MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to
UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446,
correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are:
to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some base points and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of
islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On
the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out base points along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure.
it merely notices the international community of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate.

The fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis
continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid
such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the base points mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total
maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should follow the natural
configuration of the archipelago.

LLBP Vs. Pres. Corazon Aquino

FACTS:On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people are the judge. The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government; and The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO (43 Phil 887) Case DigestFacts:

On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacion regarding the disappearance of
certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. The article of Mr. Perfecto
suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment by the Senate since the missing
documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies. This resulted to a case
being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court
and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mr.Perfecto filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the
ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

Issue:

Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, was set up in the Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old laws. No longer is there a Minister of the
Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only in bated breath.The crime of lese
majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under
the American flag. Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and appellant ACQUITTED.

People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents
regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article
against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code provision
that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect
Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings
nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also,with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256
of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it
is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case.
Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

C. Naturalized Citizen

So v. Republic

FACTS: On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. He alleged the following in his petition. He was
born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth;
as an employee, he derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he
is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as amended, because he was
born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture
are taught; he is a person of good moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; he has mingled socially with the
Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has
all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he
is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of men's ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy;
he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude he is not suffering from any incurable contagious diseases or
from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to
become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition was docketed as Naturalization
Case No. 02-102984.

ISSUE: Whether or not petition for naturalization be granted?

HELD: DENIED, Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization law. For this
reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition for naturalization without prejudice. It must be stressed that
admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a
privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.

D. Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship - ART. 4 SEC. 3

Valles v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner questions the qualification of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez to run for governor of Davao Oriental
on citizenship grounds. Respondent was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1998, she
applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian
passport.
Issue: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being
issued an Australian passport.

Ruling: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondent’s
father was therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her. Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must
be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to
citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public
office. Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the candidate declares
himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Bengzon v. HOR Political Law – “Natural Born” Requirement – Requirements to be a Congressman

Facts: Bengson and Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in the 2nd District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress. Cruz
won by a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a Quo Warranto proceeding in the HRET alleging
that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET
subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Cruz was
indeed born a Filipino and he is defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however lost his citizenship
when he enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the
other hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of RA 2630 which provides that “Any person who had lost
his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines…”. Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.

HELD: Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain
his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term “natural-born citizen” was first defined in
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. As defined in the same Constitution,
natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship. In respondent Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of
the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Moreover, repatriation
results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Tecson v. COMELEC

Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F.Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth
of respondent.

Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "enmasse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan
F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.But
while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Maquiling v. COMELEC ( Sereno, April 16, 2013)

Facts: • Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued
in his favor.

• On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship, which states:

• On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,On 28 April 2010,
respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and
national elections.

• Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a
computer-generated travel record 11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700in entering and departing the Philippines.

• On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order 13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

• After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

• Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

• It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:

• Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a
Filipino citizen. The Court ruled that Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03
April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

• Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motionfor Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the
First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy andt he nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: ruled in favor of arnado

• Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed
seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

Issues: 1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.

3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

SC: 1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the
winner.

2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

• Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times,actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,

• Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath
of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship. 39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
theRepublic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
office.

• By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local electiv.

3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.

• Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topaciov. Paredes which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a
second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must bere-examined and its soundness
once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot
be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

• The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that"the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

• This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x xwith that produced by declaring a
person ineligible to hold such an office."

• A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try
a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction
when he"declared that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held int hat
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the
office of municipal president."

• The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An
ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even
have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date.Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate
but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to
qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
• The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines,he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

(Emphasis supplied) • It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When
set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely
serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.

• With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.

• We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect.

• Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

• Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,and even more so.
The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes
cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

• There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.COMELEC 56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of
notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules
affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

• The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

• That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the
COC but also the proclamation.

• The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

• The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate,
his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except
that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

• Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.

• Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
Code will not apply.

Co v. HRET R No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991

FACTS:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who
vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of
the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers.

HELD:

1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
The respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship
of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that
time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship
unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has
already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural
born citizen by both bodies.

- representative; 2nd District of Samar; election of citizenship – The exercise of the right to suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship; Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part
of Jose Ong would not only have been superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity considering that it was the law itself
that had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.

In re: Ching

– permission to take the lawyer’s oath; Ching elected Filipino citizenship beyond the required “upon reaching the age of
majority” – If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under
the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution; CA 625
and the 1935 Constitution did not prescribe a time within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made;
“reasonable time”; “upon reaching the age of majority” – it was clearly beyond by any reasonable yardstick, the able period to
exercise the privilege.

IN RE: VICENTE CHING

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching
finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he
needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.

Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was
born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of
the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant
– a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have
elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was
preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not
formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by
present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD:

No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or
fourteen years after he had reached the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.
The Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any
further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino;
that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t
give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s
Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.

DECISION:

The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

Altarejos vs. Comelec

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS vs. COMELEC, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA

(G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004)

AZCUNA, J.:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.

Private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza filed to the COMELEC a petition to disqualify and to deny due course
or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.

Petitioner object that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because he was already
issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant
to Republic Act No. 8171.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed
their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period. Petitioner, however, filed a Reply
Memorandum subsequently.

Atty. Zaragoza, Jr hearing officer of this case recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for
the position of mayor.

Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view
thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was
delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the
same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization
show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.

ISSUE: When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply?

RULING:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the
time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
discussed, thus:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year’s residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty-three years of age on election day).

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to
the date of the filing of his application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725,
which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is
retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court,
thus:

xxx

The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past
events i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and
such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply
in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is,
the repatriation granted to Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving
retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a
mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

CASE DIGEST : FRIVALDO VS COMELEC

FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and
assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on
Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided
instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in
another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the
said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the
petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time
required comments from the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial
governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.

HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of
the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe
the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code
that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so
in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he
had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The
herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during
her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the
challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even
denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was
challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance
to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which
is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is
gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Cabiling vs. Hernandez

G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010

FACTS:

The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother. They were all raised, have
resided and lived their whole lives in this country. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration
their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary
documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

ISSUE:

Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers persons to become naturalized
citizens of the Philippines.

RULING:

No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration
of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the facts peculiar to the
petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory
requirements for such election.The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is
actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

Republic vs. Sagun

G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent is the legitimate child of father, aChinese national, and mother, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959
in Baguio Cityand did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. At the age of 33, she executed an Oath
of Allegianceto the Republic of the Philippines. The document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Baguio City. In 2005, she applied for a Philippine passport but was denied due to the citizenship of her father
and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a
judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
annotate the same on her birth certificate.

ISSUE/s:

1.) Whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is authorized by the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence; and

2.) Whether the respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

RULING:

1.) Yes. But it should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a
petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. Respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the
intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine
citizenship.

2.) No. Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid
and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election.All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippinecitizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

STATE POLICIES- ART. 2, SEC 7

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration
shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons
in its territory.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.

Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare
of the nation.

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed, under the law to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.