GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Rights (“Covenant”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”); Even
1. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10, G.R. No. 104768 July 21,
2003
Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; International Law; The
resulting government following the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 was indisputably
a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the
Philippines, assumed under international law.—The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-
25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated
25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution.” The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that
the revolutionary government, as thede jure government in the Philippines, assumed
under international law.
Same; Same; Same; During the interregnum—i.e., after the actual and effective take-
over of power by the revolutionary government up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution)—a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
Bill of Rights then.—We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was
not operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded
to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and
scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could
not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
Same; Same; Same; Sequestration Orders; To hold that the Bill of Rights under the
1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all
sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution.—To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by
the Philippine Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even
the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration
orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of
Rights of the Freedom
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; International Law; International Covenant on Civil and Political
during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and
the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.—Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in
force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration
orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void
during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government,
after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s
good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government
had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.” The Declaration, to
which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the
Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration,
the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles
of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was
also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the
Declaration.
2. Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, 267
SCRA 408, G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and.construction
of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.—Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of
policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and
carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing
certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent
of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Same; Same; Same; Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing.—As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people
in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
3. Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., 824 SCRA 327, G.R. No.
213948 April 25, 2017
Constitutional Law; Arts and Culture; Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which
deals with the subject of arts and culture, provides that “[t]he State shall conserve,
promote and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and resources.”—
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and
culture, provides that “[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s
historical and cultural heritage and resources x x x.” Since this provision is not self-
executory, Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of
our cultural heritage. One such law is Republic Act No. 10066, or the National Cultural
Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the National Commission for Culture and the
Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order “when the physical
integrity of the national cultural treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to
be in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original state.” This law
declares that the State should protect the “physical integrity” of the heritage property
or building if there is “danger of destruction or significant alteration from its original
state.” Physical integrity refers to the structure itself — how strong and sound the
structure is. The same law does not mention that another project, building, or
property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease and
desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or sight line of a
heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre
de Manila condominium project.
Historic Sites and Facilities; Ordinance No. 8119; Torre de Manila; Nowhere is it found
in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the
construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within
the background sight line or view of the Rizal Monument.—In the present case,
nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that
matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the
building is within the background sight line or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there
is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider,” in the words of the
Dissenting Opinion, “the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the
applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these
standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal
Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is
being built is a privately-owned property that is “not part of the Rizal Park that has
been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is in
fact “well-beyond” the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I.
Diokno. Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a “heritage
zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure.”
4. Santiago vs. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106, G.R. No.
127325 March 19, 1997
Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; The right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation.—Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted
that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
Same; Same; Same; The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.—The conclusion then is inevitable
that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII
of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress “provided” for the
implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the
affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A.
No. 6735. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the
exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act.
5. Lambino vs. Commission on Elections, 505 SCRA 160, G.R. No.
174153, G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; People’s Initiative;
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people—first, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal, and, second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition; The full text of the
proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached
to it, and if so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment.—The
essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential
elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that
every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the
framers of the Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative.— Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence
on people’s initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act thatthe Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that
the people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.
6. Magallona vs. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476, G.R. No. 187167 August 16,
2011
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); Congress’ decision to
classify the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of
Islands’ manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.—Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines
consistent with Article 121” of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121
of UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
“regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
7. PH vs China
8. Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) vs.
Abecina, 795 SCRA 214, G.R. No. 206484 June 29, 2016
Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; The State may not be sued without its
consent.—The State may not be sued without its consent. This fundamental doctrine
stems from the principle that there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends. This generally accepted principle of law
has been explicitly expressed in both the 1973 and the present Constitutions. But as
the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State
may waive its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be made expressly or by
implication.
Same; Same; It became necessary to distinguish between the State’s sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure imperii while
acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity.—Over the years, the
State’s participation in economic and commercial activities gradually expanded beyond
its sovereign function as regulator and governor. The evolution of the State’s activities
and degree of participation in commerce demanded a parallel evolution in the
traditional rule of state immunity. Thus, it became necessary to distinguish between
the State’s sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial,
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends
only to acts jure imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of
immunity.
9. Republic vs. Hidalgo, 534 SCRA 619, G.R. No. 161657 October 4,
2007
The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs not
being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law. The assailed
trial court’s issuance of the writ of execution against government funds to satisfy its
money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.
Republic v. Palaci teaches that a judgment against the State generally operates merely
to liquidate and establish the plaintiff’s claim in the absence of express provision;
otherwise, they cannot be enforced by processes of law.
10. University of the Philippines vs. Dizon, 679 SCRA 54, G.R. No.
171182 August 23, 2012
Constitutional Law; The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”—Indeed,
an appropriation by Congress was required before the judgment that rendered the UP
liable for moral and actual damages (including attorney’s fees) would be satisfied
considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the “appropriations
earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.”
11. Republic vs. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division),
787 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 174747 March 9, 2016
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; Under Section 26 of the
State Auditing Code, the Commission on Audit (COA) has jurisdiction over the
settlement of debts and claims “of any sort” against government.—Under Section 26 of
the State Auditing Code, the Commission on Audit has jurisdiction over the settlement
of debts and claims “of any sort” against government: Section 26. General
jurisdiction.—The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the
keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers
pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the
books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of
the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in
an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts
and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned
or -controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other selfgoverning [sic]
boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including nongovernmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by
donation through the government, those required to pay levies or government share,
and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly
funded by the government.
12. NPC Drivers and Mechanics vs. National Power Corporation 845
SCRA 487, G.R. No. 156208 November 21, 2017
Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; Backwages; The back payment of any
compensation to public officers and employees cannot be done through a writ of
execution. The Commission on Audit (COA) has exclusive jurisdiction to settle “all
debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.”—While PSALM is directly liable for the
payment of the petitioners’ entitlement, the proper procedure to enforce a judgment
award against the government is to file a separate action before the COA for its
satisfaction. We have consistently ruled that the back payment of any compensation to
public officers and employees cannot be done through a writ of execution. The COA
has exclusive jurisdiction to settle “all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing
to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.” The
proper procedure to enforce a judgment award against the government is to file a
separate action before the COA for its satisfaction.
Same; Same; Same; To enforce the satisfaction of the judgment award, the amount of
which has been provisionally computed in the National Power Corporation (NPC) List
and Computation, the petitioners must now go before the Commission on Audit (COA)
and file a separate money claim against the NPC and the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM).—The NPC List and Computation is by no
means final and binding either on the Court or the COA, regardless of the petitioners’
acceptance and admission of the same. It is still subject to the COA’s validation and
audit procedures. To enforce the satisfaction of the judgment award, the amount of
which has been provisionally computed in the NPC List and Computation, the
petitioners must now go before the COA and file a separate money claim against the
NPC and PSALM. Whether the claim shall be allowed or disallowed is for the COA to
decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court
13. Buisan vs. Commission on Audit, 816 SCRA 346, G.R. No. 212376
January 31, 2017
Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the State, as
well as its government, is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.—The
fundamental law of the land provides that the State cannot be sued without its
consent. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the State, as well as its government, is immune from suit
unless it gives its consent. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say
that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The doctrine only conveys
that “the state may not be sued without its consent”; its clear import then is that the
State may at times be sued. Suits filed against government agencies may either be
against incorporated or unincorporated agencies. In case of incorporated agencies, its
suability depends upon whether its own organic act specifically provides that it can sue
and be sued in Court.
Same; Same; The Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) from being held responsible for alleged damages it performed
in consonance with its mandated duty.—As the State’s engineering and construction
arm, the DPWH exercises governmental functions that effectively insulate it from any
suit, much less from any monetary liability. The construction of the Project which was
for the purpose of minimizing the perennial problem of flood in the area of Tunggol,
Montawal, Maguindanao, is well within the powers and functions of the DPWH as
mandated by the Administrative Code of 1997. Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability
clothes the DPWH from being held responsible for alleged damages it performed in
consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it appear in the petition that the
State has given its consent, expressly or impliedly, to be sued before the courts. The
failure to allege the existence of the State’s consent to be sued in the complaint is a
fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the dismissal of the complaint.
14. Housing Authority vs. Roxas, 773 SCRA 358, G.R. No. 171953
October 21, 2015
Administrative Agencies; National Housing Authority; Under Section 6(i) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 757, which was its charter, the National Housing Authority (NHA)
could sue and be sued.—The mantle of the State’s immunity from suit did not extend
to the NHA despite its being a government-owned and -controlled corporation. Under
Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the NHA could sue
and be sued. As such, the NHA was not immune from the suit of Roxas.
15. Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014
Constitutional Law; State Immunity from Suit; This traditional rule of State immunity
which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis).—This traditional rule of State immunity which
exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the former’s
consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends
only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs.
 16. Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 169777
Same; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Power of
Inquiry; Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch,
and its power of inquiry extends to executive officials who are the most familiar with
and informed on executive operations.—Since Congress has authority to inquire into
the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power
of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, “with
process to enforce it,” is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative
process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their
offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning,
Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; Even where the inquiry
is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.”—Even where the
inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.” Since this term
figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its
preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial
for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption
that this is the intention of the challenged order.
17. KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs.
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. – All government agencies and government-
owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents
shall be covered by this executive order." EO 420 applies only to government entities
that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These government
entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these
government entities are the GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayor’s Office,6 LTO,7 PRC,8 and
similar government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a unified multi-
purpose ID system." Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their
functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and
format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data
collection and format, namely:

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Execu-tive privilege is properly a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the
invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of government and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and
persons; The reference in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. 464 to persons being “covered by the the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related
executive privilege” may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in information;
possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned,
privileged as defined in Section 2(a).—Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
government and those availing of government services;
appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all
senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all
senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID
designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief card as provided under this executive order;
of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are “covered by the executive
privilege.” The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and
the President. Given the title of Section 2—“Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege”—, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government
the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of service.
coverage under executive privilege. En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of
E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a
misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce
relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons. In light, costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience
however, of Sec. 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of to the people served by government entities.
executive privilege, the reference to persons being “covered by the executive
privilege” may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in
possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned,
 18. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19,
2007
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil
Code which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation; In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
of the effects of sex reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates
that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage
in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute based.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a law
where no law exists.—To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for
change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and
what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for
this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on
that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It
can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters
of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal, but the
remedies involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts.—Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life
of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about
that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do
not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that,
at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007Same;
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil Code
which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation; In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
of the effects of sex reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates
that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage
in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a law
where no law exists.—To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for
change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and
what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for
this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on
that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It
can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters
of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal, but the
remedies involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts.—Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life
of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about
that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do
not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that,
at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts
19. Republic vs. Gingoyon, 478 SCRA 474, G.R. No. 166429 December
19, 2005
Same; Same; Just Compensation; Standards of Just Compensation; Separation of
Powers; The appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter, and it
is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard.—It likewise bears
noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is
well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the
enactment of Republic Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standard in
determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to
national government infrastructure project, as well as the payment of the provisional
value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. Of course, rules of
procedure, as distinguished from substantive matters, remain the exclusive preserve of
the Supreme Court by virtue of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed,
Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67
on procedural aspects when it provides “all matters regarding defenses and objections
to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of
appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint
shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.”
20. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Reyes, 621 SCRA 511, A.M. No.
P-08-2535
Same; Same; The legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring
dangerous drug use by resort to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment
must be considered in light of the Supreme Court’s constitutional power of
administrative supervision over courts and court personnel—the legislative power
cannot limit the Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices,
judges and court personnel.—Two justices disagree with the majority opinion. They
opine that the Court’s action in this case contravenes an express public policy, i.e.,
“imprisonment for drug dealers and pushers, rehabilitation for their victims.” They also
posit that De Guzman’s failure to properly perform his duties and promptly respond to
Court orders precisely springs from his drug addiction that requires rehabilitation.
Finally, they state that the Court’s real strength is not in its righteousness but in its
willingness to understand that men are not perfect and that there is a time to punish
and a time to give a chance for contrition and change. However, the legislative policy
as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort to
sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of
this Court’s constitutional power of administrative supervision over courts and court
personnel. The legislative power imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is
subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters both in the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. As such, it cannot
limit the Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges
and court personnel. Neither should such policy be used to restrict the Court’s power
to preserve and maintain the Judiciary’s honor, dignity and integrity and public
confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency
and propriety governing the conduct of justices, judges and court employees.
21. Mamiscal vs. Abdullah, 761 SCRA 39, A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J July 1,
2015
Same; Same; Civil Registrars; It was only with the advent of the Local Government
Code (LGC) that the power of administrative supervision over civil registrars was
devolved to the municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units
(LGUs).—It was only with the advent of the Local Government Code that the power of
administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the municipal and city
mayors of the respective local government units. Under the “faithful execution clause”
embodied in Section 455(b)(1)(x) and Section 444(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government
Code, in relation to Section 479 under Article IX, Title V of the same Code, the
municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units, in addition to their
power to appoint city or municipal civil registrars are also given ample authority to
exercise administrative supervision over civil registrars.
22. Ampatuan vs. Puno, 651 SCRA 228, G.R. No. 190259 June 7, 2011
Administrative Law; State of Emergency; The Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).—The DILG Secretary did not take
over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the
vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in
Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM
Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or
operations of the ARMM.
23. Southern Cross Cement Corp vs. Cement Manufacturers Association
of the Philippines, 465 SCRA 532, G.R. No. 158540 August 3, 2005
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The authority delegated to the
President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with
legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department
secretaries—for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs under
Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as his alter
ego.—The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under
Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by
the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes
of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it
is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA
provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is
tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such
measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of
the President, to levy tariffs and imports.
24. Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA 700, G.R. No. 177597
July 16, 2008
Same; Delegation of Powers; There is neither an express prohibition nor an express
grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units.—There is neither an
express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In
fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the
power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code,
“only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
25. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) vs. National
Power Corporation (NPC), 503 SCRA 138, G.R. No. 156208
September 26, 2006
Administrative Law; Delegation of Powers; The department secretaries composing the
National Power Board of Directors (NPB) cannot delegate their duties as members of
the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is
their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such
responsibility.—We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who
shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon
these persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in running the
affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as “the act or the liberty to decide
according to the principles of justice and one’s ideas of what is right and proper under
the circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Discretion, when applied to public
functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially
in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and
conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. It is to be
presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the board
of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive
departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which made
them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the
department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much
less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is their personal
judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.
26. AIR CANADA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 778 SCRA 131, G.R. No.
169507 January 11, 2016
Same; Tax Treaties; Words and Phrases; A tax treaty is an agreement entered into
between sovereign states “for purposes of eliminating double taxation on income and
capital, preventing fiscal evasion, promoting mutual trade and investment, and
according fair and equitable tax treatment to foreign residents or nationals.”—A tax
treaty is an agreement entered into between sovereign states “for purposes of
eliminating double taxation on income and capital, preventing fiscal evasion,
promoting mutual trade and investment, and according fair and equitable tax
treatment to foreign residents or nationals.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C.
Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87 (1999), explained the purpose of a tax treaty:
The purpose of these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal
legislations of the contracting parties in order to help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous
taxation in two different jurisdictions. More precisely, the tax conventions are drafted
with a view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation, which is
defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same
taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods. The apparent
rationale for doing away with double taxation is to encourage the free flow of goods
and services and the movement of capital, technology and persons between countries,
conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies. Foreign
investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable international
investment climate and the protection against double taxation is crucial in creating
such a climate.
Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; Words and Phrases; Pacta sunt servanda is a
fundamental international law principle that requires agreeing parties to comply with
their treaty obligations in good faith.—Observance of any treaty obligation binding
upon the government of the Philippines is anchored on the constitutional provision that
the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land[.]” Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental international law principle
that requires agreeing parties to comply with their treaty obligations in good faith.
27. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32, G.R.
No. 190582<br/> April 8, 2010
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establish-ment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it
was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
28. Imbong vs. Ochoa Jr., 721 SCRA 146, G.R. No. 207563 April 8, 2014
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; It is apparent that the
Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to
both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is,
upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.—It is
apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide
equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity
of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to
prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins
Same; Religious Freedom; Free Exercise Clause; Establishment Clause; The
constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.—In short, the constitutional
assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause. The establishment clause “principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates
a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups.” Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious
freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one’s belief and faith.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality; In case of conflict between the
free exercise clause and the State, the Supreme Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality.—In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the
State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), (Escritor) where it was
stated “that benevolent neutrality-accom-modation, whether mandatory or permissive,
is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.” In the same
case, it was further explained that: The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with
respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not
to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. “The purpose of accommodation is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.”
“What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
‘burdensome effect,’ whether by the legislature or the courts.” In ascertaining the
limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.
Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.
29. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,
respondent. Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16,
2013
Same; Same; No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State;
The Supreme Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.―No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it
suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
30. MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL,-versus -RODRIGO R. DUTERTE
Full text nilagay sa escra pero sa general welfare clause ung issue dito
Even if it is otherwise,
Proclamation No. 475 must be
upheld for being in the nature of
a valid police power measure
Police power, amongst the three fundamental and inherent powers of the state, is the
most pervasive and comprehensive.[40] "It has been defined as the 'state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare."[41] "As defined, it consists of (1) imposition or restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of exact
definition but has been purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace."[42] The police power "finds no specific Constitutional grant
for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter"[43] since "it is inborn
in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty."[44] It is said to be the "inherent and
plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of the society."[45] Thus, police power constitutes an implied
limitation on the Bill of Rights. [46] After all, "the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to
be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties. 'Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will.' It is
subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number."[47]
"Expansive and extensive as its reach may be, police power is not a force without
limits."[48] "It has to be exercised within bounds – lawful ends through lawful
means, i.e., that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a
particular class, require its exercise, and that the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being unduly oppressive
upon individuals."[49]
That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the scope of police
power cannot be disputed. Verily, the statutes[50] from which the said measure draws
authority and the constitutional provisions[51] which serve as its framework are
primarily concerned with the environment and health, safety, and well-being of the
people, the promotion and securing of which are clearly legitimate objectives of
governmental efforts and regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 475 is without a doubt the interest of the public in general. The only
question now is whether the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
LEGISLATURE
1. City of Davao vs. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City, 467 SCRA 280, G.R.
No. 127383 August 18, 2005
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutes; Only the constitution may operate to
preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws—constitutional dicta
are of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter should always yield to the
former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.—The second paragraph of Section 33 of P.D.
No. 1146, as amended, effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the
Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue
restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially
considering that it is a lawmaker’s act that imposes such burden. Only the Constitution
may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws.
Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter should
always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive
limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of
irrepealable laws.—It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations
on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws.
Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte
blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes
an unhealthy stasis in thelegislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus
that may be responsive to the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once
observed, “[t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable
Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change.”
2. Government Service Insurance System vs. City Treasurer of the City
of Manila, 609 SCRA 330, G.R. No. 186242 December 23, 2009
Same; Taxation; It is to be noted that prominently added in Government Service
Insurance System’s (GSIS’s) present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied
repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect the solvency of GSIS funds;
Restrictions in the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Charter which for a
future express repeal do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such restrictions
do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the legislature to so
amend it.—The foregoing exempting proviso, couched as it were in an encompassing
manner, brooks no other construction but that GSIS is exempt from all forms of taxes.
While not determinative of this case, it is to be noted that prominently added in GSIS’
present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of the tax-exempt clause
so as to protect the solvency of GSIS funds. Moreover, an express repeal by a
subsequent law would not suffice to affect the full exemption benefits granted the
GSIS, unless the following conditionalities are met: (1) The repealing clause must
expressly, specifically, and categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39; and (2) a provision
is enacted to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential
factor to maintain or protect the solvency of the fund. These restrictions for a future
express repeal, notwithstanding, do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such
restrictions do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the
legislature to so amend it. The restrictions merely enhance other provisos in the law
ensuring the solvency of the GSIS fund.
Same; Same; While recognizing the exempt status of Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) owing to the reenactment of the full tax exemption clause under Sec.
39 of Republic Act No. 8291 in 1997, the ponencia in City of Davao v. RTC, Branch XII,
Davao City, 467 SCRA 280 (2005), appeared to have failed to take stock of and fully
appreciate the all-embracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39 which, for all
intents and purposes, considered as paid “any assessment against the GSIS as of the
approval of this Act.”—While recognizing the exempt status of GSIS owing to the
reenactment of the full tax exemption clause under Sec. 39 of RA 8291 in 1997, the
ponencia in City of Davao appeared to have failed to take stock of and fully appreciate
the all-embracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39 which, for all intents
and purposes, considered as paid “any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval
of this Act.” If only to stress the point, we hereby reproduce the pertinent portion of
said Sec. 39: SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.—x x x Taxes
imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase
the contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly,
notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all
accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act
are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances,
opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby
deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and
effect.
3. Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA
410, G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates
any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.—
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it
is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid
if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the
three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Same; Same; Definition of the limits on legislative power in the abstract.—Congress’
inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As
early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the
limits on legislative power in the following wise: Someone has said that the powers of
the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited
and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given
powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves
of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
4. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 803 SCRA 435, G.R. No. 221538
September 20, 2016
Constitutional Law; Senators; Natural-born Citizens; Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he
[or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”—Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he
[or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
Same; Statutory Construction; Even when a reading of the plain text is already
sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for
verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.—At
the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely, foundlings have
biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their
being foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this
controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no
fault of the foundling, remains unknown. Resolving this controversy hinges on
constitutional interpretation. Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in
discovering the sovereign’s purpose so as to identify which among competing
interpretations of the same text is the more contemporarily viable construction.
Primarily, the actual words — text — and how they are situated within the whole
document — context — govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning from the plain
text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle what is more
viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient,
contemporaneous construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or
validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,”
that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and
the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to
certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights
and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became
citizens of another country before the effectivity of RA No. 9225 “reacquire” their
Philippine citizenship andmay exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon
compliance with certain solemnities.—Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after
Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is,
keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the
ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to
certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights
and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became
citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 “reacquire”
their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon
compliance with certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2’s declaration of
a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves a
vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore natural-
born status as though it was never lost at all
5. Aquino III vs. Commission on Election, 617 SCRA 623, G.R. No.
189793<br/> April 7, 2010
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the
fundamental law has been violated or transgressed.—Any law duly enacted by
Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. Before a law may be
declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is
neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing
that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the
law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
Same; Election Law; Legislative Districts; There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.—There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned,
the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear
distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to
have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not
have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.—The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population
by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the
Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should
not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative
district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in
a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the
mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
6. VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G.
MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Election Law; Legislative Districts; The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to
have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand.”—The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district,
the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only
issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether
actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a
legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
Same; Same; A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a
legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of
the 250,000 population.—The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is
based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director
Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is
also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population
of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal
demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city
whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only
in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
Same; Same; National Statistics Office; National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB);
Certifications on demographic projection can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).—First,
certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second,
certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population
projections must be as of the middle of every year.
7. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA,
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the
Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of
Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of
Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN,
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; The Constitution clearly mandates that
the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the
Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.—The Constitution
clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Gerrymandering; Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage
to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, defined ‘gerrymandering’ as the formation of one legislative district out of
separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.—
“Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative
districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined
“gerrymandering” as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories
for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as
practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
8. ANGEL G. NAVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
NELSON B. JULIA Naval vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Term Limit; Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence of
term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the State that citizens
shall have equal access to public service.—While it is settled that in elections, the first
consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect to the expressed will of the
majority, there are limitations to being elected to a public office. Our Constitution and
statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of public office, and
the guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal access to public service.
Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term limits, is significantly reiterated by
Section 43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court has time and again declared that a
public office is a public trust and not a vested property right.
Election Law; Three-Term Limit; The drafters of our Constitution are in agreement
about the possible attendant evils if there would be no limit to reelection.—The
drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils if
there would be no limit to reelection. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences on
whether the term limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually or temporarily,
they decided that only three consecutive elections to the same position would be
allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once again vie for the same post provided
there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election. The rule answers the
need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few, while at
the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service those
who are worthy to be called statesmen. The compromise agreed upon by the drafters
of our Constitution was a result of exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after
three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the rule cannot be taken with a grain
of salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called for.
Constitutional Law; Reapportionment; Words Phrases; Reapportionment is “the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.”—
Reapportion­ment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality
of representation.” The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and
voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the number of the
inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered voters therein.
9. BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Party-List System Act; In computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional.—We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
Same; Same; The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”—We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of
seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.—In
computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system.—Neither the Constitution nor R.A.
No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties
to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.
10. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
Election Law; Party-List System; The party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections
a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.—The 1987 Constitution
provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list
system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot
win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives:
one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or
organization of choice.
Same; Same; The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.—Indisputably, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties
to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system “[F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.”
11. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court will uphold the classification as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.—Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we declared that
“[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have
followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force to
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.—From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the
same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force
to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors
12. MILAGROS E. AMORES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA,
respondents.
Election Law; Party-List System; A candidate who is more than 30 on election day is
not qualified to be a youth sector nominee.—As the law states in unequivocal terms
that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate
who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee.
Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers
ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
Same; Same; Changes of Political Party and Sectoral Affiliation; A nominee who
changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will not only be eligible for
nomination under the new sectoral affiliation of the change has been effected at least
six months before the elections.—What is clear is that the wording of Section 15
covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur
within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to
participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his
sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the
new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the
elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning
rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the
index of intention
13. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST], represented
herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL,
Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Same; Term-Sharing Agreements; When the term-sharing agreement was executed in
2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.—The Datol
Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under
Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on
February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to
the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect.
When the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet
expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
14. DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C.
LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Commission on Elections; Once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) own jurisdiction begins.—What
is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once
the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins
15. Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc, 771 SCRA 596, G.R. No.
205505 September 29, 2015
Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members
of Congress.—Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with
jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the
case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification
case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his
oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET,
and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
16. (Abang Lingkod) vs. Commission on Elections, 708 SCRA 133, G.R.
No. 206952 October 22, 2013
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register
under the party-list system are not required to submit evidence of their track record;
they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions their “constitution, by-
laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant
information as may be required by the COMELEC.”—Track record is not the same as
the submission or presentation of “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list
of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by
the COMELEC,” which are but mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to
establish that the group exists and is a going concern. The said documentary evidence
presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations seek to achieve. This is not merely a matter of semantics; the
delineation of what constitutes a track record has certain consequences in a group’s
bid for registration under the party-list system. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941,
groups intending to register under the party-list system are not required to submit
evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified
petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.”
Same; Same; Same; There exists no reason to further require groups seeking
registration under the party-list system to submit evidence showing their track
record.—There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under
the party-list system to submit evidence showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong
Paglaum, not all groups are required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and, accordingly, there is no longer any incentive in merely
feigning representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking
registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.—
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track
record since there would be no reason for them to feign representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional
party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, stated that, for purposes of
registration under the party--list system, it is enough that the principal advocacy of
sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent. There is thus no basis in
law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the
party-list system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in
R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit
evidence to show their track record as a group
17. Señeres vs. Commission on Elections, 585 SCRA 557, G.R. No.
178678 April 16, 2009
Same; Same; Same; Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) own jurisdiction begins.—
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives “begins only after a candidate has become
a member of the House of Representatives.” Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins
18. Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, 699 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 207264
June 25, 2013
Same; Same; To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must
be a concurrence of the following requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper
oath, and (3) assumption of office.―It is then clear that to be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Indeed, in
some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has
been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over
contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only
taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.
19. Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr., 780 SCRA 81, G.R. No. 211140 January
12, 2016
As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have
no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register
the latter’s name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively.
It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court
in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a
final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and
void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for
the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.The
foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as settled and
beyond dispute — Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative
of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. Reyes argues in essence that this
Court is devoid of original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. Instead, it is the
HRET that is constitutionally mandated to resolve any questions regarding her election,
the returns of such election, and her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives especially so that she has already been proclaimed, taken her oath,
and started to discharge her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives
representing the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. But the confluence of the
three acts in this case — her proclamation, oath and assumption of office — has not
altered the legal situation between Velasco and Reyes.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The
most crucial time is when Reyes’s CoC was cancelled due to her non-eligibility to run
as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — for without a
valid CoC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election and much less as
a duly proclaimed winner. That particular decision of the COMELEC was promulgated
even before Reyes’s proclamation, and which was affirmed by this Court’s final and
executory Resolutions dated June 25, 2013 and October 22, 2013.
20. Tañada, Jr. vs. House of Represetatives Electoral Tribunal, 785
SCRA 314, G.R. No. 217012 March 1, 2016
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Nuisance Candidates; It is not enough
for Wigberto to have Alvin John’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) cancelled, because
the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray votes. Alvin John must also be
declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John’s votes be credited to
Wigberto.—The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it
has no jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. If
Wigberto timely filed a petition before this Court within the period allotted for special
actions and questioned Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy, then it is proper for this Court
to assume jurisdiction and rule on the matter. As things stand, the COMELEC En Banc’s
ruling on Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy had long become final and executory. To our
mind, it appears that Wigberto’s petition challenging Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy
filed before the HRET, and now before this Court, is a mere afterthought. It was only
after Angelina was proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his zeal in pursuing
Alvin John’s alleged nuisance candidacy. It is not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin
John’s CoC cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray votes.
Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin
John’s votes be credited
21. Abayon vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), 791
SCRA 242, G.R. No. 222236, G.R. No. 223032 May 3, 2016
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; The Constitution no
less, grants the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of
Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud,
terrorism or other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections.—The
Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power
granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less,
grants the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the
members of the House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which
raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities committed before, during or
after the elections. To deprive the HRET the prerogative to annul elections would
undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election contests. The phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. Consequently, the annulment of
election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET’s constitutional mandate to
determine the validity of the contestee’s title.
Same; Same; Same; The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its
determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the
annulment.—The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Thus, the
HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, may annul election results
if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to
warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional
duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes
cast.
Same; Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Failure of Elections;
Annulment of Elections; There is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declares a failure of elections on the ground of
violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative
capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds,
they do so in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions.—The difference
between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of failure
of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former is an incident of the
judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the
COMELEC’s administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election
results connected with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of failure
of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct or
political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who
among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on
the other hand, declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or
continuing the elections, which were not held or were suspended, or if there was one,
resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special
elections will have to be conducted. Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because
when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence,
intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity.
In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do
so in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions
22. Baguilat, Jr. vs. Alvarez, 832 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 227757 July 25,
2017
Political Law; Speaker of the House of Representatives; The Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said
provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control.—The Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said
provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control. In the case of Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756 (1998), which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate
Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that
“[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the
House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the
other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ‘[e]ach House
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.’ [As such], the method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the]
Court.”
Same; Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its
proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints
of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’”—
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the
sole authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative
rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of
a majority [of the House of Representatives].” Hence, as a general rule, “[t]his Court
has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of
Representatives].”
23. Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 7399 August 25,
2009
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof.” Explaining the import of the underscored
portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
“Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.”1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of
the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators
are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not
for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little
value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a
trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them
based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts
of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-
accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is
intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
24. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, Petitioner, v. HON. EVANGELINE C.
CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 101 AND
ANTONIO L. TIU, Respondents.
Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the
parliamentary speech or debate" privilege
Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private
respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-
called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in
plenary and committee hearings in the Senate.44 With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is
evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under
Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of
any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not
spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully
contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance of petitioner's
duties as a Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative
process. It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked
when the lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or
debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the (legislative)
process."49 To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official function
of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the
process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties
and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation
in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," 50 outside the
ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987
Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary
immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises
not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in
furtherance of legislation.
The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and
Congressmen into "super-citizens"51 whose spoken words or actions are rendered
absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred the
privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good."52 It was intended to protect them against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing their decision-making prerogatives.53 Such grant of
legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose and plain
language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable) reckless
men to slander and even destroy others,"54 is not a cloak of unqualified impunity; its
invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of
the legislative department."55 As this Court emphasized in Pobre,56 "the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people's
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being
made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall."
25. Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68, G.R. No. 175352 July 15, 2009
Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC); Public Officers; Constitutional
Law; The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or employee
of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution; Not being a government official or employee, the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or
employment.—The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither
does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC
Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being
government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a
government office or employment

26. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, 549 SCRA 77, G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances;
Power of Inquiry; Executive Privilege; Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation while Section 22 pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function.—Senate cautions that while the above provisions are
closely related and complementary to each other, they should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct
inquiry, their objectives are different.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22.—This distinction gives
birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in
Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 22. The Court’s pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), is
clear: When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of
Congress may be facilitated by compulsory pro-cess only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
27. Romero II vs. Estrada, 583 SCRA 396, G.R. No. 174105 April 2, 2009
Same; Same; A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has
different purposes; On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional
hearings in aid of legislation.—A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court
proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like
adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand,
inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the
legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial
legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going
judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
28. ARVIN R. BALAG, Petitioner, v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The period of detention under the
Senate's inherent power of
contempt is not indefinite.
The Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of
imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of
contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of
legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected
therein. Under Arnault, however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by
the Senate may be detained indefinitely due to its characteristic as a continuing body.
The said witness may be detained for a day, a month, a year, or even for a lifetime
depending on the desire of the perpetual Senate. Certainly, in that case, the rights of
persons appearing before or affected by the legislative inquiry are in jeopardy. The
constitutional right to liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly cannot be respected
when they are detained for an indefinite period of time without due process of law.
As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-
preservation and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means
to an end and not the end itself.48Even arguendo that detention under the legislative's
inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it may be
used by Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove
an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the
restrictions during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent
to punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be
related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in
relation to that purpose.49 An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will
amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of contempt is of
utmost importance. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations are intended to
affect or change. Mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of
contempt during legislative inquiry.50 While there is a presumption of regularity that
the Senate will not gravely abuse its power of contempt, there is still a lingering and
unavoidable possibility of indefinite imprisonment of witnesses as long as there is no
specific period of detention, which is certainly not contemplated and envisioned by the
Constitution.
Thus, the Court must strike a balance between the interest of the Senate and the
rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative inquiries. The balancing of
interest requires that the Court take a conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. These
interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the
one hand, and the government's promotion of fundamental public interest or policy
objectives on the other.51
The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power
of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only
last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said
power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process may be
enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within
the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to
that subject.52 Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely,
once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained
witness.
Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two
instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23
of Senate Rules state:
Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of
the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its
Report.
The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members. Concurring and
dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members who do not sign the majority
report within seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the report. The number of
members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions of the Committee Report shall
be taken into account in determining whether the Report has been approved by a
majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both a
concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the majority
unless he expressly indicates his vote for the majority position.
The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall
be filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the
next Order of Business.
Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall
be referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases
supplied)
As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after
the conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is
highlighted in the Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin the
consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry.
The said Committee Report shall then be approved by a majority vote of all its
members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of
the next order of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the
Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or
disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate
whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of
business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained
witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention
of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.
Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one
(1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a
continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry
ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.
29. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 208566 November 19,
2013
Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions.―The Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress
enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the
President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage of the
GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the
Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details
for implementation by the Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were
definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the moment the
law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.” It must be clarified,
however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be
made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-
enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme
Court observes that the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article,
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators,
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which ― as settled in Philconsa ― is
lodged in Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF
Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in
Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised
only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of
appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law
of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under
the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and
given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as
well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
30. Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014
Same; Same; Requisites for a Valid Transfer of Appropriated Funds.—The transfer of
appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective
offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations
for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.
Same; Constitutional Law; Section 25(5), Article VI, not being a self-executing
provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative.—
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, not being a self-executing provision
of the Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law,
generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs
should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
31. (TESDA) vs. Commission on Audit, 750 SCRA 247, G.R. No. 196418
February 10, 2015
Constitutional Law; Pursuant to Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.—It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987
Constitution, no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. Hence, the GAA should be purposeful, Technical Education
and Skills Development Authority deliberate, and precise in its contents and
stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when it held that the provisions of the GAA
were not self-executory. This meant that the execution of the GAA was still subject to
a program of expenditure to be approved by the President, and such approved
program of expenditure was the basis for the release of funds. For that matter,
Section 34, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code (Executive Order No. 292)
states that — Section 34. Program of Expenditure.—The Secretary of Budget shall
recommend to the President the year’s program of expenditure for each agency of the
government on the basis of authorized appropriations. The approved expenditure
program shall constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal period, subject to
such policies, rules and regulations as may be approved by the President.
32. Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251, G.R. No.
166715 August 14, 2008
Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.—
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
Same; Same; Principle of Bicameralism; Presentment Clause; The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for
their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the
rule on presentment; A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers—it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a
committee of either or both chambers.—The requirement that the implementing rules
of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity
violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment. x x x Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and
repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the
House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee
legislative veto are invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President
for approval or veto and in the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed
by Congress can become a law.—Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to
the President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no
bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the
Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that
legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect
without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of
law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.—From the moment the law becomes effective,
any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has
already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or
its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law
PRESIDENCY
1. Pimentel vs. Congress
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the
final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect
its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers.
In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express
directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to
proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot,
adjourn sine dieuntil it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only
when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio.
Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385
[1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934] and Aquino v. Commission
on Elections, L-28392, January 29 1968)
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass
the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as
the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it
referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of
canvass, has not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to
the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for
the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may
reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
2. Macalintal vs PET
PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies—
not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as
well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral
court.
The designation of members of the SC is not unconstitutional. The case that was
pointed out by the petitioner is that the issue in Buac v. COMELEC involved the
characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct
of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections.
However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an
obiter, that “contests involving the President and the Vice President fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasijudicial power.”
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.”
3. Clinton vs. Jones --------
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), was a landmark United States Supreme
Court case establishing that a sitting President of the United States has
no immunity from civil law litigation, in federal court, against him or her, for acts done
before taking office and unrelated to the office. [1] In particular, there is no temporary
immunity, so it is not required to delay all federal cases until the President leaves
office.[1]
4. Rubrico vs GMA
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under
our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that
it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during
his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and
why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance
of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government
5. Rodriguez vs GMA
GMA cannot invoke immunity from suit in the case at bar. The president, being the
commander in chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military
that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility
doctrine. The intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit
is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
6. Funa vs Ermita
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the
Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object
sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be
avoided or remedied.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses
by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of
self-enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious
causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in
consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions
under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that
flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and
employment.38 Our declaration in that case cannot be more explicit:
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already
contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in
the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional
provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
7. Funa vs Agra
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.
The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of
his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this
regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section
13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment
or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of
Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the
veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of
officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of
appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
8. PIMENTEL v. ERMITA 472 SCRA 587 (2005)
On the nature of the power to appoint – the power to appoint is essentially executive
in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of the executive
power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
Limitations on executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.
The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that
office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office. However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not
legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature.
It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
9. AGUINALDO v. AQUINO 811 SCRA 304 (2016) AND 818
SCRA 2017 (2017)
2016 case: It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be
used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to
choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the
Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone
nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. The Court finds that President Aquino
was not obliged to appoint 1 new SB Assoc. Justice from each shortlist submitted by
the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the 6 shortlists encroached on
the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the
JBC had considered to be qualified.
2017 case: President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint
members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six
separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st SB
Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice,
consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the
six new SB Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one
JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which
requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by
the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said
constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18
nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for SB Associate Justice; but the minimum
requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the President's
consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed SB Associate
Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as
well as the other four new SB Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.
The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for
the simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of
Associate Justice of the SB is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that
President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the
vacant SB Associate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did not
require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as the issue of
clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant posts of SB Associate Justice was
concerned.
10. RUFINO v. ENDRIGA 496 SCRA 13 (2006)
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those
instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally
Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of
separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints
three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers
to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group
refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers
whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of
this fourth group of officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of
officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power,
or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the
trustees fall under the third group of officers.
11. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL 615 SCRA 666 (2010)
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President
or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
12. VELICARIA-GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 758 SCRA 414
(2015)
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that
takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the
exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of
the President signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official
transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the
appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time
of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during
the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur
and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks
even one step. And, unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no need to further
distinguish between an effective and an ineffective appointment when an appointment
is valid.
13. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO v. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP) 692 SCRA 359 (2013)
The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the
various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the
actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the
acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This
doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all
executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the
Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the
multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed
through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of
practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to personally
perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.
But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the
acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being
themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of
Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8494, the five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of
Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-
General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman of
the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other members of the
Board were the three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come from
the export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board for a
term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who was
concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board
of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because
of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law,
not the President that sat them in the Board.
14. ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST VS. ERMITA G.R. No. 168056, September
1, 2005 J. Austria-Martinez
In order that a court may be justified in holding a statute as unconstitutional as a
delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is purely
legislative in nature. In this case, the delegation is simply of an ascertainment of facts
upon which the enforcement and administration of the increase under the law is
contingent. The legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to
determine certain facts or conditions on which the operation of a statute is, by its
terms, made to depend. Hence, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but
only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
15. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation vs. CIR
835 SCRA 235 (2017
It is only proper that intra-governmental disputes be settled administratively since
the opposing government offices, agencies and instrumentalities are all
under the President's executive control and supervision. Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution states unequivocally that: "The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed." In Carpio v. Executive Secretary,32 the Court expounded
on the President's control over all the executive departments, bureaus and offices,
thus:
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends
over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been
held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the
President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that
of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive."
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over
the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department."33
This power of control vested by the Constitution in the President cannot be diminished
by law. As held in Rufino v. Endriga,34 Congress cannot by law deprive the President of
his power of control, thus:
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the
Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that
office from politics or making it independent.If the office is part of the Executive
branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise,
the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of
control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this
with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow
to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower
courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the
system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the President's constitutional power of control over all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices cannot be curtailed or diminished by law. "Since the
Constitution has given the President the power of control, with all its awesome
implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power." 36This
constitutional power of control of the President cannot be diminished by the
CTA. Thus, if two executive offices or agencies cannot agree, it is only
proper and logical that the President, as the sole Executive who under the
Constitution has control over both offices or agencies in dispute, should
resolve the dispute instead of the courts. The judiciary should not intrude in
this executive function of determining which is correct between the
opposing government offices or agencies, which are both under the sole
control of the President. Under his constitutional power of control, the
President decides the dispute between the two executive offices. The
judiciary cannot substitute its decision over that of the President. Only after
the President has decided or settled the dispute can the courts' jurisdiction be invoked.
Until such time, the judiciary should not interfere since the issue is not yet ripe for
judicial adjudication. Otherwise, the judiciary would infringe on the President's exercise
of his constitutional power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
it is mandated that where a remedy before an administrative body is
provided by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy prior
to bringing an action in court in order to give the administrative body every
opportunity to decide a matter that comes within its jurisdiction.
16. BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010 J. Mendoza
The creation of the PTC finds justification in the Constitution on the duty of the
President that the laws shall be faithfully executed. (Sec. 17, Art. VII) The President’s
power to conduct investigation to aid him in ensuring faithful execution of laws – in
this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in
the President’s powers as Chief Executive. One of the recognized power of the
President pursuant to this is the power to create ad hoc committees.
There is also no transgression on the prerogative of the Congress to appropriate funds
because there will be no appropriation but only allotment or allocation of funds already
appropriated to the Office of the President.
NOTE: The creation of PTC is not justified under the President’s power to reorganize
because such power is limited only to abolishing, consolidating, merging, or
transferring functions of agencies, not creating new ones. Nor is it justified under the
President’s power of control because it only refers to the power to alter, modify, or
nullify acts and decisions of subordinate officers.
17. ALMARIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 189028, July 16,
2013 J. Leonardo- De Castro
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The
faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President,
not a separate grant of power. The rules and guidelines and policies regarding the
Order jointly issued by the CCP and NCCA pursuant to their statutory mandates have
the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and
administrative agencies including the President himself as the chief executor of laws.
Therefore, the discretion of the President in the matter of the Order is confined to
names submitted to him by the NCCA and CCP.
18. RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
J. Leonardo- De Castro
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence
whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express
or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of thePhilippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related
to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a
law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the
police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires andunconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article
XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot
take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public
interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take
over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if
there is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate
legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law
would be observed.
20. GUDANI VS. SENGA
The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a
general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing
before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and
the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution
vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain
of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of
the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.
21. KULAYAN VS TAN
When the Constitution, Article 7, Sec 1 speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers (Article 6, Section 23) and calling-out powers (Article 7,
Section 7). The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the SC’s authority
to review the factual basis thereof. The calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity
than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. The
framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the
police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police
units in their jurisdiction, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in
day to day situations. But the police is subject to the exercise by the President of the
power of executive control. b. Respondent: Nowhere does it limit the authority to
declare a state of emergency to the President alone. David v. Arroyo limits the
authority to declare a national emergency, and does not include emergency situation
in LGUs. SC: It is the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats
to security, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-
out powers. c. Respondent: LGC, Section 465 in relation to Section 16 allows the
governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies for assistance. Petitioners: General search and seizure in the
pursuit of kidnappers violates the Bill of Rights, Sec 2. SC: Respondent cannot rely on
Sec 465, par 1 (vii)1 as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters.
Kidnapping cannot be considered as a calamity or disaster. Par 2 (vi)2 is equally
inapplicable. First, the AFP does not fall under the category of a national law
enforcement agency. Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the country. Second,
there was no allegation that the local police forces were inadequate. If they were, the
recourse was to ask assistance from the DILG Secretary. The LGC does not involve the
diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially
not the prerogatives solely granted to the President. The intent behind the powers
granted to LGUs is fiscal, economic, and administrative. The LGC is concerned only
with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective and should
not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers.
22. FORTUN VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill
their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of
a call.
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the
Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in
person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of
the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or
suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress
deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on
the ground, a power that the President does not have.
23. REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioners vs. HON. SALVADOR
C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; Respondents
Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's
power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy
itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether
the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review
by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual
basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the
President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the
process of his decision-making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to
him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also
defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to
borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to
the root cause of the emergency" Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with
the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late in the day as the
invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is hard, if not
impossible, to curtail.
24. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD,
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, RENE B. GOROSPE, and SENATOR LEILA M. DE
LIMA, Petitioners
vs.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, consisting of the SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, as represented by Senate President Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel
III, and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, as represented by House
Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Respondents
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to
vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session."
While it may be conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting
jointly" shall already be understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint
session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language in the Constitution, still, the
requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation
when the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only
requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation
and/or suspension.
What is evident in the deliberations of the 1986 ConCom were the framers' intentions
to (a) remove the requirement of prior concurrence by the Congress for the effectivity
of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress the discretionary power to
revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a majority
of its Members, voting jointly.
25. REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al petitioners vs SENATE
PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, et al Respondents
1. Presidential privilege of immunity from suit is a well-settled doctrine in our
jurisprudence. The President may not be sued during his tenure or actual incumbency,
and there is no need to expressly grant such privilege in the Constitution or law. This
privilege stems from the recognition of the President's vast and significant functions
which can be disrupted by court litigations.
2. Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. However, the provision is
indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the
President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus. Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitations to
the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension
are that the extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be
grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public
safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis
upon the petition of any citizen.
3. No necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the President's exercise
of military powers
It is sufficient to state that this Court already addressed the same argument in Our
decision in Lagman. The determination of which among the constitutionally given
military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a
prerogative of the President. The Court's power of review, as provided under Section
18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon
the President, as to which and how these military powers should be exercised.
27. AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), vs.THOMAS G.
AQUINO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI)
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no
rigid test which can be applied. ‘Public concern’ like ‘public interest’ is a term that
eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter
at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.16(Underscoring supplied)
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole
representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence,
the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
28.1 VINUYA vs. ROMULO G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010 J.
DEL CASTILLO
Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such
category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct
of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative--'the political'-departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision."
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of
such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail
the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for
certiorari.
28.2 VINUYA vs. ROMULO G.R. No. 162230 August 12, 2014
J. BERSAMIN
Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment
of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom
of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we
cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to
conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
29.1 SAGUISAG vs. OCHOA, JR. G.R. No. 212426 January 12,
2016 J. SERENO
Broad Constitutional Context of the Powers of the President: Defense,
Foreign Relations, and EDCA
A. The Prime Duty of the State and the Consolidation of Executive Power in the
President
B. The duty to protect the territory and the citizens of the Philippines, the power to call
upon the people to defend the State, and the President as Commander-in-Chief
C. The power and duty to conduct foreign relations
The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of
foreign relations. Since every state has the capacity to interact with and engage in
relations with other sovereign states, it is but logical that every state must vest in an
agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states.
D. The relationship between the two major presidential functions and the role of the
Senate
The role of the President as the executor of the law includes the duty to
defend the State, for which purpose he may use that power in the conduct
of foreign relations
The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign military
bases, troops or facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in by the
Senate — a clear limitation on the President’s dual role as defender of the
State and as sole authority in foreign relations.
The President may generally enter into executive agreements subject to
limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty
already concurred in by the Senate.
One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their
validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence.
29.2 SAGUISAG vs. OCHOA, JR. G.R. No. 212426 July 26,
2016 J.SERENO
There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive
agreements.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied
authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these
precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious
question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the
laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these
rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that
are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive
agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike
executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative
participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a
statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence
over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive
agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the
supremacy of the Constitution.
30. OCAMPO vs. ENRIQUEZ G.R. No. 225973 August 8, 2017 J.
PERALTA
Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the constitutional provisions they invoked delimit
the executive power conferred upon President Duterte. Significantly, AFP Regulations
G 161-375 was issued by order of the DND Secretary, who, as the alter ego of the
President, has supervision and control over the AFP and the PVAO. The Veterans
Memorial Historical Division of the PVAO is tasked to administer, develop and maintain
military shrines such as the LNMB. As held in Our Decision, AFP Regulations G 161-375
is presumptively valid and has the force and effect of a law and that, until set aside by
the Court, is binding upon executive and administrative agencies like public
respondents, including the President as the chief executor of the laws.
To note, if the grant of presidential pardon to one who is totally undeserving cannot
be set aside under the political question doctrine, the same holds true with respect to
the President's power to faithfully execute a valid and existing AFP regulation
governing the LNMB as a national military cemetery and military shrine.
More so, even if subject to review by the Court, President Duterte did not gravely
abuse his discretion when he allowed Marcos' burial at the LNMB because it was
already shown that the latter is qualified as a Medal of Valor Awardee, a war veteran,
and a retired military personnel, and not disqualified due to dishonorable
separation/revertion/discharge from service or conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by
its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
Even if the challenged issuance of public respondents were rendered upon the verbal
order of president Duterte, it cannot be denied that the concerned AFP officials still
have the power to enforce compliance with the requirements of AFP Regulations G
161-375, as amended. The logical and reasonable remedy to question the burial
procedures and the allocation of plots should be with public respondents who issued
the directives.
JUDICIARY
1. CITY OF MANILA vs. GRECIA-CUERDO G.R. No. 175723 February 4,
2014
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution
or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
With respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that
the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate,
is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries
with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate
jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement
to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the
RTC.
2. LOZANO vs. NOGRALES G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009 J.
PUNO
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The
determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the
exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for
the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to
its mere fulfillment of its “solemn and sacred obligation” under the Constitution. This
Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after
full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-or-controversy” requirement
bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the
court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.
3. GALICTO vs. AQUINO III G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012
J. BRION
Petitioner lacks locus standi.
“Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this
Court settle only actual cases or controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question” when (1)
he can show that he will
personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
4. MOLDEX REALTY, INC. vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
G.R. No. 149719 June 21, 2007 J.TINGA
When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a
party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the
regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the
party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been
raised at the earliest opportunity. This requisite should not be taken to mean that the
question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the
state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised
before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule
would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality
by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.
The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over
cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in
circumstances where the Court believes that resolving the issue of constitutionality of
a law or regulation at the first instance is of paramount importance and immediately
affects the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.
5. SERRANO vs. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009 J. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its
co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that
there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of
judicial determination; (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party
and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis
mota of the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on
some other ground.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of
a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which
the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the
government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state
interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden
is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.
6. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., vs. JOY C. CABILES,
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of
the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the
Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with
the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the
same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant
a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in
Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
7. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) v. COMELEC
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional
law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial
declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to
the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the
“new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized
as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they
remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are
left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have
relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of
their unconstitutionality.
8. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF
THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July
31, 2012
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that
individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes,
while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional
functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be “broken down
into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence.”
Decisional independence “refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law.”
On the other hand, institutional independence “describes the separation of the judicial
branch from the executive and legislative branches of government.” Simply put,
institutional independence refers to the “collective independence of the judiciary as a
body.”
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant
of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his
or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its
hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from
courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their
funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the
authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any
form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the
judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to
command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to
compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush
appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative
autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided
for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article
VIII.
Scope and Extent of Fiscal Autonomy
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it
needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We
now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a
meaningless provision.
Thus, it is clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive
than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations;
real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and
dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or
interference.
9. Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Sec. 7, Rule III of R.A. No.
10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees to Secure Clearance of
Pendency/ Non-Pendency of Case/s from the Civil Service Commission
Under Sec. 6, Art. VIII, it is the Supreme Court that has exclusive administrative
supervision over the personnel of the Judiciary. Hence, the personnel of the judiciary
need not secure a clearance from the CSC.
Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of
pendency/ non-pendency of administrative cases from the SC. Complying with the said
IRR would only be superfluous.
However, the Court noted that its power is limited only to administrative supervision.
Hence, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by
the appropriate government agency, i.e. Ombudsman.
 10. JARDELEZA v. SERENO
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014
733 SCRA 279
While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s
self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of
due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This
holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually,
its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its
discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is
afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of
the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to
strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the
dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount
is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included
in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice
Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from
the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
11.1 Chavez vs. JBC G.R. No. 202242; July 17, 2012 J. Mendoza
Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII is clear and unambiguous. The JBC is composed of the following:
1. CJ (ex officio chairman)
2. Sec. of Justice (ex officio member)
3. A representative of the Congress (ex officio member)
4. Rep of IBP (regular member)
5. A professor of law (regular member)
6. A retired member of the SC (regular member)
7. A rep from the private sector (regular member
There is no need to resort to the ConCom records to ascertain their intent.
Nevertheless, the SC reviewed the ConCom records and found that their intent is to
make JBC a 7-member body to avoid stalemate in voting. Thus, even the previous
practice of the HOR and Senate rep of dividing the vote in half is wrong because it
causes disorder when a tie is reached.
The Court adopted JBC Consultant and Ret. Justice Ynares-Santiago’s submission that
“the unmistakable tenor of Art VIII, Sec 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of the government” and that the Congress is
bicameral only in relation to its primary function of legislation and other functions
specifically outlined by the Constitution, but not when it interacts with the other co-
equal branches.
11.2 Chavez vs. JBC G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013 J. Mendoza
The Constitution should be interpreted based on the plain meaning of its words. It
clearly enumerated the members of the JBC. The Court has no power to add another
member by judicial construction. Based on the rule on casus omissus, the Court cannot
supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or
because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated. Otherwise, it would
be in the nature of judicial legislation.
Besides, their participation in the JBC is just a contributory, non-legislative action.
There is no interaction between the two houses in the JBC, as opposed to their other
functions found in the Constitution. The framers simply gave recognition to legislature,
not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a
major branch of the government. Therefore, in the words of Ret. Justice Ynares-
Santiago, “the Congress should not have any more quantitative influence as the other
branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three.”
12. Umali vs. JBC G.R. No. 228628; July 25, 2017 J. Velasco Jr.
The doctrine of stare decisis is applicable. When a court has laid down a principle of
law applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Here, although it was the
rotational representation that was questioned, the arguments still boil to the proper
interpretation of Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII. And again, the court affirms its ruling in Chavez
vs. JBC.
Mandamus also does not lie. The ministerial duty of the JBC is only as to the counting
of votes of its rightful members. The JBC has full discretion not to count petitioner’s
vote as he is not the Congress representative at that time.
13. Villanueva vs. JBC G.R. No. 211833; April 7, 2015 J. Reyes
JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and the law for every
position. The adoption of the 5-year requirement policy is but necessary and incidental
to its function conferred by the Constitution.
There is no violation of equal protection clause in that case because there is
substantial distinction between judges who has 5-year experience than those who do
not. It is a reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the
applicants.
Mandamus also does not lie because JBC’s function of selecting and recommending
nominees is discretionary. The opportunity to be appointed in the judicial office is a
mere privilege, not a judicially enforceable right.

14. RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF
THEGOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL
FEES.
An interesting aspect of legal fees is that which relates to indigent or pauper litigants.
In proper cases, courts may waive the collection of legal fees. The GSIS cannot
successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of
its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct
from that of its individual members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under
Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power which involves the exemption that it
claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members. Indeed, even the GSIS
acknowledges that, in claiming exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not
asking that rules be made to enforce the right to social security of its members but
that the Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS to seek relief from the courts
of justice sans payment of legal fees. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital
component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of
the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That
power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
ExecutiveCongress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional
safeguard of the Courts independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes
the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees including legal
fees.
15. SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA vs. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the
evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now
stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting
the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in
one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of
institutionalizing a "[ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISION
1. DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR
This brings Us to the pivotal substantive issue of whether or not Villars appointment as
COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4) years of
his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations
imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution, which reads:
Early on, in Republic v. Imperial,[21] the Court wrote of two conditions, both
indispensable to [the] workability of the rotational plan. These conditions may be
described as follows:
(a) that the terms of the first batch of commissioners should start on a common date;
and
(b) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.
Otherwise, Imperial continued, the regularity of the intervals between appointments
would be destroyed. There appears to be near unanimity as to the purpose/s of the
rotational system, as originally conceived, i.e., to place in the commission a new
appointee at a fixed interval (every two years presently), thus preventing a four-year
administration appointing more than one permanent and regular commissioner, or to
borrow from Commissioner Monsod of the 1986 CONCOM, to prevent one person (the
President of the Philippines) from dominating the commissions. It has been declared
too that the rotational plan ensures continuity in, and, as indicated earlier, secure the
independence of, the commissions as a body.
2. DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs.THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a
government corporation and are deemed attached to the Department of Health45 and
the Department of Labor,46 respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall
under the Office of the President.47 The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF are exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are
all appointed by the President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the
control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with
various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created.
While powers and functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits
affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also
tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-
related. Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duque’s
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC.
Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of Duque’s designation as
member of the governing Boards of theGSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF -
The De FactoOfficer Doctrine
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de
facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has
been held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer,
who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the
duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office,
and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services
of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents
by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.
3. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner vs NITA P. JAVIER, respondent
Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions
in the civil service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a
constitutional body like the petitioner.[23] The Court is expected to make its own
determination as to the nature of a particular position, such as whether it is a primarily
confidential position or not, without being bound by prior classifications made by other
bodies.[24] The findings of the other branches of government are merely considered
initial and not conclusive to the Court.[25] Moreover, it is well-established that in case
the findings of various agencies of government, such as the petitioner and the CA in
the instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise its constitutional role as final
arbiter of all justiciable controversies and disputes.
4. TORRES VS DE LEON
CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC. the issue at hand is the enforcement of labor laws
and penal statutes, thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC,
and as such, it is within the ambit of Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of
Republic Act 6713, stating that: Section 1. These Rules shall cover all officials and
employees in the government, elective and appointive, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or noncareer service, including military and police personnel,
whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount. Thus, having
jurisdiction over the PNRC, the CSC had authority to modify the penalty and order the
dismissal of petitioner from the service.
5. CESB vs COA
CSC has jurisdiction over the case. Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the
CSC the administration of the civil service, which is comprised of “all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.” In particular,
Section 3 of Article IX-B provides for the mandate of this independent constitutional
commission: SECTION 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in
the civil service. Since the Career Executive Service Board is an attached agency of the
Civil Service Commission, the former’s decisions are expressly subject to the CSC’s
review on appeal.
6. Dimagiba vs Espatero
The additional grant of the gratuities to the petitioners constitutes double
compensation which is prohibited in the constitution. The only exception for an
employee to receive additional, double and indirect compensation is where the law
allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered in another position
which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. The prohibition against
additional or double compensation, except when specifically authorized by law, is
considered a “constitutional curb” on the spending power of the government.
7. PSPCA vs COA
The refusal of the petitioner to go through audit of COA is correct. The amendments
introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private corporation
and not an agency of the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63,
issued by then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the
revocation of the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest
“corrected a serious defect” in one of the laws existing in the statute books. A reading
of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any
agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No
government representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all
private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and
solely by the petitioner in accordance with its bylaws, and may exercise those powers
generally accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue
and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal
operations. If the corporation is created by the State as the latter’s own agency or
instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. The petitioner is created for
animal welfare and not to carry out governmental functions.
NATIONAL PATRIMONY AND ECONOMY
1. LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O.
RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural
Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) INC.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or
lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for
the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
―technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining
activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was
precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception
to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act
authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
2.1 GAMBOA v. TEVES (2011)
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution
mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition
that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public
utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing
body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association
must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore
meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public
utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be owned by Filipino citizens.
Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to
both the beneficial ownership and the controlling interest.
Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public
utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to
vote, i.e., common shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice
but it must be shown that the legal and beneficial ownership rests in the hands of
Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of petitioner PLDT, since it is already
admitted that the voting interests of foreigners which would gain entry to petitioner
PLDT by the acquisition of SMART shares through the Questioned Transactions is
equivalent to 82.99%, and the nominee arrangements between the foreign principals
and the Filipino owners is likewise admitted, there is, therefore, a violation of Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution.
2.2 GAMBOA v. TEVES (2012)
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy
“effectively controlled” by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the
Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to
Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capital with
voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing rules explain that “for
stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals,
mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial
ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is
essential.” In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that
the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares
with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership . This is precisely
because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.
3. ROY III v. HERBOSA (2016)
Ultimately, the key to nationalism is in the individual. Particularly for a public
utility corporation or association, whether stock or non-stock, it starts with the Filipino
shareholder or member who, together with other Filipino shareholders or members
wielding 60% voting power, elects the Filipino director who, in turn, together with
other Filipino directors comprising a majority of the board of directors or trustees,
appoints and employs the all-Filipino management team. This is what is envisioned by
the Constitution to assure effective control by Filipinos. If the safeguards, which are
already stringent, fail, i.e., a public utility corporation whose voting stocks are
beneficially owned by Filipinos, the majority of its directors are Filipinos, and all its
managing officers are Filipinos, is pro-alien (or worse, dummies), then that is not the
fault or failure of the Constitution. It is the breakdown of nationalism in each of the
Filipino shareholders, Filipino directors and Filipino officers of that corporation. No
Constitution, no decision of the Court, no legislation, no matter how ultra-nationalistic
they are, can guarantee nationalism.
5. NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS REDMONT
CONSOLIDATED MINES CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 195580 APRIL 21, 2014
The SEC Rules provide for the manner of calculating the Filipino interest in a
corporation for purposes, among others, of determining compliance with nationality
requirements (the ‘Investee Corporation’). Such manner of computation is necessary
since the shares in the Investee Corporation may be owned both by individual
stockholders (‘Investing Individuals’) and by corporations and partnerships (‘Investing
Corporation’). The said rules thus provide for the determination of nationality
depending on the ownership of the Investee Corporation and, in certain instances, the
Investing Corporation.
Under the SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the
Investee Corporation. The first case is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the SEC as the
Control Test in its 30 May 1990 Opinion, and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph
7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, ‘(s)hares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be
considered as of Philippine nationality.’ Under the liberal Control Test, there is no need
to further trace the ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the
Investing Corporation since a corporation which is at least 60% Filipino-owned is
considered as Filipino.
The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the
portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, “but if the percentage
of Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the
number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine
nationality.” Under the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in
the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e.,
“grandfathered”) to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership. Moreover,
the ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level of the
Investing Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the Investee
Corporation.
In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or
the second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity
ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino
and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in
other joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less
Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in
doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply.
6. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON
STRAIT v. SEC. ANGELO REYES, (G)
G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President
Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum
through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield
the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine
Government.
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in
1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless
otherwise repealed.
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but
a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that
construction should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on
Elections expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory
construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and
that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that
reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a
service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be
discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present
case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is
a NIPAS area.
7. METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD) v. M. ADALA 526 SCRA
465 (2007)
MWCD‘s position that an overly strict construction of the term ―franchise as used in
Section 47 of P.D. 198 would lead to an absurd result impresses. If franchises, in this
context, were strictly understood to mean an authorization issuing directly from the
legislature, it would follow that, while Congress cannot issue franchises for operating
waterworks systems without the water district‘s consent, the NWRB may keep on
issuing CPCs authorizing the very same act even without such consent. In effect, not
only would the NWRB be subject to less constraints than Congress in issuing
franchises. The exclusive character of the franchise provided for by Section 47 would
be illusory. While the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of
CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab
initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which
was ratified on January 17, 1973 – the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued
on May 25, 1973. That the legislative authority – in this instance, then President
Marcos – intended to delegate its power to issue franchises in the case of water
districts is clear from the fact that, pursuant to the procedure outlined in P.D. 198, it
no longer plays a direct role in authorizing the formation and maintenance of water
districts, it having vested the same to local legislative bodies and the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA).
8. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS
(2006)
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section
2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned
or controlled corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
because MIAA is not required to meet the test of economic viability. MIAA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing essential
public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. As a government instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind
of tax by local governments under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. The
exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA because MIAA is
not a taxable entity under the Local Government Code. Such exception applies only if
the beneficial use of real property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable entity.
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to
private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted
the beneficial use of such portions for a consideration to a taxable person.
9. LIBAN v. GORDON (2011)
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State.
Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under
the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply
that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. The sui generis
character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a
case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised
by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of
the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court
should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that
would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the
Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
declared void must therefore stay.
10. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (2011)
BSP is a public corporation. It does not fall under the Constitutional prohibition under
Section 16, Article XII notwithstanding amendments to its charter. The scope and
coverage of Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution can be seen from the declaration
of state policies and goals which pertains to national economy and patrimony and
the interests of the people in economic development. Article XII, Section 16
bans the creation of private corporations by special law. The said constitutional
provision should not be construed so as to prohibit the creation of public
corporations or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to
serve a public interest or purpose, which should not be measured on the basis of
economic viability, but according to the public interest or purpose it serves as
envisioned by paragraph (2), of Article 44 of the Civil Code and the pertinent
provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Public corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the
government not subject to tests of ownership, control and economic viability but to
different criteria relating to their purpose or interest constitutional policies or
objectives and their administrative relationship to government or department offices.
Thus, it remains under the ambit of COA’s jurisdiction.