BAR MATTER No.
914 October 1, 1999 On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE
BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a
Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine
citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present
case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar
of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a
Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of
Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to
the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18
November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission
showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the
12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching
released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees.
The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled
on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant
to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required
to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and
on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching,
being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority
he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best
was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect
by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard,
the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that
the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a)
the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of
the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching
the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of
majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to
be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing
Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7)
years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally
elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of
the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith
his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared
myself as one in my school records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant)
reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was
eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and
sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing
fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July
1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that
"(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens
of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship
for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing
such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that
the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one
(21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions
of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect
that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after
attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,
12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the
Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option
to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16,
1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has
not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964,
was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute
what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,
15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally
married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as
early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was
already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in
the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban
Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No.
625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was
already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In
this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary
to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-
4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that
he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which
he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where
we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal
and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of
the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot
be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr.
Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of
the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but
it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching.
However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life
of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation
of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly
elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly
way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing
"upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered
no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay
in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that

can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.
20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of
the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this
case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY

Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to
seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied
for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There
is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar
Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to
Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the
bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that,
by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he
be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is
so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate
it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of
any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the
continued exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such
in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must
also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk
of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in
good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules
and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to
judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
[RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen
of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh
the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him
of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of
the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing
as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions
stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the
Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of
the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3405
JULIETA B. NARAG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a "Petition for Readmission" to the practice of
law filed by Dominador M. Narag (Respondent).
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an
administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband,
herein respondent, whom she accused of having violated Rule
1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who was then a
college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan,
maintained an amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita
(Gina) – a 17-year old first year college student. Julieta further
claimed that the respondent had already abandoned her and their
children to live with Gina. The respondent denied the charge
against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta were
mere fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which
made her concoct stories against him.
On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision, which directed
the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined that the
respondent committed an act of gross immorality when he
abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The Court pointed
out that the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the legal profession.
A Motion for the Re-opening of the Administrative Investigation, or
in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the
respondent on August 25, 1998. He averred that he was denied
due process of law during the administrative investigation as he
was allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his behalf and
adduce additional vital documentary evidence. Finding no
substantial arguments to warrant the reversal of the questioned
decision, the Court denied the motion with finality in the
Resolution dated September 22, 1998.
On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed the instant petition
for reinstatement to the Bar. The respondent alleged that he has
expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and their
children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and
their children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at their
residence in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an
undated affidavit prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly
attesting to the truth of the respondent’s claim.
The respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years
already and that he has been punished enough. He alleged that
he is already 80 years old, weak and wracked with debilitating
osteo-arthritic pains. That he has very limited mobility due to his
arthritis and his right knee injury.
He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine Air Force
Reserve Command where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel; that as member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in
various rescue, relief and recovery missions. The respondent
likewise submitted the various recommendations, testimonials and
affidavits in support of his petition for readmission.4
"Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys
rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice
will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as
a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court
will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement."5
The extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent
on account of his having committed a grossly immoral conduct,
i.e., abandoning his wife and children to live with his much
younger paramour. Indeed, nothing could be more reprehensible
than betraying one’s own family in order to satisfy an irrational
and insatiable desire to be with another woman. The respondent’s
act was plainly selfish and clearly evinces his inappropriateness to
be part of the noble legal profession.
More than 15 years after being disbarred, the respondent now
professes that he had already repented and expressed remorse
over the perfidy that he had brought upon his wife and their
children. That such repentance and remorse, the respondent
asserts, together with the long years that he had endured his
penalty, is now sufficient to enable him to be readmitted to the
practice of law.
The respondent's pleas, however, are mere words that are hollow
and bereft of any substance. The Court, in deciding whether the
respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law,
must be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had
already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would make
him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the
respondent, while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with
his paramour - the woman for whose sake he abandoned his
family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet
learned from his prior misgivings.
That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children
would likewise not be sufficient ground to grant respondent's
plea.1âwphi1 It is noted that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed
the affidavit which was supposed to evidence the forgiveness
bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and
the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had
likewise forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the
family of the respondent had forgiven him does not discount the
fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still
living with a woman other than his wife.
Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein
he bequeaths all his properties to his wife and their children is
quite immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had
indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the
respondent from later on executing another last will and testament
of a different tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal
profession.
In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown
remorse over his transgressions and that he had already changed
his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal, profession.
Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue
to display unassailable character.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for
Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 1153
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of
year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Lawyer's Oath
the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a foreign law
Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through school must present proof of having completed a separate allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The bachelor's degree course.
Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments I will support the Constitution and obey the
to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit: The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
is hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All all law schools in the country." constituted authorities therein;
applicants for admission other than those referred to in the
two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the Official Title I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully Bar Matter No. 1153
completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of doing of any in court;
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school
or university officially recognized by the Philippine I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
Government or by the proper authority in the foreign
jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same;
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in
this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar examination I will delay no man for money or malice, and
unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following
course in a law school or university duly recognized by the will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, the best of my knowledge and discretion, with
criminal law, public and private international law, political
law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
taxation and legal ethics.
clients;
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school
shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon and I impose upon myself these voluntary
submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: obligations without any mental reservation or
(a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition purpose of evasion. So help me God.
or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority;
and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the
Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly
recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar

examination shall present a certificate issued by the proper
government agency that, before commencing the study of
law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-