PEOPLE VS BARTOLOME (GR NO 191726 FEBRUARY 06, 2013)

People of the Philippines vs Bartolome

GR No 191726 February 06, 2013

Facts: On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Unit (ADSOU) in Caloocan City to report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. Acting on the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of ADSOU immediately instructed some of his
men to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. During the pre-operation briefing, the buy-bust team
designated PO1 Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a P100.00 bill that he marked with his initials
BP. It was agreed that the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify him to Paras; and
that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust team that the transaction with the suspect had been
consummated. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Upon arriving at the
target area at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 2003, the team members positioned themselves in the vicinity of a
store. The informant then approached a person who was standing in front of the store and dropped a cigarette butt in
front of the person. Paras, then only two meters away from the informant, saw the dropping of the cigarette butt.
Paras went towards the suspect and said to him: Pre pa-iskor nga. The suspect responded: Pre, piso na lang tong
hawak magkano ba kukunin mo? Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after which he
handed the marked P100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn drew out a plastic sachet containing white substances
from his pocket and gave the sachet to Paras. With that, Paras scratched his head to signal the consummation of the
sale. As the other members of the team were approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. PO3 Rodrigo Antonio, another
member of the team, confiscated the marked P100.00 bill from the suspect, who was identified as Noel Bartolome y
Bajo. Paras immediately marked the sachet at the crime scene with Bartolomes initials NBB. Insp. Cruz later
requested in writing the PNP Crime Laboratory in Caloocan City to conduct a laboratory examination of the
contents of the plastic sachet seized from Bartolome. PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, another member of the buy-bust
team, brought the request and the sachet and its contents to the laboratory. In due course, Forensic Chemical Officer
Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed in Physical Science Report No. D-1038-03 that
the plastic sachet contained 0.06 gram of methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

Issue: Whether the transaction resulting to the arrest of Bartolome is an instigation.

Held: No. Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order
to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or
lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of
committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of
the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and
schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as coprincipals,
the accused will have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said,
instigation is a “trap for the unwary innocent,” while entrapment is a “trap for the unwary criminal.

As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting violators of
Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding
him to commit the offense.

A police officers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a “decoy
solicitation,” is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of contraband is
a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminals course of
conduct. In People v. Sta. Maria, the Court clarified that a “decoy solicitation” is not tantamount to inducement or
instigation.

In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust
operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders, which is made difficult by the secrecy
with which drug-related offenses are conducted and the many devices and subterfuges employed by offenders to
avoid detection. On the other hand, the Court has taken judicial notice of the ugly reality that in cases involving
illegal drugs, corrupt law enforcers have been known to prey upon weak, hapless and innocent persons. The
distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be crucial. The balance needs to be struck between the
individual rights and the presumption of innocence on one hand, and ensuring the arrest of those engaged in the
illegal traffic of narcotics on the other.

Applying the foregoing, we declare that the accused was not arrested following an instigation for him to commit the
crime. Instead, he was caught in flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust. In a buy-bust operation,
the pusher sells the contraband to another posing as a buyer; once the transaction is consummated, the pusher is
validly arrested because he is committing or has just committed a crime in the presence of the buyer. Here, Paras
asked the accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted with the former, receiving the
marked bill from Paras and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The accused was shown to
have been ready to sell the shabu without much prodding from Paras. There is no question that the idea to commit
the crime originated from the mind of the accused.

Prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust operation legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is
accompanied to the target area by the informant

PEOPLE VS CASIO (G.R. NO. 211465 DECEMBER 3, 2014)

People of the Philippines vs Casio
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014

Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the
police in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1
Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police
operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain
their guests. IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter. The team went to
Queensland Motel and rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room
25 was for the rest of the police team. PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the accused noticed them and called their attention. Negotiation
occured and upon the signal, the accused was arrested and the two minors were taken into custody by the DSWD
officials.

Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.

Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the
following acts:

(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;”

(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person”

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”

The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services were peddled to the
police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her services.66 to work as a prostitute
because she needed money. AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a
child and as one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or
when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as
‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.”

Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:

1. When the trafficked person is a child;

2. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually
or as a group;

4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise authority over the
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;

5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;

6. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and

7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes
insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).

People of the Philippines vs. Nenita

Legaspi y Lucas
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 173485 November 23, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NENITA LEGASPI y LUCAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Challenged in this appeal is the January 16, 2006 Decision 1 promulgated by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01209, which affirmed in toto the Judgment 2 of
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 rendered by the
Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 12351-D.

On April 23, 2003, accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi y Lucas (Legaspi), also known as
"Nita," was charged before the RTC for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Nenita Legaspi y
Lucas a.k.a. "Nita" with the crime of violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165,
committed as follows:

On or about April 22, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing sixteen (16)
decigrams (0.16 grams), which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of said law. 3

Upon arraignment4 on July 14, 2003, Legaspi pleaded not guilty to the charge against
her. After the pre-trial conference5 held on the same day, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution evidence, upon which the RTC anchored its finding of guilt, consisted
of the testimonies of two of the operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, Police
Officer (PO) 2 Arturo San Andres and PO1 Janet A. Sabo. 6 Their version of the incident
leading to Legaspi’s arrest is summarized as follows:

San Andres and Sabo were assigned to the Mayor Special Action Team (MSAT), Pasig
City Police Station. On April 22, 2003, at around 4:00 p.m., a certain informant, whose
identity remained confidential, approached San Andres to report about the rampant
incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City and about the
drug pusher who was identified as Legaspi. After gathering all the necessary details, San
Andres immediately informed his superior, Police Inspector Villaruel, who instructed
him, Sabo, PO1 Aldrin Mariano, and PO1 Roland Panis to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Villaruel designated San Andres to act as the poseur-buyer and gave him two pieces of
one hundred-peso (P100.00) bills to be used as buy-bust money. Mariano was tasked to
be the team leader, and he, along with the rest of the team, served as San Andres’s
backup. At around 5:15 p.m., the team reached Centennial Village, where after a briefing
on their operations, San Andres, together with the informant, proceeded to Legaspi’s
house, while the others strategically placed themselves in the entrapment area, keeping
San Andres within their view. Upon seeing Legaspi, who was just outside her house, the
informant introduced San Andres to her as a "scorer." 7Legaspi asked them how much
they wanted to "score," to which San Andres replied "P 200.00 panggamit lang."8 After
San Andres gave Legaspi the buy-bust money, which he had previously marked with his
initials "ABS," Legaspi reached into her pocket and gave him one heat-sealed plastic
sachet containing the suspected shabu. As soon as San Andres got the sachet, he
scratched his head, to signal to his team that the transaction was over. He thereafter
introduced himself as a police officer, informed Legaspi of her rights, and marked the
sachet he had received from her with his initials. The team then brought Legaspi to Rizal
Medical Center for a check-up, and then to the police station wherein they filed the
appropriate charges against her. Meanwhile, San Andres sent the sachet to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and requested for an examination to
determine the nature of its contents.9

Annalee R. Forro, a PNP forensic chemist at the Eastern Police District Crime
Laboratory, examined the "heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings ‘EXH A
ABS 04/22/03’ containing 0.16 gram white crystalline substance" 10 on the same day. In
her Chemistry Report No. D-727-03E, she stated the following:

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result

to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

xxxx

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 11

This report, along with the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance bought from
Legaspi, and the two P 100.00 bills used as marked money,12 were presented in court.

After the prosecution had rested its case, Legaspi was called to the witness stand to relay
her version of the events. Legaspi primarily denied the charges against her. She testified
that on April 22, 2003, while she was inside her house taking care of her grandson, San
Andres and Mariano peeked through her window and asked her if she was "Nita."
Legaspi alleged that after she answered in the affirmative, the two police officers pushed
the door open and told her to go with them. She claimed that because of the shock the
events had caused her, she was not able to ask the police officers why they were taking
her with them. Legaspi said that she was brought to the police precinct in Pasig City
where she was asked about her shabu source. Legaspi averred that she told the police
officers that she did not know what they were talking about. She asseverated that she
had never been arrested before and that she had never been involved in any illegal drugs
case.13

On December 12, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused NENITA LEGASPI Y LUCAS a.k.a. "Nita"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and
hereby imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred
thousand pesos (P 500,000.00), with the accessory penalties provided under Section 35
thereof.

Moreover, the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.16 gram of

methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (Exhibit "E-1") is hereby confiscated in favor
of the government and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for
destruction in accordance with law.
With Costs.14

In convicting Legaspi, the RTC stated that it was more convinced with the version of the
prosecution. The RTC held that the positive testimonies of the two police officers were
stronger than Legaspi’s negative testimony. The RTC added that aside from the
presumption that the two police officers performed their duties in a regular manner,
there was no showing that they had any ill motive in arresting Legaspi.

Aggrieved, Legaspi appealed15 her case to this Court. However, conformably with this
Court’s Decision in People v. Mateo, 16 which modified certain rules on direct appeals
from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, Legaspi’s case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.17

Legaspi anchored her appeal on the lone error as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE POLICE
INSTIGATED THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST TRANSACTION.18

On January 16, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, affirming the
RTC’s judgment of conviction, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 12, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 164 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED en toto. 19

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals explained the difference between instigation, which
is deemed contrary to public policy, and entrapment, a valid means of arresting violators
of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It then held that the buy-bust operation that led to
Legaspi’s arrest was an entrapment, and that Legaspi miserably failed to substantiate
her allegation of instigation, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court of Appeals also said that contrary to Legaspi’s assertions, neither prior
surveillance nor the presentation of the informant in court was an indispensable
requirement to the successful prosecution of a drug case.20

Undaunted, Legaspi is once again before this Court, assigning the same error she
assigned before the Court of Appeals.21

The Ruling of this Court

Legaspi was charged and convicted for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
or the Dangerous Drugs Law, which provides:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P 10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential
chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation

of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires
within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed in every case.

For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners,
couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed in every case.

If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a

dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any
offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.

The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any
person who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities
prescribed in this Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

Defense of Instigation

Legaspi contends that she was instigated to commit the crime, as she was not the one
who sought out San Andres to sell him shabu. She avers that San Andres’s own
testimony clearly shows that he had suggested the commission of the crime by offering
her P 200.00 for the purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that this is supported by her
testimony wherein she denied selling shabu to San Andres or to anyone for that matter.
This, she says, is confirmed by the fact that she has no police or criminal record. 22

Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we shall first distinguish between entrapment
and instigation. Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of
apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution
of their criminal plan. Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such a case, the instigators
become co-principals themselves.23
Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him,
there is instigation and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent
originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, even after a
person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an
opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him,
there is no instigation and the accused must be convicted. The law in fact tolerates the
use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. 24

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very relevant in
anti-narcotics operations. It has become common practice for law enforcement officers
and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders.25 This Court, elaborating on the concept of a buy-bust
operation within the context of entrapment and instigation, has said:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as
a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly
employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act
of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates
from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its
opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused
into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to
public policy and considered an absolutory cause. x x x.26

Instigation is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this
as a defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the
government induced him to commit the offense. 27 Legaspi claims that she was induced
into committing the crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San Andres,
who was then looking to buy shabu.

We find, however, that Legaspi’s defense of instigation must fail. It is an established rule
that when an accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses
cannot be set up:

(1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his
way; or

(2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer
seeking to expose his criminal act; or

(3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisted in its commission. 28

The foregoing are especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that
is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of
conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the
offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the police
officer.29
In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of drug trafficking from
their confidential informant, immediately set-up a buy-bust operation to test the
veracity of the report and to arrest the malefactor if the report proved to be true. The
prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell P 200.00 worth of
shabu to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced,
coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres
did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed
that he was also a "scorer"; and as soon as she learned that he was looking to buy, she
immediately asked him how much he needed. Under the circumstances, the police
officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to arrest Legaspi even
without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence. 30

The RTC was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in
applying the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the police officers,
especially since Legaspi failed to impute on them any motive to falsely testify against
her.31 Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust
operation team were inspired by improper motive or did not properly perform their
duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. 32

Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not
instigation. While instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of a
confession and avoidance.33 In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the
accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer. 34 Thus, it is
incompatible with the defense of denial, where the theory is that the accused did not
commit the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present
concurrently. Besides, this Court has consistently held that:

[B]are denials are weak forms of defenses, especially in this case where the accused-
appellant’s testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The
uncorroborated denial by the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the testimonies of
the arresting officer and the poseur-buyer, who both testified on affirmative matters.

Furthermore, there is no indication that the arresting team and the other prosecution
witnesses were actuated by improper motives, prevaricating just to cause damnation to
him. Thus, their affirmative statements proving accused-appellant’s culpability must be
respected and must perforce prevail.35

No Prior Surveillance

Legaspi also argues that the veracity of the buy-bust operation is suspect as it was
conducted without prior surveillance.36

This Court has many times discussed the dispensability of prior surveillance in buy-bust
operations, as it is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or such buy-bust
operation. In People v. Eugenio,37 we held that the conduct of surveillance prior to a
buy-bust operation is not required especially when the police officers are accompanied
to the scene by their civilian informant. This is so because there is no rigid or textbook
method in conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work, and
the need for prior surveillance may be dispensed with when time is of the essence. 38 In
People v. Gonzales,39 we said:
The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means
to apprehend drug dealers. Thus, we have refused to establish on a priori basis what
detailed acts the police authorities might credibly undertake in their entrapment
operations.40

Non-presentation of Informant

Legaspi further contends that the failure to present the informant as a witness in court is
very material and relevant in the case at bar, inasmuch as she had denied having sold
shabu to anyone. She also claims that since the identity of the informant was known to
her from the beginning, there was no reason for the prosecution to not present him in
court as a witness, especially since he is in the best position to establish that she had
indeed been engaged in the sale of shabu prior to the buy-bust operation against her. 41

We do not agree. The presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the successful
prosecution of drug cases. Informants are almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. 42 In People v. Ho
Chua,43 we held:

[P]olice authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they
surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the
moment they are presented in court. Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon
squealers and informants. It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their
identities are kept secret. In any event, the testimony of the informant would be merely
corroborative.44

Legaspi argues that it was the civilian informant who reported on her alleged drug-
pushing; hence, only he had personal knowledge of such activities, subject of this case.
Contrary to Legaspi’s claims, the subject matter of this case is her sale of shabu to San
Andres on April 22, 2003. She was not charged and convicted for her activities prior to
such sale. Since San Andres, who was the poseur-buyer himself, already testified to the
events, which he had personal knowledge of, the testimony of the informant would be
merely corroborative, and can thus be dispensed with. 45

Only two elements are to be proven for the prosecution of illegal sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

The prosecution had presented evidence that established both elements by the required
quantum of proof, i.e., guilt beyond reasonable doubt.46

Legaspi was positively identified by the prosecution’s eyewitnesses as the person who
sold to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. Her identity as the culprit cannot be doubted, having been caught in
flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation conducted by the MSAT of Pasig City. Such
positive identification prevails over Legaspi’s uncorroborated and weak defense of
denial, and unsubstantiated and contradictory defense of instigation. 47
The prosecution also succeeded in establishing with certainty and conclusiveness the
corpus delicti of the crime. After Legaspi received the P 200.00 from San Andres, the
poseur-buyer, she reached into her pocket and handed him one heat-sealed plastic
sachet containing shabu. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust
transaction between the entrapping officers and Legaspi.48

As the prosecution ably established Legaspi’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting her for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 16, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01209.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MYRNA GAYOSO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MYRNA GAYOSO Y ARGUELLES

G.R. No. 206590 March 27, 2017

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:

Based on the testimonies of SPO3 Victorino de Dios, SPO3 Rolando G. Salamida, PO2 Rex Isip,
SPO4 Josefina Bandoy, P/Insp. Eleazar Barber, Jr., PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto, and the documentary
exhibits, the following facts emerged: PI Barber of the PNP Guiuan Police Station directed SPO3 De Dios
to conduct a surveillance on appellant after receiving several reports that she was peddling prohibited
drugs. Three weeks later, SPO3 De Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug
activities. PI Barber filed for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior to implementing the search
warrant, PI Barber decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SPO3 De Dios as poseur-
buyer and giving him P200.00 marked money for the operation.

Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24, 2004, somebody
forcibly kicked the front door of her house and tried to break it open. When she opened the door, PI
Barber pushed her aside and told his companions to move quickly. They went directly to her room; when
PO2 Isip emerged therefrom seconds later, he was holding a substance that looked like tawas. SPO3 De
Dios and SPO3 Salamida went in and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant was
shown to her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She argued that the police
 officers fabricated the charges against her since her family had a quarrel with a police officer named
Rizalina Cuantero regarding the fence separating their houses.

The RTC, in finding the appellant guilty, ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain
of custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they were bought from appellant and/or seized from
her house, to its turnover to the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
RTC rejected appellant's defense of denial and frame-up in view of her positive identification by
eyewitnesses as the criminal offender. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of
unauthorized sale and possession of shabu. The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the
"test-buy operation" amounted to instigation since it is settled jurisprudence that a ''decoy solicitation"
is not tantamount to inducement or instigation.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a confirmatory test-buy solicitation constitutes instigation.

2. Whether the chain of custody was established.

RULING:

1. In inducement or instigation — the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and
the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator
practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-
principal. This is distinguished from entrapment wherein ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto.

The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It does not
amount to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant
habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug
transaction with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal
drugs to him.

2. No. From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we have
here are individual links with breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied together.
The so-called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not handled properly starting
from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as well as its transfer to the
crime laboratory for examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty that the
shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented tor laboratory examination and then
presented in court.

Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, another
procedural lapse casts further uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This refers
to the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the most basic procedural safeguards relative to the
custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165.
 In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at
the place where the search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the Department of
Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial custody and control
of said drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same. Neither was an explanation
offered for such failure.
US vs Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272
15 Phil 488
March 19, 1910

Petitioner: The United States

Respondent: Ah Chong

FACTS: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going
to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he
was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice "Who is there?", but received
no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been
placed the door and believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife, struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon, he called to his employers and
rushed back int the room to secure the bandages to bind up the wound. Defendant was charged with
murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong may be held criminally responsible for murder in the case at bar.

HELD: The Court held that Ah Chong must be acquitted.

Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the
intrude. Par. 1, Art XI of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that in order for the act to be
justified, the requisites must be present.

Requisites (Honest Mistake of Fact):

1) Unlawful agression on the part of the victim
2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression
3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

If the victim was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been
unlawful aggression, there would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself
and/or his home and the knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such
aggression.

The act done by Ah Chong was merely an act done due to Honest Mistake of Fact. The Court acquits Ah
Chong.

0290Baxinela v. People of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 149652

Quiza, Justiniano, Jr. G.

2008-0290
Baxinela v. People of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 149652, March
24, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo
L. Baxinela was in a pub
drinking with two other
policemen in as early as
11:00 p.m. of October 18,
1996. At around 12:00
a.m. to
12:30 a.m. there was a
minor altercation
between the deceased
Sgt. Lajo and
another customer at the
pub but eventually the
two were able to patch
things up.
While on his way out,
Lajo was followed by
Braxinela with a gun
already drawn
out. From behind,
Baxinela held Lajo’s left
arm and asked why he
was carrying a
gun. Thereafter an
explosion coming from
Baxinela’s gun was
heard. Lajo, still
standing, took two
steps and then fell
down.
Issue:
Whether or not fulfilment
of duty may validly be
invoked by the petitioner.
Decision:
No. In order to avail of
this justifying
circumstance it must be
shown that:
1) the accused acted in
the performance of a
duty or in the lawful
exercise of a
right or office; and 2) the
injury caused or the
offense committed is the
necessary
consequence of the due
performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of a
right or
office. While the first
condition is present,
the second is clearly
lacking.
Baxinela’s duty was to
investigate the reason
why Lajo had a gun
tucked behind
his waist in a public
place. This was what
Baxinela was doing
when he
confronted Lajo at the
entrance, but perhaps
through anxiety,
edginess or the
desire to take no
chances, Baxinela
exceeded his duty by
firing upon Lajo who
was not at all
resisting. The shooting
of Lajo cannot be
considered due
performance of a duty if
at that time Lajo posed
no serious threat or harm
to
Baxinela or to the
civilians in the pub.
The Court will, however,
attribute to Baxinela the
incomplete defense of
fulfillment of a duty as a
privileged mitigating
circumstance. In
Lacanilao v. Court
of Appeals, it was held
that if the first
condition is fulfilled but
the second is
wanting, Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code is
applicable so that the
penalty
lower than one or two
degrees than that
prescribed by law shall
be imposed
Quiza, Justiniano, Jr. G.2008-, March 24, 2006Facts:Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela was in a pub
drinking with two otherpolicemen in as early as 11:00 p.m. of October 18, 1996. At around 12:00 a.m.
to12:30 a.m. there was a minor altercation between the deceased Sgt. Lajo andanother customer at the
pub but eventually the two were able to patch things up.While on his way out, Lajo was followed by
Braxinela with a gun already drawnout. From behind, Baxinela held Lajo’s left arm and asked why he was
carrying agun. Thereafter an explosion coming from Baxinela’s gun was heard. Lajo, stillstanding, took
two steps and then fell down. Issue:Whether or not fulfilment of duty may validly be invoked by
the petitioner.Decision:No. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that:1) the
accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of aright or office; and 2) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessaryconsequence of the due performance of duty or the
lawful exercise of a right oroffice. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly
lacking.Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behindhis waist in a
public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when heconfronted Lajo at the entrance, but
perhaps through anxiety, edginess or thedesire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing
upon Lajo whowas not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered
dueperformance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm toBaxinela or to the
civilians in the pub.The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense offulfillment of
a duty as a privileged mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Courtof Appeals, it was held that if the
first condition is fulfilled but the second iswanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable
so that the penaltylower than one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed

People vs. Noel T. Sales GR. No 177218

Facts:

On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left
their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their
parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for
them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their father’s rage,
Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the
two kids reached home a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick
which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s
hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.

When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told
them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious
Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and
because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead,
appellant brought his son back to their house.

Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed
that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping
done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before
September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.

On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from
epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes.
His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.

The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

Rulings:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this case.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.

In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was
killed. There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the
deceased. It is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. As to the third
element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.

As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother
Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He
recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician
thereafter. Maria corroborated her son’s testimony.

Search

QUELNAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

ANDY QUELNAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 150917 September 27, 2006.

FACTS: A team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG) went to the Cityland Condominium in Makati to implement a
search warrant. Upon arrival, they went directly to the Security Office of said building to seek
assistance in serving a warrant. Security Officer Celedonio Punsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the
group and they proceeded to Unit 615.

At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door. He was later identified as
petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to petitioner. Upon entry, the police operatives
searched the unit, which was composed of a small room with a plywood divider separating the sala
from the bedroom. In the presence of petitioner and Punsaran, the group started searching the place
and eventually found on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances later confirmed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing scales, an improvised burner, and empty
transparent plastic sachets. Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt of the properties seized and an
Affidavit of Orderly Search allegedly signed by petitioner in their presence and that of Punsaran.
Petitioner was arrested and subsequently charged in court.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, as amended.

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of the crime for which he was convicted?

HELD: Yes. In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements
must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is
not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the
said drug is a regulated drug.

More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess the drug.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the
accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The fact of possession may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion, as well as the character of the
drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drug in the place where
he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that
the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or
within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.

Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the bedroom of the
subject premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was the only person in said
premises. Moreover, at the time of entry of the searching team in the subject premises, appellant
was half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court correctly concluded, only "indicates
extreme familiarity and gives the impression of he being at home" in the premises, of which he was
the registered owner

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL T. SALES (G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011)

SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Proximate Cause

Ponente: Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo

Doctrine: In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to
the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.
FACTS: In the night of September 2002 in Camarines Sur, appellant Noel T. Sales beaten his two sons
Noel Jr. and Noelmar because they failed to return home after joining the fluvial procession of Our Lady
of Penafracia. Sales whipped his son with a piece of wood approximately one meter in lenght and one
and a half inches in diameter. After he was finished beating his sons, his wife, Maria, noticed that there
was a crack in the head of Noemar so they brought him to a quack doctor, who said that Noemar was
already dead.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing. The
pupils of Noemar’s eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him say that he wanted to
sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came.
It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.

The wake of the child lasted only for a day and his body was never examined by a physician.

Sales surrendered to the police the day after.

RTC found Sales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Sales appealed to CA but the CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

Appellant raised the argument that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To
substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered
seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.

ISSUE: WON Sales was responsible for the death of Noemar.

RULING: YES. Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code states:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.

In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.

Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries,
committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED

JACINTO vs PEOPLE
GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26

FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a post dated checked
worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was
deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph
Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.

Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.

RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5)
months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.

HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.

The requisites of an impossible crime are:

That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;

That the act was alone with evil intent; and
That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the
acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an impossible
crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.

People vs. Balmores (G.R. No. L-1896)Facts:

Accused Rafael Balmores was convicted for the crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
asecurity. On September 22, 1947, accused tear off the bottom portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine
CharitySweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and
substituting andwriting in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000
thus making the saidticket bear the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakesdraw last June 29, 1947. Thereafter, he present the said falsified ticket in
the Philippine Charity SweepstakesOffice for the purpose of exchanging the same for the corresponding
cash. Accused pretended that the said1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and
that he is entitled to the correspondingamount of P359.55. However, one Bayani Miller, an employee to
whom the said accused presented the saidticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered
that the said ticket as presented by the saidaccused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called
for a policeman who apprehended and arrestedthe said accused right then and there.
Issue:
Whether or not Balmores committed an impossible crime.
Held:
No. It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent asthat
which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of
thefalsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in
relation to article59, of the Revised Penal Code. Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly was
not punishable but isnow under article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following: (1) When one
tries to kill another byputting in his soup a substance which he believes to be arsenic when in fact it is
common salt; and (2) whenone tries to murder a corpse. Judging from the appearance of the falsified
ticket in question, we are notprepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to
consummate the crime of estafa thrufalsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for
the payment had not exercised due care.The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or
falsification of "treasury or bank notes or certificatesor
other obligations and securities" is reclusion temporal
in its minimum period and a fine not to exceedP10,000, if the document which has been falsified,
counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or security of theUnited States or of the Philippine Islands. This
being a complex crime of attempted estafa through falsificationof an obligation or security of the
Philippines, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period in accordance with article 48. Taking
into consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, andapplying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be lower than prision mayor in its maximumperiod, which is 10
years and 1 day to 12 years. It results, therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trialcourt is correct.

NORMAN GAID vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009

Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide

Gaid was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide when the passenger jjeepney he was
driving ran over Michael Dayata. Witness testimony allege that Gaid was not driving in violation of law
and that the Dayata hastily ran after the jeep when it failed to stop after he flagged it, thereby resulting
to his pinning to the rear of the jeep. Gaid allege that he had not seen anyone flag the jeepney and that
he only felt the jeepney’s left rear tire jolt that caused the vehicle to tilt to the right. The CA exonerated
him of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but ruled that he was negligent based on his failure to
stop to check what caused the sudden jolt, as such he was convicted of simple negligence resulting to
homicide.

Issue: Is petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting to homicide?

Ruling: The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative
events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage
began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended
when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the moment
immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.

During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent, thus, he cannot be held liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the
accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the
moving jeepney to get a ride. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a
vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the
causation of the accident is not the proximatecause of an injury.

The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his
death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had
petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the
injuries he suffered were fatal.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act. Petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove
slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who
came from behind on the left side.

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of
precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest

FILOMENO URBANO vs. CA (G.R. No.

72964 January 7, 1988)
SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY

Subject: Criminal Law- Proximate Cause

Ponente: Justice Hugo Guitierrez, Jr.
Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.

FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means

of cutting grass which caused the flooding of the storage area of the
petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay for the
soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued.
Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the
right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the treatment
of the wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and
tended to his tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the
hospital. Doctors findings showed that he was suffering from tetanus
infection. The next day, Javier died.

RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

homicide. Petitioner raised the case to the SC arguing that the cause
of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.

ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death
of Javier.

RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally

responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is
that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the
death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr.
Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm
and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus

after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into

operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause

ONE WHO INITIATES UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION AGAINST ANOTHER CANNOT CLAIM THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF DEFENSE Virgilio Talampas v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 180219. November 23, 2011 Bersamin, J: FACTS: Virgilio Talampas was accused with the crime
of homicide for the death of Ernesto Matic. It was alleged by the witness Jose Sevillo, that while he,
together with the brothers Ernesto and Eduardo Matic, was repairing a tricycle in front of his house,
Talampas passed by and stopped near them. Talampas then alighted from his bicycle, walked towards
them and brought out a revolver, and fired the same to Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto.
Talampas again fired his gun hitting Ernesto
which caused the latter’s death.
On trial, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that Eduardo was his enemy and not
the victim Ernesto. He claimed that Eduardo had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he was able to parry
the blow. On his version, he claimed that while he and Eduardo was grappling with the wrench, he
noticed that Eduardo had a revolver so he tried to take control of the same, which accidentally fired and
hit Ernesto during the struggle. The RTC found him guilty of the crime of homicide. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Can one who initiates the attack against another interpose self-
defense as a justifying circumstance? HELD: NO, one who initiates the attack against another cannot
interpose self-defense as a justifying circumstance. The elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repeal the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused in defending himself. In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and
the victim. The established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas
who had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been a target of Talampas'
attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack. Neither Eduardo nor Ernesto
had committed any unlawful aggression against Talampas. Therefore, as Talampas was not repelling any
unlawful aggression from the victim, he cannot interpose self-defense as a justifying circumstance

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLLY ADRIANO (G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015)
SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY
Subject: Criminal Law 1- Aberratio Ictus (Accidental Harm)

Ponente: Justice Jose P. Perez

Doctrine: One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is
found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado’, or he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
FACTS: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others, overtook a policecar and
Honda CRV. With intent to killd, treachery, and abuse of superior stregth, willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes,
the driver of CRV, resulting from his instant death.

The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray bullet and eventually die.

Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended up arresting Adriano. RTC found
accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo
Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia
Bulana.

CA affrimed the decision of RTC.

ISSUES: (1) WON Adriano is responsible for the death of Bulanan.

(2) WON treachery can be appreciated in aberratio ictus?

RULING: (1) YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the
commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the
consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, ‘el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado‘,
or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

(2) YES. The accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims,
Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The material
facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine

People vs. Umawid Case Digest G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014
Facts:
On November 26, 2002 at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Ringor was staying with his
two-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor, at the terrace of their house located at
Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Roger Ringor Umawid appeared and started
attacking Vicente with a long bolo (panabas) without any reason. While Vicente was able to
escape Umawid's blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing
her instant death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.

Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five meters away from Vicente's
house where his nephew, Jeffrey Mercado, was sleeping. Awaken by the sudden noise, Jeffrey
went outside only to see his uncle rushing to attack him with his panabas.
Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety. However,
Umawid was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door and the former barge into the house.
Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid's impending
attacks.

Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter's fingers.
Umawid only stopped upon seing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead, leaning on the
wall and blood-stained.

In court, Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to
attest the same. Instead, he presented the testimonies of Dr. Arthur M. Quincina and Dr. Leonor
Andres Juliana to support his claim. Dr. Quincina testifies that he evaluated Umawid's
psychiatric condition in May 2002, February 2003, and on March 2003 and found that the latter
was evident od psychotic symptoms. However, he could not tell with certainty whether Umawid
was psychotic at the time of the commission of the crimes. On the other hand, Dr. Juliana failed
to testify on Umawid's mental stare since she merely referred the latter to another doctor for
further evaluation.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is exempted from criminal liablity due to insanity?

Ruling:
No. Under Article 12 of the RPC:

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liabity - The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused
invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty
because of insanity. The presumption is in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Considering the case, the
evidence must relate to the time immediately before or during the commission of the offense/s
with which one is charged. Also, to support the defense of insanity, it must be shown that the
accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.

In this case, Umawid relied solely on the defense of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to support his
claim of insanity. However, Dr. Quincina only examined Umawid six months before he
committed the crime and three months and four months thereafter. Her findings as she admitted
did not include Umawid's mental disposition immediately before or during the commission of the
crimes. Also, given that Dr. Juliana failed to testify in favor of the accused, Umawid's defense of
insanity remained unsubstiantiated, hence, he was properly adjudged by the RTC and CA as
criminally liable

People vs. Abalos, 258 SCRA 523

By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera
Facts: In the evening of March 20, 1983, while accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police Major
Cecilio Abalos, were having a heated argument, a woman shouted “Police officer, help us!
Somebody’s making trouble here.” The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then appeared at the scene and asked
Major Abalos, “What is it, sir?” The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him.
As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood,
about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle. He
then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind,
hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a
heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with
murder.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the complex crime of direct assault with murder.

Held: No. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under
Article 148 of the RPC. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition,
except that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way
of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the
offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. Appellant
committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was
made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and
the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent
of a person in authority. Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan,
Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the RPC. There is
also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that
is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself
testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his
uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant
conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of
the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there
arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case
constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately
adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by
appellant’s father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he
then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975TH !"!L "# TH !H$L$!!$N%,
plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ANT"N$" T"L$NG y R"&R" an' J"% T"L$NG y R"&R",
defendants-appellants.
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, boarded the Bicol xpress train. While in transit, both pic!ed each
a pair of scissors and started stabbing and butchering their co- passengers, thereby causing several
casualties. They were charged with multiple murder and an attempted murder.
Issue: whether there is a case of complex crime

Held:
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of differentacts. Hence, they
cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under Article 48 of the Reised !enal "ode which
refers to cases where a single act constitutes two or more grae felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other

US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ

G.R No. L-16486 22 March 1921

FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat
consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the deceased, Venancio
Gargantel. During their work, the accused began to abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel
complained, saying that it would be better if he would not insult them. The accused took this as a display
of insubordination, thus, he moved towards Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him.
At the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently
believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its
surface to be seen no more.

As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a consequence of having
thrown himself into the water and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The
Judgment rendered against the accused. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide, the
accused alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or
at most of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel.

HELD:

The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the following doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and
necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery ,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was
placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in
order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured
person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said
attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all
possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the
trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law,
as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel,
and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating
circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed.
( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)
#CriminalLAW Circumstance Ph3 years ago Permalink

G.R. No. L-19069 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968
People of the Philippines
vs Amadeo Peralta

Facts:
February 1958, Peralta among other inmates of New Bilibid Prisons,
conspired and mutually helped one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, armed with deadly weapons, feloniously
killed Jose Carriego, Eugene Barnosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts
of New Bilibid. Aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is
present because the crime was committed while the offenders were
convicted by final judgments.

Upon motion of the fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed
the charge against one of the accused for lack of evidence. After
prosecution of the case, the charge against 6 accused were
dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case against them.
After trial, 5 of the accused were also acquitted, then 1 died.

Issues:
(1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital
penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of
penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that
multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it
overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death
penalties.

Ruling:
The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused
acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade,
up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While
it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the
actual killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they
are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the
act of one is the act of all. It is not indispensable that a co-
conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should know
the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the common
design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the
details of the execution of the crime. All those who in one way or
another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony
previously planned are co-principals. Hence, all of the six accused
are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz —
each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.

Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they

will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of
article 70 will show that there are only two modes of serving two
or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The
first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In
the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal
sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates
simultaneous service.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance

of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the
commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New
Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final
judgments the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its
maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of
article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in a
position, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is
justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows:

Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog,
Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of
three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each
sentenced to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased
victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the
costs.

People vs. Anticamara and Calaguas (Case Digest)

People vs. Anticamara and Calaguas (Case Digest)
GR No. 178771, June 08, 2011
Facts:

That on or about the 7th day of May 2002, more or less 3:00 o'clock in the early morning, at the
Estrella Compound, Brgy. Carmen East, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, the above-
named accused, who are private persons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
armed with firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Sulpacio Abad and
AAA, both employees of the Estrellas, thereby depriving them of their liberty, all against their will for a
period of twenty-seven (27) days.

That in the course of the kidnapping, Sulpacio Abad was killed and buried in Brgy. Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan and AAA was raped for several times by her abductors.

Issue:

Whether or not there is special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape in
the instant case spite of the fact that he (Lando Calaguas) had no participation in the commission of the
(two) sexual abuses against the victim?

Held:

Lando Calaguas (one of the accused-appellant) is also liable for special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. Since conspiracy is established between the other
accused and Lando in the commission of kidnapping, the latter is responsible for the rape committed by
former since there is no showing that Lando endeavored to prevent his companion from raping AAA.

G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010

QUIDET

VS.

PEOPLE

FACTS

Quidet and the other two accused were charged with homicide for the death of a victim and frustrated
homicide for the stab wounds sustained by another victim. The RTC convicted all of them for the said
offense. Of the three accused, only Quidet appealed. The CA confirmed the decision of RTC but with
modification. The CA convicted them for attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE

Whether or not the favorable appeal of Quidet will extend to the other two accused who did not appeal.

HELD
YES. Although they did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate courts judgment is
favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

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ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148965
February 26, 2002

FACTS:

In connection with the impeachment proceedings against President Joseph Estrada, five criminal
complaints were filed against him, the members of his family, his associates, friends, and conspirators in
the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent Ombudsman found probable cause warranting the filing with
the Sandiganbayan of several criminal information against the former President and the other
respondents. One of the information filed was for the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080 and among the
respondents was petitioner Jinggoy.

Petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: 1) no probable cause exists to put him on
trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling
and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. 7080; and 2) he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Respondent Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of plunder is proper (YES)

HELD:

1) Contrary to petitioner's contention, he was not charged with the commission of only one act,
considering the phrase "on several instances" stated in the Amended Information.

Petitioner's contention that R.A. 7080 does not apply to him is principally based on the premise that the
amended information charged him with only one act or offense which cannot constitute plunder.
However, examination of the information will show that it is divided into 3 parts: 1) first paragraph
charges President Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jinggoy Estrada; 2) second
paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder;
and 3) the following four sub-paragraphs describe in detail the predicate acts constitute of the crime of
plunder and state the names of the accused who committed each act.

The allegation in the information is that petitioner Jinggoy received or collected money from illegal
gambling "on several instances", meaning he committed the predicate act in series. Thus, contrary to
petitioner's contention, it cannot be said that he was charged with the commission of only one act,
considering the phrase "several instances".

It was held in Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (2001) that the words "combination" or "series" are taken in
their popular, not technical, meaning. "Series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances".
"Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law.
"Combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said
items.

2) If conspiracy is proven, the penalty of the petitioner shall be the same as former President Estrada.

In the crime of plundering, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the
different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.

In American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves
two structures:

1) "Wheel or circle conspiracy," in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually
with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and

2) "Chain conspiracy," usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there
is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.

The case at bar appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the
spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e. the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

Under Philippine jurisdiction, conspiracy may be alleged as a mode of committing a crime or as

constitutive of the crime itself.

When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be
set forth in the complaint or information.

When conspiracy is charged as a mode of committing a crime, as in the case at bar, there is less necessity
of reciting its particularities because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offence charged. The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy
and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.
The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts
of others, for the act of one is the act of all.

In the case at bar, the information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the crime of
plunder. It used the words "in connivance/ conspiracy with his co-accused." These words are sufficient to
allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.