Republicanism
Separation of powers
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15,
2011
Doctrine: Separation of Powers; The issuance
of subsequent resolutions by the Court setting
time frames be set for the executive agencies
to perform their assigned tasks pursuant to
earlier decision of the Court is simply an
exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the
Constitution, because the execution of the
Decision is but an integral part of the
adjudicative function of the Court, not an
encroachment by the Court over executive
powers and functions.
FACTS: This was a Resolution of the SC for the
enforcement of its Decision on the
environmental case filed by the concerned
residents of Manila Bay, ordering various
government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate
and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and
maintain its water to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation. The defendant government
agencies failed to appeal on such decision,
hence, it became final and executory. The final
and executory decision provide, among others,
that: (1) DENR is the primary agency to
implement its operational plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy, (2) DILG shall exercise
the general supervision and will formulate the
waste management program, (3) MWSS and
LWUA to install and maintain waste water
treatment, sewerage and sanitation facilities,
(4) DA to restore marine life, (5) PNP Maritime
Group to prevent marine pollution, (6) PPA to
adopt a measure to prevent discharge and
dumping of ship-generated wastes, (7) MMDA
as the lead agency and implementor of program
and projects including the establishment and
maintenance of sanitary landfill, (8) DOH for
health concerns and (9) DBM for appropriation
of funds. Further, the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee was created to receive and
evaluate the quarterly progressive reports
on the activities undertaken by the said
agencies and to monitor the execution
phase. In the absence of specific
completion periods, the Committee
recommended that time frames be set for
the agencies to perform their assigned
tasks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the setting of time frame
for the concerned government agencies to
perform their assigned task is an
encroachment over the powers and functions
of the Executive Branch headed by the
President of the Philippines?
Ruling: No. The case is now in the execution
phase of the final and executory December 18,
2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory
Committee was created to receive and evaluate
the quarterly progressive reports on the
activities undertaken by the agencies in
accordance with said decision and to monitor
the execution phase. In the absence of specific
completion periods, the Committee
recommended that time frames be set for the
agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This
may be viewed as an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch
headed by the President of the Philippines. This
view is misplaced. The issuance of subsequent
resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution,
because the execution of the Decision is but an
integral part of the adjudicative function of the
Court. None of the agencies ever questioned
the power of the Court to implement the
December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of
them raised the alleged encroachment by the
Court over executive functions. While additional
activities are required of the agencies like
submission of plans of action, data or status
reports, these directives are but part and parcel
of the execution stage of a final decision under
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
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Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19, 2013 (November 11 in SC
website)
FACTS: Before the Court are consolidated
petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of
the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity
of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore
discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings
before detailing the particulars of the
constitutional challenge. The Facts I. Pork
Barrel: General Concept. "Pork Barrel" is
political parlance of American -English origin.3
Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed
with pork to a multitude of black slaves who
would cast their famished bodies into the
porcine feast to assuage their hunger with
morsels coming from the generosity of their
well-fed master.4 This practice was later
compared to the actions of American legislators
in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their
districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has
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made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists
in reference to political bills that "bring home the
bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork
Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and
secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district.7Some scholars on the
subject further use it to refer to legislative
control of local appropriations.8 In the
Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will
be later discussed, its usage would evolve in
reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the
Philippines. While the term "Pork Barrel" has
been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress,
the present cases and the recent controversies
on the matter have, however, shown that the
term‘s usage has expanded to include certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. On the
one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created
as a special fund under Section 880 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos)
on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law,
Marcos recognized the need to set up a special
fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic
growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities
of the government in the Malampaya natural
gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep
Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special
fund created under PD 910 has been currently
labeled as Malampaya Funds. On the other
hand the Presidential Social Fund was created
under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was
similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983.
More than two (2) years after, he amended PD
1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on
October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of
the former law. As it stands, the Presidential
Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by
the Presidential Management Staff through
which the President provides direct assistance
to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget. It is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
III. Controversies in the Philippines. Over the
decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have
increased tremendously,89 owing in no small
part to previous Presidents who reportedly used
the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional
support.90 It was in 1996 when the first
controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel"
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative
Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an
anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge
sums of government money that regularly went
into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were
‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among
legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to
a high 52 percent of the cost of each project,
which could be anything from dredging, rip
rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction
of school buildings."92 "Other sources of
kickbacks that Candazo identified were public
funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A
few days later, the tale of the money trail
became the banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied
by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The
publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain
lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned
citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse
of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its
probe into allegations that "the government has
been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from
the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."96 The investigation was spawned by
sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing
for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had
swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than
20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While
the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate
recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers
declared that the money was diverted into
Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy,
criminal complaints were filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
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complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -
of-staff or representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing agencies,
and the several presidents of the NGOs set up
by Napoles.98 On August 16, 2013, the
Commission on Audit (CoA) released the
results of a three-year audit
investigation99covering the use of legislators'
PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last
three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
The purpose of the audit was to determine the
propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and
the Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application
of these funds and the implementation of
projects by the appropriate implementing
agencies and several government-owned-and-
controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total
releases covered by the audit amounted to
₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in
VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively,
of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were
found to have been made nationwide during the
audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s
findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03
(CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP),"
were made public, the highlights of which are
as follows:103 ● Amounts released for projects
identified by a considerable number of
legislators significantly exceeded their
respective allocations. ● Amounts were
released for projects outside of legislative
districts of sponsoring members of the Lower
House. ● Total VILP releases for the period
exceeded the total amount appropriated under
the 2007 to 2009 GAAs. ● Infrastructure
projects were constructed on private lots
without these having been turned over to the
government. ● Significant amounts were
released to implementing agencies without the
latter‘s endorsement and without considering
their mandated functions, administrative and
technical capabilities to implement projects. ●
Implementation of most livelihood projects was
not undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were
transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in
spite of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance. ● Selection of the NGOs were not
compliant with law and regulations. ● Eighty-
Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation
of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects
amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted
questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the
Funds. ● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as
some implementing agencies, of goods and
services reportedly used in the projects were
not compliant with law. As for the "Presidential
Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at
least ₱900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104
According to incumbent CoA Chairperson
Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson),
the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of
preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105 IV. The Procedural
Antecedents. Spurred in large part by the
findings contained in the CoA Report and the
Napoles controversy, several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant
procedural antecedents in these cases are as
follows: On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson
S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social
Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of
even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and
Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective
capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives,
from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel
System," in whatever form and by whatever
name it may be called, and from approving
further releases pursuant thereto.106 The
Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208493. On September 3, 2013, petitioners
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L.
Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes
San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M.
Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition
For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions
of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue
a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and
Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective
3
capacities as the incumbent Executive
Secretary, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), and National
Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the
Court order the foregoing respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the
complete schedule/list of legislators who have
availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds,
the project or activity and the recipient entities
or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto";
and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, including the proceeds
from the x x x Malampaya Funds and
remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003
to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity
and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for
the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with
the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-
sum, discretionary funds including, but not
limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds
and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The
Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208566.
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito
M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition
dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition),
seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order
be issued restraining President Benigno
Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress and, instead, allow their
release to fund priority projects identified and
approved by the Local Development Councils
in consultation with the executive departments,
such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism,
the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the
National Economic Development Authority.111
The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as
UDK-14951.112 On September 10, 2013, the
Court issued a Resolution of even date (a)
consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public
respondents to comment on the consolidated
petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10,
2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National
Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of
the persons acting under their authority from
releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to
Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013,
and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase
"for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section
8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing
energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government‖
under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on
October 8, 2013. On September 23, 2013, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even
date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in
the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to
educational and medical assistance purposes,
of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and
that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for
lack of merit.113 On September 24, 2013, the
Court issued a Resolution of even date
directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno,
filed their respective replies to the Comment:
(a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a
separate Reply dated September 27, 2013
(Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013,
Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September
30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2,
2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1,
2013. On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an
Advisory providing for the guidelines to be
observed by the qwould be able to competently
and completely answer questions related to,
among others, the budgeting process and its
implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson
was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby
requested to appear before the Court during the
Oral Arguments. On October 8 and 10, 2013,
the Oral Arguments were conducted.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a
period of seven (7) days, or until October 17,
2013, which the parties subsequently did.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article
and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering
that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers
RULING: 1. Separation of Powers. a.
Statement of Principle. The principle of
separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government. In the celebrated words of
Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution
has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."163 To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress,164belongs the
power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President,165
belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the
Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by
constitutional design, ordained in this respect,
"each department of the government has
4
exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe
the law, and the judiciary has no power to make
or execute the law."168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of
autonomy and independence stem from the
notion that the powers of government must be
divided to avoid concentration of these powers
in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the
divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally
capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability of
one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.170 Broadly speaking, there is a
violation of the separation of powers principle
when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US
Supreme Court decisions instruct that the
principle of separation of powers may be
violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch
may interfere impermissibly with the other’s
performance of its constitutionally assigned
function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine
may be violated when one branch assumes a
function that more properly is entrusted to
another."172 In other words, there is a violation
of the principle when there is impermissible (a)
interference with and/or (b) assumption of
another department‘s functions. The
enforcement of the national budget, as primarily
contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function
both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of
government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court
explained that the phase of budget execution
"covers the various operational aspects of
budgeting" and accordingly includes "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release
of funds" as well as all "other related activities"
that comprise the budget execution cycle.174
This is rooted in the principle that the allocation
of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in
them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and
prerogatives which go into the implementation
of the national budget as provided under the
GAA as well as any other appropriation law. In
view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members,
should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the
same is properly the domain of the Executive.
Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of
the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely
following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by
law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes
to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of
implementing the national budget begins. So as
not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must "not concern it
self with details for implementation by the
Executive.
The foregoing cardinal postulates were
definitively enunciated in Abakada where the
Court held that "from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified,
however, that since the restriction only pertains
to "any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made
clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to
mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure
allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive
functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x
x should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.1âwphi1 In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the
following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on
Congress‘ power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with
it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Any action or step beyond that will
5
undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied) b. Application. The post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr.
puts it – "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities" and
the "regulation and release of funds" in violation
of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the
moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory
in nature does not alter its unconstitutional
tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law. Towards this end, the Court must
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is
merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents‘ reliance on the same falters
altogether. Besides, it must be pointed out that
respondents have nonetheless failed to
substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import. Quite the contrary,
respondents – through the statements of the
Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments –
have admitted that the identification of the
legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding
source, thereby highlighting the indispensability
of the said act to the entire budget execution
process:192 Thus, for all the foregoing reasons,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article as well as all other provisions of law
which similarly allow legislators to wield any
form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators
have effectively intruded into the proper phases
of budget execution, must be deemed as acts
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded
the same unconstitutional treatment.
That such informal practices do exist and have,
in fact, been constantly observed throughout
the years has not been substantially disputed
here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno)
during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno: Now, from the responses
of the representative of both, the DBM and two
(2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the
extent of this research made by my staff, that
neither the Executive nor Congress frontally
faced the question of constitutional
compatibility of how they were engineering the
budget process. In fact, the words you have
been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM,
and both Houses of Congress has also been
using is surprise; surprised that all of these
things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that
what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to
codify in one section all the past practice that
had been done since 1991. In a certain sense,
we should be thankful that they are all now in
the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) Ultimately,
legislators cannot exercise powers which they
do not have, whether through formal measures
written into the law or informal practices
institutionalized in government agencies, else
the Executive department be deprived of what
the Constitution has vested as its own.
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Principle of checks and balances
Gonzales III v Office of the President
FACTS:
There are two petitions that have been
consolidated because they raise a common
thread of issues relating to the President's
exercise of the power to remove from office
herein petitioners who claim the protective
cloak of independence of the constitutionally-
created office to which they belong - the Office
of the Ombudsman.
1st case G.R. No. 19621:
Petition for Certiorari which assails on
jurisdictional grounds the Decision dated March
31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the
dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III,
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other
Law Enforcement Offices, upon a finding of guilt
6
on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect
of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a
Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily
seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section
8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
which gives the President the power to
dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
2nd case G.R. No. 196232:
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking
to annul, reverse and set aside the undated
Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-
Sulit to submit a written explanation with
respect to alleged acts or omissions
constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to
the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into
with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and the
April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary
Investigation, both issued by the Office of the
President the administrative case initiated
against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
The petition likewise seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
giving the President the power to dismiss a
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Facts of 1st case
A hostage drama involving Rolando Mendoza
and Hong Kong nationals in a tourist bus.
Rolando Mendoza demanded his
reinstatement. Sometime in 2008, a formal
charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave
threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries)
was filed against him and other police officers
Office of the Regional Director of the National
Police Commission turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all
relevant documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative
adjudication.
The administrative case against Mendoza was
dismissed upon a finding that the material
allegations made by the complainant had not
been substantiated "by any evidence at all to
warrant the indictment of respondents of the
offenses charged
However, upon the recommendation of
petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a
Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza
and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave
Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman
They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration followed by a Supplement to
the Motion for Reconsideration. The pleadings
mentioned and the records of the case were
assigned for review and recommendation to
Graft Investigation and was endorsed for final
approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending
for final review and action when P/S Insp.
Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists
on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a
desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in
the police service
Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC): found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales
committed serious and inexcusable negligence
and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine
(9) months without any justification, in violation
of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve
motions for reconsideration in administrative
disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering
there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged
inaction precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking.
Case was elevated to OP (Office of the
President). OP instituted a Formal Charge
against petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect
of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance
of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service
Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct
in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
OP Dismissed Gonzales from his office.
2nd case
The Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D.
Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo
Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and Money
Laundering before the Sandiganbayan
Issues:
7
1. Whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who
belong to the constitutionally-created Office
of the Ombudsman.**issue based on syllabus
2. Whether or not Gonzales is liable for his acts
and therefore be removed from office.
Held: (Based on the syllabus principle)
1.YES.The Ombudsman's
administrative
 disciplinary power over a
Deputy
 Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's
authority to discipline administratively is
extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the
exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment such authority is by no means
exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For,
while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other
hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction
of these two apparently conflicting provisions in
R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion
that Congress had intended the Ombudsman
and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section
8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act
was to provide for an external authority, through
the person of the President, that would exercise
the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the
Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply
a measure of "check and balance" intended
to address the lawmakers' real and valid
concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from
administrative liabilities.
2. Petitioner Gonzales may not be
 removed
from office where the
questioned acts,
falling short of
 constitutional standards, do
not
 constitute betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to
endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor
cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation
of his undue interest in the case that would
amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After
all, taking cognizance of cases upon the
request of concerned agencies or private
parties is part and parcel of the constitutional
mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be
the "champion of the people." The factual
circumstances that the case was turned over to
the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's
request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
without the private complainant verifying the
truth of his statements; that the decision was
immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for
more than nine months cannot be simply taken
as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the
case considering the lack of evidence of any
personal grudge, social ties or business
affiliation with any of the parties to the case that
could have impelled him to act as he did. There
was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery
that took place, or of any corrupt intention or
questionable motivation. The OP's
pronouncement of administrative accountability
against petitioner and the imposition upon him
of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must
be reversed and set aside, as the findings of
neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not
amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with
authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner
as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no
intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious
kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
As to the second case: The Office of the
President is vested
 with statutory authority to
proceed
 administratively against
petitioner
 Barreras-Sulit to determine
the
 existence of any of the grounds for
 her
removal from office as provided
 for under the
Constitution and the
 Ombudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the
decision of the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is
ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the
Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed
with the investigation in connection with the
above case against petitioner. In G.R. No.
196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-
DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged
8
acts and omissions tantamount to culpable
violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of
public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is
hereby DENIED.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-
making.
BELGICA vs. OCHOA
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
Justice Bernabe
FACTS:
HISTORY”: In the Philippines, the “pork barrel”
(a term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”).
However, it has also come to refer to certain
funds to the Executive. The “Congressional
Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044
(Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for
Local Development Projects during the Marcos
period, the Mindanao Development Fund and
Visayas Development Fund and later the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under
the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
under the Joseph Estrada administration, as
continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and
the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically
associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds
of Members of Congress, the present cases
and the recent controversies on the matter
have, however, shown that the term‘s usage
has expanded to include certain funds of the
President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
Recently, or in July of the present year, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its
probe into allegations that "the government has
been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from
the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost
projects."96 The investigation was spawned by
sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing
for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had
swindled billions of pesos from the public
coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than
20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S.
Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social
Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of
even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
xxxxx in whatever form and by whatever name
it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto. The Alcantara
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco
Antonious Beda B. Belgica, xxxx filed an Urgent
Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27,
2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork
Barrel System," xxxxx and the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund be declared unconstitutional and null and
void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
The Malampaya Funds was created as a
special fund under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910, issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22,
1976. Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power since the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" gives the President "unbridled
discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used.
ISSUE (based on the syllabus):
Whether or not Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power since the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what
purpose the funds will be used.
RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the petitioners’
submissions.
Respondents, on the other hand, urged the
Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis
to the same section and thus, construe the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
9
hereafter directed by the President" to refer only
to other purposes related "to energy resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."
While the designation of a determinate or
determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to
exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same
law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling
up the details of the law for its enforcement,
known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into
actual operation, referred to as contingent
rule-making.
TWO (2) FUNDAMENTAL TESTS
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure
that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-
making are indeed adequate. The first test is
called the "completeness test." Case law
states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other
hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s
authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the phrase "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s
authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,
allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law. That the
subject phrase may be confined only to "energy
resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government"
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
meaning that the general word or phrase is to
be construed to include – or be restricted to –
things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned, is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase
"energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government"
states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase
"for such other purposes" may be limited;
second, the said phrase also exhausts the
class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and,
third, the Executive department has, in fact,
used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy
related purposes under the subject phrase,
thereby contradicting respondents‘ own
position that it is limited only to "energy
resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."
Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have
passed the completeness test since the policy
of energy development is clearly deducible from
its text, the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" under the same provision of
law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must
be underscored that the rest of Section 8,
insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the
declared unconstitutionality of the
aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that
the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it
should be used – only in accordance with the
avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Civilian supremacy clause (Art. II, Sec. 3)
GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012
FACTS:
Major General Carlos F. Garcia was tried by the
Special General Court Martial No. 2 (Military
Court).
Two days after his arraignment, petitioner,
having reached the age of fifty-six (56),
compulsorily retired from military service.
10
MG Garcia (ret) was convicted for violations of
the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and Gentleman) and 97th Article of
War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and
Military Discipline) for knowingly, wrongfully
and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare and make
untruthful statements under oath of all his
existing assets in his Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Net worth (SALN) for
the years 2003 and 2002 as required by RA
3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.
After six (6) years and two (2) months of
preventive confinement, on December 16,
2010, petitioner was released from the Camp
Crame Detention Center.
On September 9, 2011, The Office of the
President, or the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP and acting as the Confirming
Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed
the sentence imposed by the Court Martial
against petitioner. The Confirmation of
Sentence further states that pursuant to the
48th and 49th Articles of War the sentence on
MG Carlos Flores Garcia, AFP shall not be
remitted/mitigated by any previous
confinement.
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and
detained, and continues to be detained at the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari and petition for
habeas corpus, alternatively. Garcia argued
that the confirmation issued by the Office of the
President directing his two-year detention in a
penitentiary had already been fully served
following his preventive confinement subject to
Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code).
ISSUE:
1) Whether the Office of the President acted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the
Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9,
2011.
2) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is
applicable in Military Courts.
HELD:
1) The Court upheld the authority of the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to confirm
the sentence. It held that the General Court
Martial had jurisdiction over the case since it
was indisputable that Garcia was an officer in
the active service of AFP when he committed
the violations until his arraignment. Garcia’s
mandatory retirement on November 18, 2004
did not divest the General Court Martial of its
jurisdiction. Having established the jurisdiction
of the General Court Martial over the case and
the person of the petitioner, the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the
jurisdiction to confirm petitioner's sentence as
mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War
The Court stressed that Article 48 of the Articles
of War vests on the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, the power to approve or disapprove
the entire or any part of the sentence given by
the court martial, also Article 49 of the same
grants the President the power to mitigate or
remit a sentence.
“Thus, the power of the President to
confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of
erring military personnel is a clear
recognition of the superiority of civilian
authority over the military. However,
although the law (Articles of War) which
conferred those powers to the President is
silent as to the deduction of the period of
preventive confinement to the penalty imposed,
as discussed earlier, such is also the right of an
accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.”
2) Yes. The Court ruled that applying the
provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) (Period of preventive
imprisonment deducted from time of
imprisonment), the time within which the
petitioner was under preventive confinement
should be credited to the sentence confirmed
by the Office of the President, subject to the
conditions set forth by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial
is a court within the strictest sense of the word
and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain
provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are
not provided in the Articles of War and the
Manual for Courts-Martial, can be
supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to
the application of a criminal concept in the
implementation and execution of the General
Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29
should be applied. In fact, the deduction of
petitioner’s period of confinement to his
sentence has been recommended in the Staff
Judge Advocate Review.”
The Court further held that the application of
Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of
the 1987 Constitution. “[T]he concept of equal
11
justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective. It, however, does not
require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification.” held the Court.
-----------------------------------------------------------
The right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16)
Oposa vs Factoran
Facts:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan
Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber
Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they
claim that the act of the defendant in allowing
TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he
holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs
is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the
government.
Issue:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action
in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled
that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers
the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Academic Freedom (Art. XIV, Sec. 5[2])
Aldrin Jeff Cudia vs The Superintendent of
the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No.
211362
Facts:
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s
class had a lesson examination in their
Operations Research (OR) subject the
schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper,
Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said
teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia
complied and as a result, he was late for his
next class (English). Later, the English teacher
reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was
late because his OR class was dismissed a bit
late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look
12
upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when
he said that their OR class was dismissed late
because the OR teacher said she never
dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was
meted with demerits and touring hours because
of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he
asked the TO about it. Not content with the
explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be
appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior
tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia
to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late
was out of his control because his OR class was
dismissed at 3pm while his English class
started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that
on record, and based on the interview with the
teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not
dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the
English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that
besides, under PMA rules, once a student
submitted his examination paper, he is
dismissed from said class and may be excused
to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in
fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie
for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed
late because again, on that day in the OR class,
each student was dismissed as they submit
their examination, and were not dismissed as a
class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher
to stay, it was not because such transaction
was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was
initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the
teacher), although there were at least two
students with Cudia at that time querying the
teacher, the three of them cannot be
considered a “class”; Cudia could just have
stated all that instead of saying that his class
was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s
Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating
the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his
written appeal when he said his class was
dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late
for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the
minimum standard of behavior required of their
cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground
to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC.
Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine
(9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After
two hearings and after the parties involved were
heard and with their witnesses presented, the
HC reconvened and the members cast their
vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia
guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules
(Honor System), a dissenting vote means the
acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a
practice of chambering where the members,
particularly the dissenter, are made to explain
their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the
minority”. After the chambering, the dissenter
was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote”
was improper, hence he changed the same and
the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMA’s holding
center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his
appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the
dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then
sent letters to various military officers
requesting for a re-investigation. It was their
claim that there were irregularities in the
investigation done by the HC. As a result of
such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA
(CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham”
investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due
process, education, and privacy of
communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This
ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff.
But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor
of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best
recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before
the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said
petition as it argued that the same is not proper
as a matter of policy and that the court should
avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss
Cudia based on its findings.
HELD:
II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic
freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still
worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when
13
it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded
due process. In this case, the investigation of
Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in
the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
submitted by his TO. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him.
He was informed about his options and the
entire process that the case would undergo.
The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report
together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the
findings and recommendations. When the
honor case was submitted for formal
investigation, a new team was assigned to
conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the
charge against him and given the right to enter
his plea. He had the chance to explain his side,
confront the witnesses against him, and present
evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was
found to have violated the Honor Code.
Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the
review process at the Academy level – from the
OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge
Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and
to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG
(Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the
directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General
Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a
review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA
senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he
had the opportunity to appeal to the President.
Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable
rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to
disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law
providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be
used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend the
dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor
Code violation is not among those listed as
justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System (manner which PMA conducts
investigation of Honor Code violations) do not
state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without
express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets. Further, there is a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the
President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the
President may be delegated to the PMA
Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the
PMA is well within its academic freedom.
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning has been
enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom
on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted
to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA
to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has
the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case,
based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a
violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal
from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish
between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes
any form of lying. It does not have a gradation
of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the
PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When
Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by
the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus,
while the punishment may be severe, it is
nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and,
therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have
known all of these.
-----------------------------------------------------------
The right of the states to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials and
employees (Art. XI, Sec 15)
14
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v. HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 130140; October 25, 1999
FACTS: On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V.
Ramos issued AO No. 13, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans.
On 9 November 1992, President Ramos issued
MO No. 61 directing the COMMITTEE to
include in its investigation, inventory, and study
all non-performing loans which shall embrace
both behest and non-behest loans. It likewise
provided for the following criteria which might
be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining a behest loan, to wit:
a. It is undercollateralized.
b. The borrower corporation is
undercapitalized.
c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high
government officials like presence of marginal
notes.
d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the
borrower corporation are identified as cronies.
e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the
purpose intended.
f. Use of corporate layering.
g. Non-feasibility of the project for which
financing is being sought.
h. Extraordinary speed in which the loan
release was made.
In its report on behest loans to President
Ramos, the Committee reported that the
Philippines Seeds, Inc. was one of the twenty-
one corporations which obtained behest loans.
On 2 March 1996, the Committee, filed with the
OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the
Directors of PSI for violation of paragraphs (e)
and (g) of Section 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
In the resolution, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed
the complaint in on the ground of prescription.
Relying on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by
the Court of Appeals, he ratiocinated that since
the questioned transactions were evidenced by
public instruments and were thus open for the
perusal of the public, the prescriptive period
commenced to run from the time of the
commission of the crime, not from the discovery
thereof. Reckoning the prescriptive period from
1969, 1970, 1975, and 1978, when the disputed
transactions were entered into, the
OMBUDSMAN ruled that the offenses with
which respondents were charged had already
prescribed. Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the OMBUDSMAN, the
Committee filed this case to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether the right of the Republic to
recover behest loans unlawfully acquired by
PSI imprescriptible
RULING: The Republic of the Philippines
has the right to recover behest loans
unlawfully acquired by PSI although may be
barred by prescription. The Court explains
that behest loans are part of the ill-gotten
wealth which former President Marcos and his
cronies accumulated and which the
Government through the PCGG seeks to
recover. Furthermore, the ruling in Dinsay is
not applicable to the case at bar. First, it is a
decision of the Court of Appeals; hence, it does
not establish a doctrine and can only have a
persuasive value. Second, it involved a
prosecution for estafa in that the accused
disposed of his property claiming that it was
free from any lien or encumbrance despite the
fact that a notice of lis pendens was registered
with the Registry of Deeds. Third, Dinsay
involved private parties, while the instant case
involves the Government and public officers.
Fourth, the ruling is not absolute.
The Court held that under Section 15, Article XI
of the Constitution the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel. The
consequence of the foregoing discussion is that
the prosecution of offenses arising from,
relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten
wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of
the Constitution may be barred by prescription.
Since the law alleged to have been violated,
i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the
applicable rule in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy. This simply
means that if the commission of the crime is
15
known, the prescriptive period shall commence Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain
to run on the day it was committed. provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an
In the present case, the Court explained, it was unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
well-nigh impossible for the State, the over lands of the public domain as well as
aggrieved party, to have known the violations of minerals and other natural resources therein, in
R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in
transactions were made because, as alleged, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, as
the public officials concerned connived or follows:
conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans.
Thus, the Court agrees with the Committee that 1. Section defining the extent and
the prescriptive period for the offenses with coverage of ancestral
which the respondents were charged should be domains, and ancestral lands;
computed from the discovery of the commission 2. Section which provides that
thereof and not from the day of such ancestral domains including
commission. However, the Court held that inalienable public lands,
Section 15, Art XI of the Constitution only bodies of water, mineral and
applies to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten other resources found within
wealth, and not to criminal cases. ancestral domains are private
but community property of the
The case was remanded to the OMBUDSMAN indigenous peoples;
finding upon grave abuse of discretion on their 3. Section which defines the
part. composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
----------------------------------------------------------- 4. Section which recognizes and
enumerates the rights of the
Regalian Doctrine (Art. XII, Sec. 2 relate with indigenous peoples over the
Art. XII, Sec. 5 and Art. II, Sec. 22) ancestral domains, and over
the ancestral lands;
ISAGANI CRUZ V. SEC. OF NATURAL 5. Section which provides for
RESOURCES (G.R. No. 135385, December 6, priority rights of the indigenous
2000) peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or
REGALIAN DOCTRINE – all lands of the exploration of minerals and
public domain as well as all-natural other natural resources within
resources enumerated therein, whether on the areas claimed to be their
public or private land, belong to the State. ancestral domains, and the
(Section 2 of Article XII) right to enter into agreements
with nonindigenous peoples for
FACTS: the development and utilization
This suit for prohibition and mandamus filed by of natural resources therein for
petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as a period not exceeding 25
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the years, renewable for not more
constitutionality of certain provisions of than 25 years; and
Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise 6. Section which gives the
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of indigenous peoples the
1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and responsibility to maintain,
Regulations (Implementing Rules). develop, protect and conserve
the ancestral domains and
The Solicitor General, representing the Sec. of portions thereof which are
DENR and DBM is of the view that the IPRA is found to be necessary for
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it critical watersheds,
grants ownership over natural resources to mangroves, wildlife
indigenous people. The CHR, through sanctuaries, wilderness,
Intervention, asserts that IPRA is an expression protected areas, forest cover
of the principle of parens patriae and that the or reforestation.
State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a
ISSUE:
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples.

16
Whether the provisions of IPRA contravene the
Constitution being violative of the Regalian
Doctrine
RULING:
Seven Justices voted to dismiss the petition,
while seven other members of the Court voted
to grant the petition. As the votes were equally
divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Separate Opinion of J. Puno
The provisions of the IPRA do not contravene
the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands
are the private property of indigenous
peoples and do not constitute part of the
land of the public domain.
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands may be acquired
in two modes: (1) by Native Title over both
ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by Torrens
Title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands
only.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest
rights to lands and domains held under a claim
of private ownership as far back as memory
reaches. These lands are deemed never to
have been public lands and are indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest. Ancestral lands
and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. This is concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal
grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
The option to register land under the Public
Land Act and the Land Registration Act has
nonetheless a limited period. This option must
be exercised within twenty (20) years from
October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the
IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.
Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy
and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into four
categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber,
(c) mineral lands, and (d) national
parks. Section 5 of the same
Article XII mentions ancestral lands and
ancestral domains but it does not classify them
under any of the said four categories. To
classify them as public lands under any one of
the four classes will render the entire IPRA law
a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct
concept of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem
of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and
space are of vital concern in terms of sheer
survival of the ICCs/IPs.
B. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands
and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral
Domains Does Not Deprive the State of
Ownership Over the Natural Resources and
Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.
There is nothing in IPRA that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by
the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right
to the small-scale utilization of these resources,
and at the same time, a priority in their large-
scale development and exploitation.
The ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources
take the form of management or stewardship.
NOTE:
Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A.
8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion
sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III
of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he
contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
17
does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6,
7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on
the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and
66 of the law, which he believes must await the
filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and
57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Utilization of natural resources (Art. XII, Sec. 2)
Resident Marine Mammals vs. Sec. Angelo
Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
FACTS:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46),
which allowed the exploration, development,
and exploitation of petroleum resources within
Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water
situated between the islands of Negros and
Cebu.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical
studies of the Tañon Strait.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX
formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for
the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers
offshore the Tañon Strait.
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted
seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait.
A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering
approximately 751 kilometers was also done to
determine the area's underwater composition
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well
during the second sub-phase of the project.
Since the well was to be drilled in the marine
waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan,
where the Tañon Strait was declared a
protected seascape in 1988,[10] JAPEX agreed
to comply with the Environmental Impact
Assessment requirements pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with
a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan
town in the western Cebu Province.[15] This
drilling lasted until February 8, 2008
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs
that petitioners applied to this Court for redress,
via two separate original petitions both dated
December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly
seek that respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for, among others,
violation of the 1987 Constitution
Petitioners' Allegations: Petitioners maintain
that SC-46 transgresses the Jura
Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because
JAPEX is 100% Japanese-
owned.[60] Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that
SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and
financial assistance agreement validly
executed under paragraph 4 of the same
provision.[61] The petitioners claim that La
Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos[62] laid down the guidelines for a valid
service contract, one of which is that there must
exist a general law for oil exploration before a
service contract may be entered into by the
Government. The petitioners posit that the
service contract in La Bugal is presumed to
have complied with the requisites of (a)
legislative enactment of a general law after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such as
Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining
Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and
(b) presidential notification. The petitioners thus
allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which
involved mining contracts under Republic Act
No. 7942, does not apply in this case.[63] The
petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree
No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46 as it is
deemed to have been repealed by the 1987
Constitution and subsequent laws, which
enunciate new policies concerning the
environment.[64] In addition, petitioners in G.R.
No. 180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by
the Filipinos of our natural resources,[65] and
paragraph 4 does not speak of service
contracts but of FTAAs or Financial Technical
Assistance Agreements.
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations:
claims and asseverate that SC-46 does not
violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not fall
under the coverage of paragraph 1 but instead,
under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of
18
the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They also
insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, which refer to
the grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos,
are not applicable to SC-46 as the contract
does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX
nor does it otherwise impinge on the FIDEC's
right to preferential use of communal marine
and fishing resources
ISSUE:
WON Service contract 46 is constitutional?
RULING:
NO. In summarizing the matters discussed in
the ConCom, we established that paragraph
4, with the safeguards in place, is the
exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of
Article XII. The following are the safeguards
this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into
only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject
to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in
accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and
requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public
scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed
agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an
opportunity to look over the agreement and
interpose timely objections, if any.[69]
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this
Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void
for noncompliance with the requirements of the
1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This
was enacted by then President Ferdinand
Marcos to promote the discovery and
production of indigenous petroleum through the
utilization of government and/or local or foreign
private resources to yield the maximum benefit
to the Filipino people and the revenues to the
Philippine Government.[70]
Contrary to the petitioners' argument,
Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted
in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless
otherwise repealed, to wit:
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential
Decree No. 87, it would have been done
expressly by Congress.
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners'
contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the
ground that there is no general law prescribing
the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and
requirements for service contracts involving oil
exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while
Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, as will be discussed below, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress, since
the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS[75] area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46
and the same was not submitted to
Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree
No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
a general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to
SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such
contract, renders it null and void.
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires that the President himself
enter into any service contract for the
exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to
have been entered into and signed only by the
DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S.
Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional
requirement. Moreover, public respondents
have neither shown nor alleged that Congress
was subsequently notified of the execution of
such contract.
While the requirements in executing service
contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII
19
of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere
formalities, they, in reality, take on a much
bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal,
they are the safeguards put in place by the
framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or
minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime." As this Court has held in La
Bugal, our Constitution requires that the
President himself be the signatory of service
agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving the exploration, development, and
utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly.
Even if we were inclined to relax the
requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987
Constitution with the aforementioned provision
of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown
that the government agency or subordinate
official has been authorized by the President to
enter into such service contract for the
government. Otherwise, it should be at least
shown that the President subsequently
approved of such contract explicitly. None of
these circumstances is evident in the case at
bar.
(Just an FYI in case tanungin)
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may
be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine
wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its
use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of
every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Franchise, certificate and authority for public
utilities (Art.XII, Sec.11)
Roy III vs. Chairperson Herbosa, G.R. No.
207246, 22 November 2016
------MISSING CASE========
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ownership / acquisition of lands (Art. XII, Secs.
7 and 8)
Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC) vs. Keppel Philippines
Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 202050, 25 July
2016
(Ownership/acquisition) Art. XII, Sec. 7&8
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law.
Philippine National Oil Company and PNOC
Dockyard & Engineering Corporation vs.
Keppel Philippines Holdings, Inc.
FACTS:
Almost 40 years ago or on 6 August
1976, the respondent Keppel Philippines
Holdings, Inc. (Keppel) entered into a lease
agreement (the agreement) with Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (Lusteveco) covering
11 hectares of land located in Bauan,
20
Batangas. The lease was for a period of 25
years for a consideration of P2.1 million. At the
option of Lusteveco, the rental fee could be
totally or partially converted into equity shares
in Keppel.
At the end of the 25-year lease period,
Keppel was given the "firm and absolute option
to purchase the land for P4.09 million, provided
that it had acquired the necessary qualification
to own land under Philippine laws at the time
the option is exercised. Apparently, when the
lease agreement was executed, less than
60% of Keppel's shareholding was Filipino-
owned, hence, it was not constitutionally
qualified to acquire private lands in the
country. If at the end of the 25-year lease
period and Keppel remains to be unqualified to
own lands, their lease would automatically be
renewed for another 25 years. They are allowed
to exercise the option to purchase the land up
to the 30th year of the lease, also on the
condition that, by then, it would have acquired
the requisite qualification to own land in the
Philippines.
Together with Keppel's lease rights and
option to purchase, Lusteveco warranted not to
sell the land or assign its rights to the land for
the duration of the lease unless with the prior
written consent of Keppel. Accordingly, when
the petitioner Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC) acquired the land from
Lusteveco and took over the rights and
obligations under the agreement, Keppel did
not object to the assignment so long as the
agreement was annotated on PNOC's title. With
PNOC's consent and cooperation, the
agreement was recorded as Entry No. 65340
on PNOC's Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-
50724.
Keppel, then at least 60% Filipino-
owned, wrote to Keppel to exercise its option to
purchase the land and its readiness to
purchase. However, despite demand, PNOC
did not favorably respond. Keppel filed a
complaint for specific performance which was
countered by PNOC stating that Keppel's
claims by contending that the agreement was
illegal for circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against aliens holding lands in the
Philippines. It further asserted that the option
contract was void, as it was unsupported by a
separate valuable consideration. It also claimed
that it was not privy to the agreement. RTC
rendered in favor of Keppel and PNOC was
ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale
upon payment of Keppel. PNOC elevated the
case to the CA which affirmed the decision of
the RTC. Failure to secure a reconsideration,
hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the terms of the
Agreement amounted to a virtual
sale of the land to Keppel that was
designed to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition on aliens
owning lands in the Philippines.
(2) Whether Keppel's equity ownership
meets the 60% Filipino-owned
capital requirement of trie
Constitution, in accordance with the
Court's ruling in Gamboa v. Teves.
RULING:
(1) The Court affirms the
constitutionality of the Agreement.
The agreement was executed to
enable Keppel to use the land for
its shipbuilding and ship repair
business. The industrial/commercial purpose
behind the agreement differentiates the present
case from Lui She where the leased property
was primarily devoted to residential use.
Undoubtedly, the establishment and operation
of a shipyard business involve significant
investments. Keppel's uncontested testimony
showed that it incurred P60 million costs solely
for preliminary activities to make the land
suitable as a shipyard, and subsequently
introduced improvements worth P177 million.
Taking these investments into account and the
nature of the business that Keppel conducts on
the land, we find it reasonable that the
agreement's terms provided for an extended
duration of the lease and a restriction on the
rights of Lusteveco.
We observe that, unlike in Lui She, Lusteveco
was not completely denied its ownership rights
during the course of the lease. It could dispose
of the lands or assign its rights thereto, provided
it secured Keppel's prior written consent. That
Lusteveco was able to convey the land in favour
of PNOC during the pendency of the
lease should negate a finding that the
agreement's terms amounted to a virtual
transfer of ownership of the land to Keppel.
(2) In Gamboa v. Teves (2011) the Court
declared that the "legal and beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding
capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipino nationals." Clarifying the ruling, the
Court decreed that the 60% Filipino
ownership requirement applies separately
21
 to each class of shares, whether with or
without voting rights.
As of November 2000, Keppel's capital is 60%
Filipino-owned. However, there is nothing in the
records showing the nature and composition of
Keppel's shareholdings, i.e. ,whether its
shareholdings are divided into different classes,
and 60% of each share class is legally and
beneficially owned by Filipinos - siege and acts of violence directed towards
understandably because when Keppel
exercised its option to buy the land in 2000,
the Gamboa ruling had not yet been
promulgated. The Court cannot deny Keppel
its option to buy the land by retroactively
applying the Gamboa ruling without violating
Keppel's vested right. Thus, Keppel's failure to
prove the nature and composition of its
shareholdings in 2000 could not prevent it from
validly exercising its option to buy the land.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot completely
disregard the effect of the Gamboa ruling; the
60% Filipino equity proportion is a continuing
requirement to hold land in the Philippines. In
this case, Keppel must be allowed to prove
whether it meets the required Filipino equity
ownership and proportion in accordance with
the Gamboa ruling before it can acquire full title
to the land.
SC affirms the RTC decision and
REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial
Court for the determination of whether the
respondent Keppel Philippines Holdings,
Inc. meets the required Filipino equity
ownership and proportion in accordance
with the Court's ruling in Gamboa v.
Teves, to allow it to acquire full title to the
land.
-----------------------------------------------------------
V. Legislative Department
Lagman vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
231658, 4 July 2017
Facts:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not
exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring
a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President submitted to
Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on
the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The
Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao
has been plagued with rebellion and lawless
violence which only escalated and worsened
with the passing of time. Particularly, on May
23, 2017, a government operation to capture
the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaff
Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was
confronted with armed resistance which
escalated into open hostility against the
government. Through these groups' armed
civilians and government authorities,
institutions and establishments, they were able
to take control of major social, economic, and
political foundations of Marawi City which led to
its paralysis. This sudden taking of control was
intended to lay the groundwork for the eventual
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province
in Mindanao. The President then chronicled in
his Report the events which took place on May
23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him to
declare a state of martial law and suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus.
The Report highlighted the strategic location of
Marawi City and the crucial and significant role
it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a
whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the
possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City
falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the
briefings with the military and police authorities,
the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888
expressing full support to the martial law
proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216
"to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law". In the same
Resolution, the Senate declared that it found
"no compelling reason to revoke the same".
The House of Representatives likewise issued
House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full
support to the martial law proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not the power of this Court to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
independent of the actual actions that have
been taken by Congress jointly or separately
Held:
Yes. The Court may strike down the
presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of
lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other
hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
22
considers only the information and data
available to the President prior to or at the time
of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake
an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings." On the other hand, Congress may
take into consideration not only data available
prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court which does not
look into the absolute correctness of the factual
basis as will be discussed below, Congress
could probe deeper and further; it can delve into
the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
The Court's review power is passive; it is only
initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the
other hand, Congress' review mechanism is
automatic in the sense that it may be activated
by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.
The power to review by the Court and the power
to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each
other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the
power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of
Congress.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Houses of Congress
Senate; Composition (Art. VI, Sec. 2)
Trillanes v. Judge Pimentel, Sr.
Facts: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than
300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers
of AFP stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials.
Later that day, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Trillanes was charged with coup detat.
Close to four years later, petitioner,
who has remained in detention, threw his hat in
the political arena and won a seat in the Senate
with a six-year term commencing
at noon on June 30, 2007.
Trillanes sought from the Makati RTC
leave to attend Senate sessions and to
convene his staff, resource persons and guests
and to attend to his official functions as Senator.
He anchored his motion on his right to be
presumed innocent, and claims that the
Jalosjos ruling should not be applied to him,
because he is a mere detention prisoner and is
not charged with a crime involving moral
turpitude. The Makati RTC denied the motion.
Issues: 1. WON the petition of trillanes be
granted.
2. WON the Jalosjos ruling is applicable in this
case.
Held: 1. No. The SC denied Trillanes’ petition
on the ground that Sec. 13, Art. Ill of the
Constitution, explicitly provides that crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong are nonbailable. The
Court further said that the presumption of
innocence does not necessarily carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
2. Yes. In People v. Jalosjos, the SC denied the
motion of Congressman Jalosjos that he be
allowed to fully discharged the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee hearings
despite his having been convicted by the trial
court of a non-bailable offense. The denial was
premised on the following: [i] membership in
Congress does not exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons; [ii] one rationale behind
confinement, whether pending appeal or after
final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it is
the injury to the public, not the injury to the
complainant, which state action in criminal law
seeks to redress; [iii] it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune from arrest during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same; and [iv] accused-
appellant is provided with an office at the House
of Representatives with a full complement of
staff, as well as an office at the Administration
Building, New Bilibid Prison, where he attends
to his constituents; he has, therefore, been
discharging his mandate as member of the
House of Representatives, and being a
detainee, he should not even be allowed by the
prison authorities to perform these acts.
In this case, petitioner posits that his election
provides the legal justification to allow him to
serve his mandate, after the people, in their
sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He
argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is
tantamount to removing him from office,
depriving the people of proper representation,
denying the peoples will, repudiating the
peoples choice, and overruling the mandate of
the people.
In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically
held that the doctrine of condonation does not
23
apply to criminal cases. Election to office does
not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that
when the voters elected him to the Senate, they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison.
In once more debunking the
disenfranchisement argument, it is opportune
to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the
call of duty conferred by the voice of the people
is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the
mandate of the people yields to the Constitution
which the people themselves ordained to
govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate
and even essential duties by
public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the mandate of the
people are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks
highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention
the 24 members
of the Senate, charged with the
duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a
few of its members. x x x Never
has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others
who are validly restrained by
law (People v. Jalosjos).
-----------------------------------------------------------
House of Representatives
Representation of cities and provinces (Art. VI,
Sec. 5[3], 2nd sentence)
Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, 7
April 2010
Facts:
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act
No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment. Province of Camarines Sur
was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4)
legislative districts, following the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
order to create an additional legislative district
for the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul
of the explicit constitutional standard that
requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that
the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of
the first and second districts of Camarines Sur
is unconstitutional, because the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an
indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a
province
Ruling:
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with
it the presumption of constitutionality. Before a
law may be declared unconstitutional by this
Court, there must be a clear showing that a
specific provision of the fundamental law has
been violated or transgressed. When there is
neither a violation of a specific provision of the
Constitution nor any proof showing that there is
such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be
upheld. To doubt is to sustain. There is no
specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district, each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear
distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
24
province to a district on the other. For while a
province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city
must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The
use by the subject provision of a comma to
separate the phrase "each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the
phrase "or each province" point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for
a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, 8 December 2008
DOCTRINE: A plebiscite is not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took
place.
FACTS: Rogelio Bagabuyo filed an action to
prevent the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No.
7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 937
“An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the
Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan
De Oro." 12 - the law that Resolution No. 7837
implements - is unconstitutional.
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371
and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional
grounds, the petitioner argued that the
COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371
without providing for the rules, regulations and
guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which
is indispensable for the division or conversion
of a local government unit. He prayed for the
issuance of an order directing the respondents
to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No.
9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and
to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No.
7801 which provided for a single legislative
district for Cagayan de Oro.
The respondent's Comment on the petition,
argued that:
1. R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution;
2. The criteria established under Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply
when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in
this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and
3. R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change
in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is
required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that:
1. Cagayan de Oro City's
reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371
falls within the meaning of creation,
division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of
cities under Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution;
2. the creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units involve a
common denominator - the material
change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units
directly affected, as well as of the
people therein.
ISSUE:
1. Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for
the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve
the division and conversion of a local
government unit?
2. Whether or not a plebiscite was
required in the case at bar.
HELD: R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the
legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro
City.
Reapportionment, is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of
the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on
legislative apportionment under its Section 5
which provides:
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable,
continuous, compact, and adjacent
25
 territory. Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the
return of every census, the
Congress shall make a arose from the division of the congressional
reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
The creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of local government
units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays, are covered by the Article on
Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this
Article provides:
No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria
established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political unit directly affected.
In contrast with the equal representation
objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local
government units may be "created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered." Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the
modification of local government units'
corporate existence and territorial coverage;
and it speaks of two specific standards that
must be observed in implementing this concern,
namely, the criteria established in the local
government code and the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. Under the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in
1991, the criteria of income, population and
land area are specified as verifiable indicators
of viability and capacity to provide
services.24 The division or merger of existing
units must comply with the same requirements
(since a new local government unit will come
into being), provided that a division shall not
reduce the income, population, or land area of
the unit affected to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed in the Code.25
A pronounced distinction between Article VI,
Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution
and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government unit.26 In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under
the apportionment or reapportionment
provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case that
district formerly covering San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate districts, we
confirmed this distinction and the fact that no
plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up
because one was ordered and held for
Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city, while none was
held for San Juan. In explaining why this
happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite
was necessary for San Juan because the
objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
required by Article X, Section 10 the Local
Government Code; the creation of a new
legislative district only followed as a
consequence. In other words, the
apportionment alone and by itself did not call for
a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San
Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
-----------------------------------------------------------
SEMA vs. COMELEC
=======MISSING CASE======
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Party-list System
The four parameters in the Party-List election
Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, GR No.
203766, 02 April 2013
This constitutes 54 Petitions filed by 52 party-
list groups and organizations assailing the
Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
FACTS:
26
  Pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7941 and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and
organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
 On 5 December 2012, the COMELEC
En Banc issued a Resolution affirming
the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng
Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the
National Capital Region. However,
PBB was denied participation in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections because
PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented"
sector; PBB failed to apply for
registration as a party-list group; and
PBB failed to establish its track record
as an organization that seeks to uplift
the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
 On 7 January 2013, the COMELEC
issued a Resolution and excluded the
names of 13 petitioners in the printing
of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013
party-list elections. The 13 petitioners
were (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-
EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN,
PPP, and PBB).
 The COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
Then, the COMELEC disqualified some
groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-
list elections.
 39 petitioners were able to secure a
mandatory injunction from the Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13
May 2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE:
Whether the criteria for participating in the
party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be
applied by the COMELEC in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court declared that it would
not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who
are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. Thus, the Court
remanded all the present petitions to the
COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere
to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may
participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and
regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in
party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is
by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through
a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations
may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities,
27
 handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and
the youth.
5. A majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented,"
or that represent those who lack "well-
defined political constituencies," either
must belong to their respective sectors,
or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-
fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
**************
ARTICLE VI
The indisputable intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to include in the party-list
system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties
is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative
shall be composed of not more that two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is
crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." The
commas after the words "national," and
"regional," separate national and regional
parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended national and
regional parties to be at the same time sectoral,
they would have stated "national and regional
sectoral parties." They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the
party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they
expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be
any clearer: the party-list system is composed
of three different groups, and the sectoral
parties belong to only one of the three groups.
The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any
doubt that national and regional parties are
separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed
of three different groups: (1) national parties
or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector."
This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives,
clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of
one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral
parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three
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congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the
three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording,
and party-list structure ordained in Section
5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-
list system is not for sectoral parties only,
but also for non-sectoral parties.
SEC. 9 OF R.A. NO. 7941
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the
qualifications of party-list nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only
for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List
Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration
of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he
or she seeks to represent. In the case of
sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list
nominee one must either belong to the
sector represented, or have a track record
of advocacy for such sector.
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People vs. Jalosjos
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a
full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman. He calls this a
covenant with his constituents made possible
by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos further argues that on several
occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave
his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First
District of Zamboanga del Norte want their
voices to be heard and that since he is treated
as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal
branch of government to respect his mandate.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of
House of Representatives and to leave his cell.
Held:
To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee
meetings will virtually make him a free man.
When the voters of his district elected the
accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more
drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with
full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any
time, he may no longer serve his full term in
office.
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To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us

boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall

any person be denied the equal protection of
laws." This simply means that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.
The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a

substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same
class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even

essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.

The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position

of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.

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