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Managerial Illusion
Managerial Illusion
Managerial Illusion
Merchant & Van der Stede’s “object of control” framework presumes an implicit
economics-based model by conceptualising the choice of control systems as an
outcome of cost-benefit trade-offs. Under this model, it is assumed that all
organisational members are economically rational actors (Homo Economicus). All
superiors (principals) and subordinates(agents) are both interested and have diverging
interests/objectives. Subordinates are effort and risk averse and also the choice of
control systems can be reduced to a question of explicit or implicit contracting. Costs
and benefits are easily conceptualised and (in principle) measurable.
Where superiors have imperfect information about subordinates actions, they have
two basic options in choosing control systems. The first one is contract based on
behaviour of the subordinate and monitor compliance, and the second one is contract
based on the outcomes of subordinates action and rewards are designed to compensate
the risk bear by the subordinates (result controls). The direct and indirect cost of
option one and two is compared and the least costly alternative subject to contextual
constraint is chosen.
The limitation for this model is that it presumes that organisational members work in
social vacuum and always act on their self interests. The political, cultural context and
organisational history is ignored. This model also reduces the choice of control
systems to a matter of explicit or implicit economic calculation. This model can also
be self fulfilling if economics based arguments are explicitly used as a justification for
the choice of control systems. This can reinforce rather than mitigate dysfunctional
attitudes and behaviour.