G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

ESMAEL GERVERO,
FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, DANILO CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused.;
ESMAEL GERVERO (DECEASED), DANILO CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused-
Appellants.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO,

DANILO CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO BAÑES, Accused.

ESMAEL GERVERO (DECEASED), DANILO CASTIGADOR, CELSO SOLOMON AND EDUARDO

BAÑES, Accused-Appellants.

MARTIRES, J.:

This is an appeal from the 31 March 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00674
which affirmed with modification the 6 March 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Iloilo
City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 37792, finding Esmael Gervero, Florencio Arbolonio, Celso Solomon, Danilo
Castigador, and Eduardo Bañes (the accused) guilty of murder.3

THE FACTS

In an Information, dated 27 March 1992, the accused were charged with multiple murder. The information
reads:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 1991, in the Municipality of Lemery, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with one another, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with firearms, they
were then provided, through treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit HERNANDO VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLEGAS and
BENITO BASUG, JR. with said firearms inflicting upon said Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito
Basug, Jr. numerous gunshot wounds on different parts of their bodies which caused their deaths
immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Delia Villegas (Delia), Isaac Villegas (Isaac), Dr. Alexander Rendon (Dr. Rendon),
Barangay Captain Hernando Balinas (Brgy. Capt. Balinas), Roda Incronal (Roda), SPO3 Julius Dacles, PO3
Nazario Apundar, PS/Supt. Juan Mabugat, Jr., Inspector Norberta Simon, Nenita Villegas, and Ramona
Basug as its witnesses. Their combined testimony tended to establish the following:

At around 6:30 p.m. of 25 November 1991, at Barangay Milan, Lemery, Iloilo, Roda was at the house of
Barangay Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) Commander Hernando Villegas (Hernando). After eating and
while Roda was waiting for transportation bound for her residence at Ajuy, Hernando, CVO members Jose
Villegas (Jose) and Benito Basug, Jr. (Benito) came out of Hernando's house. Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) officers Bañes, Castigador, and their two companions, who were carrying
firearms, approached Hernando and asked him for money. When Hernando gave them P20.00, Bañes
remarked, "Is that the only amount you can give when you just received money from your wife?" Castigador
took the money and said, "You just watch out." When the CAFGU officers left, Roda informed Hernando of
Castigador's remark, which Hernando dismissed. Thereafter, Hernando, Jose, and Benito went back to
Hernando's house and prepared to go to the wake of CVO member Saturnino Inventor's wife.5

At around eight o'clock in the evening, while Delia was inside their house at Barangay Milan, Lemery, Iloilo,
her husband Jose, together with Hernando and Benito, passed by. Delia peeped through the window, called
Jose's attention, and told him not to stay long at the wake. With the area being illuminated by a light bulb,
Delia saw the three walk along the national road and cross towards the rice field. A few minutes later, Isaac,
Jose's younger brother and also a CVO member, passed by Delia's house together with Roda. Isaac shouted
to call the attention of Hernando, who was then already in the middle of the rice field. Roda, Delia, and
Isaac could hear the three CVOs laughing while they were traversing the rice field.6

Suddenly, Delia, Roda, and Isaac heard a burst of gunfire from where Hernando, Jose, and Benito were
walking. Jose, who was then wearing a pair of white pants, fell first. Delia heard someone shout, "This is
Hernando, a CVO!" and someone replied, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!"). Delia, from her window, also saw
Hernando attempting to turn back but was also gunned down. She also witnessed the group of armed men
approach the three CVOs whom they fired upon at close range.7

When they heard the gunfire, Isaac dropped to the ground and ran back to his house; Roda took cover
among the rice paddies, looked at the direction of the gunshots, and saw persons with long firearms. When
Roda reached Hernando's house, she saw Hernando's son Ronnie and told him that his father was shot but
warned him not to go out as he might also be harmed. Delia and Isaac heard men pass by their houses
thereafter. Isaac recognized some of the gunmen to be his friends and positively identified the accused as
the armed men he saw.8

Later that same night, Pilar Basulgan, wife of Brgy. Capt. Balinas, summoned Isaac. Together with Delia and
Ronnie, Isaac went to the house of Brgy. Capt. Balinas. There they saw the accused who had already told
Brgy. Capt. Balinas that they made a mistake in shooting Hernando, Jose, and Benito because they thought
that the three were members of the New People's Army (NPA). Isaac asserted that misapprehension was
impossible because the CAFGU officers personally knew the victims and the voices of the three CVO
members were recognizable. Brgy. Capt. Balinas asked if the victims were able to shoot back, but the
accused answered in the negative. Thereafter, Isaac, Delia and Ronnie proceeded to the crime scene and
saw Hernando, Jose, and Benito lifeless on the ground.9

Version of the Defense

At around six o'clock in the evening of 25 November 1991, the accused were given oral instructions by
Senior Inspector Benigno Baldevinos (Senior Inspector Baldevinos) to conduct tactical patrol and combat
operations against NPA members at Barangay Milan, Lemery, Iloilo. In that briefing, they were told to use
the password "Simoy," to which the response would be "Amoy."10

At Barangay Milan, the accused positioned themselves near the river. A while later, they noticed people
approaching, which prompted Arbolonio to utter the password "Simoy." Instead of replying with the agreed
safe word, the men fired at the accused. The accused fired back and the exchange of gunfire lasted for
about thirty minutes. Gervero thereafter ordered his group to gather the firearms of the slain persons.
Arbolonio crawled ahead of his companions and with the use of a flashlight, he recovered a homemade
armalite and one pistolized 12 gauge with two live ammunitions. Gervero ordered the group to proceed to
the house of Brgy. Capt. Balinas to inform him that they encountered a group of men, whom they believed
to be members of the NPA. They also turned over the recovered firearms to the police and reported the
incident to Senior Inspector Baldevinos, who went back to the scene of the incident with the accused.11

The Regional Trial Court's Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It found the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses straightforward, credible, and in accord with the physical evidence.

With regard to the defense of fulfillment of duty, the trial court ruled that the attendant circumstances
leading to the killing of the three victims by the accused clearly showed the absence of the two essential
requisites for such defense to prosper. It declared that while it may be initially said that the accused acted in
obedience to the order of their superior to conduct foot patrol and take up ambush position at the place of
the incident, they undoubtedly exceeded in the performance of their duties by immediately firing successive
shots on the three unsuspecting victims. The RTC observed that the accused approached their victims and
mercilessly sprayed them with bullets to completely silence them.

The court a quo further held that the defense of misencounter due to mistake of fact was unbelievable. It
noted that just a few hours before the incident happened, Bañes, Castigador, and two other unidentified
CAFGU members came to the house of Hernando to ask for money, indicating that they knew each other;
and that Gervero was likewise bound by his testimony that he knew Hernando. Lastly, the RTC concluded
that the suddenness of the attack and the lack of opportunity for the victims to defend themselves
constituted treachery. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the remaining five (5) accused
ESMAEL GERVERO, FLORENCIO ARBOLONIO, CELSO SOLOMON, DANILO CASTIGADOR and EDUARDO
BAÑES GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
and hereby sentences each of them as follows:

1. The penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the death of Hernando Villegas;

2. The penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the death of Jose Villegas; and

3. The penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the death of Benito Basug, Jr.

Each of the accused are likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito
Basug, Jr. the following:

1. P15,000.00 as temperate damages;

2. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

5. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, the accused elevated its appeal before the CA.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused but modified the amount of damages
awarded. It pronounced that even in cases of arrest, the use of unnecessary force, the wantonly violent
treatment of the offender, and the resort to dangerous means, when such apprehension could be done
otherwise, were not justified acts. The appellate court opined that the accused were entirely careless in not
first verifying the identities of the victims; such negligence diminished the defense of mistake of fact. It
added that if self-defense could be negated by the manner it was allegedly employed, the sheer number of
gunshot wounds demonstrated the accused's mens rea. The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of 06 March 2006 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 37792 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION only insofar as the amount of damages as follows:

"Each of the accused [is] likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas, and Benito
Basug, Jr. the following:

1. P25,000.00 as temperate damages;

2. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. P75,000.00 as moral damages; and

5. To pay the costs."

SO ORDERED.13
Hence, this appeal by Esmael Gervero (deceased), Danilo Castigador, Celso Solomon, and Eduardo Bañes
(accused-appellants).
ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF MISTAKE OF
FACT; AND

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF TREACHERY QUALIFIED THE KILLING TO MURDER.

Accused-appellants assert that the patrol and combat operation they conducted on 25 November 1991, was
authorized by their commanding officer Senior Inspector Baldevinos; that the year 1991 was a time of
political instability as the then administration had to deal with an invigorated communist insurgency; that
when they went their way to confront their enemies, they needed the mindset of men with resolve; thus,
when they confronted three non-uniformed armed men who fired at them, they were acting in good faith;
that there was no treachery because they were justified by the circumstances of place and time to introduce
the element of surprise; and that they reported the encounter to the barangay captain of Barangay Milan
and to the Lemery Police Station at their own volition, when during such time they could have already fled if
indeed they had acted in malice and bad faith.14

THE COURT'S RULING

Mistake of fact finds no application in this case.

As early as in the case of People v. Oanis and Galanta,15 the Court has ruled that mistake of fact applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness:
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
of US. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If
you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck
and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a
friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend
under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that
his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time
or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no
alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In
the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever
which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according
to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get
him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes,
and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738), yet he is never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the
arrest could be effected otherwise x x x16
Further, in Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan,17 the Court has laid down the requisites for such defense to
prosper, viz:
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the
context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified
the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a
defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even
if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the
defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper
invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a
matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the
existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the
offense.

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah Chong, but
in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of
the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the
accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and,
receiving no response from the intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had
broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had
placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the
intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest
mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:

x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of
supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows
the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
xxx

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which
will justify a killing-or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if
without fault or carelessness he does not believe them -he is legally guiltless of homicide; though he
mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and
with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If,
without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what
he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has
really no occasion for the extreme measure.

xxxx

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is otherwise
criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused.
Thus, Ah Chong further explained that -

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible
who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability
if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To
this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith. [emphases supplied]18
First, there was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because they were traversing an
open area which was illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition, the witnesses
testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly. It must be borne in mind that it was not the
first time that the accused had seen the victims as, in fact, accused Bañes and Castigador met Hernando
just a few hours before the shooting. Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly, the accused
who were all members of the CAFGU would know the residents of that town so as to easily distinguish them
from unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA. Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando
identified himself and shouted, "This is Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities of the
victims, the accused continued to fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot
now!"). Third, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point, they could no
longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not contented, they sprayed them with bullets
such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds,19 Hernando 16 gunshot wounds,20 and Benito 20 gunshot
wounds.21Fourth, contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the first to fire
their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused whether the victims had fired at
them, the accused answered him in the negative. Fifth, the accused would like the Court to believe that the
victims knew the safe word "Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily
determine whether they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe
words as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and his co-accused were present
when their commanding officer briefed them about the safe words to be used in their operation.22 All these
circumstances negate accused-appellants' claim of mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action to
eliminate the victims.

No justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty

In People v. Oanis,23 the Court set forth two requisites in order that fulfillment of duty and exercise of a right
may be considered as justifying circumstance, namely: (a) that the offender acts in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or in the lawful exercise of such right or office. If one is
absent, accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of right or office.24

In this case, it could not even be said that the accused acted in the performance of their duty. Indeed,
Gervero narrated that they conducted the operation on 25 November 1991, on the verbal instruction of
Senior Inspector Baldevinos who later on testified in court to corroborate this claim. However, even
assuming that they were indeed tasked to capture members of the NPA, their actions on that fateful night
disprove their defense of fulfillment of duty as shown by the way they had viciously attacked their helpless
victims. The evidence speaks in no uncertain terms that the accused, instead of fulfilling their sworn duty to
protect the public in accordance with law, allowed their personal grudges and thirst for vengeance to prevail
and killed Jose, Hernando, and Benito in cold blood.

Accused-appellants are guilty of murder qualified by treachery.

Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, which
provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin;

4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a

volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;

5. With evident premeditation;

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) That a person was killed; 2) That the accused killed him; 3) That
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4) That the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.25

That Hernando, Jose, and Benito died and that the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide have already
been established by the trial and appellate courts. Moreover, that accused-appellants killed the three victims
remain undisputed considering that they had admitted the act of shooting the victims, but raised the
defense of mistake of fact. However, as previously mentioned, neither mistake of fact nor fulfilment of duty
is applicable to exculpate accused-appellants from criminal liability. Thus, what remains to be resolved is the
appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that "[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to. ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." Thus, in order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated,
the following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution
would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity
being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.26 "The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unanned, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."27

The witnesses were all consistent in declaring that accused-appellants suddenly fired at the three
unsuspecting victims who never had a chance to mount a defense. The victims, who were on their way to
attend a wake and happily conversing with one another, were caught off guard when all of a sudden, they
were met with multiple gunshots. In such a rapid motion, accused-appellants shot the victims, affording the
latter no opportunity to defend themselves or fight back. Without any doubt, the manner of execution was
deliberately adopted by the accused who were all armed with heavily powered firearms. They positioned
themselves in what they termed as "ambush position," at a distance where their victims could not easily see
them, thereby ensuring that they hit and terminate their targets.

Penalty and award of damages

Pursuant to Art. 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63(2)
of the RPC, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed upon the
accused-appellants in view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the
killing of Jose, Hernando, and Benito.

Following the jurisprudence laid down by the Court in People v. Jugueta,28 accused-appellants are ordered to
pay the heirs of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas, and Benito Basug, Jr. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.29 It was also ruled in Jugueta that
when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of
P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent per
annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 31 March 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00674 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Danilo Castigador, Celso
Solomon, and Eduardo Bañes are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER for the killing of
Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas, and Benito Basug, Jr. and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral
damages; Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as temperate damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., on official leave.

July 26, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on July 11, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 26, 2018 at 10:45
a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 3-18; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. with Associates Justice Edgardo L.
Delos Santos and Gabriel T. Ingles, concurring.

2
Records, pp. 805-827; penned by Pairing Judge Loida J. Diestro-Mapurol.

3
Remegildo P. Arbolonio and Jesus A. Catequista, Jr. died during the pendency of the case.

4
Records, p. 1.

5
Records, pp. 994-999.

6
Records,pp. 886-890, 905-907, 1000.

7
Records, pp. 890-891, 908, 1000-1002.

8
Records, pp. 891-893, 908-909, 1001-1002.

9
Records, pp. 910-911, 941-942.

10
Records, pp. 1054-1057, 1106.

11
Records, pp. 1059-1064.

12
Records, p. 827.

13
Rollo, p. 17.

14
CA rollo, pp. 38-58.

15
74 Phil. 257 (1943).

16
Id. at 257-258.

17
689 Phil. 75 (2012).

18
Id. at 115-118.
19
Records, p. 927.

20
Records, pp. 808-809.

21
Records, p. 930.

22
Records, p. 1106.

23
Supra note 15.

24
Id. at 259.

25
Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Code, Book Two, 17th Ed., p. 496 (2008).

People v. Manzano, Jr., G.R. No. 217974, 5 March 2018.

26

27
People v. Amora, 748 Phil. 608, 621 (2014).

28
783 Phil. 806 (2016).

29
Id. at 847