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Development of the sporting nation:

sport as a strategic area of national
policy in Japan
a b
Mayumi Ya-Ya Yamamoto
a
Centre for Olympic Studies & Research, Loughborough
University , Loughborough , UK
b
Jigoro Kano Memorial International Sport Institute , Tokyo ,
Japan
Published online: 01 Jun 2012.
To cite this article: Mayumi Ya-Ya Yamamoto (2012) Development of the sporting nation: sport as
a strategic area of national policy in Japan, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 4:2,
277-296, DOI: 10.1080/19406940.2012.685489
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19406940.2012.685489
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International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics
Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2012, 277–296
COUNTRY PROFILE
Development of the sporting nation: sport as a strategic area of national
policy in Japan
Mayumi Ya-Ya Yamamotoa,b*
a
Centre for Olympic Studies & Research, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK; bJigoro
Kano Memorial International Sport Institute, Tokyo, Japan
This article provides an analysis of the development of sport policy in Japan with a
particular focus between 2007 and March 2012. It illustrates the way a necessary political
momentum was achieved for the enforcement of a new legislation for sport in Japan. The
first part of the article shows the recent but growing governmental and political salience
and interests in sport and the second part explains three key landmarks for the passage of
the Basic Sport Law. The third part maps out the fragmented administrative structure of
sport in Japan. The policy agenda of the government is now around the concept of the
development through sport in order to establish a state founded on a strong sporting
culture.
Keywords: sport policy; Japan; legislation; development through sport
Introduction
On the centenary anniversary of sport in Japan, the new Basic Sport Law came into force in
August 2011, which was followed by the publication of the Basic Sport Plan in March 2012.
Throughout the course of the enactment of the new Law, the characteristics of sport policy in
Japan and the shift in policy priority were highlighted. The objective of this article is to
provide an analysis of the development of sport policy in Japan. Its focus is between 2007,
after Tokyo became an applicant city for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, and
March 2012, when the Basic Sport Plan was published. It is intended to explain the process
by which the legislation came into force and why and how the necessary political momentum
was achieved. The first part of the article describes the development of sport policy up to
2000 by identifying some key events that can illustrate the highly variable, but recently
growing, governmental and political interest in sport. On the basis of the brief history of
government involvement in sport, the second part of the article illustrates the process that led
to the eventual passage of the new Basic Sport Law and its enforcement. Three principal
landmarks will be identified in relation to the gradual gathering of political momentum; one
of which will be Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The third part of
the article will explain the current administrative structure, including how the machinery of
government divides the responsibility for sport and the roles of the central and regional sport
organizations. The way the public policy for sport is funded is also explained as are the
public policy objectives that are expected to be achieved in return for funding. In the context
of the new Law, the emerging policy trends and possible challenges will be explored in
*Email: yaya.yamamoto@100yearlegacy.org
ISSN 1940-6940 print/ISSN 1940-6959 online

# 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19406940.2012.685489
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278 M.Y.-Y. Yamamoto
relation to the emphasis in current policy on creating Japan as a ‘leading sport nation’ and a
‘state founded on sport’, shifting the focus from the ‘development of sport’ to ‘development
through sport’.
The gradual involvement of government in sport policy

The involvement of the government in sport in Japan was tentative in the post-World War II
era. The role of the government during the wartime era was to prepare strong and healthy
soldiers and citizens for war (Kusafuka 1979, Kozu 1994). It can be confidently stated that
the government’s involvement with the structure of sport in the post-war time was to avoid
the association of sport (or rather physical education, PE) with militarism. Nevertheless, the
post-war introduction of the annual national athletic/sport competition, called as Kokumin
Taiiku-taikai (known as, and hereafter referred to as, Kokutai), which rotates around all 47
prefectures across Japan, contained echoes of the wartime era due to the Imperial Trophy
awarded to the winning prefecture. This national event has quickly become significant
because the government allocates a budget to the hosting prefecture and identifies the
event as an important element in the promotion of mass participation and elite sport (see
Takahashi and Tokimoto 1996).
It is generally acknowledged that a crucial period in shaping the government’s involve-
ment in sport was between the awarding of the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1959 and the actual
Games in 1964. In 1958, the Physical Education Bureau, which was abolished right after
World War II due to its close association with militarism, was re-established in the Ministry
of Education in preparation for the Asian Games in the same year and the bid for the 1964
Games. The 1964 Games became a national project due to the ‘powerful symbolic value,
both domestically and internationally, of hosting a successful Olympic Games’ (Yamamoto
2008, p. 58). The government was centrally involved and invested in both infrastructure and
the development of the sport structure. During this phase of the post-war economic recovery
and development, the government was interested in the promotion of the health and physical
fitness of the general public. The government also raised national concerns over the success
of Japanese athletes in international sport and at the Olympic Games with a view to
increasing Japan’s international presence and representation as well as raising national
pride. A total of ¥2.06 billion was invested over six fiscal years which included ¥5 million
to elite development (JASA 1986). During this period, a significant milestone was the
enactment of the Sports Promotion Law in 1961, which has become the guiding legislation
in sport up to 2011, determining the objectives and areas of activity to be undertaken by
national sport agencies, municipal responsibilities and the organizational and funding
framework.
A ‘blank’ post-Tokyo 1964 Games period, mid-1960s–1980s

The post-Games era up to the 1980s was largely driven by a ‘sport-for-all’ agenda, but the
government’s involvement in sport was much reduced during this period. This was repre-
sented by the publication of the Fundamental Policies for the Promotion of Physical
Education and Sport in 1972 by the Advisory Council of Health and Physical Education
(ACHPE 1972). During the 1980s, the neoliberal policies of the government influenced the
direction of sport policy (Henry and Uchiumi 2001). It can be highlighted that due to the
societal transformation and related lifestyle changes, leisure activity was incorporated into
the consumption culture and the commercial sectors in sport, leisure and outdoor activities
flourished. Uchiumi argued that the 1980s was characterized by the dependence on
International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 279
investment through the ‘pure, private capital resources’ in sport (2002: 6). It was also a time
of political intervention in elite sport (Japan boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games)
and a time of growing concern at the poor performance of Japanese athletes at international
competition. One consequence of the general turbulence was that Prime Minister Nakasone
‘privately’ founded, in September 1987, a supra-cabinet advisory council, called the Round-
Table Council for Sports Promotion. Though it was a ‘private’ (i.e. non-civil service)
arrangement by the prime minister, its recommendations in March 1988 were significant
due to its substantial influence on the subsequent development of sport policy, an aspect of
which can be seen in the ACHPE Report, Strategies for the Promotion of Sports for the 21st
Century of 1989 (ACHPE 1989). This 1989 Report endorsed most of the recommendations
put forward by Nakasone’s advisory council, including the development of mid- to long-
term (5-year) sport promotion plan, the establishment of a national training centre and a
national sports research centre for elite sport and the establishment of a sports promotion
fund (Seki 1997). The 1989 Report also coined the term ‘lifelong sport’ by highlighting the
triad of ways in which citizens engage in sport, not only ‘doing and viewing sport’ as the
conventional approaches to sport, but also ‘supporting sport’ which was subsequently
endorsed in the ACHPE Report in 1997 (ACHPE 1989, 1997).
A growth in the general interest in sport, late 1980s–1990s

As indicated, the period in the late 1980s and the early 1990s saw the rapid growth in the
general interest in sport, leisure, recreation and health/health promotion and in the commer-
cial sector related to health. During this period, a number of ministries became engaged in
sport policy though mainly to achieve non-sport policy objectives (Yamamoto 2011). The
passage of the Comprehensive Resort Region Provisional Law (known as the Resort Law) in
1987, for instance, planned to (artificially) establish ‘resorts’ in 42 areas under the auspices
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Land, Transport and
Tourism (currently Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, MLIT) and the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Seki argued that although the introduc-
tion of the Resort Law was intended to expand the domestic market and to open it to greater
international capital investment, it was likely only to benefit the construction companies and
result in huge environmental damage rather than provide greater leisure or recreational
opportunities to a wide range of citizens (Seki 1997, p. 434–464, see also Yamashita and
Seino 1995, Horne 1998). It can be argued that although the overall sport policy had once
been confined within the remit of the Ministry of Education (presently the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, MEXT), its use of private finance to
stimulate the domestic economy and to expand domestic demand now aligned it more with
the national policy areas of economy and industry.
It was also during this period that health promotion came on to the national agenda
with, for instance, the introduction of the Active Health Plan (previously the Health Japan
Programme published in 1978) in 1988 by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (currently
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, MHLW) to encourage physical activity for all
citizens (MHW 1988). The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is also
engaged in the promotion of sport at the prefectural and regional levels. This latter
involvement became more apparent when Prime Minister Koizumi appointed Taro Aso,
an Olympian who was the then minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, as the
Public Sports Minister (Kokumin Sports Daijin) in 2005. However, the appointment was of
limited duration and failed to generate any substantial achievements. Notwithstanding the
relative lack of impact, the appointment was notable first because the initiative bypassed
the MEXT and second, because it was the first time that ‘sport’ had appeared in a
ministerial title.
Influenced by the 1989 Report, it can be argued that the 1997 Report by ACHPE laid the
foundation for current policies emphasizing the improvement of children’s health and
physical activity, lifelong sport participation and elite sport. The 1997 Report was significant
in bringing ‘health promotion’ or ‘health education’ to light with an emphasis on identifying
appropriate levels of physical activity and sport depending on one’s age and lifestyle. It also
noted the poor performance of the Japanese athletes at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games as a
further policy concern by identifying a lack of a systematic support structure for elite athletes
(ACHPE 1997). The 1997 Report was also significant because it confirmed the necessity of
establishing a public agency to coordinate anti-doping activity and also an appeal body for
sport disputes.
The master plan for sport, 2000–2010

Although the ACHPE Reports were important, it should nonetheless be stressed that it
was the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Sport, 2000–2010 (hereafter Basic Plan)
published by the MEXT in 2000, which finally provided the first master plan for sport
in Japan. Thirty-nine years after the passage of the Sports Promotion Law in 1961,
this Basic Plan was eventually produced and included a series of quantifiable policy
objectives covering the next 10 years. While the development of a detailed national
plan for sport had been required in the 1961 legislation (Clause 4), its significant
delay led the ACHPE to issue a report, upon the request of the Minister for Education,
which became a reference document guiding the direction of sport policy. It should be
stressed that the timing of the publication of the Basic Plan by the MEXT since April
2001 (previously the Ministry of Education and then the Ministry of Education,
Science, Sports and Culture, MESSC) coincided with and was coordinated with the
establishment of a lottery for sport from April 2002. The somewhat controversial
Sports Promotion Lottery Law was submitted by the Federation of Supra-party Diet
Members for Sport in 1998. It came into effect in January 2001 and the sale of sports
promotion lottery tickets, or Soccer Lottery (known as toto), subsequently began in
November 2001. In September 1999, before the Sports Promotion Lottery Law came
into effect, the Minister for Education, Akihito Arima, requested ACHPE to outline
the necessary priorities for toto distribution and the ACHPE responded with the triad
of objectives for sport, which were later reflected in the 2000 Basic Plan (ACHPE
1999). Tokimoto argued that the publication of the Basic Plan was due to the need to
solve problems associated with the financing of the sport promotion programme: the
Basic Plan legitimized the use of the new toto lottery (2004; 156; see below the
introduction of the toto as funding stream). The MESSC saw the introduction of the
toto as a major achievement for national sport actors who had now secured a revenue
source which would help achieve the objective of building a ‘“lifelong sporting
society”, in which everyone can become familiar with sports and lead a healthy and
active lifestyle at all times, top-level athletes can be developed to perform on the
world stage, and a rich sports environment can be established’ (Ministry of Education
et al. 1998).
The objective of the Basic Plan was defined as establishing a ‘vigorous, affluent and
active society in the twenty-first century’ with the ‘systematic and planned commitment’ of
central, municipal and regional governments to the three pillars of this sport policy: (1) the
realization of lifelong sport participation (more than 50% of adults to participate in sport
more than once a week); (2) the increase in international sporting competitiveness (securing
3.5% of overall medals available at summer and winter Olympic Games) and (3) the
development of school PE and sport through pillars (1) and (2) (Ministry of Education
et al. 2000). After the consultations with the Division of Sports and Youth of the Central
Council for Education (previously known as ACHPE), an interim review made in September
2006 stressed the need for a shift in policy focus in order to address a growing concern with
the decrease in the ‘fitness’ of children and the growing disparity in terms of access to sport
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ (MEXT 2006, Yamamoto 2011). With the revision
in 2006, the initial association of school PE and sport with elite sport development and
lifelong sport participation became less relevant as more emphasis was placed on the
enhanced role of education and the community for increasing children’s participation in
sport. Specialist sport facilities and related policy development were a focus for activity in
the early 2000s.
The increasing enthusiasm for state leadership in sport policy and the process of
enforcing the Basic Sport Law, 2007–2011
The developments in sport policy between 2007 to the eventual passage and enforcement of
new sport Law in 2011 are interesting as a phase of rapidly gathering enthusiasm for sport
among politicians, the government and sport officials as well as academics. It could be
argued that this phase of policy debate simply highlighted the previous un-strategic nature of
the government’s policy for sport: alternatively, it might be claimed that the political and
policy salience in sport had increased. However, it is interesting to observe that when the
final year of the Basic Plan passed in 2010, there was no audit, evaluation or analysis of the
10-year policy project commissioned by or undertaken by the government/MEXT. Instead,
the political interests and debate focused on the complete renewal of the ‘outdated’ Sports
Promotion Law of 1961. In its place, the ‘right for sport’ that encompassed such concepts as
justice, fairness, autonomy and good governance, the government’s responsibility for sport,
a streamlined ‘sport ministry/agency’ acquiring all responsibility for sport, and the devel-
opment of and through sport have been the focal points of the argument. As noted, it can be
argued that ‘sport policy in Japan [had] entered a potentially transformational phase’ towards
the acceptance of sport as an emblem of national strategy, prestige and status which was
reflected in a number of contemporary political and popular policy initiatives and discus-
sions (Yamamoto 2011).
Three key events occurred in parallel, which will accordingly be described and analysed
below. They were arguably triggered the political discussions that led to sport emerging as a
principal policy concern of the government. Although a detailed analysis of the policy-
making process is not appropriate for this article the period between 2007 and 2011 was one
of unprecedented political discussion and progress in policy development (see Table 1). This
concentrated period of activity could nevertheless be seen as a reflection of the previous
marginalized status of sport, the impact of the government’s changing agenda with regard to
sport policy, and the political enthusiasm of those parties and individual officials engaged in
sport. An enthusiasm for extending the opportunities and corresponding ‘legacy’ discourse
generated through the bid process for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games was also
important. Political momentum was generated for the ambition to create ‘a state founded on
sport’, in other words, identifying sport as the central policy and strategy of the government.
Table 1 lists the major initiatives resulting from and reflecting this enthusiasm, which were
the outcome of cross-party collaboration for the successful enactment of new legislation and
the support for creating a ministry or agency for sport. One important consequence of these
Table 1. Key dates and development of sport policy in relation to the Tokyo 2016 Bid
Key dates Policy development Tokyo 2016 related Comments
30 August 2006 The JOC selected Tokyo as the Japanese Fukuoka Prefecture was eliminated; Governor of Tokyo had
candidate for the XXI Olympiad and the initially shown his interest in bidding on 20 September 2005
282
Games of the XV Paralympiad. at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Assembly. The

members of the Assembly created the Federation for the
Olympic Bid on 22 February 2006, later endorsed by the
Assembly with a resolution on 8 March 2006.
7 June 2007 The JOC submitted Tokyo as the An early submission, deadline was 13 September 2007.
Applicant City to the IOC.
9 August 2007 A Leading Sport Nation, Nippon: National The report known as Endo Report; Five rationales for sport as
Strategy for Top Sports published. the national strategy identified with elite sport emphasized.
20 December 2007 The Supra-party Project Team for the The Project Team launched hearings (19 in total) with national
M.Y.-Y. Yamamoto
Enactment of the New Sport Promotion sport officials and experts.

Law established.
10 June 2008 LDP published the Interim report, Aiming The report stressed that international sporting success will lead
for the Developed Sporting Nation: to wider sporting opportunities and a stronger foundation for
sport as the national strategy. sport.
29 May 2009 The Supra-party Project Team for New The Project Team summarized the 17-week discussions and
Sport Promotion Law consolidated its identified, inter alia, the enactment of the Basic Sport Law as
summary of discussions. a principal law and outlined the strategies for making sport a
central government policy.
4 June 2008 Tokyo was selected as the Candidate City
by the IOC Executive Board.
14 July 2009 The Basic Sport Law, submitted to the Diet The DPJ pulled out of the legislation at the last minute, in view
by the LDP and New Komeito. of the upcoming general election.
27 July 2009 PM Aso dissolved the Diet and called for The general election was to be held on 30 August; the submitted
the general election. Basic Sport Law became consequently abandoned.
16 September 2009 Democratic Party of Japan came into Yukio Hatoyama became Prime Minister Emphasis on the
power after the general election and reduction of public expenditure and increased public
resignation of Aso as Prime Minister. accountability as a ‘deliberative democracy’. Public policy
areas became scrutinized.
2 October 2009 Final presentation at the 121st IOC
Session, Rio de Janeiro became the Host
City.
11 June 2010 Basic Sport Law was re-submitted to the The revised version from July 2009.
Diet.
26 August 2010 The Strategy for the Development of Sport- Some public comments were incorporated.
founded State: Sports Community,
Nippon was published by the MEXT.
31 May 2011 Basic Sport Law was presented to the An eight party Supra-party group collectively submitted the
House of Representatives. proposal to the 177th Diet session.
24 August 2011 Basic Sport Law enacted.
debates was to stimulate further the interest not only of politicians, but also of sport officials,
academics and citizens in the ambition to create a ‘leading sport nation’ and a state that is
‘founded on sport’. It could be argued that these processes of policy deliberations and debate
gave the government’s central sport policy a degree of maturity (see, e.g. Sasakawa Sports
Foundation 2010). The following section discusses more recent policy-making and espe-
cially, the role of advisory bodies.
The establishment of a policy advisory body and the operation of the supra-party
consultation process
The first key event, though perhaps often neglected, was the creation of an expert body
working closely with the minister who subsequently led the process of enactment of
legislation, and the publication of The Leading Sport Nation, Nippon: National Strategy
for Top Sport (known as, and hereafter, Endo Report) in August 2007. This report should be
highlighted as the starting point for a series of subsequent events leading to the increased
interest of political parties in establishing sport as a more central policy concern. In
December 2006, the then Senior Vice Minister of the MEXT, who was also the minister in
charge of sport, Toshiaki Endo, formed his personal consultation body, the Sport Promotion
Advisory Panel (Sports Shinkou ni kansuru Kondankai), composed of six sport adminis-
trators and (academic) experts in the field. This consultation body followed a similar model
to that adopted by former Prime Minister Nakanone, who established his supra-cabinet
advisory council in the late 1980s. The decision by Endo was significant as the formation of
a personal expert consultation group not only made possible the examination of a national
strategy for sport, but it also indicated that it was an urgent area of government’s policy. This
advisory body published the aforementioned Endo Report after conducting 11 deliberations
and three research visits including visits to the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) and the
Australian Institute of Sport (AIS). With the then current issues facing Japan and in relation
to the globalizing of sport, the report concluded that ‘the only way Japan can be successful in
the world elite sport is the state engagement’ (Sport Promotion Advisory Panel 2007, p. 31).
The report identified five ‘core rationales’ for greater government involvement. It should
be stressed that these rationales later became the key reference points for subsequent sport
legislation:
(1) it is sport that shows the Japanese prowess as one of the most developed nation-
states and indicates Japan’s increasing ‘presence’ on the international stage;
(2) it is sport that can contribute to international society, security and peace through
international sport events;
(3) it is sport that develops national prestige and healthy citizens;
(4) it is sport that brings an economic ripple effect and
(5) it is the rapidly changing and transforming nature of elite sport means that it cannot
be left outside of a government mandate – making it necessary to include the
development and support of athletes as a national strategy
(Sport Promotion Advisory Panel 2007, p. 3–4).
It is apparent that the Endo Report put a particular emphasis on the responsibility of the
government to invest in elite sport as a strategy for achieving long-term overarching goals
for sport. It was highlighted in the report that international competitions should be consid-
ered ‘state competitions’ further reinforcing the view that elite sport development was now
the ‘responsibility of the government’ hence the area of ‘investment of the state budget’
(ibid, 15–16). The report also recommended (1) the consolidation and streamlining of the
organizational structure for sport by the establishment of a Ministry (or Agency) for Sport,
the Japanese Sports Commission and the National Intelligence Agency for Sports; (2) the
enforcement of a new Sport Promotion Law that specifically stated the responsibilities of the
government; (3) the establishment of a specific budget for sport; (4) the development of an
anti-doping programme in Japan and the contribution to the global anti-doping activity,
particularly in the Asian region and (5) the development of a national programme for elite
sport, including an enhancement of the functions of the National Training Center of Japan.
The national programme for elite athletes would include intelligence activity and the support
structure that identifies talented athletes and develops athletes’ careers, scholarship pro-
grammes, as well as the bidding for, and hosting of, international sports events and
conferences (ibid, 22–30). The increased emphasis on elite sport was justified by its
international association and the potential increase in the profile of Japan, both of which
contribute to the formation of national identity.

The Endo Report in August 2007 was followed by the establishment of the Research
Committee for the Development of the Sporting Nation (Sports Rikkoku Chôsa-kai) in
October by the then ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The significance of this
Committee should be understood from the perspective that it was the very first time in the
LDP’s history that a research committee focused on ‘sport’ had been established inside the
LDP’s Policy Research Council, which effectively is the policy-making body of the party,
and consequently has significant influence on government policy. Its importance to the LDP
was further evident in the appointment of the former Prime Minister, and the then President
of Japan Sports Association (JASA), Yoshiro Mori as its Supreme Advisor, the Olympian
Taro Aso as its Chair, and Toshiaki Endo as the Secretary General. It could be argued that as
Chair, and later as Prime Minister (24 September 2008–16 September 2009), Aso helped to
maintain the enthusiasm of the government and members of his party. This was further
illustrated when Aso as Prime Minister later included sport as a central item on the agenda
for the Meeting of the Education Rebuilding Council (Kyouiku Saisei Kondankai1) – second
only to the Cabinet Office as a consultation body for education policy in general (see
Education Rebuilding Council 2007).
In late 2007, the LDP members who belonged to the Federation of Supra-party Diet
Members for Sport then initiated the formation of the Project Team for the Enactment of
New Sport Promotion Law (Shin-Sports Shinkou-hou Seitei Project Team, hereafter the PT for
New Sport Promotion Law) with members drawn from the coalition parties: New Komeito, the
Social Democratic Party, the People’s New Party and the biggest opposition party, the DPJ. The
Project Team was attached to the Supra-party Federation as the supreme body. The Advisory
Board for the Project Team for the Enactment of New Sport Promotion Law (hereafter Project
Team Advisory Board) was formed in April 2008, a similar type of consultation body
composed of experts and national sport officials as that initiated by Endo. The significance
of the Advisory Board, which eventually met on 10 occasions throughout the course of
consolidating the legislation, was that its recommendations were treated as expert opinion
that was shared among the Supra-party members/politicians and the government officials
(Advisory Board for the Project Team for the Enactment of New Sport Promotion Law 2009).
After 12 deliberations, the LDP’s Research Committee for the Development of the
Sporting Nation published the interim report, Aiming for the Developed Sporting Nation:
sport as the national strategy, in June 2008. This largely echoed the conclusions of the Endo
Report in stressing the urgent necessity to identify sport as the ‘source of the state’s vitality’
and realizing the promotion of Japan as a world leading nation in sport (Research Committee
for the Development of the Sporting Nation, 2008, p. 1). It stressed the significance of
international success for the promotion of sport by stating: ‘the higher the pinnacle of
sporting achievement, the wider the sport field and foundation can be’ (ibid, 2). The triad
of strategies for forming a developed sporting nation were identified as (1) the development
of international achievement; (2) the active engagement of the government in the successful
bid for international sport events and (3) providing support for the development of commu-
nity sport environments. The above-mentioned Cabinet-attached Meeting on Education
Rebuilding also echoed these LDP proposals when it published a report in May 2009 that
stressed the necessity of enactment of a sport basic law for realizing a ‘sport-founded state of
Nippon’ and enabling a comprehensive sport promotion policy (Meeting on Education
Rebuilding 2009: Chapter 3).
Following receipt of the interim report of the Project Team Advisory Board in April
2009, legislation for a new sport law was drafted by the LDP-led Working Group for the
Sport Basic Law following extensive discussions and consultations with the MEXT officials.
Toshiaki Endo MP, who acted as the Secretary General for the LDP Research Committee and
the Project Team, reflected on the process of finalizing the legislation and indicated the
necessary compromises that the LDP Working Group had to make with other parties,
especially the MEXT (quoted in SSF 2010, p. 17–18). One of the central compromises
concerned the creation of a specialist ministry for sport which needed to be toned down due
to the government’s ongoing administrative reforms. The proposal, in the supplementary
provision of the Basic Sport Law of 2009, only commented that ‘the necessary instruments
for the creation of the agency for sport could be considered’ (Basic Sport Law 2009). Since
the DPJ had pulled out at the very last minute due to the upcoming general election, the bill
was, in the end, put forward to the House of Representatives (Lower House) on 14 July 2009
solely by the LDP and New Komeito rather than as a cross-party group bill as originally
planned. Unfortunately, the dissolution of the Diet by Prime Minister Aso on 27 July 2009
resulted in the abandonment of the proposed Basic Sport Law.
Change of government and a shift of policy emphasis

The landslide win in the 2009 general election by the Democratic Party of Japan, and the
subsequent change in policy priorities from those of the LDP should be highlighted as the
second turning point in the sport policy development in Japan. This incoming government
had opposed the previously submitted Basic Sport Law of the LDP-New Komei partly
because, as it was reported, the DPJ did not agree with the way the establishment of an
agency for sport had been agreed as a precondition in the legislation (Asahi Shinbun, 20 June
2009). In the campaigning before the general election, each major party, except for the DPJ,
had identified sport in its Manifesto and argued for the creation of an agency dedicated to
sport. The LDP, for example, published a number of ‘policy promises’, one of which was the
enactment of ‘a fundamental law for sport’ as well as the establishment of ‘a Sport Agency to
promote regional sport activities and to oversee the training of top-level athletes’ (LDP 2009,
p. 6). The DPJ, however, did not ignore sport and indicated their interest in sport in their
Policy INDEX 2009, which was the foundation of their Manifesto. In this document, five
areas of policy for sport were highlighted, one of which was to enact a new law for sport by
taking into consideration the conventional triad of ‘doing’, ‘viewing’ and ‘supporting’ sport.
Other areas that were considered related to the development of the foundations for sport,
including regional and local sport facilities, further development of sport medicine and the
promotion of sport in the less-developed regions and a commitment to anti-doping activity
(DPJ 2009a,b).
A key emphasis of the DPJ policy was the introduction of the concept of the New
Public Commons (Atarashii Kôkyô), and the subsequent implementation of a ‘deliberative
democracy’ programme. The New Public Commons was defined: ‘venues of cooperation
established by and among stakeholders to create a society of mutual support and vibrancy’
and where ‘everyone has a place to go and a role to play’ (Cabinet Office et al. 2010a,
p. 2, 5). In his first policy speech, the newly appointed Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama
stressed the value of the New Public Commons as ‘slimming down of the state’ by
highlighting the significance of ‘stronger people’s power’. The DPJ also questioned the
bureaucrat-led policy-making process and advocated the active engagement of the not-for-
profit organizations and citizens in multiple ‘public’ arenas to take the lead and to extend
these activities to create a ‘new publicness’ (see Cabinet Office et al. 2010a,d). The
Round-Table Meeting (Entaku Kaigi) was formed to discuss and suggest policy areas
for achieving the objectives of the New Public Commons, namely meeting the objectives
of institutional transformation and stimulating an increased awareness of social responsi-

bilities and thereby forming a ‘new development strategy’ (Cabinet Office et al. 2010b). In
relation to the sport policy development, a special budget category for the fiscal year 2011
(known as the Special Budget for the Revival of a Vivid Japan [Genki na Nippon Fukkatsu
Tokubetsu Waku]) was agreed along with special ‘government action areas’ that were
suggested at the Round-Table Meeting. Among the 10 projects submitted by the MEXT,
one was the Vivid Japan, Sport-founded Project [Genki na Nippon Sports Rikkoku Project]
for the promotion of community sport and the development and enhancement of elite
athletes with the request for ¥5.4 billion (Cabinet Office et al. 2010a,c, MEXT 2010a).
After public consultation, this policy proposal for sport was granted ‘C’ status in terms of
the policy significance.2
As argued above, with the DPJ in power, some changes in policy discourse and policy-
making procedure became apparent. It was noticeable that the public policy areas and their
budget came under the scrutiny of the public; the DPJ opted for the idea of ‘deliberative
democracy’ that welcomed public comments and opinions which would be considered by
the government. The strategy paper for sport, The Strategy for the Development of a Sport-
founded State: Sport Community Nippon [Sports Rikkoku Senryaku: sports community,
Nippon], was first published by the MEXT as a ‘draft’ in July 2010 and was intended to
replace the non-audited 10-year Basic Plan. The Senior Vice Minister for the MEXT and
the Minister for Sport, Kan Suzuki, subsequently launched a public consultation exercise
on this draft for developing a national strategy. Despite the actual impact of the consulta-
tion exercise, it can be argued that the 3-week public consultation process was significant
in the sense that it was an evidence of the government’s commitment to deliberative
democracy, although it might also have served the purpose of producing an endorsement
of the proposed strategy as a means of increasing further the interest of the public as well as
the government officials in the process. Following the incorporation of some suggestions
from the consultation process, the policy document was formally published with the
objective of creating a ‘new sport culture’. To this end, five principal strategic areas for
enhancing ‘human resources’ in ‘doing’, ‘viewing’ and ‘supporting/developing’ sport as
well as the promotion of partnership and collaboration were written into the document
(MEXT 2010b). In contrast to the LDP-New Komei submitted legislation, the distinctive
element of DPJ’s policy emphasis was the specific statement on the ‘right to sport’ and
‘transparency and justice/fairness in sport’ which were emphasized along with specific
policies such as those related to global sport governance and anti-doping (MEXT 2010b,
p. 16–17; see also SSF 2010). Another area of policy significance within the context of the
DPJ’s overall policy can be found in extending network relationships among sport
organizations and the idea of ‘virtuous circle’ was stressed. Following the publication of
the policy, the comprehensive reform of the sport structure, the creation of a ‘sport agency’
and the enactment of a ‘sport law’ were stated as the next steps in the DPJ’s sport policy
development (MEXT 2010b, p. 19–20).
Despite their defeat in the election, the LDP-New Komei re-submitted a slightly revised
sport law to the Diet in June 2010. However, the DPJ had already acquired a lead in the
initiation of new legislation for sport and instigated a programme of consultations and
hearings. Fourteen agencies, including the lawyers’ association and the Japan Sports
Arbitration Agency, were invited in February 2011 to make presentations in accordance
with a questionnaire that had been answered in advance. The DPJ Federation of Sport MP
led the formation of the Supra-party Project Team for the Enactment of the Basic Sport Law,
which included eight parties (only one declined) and was co-chaired by the DPJ and the
LDP,3 in May 2011 to agree the content of the legislation. The proposed bills from the DPJ,
the LDP-New Komei and the Communist Party of Japan were compared and the previously
formed Advisory Board was also invited to provide comments to the Project Team members
(see, e.g. Tomochika, quoted in SSF 2011). In the very final phase of agreeing the legislation,
it was significant that the Culture and Science Committee of the House of Representatives
that subsequently agreed to submit the bill to parliament contacted individuals from the sport
field requesting their ‘expert evidence’ as to why sport should be treated as a national area of
policy (Culture and Science Committee of the House of Representatives 2011). After these
steps that were intended to ensure incorporating various actors’ viewpoint, eight political
parties agreed and submitted the Basic Sport Law, which unanimously passed in the both
Lower and Upper House, and speedily came into force within 3 months of its proclamation
on 24 August 2011.
The significance of the bid for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games
The third and final landmark event in the recent sport policy development was Tokyo’s bid
for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The candidature status of Tokyo and the
corresponding domestic and international campaigns during the candidature phase gained
from, and build upon, the momentum developed by past governments (LDP and DPJ) who
provided the government’s guarantees for the Games. It can be argued that the series of key
events described above and in Table 1 are both directly and indirectly co-related to what had
been undertaken during the 3-year bid phase (mainly from August 2006 to October 2009),
meaning, without the bid, they would not have been realized with such speed if at all.
Maintaining a focus on the arguments related to the complete renewal of the ‘outdated’
Sports Promotion Law of 1961 can be regarded as one of the biggest ‘legacies’ of the Tokyo
2016 Candidature (Sano argues a similar point, quoted in SSF 2010).
There were a number of initiatives to make the Tokyo’s bid a national project, which
could be seen as a driver of the development of sport policy. The first, and crucial, initiative
was to obtain the financial guarantee and other related guarantees from the government,
including the special arrangements for the foreign athletes and visitors and financing of the
athletes village, for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Tokyo 2016, 2009). Among
the many guarantees required by the International Olympic Committee (IOC 2008), the
financial guarantee for meeting the deficit from organizing the Games was seen as essential
(Tokyo 2016, 2010). The financial guarantee for the 2016 Games had been granted on
3 February 2009 by the Prime Minister Aso just before the deadline for the submission of
Tokyo’s Candidature File to the IOC (12 February 2009). The significance of this should be
stressed because the financial guarantee applied not only for the Tokyo 2016 Games but also
for the international sport events in general. The above-mentioned LDP’s interim strategy
report in August 2008, Aiming for the Developed Sporting Nation: sport as the national
strategy, had initially identified the necessity for national engagement in bidding for inter-
national sport events as one of the three national objectives and stressed the importance of
the government agreeing to underwrite financially any successful bid on international sport
events which the LDP viewed as a means to strengthen international sport diplomacy
(Research Committee for the Developed Sporting Nation 2008). The financial guarantee
became a precedent, which was specified in the Basic Sport Law, ‘the central government
shall facilitate such necessary provisions as enhancing societal support and securing finances
for the bid and hosting events’ (Basic Sport Law 2011: Clause 27).
The second initiative designed to make the bid a national project was the expression of
support for the Tokyo 2016 Bid by the members of the parliament, who formed the
Federation for the Support of 2016 Olympics in Japan in December 2008, led by the
Federation of Supra-party Diet Members for Sport. A total of 186 members from both the
House of Representatives and the House of Councillors expressed their support for the
2016 Games in Japan, which helped achieve the eventual endorsement of Tokyo’s bid in
both Houses in March 2009. One also cannot ignore the fact that the bidding for the
Olympic and Paralympic Games was influenced by the Prime Minister’s office. During the
Tokyo candidacy, Prime Minister and Olympian, Aso, was strongly supportive of the
Tokyo’s bid, especially in relation to obtaining the financial guarantee for the Games at the
very last phase of the Candidature File submission and during the Evaluation Commission
visit by the IOC. It was Aso who, as the Chair of the LDP’s Research Committee for the
Development of the Sporting Nation, was centrally involved in a series of initiatives for
making sport a national policy. Given the change of government, the last-minute decision
by the newly appointed Prime Minister Hatoyama to become a member of Tokyo’s final
presentation delegation at the 121st IOC Session can also be acknowledged as significant
and symbolic.
Another point to highlight, which illustrates the impact of the Tokyo 2016 Candidature
on the newly drafted legislation on sport, is the change of the bid committee name to the
Tokyo 2016 Olympic & Paralympic Games Bid Committee in April 2008 by adding the
world Paralympic. Though often ignored, this change in name should be highlighted because
of the separate ministerial authorities that for the Olympics lay with the MEXT, whereas that
for the Paralympics lay with the MHLW. One of the central challenges for the renewal of the
sport law was to unify the disjointed ministerial divisions and bring disability sport into the
‘mainstream’ of sporting activity and policy and to regard Paralympians as high-
performance athletes (see Yamamoto 2011). For this, the Tokyo 2016 Bid’s Committee,
which was endorsed by the Competitive Sports Division of the MEXT, had created a fait
accompli regarding this debate. The LDP-New Komei version of Basic Sport Law, which
was eventually approved, acknowledged the international and domestic sport competitions
organized by the Japan Sports Association for the Disabled (JSAD) and the government’s
responsibility to support Paralympic athletes in the same way as those for the Olympics
(Basic Sport Law 2009, 2011).
It can be argued that Tokyo’s bid for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games was
almost treated as a national project and could have created a similar momentum as did the
1964 Tokyo Olympic Games. Given that further analysis would be required to understand
the process and the impact of the bid on national policy change or debate, we can only
speculate that a number of political initiatives in relation to the enforcement of the Basic
Sport Law were driven in parallel with Tokyo’s 2016 bid. It is apparent that without the bid,
the political enthusiasm for the enactment of new legislation and the debate surrounding the
creation of a dedicated ministry or agency for sport would not have achieved such momen-
tum. Nevertheless, in the post-bid phase, while some of the momentum for uniting the
political parties for a ‘common’ goal was lost, sufficient residual interest remained to ensure
progress towards the enactment of the new legislation. The Supra-party joint submission,
composed of eight different political parties, of the Basic Sport Law to the 2011 Diet session
was made in May and was unanimously passed in both the Houses. The Law defines the
fundamental principles of sport and clarifies the responsibilities, including financial, of the
central and municipal governments. Among the new policy statements in the legislation, the
acknowledgement of the ‘right for sport’ should be highlighted as the most important. The
Law states that: ‘It is the right of all people to enjoy happiness and the amenities of life
through sport’ (Basic Sport Law 2011, Clause 2).
Current administrative structure, main sources of funding for sport and the recent
trends in funding
It should first be noted that with the implementation of the new Basic Sport Law, the current
structure illustrated in this article will likely have undergone some transformation. The
policy area of sport in Japan is congested and cluttered. In other words, multiple ministries
and agencies are involved but have different priorities related variously to sport, leisure and
outdoor-related activities, physical activity and health (see Yamamoto 2011). As highlighted
in the previous section, the recent political interest in, and the debate around, the revision and
the complete renewal of the Sports Promotion Law of 1961 and the political will to create a
sporting ministry or agency has drawn attention to the fragmented nature of the sport policy
sector. The recommendation in the Endo Report, for example, to create a Japan Sports
Commission, which would take all responsibility and authority for a ‘unified and consistent
policy’ towards projects ‘related to the promotion of sport’, is a clear reflection of the
frustration with the fragmented nature of the administration of sport policy (Sport Promotion
Advisory Panel 2007, p. 22).
As noted, the MEXT has been the principal government ministry responsible for sport
and PE. However, when it comes to the programmes delivered by the commercial sector in
sport or health, such as sports goods, leisure industries or fitness clubs, the METI is the
responsible body. As for the policy in the area of physical activity, health and welfare, the
MHLW takes charge, whereas the MLIT oversees the sport fields, parks and natural activity
areas (see Yamamoto 2011, p. 258–261). At the municipality level, there is a growing trend
to locate responsibility for the sport portfolio outside the education department, either on its
own or combined occasionally and strategically with the health portfolio. The Tokyo
Metropolitan Government, for example, unified all related divisions of sport to create the
Bureau of Sports in July 2010.
The Sports and Youth Bureau within the MEXT is responsible for government sport
policy with five divisions dedicated to the following policy priorities: overall development
and monitoring of sport policy (including school sport/PE); sport for all; competitive sports;
school health education and promotion of youth education and the improvement of physical
fitness and youth development. The existence of the Central Council for Education within
the MEXT provides a distinctive element to decision-making. Of the five subdivisions of the
Central Council for Education, the Sports and Youth Division4 is the advisory body that
conducts research and provides recommendations or policy advice directly to the MEXT
minister. However, as highlighted in the previous section, there have been a number of
intensive initiatives by the politicians to raise the profile of sport and create a ministry or
agency specifically for sport, which would certainly influence the direction of policy and the
profile of sport within government. At the sub-national government level, the National
Agency for Advancement of Sports and Health (hereafter NAASH) is an independent
administrative institution that delivers the national policy for the promotion of sport and
health of children and youth. Its programmes and operations are financed and monitored by
the Sports and Youth Bureau of the MEXT.
The NAASH has the responsibility for managing and distributing the three funding
streams available in Japan: (1) the Sports Promotion Fund (established in 1990, principally
for the development of elite athletes); (2) the Sports Promotion Lottery or toto (distribution
started in 2002 mainly for ‘sport for all’) and (3) the Support for the Development of Sport
Project (introduced in 2003, for winning medals). The Japan Institute of Sports Sciences
(JISS), inaugurated in October 2001, is one of the operational divisions of the NAASH and is
focused on specialist services for elite athletes; it is a centralized institute with the primary
aim to support and develop athletes of medal-winning potential, including support for
municipally or locally-led talent identification programmes. The establishment of JISS
enabled the concentration of specialist services in sport science, medical support and
research for elite athletes, plus a ‘mini training centre’ with a limited range of indoor
facilities. Under the National Project for the Improvement in High Performance (started in
2009), the Competitive Sports Division funded NAASH/JISS for the Team ‘Nippon’ Multi-
Supports Project (originally started in 2008) in order to provide holistic, professional support
across eight potential medal-winning sports and disciplines at the London 2012 Olympics
and the Sochi 2014 winter Olympic Games. One of the assigned projects for JISS is to set up
a Multi-Support House during the Olympic Games and provide on-site support, whereas the
University of Tsukuba was granted permission to conduct the Research & Development
Elite Sport Performance Project designed to identify, refine and improve elite performance.
The objective of this national project is to strategically invest in the ‘multiple aspects of
comprehensive professional support’ to targeted sports and medal-winning athletes. It aims
at creating ‘a unified and consistent multi-support system, unique to Japan’ (MEXT Press
Release, 21 June 2010). The National Training Centre of Japan (currently Ajinomoto
National Training Center, hereafter NTC) became fully operational, in January 2008, at
the request of Prime Minister Koizumi soon after the success of the Japanese athletes at the
Athens Olympic Games in 2004. The investment of around ¥22 billion (total of ¥37.4
billion, including the purchase of land) in the construction of the NTC should be highlighted
as providing an insight into the policy process. Headed by the then Director of JISS, an
expert committee, which included sport officials from the national sport agencies and
academics in the field, was formed upon the request of the Director General of the Sport
and Youth Bureau of MEXT (13 July 2001–31 March 2003) in order to identify the functions
and specialist programmes at the NTC. The National Training Centre Expert Committee
argued that the proposed NTC should operate in partnership with the JISS and with the
already-existing training bases for winter sport events, marine/waterside sports and high-
altitude training (NTC Expert Committee 2003, 2004). The operation and delivery system of
the NTC was decided during the time when Hiroshi Hase, the Olympian, was the minister in
charge of sport, and the public–private hybrid operational system was agreed after a long
discussion. The facility itself is managed by the NAASH, whereas the Japan Olympic
Committee (JOC) is responsible for facilitating the actual delivery of the programmes,
namely those associated with the young elite athletes academy, the development of elite
coaches and management directors, athlete education and second career support (for details,
see Yamamoto 2008).
There are three central non-governmental bodies (or ‘private’ corporations) that are
directly linked to the MEXT: the JOC, the JASA and the Budokan. The JOC is
responsible specifically for the success of elite athletes at international sport events
and its analyses determine the strategy for high-performance programmes as well as the
annually targeted allocation of funding to national federations and elite athletes. In
addition, along with the JISS’ Team Nippon project, the JOC won the public bid to be
commissioned by the Competitive Sports Division for the Next Generation of Athletes,
Special High Performance Enhancement Project (under the above-mentioned national
project), which is designed to increase athletes achievement. A budget of ¥227 million
was acquired in 2009 in order to hire national coaches/managers in the 14 medal-
potential sports. As for the JASA, its mandate is to achieve the policy objective
associated with the ‘realization of a lifelong sport society’ that mainly involves provid-
ing subsidies for projects that develop sport coaches/instructors and sport exchange. At
sub-national level, all 47 prefectures are members of the Prefectural PE (or Sports)
Association with JASA, which consequently has considerable influence over the direc-
tion and promotion of sport in general, partly due to its oversight of the funding
allocation and commissioned programme operated by the Prefectural PE Associations
regarding the development of Comprehensive Community Sports Clubs. Since 1955, the
prefectural organizing committee for the annual inter-prefectural National Athletic Meet
(Kokutai) has been funded by the MEXT, which is the co-host along with JASA and
despite the ‘reform’ of Kokutai, its significance at the prefectural level remains strong
(for further information, see Yamamoto 2008, 2011).
The Japan Anti-Doping Agency (JADA) was created in September 2001 as a ‘judicial
foundation’, not as a public body as originally planned, to act as an independent agency for
anti-doping. JADA has been governmentally recognized as the sole responsible national
body for anti-doping activity since 2007 when the MEXT ratified the UNESCO
International Convention against Doping in Sport and required sport organizations to
comply with the Japan Anti-Doping Code (MEXT 2007). JADA was in receipt of govern-
ment funding for increasing the number of doping tests to the ‘international standard of
8,000’ between 2006 and 2008. From 2009, the funding for conducting doping tests now
comes from the toto. However, because of a growing recognition of the importance of anti-
doping programmes for education and research, ¥122 million was allocated to JADA for
these purposes in 2009 (GRU 2009, MEXT 2010d: Project No. 0369). In 2011, JADA
obtained a public corporate status, the same as the JOC, and had its role and responsibility
recognized in the Basic Sport Law.
‘Government Revitalization’ and increased funding for sport

In recent years, under the DPJ government, the trend in funding for sport has been influenced
by so-called Government Revitalisation project (or the reform of public administration). The
project is aimed at bringing power back to the Cabinet, the elected members of parliament
and legislative organs and away from the influence of bureaucrats. It is also intended to
eliminate ‘wasteful’ expenditure, through seeking efficiency in policy delivery and making
budgetary processes and policy-making more transparent to the public (see Cabinet
Secretariat 2009). The policy and budget reviewers, both members of parliament and
‘private’ figures appointed by the Government Revitalisation Unit (hereafter GRU), under-
took the first round of screening of 449 national projects from all ministries, including the
Cabinet Office, in November 2009. The screening process was open to the public.5
In the first round, the effectiveness and appropriateness of funding for sport as well as the
projects nationally commissioned by the Sports and Youth Bureau were scrutinized. Among
the many project areas for the development of sport, five projects, for which Sports and
Youth Bureau budgeted in 2009, were assessed. These were the development of regional
sport facilities; the development of Comprehensive Community Sports Clubs; support of the
prefectural Kokutai organizing committee; the promotion of anti-doping activity and the
promotion of the ‘utilisation of green field’ (sic) (GRU 2009, p. 3.3).
The ‘recommendations’ provided by the GRU Working Group are not legally binding. It
is evident that each ministry as well as all non-departmental bodies (or independent admin-
istrative institutions) and public-interest corporations, including not-for-profit bodies that
are partially funded by taxpayer money, have been impacted by this budget screening
process and by the political discourse to justify their spending in the light of effectiveness,
efficiency and public accountability. One of the consequences has been that a thorough self-
evaluation is undertaken by the ministries, all of which are required to demonstrate the
legitimacy of their budget requests and projects. Before the GRU conducted the third-round
screening (October 2010), the MEXT not only examined all their projects budgeted and
delivered in 2009, and then published their self-evaluation in a standardized Public Project
Review Sheet, but also ensured all the recommendations provided in the first round of
screening were reflected in the 2011 fiscal budget (see MEXT 2010c). Of the 535 projects
implemented by the MEXT, the Sports and Youth Bureau examined a total of 86 (including
three projects shared with other bureaux of the MEXT) and also identified some projects as
unnecessary, for example, the annual National Coach Summit.
Future developments in sport policy and funding

The trend towards the self-evaluation of policy effectiveness and efficiency, the budget
screening and the anticipated funding cuts could be hugely influential in the public policy
expenditure in a long term and are almost certain to affect sport. It is thus uncertain whether
the government budget could enable further investment in sport and given the limited
sources of sport funding available outside of taxation (i.e. lottery money and Sports
Promotion Fund). The GRU Working Group highlighted that there are overlaps between
the government funding and the Sports Promotion Fund/toto in financing both the support
and development of elite athletes (including talent identification and development) and the
support of coach development and their activities. It recommended more streamlined
funding arrangements and specifically a unified sport budget as a means of possibly further,
reducing government funding (GRU 2010, p. 11.11, 11.25). However, cuts to sport budgets
have not so far materialized. The sports-related budget for the fiscal year 2010 increased to
¥22.7 billion, as a result of positive evaluations and reviews. Interestingly, under the
National Project for the Improvement in High Performance Sport, ¥530 million was
allocated in 2009, while the project was expanded to ¥2.412 billion in 20106 (see MEXT
2010d: Project No. 0366).
The ongoing positive political debate and the continued enthusiasm and momentum
in relation to sport following the passage of the Sport Law are indicative of the recent
change in the political salience of sport. In addition, if the much-anticipated creation of a
sole agency/ministry for sport takes place, further impetus would be added to the claim
that sport is becoming a centrally important public policy area and would help secure the
resource foundation of the sub-sector. Following the enactment of the Basic Sport Law,
the Basic Sport Plan for actual implementation of policy over the next 10 years was
published in March 2012. It can be highlighted that the following four elements of the
legislation will determine the development of sport policy. First, the emerging sport
policy will be affected by the DPJ’s overarching policy emphasis on the ‘right to sport’
and the concepts as ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ in sport with respect to autonomy of sport
that encourages and empowers civil society through partnerships and network relation-
ships (see MEXT 2010b). There will need to be clarification regarding the interpretation
of the right of citizens to sport and how that right might be protected and how the
government will ensure justice and fairness in sport. The second element is the accep-
tance by government of greater responsibility for sport reflected in the easing of the
sport-related taxation and the bidding for, and hosting of, international sport events.
With regard to the successful bidding to host events, the extent and depth of commitment
of the government is generally crucial. Third, while a sport agency/ministry is eagerly
supported by sports organizations, it is interesting to observe the increase in cross-
ministerial collaboration and agreement and the impact of administrative reviews and
reforms of the NAASH and other non-governmental bodies of sport that have been
achieved since the passage of the Law. Last but most importantly, the significance in the
shift of policy emphasis in the legislation from achieving development of sport to
development through sport should be stressed in relation to the idea of a ‘state founded
on sport’. Since the DPJ came to power, the emerging argument in relation to sport
policy has been around the balance between sport for all (or community sport), elite
sport and PE and school sport. Though the argument is conventional, it is the (con-
ceptual) clarity or separation between sport and PE that has been the central issue.
However, more importantly, the idea of creating a state founded on sport by the policy
concept of development through sport has become a fundamental element of the policy
agenda of the government which is likely to have a substantial impact not only on the
domestic policy and infrastructure but also at the international level in relation to
Japanese involvement with international sport organizations.
Notes
1. It was initially the Education Rebuilding Council, established in October 2006 and later renamed
to the Meeting on Education rebuilding, whereas abandoned by DPJ in November 2009.
2. After the public consultation process, the Evaluation Commission of the Special Budget for the
Revival of a Vivid Japan granted the policy significance to each proposed project. The evaluation
was given based on the content of the project and the ‘attitudes towards reformation’ and
evaluation was given accordingly: ‘A’, positive overall; ‘B’, positive in the project but some
issues in attitudes towards reformation; ‘C’, some values in the project but big issue in the attitudes
towards reformation; and ‘D’ negative in the content of the project (Evaluation Commission of the
Special Budget for the Revival of the Vivid Japan 2010a).
3. These eight parties are: DPJ, LDP, New Komei, the Communist Party of Japan, Social Democratic
Party, Your Party, the People’s New Party and New Renaissance Party. The Sunrise Party of Japan
left the decision to the Supra-party Project Team.
4. The ACHPE and the Youth division of the Council of Lifelong Learning were merged on 6 January
2001 as a consequence of the administrative restructure of the government.
5. The Government Revitalisation Unit was created on 18 September 2009, as soon as the DPJ
government was formed, and it was placed under the Cabinet Office and chaired by the Prime
Minister. There are four main areas that the Unit works on: to reduce wasteful budget spending and
public work projects; to deregulate and undergo institutional reformations; to improve
transparency of public administration; and to increase the use of private funding and
reformation in public services. The first round of screening in November 2009 was conducted to
review all national projects delivered by the general account (the overall saving was about ¥700
million from the 2010 budget requests). The second round was held in April–May 2010 with two
stages to scrutinize the 151 programmes of 47 independent administrative institutions and public-
interest corporations (recommended to abolish 36 projects and 50 to ‘scale back’ and requested to
return of ¥1.8 billion to the treasury), whereas the third round targeted on 18 Special Accounts and
48 projects under those special accounts, as well as those projects that had been recommended to
cut budget or greatly reduce budget in the first round, but not being met the recommendations
(October 2010). All the Government Revitalisation Unit and the rounds of screening are available:
http://www.cao.go.jp/gyouseisasshin/
6. However, due to the termination of the Team ‘Nippon’ Multi-Supports Project, the requested
budget for 2011 went down to ¥ 486 million.
Acknowledgment
I would like to express my special thanks to Professor Barrie Houlihan of Loughborough University for
his expert knowledge.
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On: 14 December 2014, At: 17:08

International Journal of Sport Policy

Development of the sporting nation:

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19406940.2012.685489

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ISSN 1940-6940 print/ISSN 1940-6959 online

The gradual involvement of government in sport policy

A ‘blank’ post-Tokyo 1964 Games period, mid-1960s–1980s

A growth in the general interest in sport, late 1980s–1990s

The master plan for sport, 2000–2010

Games of the XV Paralympiad. at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Assembly. The

Enactment of the New Sport Promotion sport officials and experts.

contribute to the formation of national identity.

Change of government and a shift of policy emphasis

of institutional transformation and stimulating an increased awareness of social responsi-

‘Government Revitalization’ and increased funding for sport

Future developments in sport policy and funding

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