TOPIC:REGALIAN DOCTRINE, CONCEPT
part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
1. CASE TITLE: CRUZ v. SEC. OF DENR
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
alsoknown as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).
In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend
the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over
natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part. On November 10, 1998, a group of
intervenors, Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA,
Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition. The CHR also asserts
that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the
rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous
peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Section 3(A),
5,6, 7,8 and 57 provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not IPRA are unconstitutional for unlawfully
depriving the State of its ownership over lands of public domain,
minerals, and other natural resources therein, violating the regalia
doctrine enshrined in Sec. 2, Article 12 of the Constitution.
RULING:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they
voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the
same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s
petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include natural resources. Hence, IPRA
does not contravene the constitution because there is nothing in
the law the ICCs ownership over natural resources over their
ancestral domain. Right of ownership and possession by the ICC
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate them.
*No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development
and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate the same.
In Carino v Insular:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the
government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be
proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony
or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held
in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is
doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the
applicant the benefit of the doubt."
Topic: Concept of Regalian Doctrine
2. Secretary of DENR vs. YAP, GR No. 167707, Oct. 8,
2008
FACTS
This a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief
filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and
ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its
powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is
also home to 12,003 inhabitants who live in the bone-shaped
island’s three barangays.
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of
Boracay
Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed
by named persons.
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3,
1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants, Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad
Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, 1and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right
to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
Public International Law – USC Law EH 406 – 2019 | 1
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid
realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and
its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered
in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public
forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right
to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and
PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated
on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently
in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural
growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years
ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were
occupying for tax purposes.
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was
purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal
hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay.
They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for
resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.
The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in
Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344,
were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222)
in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC
of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on August 7, 1933.
ISSUE:
• WON Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those
similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island.
RULING:
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire
title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable
laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands
surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical
Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their
occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that
lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of
disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land
Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were
declared as part of the forest reserve.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced
by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707
is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regalian principle and the power of the executive to
reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber
or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be
provided by law, giving the government great leeway for
classification. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private
Public International Law – USC Law EH 406 – 2019 | 2
ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of
what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian
Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The Regalian doctrine
was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage
Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as
well as possessory claims.
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly
amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the
Indies. It established possessory information as the method of
legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set forth in said decree. Under Section 393
of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title, when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property,
is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty
(20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual,
public, and adverse, from the date of its inscription. However,
possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise,
the lands would revert to the State.
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish
regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took
various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion
especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or
adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in
the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the
Philippine Bill of 1902. By this law, lands of the public domain in
the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand
divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands. The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral
lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system). It also provided the definition by exclusion of
"agricultural public lands." Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used
in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain
which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
known as the Torrens system.
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission
passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act
introduced the homestead system and made provisions for
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for
the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations
regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling
stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. Under the
Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years
preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This
new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto
dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended
Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other
than timber and mineral lands, and privately owned lands which
reverted to the State.
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act
No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last
amended by PD No. 1073, which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 discontinued
the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered
lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD
No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was
enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
property. It governs registration of lands under the Torrens
system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section
8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act
declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
Public International Law – USC Law EH 406 – 2019 | 3
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already
open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of
such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands
that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.
___________________________________________________
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: REGALIAN DOCTRINE (Concept)
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
Regional Executive Director, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional
Office No. 2, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND
VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CAGAYAN, respondents. (G.R. No. 155450 August 6,
2008)
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals Resolution
dismissing petitioner’s amended complaint for reversion,
annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of
titles. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
FACTS:
 On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan
(trial court) issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag),
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents),
covering a parcel of land containing an area of 7,047,673
square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan.
 On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No.
115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
 On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled and two
transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued: TCT No. T-
1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan,
consisting of 100,000 square meters and TCT No. T-1278,
issued in the name of the private respondents, consisting of
6,997,921 square meters.
 On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and
others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of DENR,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR
to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree
No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property
which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time
of the issuance of Decree No. 381928. The DENR Regional
Executive Director created an investigating team to conduct
ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject
property which reported that:
o A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in
the Plan prepared for spouses Carag was found to
be still within the timberland area at the time of the
issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses
Carag, and the same was only released as
alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as
certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority
(NAMRIA).
o B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag
and others have possessed and occupied by
themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest
the said portion of Lot since time immemorial.
o Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion
of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as
alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982."
 In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal
Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to
the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of
OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with
the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the
recommendation.
 On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree
No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and
declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930
the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion
of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000
square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was
allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance
of Decree No. 381928; thus, was not alienable and
disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion
was classified as alienable and disposable.
 On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the following allegations:
o Petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court because the real ground for the complaint
was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that
petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings,
could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies but failed to do so.
o Petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified
true copy of the decision sought to be annulled.
o Private respondents also maintained that the
complaint was barred by the doctrines of res
judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of
Act No. 496.
o Private respondents also stated that not all the
heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the
Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the
case.
o Finally, private respondents claimed that the real
party in interest was not petitioner but a certain
Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against
private respondents.
Public International Law – USC Law EH 406 – 2019 | 4
 On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for
reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration
of nullity of titles.
 On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
 Whether petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court;
 Whether compliant for Annulment of Decree has merit.
RULINGS:
 While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
complaint on procedural grounds, the Supreme Court
still deny the petition because the complaint for
annulment of decree has no merit.
 Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court.
o First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner
failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for
annulment of decree.
 Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and
amended complaint that it was seeking to
annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
land, specifically over the disputed portion,
which petitioner maintained was classified as
timber land and was not alienable and
disposable.
o Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the
complaint on the ground of petitioner’s failure to
allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available."
 Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on
lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the
action, petitioner need not allege that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner.
o Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues
raised in petitioner’s complaint were factual in
nature and should be threshed out in the proper
trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the
Public Land Act.
 Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in
ordinary civil cases shall be observed.
Should a trial be necessary, the reception
of evidence may be referred to a member
of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial
Court.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the
factual issues raised in the complaint for the
complete and proper determination of the
case.
 Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
o Petitioner contends that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the
disputed portion of the subject property.
o Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of
judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction over the
Public International Law – USC Law EH 406 – 2019 | 5
subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the statute in force at the time of
the filing of the action.
o Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were
per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular
Government, Supreme Court ruled:
 From the language of the foregoing
provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the
mineral and timber zone, all lands owned
by the State or by the sovereign nation
are public in character, and per se
alienable and, provided they are not
destined to the use of the public in general or
reserved by the Government in accordance
with law, they may be acquired by any
private or juridical person x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
o In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the
disputed portion had been declared as
mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law, during
the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land
classification maps petitioner attached to the
complaint also do not show that in 1930 the
disputed portion was part of the forest zone or
reserved for some public purpose. The NAMRIA
certification contained no statement that the
disputed portion was declared and classified as
timber land.
o The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was
issued was Act No. 2874, which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into -
(a) Alienable or disposable; (b) Timber; and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner
transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their government and
disposition.
o Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-
General had declared the disputed portion of the
subject property timber or mineral land pursuant
to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
o Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition
only those lands which have been declared
alienable or disposable. However, Section 8
provides that lands which are already private
lands, as well as lands on which a private claim
may be made under any law, are not covered by
the classification requirement in Section 8 for
purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section
8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime,
Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling
under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise
reserved for some public purpose in accordance
with the law.
o Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from
the classification requirement in Section 8,
trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate
these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not
alleged that the disputed portion had not become
private property prior to the enactment of Act No.
2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the
disputed portion was not land on which a private
right may be claimed under any existing law at
that time.

o In Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, The Court ruled: “By express declaration
of Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874, those who have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious acquisition of ownership since July 26,
1894 may file an application with the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and these
applicants shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title. When the land registration
court issued a decision for the issuance of a
decree which was the basis of an original
certificate of title to the land, the court had
already made a determination that the land
was agricultural and that the applicant had
proven that he was in open and exclusive
possession of the subject land for the
prescribed number of years. It was the land
registration court which had the jurisdiction to
determine whether the land applied for was
agricultural, forest or timber taking into
account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
o As with this case, when the trial court issued the
decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928
in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine whether the subject property, including
the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural,
timber or mineral land. The trial court
determined that the land was agricultural and
that spouses Carag proved that they were
entitled to the decree and a certificate of title.
The government, which was a party in the original
proceedings in the trial court as required by law,
did not appeal the decision of the trial court
declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since
the trial court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, its decision
rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final
and beyond review.
o Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that
all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the
public domain belong to the State, it recognized
that these lands were "subject to any existing
right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution." When
the Commonwealth Government was established
under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had
already an existing right to the subject land,
including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree
No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
 Supreme Court DENIED the petition and DISMISSED
petitioner complaint for lack of merit.
4. Milagros Bishop et al vs. CA and Spouses Salang
Topic: Purposes and Meaning of the Torrens System of
Registration
Issues:
Facts:
1. In dispute are portions of a parcel of land situated in
Subic, Zambales, with a total area of 1,652 sq m. These
portions are in the possession of the petitioners. The
entire parcel is registered in the name of the private
respondents under TCT No. T-29018.
2. On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the
petitioners for recovery of possession of the lots in
question.
3. Plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered owners of the
land.
4. In their answer, the defendants claimed that the lots
were part of the public domain and could not have been
registered under the Torrens system. All alleged long
and continuous possession of the lots and produced tax
declarations in their names. Two of them maintained
that they had acquired their respective lots by virtue of
valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on
inheritance.
5. RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. RTC
Judge Mendoza held that:
“The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple
of the land in question, necessarily have the lawful right
to the physical possession of the land. The owner of a
land has a right to enjoy and possess it, and he has also
the right to recover and repossess the same from any
person occupying it unlawfully.
Art. 428 –– New Civil Code
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder
and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs
being the registered owners of the land in question have
also the corresponding right to the recovery and
possession of the same. The defendants who are in
physical occupancy of the land belonging to the
plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to unjustly withhold
the possession of the said land from the plaintiffs. The
defendants' occupancy of the land in question is
unlawful and in violation of plaintiffs right to the recovery
and possession of the land they owned. The evidence
presented by the defendants claiming as per
certifications of the Bureau of Forestry that the land
occupied by them is within the alienable and disposable
public land, deserves scant consideration as the said
certification are without basis in law. The moment the
land in question was titled in the name of the plaintiffs,
it ceased to become a part of the public domain as the
same became the private property of the registered
owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land
made in the names of the defendants are not evidence
of title, it appearing that the land is already titled to the
plaintiffs. The registration of the land in the names of the
defendants with the Assessor's Office for taxation
purposes and the payments of real property taxes by
the defendants cannot and does not defeat the title of
the plaintiffs to the land. The fact that the defendants
have been in occupancy of the land in question for quite
a period of time is of no moment as prescription will not
ripen into ownership because the land is covered by a
torrens title. Acquisitive prescription will not be available
to land titled under Art. 496.
6. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
1. WON the land in question is part of the public
domain and could not have been validly registered
under the Torrens System. NO.
2. WON the petitioners have acquired title to their
respective lots by laches. NO.
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 3. WON the petitioners should be considered builders
in good faith entitled to the rights granted by Art.
448, 546, 547, and 548 of the Civil Code. NO.
Held:
First Issue: NO.
On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents'
title is traceable to an Original Certificate of Title issued way back
in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now
incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The
Presumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that
certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land
subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore
registrable under the Torrens system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for
being void ab initio, it must be shown that the registration court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was
actual fraud in securing the title. Neither of these requirements
has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was
the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in question
was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court was
correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack of
legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body
cannot prevail against court decision declaring the land to be
registrable.
No less importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of title on
the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of 1 year from
the entry of the decree of registration 4 and cannot now be
resorted to by the petitioners at this late hour.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of
registered land must also possess it does not merit serious
attention. The non-presentation by the private respondents of
their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they have
never acquired ownership thereof or have lost it by such
omission.
Second Issue: NO.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even
if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners'
occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return
of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never
barred by laches.
It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered
under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby:
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration
is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question
of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the
time of registration in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would
seem that once the title was registered, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land.
Third Issue: NO.
A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his
title to the land at the time he builds on it. This definition cannot
apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very outset that
they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
4. LEGARDA VS. SALEEBY
October 2, 1915 G.R. No. L-8936
FACTS:
Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots
in Ermita, Manila. Between their lots is a stone wall which is
located on the lot of the plaintiffs (CONSUELO LEGARDA). On
March 2, 1906, Consuelo and her husband presented a petition
in the Court of Land Registration to register their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October
1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered
and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the
Torrens system. The said registration and certificate included the
wall.
On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of N.M. Saleeby presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration for registration. The
court decreed the registration of the land which also included the
wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, her husband, discovered
that the wall has also been registered to N.M. Saleeby. They
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
adjustment and correction of the error where the wall was
indicated in both registrations. However, the lower court
contended that during the pendency of the petition for the
registration of the defendant’s land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the
name of the defendant (N.M. Saleeby). The lower court decided
the case in favor of the Saleeby.
ISSUE:
Whether or not N.M. Saleeby is the owner of the wall and the land
occupied by it, since Legarda failed to make any objection during
the registration of Saleeby’s lot?
RULING:
NO. Saleeby is not the owner of the wall and the land occupied
by it. The lower court’s decision would call for the owner who
registered the property first, to be always on alert and see to it
that no other parties will register the wall and its land. Else, if they
spotted someone registering such wall in their own name, they
must immediately oppose it. Such would become defeat the real
purpose of the Torrens system of land registration. The real
purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law,
when a title is registered, the owner may rest, secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
Who owns the land? According to Torrens system, Legarda.
Under our law, once a party registers the land, final and in good
faith, no third parties may claim interest on the same land. The
rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.
The registration, under the Torrens system, does not give the
owner any better title than he had. The registration of a particular
parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same. It is a
notice to the world, and no one can plead ignorance of the
registration. In case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier
in date shall prevail. The presumption is that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. This
presumption is IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be overcome by proof
of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object
of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The rule is that
all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record
Public International Law – USC Law EH 406 – 2019 | 7
contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation
would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

DECISION: Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The wall

and the land where it sit is awarded to LEGARDA.

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