[ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.

, PETITIONERS, action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
VS. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no
MARCH 25, 1919] jurisdiction over this other municipality, then the more the
writ of habeas corpus should be enforced.
FACTS:
Justo Lukban, respondent and then Mayor of Manila, sent 170 Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally
women to Davao. The women were confined to their houses in parted with the custody of a person before the application for
the district by the police from October 16 to October 25, 1918. the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the
The vessels reached their destination at Davao only on mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law,
October 29, 1918. Lukban claims that the women were to be could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao,
laborers and was received by Feliciano Yñigo, a haciendero, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to
Rafael Castillo, and Francisco Sales, the governor of Davao. return them from Davao to Manila.
The women thought that they were being transported to
another police station, while Yñigo, the haciendero from The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but
Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to them as Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be
laborers him were actually prostitutes. The families of the forced to change their place of residence.
prostitutes then filed charges against Lukban, Anton The then mayor of Manila Justo Lukban loses this case.
Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Sales. They prayed for a
writ for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court to
be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back
the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their
will. The stipulation of the parties was made to include all of
the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as
the same questions concerned them all, the application will be
considered as including them. The SC granted the writ,
however, the mayor was not able to bring any of the women
before the court on the stipulated date.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the
women to Davao.

RULING:
No further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary.
The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin,
Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court.
Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court.
RULING:

The Supreme Court said "We are clearly a government of

laws". Lukban committed grave abuse of discretionby
deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the
contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to
change his residence.

Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the

Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill
of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession
should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some,
like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize
anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from
the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived
of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being
given the opportunity to collect their belongings or,
worse,without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al must be severely punished.

Court reasoned further that if the chief executive of any

municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take
a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
AGUSTIN v. EDU
FACTS:
Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of
Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning device to
be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process and transgresses the
fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing rules
and regulations of the said instruction.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen
Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it
came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in
case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions
No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and
regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land
transportation Commission,"
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous
and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense
of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called
early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set."
are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts
of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and
confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well
provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better
substitute to the specified set of Early Warning Device
(EWD)."
This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent
accidents on streets and highways, including expressways or
limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled
or parked motor vehicles without appropriate early warning
devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic
safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by
the Philippine Government under PD 207.
ISSUE:
WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional
guarantees of due process.
HELD:
NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of
police power and there was no unlawful delegation of
legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified,
police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police
power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found
in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the nation.”
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for
this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our
own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna
Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt
servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is,
moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.
Petition dismissed.
GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
FACTS:
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite of
securing a certification from the Nat’l Economic Council
showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales
filed a petition opposing the said implementation because RA
No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207,
prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA
2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines,
and by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines. They
add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and
any other government agency from importing rice and corn, S.
10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import
rice under its provisions. They contended that the government
has already constitute valid executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207
and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved
under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the
one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable
to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists
that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not
authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting
the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that
the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but,
also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the
people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are
not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May
15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law,
until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of
juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the
Act or until the expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were
exempted from this Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the
retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
 provision against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business
Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and nations. The Treaty of Amity between
China and the Philippines guarantees equality of treatment to
the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of
any other country,” and is therefore not violated for all
nationals, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a
treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must
be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong
can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in
the Pasay city market.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law show that it is
reasonable as it is made prospective and recognizes the right
and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to
continue therein during the rest of their lives. Furthermore,
the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due
process, is not in its reasonableness but its unreasonableness
and the Court found that these provisions are not
unreasonable.

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien

residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act,
filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUES:
Does the Act violate international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines? NO.
Do the provisions of the Act violate the due process of law?NO.

RATIO:
A law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle.
In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and,
that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations

regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for
admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the
examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
FACTS:
Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines without submitting to the required bar
examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a
Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He
had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in
Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the
“Insitututo de Cervantes” for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law
course, graduating there as “Licenciado en derecho”.
Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in
Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the Treaty on
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled
to the practice the law profession in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission
to the Philippine Bar
RULING:
The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the
Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state
cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended
to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in
Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal
profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He
is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided
in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly
subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in
whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic
of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not have been
intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason
that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the
consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
KURODA V. JALANDONI
FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during Second
World War. He was charged before a military commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the
Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese
Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war”. The said
military commission was empaneled under the authority of
Executive Order 68 of the President of the Philippines.
Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His
arguments, were as follows:
(1) Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates
not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our
local laws.
(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory
to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore,
he is charged with “crime” not based on law, national or
international
(3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this
case because they are not qualified to practice law in
Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our
national sovereignty.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Executive Order 68 had violated the
provisions of our constitutional law
Discussions:
The provision of Article 2 Sec 3 states that “The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations”. Every
State is, by reason of its membership in the family of nations,
bound by the generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered to be automatically part of its own
laws.
RULING/S:
No. Executive Order 68 has not violated the provision of our
constitutional law. The tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda.
This executive order is in accordance with Article 2 Sec 3, of
Constitution. It is in accordance with generally accepted
principles of international law including the Hague
Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international
jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle
that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing,
waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of
laws and customs of war.
The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions
at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly
based on the generally accepted principles of international law.
They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and
Japan) Furthermore, the Phil. Military Commission is a special
military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are
not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this
special law.

AGLIPAY V. RUIZ
FACTS:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies
of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of
the Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfilment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney,
the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said
stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part
remained unsold.
3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the
petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of Section 23,
Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in
the issuance and selling of the commemorative postage stamps.
It was provided therein that, ‘No public money or property
shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or
for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister,
or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium.’
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the
principle of separation of church and state. NO
RULING
1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial
of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated.
2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order
to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity
the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him
who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act
No. 4052 granted the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to
issue postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to
assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in
issuing and selling the postage stamps in question, still, the
case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the
exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the
step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the
court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within
a constitutional inhibition. The court resolved to deny the
petition for a writ of prohibition.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR CASE DIGEST
Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant,
wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of
rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of
Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes
referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no
truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and challenged
Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the
proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and
Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in
hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he
filed a letter-complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct”
under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for
that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned
Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she
was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been
living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as
a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses,
and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”
(which allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations)
jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her
conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious
beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not
constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Ruling:
Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the
benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling
state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state
has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no
iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble
attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive
means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this
element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances,
Escritor cannot be penalized.
The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make
exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general
application, and under these distinct circumstances, such
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case
for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to
freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state.
GARCES vs. ESTENZO
FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of
Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer
was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by
means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay
assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-
religious celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per
Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish
church during the saint's feast day which also designated the
hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta,
however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao
Osmeña, refused to return custody of the image to the council
on the pretext that it was the property of the church because
church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter,
by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted
the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-
petitioners filed an action for annulment of the council's
resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when
they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly
constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay
was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the
constitutional provisions on separation of church and
state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor
any sect or church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for
purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with
barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela,
Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor
San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and
providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente
Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained
through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not
directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any
sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with
private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the
waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image
was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio
fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not
for the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights
of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the
patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then
any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot
be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio
fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained
tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the
monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
TARUC VS DE LA CRUZ

FACTS:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent
Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents
Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and
parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality.
Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer
of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied
their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr.
Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to
petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions
with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political camp.
Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for
transferring Fr. Florano to another parish.Because of the order
of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint
for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la
Cruz before the RTC.They contended that their expulsion was
illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their
right to due process of law.

ISSUE:
What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters
of religious intramurals?

RULING:
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion
of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

It is not for the courts to exercise control over church

authorities in the performance of their discretionary and
official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church
regulations.

“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a

religious organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation
in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine
controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church
property.”

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present

case.