Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon (G.R. No.

136760)

Facts:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged
mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-
RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of
sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square
meter. The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and
testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction
with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a
TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action. The Trial
Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Majaducon
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed
the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The principle of
separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive,
and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the
others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-
RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly
provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:

The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the
Committee from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it.

Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in this case.
The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended
legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts
rather than the legislature. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is
to look into the reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting
appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.

Abakada Guro Partylist vs Purisima

Facts:

RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives
Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF, DBM, and
NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the
fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service officials and employees whose revenue collection
fall short of the target; and further, to issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the purpose of approving the formulated
IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO became functus officio
and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335
and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing and enforcing said law.

Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the implementation
and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the
creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation
of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

Issue:

Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers
under the Constitution

Ruling: YES.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the
law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under
the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment
congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and

Report this ad

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation)
to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design
or structure of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.Wherefore, the
petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.