G.R. No.

L-29972 January 26, 1976

ROSARIO CARBONELL
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PONCIO, EMMA INFANTE and RAMON INFANTE

FACTS:

Respondent Poncio was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Rizal. The said
land subject to mortgage in favor of Republic Savings Bank. Both Petitioner Carbonell
and Respondent Infante offered to buy the said lot from Poncio. Poncio offered to sell
the land to petitioner Carbonell excluding the house wherein the former lived. Carbonell
accepted the offer and proposed the price of P9.50/sq.m to Poncio in which the latter
had agreed on the condition that the money to be paid in the bank would come from
the purchase price.

On January 27, 1955, petitioner and Respondent Poncio had made and executed
a document (in Batanes Dialect) which reads: “CONTRACT FOR ONE HALF LOT WHICH I
BOUGHT FROM PONCIO”. Thereafter, petitioner asked a lawyer to prepare the formal
deed of sale, which she brought to respondent Poncio together with the balance of
P400.00.

However when he arrived at Poncio’s house, the latter told her that he could no
longer proceed with the sale because he had already sold the lot to respondent Emma
Infante. Petitioner then sought to contact respondent Mrs. Infante but the latter refused
to see her.

Poncio admitted that on January 30, 1955, Mrs. Infante improved her offer and he
agreed to sell the land and its improvements to her for P3,535.00. In a private
memorandum agreement dated January 31, 1955, respondent Poncio indeed bound
himself to sell the same to his corespondent Emma Infante.

On February 2, 1955, respondent Poncio executed the formal deed of sale in favor
of respondent Mrs. Infante .

Upon gaining knowledge that the sale to Infante was not yet registered, petitioner
thru counsel has filed an adverse claim on the said property on February 8, 1955. Hence,
the deed of sale in favor of respondent Mrs. Infante was registered only on February 12,
1955. The title issued to the latter has an annotation of the adverse claim filed by
petitioner. Thereafter, respondent Infante immediately took possession of the lot and built
a house thereof.

On June 1, 1955, petitioner Carbonell, thru counsel, filed a second amended

complaint against private respondents, praying that she be declared the lawful owner
of the questioned parcel of land; that the subsequent sale to respondents Infante be
declared null and void, and that respondent Poncio be ordered to execute the
corresponding deed of conveyance of said land in her favor.

The RTC has rendered a decision in favor of Petitioner declaring that the sale
between Respondents Poncio and Infante null and void. However, after a re-trial, the
lower court reversed its previous ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
lower court and decided in favor of the petitioner. Thus, a motion for reconsideration was
filed by the Respondents. The CA reversed its decision.
 Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CARBONELL HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT OVER EMMA INFANTE.

HELD:
Article 1544, New Civil Code, which is decisive of this case, recites:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if
it should movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

It is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed
of sale to merit the protection of the second paragraph of said Article 1544.

Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference
to the one who first takes possession in good faith of personal or real property, the second
paragraph directs that ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor
of one "who in good faith first recorded" his right. Under the first and third
paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of anterior registration (DBP vs.
Mangawang, et al., 11 SCRA 405; Soriano, et al. vs. Magale, et al., 8 SCRA 489).

If there is no inscription, what is decisive is prior possession in good faith. If there is

inscription, as in the case at bar, prior registration in good faith is a pre-condition to
superior title.

When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only
buyer thereof and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank
mortgage duly annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware — and she could not have
been aware — of any sale of Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence,
Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in good faith. Her good faith subsisted
and continued to exist when she recorded her adverse claim four (4) days prior to the
registration of Infantes's deed of sale. Carbonell's good faith did not cease after Poncio
told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Because of that
information, Carbonell wanted an audience with Infante, which desire underscores
Carbonell's good faith. With an aristocratic disdain unworthy of the good breeding of a
good Christian and good neighbor, Infante snubbed Carbonell like a leper and refused
to see her. So Carbonell did the next best thing to protect her right — she registered her
adversed claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of her
adverse claim should be deemed to have been done in good faith and should
emphasize Infante's bad faith when she registered her deed of sale four (4) days later on
February 12, 1955.

(Yung nasa Nota Bene Pwede mo na ito hindi isulat, basahin mo na lang)

NOTA BENE:
Bad faith arising from previous knowledge by Infante of the prior sale to Carbonell is
shown by the following facts:
 1. Mrs. Infante refused to see Carbonell, who wanted to see Infante after she was
informed by Poncio that he sold the lot to Infante but several days before Infante
registered her deed of sale. Ordinarily, one will not refuse to see a neighbor.
Infante lives just behind the house of Carbonell.
2. Carbonell was already in possession of the mortgage passbook and Poncio's copy
of the mortgage contract. Infante naturally must have demanded from Poncio
the delivery to her of his mortgage passbook as well as Poncio's mortgage
contract so that the fact of full payment of his bank mortgage will be entered
therein; and Poncio, as well as the bank, must have inevitably informed her that
said mortgage passbook could not be given to her because it was already
delivered to Carbonell.
3. The fact that Poncio was no longer in possession of his mortgage passbook and
that the said mortgage passbook was already in possession of Carbonell, should
have compelled Infante to inquire from Poncio why he was no longer in possession
of the mortgage passbook and from Carbonell why she was in possession of the
same (Paglago, et. al vs. Jara et al 22 SCRA 1247, 1252-1253). Infante snubbed
Carbonell's request to talk to her about the prior sale to her b Poncio of the lot. As
aforestated, this is not the attitude expected of a good neighbor imbued with
Christian charity and good will as well as a clear conscience.
4. Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 her adverse claim, which was
accordingly annotated on Poncio's title, four [4] days before Infante registered on
February 12, 1955 her deed of sale executed on February 2, 1955. Here she was
again on notice of the prior sale to Carbonell.
5. It is therefore logical to presume that Infante was told by Poncio and consequently
knew of the offer of Carbonell which fact likewise should have put her on her
guard and should have compelled her to inquire from Poncio whether or not he
had already sold the property to Carbonell.

x------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA VS HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
(EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS)

FACTS:

Petitioners Tanada et al., seek a writ of mandamus, invoking the right of the people
to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, to compel the respondent public officials to publish and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations, and
administrative order.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

ISSUE: WON ALL LAWS SHALL BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE ITS EFFECTIVITY

HELD:

YES.
The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the

effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.

** The clear object of SECTION 1 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 638 is to give the

general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents
and texts of such decrees. (HUWAG MO NA ISULAT ITONG PARAGRAPH NA ITO)

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public

nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,

which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

x-------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939

MARCIAL KASILAG
vs
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO
(IGNORANCE OF THE LAW)
FACTS:

On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio and petitioner, Marcial Kasilag executed a
contract of mortgage (Exhibit 1) of improvements of land acquired as homestead to
secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1, 000 plus interest. The parties stipulated in
the contract that Ambrosio would pay the debt with interest within a four and one-half
(4½) years after date of the execution of this instrument then said mortgage shall be and
become null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and
effect. Moreover, they agreed that Ambrosio would pay all the taxes thereof.
Furthermore, they agreed that when the mortgagor Ambrosio should fail to redeem this
mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property after the
expiration of the agreed period.

One year after, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable
to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this
reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she
conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not
collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon.

The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio,

commenced an action for recovery of possession and improvements in the land against
Petitioner Kasilag. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondents. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed an appeal with Court of Appeals in which it modified the decision of the
lower court. The Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so held that the contract
entered into by and between the parties was one of absolute purchase and sale of the
land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal
effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between
the parties.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE DEEMED A POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH

BECAUSE HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY FLAW IN HIS TITLE OR IN THE MANNER
OF ITS ACQUISITION BY WHICH IT IS INVALIDATED.
WON PETITIONER’S GOOD FAITH MAY BE PREMISED UPON IGNORANCE OF
THE LAWS.

RULING: YES.

From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce
nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Section 116 of Act No. 2874, as
amended by Section 23 of Act No. 3517.

(** WAG MO NA ITO ISULAT: SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of
its branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands
acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a
term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall
they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.)

According to this Manresa, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be
the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In
accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly
as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance
of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good
faith. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of
the land and enjoying its fruits.

x---------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989

ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO vs. HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
(IGNORANCE OF THE LAW)

FACTS:

On March 1976, Warren Taylor Graham died in U.S.A. He left shares of stock in the
Philippines so his son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax in U.S.A. On January 18, 1977, the
decedent's will had been admitted to probate in Oregon. Ward Graham, the designated
executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact
for the allowance of the will in the Philippines. On the basis of the return, respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax on
February 9, 1978. The assessment was protested but was denied by the CIR.

Petitioner commenced probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

The will was allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary administrator.
As such, he filed a second estate tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on June
1980. The Commissioner imposed an assessment on the estate. This was also protested.
While the protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a
motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax as assessed on February 9, 1978.

Petitioner regarded this act as an implied denial by the Commissioner thus, he filed
a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. The
Commissioner, instead of filing his answer, cancelled the protested assessment. And the
latter filed a motion to dismiss which was granted the CTA.

Aggrieved, Petitioner filed an appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT THAT THE FIRST ASSESSMENT IS NOT BINDING
ON HIM BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON A RETURN FILED BY FOREIGN LAWYERS
WHO HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF OUR TAX LAWS OR ACCESS TO THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS IS MERITORIOUS

RULING:
 The petitioner is clutching at straws.

Petitioner’s contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he

argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the
return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the
petitioner suggesting that they are excused from compliance therewith because of their
ignorance?

If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they
are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be
any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow
discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.

But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first
assessment is already final and executory and can no longer be questioned at this late
hour. The assessment was made on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978.
The protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no further action was taken thereon by the
decedent's estate, there is no question that the assessment has become final and
executory. In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise
the question of its validity before this Court any more than he could have done so before
the Court of Tax Appeals.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE
(RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS)

FACTS:

Petitioner Frivaldo and Respondent Lee filed their certificate of candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogan in the May 1995 election. Respondent Lee filed a petition
with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public
office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines" and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be canceled which was granted by the COMELEC. The Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May
elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held
on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned
Resolution of the Second Division. However, Frivaldo has garnered the highest number of
votes in the said election.

On June 9, 1995, Respondent Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as
duly-elected Governor. The COMELEC En Banc decided in his favor and Lee was
proclaimed as Governor on June 30, 1995.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a petition praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as
a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As
such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more
legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ."

COMELEC granted petitioner Frivaldo’s petition hence Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC.

Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: WON FRIVALDO’S REPATRIATION UNDER PD 725 IS VALID AND MAY BE GIVEN
A RETROACTIVE EFFECT

HELD:

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation
of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general
rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW
RIGHTS.

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also
provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. In this case, P.D. No.
725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A.
No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of
their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and
other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Presidential Decree No. 725 provided
a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered
essentially remedial and curative.

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became
an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor,
August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the
legislative authority that the law should apply to past events in order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise
the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be
given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law
apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As
earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary
intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or
prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity
to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional
guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a
liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
x---------------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-22802 November 29, 1968

MAXIMO H. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZO G. VALENTIN

FACTS:

In this special action for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, invoking the
applicable procedural rule, assail the validity of two resolutions of respondent Court of
Appeals. The first, rendered on March 13, 1964, denied a petition of the deceased father
of petitioners. The aforesaid order was affirmed in another resolution of April 8, 1964,
denying a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the provisions of Section 2, Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Court are not applicable and the appeal was perfected before
the Revised Rules took effect. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus dated
April 21, 1964. At first, it was dismissed for being premature. However, on July 6, 1964, the
Court reconsidered.

ISSUE: WON THE PROCEDURAL LAW MAY BE GIVEN A RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

RULING:

Petitioner is entitled to the writ prayed for. It is undeniable, as respondent Court

stated in the aforesaid resolution, that the rule of court applicable as of January 1,
1964,4 which would enable a party appealing from a judgment denying relief under Rule
38 likewise to "assail the judgment on the merits" for lack of support in the evidence, gave
rise to a new procedural right. Nonetheless, under the doctrine uninterruptedly adhered
to by this Court, the retroactive application of a procedural law is not violative of any right
of a party who may feel that he is adversely affected.

“Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable

to causes of action accrued, and actions pending and undetermined, at the time of
their passage, unless such actions are expressly excepted or unless vested rights would
be disturbed by giving them a retrospective operation." Respondent Valentin, in this
case, cannot allege any vested right which would preclude the application of the above
principle.
In Tolentino v. Angeles, a 1956 decision, it reiterated that "retroactivity of laws that
are remedial in nature is not prohibited."

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR et al., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIA ARUEGO

FACTS:

On March 7, 1983, Respondent Antonia Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn
Aruego filed a complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional
Rights against herein Petitioners. The complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr.
had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death. And out
of this relationship were born Respondent Antonia and Evelyn. The main basis of the
action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children".

After trial, the lower court rendered judgement declaring only Antonia Aruego as
an illegitimate child of Jose M. Aruego, Sr. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court
over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Family Code of the Philippines which took
effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated
January 14, 1993. The latter interposed an appeal but was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but no avail. A
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.

ISSUE: WON THE PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY CODE BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY

RULING:

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with
the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause
of action has not yet prescribed.

The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory

recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent
of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article
175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect
insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right
of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The
right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil
Code.

x----------------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

HERBERT CANG vs.COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA
CLARA CLAVANO

FACTS:

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano got married on January 27,
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on
January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.

During their marriage, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital
affair with Wilma Soco. Thus, she filed a petition for legal separation which was duly
granted by the lower court.

Thereafter, petitioner left for the United States where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie. Petitioner remarried and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In
1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in US, he worked in a
clinic and remitted the portion of his earnings to the Philippines for his children’s expenses.

On September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, a petition for
the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had
"evaded his legal obligation to support" his children.
 Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. Pending resolution, petitioner moved to
reacquire custody over his children which was granted on January 11, 1988.

On March 27, 1990, the RTC issued a decree granting the petition for adoption on
the ground that Cang has abandoned his children. Thus, petitioner appealed to Court
of Appeals and contended that he did not give his consent in the petition nor he
abandoned his children. But, the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. Petitioner
moved to reconsider before CA but it was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONER HAD ABANDONED HIS CHILDREN AS TO WARRANT

DISPENSATION OF HIS CONSENT TO THEIR ADOPTION UNDER ARTICLE 31 (2)
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603, THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE,
AND ARTICLE 188 (2) OF THE FAMILY CODE

HELD:

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction
of the court. As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on
September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 91.

During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family
Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the
Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to

the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite
for its validity.

However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his
consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child
becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor
natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon,
failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did
not abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on
the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his
consent to the adoption unnecessary.

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial
and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner
was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims.
 G.R. No. 130768 March 21, 2002
CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO vs THE COURT OF APPEALS and REGINO B. RELOVA, JR.

FACTS:

On October 2, 1991, respondent Regino G. Relova filed a petition with the trial
court for the registration of two parcels of land described as Lots Nos. 1834 and 1832
situated in Taytay, Rizal. He alleged that he has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the said parcels of land since 1958 and, therefore, has acquired
the same by prescription. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, registered its written opposition to the petition.

The trial court rendered a decision confirming title to Respondent Relova. Upon
motion of the latter, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of possession on
December 7, 1993.

On January 14, 1994, petitioner Crisanto L. Francisco entered his appearance as

oppositor and filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Possession. He alleged that he has been in
actual possession of Lot 1832; that no notice of the motion for writ of possession was
furnished to him; and that the land registration court has no authority to issue a writ of
possession. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Reopening and Review of the
decree of registration pursuant to Article 32 of P.D. 1529 and a Supplemental Petition and
Reply based on the same grounds abovementioned.

On February 27, 1995, the trial court ruled in petitioner’s favor granting the
reopening of the case insofar as Lot 1832 is concerned. However, upon a motion for
reconsideration of respondent, the trial court reversed its previous order.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the lower court.
The former appealed to the Court of Appeals but likewise denied. Even the MR was
denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL
COURT DENIED THE PETITION FOR THE REOPENING AND REVIEW OF THE DECREE
OF REGISTRATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO
SUBSTANTIATE THE ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD

RULING:

A careful scrutiny of the assailed order reveals that the trial court did not entirely
consider the allegations of fraud or falsity in the petition to reopen and review the decree
of registration. The trial court only resolved the issue of republication of the corrected
technical description of Lot 1832 and found that the area of the property was the same
as that applied for. It summarily dismissed the petition to review the decree of registration.

The foregoing are serious allegations which should have necessitated a reopening
of the application if only to ensure that the claims of respondent of acquisitive
prescription were valid. This was done by the trial court in its order dated February 27,
1995 granting the reopening of the case, wherein it stated that "the allegations of the
oppositor as to the actual fraud allegedly committed by the applicant in the latter’s
application for registration of title of lot 1832 necessarily requires proof which can only be
adduced in a proper hearing or trial." Subsequently, however, it reversed its order and
denied the petition to reopen and review the decree of registration, thereby depriving
petitioner the opportunity to substantiate his allegations and protect his claims over the
property. In this regard, the trial court’s act was reversible error and an unwarranted
deviation from both substantive and procedural norms.

A person deprived of land or any estate or interest therein by adjudication or

confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud may seek the reopening and review of a
decree of registration. The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but it cannot be used for the perpetuation
of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------x

ARTICLE 6 : WAIVER OF RIGHTS

G.R. No. 124841 July 31, 1998

PEFTOK INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC.,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EDUARDO ABUGHO, ET. AL.,

FACTS:

Respondents executed a waiver of all their claims against Peftok Integrated

Services, Inc. Said waiver appeared to bar all claims they may have had against PEFTOK
before June 30, 1989. On May 29, 1992, Respondents Eduardo Abugho et. al., executed
another waiver and quitclaim purportedly renouncing whatever claims they may have
against PEFTOK.

Herein Respondents filed a case for issuance of an alias writ of execution before
Labor Arbiter asserting that the quitclaims were prepared and readied for their signature
by PEFTOK and they were forced to sign the same. In addition, respondents stressed that
the waivers of claims signed by them are contrary to public policy; the same being
written in the English language which they do not understand and the contents thereof
were not explained to them.

The Labor Arbiter issued the writ of execution. Wherein, petitioner interposed an
appeal but was dismissed on the ground of late filing. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: WON THE QUITCLAIMS/WAIVERS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE

VALID

RULING:

It stressed that quitclaims by employees are basically against public policy.

It is decisively clear that they (guards) affixed their signatures to subject waivers
and/or quitclaims for fear that they would not be paid their salaries on pay day or worse,
still, their services would be terminated if they did not sign those papers. In short, there
was no voluntariness in the execution of the quitclaim or waivers in question. It should be
borne in mind that in this jurisdiction, quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with
disfavor. "Necessitous men are not free men." "They are commonly frowned upon as
contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers'
legal rights."

X----------------------------------------------------------X