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    Lawsuit Against National Credit Systems

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    Julie Wolfe
    Ryan Baxter made multiple claims in a lawsuit against the company he worked for saying he left NCS because executives asked him repeatedly to break the law.

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    Lawsuit Against National Credit Systems

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    Julie Wolfe
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    Ryan Baxter made multiple claims in a lawsuit against the company he worked for saying he left NCS because executives asked him repeatedly to break the law.

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    Lawsuit against National Credit Systems

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    Ryan Baxter made multiple claims in a lawsuit against the company he worked for saying he left NCS because executives asked him repeatedly to break the law.

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    854 views26 pages

    Lawsuit Against National Credit Systems

    Uploaded by

    Julie Wolfe
    Ryan Baxter made multiple claims in a lawsuit against the company he worked for saying he left NCS because executives asked him repeatedly to break the law.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    @ EFILED IN OFFICE CLERK OF STATE COURT COBB COUNTY. GEORGIA 19-A-2226 IN THE STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY. SUL 03, 2019 12:44 PM STATE OF GEORGIA Cri of, (ua). RYAN BAXTER ) ) Civil Action No. Plaintiff, ) ) v. } NATIONAL CREDIT ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED SYSTEMS, INC., JOEL B. LACKEY ) ) Defendants, ) ) VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS & ASSAULT & BREACH OF CONTRACT & NEGLIGENCE COMES NOW, Ryan Baxter, Plaintiff pro se, against Defendants National Credit Systems, Inc. (NCS) and Joel B. Lackey, and, upon personal knowledge and upon information and belief, allege and claim as follows: PARTIES 1. Plaintiff RYAN T. BAXTER is a 36-year-old man who resides in Cobb County, Georgia. 2. Defendant National Credit Systems, Inc.is a Georgia Corporation with registered agent, C T Corporation, located in Gwinnett County, Georgia. 3. Defendant Joel B. Lackey is a 52-year-old man who resides at 1311 Pebble Creek Rd. SE, Marietta, Cobb County, Georgia. Mr. Lackey is President and sole owner of Defendant corporation National Credit Systems, Ine. JURISDICTION & VENUE 4, Jurisdiction and Venue are proper in this Court because Defendant Joel Lackey resides at 1311 Pebble Creek Rd SE, Marietta, Georgia. Defendant may be served where he resides in Cobb County. Further, this court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because he resides in Cobb County. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS & FACTS 5. Plaintiff began working for Defendant corporation on September 24", 2014. 6. Defendant National Credit Systems, Inc. (NCS) is a national debt collection agency specializing in the collection of debts for the apartment industry, as well as other industries, spanning virtually the entire spectrum of the collections industry, generally, including, but not limited to: medical office collections, gym collections, personal loan collections, credit card (retail) collections, commercial collections, as well as others. Defendant corporation also specializes in garnishment of judgments by and through a network of attorneys as well as forwarding claims to attomeys throughout the United States. 7. Onorabout September 24, 2014, Plaintiff began working for Defendant corporation in the capacity of manager of Defendant's legal department and co-manager of Defendant corporation’s garnishment department. 8. Plaintiff was sought out for hire by Defendants due to his extensive experience within the consumer collection industry. 9. Plaintiff began working in consumer collections in 1998. Plaintiff spent the three (3) years of his career prior to his employment with Defendant corporation working within the consumer collections field as a legal assistant for a collections law firm while simultaneously attending law school. Plaintiff, over the course of his life, has spent over a decade working within the consumer collections business. 10, Subsequent to the commencement of Plaintiff"s employment, and on or about ‘September 30", 2014 and under false pretenses, Defendants demanded that Plaintiff sign an Employee Restrictive Covenant and Nondisclosure Agreement (the “Non-Compete Agreement”) which is not at issue in the instant case. 11. The Non-Compete Agreement was backdated in error to a date (September 17", 2014) prior to Plaintiff's actual start date at Defendant corporation. No additional consideration was given to Plaintiff to sign the Agreement. 12. Onor about December 20, 2014, Defendant presented a bonus compensation plan, which was accepted by Plaintiff, that was drafted by Defendant pursuant to the terms of the offer letter that Defendant provided Plaintiff on September 17, 2014. See Exhibit A attached hereto. 13. Over the course of his employment with Defendant corporation, Plaintiff learned of certain activities Defendant and its employees and management staff were engaging in that were illegal and which violated both State and Federal law. 14, Subsequent to every discovery by Plaintiff of Defendant corporation's activities that were illegal, Plaintiffs workload was unreasonably increased. Plaintiff reasoned that this unreasonable inerease(s) in workload was retaliation/punishment for bringing such issues to light to Defendant’s management team and that Defendant's actions were retaliatory in nature. 15. Plaintiff advised Defendant corporation’s management staff on numerous occasions of the activities that Defendant corporation and its employees were engaging in that were illegal and Plaintiff was repeatedly verbally harassed. Plaintiff advised Defendants that Plaintiff would not participate in such activities. 16. Plaintiff was repeatedly exposed to adverse treatment by Defendants. Defendant corporation did virtually nothing to remedy the result of its activity despite Plaintiff respectfully bringing issues to Defendants’ attention. 17, On or about January 10, 2015, Plaintiff discovered that Ms. Jackie Phillips, Assistant Legal Department manager of NCS, had been signing numerous sworn affid which had been filed in multiple Georgia courts, on which Ms. Phillips purported to be an agent of NCS's client(s), said clients who were plaintiffs in the lawsuits filed pursuant to the aforementioned affidavits. Plaintiff also discovered that judgments had been rendered on many of these lawsuits and that NCS had received significant sums of money in the enforcement of such judgments. 18. Plaintiff informed Defendants that affidavits of this type could not be signed by employees of Defendant corporation and must be signed by Defendant corporation’s client(s), and that Ms, Phillips’s act in signing such affidavits could constitute perjury and could put Defendant corporation in a position of legal liability. Plaintiff further advised Defendant ‘National Credit Systems, Inc.’s President, Joel B. Lackey, that it would be in Defendant corporation’ best interest to have NCS’s attomey file motions to voluntarily set aside such judgments, as such judgments had been obtained in NCS's clients’ name(s) based on the aforementioned affidavits and oral testimony by Ms. Phillips, while Ms. Phillips was purporting to be an agent/employee of Defendant's client(s) in court. 19. Upon offering this advice to NCS’s President Joel B. Lackey, Plaintiff was met with severe verbal abuse. Mr. Lackey told Plaintiff that NCS would not request that its attorney file such motions, as it would cost NCS money, and because NCS would lose money on the judgments that had already been obtained based on affidavits executed by Ms. Phillips. 20. Plaintiff calmly and respectfully suggested that the process of affidavits being disseminated to clients could be made more automated, and that Plaintiff would be happy to research ways to do so, in an effort to save Defendant corporation money, and in an effort to censure that Defendant corporation was acting in compliance with the law. 21. Defendant Joel Lackey refused to implement any suggestions given by Plaintiff, suggestions which, if implemented would not only have saved Defendant corporation money but also and moreover, would have allowed Defendant corporation to operate in compliance with the law. 22. Soon thereafter, Defendant corporation’s Vice President of Operations, Ron Sapp, informed Plaintiff that, after having a conversation with Mr. Lackey, Defendant corporation had decided that Plaintiff would thereafter be responsible for handling all responses to regulatory complaints sent to Defendant corporation by and through but not limited to: regulatory complaints from Attomey Generals’ Offices throughout the United States. Complaints of this type were numerous, as Defendant corporation had approximately four million consumer debt accounts (4,000,000) in its system at that time, From that point forward, Plaintiff often spent hours each day responding to such consumer complaints, in addition to handling his other job responsibilities. Plaintiff was not offered any compensation increase as consideration for taking on such additional tasks. 23. Onor about August 1, 2016, Plaintiff was asked by Defendant Joel Lackey to onboard a new vendor for Defendant corporation to obtain asset data for the purposes of filing garnishments through NCS’s Garnishment Department and for filing lawsuits through NCS" Legal Department. Plaintiff contacted a new vendor and began the onboarding process, which included an approval process where documentation pursuant to Defendant corporation’s licensing and insurance information were required. Plaintiff obtained the aforementioned information from Defendant corporation’s Human Resources Department and, during review, noticed that the documentation relating to Defendant corporation's insurance information contained some suspicious inconsistencies. Upon further review and upon information and belief, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant corporation did not have insurance, as required under its contracts with its clients, but rather, Defendant corporation was pooling money as a substitute for having insurance, and may be using such a process in an effort to avoid legitimate tax liabilities to the Internal Revenue Service. Confused, Plaintiff voiced his concerns to NCS's management staff; Plaintiff was met with further verbal abuse and disdain. Plaintiff was instructed by Defendant Joel Lackey to send the information to the potential vendor in its current form and not to ask any further questions relating to its authenticity. 24, On or about August 15, 2016, Defendant corporation received a demand to. respond to a consumer complaint from the office of the Attorney General of Colorado (COAG) pursant to a dispute that had been filed by Mr. Austin Caisse. In its demand, the COAG requested copies of all NCS’s collection notes and call recordings pertaining to Mr. Caisse’s account. 25. Plaintiff, upon receiving said demand, immediately contacted Mr. Michael Cook, Collections Manager of NCS, requesting that Mr. Cook send Plaintiff all of the call recordings requested by COAG on Mr. Caisse’s account, Mr. Cook sent Plaintiff all of the call recordings via NCS company email. 26. Plaintiff listened to the call recordings and immediately identified statement(s) that had been made by NCS’s collector, Mr. Curtis Harris, that may have been in violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) as well as in violation of the laws of the state of Colorado. 27. Plaintiff contacted Ron Sapp, Vice President of Operations at NCS and requested that Mr. Sapp listen to the call recordings as well. Mr. Sapp listened to the call recordings while Plaintiff was present and agreed that a violation of the law had likely occurred. 28. Plainti asked Mr. Sapp how he thought Defendant corporation should respond to the COAG demand. Plaintiff suggested that the company may need to terminate Mr. Harris because he made the illegal statements in violation of provisions within the NCS employee handbook. Mr. Sapp told Plaintiff that, “Joel will not terminate that employee because he makes the company too much money.” . 29. Mr. Sapp instructed Plaintiff to write and sign a letter to the COAG stating that NCS had lost the call recordings. Plaintiff refused. Mr. Sapp again gave Plaintiff the same instruction. Plaintiff remained firm in his refusal and gave the COAG complaint back to Mr. Sapp stating that Plaintiff would not participate in such activity. 30. A letter stating that Defendant corporation was unable to locate the call recordings on Mr. Caisse’s account was executed by Mr. Sapp and was sent to COAG in an effort to cover up statements made by Mr. Curtis Harris that were in violation of the law. 31. Of the approximately one hundred (100) attorney general consumer complaints received by Defendant corporation during the time that Plaintiff was responsible for responding to such complaints, Plaintiff responded to all the complaints with the exception of the complaint response referenced in the preceding paragraph. 32. Plaintiff immediately began to fear that his job was in jeopardy, as he had refused to comply with Mr. Sapp’s instruction; this put Plaintiff under a great deal of stress. After leaving NCS’s office that night, Plaintiff sent an email to.a family member who had struggled with similar situations with a former employer, requesting advice. See Exhibit “B,” attached hereto, 33. On orabout September 1, 2016, Plaintiff received a phone call from Attorney Jim ‘Wolf, one of NCS’s attorneys in Colorado. By and through this conversation, Plaintiff discovered that NCS had never posted or disclosed any of the interest collected on any of the judgments obtained on behalf of NCS’s clients, All judgments of is type had been entered by courts in the name(s) of NCS’s clients and not in NCS’s name. Plaintiff discovered that well over one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) worth of interest collected by NCS’s attorneys and remitted to NCS had never been disclosed to NCS’s clients. Further, Plaintiff discovered that Defendant corporation had been sending monthly remittance statements to its clients through the United States Postal Service that contained false and misleading information regarding the amount of money that had been collected on its clients’ accounts for over ten years. 34, Initially believing that this was due to an accounting error, Plaintiff immediately requested a meeting with his superiors, Mr. Ron Sapp & Mr. Joel Lackey. Plaintiff volunteered, to work unpaid overtime over the weekends to correct the errors and to make sure NCS’s books were properly reconciled. This issue affected NCS’s clients in several states, which include, but ‘may not be limited to: Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia. 35. Mr. Lackey told Plaintiff that Plaintiff, “didn’t know what he was talking about,” and that what NCS was doing, “is not illegal.” After discovering that the undisclosed interest ‘owed to NCS’s clients had been retained by NCS and had not been disclosed to its clients, Plaintiff immediately stated that he would not participate in such activity, and, that if such activity continued to go on, Plaintiff would consider himself terminated from his employ with NCS. 36. Mr. Lackey finally relented and told Plaintiff that NCS would manually post and disclose all of the interest owed to NCS’s clients from that point forward, but stated that he did ‘not want Plaintiff to assist in reconciling the books as to the previously-undisclosed interest, and that NCS had no inter of paying its clients any of that interest money. 37. Plain F suggested that Mr. Lackey contact one or more outside attorneys to get a second opinion relating to the issue of NCS keeping the interest money collected on its clients? accounts; Mr. Lackey refused and stated that only he would set the policy and that he did not care about Plaintiff's opinion nor the opinion(s) of outside attomeys. 38. Approximately 18-24 hours after Plaintiff's meeting with Mr. Lackey and Mr. Sapp, and on or about September 2, 2016, Mr. Lackey contacted an attorney that Defendant corporation regularly did business with and asked the attorney, “what steps he (Mr. Lackey) and NCS needed to take to get rid of Ryan (Plaintifi).” 39. After the meeting that took place on or about September 1, 2016, Plaintif immediately informed NCS's office manager, Ms. Velda Bonds, that interest remitted by NCS’s attomey network on NCS’s clients’ accounts needed to be posted to its clients’ accounts effective immediately and that all interest collected needed to be disclosed to NCS's clients. Ms. Bonds ‘was responsible for posting all payments received by NCS to its clients’ accounts. 40. Approximately one month later and on or about October 5, 2016, Plaintiff discovered that Ms. Bonds had still been neglecting to post such interest, and that all of the interest collected on NCS’s clients’ legal accounts had been retained by NCS and that none of the interest collected had been disclosed to its clients. 41. Confused, Plaintiff immediately requested a meeting with Ms. Bonds, who informed Plaintiff that he would have to manually post the interest himself, as she, “did not have time to do it.” Ms. Bonds also informed Plaintiff that it had always been NCS's policy, under the direction of Mr. Lackey, that NCS would keep the interest money collected on its clients’ legal accounts and that interest collected on NCS’s legal account portfolio was not to be disclosed to NCS’s clients. 42. Subsequent to his discussion with Ms. Bonds, Plaintiff contacted another employee at NCS, who trained Plaintiff how to manually post interest collected on legal accounts within NCS’s software. 43. From that point forward, Plaintiff manually posted all the interest collected on NCS’s legal accounts, often staying at NCS’s office hours later than usual in doing so. 44, Plaintiff also discovered by and through his conversation with Ms. Bonds, that ue to the process described above, NCS also had a policy of delaying the posting of consumer payments that were received by its attorney network, causing incorrect information to be reported on many consumers’ credit reports. Ms. Bonds informed Plaintiff that because of the company policy, as set by Mr. Lackey, payments received on NCS’s legal portfolio would often take 45-60 days or more to be accurately reported on the consumers” credit fits. 45. — The industry-standard software that Plaintiff had requested on several occasions would have fixed both of the issues referenced in the preceding paragraphs, above; the software suggested by Plaintiff would have aided Defendant corporation in being compliant with the law. 46. On or about June 20, 2017, Plaintiff received an email from Mr. Brett Borland, an attorney representing NCS’s clients in the capacity of filing breach of contract lawsuits in formed Pl: Georgia. Mr. Borlant that one of the accounts that had been forwarded to him 10 for review by NCS appeared to have documentation that had been created by employees of NCS’s Client Services Department, purporting to be business records of the client. Mr. Borland informed both Plaintiff and Ms. Candace Teal, the head of NCS's Client Services Department, that documents of this type could not be used as evidence in a lawsuit, as they were not created in the ordinary course of business by NCS’s client. 47. Onor about June 21, 2017, upon questioning, Ms. Teal informed Plaintiff that ‘NCS’s Client Services Department was responsible for obtaining documents from NCS's clients pursuant to consumer disputes. Ms. Teal further informed Plaintiff that if the elient(s) did not respond verifying the debt within the 30 days as prescribed by law, she had been instructed by Mr. Lackey that it was company policy to create statements of account on the clients’ behalf, scan the account statement(s) into the consumers’ file, and use such documentation as verification of consumer debts, despite having not received a response from the client(s). 48. Plaintiff advised Ms. Teal that NCS should not be creating documents and purporting that such documents were client business records; Plaintiff further advised Ms. Teal that such practices should cease immediately, in the interest of keeping company policy in compliance with the law. Ms, Teal informed Plaintiff that it had been a long-standing policy at NCS to create such documents and the policy would stand unless Mr. Lackey instructed her otherwise. Furthermore, Ms. Teal informed Plaintif€ that her department would continue to create such documents to be used for the purposes of validating debts under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and verifying debts under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or for other reasons. 49. On or about July 6, 2017, Plaintiff's 2006 Ford F-150 was broken into in Defendant corporation’s parking lot during bu: ss hours. Plaintiff suffered approximately a $1,000.00 in repair damages and $450.00 of stolen personal property. Despite the fact that Defendants were aware that 5 other cars had been broken into in its parking lot in the preceding days, and that one car had been stolen out of its parking lot, negligently, Defendant did virtually nothing to secure its parking lot. Neither Mr. Lackey’s C63 AMG Mercedes-Benz nor Mr. Lackey’s Chevrolet Corvette convertible were broken into. 50. _ Between September 2014 and June 2017, Defendants legal department's gross revenue had grown between eighty (80%) and one hundred fifty (150%) percent. 51. Plaintiff, during the course of his employment with Defendant was studying to sit for the Georgia Bar Examination. 52. Atno point during Plaintiff's employ with Defendant corporation was Plaintiff an attorney licensed to practice law. 53. Despite the success of Defendant corporation’ departments managed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff was never offered any compensation inteases, promotions, or internal accolades despite being one of Defendant corporation's top performers. 54. Despite Defendant’s initial verbal statements made upon Plaintiff's hire that Defendant knew its systems were antiquated and that it needed to update its software within the departments that Plaintiff would manage, Defendant refused to provide Plaintiff with industry- standard software that would have aided Plaintiff in his duties at Defendant corporation. Further, Plaintiff's requests for industry-standard software would have aided Defendant corporation in being compliant with the law; despite numerous requests by Plaintiff, Defendant refused to provide industry-standard software. 55. On or about July 12, 2017, Mr. Sapp entered Plaintiff's office and informed Plaintiff that he had spoken with Mr. Lackey and that Mr. Lackey had told Mr. Sapp that NCS 2 planned to give Plaintiff'a pay increase after he had passed the Georgia bar exam and received his license to practice law in Georgia. 56. On July 25-26, 2017, Plaintiff sat for the Georgia Bar examination. 57. Onor about August 15, 2017, Defendant Joel Lackey entered Plaintiff's office and informed Plaintiff that the attomey that had been representing NCS for several years in the capacity of revi and signing garnishment documentation had sold his firm to another attorney, Brett Borland, Plaintiff was aware that Defendants had previously requested that the former attorney sign garnishment documentation to be filed in Georgia with additional fees ‘added, and that NCS’s former attomey had categorically refused to sign garnishment documentation with such fees added, as he had found such fees to be inconsistent with opinions issued by the Fair Trade Commission and likely in noncompliance with Section 808(1) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act [15 U.S.C 1692(1)] and supporting case law. Mr. Lackey informed Plaintiff that he would, “be able to get Brett to sign gamishments with the fees added.” Mr. Lackey further insinuated that he and NCS expected that Plaintiff would take over signing gamishments with such fees added as soon as he had passed the bar exam. Plaintiff stated that he would follow all company policies and procedures, so far as those policies and procedures were legally compliant. Mr. Lackey then exited Plaintiff's office. 58. On or about September 1, 2017, Mr. Sapp entered Plaintif?’s office and informed Plaintiff that he had spoken to Mr. Lackey, and that, in addition to Plaintiff's full-time job duties, the company would soon be assigning Plaintiff all the full-time job duties of another employee, ‘Mr. James Beachum. Mr. Sapp also informed Plaintiff that the company did not intend to compensate Plaintiff for taking on the additional tasks. B 59. Approximately three (3) years after beginning his employment with Defendant corporation, and on or about September 22, 2017, Plaintiff had a meeting with Defendant company's management staff: Mr. Lackey & Mr. Sapp. During this meeting, Plaintiff again sincerely stated his loyalty to Defendant corporation and stated that he wanted to remain employed and continue to promote the growth and further success of Defendant corporation. Plaintiff again stated his concern regarding the act engage, activities that were in violation of the law. Plaintiff also expressed concern as to Defendant corporation’s policies and procedures which Plaintiff believed were not in compliance with the law. Plaintiff was again subjected to severe verbal abuse. Upon questioning, Mr. Lackey told Plaintiff that Plaintiff: (1) possessed a poor work ethic; (ji) had poor business judgment and acumen; (iii) was incapable of working independently; and (iv) that Mr. Lackey ‘was, “constantly having to clean up his (Plaintiff"s) mess.” Mr. Sapp agreed. Plaintiff again calmly requested that the company provide industry-standard software that would aid both the legal and garnishment departments in the areas of further growth and compliance. Defendant company’s President, Mr. Lackey stated that a determination would be made by “early next week,” as to whether the company would provide the requisite software. 60. No decision was ever made by Defendant corporation as to whether it would provide Plaintiff and his departments with the requisite industry-standard software, despite requests from Plaintiff to Defendants for an answer as promised. 61. Upon information and beli , Plaintiff reasoned that he was being subjected to further punishment for bringing certain issues and activities to light that he believed to be illegal. 62. On or about Monday, September 25, 2017 Plaintiff anonymously contacted the State Bar of Georgia and described the conduct of Defendant corporation but did not disclose the 4 identity of his employer at that time, Plaintiff further informed the State Bar that he felt that he had likely passed the bar examination and would likely be sworn in as an attorney in Georgia before the end of 2017; Plaintiff was informed that, if he continued to work for Defendant corporation subsequent to being sworn in as an attomey in Georgia, Defendant corporation's conduct may be imputed to Plaintiff and Plaintiff may be subject to disciplinary action by the State Bar. 63. Fearing that the aforementioned activity would adversely affect his ability to practice law in the future, Plaintiff was forced to leave his employ with Defendant corporation on September 29, 2017, as Defendant continued to attempt to lure Plaintiff into taking part in behavior that was illegal; Defendant gave no indication that the continued behavior would cease; Plaintiff reasoned that, if he remained employed at Defendant corporation subsequent to receiving his license to practice law in Georgia, he may be subject to severe disciplinary action by the State Bar of Georgia, and possibly disbarred. 64. On Friday, September 29, 2017 upon information and belief, and upon reasoning that Defendant would continue to attempt to lure Plaintiff into conducting activities on Defendant corporation’s behalf that were illegal, Plaintiff informed Defendant corporation’s President, Mr. Joel Lackey, that Plaintiff was considering himself constructively fired and would not be returning to work. 65. Mr. Lackey stood up quickly from his desk and, with extreme force, threw his pen at a shelf standing against the wall of his office and in the direction of Plaintiff. Mr. Lackey’s pen struck the shelf, causing the pen to break, making a loud noise that startled Plaintiff. 66. Plaintiff calmly exited Mr. Lackey’s office and proceeded to walk at a normal pace toward the front exit of the building. 15 67. Mr. Lackey followed Plaintiff out of the office building, shouting at him and berating him within earshot and in front of approximately one-hundred co-workers as Plaintiff was exiting the building, 68. After Plaintiff had exited the building, Mr. Lackey, appearing enraged, continued to chase Plaintiff through the parking lot to Plaintiff's vehicle while continuing to berate and shout at Plaintiff while Plaintiff's co-workers were able to look on from the windows of the building. 69. Plaintiff quickly entered his vehicle, assuming Mr. Lackey intended to attack him. 70. While standing in the parking lot and adjacent to the parking spot that Plaintiff’ vehicle had occupied, Mr. Lackey, with fists clenched, continued to glare at Plaintiff as Plaintiff calmly left the parking lot of Defendant corporation in his vehi 71. Defendant has thus-far refused to pay Plaintiff his bonus in the amount of $900.00 that Plaintiff eamed in the month of September 2017, in violation of its contractual obligation to Plaintiff under the terms of Plaintiff's bonus compensation agreement. 72. Plaintiff learned that he had passed the Georgia Bar Examination approximately 30 days after his date of departure from Defendant corporation and was swom in as a member of the Georgia Bar on November 2, 2017. Since that date, Plaintiff has been unable to practice law in the area of his training and expertise and has been unable to work within the debt collection business due to the restrictive covenants contained in a Non-Compete Agreement, which is not at issue in the instant case. 73. Atthe time of executing the Non-Compete agreement, Plaintiff was not an attomey. Plaintiff was forced to leave Defendant's employ prior to becoming an attomey and 16 Defendant is now, ostensibly, attempting to prevent Plaintiff from practicing law or working within the field in which he is qualified and experienced to work. 74. On or about August 24, 2018, Defendant corporation emailed a copy of Plaintiff's Non-Compete agreement to Plaintiff. By implication, it appeared that Defendant corporation, fully intended to enforce all elements of the Non-Compete Agreement. The Non-Compete Agreement barred Plaintiff from working within the collections industry for a period of two years and over an area effectively encompassing the entire United States. In the email exchange between Plaintiff and Defendant, Mr. Joel Lackey, in bad faith, stated that the Non-Compete Agreement, “was carefully written by an employment lawyer with a very reputable firm.” Mr. Lackey knew that this statement was not entirely true, as he himself had inserted language stating that Plaintiff could not practice law in the collections industry, in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as well as Georgia law. copy of this email exchange has been attached hereto as Exhibit C. 75. Asadirect and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff has suffered lost wages, significantly diminished employment opportunities, and emotional distress. 76. Onorabout January 30, 2017, Plaintiff began seeing a psychologist due to suffering severe emotional distress. Plaintiff continued to see his psychologist well after suffering a stroke due to the severe emotional distress he had suffered. See Exhibit D, attached hereto. TT. Onor about August 25, 2018, Plaintiff on three separate occasions, respectfully requested that Defendant release him from the Non-Compete Agreement. Defendant refused. At that time, Plaintiff did not request any monetary compensation for damages he had already sustained, Ww 78. On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed a separate 23-page action for declaratory relief pursuant to the Non-Compete Agreement, which is not at issue in the instant case. Plaintiff spent more than 80 hours writing and researching his complaint for declaratory relief. 79. — On the afternoon of September 6, 2018, after returning home from filing his action seeking declaratory judgment in Fulton County, as per the terms of the Non-Compete Agreement, Plaintiff received an email from Defendant stating that Plaintiff must dismiss his case and file in arbitration. Defendant attached a copy of an arbitration agreement that Defendant was aware had actually been executed prior to the execution of the Non-Compete Agreement. 80. Defendant and Defendant's counsel were aware that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the Non-Compete Agreement, as the Non-Compete Agreement had its own choice of venue provision dictating that all claims pursuant to it must be filed in the State and Federal courts of Fulton County Georgia. The Non-Compete Agreement was fully integrated by its own terms, and the Non-Compete Agreement had actually been executed between Plaintiff and Defendant subsequent to the execution of the Arbitration Agreement. Regardless, in bad faith, Defendant chose to file a Motion to Compel Arbitration, which contained statements that were false; Defendant also withheld material information from the court that Defendant knew was in dispute and which would have caused its motion to be denied. 81. Plaintiff was unable to steep on the night of September 6, 2018. On September 7, 2018, due to excessive stress, Plaintiff suffered a Transient Ischemic Attack (T-1.A.) ~ also known as a “mini-stroke."See Affidavit from Plaintiff's doctor, Exhibit “E,” attached hereto. 18 82. On September 23, 2018, Plaintiff suffered a massive stroke and was rushed by ambulance to Kennestone Hospital in Marietta, GA. Plaintiff had emergency neurosurgery that day. Plaintiff remained in Kennestone Hospital for post-surgery care and recovery. 83. Plaintiff was transferred to the inpatient rehabilitation unit at Kennestone Hospital on September 27, 2018 and remained there until his release to outpatient therapy on the afternoon of October 5, 2018. 84. Asa direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has suffered lost wages in the amount of $87,499.95; bonus compensation in the amount of $18,750.00; and, employee benefits in the amount of $21,000.00. Further, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has incurred medical costs in the amount of $295,178.38; ambulance costs in the amount of $1,285.00. As a result of his stroke, Plaintiff lacks dexterity and control in his left hand and strength in the left side of his body. Plaintiff is now completely unable to play the guitar, which he had previously been playing for 25 years prior to his stroke, and has suffered severe emotional distress. Additionally, as of the date of this filing, Plaintiff continues to attempt to reteach himself to type. Plaintiff has what will likely be permanent residual deficit in his left arm, left hand, left leg and left foot. BREACH OF CONTRACT Plaintiff is Entitled to Relief in the form of Monetary Damages Pursuant to the ‘Terms of his Bonus Compensation Plan as Defendant Breached its Contract with Plaintiff and has violated The Implied Covenant of Good Faith 85. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the paragraphs set forth above as though fully set forth hereinalter. 19 86. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract of employment pursuant to Plaintiff's bonus compensation plan. Defendant has refused to pay Plaintiff's bonus that Plaintiff earned in September 2017. Plaintiff entered into the bonus compensation plan and agreed to become an employee of Defendant corporation upon Plaintiff's reasonable belief that Defendant would conduct business in a manner and fashion that Plaintiff reasonably believed was in compliance with the law. Defendant vi Jated the law and repeatedly attempted to induce and lure Plaintiff into committing violations of the law. By repeatedly violating the law and punishing Plaintiff for his refusal to cooperate in such acts, Defendant has ostensibly violated its implied covenant of good faith, as required under Georgia law. Georgia courts have recognized the principle of an Implied Covenant of Good Faith in all contracts. See WirelessMD v. Healthcare.com Corp., 271 Ga. App. 461, 468, 610 S.E.2d 352 (2005); Hunting Aircraft v. Peachtree City Airport Auth., 281 Ga. App. 450, 451, 636 S.E.2d 139 (2006) (“Every contract implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the contract’s performance and enforcement.”). This honorable court should hold that Defendant is liable to pay Plaintiff the bonus that he eamed in September 2017 in the amount of $900.00; additionally, based on the evidence that Plaintiff is able to present, this court should hold that Defendant has repeatedly violated its implied duty of good faith, beginning in January 2015, in the performance of its contractual obligation to Plaintiff. 87. Itis without question that Defendant continually engaged in illegal activity and that Defendant repeatedly retaliated against Plaintiff, discriminated against Plaintiff, and punished Plaintiff for pointing out such activity and for refusing to participate in such activity. ‘As such, Defendant forced Plaintiff out of his employ and Plaintiff has suffered severely 20 diminished employment opportunity and lost wages. This court should find Defendant liable to compensate Plaintiff for lost wages and other damages as set forth in this Complaint, ASSAULT & INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS Defendant Joel Lackey Committed the Torts of Assault and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Upon Plaintiff and is Liable to Pay Damages 88. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the paragraphs set forth above as though fully set forth hereinafter. 89. On September 29, 2017, Defendant Joel Lackey chased Plaintiff out of Defendant corporation’s office while shouting at Plaintiff and berating Plaintiff. Defendant Joel Lackey continued his pursuit of Plaintiff outside of the building and through the company parking lot up to approximately 2 ft. away from the door of Plaintifi’s vehicle. Plaintiff was immediately frightened by Defendant Joel Lackey’s actions and quickly entered his vehicle, as he reasonably believed that a physical attack or harmful contact was imminent. Pursuant to 0.C.G.A. § 16-5- 20(a) a simple assault occurs when the perpetrator “Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” 90. Subsequent to the events outlined above, Plaintiff continued to have traumatic nightmares and saw a psychologist on a regular basis. 91. Georgia law is clear on the basis of fact that must be shown in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; “To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (I) the conduct giving rise to the claim was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe. 21 ‘The defendant’s conduct must be so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community...” Blue View Corp. v. Bell, 298 Ga. App. 277. 92, Defendant intentionally attempted to sabotage Plaintiff's career by repeatedly attempting to lure Plaintiff into committing violations of the law and then subsequently punishing Plaintiff for refusing to do so. Intentionally and recklessly, Defendants continued to attempt to sabotage and harass Plaintiff subsequent to his departure from Defendant corpo Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, for which he had to seek psychological treatment, 93. In good faith, Plaintiff attempted to amicably resolve his disputes with Defendants on multiple occasions by simply asking to be released from his ‘obligations’ under a legally unenforceable Non-Compete Agreement, Due to Defendants’ continued attempts to intentionally sabotage and harass Plaintiff, Plaintiff suffered a massive stroke as a result of the excessive stress from which he was suffering. 94. Due to the actions of Defendant Joel Lackey, Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress and pecuniary loss and is entitled to recovery. 95. Defendant Joel Lackey’s actions towards Plaintiff were clearly atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Plaintiff is Entitled to An Award of Punitive Damages 96. Punitive damages have been upheld in Georgia courts in instances of unwarranted and unjustifiable assaults that could be described as “malicious, wanton and aggravated,” Rattaree v. Chapman, 79 Ga. 574, 580, 4 8.E. 684 (1887); “violent [and] malicious,” Swinney v. 2 Wright, 35 Ga. App. 45, 48, 132 S.E. 228 (1925); “willful, wanton, and intentional, ” Head v. John Deere Plow Co., 71 Ga. App. 276, 279, 30 S.B.2d 622 (1944); or “willful and malicious.” Nissen v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co,, Inc., 90 Ga. App. 175, 177, 82 S.E.2d 253 (1954). Georgia courts have also recognized that a publicly-committed assault has been considered an aggravating circumstance. Bignault v. Hendry, 58 Ga. App. 644, 646, 199 S.E. 659 (1938); Additionally sufficient aggravation has been found where an assault was committed in a degrading and humiliating manner. Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193, 196 (1857); further, Georgia courts often refer to the unprovoked nature of an assault in authorizing punitive damages. Rattaree v. Chapman, 79 Ga. 574, 580, 4 S.E. 684 (1887); Swinney v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 45, 45, 132 S.E.228 (1925); Johnson v. Morris, 158 Ga. 403, 404, 123 S.E. 707, 708 (1924). O.C.G.A. § 51-1-13 expressly allows the jury to take the defendant's intention into account when awarding damages See Stover v. Atchley, 189 Ga. App. 56, 374 8.E.2d 775 (1988). 97. The clear and convincing standard of proof is inapplicable to intentional torts; rather, the standard of proof required to prove a defendant acted or failed to act with specific intent to cause harm is the preponderance of the evidence standard. Since 0.C.G.A § 51-12- 5.1(f is silent about the standard of proof required for “specific intent” cases, the court must use bl civil cases. the common law preponderance of the evidence standard generally ap; Kothari v. Patel, 262. Ga. App. 168, 585 S.E.2d 97 (2003). 98. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f) states that in any tort case in which the cause of action does not arise from products liability, if it is found that the defendant acted, or failed to act, with the specific intent to cause harm, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may be awarded as punitive damages against an active tort-feasor but such damages shall not be the liability of any defendant other than the active tort-feasor. Georgia courts have looked to the 2B Restatement (Second) of Torts for a definition of “intent” in determining whether a defendant has acted with the specific intent to cause harm. See e.g. Viau v. Fed Dean, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 801, 805, 418 S.E.2d 604 (1992); J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. Bentley, 207 Ga. App. 250, 255, 427 S.E.2d 499 (1992). Accordingly, “intent” is defined, “to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it” Eubanks v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 195 Ga. App. 359, 364, 393 S.E.2d 452 (1990), quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965). Pk led to An Award of Attorneys Fees 99. Plaintiff has presented sufficient facts so as to support a claim for punitive damages, as such, these facts are also sufficient to satisfy the “bad faith” requirement of O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 so as to entitle Plaintiff to an award of attorneys fees. Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 342 (1984). See also, Knobeloch v. Mustacio, 640 F. Supp. 124 (ND.Ga. 1986). PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for this court to grant Plaintiff relief as follows: 1. A trial by jury on all issues so triable; 2. Judgment against Defendant as compensatory damages to be proven at trial, but not less than $423.713.33; 3. Judgment against Defendant for prejudgment interest; 4, Judgment against Defendant in the form of exemplary damages to be determined by the trier of fact, for which there shall be no limitation due to Defendant's specific intent to cause harm; 24 5. Judgment against Defendant for Plaintiff's reasonable attomeys fees as provided by applicable law and otherwise by court rule; and, 6. Judgment against Defendant for any further relief that this court deems just and proper. this day of Suly, 2019 Ryan Baxter oa

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