G.R. No.
96132 June 26, 1992 This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in
Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate
Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly
illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public
respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that
while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources
International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor
Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which
Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient
funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor
was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased,
amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey
Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the
warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in
question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall
deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful
performance of its obligations.
Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS
Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the
option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to
petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested
through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2)
checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the
subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by
Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks
were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and
006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September
28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one
who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised
to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were
returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was
convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P.
Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693,
Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks.
(Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is
intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the
petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit"
equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of
Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing
scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at
the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out"
made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would
have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the
termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the
warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen
into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were
pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to
economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not
be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not
his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say
the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation
officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were
turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her
instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence,
she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the
"warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry
and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this
case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as
this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who
likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not
realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement
when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of
the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the
special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted
with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund
of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue
that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to
Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use,
is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of
the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness
transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who
are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function
of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished
in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in
time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that
moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This
disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means
of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's
view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the
objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value"
as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose
operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the
open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty
deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had
been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement — by the terms of which the warranty
deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee — and that as the lessor L.S.
Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he
assumed that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true,
do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the four checks
were originally issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there
may be a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the
element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on account or for value — it
is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must have been drawn
and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the
obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at
bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that
there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not
adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the
warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same
court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the
crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already
been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction,
besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back
the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in
her possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty
deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a
special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases
ofmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent
not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public
policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions
for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms
"warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the
alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they
are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p.
1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose: —
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment
and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to
intrust to the care of another.
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be
withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so
deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits
payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable
on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner
never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a
matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which
was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 245471that
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch
54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections,
an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging
Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with
violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia,
Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight
(6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159)
precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418,
008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes
as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass
with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator
Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of
Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but
applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is
SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of
suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to
commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision,
thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with modification,
increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the
following as errors of the appellate court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL
SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO
BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE]
TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL
BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE
REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS
THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR
INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to
reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election
law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are
forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. 9Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses,
after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted
and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it
could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However,
intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently
immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof
were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the
Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the
results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the
number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to
reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos,
Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused
Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the
use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were handed
to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each
Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of
Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera added
all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected was
handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the
column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each
precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in
SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at
the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand
total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921,
or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also
evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of
1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though
it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention
to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how
the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of
6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure
accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of
criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant,
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a
candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court
has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of
canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized. 22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921
votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy
may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as
reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to
remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from
one document to another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six
months is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill,
poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which
caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani
Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to
weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented
by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court
rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the
accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of murder
for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of
Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held
liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of
P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following
errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT
ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME
EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO
GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief,
p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to
run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta
fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a
ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading
a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions
arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the
deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling
him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of
gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former.
Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline.
Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some
people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to
extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police
officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were
responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as
the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers
brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for
interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two
accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the
reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can
of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused
Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that
he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note
is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the
commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging
that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting
authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the
commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for
the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without
Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which
remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and
Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses
to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the
police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the
deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be
adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact
there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one
Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and
setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They
were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would
be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence
wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression
of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as
to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the
latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his
absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an
unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and
state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked
to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the
accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson
testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to
testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on
the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's
testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he
(Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he
noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when you saw
Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that
incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned later you had
a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact,
you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to know that
Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to ask him not
to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour
gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that is why you
prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of
gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour gasoline when
he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of pouring
gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion
stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay
get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the
process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so;
and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused
Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal
responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is
individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs.
Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken
the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the
body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this
flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to
exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that
may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree
with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence
defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468,
470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible
for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except
through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his
conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that
gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely
helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the
deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was
merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack
must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense CARPIO, J.:
which the offended party might make.
The Case
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of
the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-
setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the
does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from
least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible
therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by
The Facts
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were
temporary release in both cases.
stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8)
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral
of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner
damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
accused-appellants. cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
SO ORDERED. arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, The Ruling of the Trial Court
Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
DECISION petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without
reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the
line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal
before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment
of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged
in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s
standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief
in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his
bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule
125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison
or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary
question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the
RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death
for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section
21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce
the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner
sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with
the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was
released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed
that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366
and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than
that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person
shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties
attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified
penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial
courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple
imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," 16 unlike
willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each
crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range
all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for
criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence
obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement
in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by
dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case
against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was
brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the
second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in
barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons,
the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion
the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court
in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising
from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it.
At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite
his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from
the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona.
We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People
vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons,
the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined
causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969
(page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of
double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No.
05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set
aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages
caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration,
found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we
quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints
were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage
to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles
involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted.
The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to
the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless
imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for
damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash.
On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of
police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in
the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law,
for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After
the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government
to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a
motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said
through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether
the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the
first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double
jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of
the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of
the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling,
upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which
are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed
in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems
from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article
48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device
allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature
crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only
serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However,
the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either
models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and
property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be
penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of
double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge
with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing
the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned
(and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now
exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there
will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the
resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of
the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing
each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365,
in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for
the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a
quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon
and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional
felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the
resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make
laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365.
It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is
why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does
not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because
the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less
grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
[Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in
this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been
previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of
the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article
365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be
no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in
the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the of the deceased Simeon
Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by
the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and
the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court,
notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to
him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental
derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined by medical
experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the
board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio
Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages
13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single moment
during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation was
determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked up the day
after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a
delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C. Guillen.
He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware of the nature
of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the
motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual with a
sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he
executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt acts. This
is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la Clementina Cigar
Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers,
and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being
provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before
when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him
deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially in
relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an
individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of
one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that
Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he committed on the date in
question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor
General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the
prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present criminal
case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in
1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic. According to
Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and
fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was
aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country,
sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to
assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the
opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the
Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President Roxas,
accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen
prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose and delivered his
speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the advantages to be gained by
the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights
granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said
firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an
American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He
had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañan, or
following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon)
where the President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided to
carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to prepare for
him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the preceding
afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity"
meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the
contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all by
myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience,
to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare, I would
not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons, and
there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had
deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them; he even went
to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he should not
continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen million
souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the consequences
of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I have only
displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew,
was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said
Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag
which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located
close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which
he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President
when the latter had just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was
about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without losing his
presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space
where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and, covering the President
with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground
and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion
ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had
seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on the following day as the result of mortal
wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was
standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a
barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of
the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen
offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some
detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under
arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were
investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom
Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen
for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the
explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the
occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters
and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the object which
exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the
same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to
his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and marked Exhibit B,
which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the
other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which
contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who
investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are
satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the witness stand during the
trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly
committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in
determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in considering the concurrence
of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the commission
of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows
beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand
grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well
that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it
to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from
being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to
carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of
transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose
was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people
around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the
President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to
the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In other word, although it
was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing
them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious
physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he
should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total
of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in
accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article
4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be
qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene;
where such intention exists, the act should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may
not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's
Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do
an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case
before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a throwing
highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely:
(1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which
President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case
of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant
intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put
up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying
circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the account when the person whom the
defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand
grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by over
acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other
persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation of the
provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others
the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the
execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral
campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the
hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the
commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the
single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But we do not deem it
necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its
maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art.
248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it
upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do
so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court
may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 123485 August 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and
EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO TIMOTEO
BERONGA, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, binding
and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Alibi, on the other hand, cannot prevail over positive
identification by credible witnesses. Furthermore, alleged violations of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the trial court is based
on the evidence obtained during such investigation.
The Case
These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this appeal from the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 Decision 2dated September 28, 1995, convicting Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of
murder and frustrated murder. The convictions arose from a shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in
Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in the killing of two persons and the wounding of three others, who were
all riding in two vehicles which were allegedly ambushed by appellants.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juanito M. Gabiana
Sr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, 3 five amended Informations
charging four "John Does," who were later identified as Rolusape Sabalones, Artemio Timoteo Beronga,
Teodulo Alegarbes and Eufemio Cabanero, with two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated
murder. The Informations are quoted hereunder.
1) Crim Case No. CBU-9257 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985, at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot GLENN TIEMPO, who was riding [i]n a jeep
and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby
causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
2) Criminal Case No. 9258 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did [then] and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO NARDO, who was riding on a
jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby
causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
3) Crim Case No. CBU-9259 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot REY BOLO who was riding in a car and who gave no
provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries to wit:
laceration, mouth due to gunshot wound, gunshot wound (L) shoulder penetrating (L) chest; gunshot
wound (R) hand (palm); open fracture (L) clavicle (L) scapula; contusion (L) lung;
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
4) Criminal Case No. 9260 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot ROGELIO PRESORES, who was riding in a
car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
gunshot wound, thru and thru right chest
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
5) Criminal Case No. 9261 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto Village,
Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot NELSON TIEMPO, who was riding in a car
and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
Gunshot wound neck penetrating wound perforating trachea (cricoid) thereby performing all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Of the four indictees in the five Informations, Teodulo Alegarbes and Artemio Timoteo Beronga were
the first to be arraigned. Upon the arrest of the two, the Informations were amended by the public
prosecutor, with the conformity of the defense counsel, by substituting the names of the two accused
for the "John Does" appearing in the original Informations. When arraigned, said accused, assisted by
their respective lawyers, pleaded not guilty to the five Informations.
Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases against him were dismissed. Accused Cabanero
remained at large. Sabalones, on the other hand, was eventually arrested. Subsequently, he jumped
bail but was recaptured in 1988 and thereafter pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.
The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were jointly tried. Thereafter, the lower court found them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES and (ARTEMIO)
TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals:
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8) months
and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1) day,
of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased, Glenn Tiempo, the sum of
P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8) months
and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1) day,
of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased, Alfredo Nardo, the sum of
P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in relation to
Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months of [re]clusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey Bolo, the sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in relation to
Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight months of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, the sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 in relation to
Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo, the sum of P20,000.00; and
To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their preventive imprisonment shall be credited to each
accused in full.
SO ORDERED. 4
Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the CA affirmed their conviction
but sentenced them to reclusion perpetua for the murders they were found guilty of. Accordingly, the
appellate court, without entering judgment, certified the case to the Supreme Court in accordance with
Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Rolusa[p]e Sabalones and
Artemio Timoteo Beronga for murder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258, and [f]rustrated
[m]urder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260, and CBU-9261 is hereby AFFIRMED; however, the
penalties in the [f]rustrated [m]urder and [m]urder cases are hereby MODIFIED, such that both
accused-appellants are each sentenced to imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS of [p]rision [m]ayormedium
as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of [r]eclusion [t]emporalmedium as
maximum in each of the three [f]rustrated [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260 and
CBU-9261); and are each sentenced to [r]eclusion [p]erpetua in each of the two [m]urder cases (Crim.
Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258). The indemnity to the victim in each [f]rustrated [m]urder case
shall remain. In conformity with Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, however, this Court refrains
from entering judgment, and hereby certifies the case and orders that the entire record hereof be
elevated to the Supreme Court for review. 5
After the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court, we required appellants to file supplemental
briefs. Appellants failed to comply within the prescribed period and were deemed to have waived their
right to do so. 6Thus, in resolving this case, this Court will address primarily the arguments raised by the
appellants in their Brief before the Court of Appeals, which assailed the RTC Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general 7 quoted the following factual findings of the trial court:
Edwin Santos, a resident of Mambaling, Cebu City stated that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, he was at the residence of Inday Presores, sister of Rogelio Presores, located at Rizal Ave.,
Cebu City to attend a wedding. He stayed until 9:00 o'clock in the evening and proceeded to the house
of Maj. Tiempo at Basak, Mambaling, Cebu City where a small gathering was also taking place. (pp. 3-6,
tsn, April 7, 1987)
Arriving thereat, he saw Nelson and Glenn Tiempo as well as Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros, Junior
Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. (p. 7, ibid.)
At about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Stephen Lim, who was also at the party, called their group and
requested them to push his car. When the engine started, the former asked them to drive his car home.
(pp. 7-11, ibid.)
Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the wheel, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros and Junior
Villoria, they drove to the residence of Stephen Lim at Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. (p.
12, ibid.)
Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also went with them riding in an owner-type jeep, driven by
the latter, in order to bring back the group [as] soon as the car of Mr. Lim was parked in his home. (p.
21, ibid.)
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. When they arrived at
the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. He looked at the
direction where the gunfire came, and saw [the] persons [who] fired at the jeep. He identified accused,
Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga as the persons who fired at the vehicle.
Except for Teodulo Alegarbes, who was naked from [the] waist up, the gunmen wore clothes. (pp. 21-
23; 13-16; 33, ibid.)
After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the ear they were riding[,] hitting Nelson Tiempo on the
throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite the injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo was able to
maneuver the car back to their residence. (pp. 17-19, ibid.)
He immediately informed Maj. Tiempo about the incident and the lat[t]er brought the victims to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital. (p. 20, ibid.)
Rogelio Presores corroborated in substance the testimony of Edwin Santos, being one of those who
were in the car driven by Nelson Tiempo to the residence of Stephen Lim. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Aug. 14, 1987)
He further testified that when the jeep driven by Alfredo Nardo with Rey Bolo and Glenn Tiempo as
passengers arrived at the front gate of Lim's residence and while their car was 3 meters from the rear
end of the jeep, there was a volley of gunfire. He glanced at the direction of the gunfire and saw the
jeep being fired at by four persons, who were standing behind a concrete wall, 42 inches in height, and
armed with long firearms. Thenceforth, he saw Alfredo Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the
ground. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
He recognized accused, Rolusape Sabalones, as one of those who fired at the jeep. He also identified in
Court accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Timoteo Beronga and another person, whom he recognized only
through his facial appearance. (pp. 7-8, ibid.)
When the shots were directed [at] their car[,] they were able to bend their heads low. When the firing
stopped, he directed Nelson Tiempo to back out from the place. As the latter was maneuvering the car,
the shooting continued and he was hit in the breast while Nelson Tiempo, in the neck, and the
windshield of the vehicle was shattered. (p. 10, ibid.)
Arriving at the house of Maj. Tiempo, they were brought to Cebu Doctor's Hospital. He and Nelson
Tiempo were operated on. He had incurred hospital expenses in the sum of P5,412.69, (Exh. "I", "K").
(pp. 11-12, ibid.)
Ladislao Diola, Jr., [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit 7 stationed at
Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City remembered having performed a post-mortem examination on the
dead body of Glenn Tiempo on June 2, 1985 at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Cebu City. (p. 7, tsn,
Nov. 11, 1987)
He issued the necessary Death Certificate, (Exh. "D") and Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F") and indicated
therein that the victim's cause of death was "[c]ardio respiratory arrest due to [s]hock and
[h]emorrhage [s]econdary to [g]unshot wounds to the trunk." (p. 8, ibid.)
The victim sustained gunshot wounds in the right chest and left lumbar area. (pp. 10-11, ibid.)
He explained that in gunshot wound no. 1, the wound entrance[,] which [was] characterized by
invaginated edges and contusion collar[,] was located in the right chest and the bullet went up to the
left clavicle hitting a bone which incompletely fractured it causing the navigation of the bullet to the left
and to the anterior side of the body. He recovered a slug, (Exh. "G") below the muscles of the left
clavicle. (p. 21, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the assailant could have been [o]n the right side of the victim or in
front of the victim but [o]n a lower level than the latter.
In both gunshot wounds, he did not find any powder burns which would indicate that the muzzle of the
gun was beyond a distance of 12 inches from the target. (p. 15, ibid.)
At the time he conducted the autopsy, he noted that rigor mortis in its early stage had already set in
which denote[s] that death had occurred 5 to 6 hours earlier. (pp. 34-5, ibid.)
Maj. Juan Tiempo, father of the victims, Glenn and Nelson Tiempo, testified that when he learned
about the incident in question, he immediately summoned military soldiers and together they
proceeded to the scene. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 12, 1988)
Arriving thereat, he saw the lifeless body of his son, Glenn. He immediately carried him in his arms and
rushed him to the hospital but the victim was pronounced Dead on Arrival. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
They buried his son, who was then barely 14 years old, at Cebu Memorial Park and had incurred funeral
expenses (Exhs. "K", "L", "O"). (pp. 7-8, ibid.)
His other son, Nelson, then 21 years old and a graduate of [m]edical [t]echology, was admitted at the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital for gunshot wound in the neck. The latter survived but could hardly talk as a
result of the injuries he sustained. He had incurred medical and hospitalization expenses in the sum of
P21,594.22, (Exh. "H"), (pp. 8-10, ibid.)
He had also incurred expenses in connection with the hospitalization of the injured victims, Rogelio
Presores and Rey Bolo in the amount[s] of P5,412.69, (exh. "I") and P9,431.10, (Exh. "J"), respectively.
(p. 11, ibid.)
He further stated that he [was] familiar the accused, Roling Sabalones, because the latter had a criminal
record in their office in connection with the kidnapping of a certain Zabate and Macaraya. (p. 16, ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC/INP, Cebu Metrodiscom, had conducted an
autopsy on the dead body of Alfredo Nardo, who sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the lower lip
and left intraclavicular region, upon the request of the [c]hief of the Homicide Section of Cebu
Metrodiscom. He issued the victim's Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F:") and Death Certificate, (Exh. "G"). (pp.
5-8, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He stated that the wound of entrance in gunshot wound no. 1 was located in the lower lip, more or
less[,] on the left side making an exit in the left mandibular region. (pp. 9-11, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 6-8,
tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
In gunshot wound no. 2, the wound of entrance was in the left intraclavicular region exiting at the back
as reflected in the sketch, (Exh. "F-2"). This wound was fatal and [could] almost cause an instantaneous
death considering that the bullet penetrated the thoracic cavity, lacerating the lungs and perforating
the heart before making an exit. (pp. 11-13, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 13-15, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He found no tattooing around the wound of entrance in both gunshot wounds. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov. 29,
1988)
He prepared and issued th[e] Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F") and Death Certificate, (Exh. "G") of Alfredo
Nardo who was identified to him by the latter's daughter, Anita Nardo. (pp. 26-27, ibid.)
Rey Bolo, one of the victims, testified that when the jeep he was riding [in] together with Glenn Tiempo
and Alfredo Nardo, reached the gate of the residence of Stephen Lim, they were suddenly fired upon.
(pp. 5-8, tsn, March 6, 1989)
He was hit in the right palm and left cheek. He jumped out of the vehicle and ran towards the car which
was behind them but he was again shot at [,] [and hit] in the left scapular region. He was still able to
reach the road despite the injuries he sustained and tried to ask help from the people who were in the
vicinity but nobody dared to help him, [they] simply disappeared from the scene, instead: (pp. 8-
9, ibid.)
He took a passenger jeepney to the city and had himself treated at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital, and
incurred medical expenses in the sum of P9,000.00. (p. 9, ibid.)
He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. "N") by his attending physician.
Dr. Miguel Mancao, a [p]hysician-[s]urgeon, recalled having attended [to] the victims, Nelson Tiempo,
Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital on June 2, 1985. (pp. 7-8, 11, 14, tsn, May
30, 1989)
Nelson Tiempo sustained gunshot wound[s] in the neck and in the right chest but the bullet did not
penetrate the chest cavity but only the left axilla. He was not able to recover any slugs because the
same disintegrated while the other was thru and thru. The wound could have proved fatal but the
victim miraculously survived. As a consequence of the injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo permanently
lost his voice because his trachea was shattered. His only chance of recovery is by coaching and speech
therapy. He issued his Medical Certificate. (Exh. "O"). (pp. 8-11, ibid.)
With regard to the patient, Rey Bolo, the latter suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the left shoulder
penetrating the chest and fracturing the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ribs in the process, in the right hand
fracturing the proximal right thumb and in the mouth lacerating its soft tissues, per Medical Certificate,
(Exh. "N") which he issued. (pp. 11-16, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the gunman could have been in front of the victim, when gunshot
would no. 1 was inflicted. (p. 30, ibid.)
With respect to the patient, Rogelio Presores, the latter suffered [a] gunshot wound in the chest with
the wound of entrance in the right anterior chest exiting at the back which was slightly lower than the
wound of entrance. He issued the victim's Medical Certificate, (Exh. "M"). (pp. 34-35, ibid.)
Based on the location of the wound, the gunman could have been in front of the victim but [o]n a
slightly higher elevation than the latter. (pp. 35-36, ibid.) 8
Version of the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi. Their version of the facts is summarized by the trial court9 thus:
. . . Timoteo Beronga, a cristo or bet caller in the cockpit, testified that in the afternoon of June 1, 1985,
he was in the Talisay Sports Complex located at Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu to attend a cock-derby.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he was fetched by his wife and they left taking a taxicab going to
their residence in Lapulapu City. After passing by the market place, they took a tricycle and arrived
home at 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
After taking his supper with his family, he went home to sleep at 10:30 in the evening. The following
morning, after preparing breakfast, he went back to sleep until 11:00 in the morning.
On February 24, 1987, while he was playing mahjong at the corner of R.R. Landon and D. Jakosalem
Sts., Cebu City, complainant, Maj. Juan Tiempo with some companions, arrived and after knowing that
he [was] "Timmy," [which was] his nickname, the former immediately held him by the neck.
He ran away but the latter chased him and kicked the door of the house where he hid. He was able to
escape through the back door and took refuge in Mandaue at the residence of Nito Seno, a driver of
Gen. Emilio Narcissi. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-17, October 19, 1989)
On February 27, 1987, upon the advi[c]e of his friend, they approached Gen. Narcissi and informed him
of the incident. The latter brought him to the Provincial Command Headquarters in Lahug, Cebu City to
confront Maj. Juan Tiempo.
After several days, he was brought by Maj. Tiempo to the PC Headquarter[s] in Jones Ave., Cebu City
where he was provided with a lawyer to defend him but he was instructed that he should assent to
whatever his lawyer would ask of him.
He was introduced to Atty. Marcelo Guinto, his lawyer, who made him sign an Affidavit, (Exh. "U") the
contents of which, co[u]ched in the dialect, were read to him.
He also testified that before he was detained at the CPDRC, complainant brought him inside the shop of
a certain Den Ong, where he was again mauled after he denied having any knowledge of the
whereabouts of Roling Sabalones and the carbine.
At the instance of Col. Medija, he was physically examined at the Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu City
and was issued a [M]edical Certificate. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-36, Jan. 18, 1990).
Justiniano Cuizon, [a]ccount [o]fficer of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) South Extension Office,
who is in charge of the billing, disconnection and reconnection of electric current, testified that based
on the entries in their logbook, (Exh. "3") made by their checker, Remigio Villaver, the electrical supply
at the Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu, particularly the Mansueto Homeowners covered
by Account No. 465-293000-0, (Exh. "4-B") was disconnected on January 10, 1985, (Exh. "3-A") for non-
payment of electric bills from March 1984 to January 1985 and was reconnected only on June 17, 1985
(Exh. "4", "4-A"). (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 22-27, Jan. 31, 1990).
Remigio Villaver, a checker of VECO, whose area of responsibility cover[ed] the towns of Talisay and
San Fernando, Cebu had kept the record of disconnection of electrical supply of Mansueto Subdivision
in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu and the same showed that on January 10, 1985, (Exh. "3-A"), a service order
was issued by their office to the Mansueto Homeowners for the permanent disconnection of their
electric lights due to non-payment of their electric bills from March 1984 until January 1985. The actual
disconnection took place on December 29, 1984.
Witness Fredo Canete made efforts to corroborate their testimony. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-5, Apr. 20,
1990).
Vicente Cabanero, a resident of Mansueto Compound in Talisay, Cebu since 1957 until the present,
remembered that on June 1, 1985, between 10:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard a
burst of gunfire about 15 to 20 armslength [sic] from his residence.
He did not bother to verify because he was scared since the whole place was in total darkness. (Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 18-23, Feb. 22, 1990).
Marilyn Boc, another witness for the accused, stated that on the date and time of the incident in
question, while she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones, younger brother of Roling Sabalones, who
died on May 26, 1985, a sudden burst of gunfire occurred more or less 60 meters away.
Frightened, she went inside a room to hide and saw accused, Roling Sabalones, sound asleep.
She came to know accused, Timoteo Beronga, only during one of the hearings of this case and during
the entire period that the body of the late Junior Sabalones [lay] in state at his residence, she never saw
said accused.
She was requested to testify in this case by Thelma Beronga, wife of Timoteo Beronga. (Tsn-Abangan,
pp. 9-13, February 28, 1990).
Dr. Daniel Medina, while then the [r]esident [p]hysician of Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu City had
treated the patient, Timoteo Beronga on March 18, 1987.
Upon examination, he found out that the patient sustained linear abrasion, linear laceration and
hematoma in the different parts of the body. Except for the linear laceration which he believed to have
been inflicted two or three days prior to [the] date of examination, all the other injuries were already
healed indicating that the same were inflicted 10 to 12 days earlier.
He issued the corresponding Medical Certificate (Exh. "2") to the patient. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 9-13, May
21, 1990).
Atty. Jesus Pono, counsel for accused Beronga, mounted the witness stand and averred that he [was] a
resident of Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. As shown in the pictures, (Exhs. "3", "4" & "5"
with submarkings) his house is enclosed by a concrete fence about 5 feet 6 inches tall. It is situated 6
meters from the residence of accused, Roling Sabalones, which was then being rented by Stephen Lim.
Outside the fence [are] shrubs and at the left side is a lamp post provided with 200 watts fluorescent
bulb.
On June 1, 1985 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he saw Roling Sabalones, whom he personally
[knew] because they used to be neighbors in Talisay, Cebu, at the wake of his brother, Federico
Sabalones, Jr. or Junior Sabalones, as mentioned repeatedly hereabout. They even had a talk and he
noticed accused to be physically indisposed being gravely affected by the loss of his only brother, who
met a violent death in the hands of an unknown hitman on May 26,1985.
He went home after he saw accused [lie] down on a bamboo bench to rest.
At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was awakened by a rapid burst of gunfire which emanated near his
house. He did not attempt to go down or look outside. He [was] in no position to tell whether or not
the street light was lighted.
When he verified the following morning, he noticed bloodstains on the ground as well as inside the
jeep which was parked 2 to 3 meters from his fence and 50 to 70 meters from the house where Junior
Sabalones [lay] in state. He observed that the jeep was riddled with bullets and its windshield
shattered. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 3-16, June 6, 1990).
He admitted that he used to be a counsel of accused, Roling Sabalones, in several cases, among which
involved the death of a certain Garces and Macaraya, which cases were however, dismissed by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 2-3, June 13, 1990).
Doroteo Ejares, a relative of accused, testified that when he attended the wake of Junior Sabalones on
June 1, 1985 at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he saw accused lying on a bamboo bench in the yard of the
house of the deceased.
At past 10:00 o'clock in the evening, accused excused himself as he was not feeling well and entered a
room to rest while he remained by the door and slept.
At almost 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was awakened by a burst of gunfire which took place more or less
20 meters away and saw the people scamper[ing] for safety. He hid inside the room where accused was
sleeping and peeped thru the door. Not long after, Marilyn Boc entered and in a low voice talked about
the incident.
They decided to wake up the accused to inform him of what was happening, but the latter merely
opened his eyes and realizing that accused was too weak, they allowed him to go back to sleep.
When he went home at past 5:00 o'clock in the morning of June 2, 1985, he saw a jeep outside of the
compound. He did not bother to investigate or inquire about the incident as he was in a hurry to go
home and prepare for the burial of Junior Sabalones.
He was requested to testify in this case by his aunt and mother of accused Rolusape Sabalones. (Tsn-
Tumarao, pp. 10-15, June 13, 1990).
Russo Sabalones, uncle of accused, Sabalones, averred that the latter was once, one of his undercover
agents while he was then the [c]hief of the Intelligence Service of the PC from 1966 until 1968.
As part of their intelligence tradition, an undercover agent is not allowed to carry his real name. In the
case of his nephew and accused, Rolusape Sabalones, the latter chose the name "Paciano Laput" which
name was recorded in their code of names.
When he retired in 1968, the accused ceased to be an agent and . . . likewise ceased to have the
authority to use the name Paciano Laput. (Tsn-Abangan, p. 12, July 23, 1990).
Alfonso Allere, a distant relative of the accused, remembered having received a call from Roling
Sabalones, one morning after the burial of the latter's brother, asking for his advise because of the
threats [to] his life which he received thru telephone from the group of Nabing Velez and the group of
the military.
After he had advised accused to lie low, he had not heard of him, since then.
Godofredo Mainegro of the Public Assistance and Complaint Action Office of the Regional Unified
Command 7, received a complaint from one Inocencia Sabalones on March 13, 1986.
He recorded the complaint in their Complaint Sheet, (Exh. "6") and let complainant affix her signature.
After the document was subscribed and sworn to before him, (Exh. "6-C"), he indorsed it to their
[c]ommanding [o]fficer, Apolinario Castano. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-10, July 24, 1990).
Ret. Col. Apolinario Castano, recalled that while he was then with the Regional Unified Command 7, his
niece, Racquel Sabalones together with her husband Roling Sabalones, came to him for advi[c]e
because the latter was afraid of his life brought about by the rampant killings of which his brother and
the son of Maj. Tiempo were victims.
Considering that accused's problem matter, they approached Gen. Ecarma, the then [c]ommander of
the PC/INP, Recom 7, and the latter referred them to his [c]hief of [s]taff, Col. Roger Denia, who
informed them that there was no case filed against the accused. Nevertheless, the latter was advised to
be careful and consult a lawyer.
Inocencia Sabalones, mother of accused, Roling Sabalones, narrated that on March 12, 1986 at past
10:00 o'clock in the evening, she was roused from sleep by a shout of a man demanding for Roling
Sabalones.
Upon hearing the name of her son, she immediately stood up and peeped through the door of her
store and saw men in fatigue uniforms carrying long firearms. Thenceforth, these men boarded a
vehicle and left.
On the following morning, she was again awakened by the persistent shouts and pushing of the gate.
When she verified, the man who introduced himself to her as Maj. Tiempo, ordered her to open the
gate. Once opened, the men of Maj. Tiempo entered the house and proceeded to search for Roling
Sabalones, whom Maj. Tiempo suspected to have killed his son and shot another to near death. When
she demanded for a search warrant, she was only shown a piece of paper but was not given the chance
to read its contents.
Racquel Sabalones, wife of accused, Rolusape Sabalones, maintained that on June 1, 1985 at 1.00
o'clock in the afternoon, she was at the wake of her brother-in-law, Junior Sabalones, at his residence
in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, together with her 3 daughters as well as Marlyn
Sabarita, Rose Lapasaran and Gloria Mondejar, left the place in order to sleep in an unoccupied
apartment situated 30 meters away from the house where her deceased, brother-in-law, Junior, was
lying in state, as shown in the Sketch, (Exh. "7" and submarkings) prepared by her. They brought with
them a flashlight because the whole place was in total darkness.
As they were about to enter the gate leading to her apartment she noticed a sedan car coming towards
them. She waited for the car to come nearer as she thought that the same belong[ed] to her friend, but
the vehicle instead stopped at the corner of the road, (Exh. "7-F") and then proceeded to the end
portion of Mansueto Compound, (Exh. "7-G"). As it moved slowly towards the highway, she rushed
inside the apartment.
Few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire outside their gate. She immediately gathered her
children and instructed Marlyn Sabarita to use the phone situated at the third door apartment and call
the police.
After the lull of gunfire, she went to the terrace and saw people in civilian and in fatigue uniforms with
firearms, gathered around the place. One of these men even asked her about the whereabouts of her
husband, whom she left sleeping in the house of the deceased.
At 8:30 in the morning of June 2, 1985, during the burial of Junior Sabalones, they were informed by
Pedro Cabanero that Roling Sabalones was a suspect for the death of Nabing Velez and the son of Maj.
Tiempo.
She believed that the reason why her husband was implicated in the killing of Nabing Velez was
because of the slapping incident involving her father-in-law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing Velez
which took place prior to the death of Junior Sabalones.
After the funeral, she began to receive mysterious calls at their residence in Sikatuna St., Cebu City
where they began staying since 1978. She also noticed cars with tinted windows strangely parked in
front of their residence.
Frightened and cowed, they decided to seek the advice of Col. Apolinario Castano, who after relating to
him their fears, advised her husband to lie low and to consult a lawyer.
To allay their apprehension, accused, Roling Sabalones, left Cebu City for Iligan, Manila and other cities
to avoid those who were after him. When she learned about the threat made by Maj. Tiempo on her
husband, she forewarned the latter not to return to Cebu.
Marlyn Sabarita, an illegitimate daughter of Rolusape Sabalones, stated that in the night in question,
she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones and saw her Papa Roling, the herein accused, lying on the lawn
of the house of the deceased.
She was already in the apartment with her Mama Racquel when she heard a burst of gunfire. Upon
instructions of the latter, she went out to call the police thru the phone located [in] the third apartment
occupied by a certain Jet. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 3-15, Oct. 15, 1990).
Edward Gutang, [a]sst. lay-out [e]ditor and [a]sst. [s]ports [e]ditor of Sun-Star Daily, while then a
military and police reporter had covered the shooting incident which took place on June 1, 1985 at the
Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
At past 1:00 o'clock dawn, together with their newspaper photographer, Almario Bitang, they went to
the crime scene boarding the vehicle of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. Arriving thereat, they
decided not to proceed inside the compound because of fear. The place was then incomplete darkness.
Upon being informed that the victims were brought to Cebu City Medical Center, they rushed to the
place and met Maj. Tiempo hugging the dead body of his 14-year old son. His photographer took a
picture of that pathetic scene. (Exh. "8-B").
Samson Sabalones, a retired [a]mbassador and uncle of Rolusape Sabalones, posted a bail bond for
his nephew with Eastern Insurance Company, when a warrant for his arrest was issued by the
Municipal Court, on March 12, 1986 because he was bothered by the fact that the latter was being
unreasonably hunted by several groups. He even advised the accused to appear in [c]ourt to clarify
the nature of the case filed against him.
Virgincita Pajigal, a resident of Butuan City, met accused, Rolusape Sabalones, who introduced
himself to her as "Paciano Laput" nicknamed, Ondo, in a massage clinic where she was working.
For less than a year, they lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage because
according to her the accused was married but separated from his wife, whose name was never
mentioned to her. For such a short span of time being together, her love for the accused developed
to the extent that whatever happen[ed] to him, she [would] always be there to defend him.
With the help of Maj. delos Santos, who advised her to always stay close [to] the accused, she was
able to board the same vessel. She saw the latter clad in green T-shirt, (Exh. "14") and pants,
handcuffed and guarded.
Reaching Cebu City, they took a taxicab and as the vehicle went around the city, she was instructed
by Maj. Tiempo to place the towel, (Exh. "15") which she found inside her bag, on the head of the
accused. They stopped at the Reclamation Area and Maj. Tiempo pulled them out of the vehicle but
she held on tightly to Ondo, ripping his shirt. This pulling incident happened for several times but
complainant failed to let them out of the vehicle.
The accused was finally brought to the Provincial Jail while she stayed in the residence of the accused.
She returned to Butuan after a week. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 5-33, Jan. 22, 1991).
Accused, Rolusape Sabalones, alias "Roling", in his defense, with ancillary incidental narrations,
testified, that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the wake of his only brother,
Junior Sabalones, who was killed on May 26, 1985.
He had no idea as to who was responsible for the killing of his brother inasmuch as the latter had
plenty of enemies. He also did not exert effort to look into the case and to place it under police
authority since he had lost faith in the capabilities of the police. The matter was however reported by
his uncle, Ambassador Sabalones, to the authorities.
He stayed at the wake until 10:00 o'clock in the evening because he was not feeling well. He retired in
a small room adjacent to the sala of the house of the deceased. Not long after, he felt somebody
waking him up but he merely opened his eyes and went back to sleep as he was really exhausted.
At 6:30 the following morning, he was roused by his wife so he could prepare for the burial. He came
to know about the burst of gunfire which took place the previous night upon the information of his
wife. He did not take the news seriously as he was busy preparing for the burial of his deceased
brother, Jun.
The funeral started at past 8:00 o'clock in the morning and he noticed the presence of Maj. Eddie
Ricardo and his men, who were sent by Col. Castano purposely to provide the burial with military
security, upon the request of his wife.
He had a conversation with Maj. Ricardo who inquired about the shooting incident which resulted in
the death of the son of Maj. Tiempo and others in his company. Also in the course of their
conversation, he came to know that Nabing Velez was killed earlier on that same night in Labangon,
Cebu [C]ity.
On the same occasion, Pedro Cabanero also notified him that he was a suspect in the killing of Nabing
Velez, a radio commentator of ferocious character, who was engaged in a protection racket with
several under his control.
He remembered that a month prior to the death of Nabing Velez, his father, Federico Sabalones, Sr.
and the deceased while matching their fighting cocks at the Talisay Sports Complex, had an
altercation and the latter slapped his paralytic father and challenged him to ask one of his sons to
avenge what he had done to him. He came to know about the incident only after a week.
He did not deny the fact that he was hurt by the actuation of the deceased for humiliating his father
but it did not occur to him to file a case or take any action against the deceased because he was too
busy with his business and with his work as a bet caller in the cockpit.
He advised his father to stay in Bohol to avoid further trouble because he knew that the latter would
frequent the cockpit[,] being a cockfight aficionado.
Likewise, during the burial, he was informed by a PC soldier, Roger Capuyan, that he was also a
suspect in the killing of the son of Maj. Tiempo and even advised him to leave the place.
On the following days after the burial, his wife started to notice cars suspiciously parked in front of
their house and [she] also received mysterious calls.
Together with his wife, they decided to see Col. Apolinario Castaño to seek his advise. The latter
verified from the Cebu Metrodiscom and learned that there was no case filed against him.
In the evening of June 6, 1985, he left for Iligan and after a month, he transferred to Ozamis and ten
to Pagadian. He likewise went to Manila especially when he learned that his uncle, Samson
Sabalones, had arrived from abroad. The latter posted a bond for his temporary liberty immediately
after being informed that a case was filed against him, before the Municipal Court of Talisay.
Despite . . . the bond put up his uncle, he did not return to Cebu City because it came to his
knowledge that Maj. Tiempo inquired from the bonding company as to his address.
He also stayed in Marikina in the house of his friend and during his stay in the said place, he
registered as a voter and was issue a Voter's Affidavit, (Exh. "19"; Exh. "R" for the prosecution) which
bore the name "Paciano Mendoza Laput" which [was] his baptismal name. He explained that the
name[s] Mendoza and Laput [were] the middle name and surname, respectively of his mother. The
name "Rolusape" was given to him by his father and the same [was] not his registered name because
during the old days, priests would not allow parents to name their children with names not found in
the Almanac; thus, Paciano [was] his chosen name and the same appeared in his Baptismal
Certificate, (Exh. "20") issued by the Parish of the Blessed Trinity of Talibon, Bohol. In his Birth
Certificate, it [was] the name "Rolusape" which appeared based upon the data supplied by his father.
He had used the name Paciano during the time when he [was] still a secret agent under his uncle,
Gen. Russo Sabalones, when the latter was still the [c]hief of the C-2 in 1966 until 1967 and as such,
he was issued a firearm. He likewise used said name at the time he was employed at the Governor's
Office in Agusan and when he registered in the Civil Service Commission to conceal his identity to
protect himself from those who were after him.
From Marikina he proceeded to Davao and then to Butuan City where he was made to campaign for
the candidacy of Gov. Eddie Rama. When the latter won in the election, he was given a job at the
Provincial Capitol and later became an agent of the PC in Butuan using the name, "Paciano Laput."
During his stay in Butuan, he met Virgie Pajigal, a manicurist who became his live-in partner.
On October 23, 1988 while he was at the Octagon Cockpit in Butuan with Sgt. Tambok, he was
arrested by Capt. Ochate and was brought to the PC Headquarter[s] in Libertad, Butuan City and was
detained. Among the papers confiscated from him was his Identification Card No. 028-88, (Exh. "21")
issued by the PC Command bearing the name Paciano Laput.
On October 26, 1988 he was taken from the City Jail by Capt. Ochate and some soldiers, one of whom
was Maj. Tiempo whom he met for the first time.
On their way to Nasipit to board a vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo made him lie flat on his
belly and stepped on his back and handcuffed him. He cried in pain because of his sprained shoulder.
A certain soldier also took his watch and ring.
Arriving in Cebu at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he and Virgie Pajigal, who followed him in the boat,
were made to board a taxicab. Maj. Tiempo alighted in certain place and talked to a certain guy.
Thereafter, they were brought to the Reclamation Area and were forced to go down from the vehicle
but Virgie Pajigal held him tightly. They were again pulled out of the taxi but they resisted.
From the Capitol Building, they proceeded to CPDRC and on their way thereto, Maj. Tiempo sat
beside him inside the taxi and boxed him on the right cheek below the ear and pulled his cuffed
hands apart.
At the Provincial Jail, he was physically examined by its resident physician, Dr. Dionisio Sadaya, and
was also fingerprinted and photographed, (Exh. "21"). He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh.
"22").
He further stated that he [was] acquainted with his co-accused Timoteo Beronga, known to him as
"Timmy" being also a bet caller in the cockpit. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 5-23, Feb. 26, 1991; Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 3-33, Feb. 27, 1991; Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-18, Apr. 10, 1991).
As surrebuttal witness, accused Rolusape Sabalones denied that he bribed a certain soldier because
at the time he was arrested, his wallet as well as his wristwatch and ring worth P2,000.00 each were
confiscated and his hands tied behind his back.
He also denied the allegation of Maj. Tiempo that he offered the latter the amount of P1,000,000.00
to drop the case against him, the truth being that while they were on board a vessel bound for Cebu
City, Maj. Tiempo compelled him to tell [who] the real killers of his son [were] because he knew that
he (Rolusape Sabalones) was not responsible. The former also inquired from him as to the
whereabouts of the carbine.
He also rebutted complainant's testimony that upon their arrival here in Cebu City and while on
board a taxicab, he directed the former [to] first go around the city to locate a certain Romeo
Cabañero, whom he did not know personally. 10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 Giving full credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
Decision convicting appellants of two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder. Like
the trial court, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery and rejected appellants'
defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the penalties imposed by the trial court were erroneous.
Hence, for each count of murder, it sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. For each count of
frustrated murder, it imposed the following penalty: ten years (10) of prision mayor (medium), as
minimum, to seventeen years (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal (medium), as
maximum. Sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals awarded indemnity of P20,000 to each of
the victims of frustrated murder. However, it was silent on the indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the
trial court to the heirs of each of the two deceased.
Having imposed reclusion perpetua on the appellants, the Court of Appeals, as earlier noted,
refrained from entering judgment and certified the case to the Supreme Court for review, in
conformity with Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
11
Hence, this appeal before this Court.
The Issues
In his Brief, 12 Appellant Sabalones raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his friends left the house where his
brother Sabalones Junior was lying in state and "went to their grisly destination amidst the dark and
positioned themselves in defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of the
supporters of Nabing Velez.
II
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his two co-accused were identified as
among the four gunmen who fired at the victims.
III
The court a quo erred in overlooking or disregarding physical evidence that would have contradicted
the testimony of prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores that the gunmen were
shooting at them from a standing position.
IV
The court a quo erred in holding that the instant case is "one of aberratio ictus", which is not a defense,
and that the "defense of alibi" interposed by the accused may not be considered.
V
The court a quo erred in not finding that the evidence of the prosecution has not overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
VI
The court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused on ground of reasonable doubt.
In a Manifestation dated December 20, 1995, Appellant Beronga, through counsel, adopted as his own
the Brief of Sabalones. 13
The foregoing assignment of errors shall be reformulated by the Court into these three issues or topics:
(1) credibility of the witnesses and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) defense of denial and
alibi, and (3) characterization of the crimes committed and the penalty therefor.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence
Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some
material facts or gravely abused its discretion, 14 especially where, as in this case, such assessment is
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. "As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning
values to declarations at the witness stand is best and most competently performed or carried out by a
trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the accused's
behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial." 15 Giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the trial court concluded:
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, this Court, given the evidence, finds that there is more realism in the
conclusion based on a keener and realistic appraisal of events, circumstances and evidentiary facts on
record, that the gun slaying and violent deaths of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and the near fatal
injuries of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores, resulted from the felonious and wanton acts
of the herein accused for mistaking said victims for the persons [who were] objects of their wrath. 16
We stress that "factual findings of the lower courts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals are, as a
general rule, binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court." 17 We find nothing in the instant case to
justify a reversal or modification of the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
appellants committed two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder.
Edwin Santos, a survivor of the assault, positively pointed to and identified the appellants as the
authors of the crime. His categorical and straightforward testimony is quoted hereunder: 18
COURT:
Q You stated there was a gun fired. What happened next?
WITNESS:
A There was a rapid fire in succession.
Q When you heard this rapid firing, what did you do?
A I tried to look from where the firing came from.
Q After that, what did you find?
A I saw persons firing towards us. A All of a sudden, we heard the burst of gunfire.
Q Where were these persons situated when they were firing towards you? Q From what direction was the gunfire?
A Near the foot of the electric post and close to the cemented wall. A Through the direction of the jeep.
Q This electric post, was that lighted at that moment? Q After hearing the gunfire, what happened?
A Yes, sir, it was lighted. A We looked at the jeep.
Q How far were these persons firing, to the place where you were? Q What did you see?
A From here to there (The witness indicating the distance by pointing to a place inside the courtroom, A We saw Alfredo Nardo and Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the ground. There were only 3.
indicating a distance of about 6 to 7 meters, making the witness stand as the point of reference). Q Who was driving the jeep at that time?
Q Were you able to know how many persons fired towards you? A Alfredo Nardo.
A I only saw 3 to 4 persons. Q What happened after that?
Q How long did these persons fire the guns at you? A So, I looked, whence the burst of gunfire came from.
A Until we went home. The persons were still firing, until we went home. Q What did you see from that gunfire?
Q You stated that you saw these persons who were firing at you. Do you know these persons? A I saw 4 persons standing at the back of the fence.
A I can identify [them] when I [see] them. Q What were those 4 persons doing when they were standing at the back of the fence?
Q Try to look around this courtroom, if these persons you saw who were firing at you are present in the A They were bringing long firearms.
courtroom[.] Q Did you recognize these persons?
A Yes, sir. A I can clearly recognize one and the 3 persons[.] I can identify them, if I can see them again.
Q Can you point to these persons? Q If you are shown these persons, can you recognize them? Can you name these persons?
A Yes, sir. A No, sir. Only their facial appearance.
Q Point at them. Q What about the 3 persons?
COURT INTERPRETER: A That's why the 3 persons, I do not know them. I can recognize only their facial appearance.
The Court directed the witness to go down from the witness stand and [point] at them, Beronga and Q What about one person?
Alegarbes. A Yes, sir.
FISCAL GABIANA: Q What is the name of the person?
I would like to make it of record that on the bench of prisoner, only the two accused were seated. A Roling Sabalones.
COURT: Q If Roling Sabalones is inside the courtroom, can you recognize Roling Sabalones?
Make it of record that only two prisoners were present. A Yes, sir, he is around.
Q Now, Mr. Santos, aside from these two accused you identified as among those who fired [at] you on Q Can you point to Roling Sabalones?
that evening, were there other persons that you saw on that particular occasion who fired at you? A Yes, he is there (The witness pointing to the person who answered the name of Roling Sabalones).
A Yes, sir, there were[;] if I can see them, I can identify them. Q I would like [you] again to please look around and see, if those persons whom you know through
their faces, if they are here around?
Corroborating the foregoing, Rogelio Presores, another survivor, also pointed to Timoteo Beronga, A The two of them (The witness pointing to the 2 persons, who, when asked, answered that his name
Teodulo Alegarbes and Roling Sabalones as the perpetrators of the crime. His testimony proceeded in [was] Teofilo Beronga and the other [was] Alegarbes).
this manner: 19 Indeed, we have carefully waded through the voluminous records of this case and the testimonies of all
the fifty-nine witnesses, and we find that the prosecution has presented the required quantum of proof
to establish that appellants are indeed guilty as charged. Appellants' arguments, as we shall now
Q When you arrived at the residence of Stephen Lim, can you remember of any unusual incident that
discuss, fail to rebut this conclusion.
took place?

Positive Identification
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A When the jeep arrived, the car was following. Appellants allege that the two witnesses could not have properly identified the appellants because,
Q What happened next? after the first burst of shooting, they both crouched down, such that they could not have seen the faces
A When the jeep was near the gate, the car was following. of their assailants. This contention does not persuade. Both eyewitnesses testified that the firing was
Q The car was following the jeep, at what distance? not continuous; thus, during a lull in the firing, they raised their heads and managed a peek at the
A 3 to 4 meters. perpetrators. Edwin Santos testified as follows:
Q While the car was following the jeep at that distance of 3 to 4 meters, what happened?
Atty. Albino, counsel for accused Beronga:
Q You mean to say that when you bent you heard the successive shots, [and] you again raised your
head. Is that correct?
A There, were times that the shots were not in succession and continuous and that was the time I
raised my head again. 20
Like Santos, Rogelio Presores also stooped down when the firing started, but he raised his head during
a break in the gunfire:
Atty. Albino:
Q So, what did you do when you first heard that one shot?
A So, after the first shot, we looked towards the direction we were facing and when we heard the
second shot, that was the time we stooped down. 21
He further testified:
Atty. Acido: [Counsel for Appellant Sabalones]
Q And you said you stooped down inside the car when you heard the first firing to the jeep. Is that what
you want the Court to understand[?]
Presores:
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you never saw who fired the successive shots to the car as you said you stooped down inside the
car?
A The bursts of gunfire stopped for a while and that was the time I reared of [sic] my head.
Q And that was the first time you saw them?
A Yes, sir. 22
The records clearly show that two vehicles proceeded to the house of Stephen Lim on that fateful day.
The first was the jeep where Alfredo Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo were riding. About three to
four meters behind was the second car carrying Nelson Tiempo, Guillermo Viloria, Rogelio Oliveros and
the two prosecution witnesses — Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores. 23 As stated earlier, said
witnesses attested to the fact that after the first volley of shots directed at the jeep, they both looked
at the direction where the shots were coming from, and they saw their friends in the jeep falling to the
ground, as well as the faces of the perpetrators. 24 It was only then that a rapid succession of gunshots
were directed at them, upon which they started crouching to avoid being hit.
Hence, they were able to see and identify the appellants, having had a good look at them after the
initial burst of shots. We stress that the normal reaction of a person is to direct his sights towards the
source of a startling shout or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, 25 "the most natural reaction for
victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the
manner in which the crime is committed.
In bolstering their claim that it was impossible for the witnesses to have identified them, appellants
further aver that the crime scene was dark, there being no light in the lampposts at the time. To prove
that the service wire to the street lamps at the Mansueto Compound was disconnected as early as
December 1984 and reconnected only on June 27, 1985, they presented the testimonies of Vicente
Cabanero, 26 Remigio Villaver, 27 Fredo Canete 28 and Edward Gutang. 29 The trial court, however, did
not lend weight to said testimonies, preferring to believe the statement of other prosecution witnesses
that the place was lighted during that time.
The Court of Appeals sustained said findings by citing the testimonies of defense witnesses. Fredo
Canete of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO), for instance, admitted that it was so easy to connect
and disconnect the lights. He testified thus:
Atty. Kintanar:
Q Now, as a cutter, what instruments do you usually use in cutting the electrical connection of a certain
place?
Canete:
A Pliers and screw driver.
Q Does it need . . . very sophisticated instruments to disconnect the lights?
A No, these are the only instruments we use.
Q Ordinary pliers and ordinary screw driver?
A Yes, sir.
Q And does [one] need to be an expert in electronic [sic] in order to conduct the disconnection?
A No, sir.
Q In other words, Mr. Canete, any ordinary electrician can cut it?
A That is if they are connected with the Visayan Electric Company.
Q What I mean is that, can the cutting be done by any ordinary electrician?
A Yes, sir. 30
Said witness even admitted that he could not recall if he did in fact cut the electrical connection of the
Mansueto Compound. 31 The Court of Appeals further noted that "none of the above witnesses were at
the crime scene at or about the exact time that the ambush occurred. Thus, none was in a position to
state with absolute certainty that there was allegedly no light to illuminate the gunmen when they
rained bullets on the victims. 32
Even assuming arguendo that the lampposts were not functioning at the time, the headlights of the
jeep and the car were more than sufficient to illuminate the crime scene. 33 The Court has previously
held that the light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give ample
illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize another. 34 In the same vein, the headlights of a
car or a jeep are sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify appellants at the distance of 4 to 10
meters.
Extrajudicial Statement
of Beronga
Appellants insist that Beronga's extrajudicial statement was obtained through violence and
intimidation. Citing theres inter alios acta rule, they also argue that the said statement is inadmissible
against Sabalones. Specifically, they challenge the trial court's reliance on the following portions of
Beronga's statement:
Q After Roling knew that Na[b]ing Velez was killed, have you observed [if] Roling and his companions
prepared themselves for any eventuality?
A It did not take long after we knew that Na[b]ing was killed, somebody called up by telephone looking
for Roling, and this was answered by Roling but we did not know what they were conversing about and
then Roling went back to the house of Junior after answering the phone. And after more than two
hours, we heard the sound of engines of vehicles arriving, and then Meo, the man who was told by
Roling to guard, shouted saying: "They are already here[;]" after that, Roling came out carrying a
carbine accompanied by Tsupe, and not long after we heard gunshots and because of that we ran
towards the house where the wake was. But before the gun-shots, I heard Pedring Sabalones father of
Roling saying: "You clarify, [t]hat you watch out for mistake[n] in identity," and after that shout,
gunshots followed. [sic] Then after the gun-shots Roling went back inside still carrying the carbine and
shouted: "GATHER THE EMPTY SHELLS AND MEO[,] YOU BRING A FLASHLIGHT," and then I was called by
Meo to help him gather the empty shells of the carbine and also our third companion to gather the
empty shells.
These arguments have no merit. In the first place, it is well to stress that appellants were convicted
based primarily on the positive identification of the two survivors, Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores,
and not only on the extrajudicial statement, which merely corroborates the eyewitness testimonies.
Thus, said arguments have no relevance to this case. As the Court held in People vs. Tidula: 35 "Any
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in
which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction."
In any case, we sustain the trial court's holding, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
extrajudicial statement of Beronga was executed in compliance with the constitutional
requirements. 36 "Extrajudicial confessions, especially those which are adverse to the declarant's
interests are presumed voluntary, and in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the
declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession shall be upheld." 37
The exhaustive testimony of Sgt. Miasco, who undertook the investigation, shows that the appellant
was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel of his own choice. 38 Said witness also stated that Beronga was assisted by Atty. Marcelo Guinto
during the custodial investigation. 39 In fact, Atty. Guinto also took the witness stand and confirmed
that Appellant Beronga was informed of his rights, and that the investigation was proper, legal and not
objectionable. Indeed, other than appellants' bare allegations, there was no showing that Beronga's
statement was obtained by force or duress. 40
Equally unavailing is appellants' reliance on the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Appellants assert that the admission referred to in the above provision is considered to be against a co-
conspirator only when it is given during the existence of the conspiracy. They argue that Beronga's
statement was made afterthe termination of the conspiracy; thus, it should not be admitted and used
against Sabalones.
The well-settled rule is that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and
is nor admissible as evidence against his co-accused, it being mere hearsay evidence as far as the other
accused are concerned. 41 But this rule admits of exception. It does not apply when the confession, as in
this case, is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of the co-accused
in the killing of the victims 42 or when the confession of the co-accused is corroborated by other
evidence. 43
Beronga's extrajudicial statement is, in fact, corroborated by the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Jennifer Binghoy. Pertinent portions of said testimony are reproduced hereunder:
Q While you were at the wake of Jun Sabalones and the group were sitting with Roling Sabalones, what
were they doing?
A They were gathered in one table and they were conversing with each other.
Q On that same date, time and place, at about 10:00 [i]n the evening, can you remember if there was
unusual incident that took place?
A I heard over the radio at the Sabalones Family that a certain Nabing Velez was shot.
Q That [a] certain Nabing Velez was shot? What else . . . transpired?
A I observed that their reactions were so queer, — as if they were running.
Q In that evening of June 1, 1985, when you went there at the house of Jun Sabalones, have you seen
an armalite?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where aid you see this armalite?
A At the table where they were conversing.
Q How many armalites or guns [did you see] that evening in that place?
A Two (2).
Q This armalite that you saw, — how far was this in relation to the groups of Sabalones?
A There (The witness indicating a distance of about 4 to 5 meters).
ATTY. KINTANAR:
Q When you looked . . . through the window and saw there were two vehicles and there were bursts of
gunfire, what happened after that?
A I did not proceed to look . . . through the window because I stooped down.
Q When you stooped down, what happened?
A After the burst of gunfire, I again opened the window.
Q And when again you opened the window, what happened?
A I saw two persons going towards the jeep.
Q What transpired next after [you saw] those 2 persons?
A When they arrived there, they nodded their head[s].
Q After that, what happened?
A So, they went back to the direction where they came from, going to the house of Sabalones.
Q While they were going to the direction of the house of Sabalones, what transpired?
A I saw 5 to 6 persons coming from the highway and looking to the jeep, and before they reached the
jeep, somebody shouted that "it's ours".
Q Who shouted?
A The voice was very familiar to me. Q: Upon being informed by these occupants who were ambushed and [you] were able to return the
Q Whose voice? car, what did you do?
A The voice of Roling Sabalones.
Q What else have you noticed during the commotion [when] wives were advising their husbands to go Major Tiempo:
home?
A They were really in chaos. 44
A: I immediately got soldiers and we immediately proceeded to the area or to the place where my
fallen son was located and when we reached . . . the place, I saw my fallen son [in] a kneeling position
A careful reading of her testimony buttresses the finding of the trial court that Rolusape Sabalones and where both knees [were] touching the ground and the toes also and the forehead was touching
his friends were gathered at one table, conversing in whispers with each other, that there were two towards the ground. (TSN, Feb. 12, 1988, p. 6)
rifles on top of the table, and that they became panicky after hearing of the death of Nabing Velez on
the radio. Hence, the observation of the trial court that "they went to their grisly destination amidst the
In such position the second bullet necessarily traveled upwards in relation to the body, and thus the
dark and positioned themselves in defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of
entry wound should be lower than the exit wound. There is no showing that both wounds were inflicted
supporters of the recently slain Nabing Velez." 45
at the same time. 47

Alleged Inconsistencies
In any event, the witnesses saw that the appellants were the gunmen who were standing side by side
firing at them. They could have been in a different position and in another hiding place when they first
Appellants also allege that the prosecution account had inconsistencies relating to the number of shots fired, but this is not important. They were present at the crime scene, and they were shooting their
heard, the interval between gunshots and the victims' positions when they were killed. These, however, rifles at the victims.
are minor and inconsequential flaws which strengthen, rather than impair, the credibility of said
eyewitnesses. Such harmless errors are indicative of truth, not falsehood, and do not cast serious doubt
Aberratio Ictus
on the veracity and reliability of complainant's testimony. 46

Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in "conjecture" in ruling that there was aberratio
Appellants further claim that the relative positions of the gunmen, as testified to by the eyewitnesses,
ictus in this case. This allegation does not advance the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that
were incompatible with the wounds sustained by the victims. They cite the testimony of Dr. Ladislao
the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush,
Diola, who conducted the autopsy on Glenn Tiempo. He declared that the victim must necessarily be on
not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did err in
a higher level than the assailant, in the light of the path of the bullet from the entrance wound to
explaining the motive of the appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court
where the slug was extracted. This finding, according to appellant, negates the prosecution's account
of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was
that the appellants were standing side by side behind a wall when they fired at the victims. If standing,
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
appellants must have been on a level higher than that of the occupants of the vehicles; if beside each
other, they could not have inflicted wounds which were supposed to have come from opposite angles.
In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial
We are not persuaded. The defense presumes that the victims were sitting still when they were fired
statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence
upon, and that they froze in the same position during and after the shooting. This has no testimonial
sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having killed the recently slain
foundation. On the contrary, it was shown that the victims ducked and hid themselves, albeit in vain,
Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the
when the firing began. After the first volley, they crouched and tried to take cover from the hail of
victims' vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez, appellants
bullets. It would have been unnatural for them to remain upright and still in their seat. Hence, it is not
opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The
difficult to imagine that the trajectories of the bullet wounds varied as the victims shifted their
Court has held that "mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused
positions. We agree with the following explanation of the Court of Appeals:
zeroes in on his intended
victim." 48
The locations of the entry wounds can readily be explained, . . . Glenn Tiempo, after looking in the
direction of the explosion, turned his body around; and since the ambushers were between the jeep
Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken. The case is better
and the car, he received a bullet in his right chest (wound no. 1) which traveled to the left. As to wound
characterized as error personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than aberratio
No. 2, it can be explained by the spot where Major Tiempo found his fallen son.
ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to
imprecision in the blow.
Atty. Kintanar:
 Second Issue:
Denial and Alibi
Appellants decry the lower courts' disregard of their defense of alibi. We disagree. As constantly
enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine requires the accused to prove not only that he was
at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but that it was physically impossible for
him at the time to have been present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. 49 This the
appellants miserably failed to do.
Appellant Beronga testified that, at the time of the incident, he was in his residence in Lapulapu City,
which was not shown to be so remote and inaccessible that it precluded his presence in Mansueto
Subdivision. The alibi of Sabalones is even more unworthy of belief; he sought to establish that he was
a mere 20-25 meters away from the scene of the crime. He was allegedly in the house of his brother
who was lying in state, which was so near the ambush site that some of the defense witnesses even
testified that they were terrified by the gunfire. Clearly, appellants failed to establish the requisites of
alibi.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the appellants. 50 As
aptly held by this Court in People v. Nescio: 51
Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from the scene of the crime.
The defense of alibi is further offset by the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses.
Alibi, to reiterate a well-settled doctrine, is accepted only upon the clearest proof that the accused-
appellant was not or could not have been at the crime scene when it was committed.
Flight
Appellants further object to the finding that Sabalones, after the incident, "made himself scarce from
the place of commission. He left for Manila, thence Mindanao on the supposition that he want[ed] to
escape from the wrath of Maj. Tiempo and his men for the death of Glenn Tiempo and the near fatal
shooting of the other son or from the supporters of Nabing Velez. . . . On his supposedly borrowed
freedom, he jumped bail and hid himself deeper into Mindanao, under a cloak of an assumed name.
Why, did his conscience bother him for comfort?" 52
Appellants rationalized that Sabalones was forced to jump bail in order to escape two groups, who
were allegedly out to get him, one of Nabing Velez and the other of Major Tiempo. Their ratiocination is
futile. It is well-established that "the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt,
and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn." 53 It
must be stressed, nonetheless, that appellants were not convicted based on legal inference alone but
on the overwhelming evidence presented against them.
Third Issue:
Crime and Punishment
We agree with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty of murder for the deaths of Glenn
Tiempo end Alfredo Nardo. The allegation of treachery as charged in the Information was duly proven
by the prosecution. "Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means,
methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person." 54These requisites were evidently
present when the accused, swiftly and unexpectedly, fired at the victims who were inside their vehicles
and were in no position and without any means to defend themselves.
The appellate court also correctly convicted them of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by
Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. As evidenced by the medical certificates and the
testimony of Dr. Miguel Mancao who attended to the victims, Nelson Tiempo sustained a neck wound
which completely shattered his trachea and rendered him voiceless, as well as a wound on the right
chest which penetrated his axilla but not his chest cavity. 55Rey Bolo sustained three injuries which
affected his clavicle, ribs and lungs. 56 Rogelio Presores, on the other hand, sustained an injury to his
lungs from a bullet wound which entered his right chest and exited through his back. 57
The wounds sustained by these survivors would have caused their death had it not been for the timely
medical intervention. Hence, we sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that appellants are guilty of
three counts of frustrated murder.
We also uphold the Court of Appeals' modification of the penalty for murder, but not its computation
of the sentence for frustrated murder.
For each of the two counts of murder, the trial court imposed the penalty of fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (medium), as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (maximum), as maximum. This is incorrect. Under
Article 248 of the Ravised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, in its maximum
period, to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of
frustrated murder. It sentenced appellants to imprisonment of ten years of prision mayor (medium) as
minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal (medium) as maximum. It
modified the trial court's computation of eight (8) years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal(minimum) as maximum.
Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a frustrated felony is the "next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony . . . ." The imposable penalty for
frustrated murder, therefore, is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period. 58 Because there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstance as the Court of Appeals
itself held, 59 the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its medium period. With the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty for frustrated murder should be 8 years
of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum)
as maximum.
Although the Court of Appeals was silent on this point, the trial court correctly ordered the payment of
P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of each of the two murdered victims. In light of current
jurisprudence, this amount is awarded without need of proof other than the fact of the victim's
death. 60 The trial court and the CA, however, erred in awarding indemnity of P20,000 each to Nelson
Tiempo, Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo. There is no basis, statutory or jurisprudential, for the award of
a fixed amount to victims of frustrated murder. Hence, they are entitled only to the amounts of actual
expenses duly proven during the trial.
Thus, Nelson Tiempo, who was treated for a gunshot wound on the neck which shattered his trachea,
should be awarded indemnity of P21,594.22 for his medical expenses. This is evidenced by a statement
of account from Cebu Doctor's Hospital. 61
Rogelio Presores, who was likewise treated for gunshot wound in the same hospital, presented a
statement of account amounting to P5,412.69 for his hospitalization. 62 Hence, he is likewise entitled to
indemnity in the said amount.
Rey Bolo, on the other hand, incurred an expense of P9,431.10 for the treatment of his gunshot
wounds, as evidenced by a statement of account from the same hospital. 63 This amount should be
awarded to him as indemnity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. However, the penalties are
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased, Glenn Tiempo,
in the sum of P50,000;
2) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased, Alfredo Nardo,
in the sum of P50,000;
3) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally pay the victim, Rey
Bolo, in the sum of P9,431.10 as actual damages;
4) In Crim Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally indemnify the victim,
Rogelio Presores, in the sum of P5,412.69 for actual damages;
5) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261 for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally indemnify the victim, Nelson
Tiempo, in the sum of P21,594.22 as actual damages.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the
Secretary of Justice so that Accused Eufemio Cabanero may be brought to justice.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38773 December 19, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, defendant-appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of homicide
committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with costs.
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living children, has
been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and has lost control of the
movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since he suffered the stroke of paralysis. One
of his daughters was named Maria and another, are married, while still another one is a nun. With the
exemption of the other married daughter and the nun, of all of them, including the appellant, live with
Maria upon whom they depend for support.
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate relations
later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that the appellant
became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house. The relations between
Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The appellant did not know that his
daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such extremes, that he had to be deceived with the
information that she had gone to her godfather's house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken
to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home
with her child.
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared sad and
worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because the child meant
an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support. For some time the appellant
wrote letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at other times entreating the deceased to
legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support her and his child. Although the
deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way of support, he never complied with his
promise.
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the deceased
worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went downstairs. What
happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant
inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his death.
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the appellant
that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that the latter refused
to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude, the deceased tried to seize
him by the neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the face with the said penknife. Due to
his lack of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon landed on the base of the neck of the
deceased.
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of the
deceased. We find that his conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the appellant
emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a permanent scar on the
face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the hospital for a week or two but
never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan of compelling him to marry or, at
least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this intention in some of his letters to the
deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That
the act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck,
was due solely to the fact hereinbefore mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm
on account of paralysis and the blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the neck.
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death of
the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities, and acted
under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into consideration in favor of the
appellant.
Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in
legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping out and
brandishing his penknife.
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to
cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the accused, should be applied
herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been interpreted as applicable
only in cases where the crime befalls a different person (decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899), which is not the case herein.
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of three mitigating
circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree, that is prision
mayor, should be imposed.
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years and (1) day
of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in all other respects, with the costs. So
ordered.
[G.R. No. L-10126. October 22, 1957.]
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARIANO MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Fortunato Jose, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; CARRIER’S LIABILITY; WORDS AND PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED. — "The
proximate legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion., all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
be probably result therefrom."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; OVERTURNING OF BUS; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. — When a vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with the lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably by the driver and the conductor themselves, and
that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them;
and coming as they did from a rural area where the lanterns and flashlights were not available, they
had to use a torch the most handy and available; and what was more natural, that said rescuers should
innocently approached the overtuned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. Held: That the proximate cause of the death of B was overturning of the vehicle thru the
negligence of defendant and his agent.
3. ID.; ID.; CARRIER’S NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF THE BUS. — The burning of the bus wherein some of
the passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through the driver
and conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. They should and must have known that in
the position in which the overtuned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline
tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
especially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, Held: That the failure of
the driver and the conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus, constitute negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under the
provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article 1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.

DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by
its owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of
Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were
about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan
Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan,
another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated on the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia
Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2 :00 o’clock that same morning, while
the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of
the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled
out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the
woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus,
particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said that they could not get out of the bus.
There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from the wreck,
including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four
passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approached
the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the
bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and
permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought
by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four doomed passengers inside the bus were removed and
duly identified, specially that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in
her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the total amount of
P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs, plus P600 as
attorney’s fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale
and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, but the latter court endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the
complaint.
Our New Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of a common carrier to its passengers and
their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal
provisions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735,
and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7 while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."cralaw virtua1aw library
"ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission."cralaw virtua1aw library
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the
Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We
also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his
agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires
burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zagging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is
to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan
was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his
co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must
have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for
his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-
appellants in their brief. It is as
". . .’that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more
comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."cralaw virtua1aw library
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing
him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set
on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire
and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and under the circumstances obtaining
in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that
the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was
very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the
most handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its
driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked
the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large
area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too
near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
above- reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regards the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include
compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees,
and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs’ attorneys not only in the trial court, but also in
the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney’s fees
may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS. The award made by the trial court of ONE
HUNDRED (P100) PESOS for the loss of the merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate
and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of
the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while in the hospital,
she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him
speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed
immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver
to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to
prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the
safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had
been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would
not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle
negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the
complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the
fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses
on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed to appear or were reluctant
to testify. But the record of the case before us shows that several witnesses, passengers in that bus,
willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect that the said driver was negligent. In the
public interest, the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of
justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this
decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS to SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX
HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for attorney’s fees,
respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y
ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO
ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE CASE OPEN FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL ERRORS AS
MAY BE IMPUTABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT. — While the factual findings of the trial court are generally
given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete
review of all errors, by commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. (People v.
Valerio, Jr., L-4116, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 208, 231) In this instance, the lower court erred in
finding that the maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the
evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that
indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a
vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of
Quiñones, Jr.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF, PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that
"el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential
requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by
the offender. (People v. Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 196, 207). We hold that
these requisites are present in this case.
3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. — The intentional felony committed was the hacking of
the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied
Quiñones is beside the point. What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr.
and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away
with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head. (See: People v. Diana, 32
Phil. 344 [1915]). The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles are expected
to pass any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running
scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people.
Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over
by a vehicle. Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head
might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. Proximate legal
cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. (Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988,
157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181). In other words, the sequence of events
from Iligan’s assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very
short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability.
4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY WITNESSES. — We agree
with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because he was
positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda,
G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, WRONGLY
APPRECIATED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings
on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been
appreciated by the lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr.
Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. (People v. Gadiano, L-31818,
July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 559) There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted
by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. (People v.
Crisostomo, L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47). In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan
followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his
companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed
on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. (People v. Mercado, L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159
SCRA 455). The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in
this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their
determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People v. Batas,
G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA 46).
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED BY MERE KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR
APPROVAL OF THE ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE NOR BY MERE
PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. — Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held
liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt
has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not
take any active part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running
over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a
stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an
undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of
the former’s criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There
must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. (People v. Izon, 104 Phil. 690 [1958]) Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of
the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated
by Iligan. (Orobio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316) Edmundo
Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND APPLYING THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. — There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on
Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the
victim’s unrealized income and therefore, the same is disallowed.
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the decision of
the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting them of the crime of murder
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for the latter’s death and P256,960 representing
the victim’s unrealized income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against Fernando Iligan, Edmundo
Asis and Juan Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo, municipality of
Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden
unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., on his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the
latter’s face which resulted to (sic) the death of said Esmeraldo Quiñones.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on January 12,
1981 Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented the following version of the commission of the crime
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his companions,
Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo, Vinzons, Camarines
Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a certain Almadrones, they met
the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed
("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of
the accused that they had no desire to fight. 3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from
his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused.
They ran for about half an hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon
seeing that they were no longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the
two to accompany him to his house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for work
as a bus conductor. 4
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly emerged
on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his bolo hitting him on
the forehead and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of
200 meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard
someone shout "May nadale na." 6
On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already dead with his
head busted. 7 They helped the brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to their house. 8
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria Belmonte in
Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The postmortem
examination report which is found at the back of the death certificate reveals that Esmeraldo Quiñones,
Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained the following injuries:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the frontal
left, temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration of the brain tissue.
"2. Other findings — Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4 cms. in
length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and right side of the neck."
9
The death certificate also indicates that Quiñones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages
due to a vehicular accident."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their respective
houses at the time the crime was committed.chanrobles law library
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house to fetch
his visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo Asis, whom he presumed
was drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to the dance hall. However, they were not able to
reach their destination because Edmundo was boxed by somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped.
11 Instead, Fernando Iligan brought his nephew home. 12 On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano
Mendoza whom Fernando Iligan invited to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his nephew
home, Fernando Iligan and Juliano Mendoza proceeded to Iligan’s house and arrived there between
1:30 and 2:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day. 14
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan’s testimony. He testified that while they were walking in front of the
Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize because there were several
persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he addressed his apology boxed him on
his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later, Iligan accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15
After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 o’clock the following
morning. 16
The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that Quiñones,
Jr. died because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the lower court, in its
decision of May 7, 1986, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death have
shown that the victim’s death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding, the Court
cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident has not been fully
established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr., (the) father of the victim, testified that Dr. Abas told him
that if his son was hacked by a bolo on the face and then run over the entire head by a vehicle’s tire,
then that hacking on the face could not be visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981)
Third, Exhibit ‘2’ (the photograph of the victim taken immediately after his body had been brought
home) is a hard evidence. It will attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any vehicle.
On the contrary, it shows that only half of the face and head, was damaged with the wound starting on
a sharp edge horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions on the upper left shoulder and on the
neck while the body downwards has none of it, while on the right forehead there is another wound
caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the
other half portion of his head and downward part of his body must have been likewise seriously
damaged, which there are none." 17
The lower court also found that Iligan’s group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the group of
the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted Iligan and Edmundo
Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on them the aforementioned penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which they were
convicted. For the second time, they attributed Quiñones, Jr.’s death to a vehicular accident.

No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The defense
relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple fracture on the
head of Quiñones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident 18 which opinion was earlier put in writing by
the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas justified his conclusion by what he
considered as tire marks on the victim’s left shoulder and the right side of his neck. 19 He also testified
that the incised wound located at the victim’s right eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo
but it was so superficial that it could not have caused the victim’s death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the vehicular
mishap. One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis that when he helped
bring home the body of Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim’s father, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr. that "before
Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle, he was hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked
why he mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he
mentioned it "because his (Quiñones, Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not farfetched to
conclude that Zaldy Asis had actual knowledge of said accident but for understandable reasons he
declined to declare it in court. Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo,
also testified that when he went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim
scattered across the road where he also saw tire marks. 23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victim’s father, presented evidence to the effect that Iligan
authored the maceration of half of the victim’s head. Quiñones, Sr. testified that from their house,
which was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding a "sinampalok" as he,
together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased someone. During the second time that he saw
the three accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan." 24 Hence, the lower court concluded that
the victim’s head was "chopped" resulting in the splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It should
be emphasized, however, that the testimony came from a biased witness and it was uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an
appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission,
as may be imputable to the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the
maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record
point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr.
had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding,
however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiñones,
Jr.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing
a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on
the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional
felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are
present in this case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was
considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What is material
is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was
meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and
delicate part of the body: the head. 29
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30 where vehicles are expected to pass any
moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and
having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have
been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. Proximate legal cause is defined
as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom." 31 In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on him to the time
Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between them, one
unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.chanrobles law
library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan because
he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution witnesses. 32
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of the
suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not
by itself show treachery. 33 There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted
by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this
case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan
was a warning to the deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group
of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. 35
The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this case.
Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to
commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 36
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again, contrary to the
lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established to hold Edmundo Asis
liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active part in the infliction of the wound
on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As
earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits
credibility being uncorroborated and coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the
companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have known of the former’s criminal intent but mere
knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere
presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice
to the assault perpetrated by Iligan. 38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium
(Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is
that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We
find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized income and
therefore, the same is disallowed
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide for which
he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum
and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against
appellant Iligan.
[G.R. No. L-72964. January 7, 1988.]
FILOMENO URBANO, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; LIABILITY OF ACCUSED FOR NATURAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM CRIME. — Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability
shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended . . ." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR NOT LIABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT DEATH OF HACKING VICTIM
DUE TO TETANUS NOT PRESENT AT TIME OF INFLICTION OF WOUND. — In the case at bar, Javier
suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in
hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he
suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have seen more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier’s wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he
died.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION TO HOMICIDE REQUIRES PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
WOUND WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. — The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused
the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038). Doubts are present.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do.
4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SETTLEMENT OF MINOR OFFENSES ALLOWED UNDER P.D. 1508. — It strains
the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the
records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner’s criminal liability
in this respect was wiped out by the victim’s own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier
used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is
allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v.
Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
5. ID.; CIVIL LIABILITY; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL DOES NOT NECESSARILY EXTINGUISH CIVIL LIABILITY.
— It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine
is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People
v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said: . . .." . . While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance
of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559)
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the
decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o’clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his
ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco
seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming
from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the
canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked
them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the virtual law library
one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between
them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very
and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter’s serious condition was
again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a hearing wound in Javier’s palm which could have
When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from been infected by tetanus.
hacking Javier.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 Exconde are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain
Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. "Date Diagnosis
Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to
report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went 11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead
suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine. adm. at DX: TETANUS

After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who 1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With
conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated
September 28, 1981) which reads difficulty opening his mouth.

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN #35, 421 Restless at times. Febrile

"This is to certify that I have examined the would of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at 11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following
cessation of respiration and HR after
"1-Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.
muscular spasm. O2 inhalation
"As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This would was presented to me
only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and
Records)
cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement.
Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit "A"), to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw P.M. PMC done and cadaver brought
library
home by relatives." (p. 100, Original
"Entry Nr 599/27 Oct ‘80/1030H/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this
Station accompanied by brgy councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are Records)
neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to
Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide
and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
other." (p. 87, Original Records.)
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of
was given to Javier at Urbano’s house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.chanrobles.com.ph : prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon
finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the
award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the
appellant.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based
on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states
"That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the
present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
"That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and
other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;
"That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued-irrigation dam which irrigates the
ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals
and ditches were regulated and reduced;
"That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches
which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches become shallow which was
suitable for catching mudfishes;
"That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto
Jaravata;
"That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in
the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;
"That few days thereafter, or on November 15, 1980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of
tetanus." (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended . . ." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of
which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was
the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that
on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier’s death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano’s unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier’s death. Thus, the
appellate court said
"The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased
was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious
consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his
death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the
process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
"Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw
because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be
infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently,
the proximate cause of the victim’s death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
(Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.; People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel, 78 Phil. 418)
"Appellant’s allegation that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was due to his own negligence in
going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in
dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt
by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is
impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand." (pp.
20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due
to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with
his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.chanrobles law library : red
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with
tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which
was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got
infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, Et. Al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate
cause:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
". . . A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .’that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more
comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier’s death.
We look into the nature of tetanus —
"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic
within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
"Nonspecific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or
back and difficulty swallowing. As the disease progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients
often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of
tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved,
rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and
symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved
to some degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptoms, on interval referred to as the
onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor
prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer-lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which
prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage
and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more
than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and
mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during
spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or
less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison’s Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man’s body depends on the
incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of
tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more
than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have seen more than
six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is
that at the time Javier’s wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him
was not yet present. Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
(People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038)
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier’s death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v.
Remoquillo, Et. Al. (99 Phil. 118)
"‘A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.’ (45 C.J. pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very
least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner’s
criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim’s own act. After the hacking incident,
Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where
Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor
offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also
People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16)
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the
criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free
of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly
liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987),
we said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
". . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil
Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559)
"The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to
the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
"‘This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: ‘There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from
a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished.’
It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
"‘For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice — a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.’"
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined.
This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992
SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding
him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to
be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4)
men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's
bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law
and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun
fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before
the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina
Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from
this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible
crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible.
Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.
Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed
out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's
and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house
at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the
Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the
idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order that his intent might
become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible.
So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally
liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it
not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would
constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such
criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or
property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2)
the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is
to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act
does not amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor
or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man
who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds
the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the
accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It
turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to
achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and
where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of
criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply
because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to
the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim
because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for
attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of
the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and
prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the
crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no application to the case
when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there
was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one
can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment to be administered,
equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really
present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended
(attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension
that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance
of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that
the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court
convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this
Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon
these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the
American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense
to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility
of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.
Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code
makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and
made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is
silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said
Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense
to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility
defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held
that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in
reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for
an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into
and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and
consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's
knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was
achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for
attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that
"elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model
Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In
disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and
thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not
made criminal by law. Further, it said:
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such
is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence
of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the
provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that
case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident
independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold
Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of
the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown
by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the
offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the
law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to
commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that
the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other
hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any
crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American