do Ihe job elfectlvely" Parsons. T , "Suggestoons for a Socnologl-
Cal Approach 10 the Theory of Organlsmons". Admintsfraftre Scmnce
OoarrerlvVol 1 . 1 9 5 6 . p 2 3 4
organise people . . . Top management is an
authority-conscious group. Men at the top of the
supervisory structure are consumed with decision-
making and commanding. Yet they do not like to
believe that men obey them because they have
power . . . They want to feel that they command
because they are gifted to lead."20
The obverse of these sentiments is presented by
the radical critique. An entirely different set of
premises are put forward. Factory power relations
are seen as a reflection of power disparities in
society at large: and this power derives not from
the mystified conceptions illustrated in the
previous paragraph, but from property. Where.
bereft of their covers, factory power relations are
but one manifestation of capitalist property and
power relationships. Insofar as some workers may
seek to legitimise managerial power this exempli-
fies a state of 'false consciousness': the exploited
failing to comprehend the true logic of their
situation. maybe viewing the rights of those who
dominate as unchallengeable. Ideological strate-
gies are employed to sustain such manifestations of
thought.
Not only is managerial authority based upon
power and property. but the very functional bases
of their existence may be challenged. The rise of
the factories and the extreme hierarchical division
of labour may be seen as due more to a desire to
exercise effective control over the workforce rather
than due to any technological imperatives. Eco-
nomic historians have tended to assume a techno-
logical basis, but Fox gives a clear statement of an
alternative explanation: "The emergence of the
factory system owed as much to the desire for
closer co-ordination, discipline and control of the
labour force as to the pressures of
The factory system, once ushered in. demanded
"speed. regularity and attention"2' In a word, the
20 Miller. 0 C and Form. W H , ~ndus~r~Jl~ocroloQv.
Harper and flow,
New'York. 1 9 6 4 . second edmon. p 1 8 6 Bendtr tw echoes th8s theme
"Like all others who enioy advantages over thmr Iellows. men In power want
10 M e thew posil~on as 'leg~lmate'and the,, advantages as 'deserve-
d' . All rulers therelore develop some myth of thev natural ruproor.
11y . . "Bend8x. R.. Msi Wabsr An InIellecrualPonrar London.Melhuen.
1966. p 294
21 F o x . A . o p c i t . p 180
2 2 Bendix. R , Work andlufhonfv m Indusfry. Harper. New Ywk. 1963.
P 39
43
Workplace collective bargaining and managerial Prerogatives
factories required discipline and this was sup-
ported by sanctions. However. whilst industrialisa-
tion has clearly been seen as implying an increase
in discipline and control. E. P. Thompson is
mindful of the shaping influence of the context:
“What we are examining here are not only changes
in manufacturing techniques which demand
greater synchronization of labour and greater
exactitude in time routines in an.v society: but also
these changes as they were lived through in the
society of nascent industrial capitali~m”?~
Whatever the forces at play in the genesis of the
factory system, the factors which now characterise
modern industrial organisations (work discipline.
hierarchies of authority) may be considered as
being reinforced both by technological and power
imperatives.
From this wider consideration of the ideological
and social bases of managerial prerogative. we
now turn to the workplace level in order to
examine the defences and inroads constructed by
collective worker action.
THE NATURE OF WORKPLACE
BARGAINING
An examination of managerial prerogatives de-
mands more than a consideration of the quality of
settlements made on various issues, and indeed
more than a consideration of the types of issues
subject to regulation. It is contended here that the
erosion of managerial prerogatives on the collec-
tive bargaining front is a function of two processes.
one procedural and the other substantive.
The existence of an organised workforce with
workplace representatives enjoying negotiating
rights. can in itself be a fundamental challenge to
unilateral management decision-makirg. Indeed.
the actual ability to challenge may be far more
important than any particular result. It certainly
represents a more impressive counter to mana-
gerial prerogative than. for instance, the level of
wages or the length of holiday entitlement. These
latter items could equally be granted by a benevo-
lent autocrat who would entertain no challenge to
his authority.
23 Thompson. E P , Time. ‘Work-D~x#plmeand Industrial Capital-
vim’ PastandPresent No 38. December 1967. p 80
44
Encroachment on managerial prerogatives is a
bi-dimensional phenomenon. both of which
approaches are essentially interdependent and
mutually reinforcing. This point can be illustrated
by Beynon’s observation that. “The post-war
period produced a struggle over the effort bargain
within the car plants. A struggle over who does
what. at what pace. for what price and with whom.
These were the issues of the 1950s that came to a
peak in the 1960s. The issues at stake were
management’s ‘right’ to organise the plant as it
thought fit and the workers’ ‘right’ to a fair wage.
to be without harassment. without speed-up, with-
out lay-off. without the sack. In fighting these
issues . . . workers found . . . that their strength lay
in their own ability to organise”?*
Procedural advance gives the potential for nego-
tiated substantive advances: at the same time.
substantive claims can precede and be a focus for.
a recognition campaign.
To further our understanding of this interactive
process it has been suggested that we need the
following data: (i) the parties invoved, (ii) their
goals. standards and ideology. (iii) the structure of
interaction, (iv) the environmental conditions. (v)
the emerging substantive r ~ l e s . 2 ~Information
pertinent to these questions is developed in this
present paper.
Before reporting. however. on empirical findings
in this area. a number of (sometimes conflicting)
assessments of the r6le of collective bargaining
need to be confronted. The first claims that the
whole institution is merely supportive of the status
quo. that it involves the unions not in the dis-
mantling but. indeed, in the preservation of man-
agerial rights. Trade union bargaining helps to
legitimise the present economic and industrial
order, and. insofar as modifications favourable to
workers are achieved. these are so marginal that
far from eliciting change they actually help to
prevent it by staving-off the worst excesses and
24 Ebynon. H.. op. cit.. p. 46.
25 Gottxhalk. A W , ‘A Bshavioural Analysis of Bargaintng’ In Warner.
M.. (ed), The Sociology olthe Workptacs. Allen and Unwin. 1 9 7 3 . p . 73.
These kind of questions inlormed the reseerch project reported in Storey.
J.. “Prowdural and Substantive Aspects of Workplace Collective Bargaining
and their Impact upon Managerial Prerogatives”. Ph.D. thesis, Unlwrsltv 01
Lancastar. 1 9 1 4
rendering safe attendant frustrations. I n other The critical perspective is overstretched when it
words. the whole exercise is at best an elaborate discounts all collective action which utilises collec-
safety-valve. at worst a total charade. tive bargaining tactics. Workgroup efforts have
A n alternative view is to stress the benefits been effective in safeguarding workers from arbi-
gained from collective bargaining. thus Slichter trary management power. and even the critics of
sees it as "a method of introducing civil rights into official union involvement acknowledge this3O But
industry",2fi what needs to be further emphasised is that such
There are a number of points here. One is the workplace action is imbued and made potent by
question as to how far cumulative changes can be the trade union ideal. I t is loo crude to discount
brought about over time - remembering the 'trade union' action because this or that piece of
periodic resurgence of managerial control?' There action is not supported by strike pay. In subtler
is also the point that. although managements may ways, the collective nature of such actions owes a
theoretically retain full rights in all the major debt to trade unionism: for the initial organising
decision areas. the results of unwelcome decisions principles of the shop. for the defining of the
may be challenged. situation. for the meaning of such concepts as
Further, the level at which bargaining takes 'picket'. 'blackleg'. 'solidarity'. In total. the whole
place can also be a factor. For example, Beynon, in exercise of workplace power is made the securer
reviewing the struggles in the American Ford because of the trade union culiure and environ-
plants. makes the point that. "the official union- ment in which it occurs.
management contract made no real inroads into
managerial prerogatives".28 The fact that company PROCEDURAL FINDINGS
agreements of this type can play a supportive rble The empirical work for this research was con-
is not, however. contested here. What is contested ducted between 1970-72 in four industries (brew-
is the nihilistically cynical view that all manage- ing. man-made fibres. mechanical engineering and
ment-worker agreements, even those at the plant bus transport) in the North West of England. I t
level. represent a similar degree of 'incorporation'. involved workplace studies, a postal question-
A recent piece of researchzg in this area whilst naire3' survey of managers and shop stewards, and
equally drawing attention to the distinction be- an analysis of written collective agreements3* The
tween official union bureaucracies and the shop object was to determine the extent of development
floor. nevertheless acknowledges the very real of workplace bargaining. to measure its impact on
importance of the development of workplace job 'managerial decisions', and to identify the relevant
rights (control of production. discipline. sub- variables.
contracting). Indeed. excessive attention to the The overall picture provided by these sources
theme of rank and file revolts as an expression of was of considerable development in workplace
the "challenge from below" to management collu- procedure - of a varied pattern. Recognition of
sion with official established unions. is somewhat manual trade unions was found to be almost
outdated in its ignorance of the supportive rble universal in these four industries, although the
given to plant-level organisation shown for small brewing establishments were an exception
example by the TGWU. here. White-collar trade union recognition was far
26 Slchter. S H , Unron Polrcrer and Indvsrrrd Managemenr. Brookings
Inrtltute. Washingion DC, 1941, p 1 30 Herding. R , ibid. Bcynon. H , op t i t ; and Lane, T. and Rbbsrls. K ,
27 This has been well documented by Cliff. Tony. The fmployers Srriks ar PMmpronr. fontana. London, 1 9 7 1
Offenswe. plum Press. London. I 9 7 0 31 The percentage figures which follow relate 10 returns from a oemple
28 Beynon. H , op cit , p 40 01 93 establishments and 14 1 shop siswardr.
29 Herdlng. R , Job Comrol and Umon Sfrucrure op tat The theme of 32 The reasoning behind the adoption 01 thew methods IS partly
this book. the dlstonttion between shopfloor acllon and oflicial umon a c t w i v refleclcd m Parker's observation lhat "!he two methods 01 sample surveys
tn the USA fno-slrke clauses and all) should not be IW easilly assumed 10 be and case studies really complement each other. because each adds a
transleiable to the U K Thus. asierlions such as "more "noon mfluence less dimension to the pssibilmes 01 data analysis allordsd by the othaz". Parker.
labour power" (p 1211 are less easily rquated w t h workplace actnon on S R , .'Research into Workplace Industrial Ralations" en Warner. M , fed).
Erllal" The Sooolopy of rhe Wodplace. op clt , p 25

45
Workplace collective bargaining und managerial prerogatives
more disparate. I t was general in mechanical
engineering and transport - in over 90% of the
establishments such recognition had been achieved
for some white-collar groups, but more infrequent
in brewing and man-made fibres where it had
been achieved in only 32% and 45% of establish-
ments respectively.
The achievement of recognition for lay repre-
sentatives was found to be one of the most
fundamental steps and arguably the most fund-
amental step on the road to workplace bargaining.
The development from recognition of trade unions
as external bodies to the actual recognition of an
internal lay representative (especially if also re-
garded as having bargaining functions) is a very
significant one indeed. In these industries ordinary
stewards were generally recognised, though with
some prevarication in the case of senior stewards
- these often being acknowledged as existing “by
force of personality only”.
Postal surveys largely reflected this situation:
89% of establishments recognised stewards for
production or maintenance workers. The highest
proportion of non-recognisers were found among
man-made fibre establishments of which 23%
failed to recognise stewards compared with only
3% in engineering. Senior steward recognition was
even more disparate: 93% in engineering, 69% in
transport. 42% in fibres and 41% in brewing.
On the question of steward committees (a
further stage in the procedural challenge) 54% of
establishments recognised such bodies, and a
further 11% reported their existence but said they
were not officially recognised. Again there was a
divergence of practice which reflected the earlier
pattern - most engineering establishments having
these committees, most fibre establishments not.
Steward committees comprising representatives
from more than one union were rare except in
engineering. This is one of the many examples in
which the engineering model was found inapplic-
able to other industrial sectors.
The analysis was next focused on the question of
negotiations’ and the
agreements observed by these establishments.
Some evidence came to light of dissociation from
national and other agreements. and a in [his
respect towards enterprise autonomy. This was
46
reflected particularly in man-made fibres where
the main industry agreement had in fact dis-
appeared, and in transport the new Public Trans-
port Authorities had decided to negotiate their
own agreements and extricate themselves from the
NJIC Agreement which was the heritage of their
municipal depots.
Workplace bargaining was clearly widespread:
managers and stewards alike testified to its fre-
quency. The most common level of bargaining
involvement for the individual steward being more
than once weekly but not quite so frequently as
once daily. Recourse to the more formalised
setting of the Negotiating Committee was usually
available ‘as and when required’.
In summary, on the procedural aspect, it can be
said that workplace bargaining is a fairly general
feature in these four industries. the potentiat
clearly being laid for developments on the substan-
tive front. It is to this aspect that we now turn.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:NEGOTIATED
AND RETAINED
There has of recent years in British industrial
relations been an overwhelming preoccupation
with the problems of procedure and procedural
reform, Flanders’ m0nographs3~go far in express-
ing the general tenor of academic debate in this
period. Meanwhile the range and depth of negotia-
tion on substantive issues has been relatively
ign0red.3~
The first question here arises from the fact that
the range and type of issues open to negotiation
are limited by notions of ‘managerial prerogatives’
which claim that certain issues are, by their very
nature, properly excluded from collective bargain-
ing. Hence, before examining the empirical evi-
dence on the types of issues negotiated. it will be
useful to consider the bases of the various con-
33 Flanders, A , lndurrnal Relartons M a t B Wrong wtrh the Svstem?
F8b.r. London 1965 Collecaw 8 a q a m n g Prescnptron for Change. Fatar.
tondon 1 9 8 7
34 Thm con~entcon8Idrruncaon {ouclinedby Flandnr in What Is Wmng
wtfh The Sprern op CII . p 1 1 ) 15 not unproblematic It tends to bs aven
more blurred the workshop IeveI. the b t e moreoften viewing
matteriot contention as “iisuea” and thsseollencontain elementi of booth.
lor esample, In the ares5 of diuiplms. and workgroup rights In lnflueming
production ~onlrol.the ‘rights’ and ‘standing’01 tho partlei can be Sean aa
both I procedural and a rubrtantiva question
 ceptual distinctions seeking to delineate typologies ly affecting the job is 'legitimate'. whereas at-
of proscribed issues. tempts to impose regulation upon wider manage-
A traditional one is that between market regula- ment matters are not.
tion (legitimate) and the attempted regulation of Nevertheless, in practice it is likely that the very
labour and capital utilisation (illegitimate). There attempt to negotiate general rules safeguarding the
is a parallel here between the 'external' and job and its nature, will inevitably involve the
'internal' distinction. Matters concerning the collectivity in wider issues.
domestic 'management' of the workplace being An influential notion in the endeavour to find a
seen as non-negotiable. conceptual basis for the empirical distinction
I t is almost a cliche that collective bargaining is between "negotiable" and "reserved" issues has
concerned with the 'terms and conditions' of been Selig Perlman's "job territory" c0ncept.3~
employment. But, in fact, the union does not need Milton Derber et al, and Martin Perline use it as
to press very far on the conditions aspect to come an explanatory principle underlying their three
u p against prerogatives relating to labour deploy- empirical categories (issues widely negotiated:
ment. choice of technological process, speed of moderately negotiated: management functions).
work. manning levels. etc. Thus, Derber writes: "on managerial functions
There are two points relating to this typology. which did not directly affect the job territory (to
however: one is that certain issues (shift and use Professor Perlman's concept). . . the unions
overtime arrangements. demarcation principles) had virtually no voice"?* Perline similarly finds:
can be seen as containing both market (external) "a familiar pattern emerges. All those issues in
and labour utilisation (internal) implications. which a clear-cut majority of respondents indicat-
Secondly, the dynamic nature of collective bar- ed that the decision rested solely with management
gaining must not be forgotten. even attempts to were outside what Selig Perlman many years ago
bargain on market issues have been seen by referred to as the "job territory"?8 Unfortunately,
employers as encroachments on their right^'?^ neither author examines what Perlman meant by
Abandoning the internaVexterna1 notion com- this term, whether it refers to a demarcated job
pletely, Clarke et al offer a distinction between area. or simply to job-related matters.
'task-centred' and 'power-centred' foci for aspir- In fact, he appears to be referring to the former
ants seeking greater participation. The task- as, for example. in his comparison between union-
centred "emphasises participation as a device like- ism and patriotism, and in his reference to the fact.
ly to increase job satisfaction and with it producti- that "common job territory.. . is constantly tend-
vity", whereas the power-centred approach "aims ing to widen" because of accumulated technologi-
at extending the bargaining power of the cal changes. thus producing "a virtually undivided
worker".36 From this it might be argued with some job territory for all employed in it, the function of
consistency that workers' interest in matters direct- framing 'rules of occupancy and tenure' for the job
opportunities in the now expanded job territory
will sooner or later be taken over by an industrial
35 Tho. second arpsct 8s rsllecled In Dubm s d#rtmcllon birrsen
lundarnantal and convonl#onal The ltrrl refers 10 ~ r r ~no1
IISUI)I r yet
union"."O
incorporaled In CoIIOCIwe bargammg whereas the latter ale those which Of course. the concepts of 'job territory' and
have h e n mcluded In CoIIect~vebargammg through part negolmona 'jobrelated' issues have some aspects in common,
Dubin R A Theory PI Confltcl and Power In Unton.Menagsmen1
Relmonr hduslnal and Labour Rektrons Revtew 1960 Vol 13 Part 4 they are nevertheless distinct. The first refers more
P 5091 T h s ISuntllmrnatrng as 10 the nalum of the ISSMS faflrngrnlo either
categorv also 11 11nor clear whether en ($suecwnd b. tundmenral m one
wtkplace and C o n v e n l m a l In another Dubm appears 10 be lhmkmg 01 3 7 This 0s expounded in Perlman. S . A Thwry 01 the LdbQQUI Mow.
Ihe supra wrkplace n l u a t ~ o n but 11 fundamental tssuer are rmplv those rnenl. AU~USIUSM Kellev, New York. 1968 lorigma1 edmon 19281
w h r h happen no1 10 ba noImally negormble on a h~aloncalr&IuaImn tho%doer 38 Derb81. M. el 11. collect#^ Bargainong and Management Functions-
not lurther our underslandmg of the nature of l h s e reserved ~ssueabut An Emprical Study". JournalolBusmess. Vol 31. 1 9 5 8 . p 110
simplv provider an altemal#vcterm woth wheh 10 devrlba them 39 Perline. M.. "Organired Labot and Managerial Prerop.llvr1". cab.
36 Clarke R 0 at aI Warkeo Pamcipatron m Msnspemenr m Bntdm loma Management R w ~ e w .1 9 7 I,p 4 9
op cot p I 40 Perlman. Selig. op CII , pp 275-6

47
Workplace collective bargaining and managerial prerogatives
to the defence of the job as a preservation of
employment opportunities, whilst the latter relates
more to regulating the conditions under which that
job will be carried out.
In the light of our empirical survey, it will be
interesting to observe whether British workers
have, at the workplace level, negotiated more upon
the job-territory issues of union security than they
have upon the jobrelated issues affecting working
conditions. I n America both Derber and Perline
suggest that the former is the main focus for
organised labour.
ISSUES NEGOTIATED: EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
In the surveys and plant studies in the four
industries, both the range and type of issues being
negotiated were examined.
It should be made clear at this point that this
survey seeks to elucidate how the situation is (or
rather was, at the time of the survey) rather than
how any party thinks it ought to be. In this
important respect it differs markedly from the
recent survey by Clarke et al at which ostensibly
contained a section on “The Pattern of Workers’
Influence Upon Managerial Decision Making”.
whereas what it in fact measured was the accepta-
bility to management of worker-influence in cer-
tain areas. On the basis of hypothetical cases, it
sought to establish whether management would
consult or negotiate. For example, on the issue of
contracting-out, they write: “the great majority of
firms do not regard a decision to put work out to
subcontract as one which they ought to discuss as a
maffer of course with the unions or their
workers”!’ In other words, it is a record of
managerial perceptions and attitudes concerning
their ‘rights’.
The distinction between attitudes and behaviour
here is crucial because of the very marginality of
the decision areas being investigated. Whilst it may
be true that firms were reluctant “to commit
themselves strongly to negotiation on these is-
sues”.4* this is surely not a matter for surprise.
As an alternative to this approach. an ‘index’ of
41 Clarke. R 0 81 al. op cil ,p 94. emphasis eddsd
4 2 ,bid p 96
48
twenty-five marginal issues was presented to man-
agers and stewards and they were asked whether
these items had in fact been negotiated (see Table
I). Three types of information were sought from
the data. Firstly, some indication of the range of
bargaining occurring at the workplace: is it restric-
tive or extensive? Secondly, the variables associat-
ed with those differences in bargaining scope.
Thirdly, the types of issues subjected to negotia-
tion. and the types of issues excluded.
THE SCOPE OF WORKPLACE
BARGAINING
From the management returns we find that of
the 25 listed issues, the average (mean) number
reported as having been negotiated was seven per
establishment. At the same time there is a wide
variation between establishments: whilst some had
negotiated on 16 of the issues, others had negotiat-
ed on none of them. The results from the shop
stewards’ survey were similar. Of the listed issues,
the stewards reported having negotiated on aver-
age 8.9 of them. Thus, whilst there was a tendency
for managers to underestimate and stewards to
overestimate their tally, these figures show neither
party to be grossly exaggerating their estimates.
So, with on average between seven and nine
‘marginal’ issues being ‘negotiated at workplace
level. (issues rarely negotiated at any other level)
this suggests some significant development in plant
bargaining. As indicated, however, there is marked
variation between establishments: some are clearly
negotiating very little, whereas others are indulg-
ing in a great deal. Table 2 gives a frequency
distribution: it suggests that trade unionists and
managers in many establishments have a wide
scope to develop their bargaining whilst remaining
on ground well-developed by others.
There was variation between industries: engin-
eering and transport generally had more joint
regulation. brewing and fibres generally less. Pas-
senger transport undertakings scored high on
domestic negotiation despite their observance of
the NJIC agreement. So it is not a case of wide
bargaining by default of industry-wide activity.
In assessing the trend in the scope of bargaining
over the previous five years, 70% of stewards
thought there had been some increase in scope
TABLE 1: Types of issues negotiated
.~ -~ ~~

% of Establishments Negotiating
the Issue
Management Steward
Issue Reports Reports

(n = 93) (n = 141)
I Speed of work 48 13
2 Quality standards of work 20 29
3 Layout of equipment 8 23
4 Shifts 68 56
5 Manning 54 57
6 Redundancy 48 60
1 Dismissal 40 61
8 Discipline 41 63
9 Overtime (existence of, and allocation) 54 12
10 Rest periods 41 53
II Production techniques and methods 26 38
12 Guaranteed week 32 55
13 Contracting work out 13 25
14 Job content 51 48
15 Price of product 1 8
16 Type of Product 0 9
17 Scheduling of operations 20 28
18 Source of materials used 0 6
19 Transfer of employees 45 62
20 Ownership. shares in enterprise 0 1
21 Level of output/service II 20
22 Control over influx of new employees 24 31
23 Promotions I 11
24 Demarcation 41 30
25 Investment policy 0 1

(and over half of these said the increase had been a
large one). Only one steward out of 141 thought
there had been a decrease in scope.
Nevertheless. the majority clearly felt that there
was still some way to go. just over a half thought
that a lot more control by workers through their
union was needed at the workplace. Significantly,
establishments with wide scope were found to
contain as much pressure to extend it further as
were establishments with the least joint regulation.
Similarly. managements in establishments with a
narrow range were as keen to contain that scope as
were those with the widest range.
TYPES OF ISSUES NEGOTIATED
The reasons why a particular establishment fails
to negotiate a particular issue is a different ques-
tion to why. in general, certain issues fall outside
the scope of bargaining. On the first problem the
answer may be sought by looking to differences in
technologies, to the scope of higher level agree-
ments which the plant may follow. and by looking
to other historical, structural and action variables.
But to seek reasons why certain issues in general
are almost universally decided by management is
an inherently different task. Here. one looks more
closely not so much at the situation of particular
49
Workplace collective bargaining and managerial prerogatives

TABLE 2: Frequency distribution of issues negotiated per establishment

No. of Issues No. of Establishments with this Range

Negotiaied Management Reports Steward Reports

(n = 93) (n = 141)
21 - I
20 - 2
19 - 2
18 - 2
17 - 3
16 4 7
I5 2 5
14 1 7
13 4 8
12 4 10
II 9 7
10 8 14
9 8 12
8 3 9
7 6 8
6 7 II
5 5 7
4 4 7
3 8 7
2 6 I
I 5 5
0 9 6

93 141

establishments but at the issues themselves.
The 25 issues chosen for inclusion in the list
shown in Table I ranged from issues concerned
with the immediate job experience (speed of work,
rest periods) to prima facie managerial issues
(investment, price and type of product).
Is it the case that workers' representatives have
confined themselves within certain theoretical
limits of legitimate bargaining areas? If so. what is
the basis or rationale behind the choice of issues?
The most widely negotiated issues were shifts
(68% reported negotiations here), manning (54%).
overtime (54%) and job content (51%). The inclu-
sion of job content in this high position is signifi-
cant: it suggests that recruitment of labour power
is not a simple hiring of men's time which can then
50
be utilised at the hirer's discretion. The effort-
bargain is a far more complex affair. (It also
suggests that at the workplace level. 'job content'
as opposed to 'job context' can be made as valid an
area for collective bargaining as it is for job
enrichment exercises.)
A complete rank ordering of issues by frequency
of negotiation is given in Appendix 1.
The resort to negotiation varies greatly between
the different issues: some are clearly rarely nego-
tiated, others frequently. But even the 'manage-
ment issues' of price of product, type of product
and source of materials had been negotiated by
some stewards. Thus, 20% had negotiated about
level of output and 9% about the type of product.
It seemed therefore that, although the 'rarely-
 negotiated’ cluster of issues could be characterised
as ‘generally management matters’, they are not
absolute rights, rather they may be more correctly
assessed as areas of decision-making which have,
so far. been to a lesser degree assailed than other
areas. They comprise ground which. although
difficult terrain for stewards in general. and the
home of particularly hostile resisting forces, is not
totally impassable. nor indeed untrodden.
The labour utilization issue results are interest-
ing. The right to transfer employees (inter- and
intra-departmentally) would seem to be a manage-
ment function of labour allocation, yet 88 stewards
(62%) reported having negotiated about it. and
45% of managers agreed that they had negotiated it
with their stewards. Similarly, manning levels are
often regarded as a clear management function,
yet 81 stewards (57%) and 50 managers (54%)
concurred that negotiations had also occurred
here.
Discipline and dismissal are often seen as crucial
guarantors of management’s other functions: man-
agers often claimed that they would not negotiate
upon these matters. Yet 60% of stewards and 40%
of managers reported that they had negotiated on
each of them. Hence, although collective bargain-
ing is necessarily a two-party process, it is clear
that management cannot always exclude from it
many issues which it theoretically prefers to regard
as its own. Nevertheless, it remains true that the
main issues reported to be not negotiated, were of
the financial management as opposed to the man-
management type.
Job-related issues appear the main focus of
workplace bargaining, these include overtime, dis-
cipline, dismissal and redundancy. Job territory
issues which relate more to the union’s institution-
al security (contracting out. allocation of work,
demarcation) whilst also widely negotiated came
second. The results differ i n this respect then, from
the American studies outlined earlier43 Such an
emphasis on job-related issues might have been
expected at the workplace level. for it is here that
workers are likely to press for regulation on issues
43 In !he case 01 M Perline. however. his was a survey 01 “organired
labour’s bdiefs”. op cil , p 47. as such. his respondenis were more likely
10 sties the importance of issues at f aim g the institutional interests of tha
union
which directly affect their day to day working lives.
Yet ultimately, the financial decisions may be
more crucial to the workforce as a whole (for
example in circumstances of plant relocation or
redundancies) than are the ‘minor’ decisions on
rest periods and manning. But even to state the
contrast is to give some clue, for, these job-
experience issues are for the individual worker not
‘minor’ at all. Indeed, they may be of greater
importance than the distant possibility that
because of a merger his company’s policies may
change. The latter may be challenged in the event
anyway.
The mystique of financial management is un-
doubtedly a factor intimidating workplace repre-
sentatives from venturing too seriously into this
They may feel more adept at challenging
the outcome rather than the financial design itself.
To some extent there may be a ‘riding’ of the
capitalist system: insofar as managers of compan-
ies compete to sustain and develop their own
companies, then on this particular aspect there
may be less incentive to interfere.
The question arises as to how far management’s
stand on prerogatives is a matter of principle and
how far simply a practical strategy. Clarke et al
assert both conflicting points with equal forceful-
ness. On the one hand, they state: “The response
of management to unions is almost entirely prag-
matic: if unions are strong and determined to
extend the range of their bargaining interests, as
the evidence from the United States indicates, they
will be able to achieve this Furthermore,
we are told that the “main reason why manage-
ment has a unitary rather than a pluralistic view of
the firm is not because of an ideological commit-
ment”, but rather a lack of union strength to “insist
on management accepting a wider field of joint
regulation”P6 The reluctance to accept the plurali-
stic view is “based not so much upon a theoretical
view of rights and duties.. . but on a,belief that
the objectives of the unions are different from
those of management - and therefore must at
44 Allhough in a m o d a t altsmpl 10 counter this the TUC has published
a working guide: “Costs and Profits: Financial Intormalion tor Trade
Unionists”. 1969
45 Clarke. A 0 et aI. op. tit.. p 99
46 ibid
51
Workplace collective bargaining and managerial prerogatives
some point come into conflict”?’ I n other words.
management and employer objections are not
matters of principle or ideology but of the practi-
calities of costs.
Yet. later in the same work. this argument is
totally contradicted. it being now suggested that
the defence of managerial prerogatives is after all
based on matters of principle: “managerial author-
ity in the eyes of most managers, has been
grounded not only on functional requirements. but
even more fundamenraltv on the exercise of an
inheren, righr . . . management is still acutely con-
cerned to maintain what it considers to be the
essential foundation of its authority. namely the
moral right to take certain decisions without chal-
lenge from the unions”!R
Now there is surely an inherent contradiction
here: “Moral rights” are by definition something
more than “practical reasons” and certainly cannot
be considered as “entirely pragmatic”.
A balanced assessment must recognise that in-
deed for some managers their ‘prerogatives’ are
viewed as a matter of principle: they d o feel that
managers have a genuine right to manage. and
owners a right to control their assets as they see fit.
However. for others, and there are at least a
significant minority. managerial prerogatives are
essentially a matter of practicality: when the costs
of defending them outweigh the gains they readily
prefer to negotiate.
VARIABLES INFLUENCING WORKERS’
PENETRATION INTO ‘MANAGERIAL
D ECISI0N S’
A third objective was to find why workplace
bargaining had made a substantial impact in some
establishments but not in others. A number of
hypotheses were constructed from the plant studies
and from the literature.
The most immediately apparent factor was the
type of industry. In this four-industry study. tran-
sport and engineering were found to be character-
ised by a wider bargaining scope than brewing and
man-made fibres. This, despite the fact that i n
both former instances the establishments in the
4 7 ibid
4 8 #bid, PP 1 5 2 - 3
52
survey were parties to an industry-wide agreement
at which level a number of important issues were
settled. (In the case of brewing. attachment to a
higher-level agreement is more irregular and
where it occurs the brewing companies follow
regional agreements: in the case of man-made
fibres an industry-wide agreement no longer ex-
ists.)
This accords with the recent study by Boraston.
Clegg and Rimmer. who hypothesised that ‘tight’
company or industry agreements would lead to
greater ‘dependence’ of the workplace upon the
local full-time union officer, whereas in fact they
found a low correlation
The notion that higher-level agreements would
in themselves ‘restrict’ the development of work-
place bargaining seems to assume too definitive a
list of areas amenable to negotiation. Parochial
independence would not appear to be the key to
the development of strong workplace representa-
tion. I n fact. establishments which were part of
multi-plant companies tended to have a wider
bargaining scope than single-plant companies.
This relationship held across all four industries.
Employers with single plants would appear to be
especially intent on preserving their managerial
rights and resisting union incursions.
Insofar as the structure of negotiations and
agreements was a factor. this tended to be related
to management policy. For example. in each of
our four industries there was a high correlation
between recognition of non-manual unions and
the scope of bargaining with manual employees.
Where management recognised non-manual trade
unions. this tended to indicate their responsiveness
to a wider role for collective bargaining in general.
Management policy was shown to be important.
too. when comparing natural textiles with man-
made fibres. In the former, there is a tradition of
close co-operation between management and local
full-time officers. and a refusal by plant manage-
ment to recognise workplace lay representatives
for negotiating purposes other than for piece-rate
settlements.
Other sub-variables of industry-type are the
technological and economic factors. The type of
4 9 Borasian. I ei al. Workplace and Union op CII p 179
technology employed is usually a key constituent
of industry taxonomies, and it is also a factor
which has attracted a good deal of attention in the
search for determinants of many aspects of
management-worker relations. One might have
expected a high degree of correlation here:
however, there was less support in this study for
the purely technological factor than the economic.
Difficult product market situations. unemploy-
ment in the industry and locality, all seemed to
weaken the potential for influence by the shop
floor collective. If the market was unstable. so too
the frontier of control.
The size of workforce is revealed as a further
factor correlating with a wide range of bargaining
at workplace level. The survey found that with an
increase in size. the average number of issues
negotiated per establishment increased accord-
ingly. The reasons for this could be numerous.
Larger establishments, for example. are more
likely to have a greater degree of formalisation in
industrial relations.
The argument from size should not. however. be
overstated. Circumstances may arise where smaller
establishments develop a wide range of bargain-
ing: even the very fact of limited size may enhance
the common identity of the group in a way less
likely on a larger site with an amorphous mass of
fellows. Further. elected representatives of these
smaller groups have the same incentives to nego-
tiate effectively. The ubiquitous AUEW stewards
representing pockets of maintenance craftsmen in
scattered plants across all types of industries. do
not appear to be muted in their attempts to
establish effective representation.
Even if size were related say to impersonality.
alienation. and generally poor relations. none of
these are necessarily translatable into an effective
impact of workplace bargaining. Size may lead to
complexities in negotiations which could increase
the likelihood of tensions and militancy. which
may in turn yield some power. but these frustra-
tions could equally be turned towards the task of
attaining limited objectives and high cash settle-
ments.
These reservations made. it nevertheless remains
a good apriori case that the size of an undertaking
in terms of numbers employed, usually presents a
fairly reliable guide to the degree of formalised
workplace bargaining and the range of negotiated
issues. This retationship was found to be positive
in the present survey. although the correlation did
tail-off at the higher levels. Respondents in plants
of 5000 plus reported a greater resort to joint
consultation.
There were two other variables which were
positively correlated with wide bargaining scope:
trade union density and the incidence of industrial
action. Managers themselves expressed the belief
that organised action had, in recent years. forced
concessions on many non-wage issues. However,
one needs to be cautious here, for. conflict may be
initiated by management, or, a history of industrial
action could betray a situation of managerial
intransigence informed by dogged ideological
belief in managerial rights.
I n that manifest conflict could mark the location
of such situations, it might therefore be postulated
that a high level of conflict would be associated
with low penetration, not high.
On the other hand, the positive correlation,
which was sustained across each of the industries
and across all forms of industrial action, itself
contains sufficient justification for closer attention
to be paid to the complex interrelationship
between the relative power of the parties and the
circumstances surrounding their willingness to act.
CONCLUSIONS
Any overall assessment of the conceptual analy-
sis and empirical findings outlined above must at
this stage be tentative.
There seems to be ground for arguing that the
extension in workplace bargaining has not been
brought about by a sustained planned challenge,
but rather derives from ad hoc attempts to restrict
management’s exercise of arbitrary power. Support
for this kind of interpretation can be found i n two
recent works by Hyman and Goldthorpe. The
former rightly observes that “the effort bargain
creates an inevitable worker interest. however
tacit. in the sphere of managerial prerogatives -
an interest which is no less real even when
consciousness of it is suppressed by acceptance of
53
Workplace collective bargaining and rnanageriol prerogatives
generalised notions of the legitimacy of manager-
ial
In a similar vein, Goldthorpe adds that “to claim
that the increased bargaining strength of labour
and the growth of the informal system of work-
place relations have resulted in a serious loss of
authority.. . is one which involves a good deal of
conceptual uncertainty”?’
He then goes on to distinguish between
authority (in the Weberian sense of the rational-
legal exercise of command) and the concept of
power (the ability to coerce and influence).
Both writers, then, are arguing that managerial
authority remains intact: what has apparently
occurred so far has been “a decline not in manage-
ment’s authority but in its purely d e fact0 capacity
to secure the compliance of workers with its
specific requirements”?*
We could at this juncture include Alan Fox and
then argue that this triumvirate are essentially
50 Hyman. R , Social Valuer and Industrial RelatlonJ. Baal1 Blackr*sll,
Oxford. 1975. p 238
51 Goldthwps, J H ,op cot , p 427
5 2 (bid, p 4 2 9
54
concerned to demonstrate that the basic structures
of capitalist society remain essentially unassailed:
that opposition to management uninformed by
conscious intent to change these fundamental
structures implies an underwriting of managerial
legitimacy: and. in such circumstances, collective
bargaining serves further to sustain, not challenge,
workers’ continued subordination to management
control.
T h e research conducted for this report seemed
to indicate that when workers challenged manage-
ment on such issues as discipline, dismissal, man-
ning. or j o b content, they were not attempting to
vitiate totally management’s decision-making role
in general, nor indeed even denying a managerial
role on these particular issues. Nevertheless. they
were making conscious efforts to set limits t o such
decision-making capabilities: certain sorts of out-
come were seen as not legitimate. Therefore.
insofar as these oppositional attempts were SUC-
cessful, their ultimate effect could only be, not just
to circumscribe power, but to produce a reduction
too in managerial authority, at least in these
particular orbits of control. Authority is divisible.
APPENDIX 1
Rank ordering of type of issues negotiated

Stewards(n = 141) Management ( n = 93)

Issue Negotiating Rank Rank Negotiating
90 %

Overtime 72 I 3 54
Discipline 62 2 10 41
Transfer of employees 62 3 9 45
Dismissal 61 4 II 40
Redundancy 60 5 6 48
Manning 57 6 2 54
Shifts 56 7 1 68
Guaranteed Week 55 8 12 32
Rest periods 53 9 7 41
Job content 48 10 4 51
Production techniques 38 II 13 26
Control over influx 31 12 14 23
Demarcation 30 13 8 41
Quality standards 29 14 I5 20
Scheduling of operations 28 15 16 20
Contracting work out 25 16 17 13
Layout of equipment 23 17 19 8
Level of output 20 18 18 II
Speed of work 13 19 5 48
Promotion II 20 20 I
Type of product 9 21 22 0
Price of product 8 22 21 1
Source of materials 7 23 23 0
Investment I 24 24 0
Ownership 1 25 25 0

Management and stewards agree to a large

extent upon the ‘negotiability’ of the various
topics. Sixteen of the issues reported by manage-
ments are ranked within two places of the rankings
given by stewards. From issue 14 to 25 the rank
orders are almost identical. Spearman’s rank corre-

sis that rs = 0. The result of r,-

lation coefficient was used to test the null hypothe-
0.807 indicated a
highly significant correlation at the .01 level of
confidence.

55