The Extractive Industries and Society 5 (2018) 66–72

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The Extractive Industries and Society

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Original article

“Referees become players”: Accessing coltan mines in the Eastern T

Democratic Republic of Congo
⁎
Claude Iguma Wakenge
Special Chair for Humanitarian Aid & Reconstruction, Wageningen University, Netherlands

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This article offers ethnographic insights into how reforms of artisanal mining have triggered conflicts regarding
Conflict minerals property rights and access to minerals (coltan),1 in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The study was
Northern Katanga inspired by the literature on access control and elite capture. Based on fieldwork undertaken in 2013 and 2014 at
Reform conflicts the Kisengo and Kahendwa mining sites (Nyunzu territory, northern Katanga), the study found that, although
Découverture
ongoing reforms aimed to sever the supposed linkages between the mining business and violent conflicts, these
Coltan
reforms brought in new types of conflicts, labelled here as ‘reform conflicts’. These conflicts result from the
reconfiguring of power relations in the Katangese province where state authorities instrumentalize reform policy
and redefine access to mining areas. Providing an in-depth understanding of the narratives, strategies and
practices of the key players, this article argues that the widespread concern about ‘conflict-free minerals’ tends to
obfuscate the nature and effects of ‘reform conflicts’. Unless these conflicts are revealed, better understood and
adequately addressed, mining reforms will fail to improve the living conditions of people living in artisanal
mining areas.

1. Introduction
The Katangese mining business can be compared to a football team.
However, during the game, it is not the competitors—but the re-
ferees—who are the players on the pitch. [Interview with civil ser-
vant from the Division des Mines, Nyunzu, May 2014]
Following national, regional and international policies aimed at
ending the supposed linkages between the mining business and violent
conflicts, artisanal mining in the Congolese region of northern Katanga
is undergoing reforms. Inspired by international discourse on ‘conflict-
free minerals’, ongoing mining reforms follow a complex conflict
landscape (Autesserre, 2012) and take many forms, including certifi-
cation schemes, legislative measures and specific interventions pro-
moting transparent models of resource governance (Verbruggen et al.,
2011).
Recently, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has become
a testing ground for many reform initiatives. In 2009, the Congolese
government began to demarcate a number of artisanal exploitation
zones (AEZ)2 which were granted to mining cooperatives with the aims
of governing artisanal mines and stopping minerals from falling into the
hands of armed groups or unregistered traders. In 2014, 13 initiatives
were active in this region: 10 focusing on 3T3 and three on gold
(Cuvelier et al., 2014).
In several parts of sub-Saharan Africa, many scholars are convinced
that the mineral sector reforms have been predominantly top-down,
externally driven and biased in favour of large-scale extractive com-
panies (Hilson and Potter, 2005). This has led to tensions between these
companies and artisanal miners (creuseurs), as well as other local sta-
keholders such as customary chiefs (Geenen and Claessens, 2013;
Maconachie and Hilson, 2011). Adding to this body of work, the present
study examined how ongoing reforms have fuelled conflicts, in other
words disputes over property rights and access to coltan in the Con-
golese region of northern Katanga. These conflicts, involving either
violence, miners’ eviction or conflicting entitlments over mining sites,
have been between mining cooperatives and trading houses, and be-
tween both of these entities and mineworkers. State authorities that are
‘in the making’ in the complex institutional landscape of mining reforms
play an active part in these conflicts − reinforcing their authority and
determining access in the process.

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: claudigumaw@gmail.com.
1
In eastern DRC, coltan is an abbreviation of columbite–tantalite, a mixture of two mineral ores, namely niobium and tantalum, used for industrial applications in high-tech industries.
For more details, see Nest M. (2011). Coltan. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 3–30.
2
AEZ are areas where ‘the technological and economical factors are not suited for the site to be industrially exploited’ (Mining law (T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 109).
3
The abbreviation ‘3T’ refers to three types of minerals extracted in DRC: tin (cassiterite), tantalum (coltan) and tungsten (wolframite).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.11.008
Received 27 June 2017; Received in revised form 17 November 2017; Accepted 17 November 2017
Available online 26 November 2017
2214-790X/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
C.I. Wakenge
Policymakers, advocacy-oriented NGOs and other well-informed
observers (De Koning, 2010) are convinced that ‘cleaning’ the mineral
trade through reforms can end the armed conflicts obstructing the mi-
neral sector in eastern DRC. Little research so far has examined the
nature of the interactions between actors and entities engaged in the
reform process (e.g. trading houses, cooperatives and mineworkers) or
how these interactions create new conflicts. By analysing how the on-
going reforms engender new conflicts, this study aimed to contribute to
debates on the governance of artisanal mines in post-conflict DRC. This
article argues that the widespread concern regarding ‘conflict-free mi-
nerals’ as a way of making the mineral market transparent and ad-
dressing the appalling poverty of people tends to obfuscate the nature
and effects of ‘reform conflicts’. For the mining reforms to yield positive
change, these conflicts need to be unmasked and adequately addressed.
This article is based on fieldwork undertaken at two coltan mining
sites in the Nyunzu territory (Kahendwa and Kisengo) from March 2013
to September 2014, and additional data were gathered in October 2014
in Lubumbashi (the provincial capital of what was then Katanga pro-
vince). In both Kahendwa and Kisengo, the reforms basically aim to
trade coltan through a ‘closed-pipe’ supply chain organised by and
around the International Tin Research Institute (ITRI), that initiated the
ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi). The ‘closed-pipe’ supply chain
is organised so that iTSCi determines the origin of the so-called 3T and
documents their trading chain, by tagging their bags at the level of mine
sites, trading posts and mineral depots.
In the remainder of this article, I begin by outlining the theoretical
framework. After introducing the study areas and the research methods,
I explain how these areas experienced ‘conflict minerals’. I then outline
how property and access to mining sites has evolved in eastern DRC,
particularly in northern Katanga. The next section examines the find-
ings from the two case studies. Briefly, the first of these centres on
conflicts over accessing coltan in Kisengo, and the second focuses on
conflicts following the entitlements to Kahendwa’s mines being granted
to several cooperatives and trading houses. The two final sections re-
spectively analyses the findings and put forward the main conclusions.
2. Theorizing access control and elite capture
The present study approached conflicts over property rights and
access to minerals (coltan) from a property rights perspective. As the
mining reforms have mainly revolved around granting entitlements of
AEZ by state authorities to mining cooperatives or trading houses
working under the iTSCi monitoring scheme, a property rights lens
allows for a fruitful analysis of these entitlements and the related
conflicts triggered by the reforms.
Debates on property and access have been informed by the field of
legal pluralism, which studies the coexistence of different normative
systems in the same social space (Griffiths, 1986). Drawing on theore-
tical understandings from legal pluralism, von Benda-Beckmann
(1981), for instance, developed the notion of ‘forum shopping’ to de-
scribe how people use multiple legal orders and different institutional
frameworks to foster their claims or to protect their interests. Being
traditionally focused on dispute resolution, public service delivery and
hybrid governance, legal pluralism also provides relevant insights for
studying how social actors are able to further their property claims by
drawing on various legal systems to access resources (Geenen, 2016).
Broadly speaking, ‘property is about relationships among social
actors with regard to objects of value’ (von Benda-Beckmann, 1981,
quoted in Sikor and Lund, 2009: 4). In other words, property is a re-
lation not between people and things, but rather between people about
things. As Sikor and Lund (2009: 4) assert, property encompasses any
enforceable claim to the use and benefit of something. Such a claim may
derive from conventions, customary rules or state law. From this legal
perspective, property contributes to maintaining order within society. It
entails the regulation of entitlements and the distribution of wealth
among social actors (Singer, 2000). However, recent theory emphasises
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The Extractive Industries and Society 5 (2018) 66–72
that establishing property relations is not just the act of authorities, but
are one of the means that authorities get established, especially in times
of rupture (Lund, 2016). In the mining refomrs of DRC, where institu-
tions are in flux, and power relations between actors in the mining areas
unsettled, state authorities play a role in conflicts between people and
entities (e.g. mining cooperatives) and become part of the reshuffling of
power in the areas. Blomley (2003) contends that such conflicts may be
shaped by overt or hidden violence and processes of exclusion.
Access is distinct from property in many ways. Indeed, having
property rights does not necessarily mean that one has the ‘ability to
benefit from things’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 153). Thus, Ribot and
Peluso (2003: 160) define access as all ‘means, processes and relations
by which actors are enabled to gain, control and maintain access to
resources’. Relating property to access, these authors conceptualise the
notion of property as a ‘bundle of powers’ instead of a ‘bundle of rights’
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 173). In their study on access theory, Ribot
and Peluso (2003: 161–172) identify three access mechanisms, namely
rights-based access (legal or illegal), structural mechanisms of access,
and relational mechanisms of access. These mechanisms mediate,
condition or constrain people’s access to resources and benefits. Rights-
based acess can be ‘sanctioned by law, custom, and convention or un-
sanctioned, by theft, coercion or violence’ (Geenen and Claessens,
2013: 11). Structural mechanisms include access to technology, capital,
markets, labour and labour opportunities, knowledge and authority.
Relational mechanisms related to access through social identities and
access via the negotiation of other social relations.
Sikor and Lund (2009) see property and access as closely linked to
power and authority (Lund, 2016: 1201). They argue that, when people
try to further their claims or to turn these into ‘recognized property’,
power and authority are closely related (Sikor and Lund, 2009: 9). This
is especially the case during so-called ‘moments of rupture’ (Lund,
2016: 1202) — like during mining reforms — as period when things are
fluid and negotiable and when different politico-legal institutions are
trying to strengthen their authority. To a certain extent this tallies with
the notion of ‘elite capture’ or ‘elite control’ defined as situations ‘where
elites manipulate the decision-making arena and agenda and obtain
most of the benefits’ (Wong, 2010: 3). However, in moments of rupture,
elites like authorities, are in flux and depend on the outcome of com-
petition over property. Reform conflicts that concern issues of access
and property are thus also about the formation of new constellations of
power tying economic actors in with authorities. The mining reforms,
granting AEZ entitlements to mining cooperatives and trading houses
has not only legitimised these organisations’ claims over property, but
this legitimisation has also led to the denial of property rights to local
resource users, especially the creuseurs.
Access control and property are dynamic, with changes over time
being shaped by various factors, which determine ‘the nature of power
and forms of access to resources’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2009: 154) and
position individuals including elites and institutions vis-à-vis access to
property. These factors include shifts in authority, competition among
different powerholders changes in political circumstances (Vlassenroot
and Huggins, 2005), new economic opportunities and shifts of ideas
and of ideologies, policy, politics and the environment (Peluso and
Lund, 2011: 673–676). All of these factors affect the conditions under
which access processes take place and influence how individuals or
interest groups develop different strategies to benefit from resources.
The literature outlined above is mostly concerned with property
rights and access in relation to state formation. It emphasises the co-
existence of norm-producing authority, institutional legitimisation, ac-
cess processes and the contestation of claims. This article adds to this
body of work. It unveils how the mining reforms that are showcased to
end violent conflict in the mines has created such an arena of compe-
tition over property and access amidst processes of state formation. The
reform law — as other pieces of legislation — becomes instrumentalised
by elites and authorities for private ends (Plateau, 2004), leading to
renewed types of conflict in the region, less violent at first sight but
C.I. Wakenge
nonetheless counting many victims. As Lund (2006: 699) argues, ‘while
formalization is often propelled by government institutions and reform,
formal rules and regulations are also negotiated and undone by cor-
ruption, political networks and powerful alliances’.
This article explores how instrumentalising laws and policy became
part of two mechanisms of access control, namely access to technology
and access to authority. The first of these mechanisms refers to the idea
that, while tools and technology are used in resources’ exploitation,
entities having access to them are able to highly benefit from resources
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 165). The second mechanism of access is
about having ‘privileged access to the individuals or institutions with
the authority to make and implement the laws’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:
170).
3. Study areas and methods
3.1. Study areas
This study was based on data collected at two coltan mining sites:
Kisengo and Kahendwa. Both sites are located in the chiefdom of
Ntengu, at a distance of 49 km from each other and roughly 115 km
from Nyunzu-centre (the territorial capital). Mining activities started in
Kisengo in March 2007 and in Kahendwa in September 2011. The
majority of the population belong to the Bakalanga ethnic group.
The two selected mining sites are typical in the Katangese mining
landscape. Kisengo and Kahendwa pioneered coltan exploitation and
iTSCi implementation (April 2011) in the then Katanga province. Both
mines are the most populated and productive of the seven coltan mines
located in Nyunzu territory (Kilunga, Lengwe, Luba, Mbale and
Lububu-Kitoke), accounting together for 286 t of coltan in 2014 sold to
Mining Mineral Resources (MMR),4 the only Indian trading house es-
tablished in the area.
Kisengo has a larger population than does Kahendwa. At the end of
2014, Kisengo hosted 17,000 inhabitants, including 1500 creuseurs and
21 middlemen (so-called négociants). Conversely, the population of
Kahendwa declined dramatically from 10,000 in 2012 to about 230 in
May 2014, following a decrease in coltan production and the ban of
mining activities by the national Ministry of Mines in May 2014 (decree
№ 0143/CAB. MIN/MINES/01/2014, Art.3), because of mineworkers’
use of dangerous extractive techniques.
Interestingly, methods of coltan production differed between
Kisengo and Kahendwa. In Kisengo, MMR began using semi-industrial
methods of coltan extraction at the quarry of Bovu in February 2014.
Additionally, MMR initiated the découverture—shovelling away of the
top layer of the pits to facilitate access to mineral deposits—at many
other quarries. This could be seen as an advanced technology compared
to the use of shovels and pickaxes by mineworkers when extracting
minerals before reforms. MMR also installed a lavérie at Bovu which
operated alongside artisanal mining. Set up by MMR at an estimated
cost of 100,000 USD, this semi-industrial method of coltan processing
or washing proved functional, even to the point of raising local pro-
duction from around 200 t of coltan (in 2013) to 284 t in 2014. In
Kahendwa, most creuseurs used pickaxes and shovels.
Kisengo and Kahendwa also differed in terms of entitlements.
Kisengo is a private MMR mining concession and has never been de-
marcated as an AEZ. Conversely, Kahendwa has been established as an
AEZ since early October 2011. In practice, this difference in legal status
means that, in Kisengo, MMR was able to exercise more freedom than
ordinary miners in enforcing its property claims.
4
MMR is a subsidiary of the Société Minière du Katanga (SOMIKA), a copper and
cobalt processing company based in Lubumbashi since 2001.
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3.2. Methods
This study drew upon qualitative methods, with data collected
through nearly 19 months of ethnographic field research. From March
2013 to September 2014, I paid regular visits to Kisengo and
Kahendwa, observing at regular intervals how access to the mining
quarries changed over time. In total, 204 creuseurs and shaft owners
were involved in 14 group interviews. Additionally, 36 individuals,
including 12 creuseurs, five staff members of MMR, the administrator of
finance of Nyunzu and seven civil servants from the Service d’Assistance
et d’Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM, Small-scale Mining
Assistance and Training Service) and the Division des mines (Mining
Division) participated in-depth interviews and informal conversations
held at eight coltan quarries, six in Kisengo and two in Kahendwa.
Participant observation was conducted at nine meetings gathering re-
presentatives of miners’ committees (comités des creuseurs),5 shaft
owners, and representatives of MMR, the Coopérative des Artisanaux
Miniers du Congo (CDMC) and the Cooperative Minière Maendeleo
(CMMA) purchasing coltan from creuseurs and selling it to MMR.
Moreover, in October 2014, I conducted additional individual in-
terviews with two staff members of the CDMC and CMMA in
Lubumbashi, and reviewed several documents, including letters written
by representatives of the comités des creuseurs, official reports and
memos, ministerial decrees and NGO reports on mining activities in the
study areas.
4. Conflict minerals in Nyunzu
According to International Peace Information Service (IPIS, 2012:
10), the term ‘conflict minerals’ is applied to define the extraction and
trade of minerals from conflict-affected areas where human rights
abuses by armed groups take place. From 1998 to 2003, Nyunzu (and a
great part of northern Katanga) was controlled by the Rassemblement
Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy), a rebel
movement that exerted control over the mining areas to finance its
military activities. During that time, a considerable part of the revenues
from coltan mining in Nyunzu ended up in the pockets of the RCD re-
bels and other armed groups. Indeed, before the reforms, many coltan
(also tin and gold) mining sites were characterised by the presence of
armed actors, including Forces Armées de la République Démocratique
du Congo (FARDC) soldiers and Mai–Mai militias6 such as the Mai–Mai
groups of Captain Kafuku Numbi and Kabeja Tango Fort (IPIS, 2007)
who found lucrative means to finance their military operations through
mining activities.
The militarisation of coltan mines took various shapes. In Kisengo
and Kahendwa, the soldiers of the Kongolo-based 69th brigade of the
FARDC regularly visited the coltan mining areas in 2009–2011. These
soldiers demanded various forms of rents, taxes and mine royalties from
the négociants, local traders and creuseurs, and imposed occasional
forced labour from them. Finally, militarisation entailed direct looting
and plundering of coltan at the mining sites and sometimes negotiated
arrangements whereby soldiers provided ‘security’ in return for a share
of the mining profits.
In recent years, the issue of conflict in the study areas have altered.
Instead of the violent conflicts that are associated with the term conflict
minerals, we now increasingly witness social conflict resulting from the
reforms.
5
In eastern DRC, these comités are local structures created by the miners for organising
mineral production and defending their interests vis-à-vis people or entities in position of
authority.
6
The term ‘Mai-Mai’ refers to local militias in eastern DRC.
C.I. Wakenge
5. Property and access to DRC’s mining areas
5.1. General situation
Geenen and Claessens (2013), in their study of access to gold sites in
eastern DRC, discuss the evolution of access to mining property. From
the Belgian colonial times (1885–1960) to 1982 and after Congolese
independence in 1960, the mineral sector was largely dominated by
colonial, private and state-owned large-scale extractive companies.
These managed their concessions through private modes of governance,
allowing these companies to provide social services and security to their
employees, while restricting outsiders’ access to their ‘mining domains’
(Hönke, 2013). In 1982, following the intensification of the financial
and socioeconomic crisis, President Mobutu liberalised artisanal
mining, especially the exploitation and trade of precious minerals,
mainly gold and diamonds. Subsequently, artisanal mining has grown
to sustain the livelihoods of approximately 200,000–550,000 mine-
workers and their 1–4 million dependants (PACT, 2010).
Liberalising artisanal mining brought changes in property rights and
in access to mining areas. This reinforced a dual system of resource
governance prevailing after the Mobutu regime passed the General
Property Law in 1973. This law declared all land and its resources to be
the property of the state, regardless of occupancy status (Van Acker,
2005). Meanwhile, the law has since opened wiggle room to traditional
chiefs (mwami,plural: bami) who started to exert considerable influence
over the allocation of the land and its resources on the basis of cus-
tomary rights. In the study areas, the mwami provided plots of land to
creuseurs and levied various taxes and fees on them. In the 1990s, this
dual system of resource governance became more problematic because
of several factors, including population growth, the manipulation of
land issues by political elites and increased militarisation and compe-
tition over mineral-rich areas following political change and instability
(Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005).
In the first decade of the 2000s, interest grew around reforming the
entire Congolese mining sector. In 2002–2003, a new national Mining
Law was passed. This law was seen as a strategy to attract foreign ca-
pital, as it favoured multinational large-scale extractive companies by
granting them vast concessions. The law also demarcated a number of
Artisanal exploitation zones (AEZ), stipulating that an AEZ could be
closed down if ‘the factors justifying its creation ceased to exist’ or if ‘a
new deposit necessitating large-scale exploitation has been discovered’
(Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 110). Moreover, the law required creu-
seurs to obtain a carte d’exploitant artisanal, a special authorisation to
mine within an AEZ’s boundaries (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 111/
112). All of these measures meant that creuseurs were increasingly
confronted with multiple restrictions.
5.2. Accessing coltan mining areas in Northern Katanga
In northern Katanga, mining reforms changed pre-existing patterns
of accessing the mining areas. Before these reforms, many creuseurs
were already extracting coltan in these areas. At the end of 2009, the
national Mining Ministry demarcated many of these areas as AEZ, and
the provincial Katangese government granted these AEZ to mining co-
operatives or, occasionally, to trading houses. In 2014, 77 AEZ granted
to 34 mining cooperatives existed in what was then the province of
Katanga. To be allowed to mine, creuseurs were encouraged by the
Mining Ministry to join these cooperatives. These entitlements and re-
quirements opened artisanal mining to new players, kindling competi-
tion between these different stakeholders and reshuffling power rela-
tions between cooperatives, trading houses and mineworkers.
Additionally, the mining reforms strongly changed pre-existing
mechanisms of land allocation and the ways in which mineworkers paid
the itulo or tozo (Bakalanga terms used to refer to customary taxes).
Before the reforms, customary chiefs provided plots of land (calendres or
shafts) to mineworkers, who paid tozo in cash—the equivalent of 4US$
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The Extractive Industries and Society 5 (2018) 66–72
a month. These mineworkers were then granted a voucher allowing
them to mine. Likewise, shaft owners paid the koroboi ya chef (a tomato
can for the chief of approximately 25 gr) at the production phase—a
payment usually made in kind, valued at approximately 50 USD. This
payment was said to prevent bad luck in the mining shafts.
Following the reforms, the calendres are given to creuseurs by the
SAESSCAM, a state agency supporting creuseurs. In the study areas,
SAESSCAM staff members interviewed in May 2013 maintained that the
calendres are allocated without payment. In reality, mineworkers are
charged by SAESSCAM 15–30 US$ to obtain a calendre. Importantly,
instead of receiving the tozo from individual mineworkers, as they did
in the past, many bami are now paid a monthly sum by mining co-
operatives or trading houses, ranging from 3000 US$/month paid by
MMR and CDMC to the acting chef de groupement of Kisengo and 250 US
$/month paid by CMMA to the chef de village of Kahendwa. These
payments vary proportionally to the local mineral production, the de-
gree of legitimacy of the mwami and how successful he negotiated this
payment with the cooperative or trading house representatives.
The above changes in access to mining areas and coltan, the allo-
cation of calendres and the payment of the tozo all contributed to a
reconfiguration of the economic interests and relative power of actors
in the local coltan business.
6. Conflicts over accessing coltan in Kisengo and Kahendwa
6.1. Case 1: Kisengo
In Nyunzu, Kisengo is an iconic mine. It was the first mine where
coltan was discovered (in March 2007). Early in 2010, Kisengo hosted
the first trading house (MMR). After signing a five-year contract with
the Katangese provincial government on 9 March 2009, MMR arrived in
Kisengo in early January 2010, followed by CDMC in June 2010.
Subsequently, MMR and CDMC have collaborated in purchasing coltan.
Kisengo was also the first iTSCi pilot site in Katanga, beginning 1 April
2011. Perhaps more interestingly, Kisengo is a rare artisanal mine using
a hybrid mode of mineral extraction. Alongside MMR’s introduction of
semi-industrial methods of coltan processing or washing (lavérie) at
Bovu, many creuseurs extract coltan manually in other local quarries.
Bovu is the most productive, populated and disputed coltan quarry
in Kisengo. In June 2013, it harboured approximately 43 shaft owners
and 450 creuseurs, extracting around 250 kg of coltan daily. With a 30%
tantalum concentration, Bovu’s coltan has one of the highest ore grade
found in Nyunzu. Bovu is also rife with conflicts between MMR and the
creuseurs regarding, for instance, the découverture and MMR’s semi-in-
dustrial methods of coltan exploitation (lavérie) that changed the pat-
terns of accessing and processing coltan.
The initiation of the lavérie at Bovu was enabled by the legal em-
powerment of the company. On 7 May 2013, MMR acquired from the
national ministry of mines, a 30-year exploitation permit, transforming
the entire Kisengo mining site into its private concession. In addition,
the Mining Law stipulates that a mining company may transform an
AEZ into an industrial concession if it finds it suitable for industrial
exploitation (Mining Law, T. 4, Ch. 1, Art. 110), requiring mineworkers
to leave the concession within 60 days. Although Bovu has never been
declared an AEZ, this legal provision enabled MMR to semi-industrialise
this quarry as part of its concession.
The MMR further pushed for semi-industrial mining for economic
reason. On a daily basis, MMR and CDMC pre-financed 21 négociants an
amount ranging from 160 to 1500 USD per négociant, allowing them to
purchase 5–50 kg of coltan. Two négociants were appointed at Bovu.
The pre-financing system allowed MMR/CDMC to obtain coltan,
yet also increased MMR/CDMC’s management expenses, because they
paid each négociant an incentive of 2.2 USD per kg of coltan purchased.
To retain profitability, the scale of production thus had to increase.
MMR/CDMC also invested in technical support to the creuseurs, in-
cluding motor pumps and découverture. MMR’s engineers, with the aid
C.I. Wakenge
of company’s bulldozers, removing the top layer of shafts to facilitate
mineworkers easier access to mineral veins. This system, called
découverture thus introduces a mechanized and company-driven phase
in the artisanal mining process. However, the steady supply of coltan
faced many constraints as explained in the following account of the
head office of MMR interviewed in Kalemie in July 2014:
Our business depends on artisanal mining. We provide various kinds
of support to creuseurs, for instance by installing motor pumps at
almost every quarry in Kisengo. This allows them to easily access
and use the water needed for washing mineral sands. However, our
support does not work as expected, because we cannot control ev-
erything. Not only do MMR/CDMC suspect creuseurs and négociants
of stealing coltan, but, recently, the number of creuseurs has dropped
from 1500 to around 800 following price cut, making it hard for our
business to flourish.
This statement conveys that the mineral’s production process was
introduced based on cooperation, mutual dependency and reciprocity
among MMR/CDMC, creuseurs and négociants. However, this relation-
ship gave way to growing suspicion and dissatisfaction. The MMR found
it difficult to control this production fully. On their parts, creuseurs and
négociants cheated on coltan production or left the mines in response to
price cut.
Ribot and Peluso (2003: 157) contend that some actors have the
ability to select the aspects of law, custom or convention that favour
their objectives. Similarly, MMR/CDMC, confronted with the chal-
lenges described above and inspired by certain provisions of the Mining
Law (e.g. the possibility of changing the extractive methods used),
developed various strategies to completely take over the quarry of
Bovu, and transform it into a fully mechanized mine. When MMR/
CDMC initiated the découverture, it was free of charge, and was based on
a mutual and verbal convention between MMR/CDMC and the comité
des creuseurs. However, in June 2013, MMR/CDMC agreed with the
comité that creuseurs would be charged for obtaining the mineral sands
(remblais). As one MMR staff member reported, charging creuseurs
helped to offset the financial costs of the découverture. Thus, MMR/
CDMC agreed with the comité des creuseurs that half of the remblais (i.e.
mineral sand) belonged to MMR/CDMC and the other half to the
creuseurs. After three months, this convention changed again in October
2013, when MMR/CDMC decided that the creuseurs had a right to only
one-fifth of the remblais, with the rest to be processed by MMR/CDMC’s
shayeurs (daily workers). In reaction to this decision, many shaft owners
interviewed at Bovu in November 2013 made the following complaint:
The decision of MMR/CDMC violates the terms of our earlier con-
vention. Incidentally, when they shared the remblais with us, we
were given the marouge or bibembele, in other words the poorest and
worthless part of the remblais. They [MMR and CDMC] keep the
richest and most promising mineral sand. Iyi ni uvamizi tu ya coltan
yetu na hatuta itika tena [This is just confiscating our coltan and we
will no longer tolerate it].
The découverture that was introduced as a technical assistance to
creuseurs, thus became the excuse for the company to steadily margin-
alize them and bring the mining process increasingly under its direct
control. In December 2013, MMR/CDMC developed a new strategy to
secure its control over the Bovu quarry. After an unsuccessful round of
negotiations with the comité des creuseurs and SAESSCAM/Kisengo,
MMR/CDMC unilaterally declared It would buy all of the miners’ shafts
at a given price of 400 USD each. The creuseurs were furious about the
forced sale, moreover because the price was set far too low considering
that many among them had already made investments between 700 and
1500 USD/shaft. Consequently, they violently protested by erecting
roadblocks on the roads leading to the mines and by setting fire to a
selling station.
In February 2014, the conflict escalated when MMR/CDMC resorted
to a radical strategy combining the destruction of miners’ camps and
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The Extractive Industries and Society 5 (2018) 66–72
the support of this operation by state authorities. Before this destruc-
tion—probably fearing protest—MMR/CDMC called in the support of
the acting administrator of the territory of Nyunzu (Etienne Mwamba
Kamasonga) who was the high-level decision-maker in the area. On
several occasions, he visited Kisengo and held meetings with the comité
des creuseurs and civil servants from SAESSCAM and the Division des
Mines, asking them to convince the creuseurs to leave Bovu. Arguably,
asking the creuseurs to leave Bovu followed an administrative decision
(№ 3072/418/BUR/CDD/DT/2013) issued on 10 May 2013 by Maurice
Kyoni Ngoie, the acting Tanganyika7 district commissioner. The deci-
sion declared that Bovu was a zone interdite—in other words, an area
where people were not allowed to live or carry out mining activities for
reasons of their own safety (Mining Law, T. 1, Ch. 1, Art. 6). As the
creuseurs were not convinced by this explanation and erected road-
blocks to access the mines, on 7 February 2014, MMR/CDMC called in
the Police des Mines et Hydraucarbures (Mining Police/Kisengo), who
destroyed a total of nine miners’ camps and expelled 526 miners’
households. As compensation, MMR/CDMC allocated two canvas sheets
and 50 USD per household. Even this small compensation was not fully
implemented. In Kisengo, rumours gained currency that the adminis-
trator of Nyunzu embezzled part of the funds intended to provide this
compensation. In the end, according to the MMR Kisengo-based ad-
ministrator, the majority of the people who were displaced did not
receive their compensation.
The process by which the miners were dispelled ran counter to the
Mining Law in two important ways. Firstly, the Mining Law (T. 1, Ch. 1,
Art. 6) states that zones interdites can be declared only by presidential
decree. Secondly, in such zones, the Mining Law (T. 1, Ch. 3, Art. 17)
stipulates that no mining activities can take place. However, mining
activities continued in Bovu. Although it was clear that MMR/CDMC
enrolled the authorities to directly support them while manipulating
the Mining Law, I was unable to find evidence that MMR/CDMC bought
off the state authorities. However, the acting administrator of finance of
Nyunzu, a man in his 60 s who had occupied this administrative posi-
tion since 2002, expressed related suspicions:
No one knows what happens regarding mining activities in Nyunzu.
Someone who wants to find out more about what happened, for
instance at Bovu, like in many other similar cases where conflicts
occurred between trading houses, cooperatives and creuseurs, faces
intimidation from high-ranking state authorities based in
Lubumbashi or Kalemie.
This statement reveals that some people in position of authority
were suspected to manipulate the law covertly because they had vested
interests in the mining business.
6.2. Case 2: Kahendwa
Kahendwa is an artisanal mine located to the east of the territory of
Nyunzu. When coltan was discovered here in September 2011, people
from different areas came to Kahendwa, increasing its size from a vil-
lage of approximately 200 to more than 10,000 inhabitants at the end
of 2011, of whom 6000 were creuseurs. During the heyday of mining
productivity, creuseurs extracted around 300 kg of coltan per day.
Extraction took place in three main quarries—maendeleo 1, 2 and 3. Of
the 3T mining sites in Nyunzu territory, Kahendwa was among the most
productive. From January 2011 to December 2013, this site produced
227 t of coltan ore.
The entitlements to Kahendwa changed on several occasions.
Following a ministerial decision (№ 10.7/00418) signed on 1 October
2011 by the acting Katangese provincial Minister of Mines (Therese
Lukenge Kapwibwe), Kahendwa was granted to Volcano Mining with
7
At the time of fieldwork, Tanganyika was still a district and shifted to a province in
July 2015 following a process of decentralization.
C.I. Wakenge
exploration and exploitation rights, a trading house based in
Lubumbashi. However, for unknown reasons, Volcano Mining con-
ducted no activity in Kahendwa. Later, on 3 January 2012, the same
Minister granted four artisanal mines (Decree 107/00504/CAB/
MIN.PROV./MINESJ.GEF/KAT/2011), namely Kankwala, Kampulu,
Maende and Mungaza, to Minserve, another trading house, which has
its Congolese head office in Kalemie. In February 2012, a group of
Minserve’s staff members arrived in Kahendwa, although this site was
not among the mines granted to the company. They began the con-
struction of several facilities, including their office and a mineral depot
and promised the creuseurs that they would buy coltan at higher prices
(around 60 USD per kg) than the price of 30 USD set by MMR/CDMC in
Kisengo.
As could be expected, the presence of Minserve in Kahendwa
sparked controversy. According to Minserve’s staff members, the
maende mine that had been granted to Minserve was short for maendeleo
(the name of the three coltan quarries of Kahendwa). However,
Nyunzu-based territorial authorities were convinced that maende had
never existed in Nyunzu and that Minserve, as an entité de traitement
(processing plant) could not be established within an AEZ like
Kahendwa for extractive activities and if this was the case, it should
only process minerals extracted by mineworkers (Mining Law, Ch. 2,
Art. 81). Thus, the Nyunzu-based authorities worried about the fact that
the ministerial decree (0562/CAB.MINES/01/2012) that legally al-
lowed Minserve to be established in the Katangese province was too
ambiguous, not indicating where exactly Minserve could conduct its
activities. However, despite these controversial interpretations,
Minserve’s staff members remained in Kahendwa for seven months,
until September 2012.
Importantly, there have also been disputes regarding Kahendwa
among mining cooperatives. CDMC, the first cooperative in Kahendwa,
arrived in October 2011. Even though CDMC was based in Kisengo
(49 km from Kahendwa) and had no entitlement over Kahendwa,
CDMC’s presence was condoned by the provincial and the Nyunzu state
authorities. A representative of CDMC interviewed in Kisengo in April
2014 confirmed this:
CDMC had no property rights but arrived in Kahendwa following a
request by the provincial Katangese government and the adminis-
trator of Nyunzu. Because CDMC was based in Kisengo, near
Kahendwa, the authorities asked CDMC to help them control the
trade of coltan extracted in Kahendwa because this was undertaken
informally.
Although a request by state authorities asking CDMC to purchase
coltan from Kahendwa mines was plausible, no further evidence was
found to substantiate this claim. CDMC also had economic reasons to
engage in purchasing coltan from Kahendwa. In contrast to Kisengo,
where iTSCi, CDMC and MMR monitored the coltan trade, this situation
was largely informal in Kahendwa. Thus, for CDMC staff members, the
coltan business of Kahendwa was likely carried out in competition with
their activities in Kisengo. For instance, in early October 2011,
Kahendwa négociants purchased coltan at 65 USD per kg, while it cost
35 USD in Kisengo. Price variations between Kisengo and Kahendwa led
CDMC staff members to believe that coltan mined in Kisengo was
smuggled to the market in Kahendwa for sale.
In February 2012, further confusion over Kahendwa’s entitlements
developed. Minserve was already present at the site and considered the
series of maende (the local quarries) to be its property. However,
Therese Lukenge Kapwibwe (the provincial Minister of mines) signed
another note (№ 10.7/00651/CAB/MIN.PROV.MINES/KAT/2012) sti-
pulating that both Kahendwa and Kankwala were granted to CMMA.
This new entitlement meant that the rights of Minserve over Kankwala
and its claim over Kahendwa were totally denied. Creating further
tensions between CMMA and Minserve, granting the ‘disputed’ mines of
Kahendwa and Kankwala to CMMA led people to believe that CMMA
was a cooperative intentionally created by the Minister as a strategy to
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The Extractive Industries and Society 5 (2018) 66–72
control the mining and to gain economic benefits from it. After CMMA
staff members arrived in Kahendwa at the beginning of February 2012,
tensions increased between them, the Minserve staff and the Nyunzu-
based authorities. One civil servant from the Division des Mines inter-
viewed in Nyunzu on 13 April 2014 suspected state authorities of ma-
nipulating such tensions:
In Nyunzu, our agency is never informed of when and how trading
houses like Minserve have been granted an AEZ. In many cases, we
see their staff members arriving from Lubumbashi or Kalemie. Then,
they talk to the Nyunzu-based administrator and go into the mining
areas to start their activities. It is when disputes have occurred be-
tween them and artisanal miners that the authorities have asked us
to mediate.
This statement implies that some high-ranking state officials, e.g.
the Nyunzu-based administrator and the provincial Minister of Mines,
used their power positions to favour the installation of a certain trading
house or mining cooperative by obstructing the activities of other en-
tities. Another example provides further evidence of this situation.
Although the acting Katangese Minister of Mines (Therese Lukenge
Kapibwe) created a commission of enquiry in charge of investigating
the existence and exact location of the contested maende or maendeleo
mines in March 2012, unsurprisingly, this commission confirmed the
exclusive rights of CMMA over the mines of Kahendwa.
7. Analysis
One major finding of this study is that, at different levels, state
authorities took advantage of their power position to influence policy
on mining property and access control to mining sites. As Hilhorst
(2013: 8) argues about policy interventions in post-conflict settings,
people try to ‘make policy fit their own perspectives and goals […]
according to their own understanding, interests and ambition’. For
various reasons, the national Ministry of Mines, the Katangese pro-
vincial Ministry of Mines, the Tanganyika district commissioner and the
Nyunzu-based territorial authorities decreed, noted, changed or con-
doned policy decisions taken to entitle certain entities to mining
property rights or to deny the rights of other entities in both Kahendwa
and Kisengo.
Although state authorities (seen here as referees) intended to or-
ganise artisanal mining, they became part of the micro-politics of
property rights and access to coltan at the grassroots level. For example,
Kisengo was not officially declared an AEZ despite the fact that it was
actually an artisanal mine. Thus, granting Kisengo to a trading house
(MMR) can be seen as the Katangese provincial authorities bestowing a
privilege upon this company. This entitlement gave MMR room to ex-
ercise—through the découverture and lavérie—more freedom than the
creuseurs in enforcing its property claims over the most productive
coltan quarry of Kisengo: Bovu.
A series of instrumentalised policy decisions illustrate the influence
of state authorities over mining property. In Kisengo, the Tanganyika
district commissioner declared Bovu to be a zone interdite. Yet, this
decision should be taken only by the Congolese President through a
decree. Then, instead of stopping the mining activities for a zone in-
terdite, mining at Bovu continued, without sanctioning MMR/CDMC.
Additionally, following mounting disputes between creuseurs and
MMR/CDMC, the Nyunzu-based territorial authorities condoned (and
seemed to appreciate) the demolition of miners’ camps and the eviction
of people from them. Allegedly, the administrator of Nyunzu embezzled
part of the funds intended for compensating the evicted households. In
Kahendwa, state authorities also leveraged their power positions.
Through entitlements, supports, approvals and denials of property
claims of several trading houses and mining cooperatives, they pitted
one against another. In short, instead of resolving disputes occurring
around these entitlements, these authorities become the main players.
Finally, two aspects can be learned from the two cases studies. On
C.I. Wakenge
the one hand, access to authority and access to technology interplayed.
‘Reform conflicts’ led to miners’ exclusion from mining sites, on the
other. In Kisengo (Bovu) MMR/CDMC used various strategies to gain
access to coltan, to the detriment of creuseurs. Over time, MMR/CDMC’s
strategies to take over Bovu gradually evolved from sharing extracted
mineral sands (remblais) with creuseurs, to buying their tunnels and fi-
nally to evicting them. MMR/CDMC’s access to the authorities played a
crucial role in this regard. This lends support to the idea that, in de-
veloping countries, violence is increasingly becoming a practice used by
governments and private investors to consolidate access to and control
of land and resources (Ballard and Banks, 2003; Peluso and Lund, 2011:
675–676). In Kahendwa, the cooperative CMMA also succeeded in es-
tablishing nearly monopolistic control over local resources. Although
no massive eviction occurred, conflicts involving creuseurs persisted
between trading houses and cooperatives in their attempts to govern
the mines of Kahendwa.
8. Conclusion
This study examined how reforms of 3T mining have been a driving
force behind new conflicts over property rights and access to minerals
(coltan). In northern Katanga, the reforms were meant to organise ar-
tisanal mining and the coltan trade around transparent models of re-
source governance. Concretely, the Congolese government allocated
artisanal mining areas—AEZ—to mining cooperatives and trading
houses for the purpose of organising artisanal mining. However, these
entitlements also introduced changes in patterns of mining property
rights and access to coltan.
Building on the evidence that property theory is very useful in ex-
plaining processes of state formation, this study has demonstrated that
mining reforms inspired by the ‘conflict-free minerals’ discourse and
fixed ideas about how the mining business should be organised have led
to a renewal of ‘conflict minerals’, in the form of ‘reform conflicts’.
These saw mining cooperatives, trading houses and creuseurs in oppo-
sitional positions. It can therefore be concluded that, although the
‘greed’ over mineral resources is central to the persistence, intensity and
duration of conflicts because it offers economic opportunities for armed
groups, addressing ‘conflict minerals’ through reforms also offers eco-
nomic opportunities for people, including state elites. This finding lends
support to the observation of Englebert and Tull (2008) who are con-
vinced that African elites view post-conflict reconstruction — in which
mining reforms play an integral part — as an opportunity to maximise
their political fortunes and to compete for resources through new
means.
Thus, it would be worthwhile for policymakers to pay attention to
‘reform conflicts’. Taking these conflicts seriously will help in under-
standing the micro-dynamics and implications of these new types of
conflicts for the vulnerable position of creuseurs.
Acknowlegments
The fieldwork as part of Claude Iguma Wakenge’s PhD study was
facilitated by WOTRO Science for Global Development Department of
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research that I would like
72
The Extractive Industries and Society 5 (2018) 66–72
to thank them for their generous funding. I am very grateful for the
comments of Prof. Dorothea Hilhorst, Dr. Jeroen Cuvelier and of two
anonymous reviewers on the original manuscript. Needless to say, I
take full responsibility for all remaining errors and shortcomings.
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