JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOOY 10, %!

i-307 (1970)

Time Estimation by Young Children with and without

Informational Feedback’

ALETHA &I. H. CROWDER? AND RAYMOND H. HOHLE

Institute of Child Behavior and Development, University of Iowa

Accuracy of time estimation by 112 preschool and elementary-school

children was investigated, using a reproduction method in which Ss at-
tempted to reproduce the time required for a hidden toy to travel along
a path to a designated point. In Experiment I> half the 8s were given feed-
back information after each reproduction trial, providing both the direction
and magnitude of error, whereas a second group simply made reproductions
of the time interval after each presentation of the standard interval. All age
groups in both feedback and no-feedback conditions showed initial tendencies
to underestimate the standard, but all groups except the preschool Ss in the
no-feedback condition showed increasingly accurate estimations over trials.
;2vcrage relative estimation errors on the last trial block (trials l&15)
were 5 and 1% of the standard for the preschool and elementary-school
children in the feedback conditions, and were 34 and 1% for these age
groups in the no-feedback condition. Results of Experiment II, carried out
with preschool Ss only, indicated that these Ss were unable to learn accurate
time estimations without informational feedback between test trials: moti-
vating praise in the absence of error-correcting information rrsultcd in
decreasing accuracy over trials.

Normative studies (e.g., Ames, 1946) have indicated that children

younger than about 7 years typically do not spontaneously use clock
concepts and have difficulty associating conventional units of time with
time intervals. Similarly, in an experimental study, using a modified
method of limits, Smythe and Goldstone (1957) found that approximately
half of t,heir 6- and 7-year-old Ss were unable to complete a task
requiring them to estimate the duration of a second. Moreover, the
younger S’s who did finish the task reportedly yielded highly variable

‘Experiment I of this paper was included in a thesis submitted to the University

of Iowa in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an MA degree and was
conducted while the senior author was supported by National Institute of Child
Health and Development Training Grant Tl-HD-113. Appreciation is expressed
to Mr. Vere Cady for providing laboratory facilities at the apartment complex.
‘Requests for reprints should be sent to Aletha M. H. Crowder, Institute of
Child Behavior and Development, University of Iowa. Iowa City, Iowa 52240.
295
296 CROWDER AND HOHLBI

data, and performance of these Ss did not improve following demon-

stration of the correct duration of a second.
Some writers (e.g., Goldstone & Goldfarb, 1966) have assumed that
failure to use and underst’and conventional time concepts reflects an
inability to perceive time, i.e., respond differentially to different time
intervals. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that a child can
discriminate time intervals at an age considerably earlier than he is
able to demonstrate this capacit’y by verbally identifying conventional
time units. The purpose of the experiments described below was to assess
the accuracy with which young children are able to estimate time inter-
vals in a situation where they are not required to make use of conven-
tional units of time.
Of the three paradigms that have been used to examine time estima-
tion-the production, reproduction, and estimation methods-only the
reproduction method avoids the requirement that S be familiar with
arbitrary time units. In the production method, E verbally designates
an interval of solar time in conventional units, and S is instructed to
produce this interval by some means such as holding down a telegraph
key, while in the estimation method, E produces an interval and instructs
5 to report its duration in conventional units. In using the reproduction
method, E marks off a standard interval by presenting some stimulus
event (e.g., a tone) of a fixed duration, and S is required to reproduce
the same stimulus event for a period he judges to be equal to the
duration of the standard.
Fraisse and Orsini (1958) used a method of reproduction to study the
accuracy of judgments of a 30-set interval by three groups of girls aged
6, 8, and 10 years, with 30 children in each group. A 30-set noise
generated by a motor was the stimulus event t’o be reproduced, and after
each reproduction, one of three lights indicated to S whether the repro-
duced interval was too long, too short, or accurate (&5 set) , The results
appear to indicate that the youngest Ss showed the greatest improvement
over the 10 trials given, and overall accuracy was highest for the oldest
Ss.” Slightly more than half the oldest Ss, and just under half the
youngest, provided judgments with +5 set of the standard during the
last few trials.
The Fraisse and Orsini study did not provide unambiguous data
concerning the size and direction of the children’s errors. Moreover,
since no control Ss who did not receive feedback information were
included in the study, it cannot be determined whether the tendency
‘This conclusion is based on data provided in the text of the Fra,isse and
Orsini report: their Figure 2, which indicates the oldest Ss were least accurate,
apparently is mislabeled.
 TIME ESTIMATION AND FEEDBACK 297

towards increasing accuracy over trials was a result of the children

correcting their errors because of the feedback, or was an instance of
a tendency, frequently observed, for Ss to show systematic variations
in time estimations as a result of repeated observation of a standard
(e.g., Falk & Bindra, 1954; Underwood, 1966).
The present study investigated the accuracy of time estimation by
preschool and elementary-school boys and girls. A reproduction method
was used in which the child made repeated judgments of the time
required for a hidden toy to travel along a path to a designated point.
For half the Ss in the first experiment, feedback information was
given after each reproduction trial, providing, in the context of the task,
both the direction and magnitude of error. In the Fraisse and Orsini
study, the Ss were informed only of the direction of their errors, yet even
the 6-year-olds appeared to improve over trials. It was expected that
including magnitude of error information would increase the likelihood
of even the preschool Ss learning to make accurate reproductions.
The remaining half of the S’s in the present experiment did not receive
feedback after each test trial, but simply made reproductions of a time
interval after each presentation of a standard interval. This second group
was necessary to assess unambiguously the effects of feedback informa-
tion on changes over trials in accuracy of judgments by the first group.
A second experiment explored the possibility that motivating praise
associated with the feedback was essential for the informational content
of the feedback to be effective in producing changes in the younger Ss’
judgments.

EXPERIMENT I

Method
Subjects. The Ss were 16 children from the University of Iowa preschool
and 16 first-grade and 16 third-grade children living in a local apartment
complex and adjacent housing development. Mean ages were 5 years
3 months, 7 years 2 months, and 9 years 1 month, respectively. Equal
numbers of males and females were chosen from the available subject
pool at each age level. The first- and third-grade Ss were paid $.75 for
participating in the experiment.
Data from five additional Ss were obtained but not analyzed. Two
preschoolers, one male and one female, were omitted according to a pre-
established criterion of failure to understand the instructions (see below).
One male preschool S refused to complete the task, apparatus failure
necessitated discarding data from one male third-grader, and incorrect
298 CROWDER Ah-D HOHLE

assignment to age group resulted in t:linGnatiou of one first-grade girl.

Each of these Ss was replacetl.
Apparatus. The apparatus rc~(~~blc(~ :I mininturc~ stage. The backdrop
was a drawing 4 it long and 2 ft, high of giq. ant1 brown mountains,
with a 3-in. wide cave in t#lie largest mountain painted midway across
the stage. Five inches from the backdrop in the middle of the floor was
a groove running t’he length of the stage. A plast8ic toy lion 3 in. long,
shown in Figure lil, was glued to a small platform which could slide
freely in the groove.
The platform was attached lo a nylon string belt operated with a
series of pulleys by a noiseless, constant speed motor, such that the
platform could be pulled in either direction at a fixed rate across the
entire lengt’h of the stage.
Three removable tunnels were constructed from plywood so that they
would cover portions of the groove and the lion as indicated in Figure 1.
These were painted the same gray as the rest of the apparatus with
evergreens painted on the front.

A 6

FIG. 1. Photographs of the apparatus as it appeared at selected points in the

procedure (see text).
 TIME ESTIMATION AND FEEDBACK 299

Movement of the platform across the stage from right to left and
the starting of a clock were initiated simultaneously by operation of a
start button by E. The plat’form was braked to a stop, and the clock
was stopped, by activating any one of three switches: (1) a subject-
operated “stop” switch, (2) a terminal limiting switch at the far left
wall of the stage, or (3) a switch in the center of the stage wh:ch
could be positioned by E to stop the lion exactly in front of the cave,
thus producing the standard interval. The standard interval was the
time it took the lio,n to travel from the start positIion, at the far right
of the stage, to directly in front of the cave (exactly 2 ft). By use of
two different speeds of the motor, the standard int,ervals were 2.7
and 5.4 sec.
Procedure. An exhaust fan was operating continuously during all
sessions to mask any possible auditory cues produced by the sliding
platform. Each S was seated in front of the apparatus at eye-level with
the top of the cave, directly in front of the cave. The “stop” button was
placed on a stool of the same height as S’s chair, on S’s preferred side.
As E moved the lion back and forth in the groove (Figure IB), she said,
“The lion can move back and forth in front of the mountains. His home is
this cave in the largest .mountain. In this game you must try to get t.he lion
directly in front of his den. Right, now he is in front of his den. See how
his nose is here a.nd his tail is here (pointing). When we start. the game you
must try f.o make the lion stop moving right when he is in front, of his
CBVC:’

The lion was then moved to the far right of the stage with his tail
touching the right wall of the stage.
“The lion will be here when we start the game and when I say ‘begin’
he will start to move to\Tard his den. I will show you first, when to stop
the lion. Then you will have a turn to push this button and stop t,he lion.”

E then placed the two tunnels used for the standard trials into posi-
tion (Figure lC), and said,
“I’ll put these tunnels here, so the lion will have to move through them
to get to his den. On your turn I will also put a tunnel in front of t.he rave:
so you will have to guess when the lion is in front, of his den.”
“Sometimes when you push the button the lion won’t, he in front of his
den yet and sometimes he will have run past his den. When you push the
button the lion will st,op right where he is.”
“Try to make the lion stop right in front of his den. When it is my
turn, watch to see the lion stop in front of his den and then on your turn,
push the button to rnakc, him stop in the .sa,mc place. Now 1’11 show you
when to push the button. Begin.”

The limiting switch in front of the cave had been positioned to stop
the lion directly in front of the cave. At the completion of the standard
300 CROWDER AND HOHLE

trial, E said (Figure lD), “See how the lion’s nose is here and his tail
is here (pointing). Now you try to guess when the lion is in this position.
Push the button when you think the lion is in front of his den.”
After the limiting switch at the cave was moved back, the third tunnel
was positioned in front of the cave, and the lion was returned to the
start position (Figure 1E). When E was satisfied that S was ready
and was looking at the lion, E said “begin,” whereupon the lion started
moving and the clock was started. The motor and timer were stopped
when S pushed the button. A loud click from the solenoid acting as
the brake accompanied the stop. If S failed to push the button, the
limiting switch stopped the lion at the far left of the stage. The S’s
reproduction was the solar time elapsed from the start of the lion’s
movement until S pushed the button, or until the lion was stopped at
the left wall.
The Ss in an experimental group received feedback after each trial
by seeing where they stopped the lion in relation to the scenery, whereas
Ss in a control group did not receive this feedback information. After
an S in the experimental group produced his reproduction, E lifted the
three tunnels (Figure 1F) and said, according to the accuracy of S’S
performance,

‘See where you stopped the lion.

(a) He’s right in front of his den. You’ve done a good job.
(b) He ran too far. On your next turn stop him sooner.
(c) He didn’t run far enough. On your next turn stop him later.”

The Ss who stopped the lion directly in front of the cave were told
(a), those who overestimated were told (b), and those who under-
estimated were told (c) . The lion was returned to the start position
and the two tunnels were positioned for the standard trials.
For the control-group Ss, after the completion of a reproduction trial,
E returned the lion to t’he start position and removed the tunnel from
in front of the cave, thus readying the apparatus for a standard trial
(Figure 1C). For both groups, E started the standard trials, which
alternated with the 15 reproduction trials, by saying, “Watch the lion
stop in front of his den. Begin.” Starting with the completion of the
second standard trial and every other standard trial after that E said,
“See how the lion stopped right in front of his den with his nose here
and his tail here.” As E was replacing the lion to the start position,
she said, “Now it’s your turn. Stop the lion right in front of his den.
Ready? Begin.”
A criterion adopted for rejecting Ss on the basis of failure to under-
stand instructions was more than half the trials with reproductions
 TIME ESTIMATION AND FEEDBACK 301

corresponding to the lion stopping less than l/e in. inside the first tunnel
or within l/e in. of the left side of the stage. Two preschool Ss were
rejected on the basis of this criterion. Both of these Ss consistently made
reproductions less than the lower limit.
Design. Twelve experimental groups, each containing two boys and
two girls, consisted of all combinations of three age levels (approximately
5, 7, and 9 years), two treatment groups (feedback and no feedback),
and two standard intervals (2.7 and 5.4 set). The Ss at each age level
were randomly assigned to one of the two time intervals. Within each
time interval they were randomly assigned to either a feedback or
no-feedback group.

Results
The percentage error for each trial for each S was computed from the
original reproductions measured in elapsed solar time, using the formula,
estimast~a;d;;ndard x loo,
Percentage error =

where the value of the standard was either 2.7 or 5.4 sec. For each
successive three-trial block, the median percentage error was determined
for each S, and these medians were entered into a five-factor analysis
of variance. Age, Feedback, Interval, and Sex were between-S factors,
and Trial Blocks was a within-S factor.
Accuracy of time estimations by the three age groups of Ss as
functions of trial blocks and feedback condition is indicated in Figure 2.
It appears that under all conditions, Ss’ initial tendencies were to under-
estimate the standard, but that all groups except the preschool Ss in the
no-feedback condition showed increasingly accurate estimations over
trials.
Main effects of Trial Blocks and Feedback .were significant, F(4,96) =
3.45, p < .05, and F(1,24) = 4.42, p < .05, respectively. The Trial
Blocks X Age interaction was significant, F(8,96) = 3.37, p < .05, but
the apparent triple interaction of Age, Feedback, and Trial Blocks was
not a statistically reliable effect, P(8,96) = 1.88, p = .07. The deviant
trend for preschool Ss in the no-feedback condition, i.e., the tendency
towards increasing underestimation, was investigated further in a second
experiment, described below.
No significant Age, Sex, or Interval main effect was found, but there
was significant interactions indicated for Trial Blocks X Sex X Interval,
F(4,96) = 2.50, p < .05; Trial Blocks X Sex, F(4,96) = 3.69, p < .05;
and Trial Blocks X Sex X Feedback, F(4,96) = 2.51, p < .05. The first
of these interaction effects apparently was due to the female Ss in the
302

FE:DeACKNO-FEEDBACK
- PRESCHOOL .----. PRESCHOOL

-FIRST-GRADE m---* FIRST-GRADE

Ii - THIRD-GRBDE b--A THIRD-GRADE

O-
E

5
w -IO-
v
?

g -EO-

f
Y

-30 -

-40 -

L I I I I I
I 2 3 4 5
TRIAL BLOCKS

FIG. 2. Average percentage error as a function of trial blocks, age, nnd feedback
condition in Experiment I.

no-feedback, 2.7-set interval condition showing abnormally short repro-

ductions during the first trial block (on the order of 50% of the stan-
dard), then improving rapidly to levels comparable to the other groups.
The “significant” interaction thus appears to be attributable to sampling
error such that this group contained a disproportionate number of
atypical Ss with initial tendencies to underestimate the standard.
Also, examination of results for the three age groups separately
revealed that the Trial Blocks X Sex and Trial Blocks X Sex X Feed-
back interaction effects could be accounted for almost entirely by data
from the preschool 8s; and since these effects were not replicated in
Nxperiment II (described below), carried out using larger samples of
preschool Ss, it appears that these interactions can be ignored.
EXPERIMENT II

Figure 2 suggests that the first- and third-grade Ss improved in

accuracy over trials whether they received feedback following test
trials or simply observed a repetition of the standard, whereas the
preschool Ss improved in accuracy only under the feedback conditions.
If the difference between the feedback and no-feedback groups of pre-
 TIME ESTIMATION AND FEEDBACK 303

school Ss is replicable, there remains the question of whether the failure

to improve in the absence of feedback was due to insufficient motivation
(when an S in the feedback condition was shown where he had stopped
the lion he not only was given information concerning his performance,
but was also provided motivating praise and encouragement), or was
due to an inability of these Ss to learn to reproduce the standard time
interval simply from repeated observations of it. The main purpose of
Experiment II was to explore, by varying praise and information com-
ponents of the feedback independently, the extent to which S’s utiliza-
tion of the information depended on E’s motivating comments following
test trials.

Method
Subjects. Sixty-four children enrolled in the University of Iowa Pre-
school Laboratories served as Ss. Mean age was 5 years, 1 month.
Apparatus and procedure. The apparatus and procedure were exactly
the same as in Experiment I except that only the shorter standard in-
t,erval (2.7 set) was included, and E’s comments between trials were
modified for half the Ss to control expressions of praise and en-
couragement.
The Ss were assigned randomly to four experimental groups of 16 Ss
each, with the restriction that equal numbers of boys and girls were in
each group. Two of these groups were treated identically to the feedback
and no-feedback groups of Experiment I; that is, a praise-plus-informa-
tion group was a replication of the “feedback” group of Experiment I,
and a no-information, no-praise group was a replication of the “no-feed-
back” group. Two additional groups consisted of one receiving informa-
tion only, and the other receiving praise only.
The Ss in the information-only group were treated identically to those
in the feedback group of Experiment I except that immediately after
lifting the tunnels following a reproduction trial, E omitted expressions
of praise and said simply, “see where you stopped the lion,” and then,
according to S’s performance: “(a) H e’s right in front of his den. (b)
He ran too far. On your next turn stop him sooner. (c) He didn’t run
far enough. On your next turn stop him later.”
The praise-only group was like the no-feedback group of Experiment
I except that while returning the lion to the start position after a repro-
duction trial, E said, without revealing the lion’s position, one of three
statements: “(a) You’ve done a good job. (b) That’s fine. (c) You really
know how to play this game.” These statements were rotated over trials
and were not related to S’s performance.
Design. The four experimental conditions constituted a 2 x 2 factorial
304 CROWDER Ah’D 1101-I LE

design, with information and praise conditions as orthogonal factors,

and sex of S was included as a counterbalancing factor.

Results
Median percentage error for the three-trial blocks was entered into a
four-factor analysis of variance with Information, Praise, and Sex as
between-S factors, and Trial Blocks as a within-X factor.
Comparison of Figures 2 and 3 indicates that the trends for the feed-
back and no-feedback groups of preschool Sa in Experiment I were
essentially replicated in Experiment II: the information-plus-praise
group improved in accuracy over trials, while the no-information, no-
praise group decreased in accuracy (increased underestimation). AH
Figure 3 indicates, both groups of 8s receiving information concerning
their performance showed improvement in accuracy over trials, whereas
the no-information groups showed decreasing accuracy over trials. This
finding was supported by a significant, Information X Trial Blocks
interaction effect, F(4,224) = 4.51, p < .05, in the analysis of variance.
Also indicated in Figure 3 is a significant Information X Praise inter-
action, F(1,56) = 4.75, p < .05: the praise manipulation apparently

IO
1 - INFORMATION-PRAISE
\
\ - INFORMATION-NO PRAISE
\
C--+ NO INFORMATION- PRAISE
\
0 1, C-- 1 NO INFORMATION-NO PRAISE
I \

-10 -
B
i
5y -20 -

!
a
g -30 -

z
I
-40 -

-50 -

I I I I I I
I 2 3 4 5
TRIAL BLOCKS

FIG. 3. Average percentage error as a function of trial blocks for the subgroups
of Experiment II receiving the four combinations of Information and Praise.
 TIME ESTIMATION AND FEEDBACK 305

had a facilitating effect when it was accompained by information to S

concerning his performance, but resulted in increased underestimation
over trials when it was provided in the absence of such information.
The main effect of Information was statistically reliable, F( 1,56) =
4.54, p < .05.

DISCUSSION
The question of whether young children can perceive time appears to
have been answered affirmatively. In contrast to findings reported by
Smythe and Goldstone (1957)) the present study indicated that children
as young as 5 years old can estimate time intervals and can make
improvements in their estimations when given appropriate informational
feedback.
The accuracy of time estimation by Xs in the present study compares
quite favorably with that found by Gilliland and Humphreys (1943)
with older 8s. Combining their data for reproduction, production, and
estimation procedures (which reportedly did not differ significantly),
Gilliland and Humphreys found that the average percentage error for
fifth-grade children was 47.5% for a 9-set standard. In comparison, the
children in the feedback group of Experiment I of the present study
averaged 5% error over all trials, and were averaging only 1% error
in the last trial block. The comparable Ss not receiving feedback averaged
15% errors overall and 11% in the last trial block, Reproduction errors
for the preschool Xs in Experiment II were somewhat higher, with overall
averages of 20%) for the groups receiving information feedback, and
31% for the groups not receiving information following the test trials.
Thus it appears that even though the children in the present study
were considerably younger than those studied by Gilliland and Hum-
phreys, they showed substantiahy better time estimation. This conclusion
depends, of course, on the assumption that percentage errors do not
increase with longer time intervals. That such an assumption is tenable is
suggested by the finding that average percentage errors did not differ
for groups judging 2.7- vs. 5.4-set standards in the present study.
Moreover, Gilliland and Humphreys obtained judgments of 9- and NO-
set intervals and found that percentage errors for both children and
adults were smaller for the longer interval.
A comparison can be made between the feedback groups of the present
study and the results of the Fraisse and Orsini (1958) study. Approxi-
mately 50% of the responses of the 6-, 8-, and lo-year-old Ss in the
Fraisse and Orsini study were “correct” (-~5 set) on the last five trials.
In other words, a mean of approximately 50% of the Ss made percentage
errors of less than 16.7% on these trials. In Experiment I of the present
303 CROWDER AND HOHLE

study, a mean of 58% of the 5, 7-, and 9-year-old Ss gave reproductions

within &I 6.7% of the standard on trials 6-10; and in Experiment II,
a mean of 407’ of the preschool Ss in the information groups gave
responses within a comparable range over these trials.
It might be noted that the S.3 in the prcaent study continued to show
substantial improvement in their reproductions following 10 trials: an
average of 79% of the S’s in the three age groups of Experiment I showed
errors of less than ?16.7% on t’he last trial block (trials 13-15)) and
a comparable mean of 59% was obtained for the preschool Ss in the
information groups of Experiment II.
It seems likely that the children in this study tended to demonstrate
more accurat,e time estimation than has been found previously for very
young children because in comparison to the tasks typically used-
production or estimation of conventional time units, or reproduction of
some arbitrary stimulus such as a tone-the task used in the present
study was more relevant to typical life situations, and the instructions
probably had more concrete meaning to the young children. Fraisse and
Orsini did use a reproduction method, so that the task did not itself
require understanding of t’ime concepts by S, but the feedback was given
in terms of lights signifying “too short,” “too long,” and “exactly
right” reproductions, hence the feedback could be effective only if S
undcr;tood these relat’ive time concepts and was able to correlate them
with the light cues. In the present study, S did not have to depend on
any verbal or symbolic cues gives by E, but could assess his performance
more concretely by observing where he had stopped the lion.
Results of Experiment I suggested that preschool Ss required feedback
between trials to show improvement over trials, but the first- and third-
grade Ss did not. The improvement by the older Ss over trials in the
absence of feedback seems to indicate that by 7 years of age, a child
has had sufficient learning experiences related to time estimation such
that he can utilize repeated observation of a standard interval to correct
his own estimates.
That t’he preschool Ss required specific training to improve their
estimations of the standard interval was indicated by the results of
Experiment II: only those Ss receiving informational feedback concerning
their performance following test trials showed improvement in accuracy
on successive test trials. Those Ss who were only shown the standard
interval between test trials failed to improve in accuracy with practice,
whether they were praised following test trials or not. In fact, praising
the Ss under these conditions resulted in decreasing accuracy. Apparently,
praise in the absence of information feedback served to reinforce the
inaccurate (underestimation) responses.
 TIME ESTIMATION AND FEEDBACK 307

That Ss in all groups in both Experiment I and II tended to under-

estimate the standard is consistent with previous results. Using estima-
tion and production methods, Smythe and Goldstone (1957) and
Goldstone, Boardman, and Lhamon (1958) found that the subjective
value of a second was less than one clock second for children of ages
6-8 years. More generally, early in the history of experimental psychol-
ogy, Vierordt (1868) made the generalization that short intervals are
overestimated (judgments are greater than the standard) while long
intervals are underestimated, where short and long intervals are relative
to an “indifference interval” at which no systematic judgment errors
occur. Vierordt initially proposed a value of about 1 set for the indif-
ference interval, while later investigators have suggested it is longer.
Most values proposed (e.g., Stott, 1935; Woodrow, 1934) have been
shorter than the shorter standard used in the present study, however, so
that Vierordt’s law would have predicted underestimation for all groups.
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