Serrano vs NLRC

The Wenphil doctrine stated that it was unjust to require an employer to reinstate an employee if, although termination is
made with cause, if due process was not satisfied. The remedy was to order the payment to the employees of full
backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But his dismissal
must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because the dismissal is ineffectual. In termination of employment
under Art. 283, the violation of notice requirements is not a denial of due process as the purpose is not to afford the
employee an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him for there is none. The purpose is to give him time to
prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment. With respect to Art. 283, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does
not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which
makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.

If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either
case, whether he is reinstated or given separation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without
written notice at least 30 days in advance. With respect to dismissals under 282, if he was dismissed for any of the just
causes in 282, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was
terminated until it is determined that the termination is for a just cause because the failure to hear him renders the
termination of his employment without legal effect.

Agabon vs NLRC

To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to
give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.[14] It is a form of
neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.[15] For a valid finding... of
abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative
factor which is manifested by... overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to
work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
An employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his employer, for the purpose of
looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job.
The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another
company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead... argued that sending notices
to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the
private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's
last... known address.[21] Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due
process.
That in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the
better rule is to abandon the
Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the
employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights.
Roos Industrial vs NLRC
The NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal within the ten (10)-day reglementary period to perfect the
appeal as the appeal bond was filed eight (8) days after the last day thereof.

The appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from
the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision. The appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. Without
said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Indeed, non-compliance with such legal requirements
is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. It must be stressed that there is no inherent right
to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of statute.

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond.”The overpowering legislative intent of Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of the appeal bond
requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a burden imposed on the employer. The intention of the
lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by
the provision that an appeal may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The word “only” makes it
perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive
means by which an employer’s appeal may be considered completed. The law however does not require its outright
payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. What
petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of such bond. The overpowering legislative
intent of Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of the appeal bond requirement as a requisite for the perfection of
an appeal and as a burden imposed on the employer (Borja Estate v Balad, G.R. No. 152550, June 8, 2005).

The judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the
Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried
into effect.It is well to recall too our pronouncement in Senarillos v. Hermosisima, et al. that the judicial interpretation of a
statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. Such judicial doctrine does not amount
to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, as is the situation
in this case.

SMU vs CA

The SC held that section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, provides that full-time teachers
who have satisfactorily completed their probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent.[6] Furthermore,
the probationary period shall not be more than six consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in
the tertiary level. Thus, the following requisites must concur before a private school teacher acquires permanent
status: (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service;
and (3) such service must have been satisfactory.

In the present case, petitioner claims that private respondent lacked the requisite years of service with the university
and also the appropriate quality of his service, i.e., it is less than satisfactory. The basic question, however, is whether
respondent is a full-time teacher.

Since there is no showing that respondent worked on a full-time basis for at least three years, he could not have
acquired a permanent status. A part-time employee does not attain permanent status no matter how long he has
served the school. And as a part-timer, his services could be terminated by the school without being held liable for
illegal dismissal. Moreover, the requirement of twin-notice applicable only to regular or permanent employees could
not be invoked by respondent.

Yet, this is not to say that part-time teachers may not have security of tenure. The school could not lawfully terminate
a part-timer before the end of the agreed period without just cause. But once the period, semester, or term ends, there
is no obligation on the part of the school to renew the contract of employment for the next period, semester, or term.
Verdadero vs Barney Autolines

Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because "continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay" and other benefits. Aptly called a
dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may,
likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part
of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.
It is to be emphasized that the unlawful acts should have been committed by the employer against the employee.
Unlawful acts committed by a co-employee will not bring the matter within the ambit of constructive dismissal.
Manalo vs Ateneo de Naga
At the heart of the issue of constructive dismissal is the matter of whether the employer’s actions are warranted. Here, we
find ample basis not only for the precautionary measures actually taken on petitioner, but even for other heavier penalties
that could have been imposed on her. It is true that petitioner may have been inconvenienced by the mandated transfer,
but, to reiterate, not every inconvenience, disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure sustains a
finding of constructive dismissal. With the backdrop of petitioner’s professional indiscretions, respondent Ateneo de Naga
University, through its president, respondent Fr. Tabora, validly exercised a management prerogative. Ultimately, there
were more than ample reasons for taking precautionary measures against petitioner. Respondent Ateneo de Naga
University could not be said to have acted in an arbitrary, unjustified, or unwarranted manner in preventing petitioner from
teaching accountancy subjects. Having failed to prove this crucial element of what amounts to constructive dismissal,
petitioner’s complaint against respondents was rightly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
SMART vs Astorga

However, SMART failed to comply with the one-month notice prior to termination. The record is clear that Regina received
the notice of termination only on March 16, 1998 or less than a month prior to its effectivity on April 3, 1998. Likewise, the
Department of Labor and Employment was notified of the redundancy program only on March 6, 1998.

SMART’s assertion that Regina cannot complain of lack of notice because the organizational realignment was made
known to all the employees as early as February 1998 fails to sway. Regina’s actual knowledge of the reorganization
cannot replace the formal and written notice required by the law. Notwithstanding her knowledge of the reorganization,
she remained uncertain about the status of her employment until SMART gave her formal notice of termination.

Rivera vs Genesis Bus

Serious misconduct as a just cause for termination was discussed in Yabut v. Manila Electric Co.:29

Misconduct is defined as the "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For serious misconduct to justify dismissal, the
following requisites must be present: (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it
must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer

Thus, it is not enough for an employee to be found to have engaged in improper or wrongful conduct. To justify termination of
employment, misconduct must be so severe as to make it evident that no other penalty but the termination of the employee's
livelihood is viable.

In Philippine Plaza Holdings v. Episcope,31 we discussed the requisites for valid dismissal on account of willful breach of trust:

Among the just causes for termination is the employer's loss of trust and confidence in its employee. Article 296 (c) (formerly Article
282 [c]) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for fraud or willful breach of the
trust reposed in him. But in order for the said cause to be properly invoked, certain requirements must be complied with[,] namely[:]
(1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence and (2) there must be an act that would justify the
loss of trust and confidence. The social justice suppositions underlying labor laws require that the statutory grounds justif ying
termination of employment should not be read to justify the view that bus conductors should, in all cases, be free from any kind of
error. Not every improper act should be taken to justify the termination of employment.

Concededly, bus conductors handle money. To this extent, their work may be analogous to that of tellers, cashiers, and other
similarly situated rank-and-file employees who occupy positions of trust and confidence. However, even granting that the first
requisite for termination of employment on account of willful breach of trust has been satisfied, we find it improper to sustain the
validity of the termination of petitioner's employment. We take judicial notice of bus conductors' everyday work. Bus conductors
receive, exchange, and keep money paid by passengers by way of transportation fare. They keep track of payments and make
computations down to the last centavo, literally on their feet while a bus is in transit. Thus, while they do handle money, their
circumstances are not at all the same as those of regular cashiers. They have to think quickly, literally on their feet. Regular cashiers,
on the other hand, have the time and comfort to deliberately and carefully examine the transactions of their employer.

To reiterate, what is involved is a paltry amount of P196.00. All that has been proven is the existence of a discrepancy. No proof
has been adduced of ill-motive or even of gross negligence. From all indications, petitioner stood charged with a lone, isolated
instance of apparent wrongdoing. Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket issued by petitioner can hardly
be used to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has acted in a manner that runs afoul of his employer's
trust. More so, petitioner cannot be taken to have engaged in a series of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud his employer.
Terminating his employment on these unfounded reasons is manifestly unjust. To infer from a single error that petitioner committed
serious misconduct or besmirched his employer's trust is grave abuse of discretion. It is an inference that is arbitrary and capricious.
It is contrary to the high regard for labor and social justice enshrined in our Constitution and our labor laws.

Filflex vs NLRC

Petitioners argue that the "second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision 11 has no basis in fact or in law."
They assert that "the decision of Labor Arbiter Cueto did not call for the reinstatement of [C]omplainant Galing [private
respondent herein], [thus] it follows that there is no basis now for this Honorable Commission to grant her backwages
during the period of appeal. Clearly, Article 223 finds no application to the instant case." 12 They also contend that the
assailed Resolution "became inconsistent with itself. For while it declared the dismissal of the complainant legal, it ruled
nevertheless that [C]omplainant Galing should have been reinstated during the period of
appeal."13

Agreeing with the petition, the solicitor general clarifies that Article 223 of the Labor Code is inapplicable to the instant
case because Labor Arbiter Cueto "did not order the reinstatement of private respondent." Likewise, the government
lawyer agrees that the NLRC Resolution was inherently inconsistent for holding that the dismissal of Complainant Galing
was justified and, at the same time, ruling that she should have been reinstated during the pendency of the appeal. 14

On the other hand, the legal department of the NLRC15 maintains that "reinstatement (pending appeal) whether actual or
in payroll is mandatory under Art. 223 of the Code."16

Private respondent adds that under paragraph one, second sentence of the Labor Arbiter's decision, "there [was] a call for
reinstatement of the complainant because of the backwages granted to her."17

Hancock vs Davis

Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another
in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in
Article 282, the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee.
A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission attesting to an employee’s
moral depravity. Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by
substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.

The labor arbiter and the NLRC relied not only on the affidavits of the NBI’s witnesses but also on that of respondent.
They likewise considered petitioner’s own investigative findings.
UE vs Pepanio

Respondents argue that UE hired them in 1997 and 2000, when what was in force was the 1994 CBA between UE and
the faculty union. Since that CBA did not yet require a master's degree for acquiring a regular status and since
respondents had already complied with the three requirements of the CBA, namely, (a) that they served full-time; (b) that
they rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c) that their services were satisfactory, 18 they should be regarded
as having attained permanent or regular status.

But the policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided in the Manual of Regulations as early as
1992. Indeed, recognizing this, the 1994 CBA provided even then that UE was to extend only semester-to-semester
appointments to college faculty staffs, like respondents, who did not possess the minimum qualifications for their
positions. Besides, as the Court held in Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, 19 a school CBA must be read in conjunction
with statutory and administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications. Such regulations form part of a valid CBA
without need for the parties to make express reference to it. While the contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions, as they may see fit, the right to contract is still subject to the limitation that the agreement
must not be contrary to law or public policy.

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of educational
institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of
sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this
field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers,
who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination 22 or to
possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment

Herrera-Manaois vs St Scholastica

Mere completion of the three-year probation does not guarantee that the employee will acquire permanent employment
status. The probationer can only qualify upon fulfillment of the reasonable standards set for permanent employment as a
member of the teaching personnel. In line with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher
learning has the discretion and prerogative to impose standards on its teachers and determine whether these standards
have been met.

Lynvil vs Ariola

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements of [due] process in cases of employee's dismissal.
The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent to dismiss and the
reason for the proposed dismissal. Upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity
to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly, to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is
effected.44 Obviously, the second written notice, as indispensable as the first, is intended to ensure the observance of due
process.

Applying the rule to the facts at hand, we grant a monetary award of ₱50,000.00 as nominal damages, this, pursuant to
the fresh ruling of this Court in Culili v. Eastern Communication Philippines, Inc. 45 Due to the failure of Lynvil to follow the
procedural requirement of two-notice rule, nominal damages are due to respondents despite their dismissal for just cause.

Rutaquio vs NLRC

With respect to attorney's fees, the Court believes, and so rules, that an award of attorney's fees is warranted since it has
been established that legal services have been rendered by the lawyer of the petitioners. Taking into account the
attendant facts and circumstances, ten (10%) percent of the total award is a reasonable amount of attorney's fees. In the
case of Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 277 SCRA 91, the Court
held.

It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus,
incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and morally
justifiable.