‘Summary of Doctrines. Constitutional Law | CONGRESS DOES NOT HAVE THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO GRANT FRANCHISES FOR THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. v. Toll Regulatory Board GR. No. 181293, February 23, 2015 Sereno, C.J. : 7 PROVISIONS OF THE GAA ARE NOS! OF THE GAA IS STILL SUBJECTITO A APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT: 144,05) TESDA vs. COA a GR. No, 196418, February 10, 2018 Bersamin, J ae 18 * ae DAP NEITHER A FUND NOR AN. APPROPRIATION, [3 ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF PRIORITIZING|SPEND! Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et ai. Vs: Benigné Sime) GR. No. 209287++, July 7, 2014 pi Bersamin, J OGRA ino Hil etal ee Ae SUPREME COURT NOT EMPOWERED TO REVI dic BILLS BECAUSE A BILL 1S NOT A LAW sig apo 'n the matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence’Against the Abolition of the Judiciary DevelopmieritiFund,(JDF)and Reduction of Ar. (XC of the Coristitutions¥atch provides bgt The Commission on y “sit"8h bang ‘ysinstwo divisions, and shall Elections; ma promuildate,.its. rules dtiwtotediire in order to expedite disposition of Ai8ERENEASe6, sx." This jurisdiction was not lost by the;siubsequentfgrmation of the Special First Division since this only entailéd a change in the Division's composition of magistrates SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CenTRALIZeD BAR OrERATIONSADMINISTRATIVE LAW ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS OMBUDSMAN’S DISCIPLINE POWERS: 5 Office of the Although the tenor of the text in Section 13(3), Article XI" of “ Ombudsman v. the Constitution merely indicates a “recommendatory’ Prudencio ¢_ function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary : legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond Quimbo G.R. No. ‘gcse stated in the Constitutional provision, pursuant to 173277, February 25, Repu otherwise known as The 2015 : First’ Class “Cadet T,_ Nanéthelésstnere daha exceptions 19 sk Goctrine oF Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia «_) “ 3exhausticnior eUiyiinistrag eyerresicgten of which is of the Philippine cvien théfe i 2 Volatin Military Academy, # AN pducet pee ‘The oiltsidecoer Superintendent of an overfidiny the PMA, The Honor restraint Committee (HC) of 3. Due process cases involving students. 2014 of the PMA and does not Is and- hearings similar to HC Members, and nescribed for ropes ‘and proceedings in the Cadet Review 4. oe ee A and Appeals Board GR No. 211362, CHRVigvonly a fact-t aanaieg body, February 24, 2015 of justicé or afquasi-judicial agency. ‘ ee” EN ADMIN - GOVT. ENTITY ENGAGES oe an NECESSARY AUTHORIZATION rt aR “The Law Firm of Receraing. io-AuditGircular No. 66-255 and President Laguesma Magsalin Memoranctim .Circular“No. 9, government-owned and Consulta and controlled corporations (GOCCs) must refer ali their legal Gastardo vs. COA matters to the OCGG. It is only in “extraordinary or GR. No. 188544, exceptional circumstances" or “exceptional cases” that it is January 13, 2018 allowed to engage the services of private counsels. Clark did not secure the approval of the OGCC and COA. To fill the gap created by the amendment of Audit Circular No. 86-255; respondents correctly held that the officials of Clark Development Comoration’ who violated ,the provisions of * Circular No, 98-002 and Circular No. 9 should be personally 40 SAN BEDA Cottese oF Law 2016 CENTRALZED BAR OPERATIONSliable to pay the legal fees of petitioner, as previously provided for in Circular No. 86-255. MEMORANDUM REITERATING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE NOT VIOLATIVE OF LGU AUTONOMY 7 “Gov. Luis Raymund MC, No, 2510-738 was a mere rellaraiion of Section 287 of F. Villafuerte, Jr. and the LGC to serve as a reminder of the proper utilization of the. Province of the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. M.C. Camarines Sur Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08 were only implementation v. Hon, Jesse m, Mechanisms, 10. accountable to their Robrede Ss, expenditures, et al. GR. No. 196390, i; LGUs, fiscal autonomy December 10, 2014: ee mS to cong their own ‘ Sourcest6f seypriuesinFafetig to their cout fare in the 7 national axe: mas: wells. they power “igkallocate their FesOutces tnratcordaricé withrtfeir Own, prigities. ADMIN - ALLOWANCE AND INCENTIVES ‘aritime Industry Additiriabaliawarice Authority vs. COA ©. “necessary or‘relev! GR» No 188812, and fune shown to be official duties icers,and employees. January 13, 2018 The burden, of: Iegallty of the grant of allowance? enfefits is with the government agency or entity GPSehAO He alle Ohoe, é benefit; or the employee “Giang IKE vallovahes, ¢ claiminigatiessame! “AY fe : Same ROWER TO APPOINT IS.VESTEDE 4 Philippine Although PAISEOR, having appojited De Guzman to her Amusement and ‘yosition/hos thevpoiver td \edthove or to discipline De Gaming Corporation Guzmateor any transgigssiéns-she may have committed vs. Lorenia P. De n sine rehire fok.ciHie from PAGCOR through its Guzman The formaréhargeruinoy Board of ,-Direct Sy Nut merely fre Att Sorde of Seno on ee of -Diréctors, but merely from Atty. Sordan PAGCOR'S” Corporate Investigation Unit, therefore, there ere etipe ele ey oe eing Vaaga acai lemet net PAGCOR's disciplinary authority. -NEPOTISM APPLIES TO A GROUP OF OFFICIALS ACTING AS A BODY CSC v. Cortes {tis absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism GR. No. 200103, does not include appointments inade by a group of Apiil 23, 2014 individuals acting as a body. To rule that the prohibition applies «nly to the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless, SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2O16 CENTRALIZED BAROPERATIONS 12LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS OMBUDSMAN ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND SUSPENSION IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY PENDING APPEAL “Gerardo R. The assailed Order was not issued in grave abuse of Villasefior and Rodel discretion since COMELEC's action find _ sufficient A Mesa V. constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Ombudsman and Constitution, which provides that “The Commission on Hon. _-Herbert Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall Bautista, City Mayor, promulgate ig, gules, of procedure in order to expedite Quezon City GR. No. 202303, June 4, 2014 only ental ROPHHGSIAS A, POWER TO DISCIPLINE [S CODGED! THE SAME, AUTHORITY Shrmicn THE POWER TO APPOINT IS VESTED 5 wonunzany Philippine ‘Although PAGCORS Amusement, and position, has Gaming Corporation Guzman for vs. Lorenia P. De Guzman GR. No, 208261; December 08, 2014 The formal chargeit Board of” Directo from Atty. Sordan of jation’ Unit therefore, there _VALIDITY OF DECISIONS'OR was ISSUED BY.A DE FACTO OFFICER Espiritu. v. Del. Deputy Ext ae ecretary’s de¢ision is not void since it has Y, Rosario Seent iim Bod capagityas a de facto officer. GR. No. 204964, “Consequent! acts’ orth {G1¢ officer are just as valid Octover 15, 2014 for-alkpuposes as thos; fé-jare officer, in so far as the public:or “thitdespessen eae interested therein are concerfied. i OSG CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO REPRESENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS _IN LAWSUITS: Office of the The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to Solicitor General jack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the OSG to (OSG) v. The represent the Municipality of Saguiran. It disregarded the Honorable Court Of provisions of the LGC that vested exclusive authority upon Appeals and the |eqal officers to be counsels of local government units. Municipal Government OfSaguiran, Lanao Del Sur : a2 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS.GR. No. 199027, June 9, 2014 LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS CONVERSION INTO A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY “Umaliy. COMELEC “AS such, the conversion to an HUG Isa ‘substantial G.R. No. 203974, April alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and 22, 2014 resultantly, said provision applies, gaverns and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC. GU Powers City” Of General fare Clause) and 17 of Santos vy. ype embody the local Commission on govertitgAts, which Audit power to i's fédinline and Citedrg ENGEL Cae to be valid, “badges lied in Seglion 2 of RA 6686 GR. No. 199439, April 22, 2014 the y"for the needs of Section 11 of the casi Git for the sick i consultation in the Vs at ‘ane ste, similar benefits embodied , nye ORN Speingne are valid SS. Ral/Séotion316-and 76 of the Local “imply, p.Si#8* authority to provide Decenaety incentives to those raffectt ERY thesreorganidaiton: On the other hand, “ZCOA counters the, Ordinance was invalid due to the absehce,, of auanestced by the Congress, aut! or RGTRE Shact ont of an ordinance granting an early,rétirement theme, The contention of COA was true, but oniy insofar as Section 5 of the Ordinance is concerned 4. Commonwealth Act No. 186, which prohibits government agenties from establishing Supplementary retirement or pension plans from the time GSIS charter took effect, does noi apply to Section 6 of the Ordinance. Consequently, this provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit which is a form of reward for an employee's loyalty. and service to the city government, and it is SAN FeDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2OL6CENTRALIZED BaROreRATions 13a4 intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his.or her life by lessening his or her financial worries. Consequently, COA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared the entire ordinance yoid and of no effect, FINDINGS OF COURT OF APPEALS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE CONCLUSIVE ON THE PARTIES. Kasamaka- 7. In the absence of any showing that the presen! case Canlubang, Inc. v, falls under the aforementioned exceptions calling for a Laguna Estate re-evaluation of evidence, the findings of fact by the Development CA should not be disturbed. Corporation 2. The power of the cities anc municipalities, such as the GR Noe 2001) Municipality of Calamba, to adopt zoning ordinances June 9, 2014 ing lands into non-agricuitural eee 8 Bae ee aw: resideptiaty before the June15{\4888, are outside “Holy Trinity R Realty & Development Corporation V: Dela Cruz ; GR. No. 200454 October 22, 2014. ae seer ral and permanent character. rajeye pldced-under the coverage of equis}ies;must be met, namely it the\lapd. must not be classified as Ce commercial or industrial Abe RELATIONS BY THE EXECUTIVE” ‘ Vinuya v. Romulo itis well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations GR, Ne. 162230, of our government is committed by the Constitution to the August 12, 2014 executive and legislative - the political - departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. SAN BeDa COLLEGE OF LAW 34 2016 CENTRALIZED BR OPERATIONS SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSOF THE COMELEC'S REQUIREMENT TO Di: "SUBSCRIBERS" OF ELECTION SURVEYS Social Weather| “7. The COMELEC may require the di Stations, Inc. and [Pulse | Asia v, ISCLOSE THE NAMES OF f sclosure of names of "subscribers" of election surveys - COMELEG 2. No curtailment of Freedom of speech; right to publish GR. No. 208062, election surveys remain April 07, 2015 3. Not a prior restraint; requirement applies at the | moment of publication not before AUTHORITY OF THE JBC ‘TO SET THE STANDARDS/CRITERIA IN CHOOSING i NOMINEES FOR EVERY VACANCY IN THE JUDICIARY _ : Villanueva v. Jug Bt sy | Judicial and Bar |§ Council ">, a — GR. _No~\ 211833, |" 4,..Poligies See, Spubidied3 fing five years of service as judges | | POWER 61 “THE COM TERMINALS \TUnited” Transport | Koalisyon (1-UTAK) fadvance vf publication v. COMELEC A filionally delegated powers of | CR No. 208020, NC AHEREBUlation ido. not extend tothe April 14, 2015 = lp pezese of PWVs.and transport terminals LIBERALLY ; ‘Besaga v. Spouses] Acosta de GR. No. 19406: April 20, 2015 1 compromised despite the iFavailed FROM NEW N wrong mo oe an [aie STED RIGHTS INCLUDE EXEMPTIOI RIGHT HAS VESTED. Caroline v. General LIGATIONS AFTER THE A state may not impair vested Tights by legisiative enactment, | Senga, et al except in a legitimate exercise of the police power GR. No, 189649, April 20, 2015 15 SAN BeDA CouecE OF LAW 2016 CenTRALIZED BR OPeranions SANBeDACOUEGEOFLAW 4 2016 CENTRALIZED Bar OPERATIONS.VALIDITY OF THE DIRECT CONTRACT A % NT BETWEEN COMELEC AND SMARTMATIC-TIM aoe ae ‘Bishop Pabillo v. 7. Conditions for direct contracting not complied with COMELEC : GR. No. 216098,| 2 Noactual need to resort to direct hiring April 21, 2015, LOSS OF PROPERTY Secretary of DPWH v. Spouses Tecson GR, No. 179334, April 21, 2015 PURPOSE OF JUST COMPENSATION IS TO COMPENSATE OWNER FOR THE 7. Just compensation is fixed at the time of taking REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS: | Office of the Ombudsman vs Castro G.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015 sthe.filing oF arges and giving | Seison charged to answer the Institute. the minimum reasonable,opport accusations ,..agei | APPROPRIATION REQUIRE! Jacomilie v. Sec. Abaya GR. No. 212381, April 22, 2015 i@ time of the signing of the pon tHe, commencement of the espiis required y tneaTe CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS APPLIES ONLY TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS ~* | Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco GR. No. 202331, Aprit 22, 2015 Appoiniments made by the local chief executive after the] elections until the end his or her term shall be disapproved, except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and ) had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban, 16 SANB:OACOLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS.jp pe Sages” Constitutional Law | CONGRESS DOES NOT HAVE THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO GRANT FRANCHISES FOR THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. v. Toll Regulatory Board G.R. No. 181283, February 23, 2015, SERENO, C.J. FACTS: & This is an original petition for ceitioggiion 5 of the Rules of Court, with, a prayer for the issuance of a wri'of preliminary injunction ard/omlem porary. jing order. Sh? REPS AS = Through PD 1112 @nd-PD 13,13, watt Fs BA gy was oreated,and PNCC was granted the right “and. authority..torcdnstiuets berate Kind.mfaintain’ toll faclities. PD 1113 was further amended t0 gtant PNCCsrignvand.authostyiecanstniatymaintain and operate the North Luzon, South Luzdnvand Metro Manila Expresewa PNCG¥then entered into an agreement with CITRA to conduct. feasibilidg ste ipropossd MME project which resulted into a proposal approved by TRS. Bh then. entered into a business venture agreement and:created' CMMTC. In 1995, the Republic ~ through the TRB, ake Operation Agreement (STOA) covenngithekdifferent stages of South. Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design andiconstractiomof.the project coads became the responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and maintgnar\6elUf the ‘project foads became the responsiblity of the PNCC Skyway Corporation: (PSG),: ai Subsidianys SPNCC, .which’ undertook the latter's obligations under the STOA.. Ina2004sthey @Xeetted the\ assailed Amendment’ to the Supplemental Toll Operaticn’ Agreémenti(ASTOA) sinich {incorporated the amendments necessary to cover the desigh‘and consirdgton of Stade 2.dfti{é. South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway.O & tM Corporation (SOMCOVFeplaced PSC ‘in performing the operations of Stage 1 of the Soluthitfetro Manila SkywaysePlrsuant to the authority granted to Department of Transportation arid’ Comnttin Is(BOFCYSecretary Leandro Mendoza under E.0. No, 49714, he approved the ASTOA througtra memorandum, Petilioners Hontiveros, et al. (legislators), PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department Workers Organization and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union filed the instant Petition with the former alleging that the execution of the ASTOA and the MOA, the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary infringed on the constitutional power of Congress, which has the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities and the latter claiming that the franchise for toll operations was exclusively vested by PD 1113 in PNCC thus TRB has no power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. They further claimed that the approval by the DOTC Secretary of the ASTOA could not take the place of the presidential approval required under P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 concerning the franchise ¢ ranted to PNCC. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS anISSUES: 4. Whether the Congress has the sok utiles 2. Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary is valid ithority. to grant franchis operation of public HELD: 1. No, Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for tiie operation of public utilities. As early as PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board, the SC has ruled that it is generally recognized that a franchise may cosa derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and the power epises, fas frequently been delegated even to agencies other than thosaisia e in (enc jleges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents nee al ppissive franchise as though the grant had been made by 2. Yes, the approval:of the ASTOMby ie Sacre} area ‘Thexddetrine of qualitied ysswyals. The: political agency. dectares “thal, “save” maliérs “ah which the ‘Constitution or the circumstances require ihe “President “touiets} ae executive and administrative functions are exercised through ‘éxecutivey: fieaded by, cabinet secretaries, ifleSs disapproved by the fatter. In GSagjen 9 of PD. 1858. ater, he REP io be personally acted upon by the PROVISIONS OF THE GAA’ARE/NOT SELF xeCurod phic ExecuTioN OF THE GAA IS STILL SUBJECT TO A PROGRAM OF EXPENDISURE-TO BE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT ae ace a TESDAV. COA GR. No. 196418, February 10, 2015 BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: This case assails the decision of the COA Commission Proper affirming the findings of COA- Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) disallowing the payment by petitioner Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the healthcare maintenance allowance of 5,000.00 to covered TESDA employees. 4g SANBeDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BaR OPERATIONSIn 1997, the CSC issued Resolution No. 97-4684 to provide an adequate policy on basic health and safety conditions of work in the Government. Subsequently, the CSC issued MC No. 33, which was a reiteration of Resolution No. 97-4684, concerning the policy on the working conditions al the workplace which provides “{h)ealth program for employees shall include any or all of the following: 1) Hospitalization services, and 2) Annual mental, medical-physical examinations.” On the basis of the issuances by the CSC, the DOLE issued AO No 430 to authorize the release healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000.00 to all eligible DOLE employees, including the TESDA's worklorce. Upon post-audity. CGA waoi Bs General indicating that the pd fe allowance TateOUEGal basis, it et contrary to Republic Act No.-8758 (Salary ae ater bay ). TESDA ar ction 34 of the General Appropriations Act for fig 4,9 Pet I Benefits which includes health insurance al ic ROS ik vet thet Me sy niin IE ISSUE: 4 cin Wheher vi ct TESDA “nay Yargly Dayneti ont tile-Basis of a resolution without 2 corresponding program of expenditure jelPresident corresponding program’ of expan ditiize reved' ‘By t the" ye ns “Section 34 of the GAA fer 2003 relied upon by roo WeGsted the {iile-that the personnel benefits costs of government officials and: employee: pbevehafuce against the funds from which their compensations are paid. Pursuantito sAfiele;vUSedtiby 26 (1) ol¥ine 1987 Constitution, no money shall be paid out of'the Treastr Sicent ingayts Stiasice oftan‘abpropriation made by law. Hence, the GAA should:be’purposefukitisiberate, ee Precise ‘insits-eontents and stipulations ‘The COA was correct when ifield that isiong*6f the oe ‘wére not self-executory. This meant that the execution “eftné JAA wad Stil “ib 1 4,A'brogram of expenditure to be approved by the President, and'sijah approved prog inhabe Senciure was the basis for the release of funds ae The mere approval by Congress of the’ GAA does nol instantly make the funds available for spending by the Executive Department. The funds authorized for disbursement under the GAA are usually sill to be collected during the fiscal year. itis important that the release of funds be duly authorized, iéentified, or sanctioned to avert pulting the legitimate programs, projects, and activities of the Government in fiscal jeopardy. SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF La 9 2016 CenrRauzeo BaROperamions >DAP NEITHER A FUND NOR AN APPROPRIATION, BUT A PROGRAM OR AN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF PRIORITIZING SPENDING Araullo, et ai. v. Aquino Ill, et al G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 BERSAMIN, J FACTS: Nine consolidated petitions assailing the consiituttonality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget cera ,,and related issuances of the Department of Budget and wenaseei on if In 2043, Senator Estrada, through _ nee allotted an additional P50 Mion eachéas incentive! Chiet Justice Corona. Secretary, Abad’ oe the ee released to the Senators had been: part of the DAP, a program desir economic expansion. He explained that the funda on uunrolvased eppropriations under Personnel ServigesS(aNiugproarammed funds (3) ‘carry-over appropriations unreleased from the arevibus a. dagets for. slow -moving items or Petitioners alleged thal the DAP, being actually-anvapljopeatign that set aside public funds for Dubie use, should equi an enabling for ts val. As /Conaress did not enact a law to establish the DAP, or to authorize ees eerie) she Constitution, The challenges posed by ailioriers allegations of transfer of funds to agencies e cc ame ISSUES: 1. Does the DAP contravene Seélion 29(1), Article V ‘er Constitution? 2. Did the DAP, NBC No, 541’endréiaed fades violate Section 25(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the docirine’of-separation of powers insofar as: (a) they treat the unreleased appropriations andunobligatedv allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the term is used in Sec, 25(5), in relation to the provisioris of the 2011-2013 Generel Appropriations Acts (GAAs) (b) they allowed the cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive (c) they fund projects not covered by any appropriation in the GAAS? HELD: 1. No, the DAP, not bring an appropriation measure, does not contravene Section 29(1), Article Vi of the 198” Constitution which provides that no money stall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. No law was necessary for 29 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSthe adoption and implementation of the. DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an ij appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending. The adoption end implementation of DAP is a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to execute | ‘aws. As the Chief Executive, the President had sufficient discretion during the execution of ' the budget to adopt a plan ike the DAP. He could pool the savings and identify the programs, activities or projects (PAPS) to be funded under the DAP. The said activities did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Conaraes*tsBassiiien f Ip such actions, the Executive did fot usurp the power ve Constitution,’ Fi and related EBtiuon and the iment as'séme discretion with ds has~fo-¢omply with Section | appropriated funds under this ae 2 Yes, the aboitementioned aati lul BLA, D ‘ele Me executive isstiances, viblatéd dot e doctrine of separation of powers..ihile.thenE» respect to the budget, any transfer or app 28(5) of Ariicle VI.of the Gonstituion, For constitutional provision, thevfollowifia are their uthin. their respective offices. for it to, be" operative. That law, ibyserHoweVer, the GAAs of 2014 and 2012 lacked G tHE'DIAP, forthe GAAs failed to include igi Constitution Hence, the iransfers i AN age ingSjonly when til birfidserfor an appropriation has been {ulfled or when’ the need“for“WHetipprepestanmac longer exist. Respondents, by ‘withdrawing unobligated allotmeits jin'thé middié‘of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing appropriations under the GAs. In effect, these funds wore used for ihe DAP when the purpose for those funds had net yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. With the purpose stil unfulfiléd or otherwise existing, there could have been re declaration of savings from these funds. Hence, the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP weré not savings, and the use of such appropriations contravened Section: 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Thitd, the purpose ‘ot the transfer’ must be to augment a GAA item for their respective officas SAN BED COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CenTRatizeD Ba Orenarions — 24Augmentation “implies the existence of a PAP with an appropriation, which upon implementation or evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. No funds from the savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items not provided in the GAA. Yet, the savings pooled under the DAP were allocated to projects that were not covered by any appropriations in the GAAs. In’ effect, the Executive substituted its will over Congress. While the Executive can spend in line with its mandate to execute the laws, such authority does not translate to an unfettered discretion that would allow the President to substitute his own wil! for that of Congress. He stil has to abide by the GAA as the power to spend is with Congress and riot with the Executive consistent with the principle of separation of powers. SEDER ntations are prohibited. By Furthermore,-the SC heldit a fhe providing that. the Presuc President o Speakerofiihe House of Representatives, ‘the Chief Justice fof; thes me peEE gpie Court, and tieSHeads of the Constitutional Commissions. may, be, algae a Pa any emp GAA Yor tei respective oifices.” Section-25(5) (lletdel octet BokioibaWeon “ingir offices, such that funds appropriated for one-otficerare=proht records show that funds were traasterred House of Representatives. These re BECAUSE A BILL Movement vs. Abolition of J Autonomy AG UDK-15143, January 21, 2075 en/[) LEONEN, J fe ee tee cs cain a Reduction of Fiscal FACTS: ‘Through a letter-petition addressed to the Supreme Court Justices, petitioner Rolly Mijares, in his capacity aé @ Filipino citizen and a taxpayer, prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel the Court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceNved hostility of Congress in light of the filing of the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and repiacing it with the "Judiciary Support Fund." In the letter-petition, petitioner alleges that he filed this petition because he is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after the Court promulgated the Priority Development Assistance Fund case and the Disbursement Acceleration Program case. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress end the President after the promulgation of these a9 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSi 1 i i cases show a threat to judicial independence. Petitioner argues that Congress gravely abused its discretion with @ blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court by abolishing the JDF. ISSUE: Whether or not a proposed bill may be subject to judicial review HELD. : No, a proposed bill may not be subject to judicial review because itis not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional . ecause that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opiniciif Thus, there cary be no justiciagigy The Court can + power Feonaliy of @ proposed bil FS enacted, Retefor. = ~ Sy SAN BEDA We THE CYBERCRIME'PREVENTION ACOSO) 21 FAtipAxio’consyifyrionaL Disini, et al. v. Secretary of Justice, tal. is : é GR. No, 203835, February 18, 2014) and Res 2014 2A ak Oe ABAD, J ee I for. Ra.oiTsideration, April 22, Facts: -ccrmtowumentt These consolidated-peitions SeeRUMeEdare ‘several prolisions,-of Republic Act 10175 unconstitutional. Petitioners, ~~ oe Adgjiled:by the cyberciime law fer regulating undesirable cyberspace activitiog wy origin Hohstfutional, rights. The government oles 5 ae st put maintained that the law merely seekstig ee ‘drgér into, cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attelens he system. gf. Oo Aa tegat*Accesspiailssio meet the strict scrutiny intefte ine "lundanienialeeighis of the people and should thus be struck down. Moreoveizcth Hesbeltioners fear {hAbiRis-Séction will jeopardize the work of athical hackers, professionals who%en pig BOREL Techniques used by criminal hackers but ‘woulé noitner damage the target systeq$ror stea!ingnnation hey Nita Peittoners contend that 'Seddiony (a) ly standard required of laws thattintéifere with Fetitioners claim that Section 4 (a) (3) on Data Interference suffers from overbreadth in that, while it Seeks to discourage data interference, it also intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on this guaranteed freerioms. Petitioners claim that Section 4 (a) (6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire. Parody, or any other literary device Sau BeoaCoueceor Law 4, 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS,Petitioners claim that Section 4 (b) (3) on Identity Theft violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and trarsgresses the freedom of the‘press. They fear that this section violates freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of.a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published Petitioners claim that Section 4 (c) (+) on Cybersex violates the freedori ot expression clause of the Constitution. They express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, whigh are.ngt regarded as crimes under the penel code, would now be regarded as crimesiy oa the term “favor” embraces Socially On Section 4 (c) (3) on Unsolicited Cominercial Coinmunicdtions, the Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points. ou thatlunsolicited. commercialceraimunications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage.and.nelwork,eapacities cfinteinet service providers, reduces: the efficiency of commerce and technology, angiifleterg : wititee owner's peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams, amounts! to:tresass;tokone's privacy. since the person sending out spams enters the recipient's domaif: without prioripemmission, The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys‘less meteton a, Sc ifleffect, the libel provisions of the ni of “presumed malice: even when the fatest dard f “actual malice” as a basis for Eesuilied malice” trGm, the. accused's defamatory so onhigiconstitutionally guaranteed chef statement by virtue of Article 354 a freedom of expression. Petitioners assail the constitutionality Ongar wilfully abets or aids in the commistion or &t ibn 5 thatfend iminally liable any person who sinpis to, 1¥ of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from ovetbiadath, creating alchilidgrahd deterrent effect an protected expression bs In the motion for reconsideration of the’petitioners, théy insist that Section @ is invalid since it produces an unusual chilling effect on users of cyberspace that would hinder free expression. ‘Such is due to the reason that Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes penalties that are one degree higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code and certain special laws are committed with the use of information and communication technolagies {ICT}. Petitioners also aver that Section 6 cannot stand in the absence of a definition of the term “information and communication technology". Lastly, they argue that Section 4(c)i4) is both vague and overbroad 24 SANBEDACOLLEG OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS} | i i ec eeeeeeeeaeeee eee ——— es ISSUES: Whether or net the following provisions of Republic Act (R.A.} 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violate certain Constitutional rights: a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access for failing to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of faws b. Section 4(aX3) on Data Interference for intruding protected speech and expression; ¢. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting for violating the equal protection clause; 3. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft for violating due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgressing the freedom of the press; Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex for Sie eEaa Section 4(¢)(3) on Unsolicited gor e f ireretat 9. Section 4(c)(4).on Libel Conte EERE h. Section 5 ont Aiding or Abetiing and Attergptig, : Eee Oe ao GE OF LAY HELD: wy nos -han ecaer anemone ~ a. Constitutional. There is nothing in: Section Teak eats for thie-application of the strict scrutiny standard-since no“fundagjental freedom, IKesspeech, is involved in punishing whet ESIOuIBITtEr-Syster of-another without right freedom of expression; unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encreach;on these.freedams al ail. it simply punishes what essentially is a form of, vandaligm;:the! act oftwilfully destroying-without right the things that belong to others, in'this case their comptiter ‘dat electronic. document, or electronic data message. ef © Constitutional. The law is-fésonaple in Petaling @-persanfor acquiring the domzin name in bad faith to profit, mislead“destroy reputation, of, deprive"others who are not ill motivated of the rightful opportunity of registeringtthexs8tHes The Challenge to the constitulionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protéttign is basela 4G. Constitutional: What this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse © Geietion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire another's personal data. The press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section. Constitutional. The element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and Pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, .e., by webcam SAN BEDA COUEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS iUnconstitutional. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rab him of this right without vioiating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression 9. Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has.an obligation to protect private individuals. froiir wefamation, Section 4(¢)(4) that penalizes online libel is VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect fo the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respes mp receive the post and react to it. h. Section 5 with respect / Hgnal. ts vagueness raises ue ie apprehension on the partaftintenier users Becatse vs ebvious chiligg’ tect on the freedom of expression, especially sinpes thes simaychaicing 4 abetting, apestnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in‘ fiz way oi eta So ES, Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abielina. ad, VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL onlysin relatigi:{ou 41) on jjlegal Access, Section 4(@)(2) on ‘legal Intrcepton Seotey S210) a igiiglertereiyce, Section 4(a)(4) on. System = Section’ A(a\(5) on Cyber-squatting, Section {Computérrelaied Fraud, Section commission of cybercrimes’ as SAt@\2y%en “Child Pornograohy, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communes ara A(eKA}en onine Lice ‘The Cour, in ts resolution, reiterates laws, like the cybercrime law>exclis) merely makes the commissiontof e: that raises by one degree thepenalt since a substantial distinctionse fimo! Sortie through the use of ICT and similar crimes committed using’ eanveptional means tet westifer penalty for online libel truly targets are those who choose toxiSeitnls, most pervadite: vapilee inedia without quaims, tearing down the reputation of private individualSnhio VaROUERST Fanfes and community standing. The law does not remotely and could not have aiiy‘chillng éfféct on the right of the people to disagree, a most protected right, the exercise of which does not constitute libel! The Court also reminded the petitioners the basic tenet that statutes should not be read in ‘solation from one another, The parameters of that ICT exist in many other laws. Indeed those Parameters have been used as basis for establishing government systems and classifying evidence. These, along with common usage, provicie the needed boundary within which the law may be applied As to the vagueness of Section 4(c)(4), The Court said that online tibel is not a new crime. itis essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penat Code and transposed to Operate in the cyberspace. Consequently, the mass of jurisprudence that secures the freedom 26 SANBEDACOLLEGE oF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSof expression from its reach applies to ontine libel. Any apprehended vagueness in its provisions has Jong been settled by precedents. ‘The Court denies with fit nalily the various motions for reconsideration that both the petitioners and the respondents, re resented by the Office of the Solicitor General, fled for lack of merit. REQUISITE OF MATTIAGE CEREMONY NOT VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE Ronulo v. People of the Philippi eee GR, No, 182438, July 2, 26148 SE BRION, J. RS oe Me 7 8 FACTS: ‘ Ae BSE ‘ Woe" Before the Cour. is @ peltionfor roview-pn: certiorari fs By pettion per, Rene Ronuic challenging the decision of the” Cotit®of “Appeal wien catty ithe ‘RIFC!s decision finding betiioner guity of violating Anicta 352 ortho RRCEssr amare: MS eee On the day o! the scheduled wedding'cf a.couplesat skOAtholk: Church; the supposed officiating priest refused to marry the wo onaccount of lak SLalvali Hisiage licenso. As a recourse, the Coupie proceeded to the ‘Agtipayan Church andatequestidiHerein petitioner to solemnize ihe marriage. Petilioner agreed despite having beh informed'by the couple that they had no marriage bcense eae ae Delitioner was later chatged with violation OF Article 352 of the RPC, wherein the Metropolitan rial Court found petitioner guilty, whichitlie RTC. dod thelCA affirmed. Lees 7 Patitioner alleged that:the State caniteliteiters: alaffairs and the principle of Separation of church and State preciudastine State frémyaualiyingrine church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony. i Qe ISSUE: coke Py, AC MEET Was there a violation of the’ separation of Church’ AgzStaté when it considered Ronulo’s blessing as a marriage ceremony’so'% InWiCkiNi UNUEr Article 3527 HELD: : No. there was no violation of the separation of Church and State wh Fonsiered 2 marriage ceremony. While the petitioner may view his acis merely as a “blessing,” “he presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a martiage caremeny quaitiod Ine pane ho 3 “marriage ceremcny’ as contemplated by Article 3(8) of the Family Code and ‘Miele 352 of the RPC. Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes mariage as an inviclable coned eaautien and that our family taw is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but Fc0ciet institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the, forcement ofits constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To is end, itis within its power to enact laws and regu ations, such as Aticle 35? of ne REG, eo Armended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of presage, Hence, there was no violation of the separation of Church and State when Ronulo'e blessing was considered a marriage ceremony. len Ronulo's blessing was SANBEDACOLLEGEOF LAW 9 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSAuthority of undersecretary to reverse a decision of the DOJ secretary ‘Madrigal v. Department of Justice GR No. 168903; June 18, 2014 Sereno, J. FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari uncier Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Department of Justice Resokitions, setting aside the finding of probable cause for the filing of the Infornvation. Petitioner Ana Consuelo Madrigalspigsigealy the City Prosecutor of Manila @! Complain with the crime of estafa under Article Sie by the Manila Prosecutor's Office finding probable cause for th respondents, which was upheld by DOS Secretary larlemioy: 23 June 2000. Fe Qn" de. A resolution was issued fling of Informétign against the Ey fats However, in a subsequent resolution of-themUndersegretaryMstciditas Gutlerroz, she reversed and set aside the Resolution of Secretary Tugletdiwtiowkas'no longer the Secretary at that time, having been replaced by Seoretary Simeon Datumascng. Pelilioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but a Resolution of Usec..Gutiest2z'alsodenied the same. Gutierrez issued the said resolution “for the Secretary”. Petitioner went-to-the CA ‘alleging that the Department of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amouriting:-to lack.or excess. of jurisdiction in setting aside the 23 June 2000 Resolution, stating thalsthé*acis.of the Secretary of Justice cannot be abrogated by his subordinate, The'appeliate:courtruled in tavor of Gutierrez. Issue LUE 3 i 's the Undersecretary of the-DOJ authorized HELD: eee Yes, the Undersecretary. is "authorized: toljeverse a Resolutiogiof its Secretary. There is a Gispulable presumption, that-an’ officialtdatynias been regu siformed applies in favor of Usec. Gutierrez. OMNIA PRAESUMUNTURSRITE"T. SOLEMNIFER ESSE ACTA — All things are presumed to be correctly angisglemnly done. This iibherfailed 10 do. ita ci > I bears stressing that when Uses. “Gutisirez Issued the’ first assciied Resolution, Secretary Tuquero was no longer the DOJ Secfefary. Similarly, at the time Usec. Gullerraz, Issued & Resolution on pettioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, she was acting “for the Secretary” who was then Secretary Simeon Dalumanong. The assailed Resolutions were issued for two cifferent Secretaries of Justice on two different occasions by virtue of a delegated authoriy. Absent any allegation and proof of any acquired vested right, the discretion exercised by a former alter-ego cannot tie the hands of their suecessors in office Fits Secretary? Hence, Gutierrez is authorized to reverse a Resok n of its Secretary. 2g SANBEDA Coutece oF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED Bar OPERATIONSImmunity from suit of an unincorporated government agency Heirs of Mendoza, et. al. v..Department of Public Works and Highways, et al. GR. No. 203834, July 9, 2014 Carpio, J. Facts: Petitioner Diosdade Mendoza, who is, doing business under the name and slyle Superior Builders, won in the biddings for the construction of roads in Benguet, namely, for Package VI and for Package IX, of tke Highland Agriculture Development Project (HADP). Petitioner received the Notice to Proceed for Package V1 of the HADP. Due lo delay in the construction, Superior Builders incurred negative spillage of 29%, prompting the DPWH to order the forfeiture of the contract and the rebidding of Packages)X: Petitioner filed with the RTC ole regu joining respondents DPWH, et. al. from rebidding Package Wand from awarding PaeRageaLXsto another Eorftractor, and to ease and desist rom withholding theseayignentot Sepetig Builders > tee, ¥ : AV sa Gere fia topiatiyawested The RTC ruled in-favour of /petitior if from immunity against suit when itentered into.a contract a The CA reversed the decisionof the RTC, Heldithg as well as the non-award of Package'!X.oF the: Superior Builders incurred a negativelslippageret government under DPWH Circular’No! 102, series Should be a distinclion whether the DPWH enjei¢ in its government “order of Package VI tipetion ‘was justified, and that (hich is double the limit set by the reover! thie CA ruled that there sdithiejcorfitgets for Package VI and Package functionsiand was imbued yithipuBIG interest. In this case, the CA ruled that the DPWH's contractual obligation-was'made in {he exercise of jts governmental functions. and was imbued with puble inerest-heniee nrmuné Yom sult Issue Is DPWH immune from suit? Held: on oe Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3,"ArtXVb of the @biistituiéh, the\State “pay not be sued without its consent. The DPWH is an uniricomorated goverment bbéhey-without any separate juridical porsonality oF its own and it enjoys‘ieimunity from sl Listlie-ontracts that the DPWH entered into with Mendoza for the construction Of PSEgGEEUI and IX of the HADP were done in the exercise of its governmental functions: Hence, “patitigners cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simoly ‘by entering inten: contract Thus, the Court of Appeals Correctly ruled that the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not be sued without jis consent ‘SAN BEDA COLE 3E OF LAW 2016 CenTRAUZED BaRO>ERATIONS §— 27CREDIBILITY OF CHARACTER WITNESSES ESSENTIAL FOR NATURALIZATION -Go v. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014 MENDOZA, J. FACTS: ‘The case was brought before the SC through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing thé Decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the ruling cf the RIC granting the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner Dennis L. Go Peliioner Dennis L Go, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473 ortheyREVigeuiNatl:[eaUGHeays(CA No. 473). Petitioner alleged that he was born ‘on May 7, 1982) Mani : . id thal his residence address, is at Oroquieta Stréet, Sta. CraziManiarwhere ea io since bigti, He also-spoke English and Tagalog, spent his elementary, secondary,,,andteniary edudgtér, in Philippine schools. He claimed to be of good érhdral dhafectes ‘nd was not dppesed to organized government. He did not defend-yiolence-and hadyneyer been conicied ofyaniy crime involving moral turpitude. He was not suffering-front-mental-al incurable*contagious diseases ‘dienatio nor was he a citizen of a naticn-atwanwithethexhilicir Jaimed:tHat-he intends, in good faith, to become a citizen of the Philippines wie te co leSideecontinuousiy in the Philippines tom de tne ofthe hing of his peton unt ng. Gleie eNSPhippine olizenchip Pelitioner testified to prove his compliance witnesses. uae The OSG argued that petitioner failed petitioner failed to state all former: ece ISSUE: Did Ge comply with all the requirement : . me HELD: : ‘ No, petitioner did not comply..with all theses rule ‘hat Philippine citizenshipishould natjey must prove, to the satisfaction ofhaCourt the aw. “oad Jn Ong v. Republic of the Philippinésythe Couristed the Yequirements for character witnesses, which includes thal witnesses be “credibé’persons"Thg records showed that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner's wiiesses did fiot establish thir own qualification to stand as witnesses in @ naturalization proceeding. Petitioner also did not present evidence proving that the witnesses he presented were oredible i.¢..."he didnot prove that.his witnesses-had good standing in the community, known to be honest and-upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word may be taken at face value, as 4 good warranty of the worthiness of petitioner". As a consequence, their statements about the petitioner do not possess the measure of “credibility” demanded of in naturalization cases. F nag be_gifen exe hay jon. it is a well-entrenched Isthose seeking to acquire it ‘with all the requirements of ft Moreover, the revelation that petitioner failed to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his application. The same being a jurisdictional requirement under CA No. 473, the trial court's decision is rendered void. Therefore, Go did not comply with all the requirements for naturalizal 39 SANBEDA CoLLece oF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSNULLIFICATION OF PROCLAMATION AS A WINNING CANDIDATE IS A NECESSARY. LEGAL. CONSEQUENCE. OF THE CANCELLATION OF COG Mayor Gamal S. Hayudini v. Commission on Elections and Mustapha J. Omar GR. No. 207900, April 22, 2014 PERALTA, J. FACTS: Petitioner Gamal S. Hayudini (Hayudini) filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition befoie the Supreme Court (SC) to set aside the Resolutions of the COMELEC which cancelled his CoC for the mayorally seat in the 2013 local : On October 5, 2012, Hayudini fats Tawi-Tawi. Thereafter, MustapifeieiiOn cipal Mayor of South Ubian, StfigeseDeny Due Gaerse ‘or Cancel Hayudin's CoCarguing that Hayugini should be sauaiiied making {alséepresentation regarding his residence. Thereafterstidyudini fits8 EReetitiol for Inclusioniin $e*Permanent List of Voters which the'MCTC granted Hie the (7G and.orgétst the deletion of Hayudin's name in-Barangay"Bintatular rmaitérit list“oF otets. In, wewrof sald decision, et ‘Omar fied before the COMELEG™=*Petinonttax wificate SKCandidacy of Gamal S. ee RT Hayudini by Virtue of aSupervening Event. Hel Appeals (CA), but the same was denied. s i tate Hé-was proclaimed and y ELEC Second Division IN AVGdin's CoC. Hayucin, th Bare "arguing: thal its Second Division ‘to aitielatedly,filed’petition and treated the RTC SWIERECSEN/'Banc denied’ Hayudini's Motion for iinigflpaythe’ instant-petition for certiorari and Hayudini won the mayoraityérase il Sauttf consequently, took hig?0ath of office! There: Resolution granting Omar's seéond petition t Motion for Reconsideration, witht committed grave erro: whén it gaverd Decision as a supery Reconsideration for lat prohibition. ISSUE, ae A, af Agee Was the COMELEC well-withinitsspowerSaanes negyints pefiionds!Hayudini's CoC and declaring Se ean ZAaw)hS (ieee HELD: ie a Yes, the COMELEC nas wellwittll ts-powernn-caeeling peitioner Hayudin's CoC and declaring his prociarmation null and void“ ‘ his proclamation as null andi Under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is required that a candidate must certify under oath that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election, In this case, when petitioner Stated in his CoC that he is a resident of Barangay Bintawian, South Ubian, Tawi Tawi and eligible for a public office, but it tumed out that he was-declared to be a non-resident-thereof in a Petition for his inclusion in the list of registered voters, he therefore committed a false representation in his CoC which pertained to a material fact By virtue of the finality of the RTC decision deleting his name from the voters’ list, Hayudini, who had been previously qualified under the law to run for an elective position, was then rendered ineiigible. This adequate.y equipped Omar with the necessary ground to successfully have Hayudini’s Coc struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a CoC claiming that a candidate is SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LaW 2016 CentrauizeD Bar Orerarions 97eligible to run for public office when: in truth he-is not, is a false material representation, a ground for a pelition of cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, the COMELEC was well-within its powers in cancelling Hayudini's CoC and declaring his proclamation as null and void. COMMISSION ON AUDIT CAN IMPOSE CONTROL MEASURES TO .CHECK IF THE DISBURSEMENTS OF GOCCS, GFIS AND THEIR SUBSIDIARIES CONSTITUTE IRREGULAR, UNNECESSARY, EXCESSIVE, EXTRAVAGANT, OR UNCONSCIONABLE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES... Espinas vs. Commission oni eabeee ase i etal. v. Commission on Audit i G.R. No. 198271, April 1, 2014 a PERLAS-BERNABE, J. 4 FACTS: ee The case involves a petition for certiorari sochagel sete eo for ils Decision affirming a Notice of Disallowance cove for extraordinary and mis ve. Commission on Audit (CoA) reimbursement claims slaneous expenses lor the peti January fo December 2008 Se Paelitioners are department:managers of the Local WalerUitlitigs Administration. They, together with 28 other LWUA officials, soughtifeimbursement Of their extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME) for the: period Januapy:'to: December\2008: The office of the COA Auditor issued an Audit Observation Memorandomirevealing'thal tte ST LWUA officials were able to reimburse Php. 16,900,705.69 in’ EME” ‘Out’ of -the: Said; ‘amount? Php. 13,110,998.26 was reimbursed only through an attached: certification’ {t, violated a CA circular which states that the claim for reimbursement-of such expenses shall.be syppojted' by receipts andior other documents evidencing disbursements, 80 oa ye 4 Wem Alter the post-audit of the LWUA. “EME? SA Cruz isstiggeatNotice of Disallowance in the latter amount by reason of such violation Petiiasteisjappesladts this notice contending that the COA circular is violative of the equal protectiof clause’ sice officials of GOCCs, such as the LWUA officiats, are prohibited from supporting their reimbursement claims with certifications unlike officials of the National Government Agencies who are permitted to do so. UE: Is Whether or noi the COA circular is violative of the equal protection clause HELD: No, the COA circular is not violative of the equal protection clause. The Court upholds the COA's finding that there exists, a substantial distinction between officials of NGAs and the officials of GC5Cs,.GFis and their subsidiaries which justify the peculiarity in regulation. Since the EME of GOCCs, GFls and their subsidiaries, are, pursuant to law, allocated by their own 32 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OF zRATIONSinternat governing boards, as opposed to the EME. of NGAs which are appropriated in the annual GAA duly enacted by Congress, there is a perceivable rational impetus for the CoA to impose nuanced control measures to check if the EME disbursements of GOCCs, GFls and their subsidiaries constitute irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable goverment expenditures. Thus, COA circular is not violative of the equal protection clause. RIGHT TO SEEK PUBLIC ELECTIVE OFFICE. S RECOGNIZED BY LAW AS FALLING UNDER THE WHOLE GAMUT, se NDPS Co oe Se AO Gs Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC andiEStrada= "80 Seiin ga G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015. LEONARDO DE-CASTRO, J; FACTS: orn ge On September 12,2007, the Sandiganbayanjecictedaiotmier Président Joseph Ejercito Estrada for the crime. of plunder. He was senténtdake:cuttertie penalty:ofReclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civilvinterdicliondunagithe2period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October/25,, 2007, fartriér'Piesident Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, iby Way of pardon; tGilormerPresident Estrada. On October 26, 2007, former President Estrada received and accepted ¢heepardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten: notation. thereon, Foren resident, Estrada lost when he ran as president in 2010. in 2042, Estradajiledshis: certificate of candidacy for Mayor in Manila, On January 24,2043, Risos-Vidal ‘tise 2 4, for. Disqualification. against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. Saidpetitionas -weil,as) tits’ motion for reconsideration were dismissed. On April 30, 2013, Riso: jdaSivoked $H8;\Court's jurisdiction by filing the present petition, On May 13, 2013; the eléctionstwere colidgcted’as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office. The Néxtigayithe lical board of.canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor. ee # i SB uct RELY ISSUE: etl Is Estrada qualified to vote and:beWoted for in public result of the pardon granted to tim by former President Artoyo? Sage HELD: i \ ‘Yes. Former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for despite the proscription found in Section 40 of the Local Government Code and Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC. Arlicles 36 and 41 of the RPC only: prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in the Pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of the accessory penally of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her intentions clearly, directly, firmly, Precisely, and unmistakably. In short, the President retains the power to make such restcration oF remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it SAN BEDA COUEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS. ieMoreover, the couit ruled that the words the statement "fhle is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” means that the pardon granted to former President Estrada:was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term “political rights” adverted to has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence and that the right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a politcal right Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to former President Estrada wes absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to-grant a limited pardon. RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY: INVESTIGATION. is'mERELWANSVATUTORY. RIGHT; NI SRN THE yohesces AGAINST Hoh : HIM DOES NOT APPLY-IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIG# N'DO} NOT REQUIRE THAT THE sG-COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS OF HS DUE PROCESS IN’ PRELIMINARY’ INVESTIGATI OMBUDSMAN SHALL FURNISH RESPONDENT:WITE CO-RESPONDENTS Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada’v, Bersamin, Office of ithe Ombudsman, Field Investigation Office, Office of the(Ombudsman, NBland Aity. Levito D. Baligod GR. Nos. 212140-41, January 21,2046 % CARPIO, J. : FACTS: ct doe This case was brought beforesthessc througn"S Pettidg\ issuance of a temporary résjraiaing order andion” Wekciot~Pieliminary injunction enjoining respondents Office of the Ombiideman*ambadsmanf'*hieid Investigation Office (FIO). of the Ombudsman, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),.and Atly. Levito O. Baligod (collectively, respondents), from conducting further proceedings and thal the declaration that petitioner Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada (Sen. Estrada) was denied due process of law is void, The Ombudsman served upon Senator Estrada copy of the complaint filed by the NB! and Ally. Baligod, later on by the FIO of the Ombudsman, graying that-criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in R.A, No. 7080 be conducted against Sen. Estrada under which the latter filed his counter-affidavit. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits. On March 20, 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be furnished with copies of Counter-aifidavits of Other co-fespondents, Affidavits of New Witn ssses and Other Filings, pursuant to the right of 3 respondent “to examine the evidence submitted by the ‘somplainant which he may not have been furnished” and "to have access to the evidence on record’. However, the Ombudsman finds thal. the foregoing provision do .not entitle the ‘SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSfespondent but he is nevertheless entitled to be furnished @ copy of the Reply if complainant opis to file such pleading. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Sen Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Ra No. 3019. Sen. Estrada asked for a judgment declaring that he has’ been denied due process of law. The Ombudsman, FIO, and the NB} argue that there was no violation,of Sen. Estrada’s right to due Process because thers '> no rule which mandates that a respondent such as Sen. Estrada has {o be furnished with copies of the submissions cf his co-respondents. Although Sen. Estrada received copies of the counter-atfidayits g,other co-respondents he claimed that he was not given the other documents ie ISSUE: Fa Whether or not'there was a violtongtien not furnished with copies of the countéi-attid Esitada'stight to due process days See respondents. * 7 Ee a ee) EY HELD: pve mec grog Se No. The Court ruled that theresis no fay or ruled Bait is a:cémpulsory requirement, of due process in a preliminary investi tHe idsman shill-furnish a respondent Beeps Rule 142 of the Revised Rules ‘op\Procedure’ of the Office of the Ang Tibay-v. Court of Industrial wih te counteatdavts ofhis e.reeordent gn of Criminal Procedurenor Sec. 4c, | oft Seat ete 2 ee ue Relations (Ang Tioay).auidelines (undamentaliandies: igtequirements of due process) for administrative cases do not ‘applyieleyprelinifary investigations ‘in. “criminal cases. The Constitutions due process. requirements} aijdatediin ‘Ang Tibay, as. amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary investigationssuhienvareicrealions ‘pt statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights, Preliminary investigalpasisGinotbdjudisateywth finality-tights ang obligations of Parties, while acministrative-investigations, coverdedeby Ang Tibay,’a8 amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. In preliminary: investigations, only tikelifiood“or Probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified.in’ GSIS Be lrinaryivestigay Jons-will change the quantum of evidence required to establishipfohable ceveec | deemed that his act of ‘ansacting: blisinessthal affgcts my Person and official functions is maiicious-in purpese;*darelwiiy 0 Motizezana, part of a larger pian of harassment activiies.to perforcs Dis.e4gilicrand evil objectives. May | therefore request thes ce favour’ office ‘in,jcifculating the above iniermation ts concemed ssabgi’secretatiat smployees of the House of the Representatives. x x-x’ eae f “ es Aye Se NOL Contending that petitioner ‘exhibitéd revident bad fai Fmanifest malice to destroy the ae? respondent Alexis C. Almendras" godd-aame, the | feta action for damages arising from libel and defamation against the férmier intheeReg Rel Court (RTC) of Digos City. Said RTC ruled that the respondent was in{det libeled Uelamed and hence, shall be also entitled to Sward of damages. The petitioner questioned theSaid ruling, contending that he, as a Congressman, only sent the said letter as il was his legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, and that he had an interest to protect and to insulate his office and his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful pursuits of his elder brother. Hence, under the rule of privileged communication, he shall not be held liable. However, the CA affirmed the Decision ‘and Order of the RTC, Hence, this petition. ISSUE Do the letters in question fall within the purview of privileged communication? SAN BEDA COLLEGE CE Law. 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERY.TIONS aHELD: No. In order to qualify as privileged communication under Article 954 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur: 1. ‘The person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of thé one to whom it is made; 2. The.communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest ‘or duty in the matter, and who has the power td furnish the protection sought; and 3. The statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. Specifically, the second requisitexisg the said tibelous etter with evidahtib communicate the statements cilytot per ve some Intessst or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the-power to fugysh the protectich sought by ie author of the siatement. Further, this intent to circulate thélletter pubieiV"S clearly shown inthe letter when he said that: “May | therefore requast the (agsistaliceFor fyodh effige in cifculating the above information to concemed officials: and secreladat 1 1 House of Representatives.” Thus, this lack of selectivity on the part of the ive ofmalice and is anathema to his claim of privilege’s communicatisn. c joner published and circulated jong the public, he failed to REASONABLE COMPENSATION 'MUST |SHMUZREY RAID FOR THE PERIOD OF DISPOSSESSION ALTHOUGH THE rose cuenaee ons DISCONTINUED. ON THE GROUND THAT THE PUSLIC PURROSE;FOREHE:EXBROPRIATION HAD MEANWHILE CEASED ? : Republic vs. Heirs of Borbor, eee GR. No, 165354, January.12, 20151 BERSAMIN, J.” \ FACTS: ee NAPOCOR entered the propétty of respotdentswctim iMET93. The said property was subjected to expropriation proceedingssince both nares {iG-not reach an agreement in their negotiations. However, during the psligner's appeal’ (SeeSopreme Court, the pettioner fled a motion to discontinue the expropriation proceedings. on-the ground that the transmission lines Constructed on the respondents’ property had alreadsbeen retired and the public purpose for which such property would be Used thereby ceased to Sxist issue: Upon return of the property is NAPOCOR still required to pay. just compensation to the respondents? RULING: Yes. Although NAPOCOR is net required to pay just compensation to the respondents, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the tie of entry in March 1895 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages. 38 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS,This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the {ruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR's construction of the transmission lines. POWER TO TAX IS NOT INHERENT FOR LGUS TO WHOM THE POWER MUST BE DELEGATED BY CONGRESS AND MUST BE EXERCISED WITHIN THE GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS THAT CONGRESS MAY PROVIDE City Of Manila v. Hon. Angel Valera Colet GAR. No. 120051, December 19,204 LEONARDO-DE.CASTRO, J. Be 5 FACTS: . Ame oe The present case-involyes the varidtis/petiténsadedinigOhe constituti Section 21(8) of OrdindncewNor 79M offtg Cy of Martlajimppsingitax cn jurisdiction, including-transpartation businesses: “*** te The Manila Revenue-Code was enadted by t Manila Mayor Alfredo'S-.Lim, Shottiykthereatt several provisions of the Manila Revenue! Coda amended, imposed @ lower tax rate jon tile Oi undér’it, and paragraph (B) thereof enumerates transportation business Since the grant of additional allowaintes slat ats GHe not authorized by law, they are then sonsidered a8 double compensation prosenbechundsr Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution SS Hence, the disaliowance of the: grant of benefits and allowances by respondent Commission on Audit is proper 62. SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law: 2016 CenTRauizeo BaR OPERATIONSPower to discipline is lod ‘ged In the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested 7 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Lorenia P. De Guzman GR. No. 208261, December 08, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari was filed by ‘orporstion (PAGCOR) against the of the CA the administrative disciplinary case coainstr without prejudice to its re-flingaasagee = PAGCOR hired Dé Guzman ai 2 lVation SpecialsPaneaisigned her tolth-Property and Procurement Department, At the lime: hgr.gmployment Be Guzman actomplistied a Personal History Statement (PHS), wich teduires, ani atest fiom the employde that the information stated therein are true and torrectitolthé:bestlot neckfbwiedge arid beliaf/and agreed that any misdeciaration or omission would.be-sutficientigr of her application, clearance, or cause for separation, es y petitioner Philippine Amusement and Gaming which affirmed the ruling of the CSC dismissing ia P. De Guzman (De Guzman), i \ - In her PHS, De Guzman indicated'thatishe had a jently-employed with PAGCOR, fel In 2008, she updated: her PHS; reiteratirig Teens fs working with PAGCOR. However, it was jater fetingiou Gerwin P. See who worked in PAGCOR. from Shige his. resignation on September 22, 2005. This prompted! Atty 3A teRugSbicart dan) \of-PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit to send: De Guzn a oreremes ‘ch eventually led to the latter's Sea Shay, dismissal from service. - Be SIPS) EA an of its ay ISSUE: 5 Did the action of the-CSC deprive? cfficersfemployees? HELD: : yy Se No, ‘the CSC did not depiNie PAGCOR olfcers/employees. Adhering t6_thetwell finsaplG—that the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same“autho} ‘Hie power to appoint is vested, only PAGCOR has the power to disciplineySstemove De’Guzman for any transgressions she may have committed. As a corporate entity, PAGCOR may‘dnly act through its Board of Directors as 2 collective body, which is vested with the power and responsibilty to exercise all corporate powers under the law. Simply put, PAGCOR is the proper disciplinary authority of PAGCOR employees, and as such, formal charges against its employees in administrative disciplinary Proceedings should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors However, the Formal Charge as well as ihe Assailed Memorandum ini this case did not come from PAGCOR through its Board of Directors, but merely from Atty. Sordan. Records are bereft of any showing that the latter was authorized by the PAGCOR Board of Directors to issue the afer said documents. As such the Formal Charge a~d the Assailed Memorandum are null and vo. Consequently, De Guzman’s removal trom PAGCOR without a valid formal charge was SAN TiEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS: csami done ‘in violation of her right to due process, warranting the dismissal of the mstant administrative disciplinary case against her, without prejudice to its re-filng, ‘Therefore, there was no deprivation of PAGCOR's disciplinary authority. NEPOTISM APPLIES TO APPOINTMENTS MADE BY A COLLEGIAL BODY eSC v. Cortes GR. No. 200103, April 23, 2014 ABAD, J. FACTS: where the appointee is the Ver eS daughter of one‘of the Commistionee CARL SERA Commissioner Eligic P. Mallar of the’ Cortmissionror! HUmen Rights (CHB, the father of Respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. ‘ithe, Jatt WAS 8 sngeltct agu®ihation Officer V of the CHR pursuant to a resoiuiion issued by.the. Cs ey f the CHR-Commissioner Maliari abstained from voting for the said postion. CHigibedal chiefrendered an opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment is not Se ileteAmepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Bancyhasta‘perst a separate from its members. ISSUE: i Whether or not the appointment of Cone eile sins orkngpotism nee HELD: is ae Nepotism is defined as an appointment iedin tavoeSt a ooh {Sithin the third civk degree of consanguinity or affitity.of any Yof hs eee ov appoinfiae: authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureatiot office; and (4) arse Siero immediate supervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisptekiffe! respandene-Soriss is a relative of Commissioner Mallar in the first degree of consanguinity aeeinttact Gi Genes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallar The argument of Cortes that the Commission En Banc has a distinct and separate personality does not hold water. It is absurd to declare that the prohibitive: veil on nepotism does not include appoiniments made by a group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Moreover, there is a legal maxim which states that “we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless: ‘Therefore, the appointment of Cortes as 1 V of the CHR is null and void. 44 SANBEDACOLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSOMBUDSMAN’S ORD! PENDING APPEAL Gerardo R. Villasefior and Rodel A, Mesa v, Ombudsman and Hon. Herbert Bautista, City | Mayor, Quezon City 2 G.R. No. 202363, June 4, 2014 MENDOZA, J. FACTS: — Vilasefior and Mesa, inspectdtsirare Cie Engineering Office Mon ccvely: along with Severaltotiers.swerssadiaigi atively connection with the anor Hotel fie: tragedy. In ts"Joint Decision, the Invetieet i Panel of, \Iké~ Office of the Ombudsman found, Villasenor guitylaf anfauet Bie[SUClalty the best intorestétte service and Mess gui of oct. fo" which .ne Was.meled. the-penally of demussal teneare service, and Mesa guilty of conduct’prejix icial to. the Bastintertst Of thte.setvigé-for whigh.he was meted the Penalty of one year suspensionwtnout.pay.cte.o approved tie findings. ? ae ae Villasefior and Mesa 'filed:theit separate Ombudsman denied the-Mesa’s motieidiad aif 'o the Court of Appeals, Villasefior madelno api Ombudsman being yet unresolved. Bending resolution “of :Mesa's -appealy-and Vil Ombudsman direcied the. Mayor oP QuezeniGity, an raison immediately upon iseeipt Crh omer i immediate implementation ‘of thetdeeior# that the order of dismissal cannot besa account of their unresolved! motion Court of Appeais aismissed the petit sae RDI Motion ‘or reconsideration, the 1g Secretary of DILG to enforce the Joint Seporagd Mesa assailed the order for the uOESpite the” pendency, of their appeals. They argue SECIEU Bxebuldry 46 ik hs ner yet attained finality on Ufecainsideraipn Milagenor) and appeal (Mesa). The ARES \ ISSUE: {5 the Ombudsman’s order o HELD; Of the Ombudsman shail ensure that the decision shall he strictly See The refusal cr faikie by any officer without jusl cars t, Gfice of the Ombridsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or Sciplinary action against such officer. The filing of a motion tor slay the immediate implementation of the foregoing Ombudsm Fesclutions. An appeal shall not i Ombudsman Law. Thus, Villasenor's dismissal an "4 Mesa's suspension are immediately executory pending their appeal. SAN BEOA COLLEGE OF Law 2O16 CENTRALIZED BaR OPERATIONS 5ACTS OF THE DE FACTO OFFICER ARE AS VALID AS THOSE OF A DE JURE OFFICER, IN SO FAR AS THE PUBLIC OR THIRD PERSONS WHO ARE INTERESTED THEREIN ARE CONCERNED Espiritu v. Del Rosario G.R. No. 204964, October 1, 2014 LEONEN, J. FACTS: ‘The case deals with the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, seeking to set aside the decision of the CA which reinstal M. Pagdanganan approving p Agrarian Reform Program. #8 Respondent Dél Rosario is the registered owner, of-two Jats classified as nghoricultural in a zoning ordinance.approved by the House arid Uant-Usb“Regulatory Boatgkin' 1978, He filed an application for exemption with the Depaziméntot Ageafiarl Refofes (DAR), seeking to exempt his lots from the Comprehensive Agratian Reform Program coverage. Theysaid application was granted. Meanwhile, the: petitioners wie are thal inggapondents landholdings filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, which motio#) wesorenied by the’ Secretary of DAR. Consequently, the respondent fied fs “appeal withthe: Office of the President, which dismissed the same through then Deputy: Executve Secretary Gaite Thed the Court of Appeals granted the petition for review tiled by the respondent, Whefein-he, argues:thal the decision of Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since the latter had. already been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commigpion{SEC)Wo months prionto the rendering of the decision, prohibited fram holding two offices during his tenure. On the other hari, thé:peliigilers aver that-rescondentavas not able to present proot that Deputy Execute Secretary Ga nee roe inlizad (0 sign the Hecsion and, hence, his ISSUE: ready heen HELD: No, the Deputy Executive Secretary's decision is not void since ft has been issued by him in his capacity as a de facto officer. A de facto officer is Gné who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment 4s valid on ils face, He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant as aulhorily derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for ait purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concemed No evidence was presented as to when Gaite accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, ‘or assumed the position. Assuming that Gaite's appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered a de facto officer at the time he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009. As a de facto officer of the Office of the President, any decision he renders during this 66 JANBEOA COLLEGE OF Law : 2016 CENTRALIZED Bar OPERATIONSSaeeaaanll time is presumed Ic be valid, binding, and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office with Gaite being @ public’ officer, his acts enjoy the presumption of regularity. Furthermore, the respondent did not present evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires, other than her allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the decision of then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite is conclusively presumed to have been rendered ‘in the regular course of business. LAWSUITS OSG v. CA and the MunicipallGovernimen tot sagul GR. No, 199027, Junie-9, 2014 REYES, J. : FACTS: govt Tae The Municipality of Saguiran was:hamed ayrespor dent ea é ition for mandamus filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur by. the former member ofits, Sangyuniang Beyan. Petitioners in the mandamus case sought:to compel the municip: Reo allt 726,060.00, representing their unpaid lerminal leavetbenehign The RTC directed the Municipality cid subject ciaims for terminaideave beriofisaBissatistied|wifh the RIC’s directive, the Municipality of Saguiran partially appealed the'ordenprihe:RFC-tdithie Court of Appeals. CA issued a notice requiring the OSG to file amemoranduinsforthe MuciGipalify of Saguiran. OSG requested to be excused from filing the memorandum omithe grout of Jaick oflegal’ authirity to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. iteasoned thatthe Municipality of Saquiram had to be represented by its legal officer, pursuant to-Article XI(3)(Qof: Republic Agt\No!e7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Cade of TESTLGC), The CA dering Gs }Otion. mol (ee On appeal to the Supreme Cour, OSS SYTHE egal offcer of a local goverment unit must represent it in ils lawsuits, citing thdtidcal govgenment units are barred from obtaining the services of a lawyer other than their dsignatex! legal officers fils generalor special budget the ISSUE: {s it proper for the OSG to represent the Municipal Government of Saguiran, Lana del Sur in its lawsuit? HELD: No. on the matter of counsels’ representation for the government, the Administrative Code is not the only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are suthorized to represent them in court actions. as the law defines the mandate of a local government unit's legal officer. LGC not only identifies the powers and functicns of a local government unit's legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent SAN BeDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS outhe locat government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general faw on the subject matter, Thus the CA erred when it ordered the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. it disregarded the provisions of the LGG that vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be counsels of local government units. Even the employment of-a speci pressly allowed by the law only upon a strict condition that the action or proceeding which involves the component city or municipality is adverse to the provincial govemment or to another component city or municipality EREHNATION OF BOUNDARIES; H 2) CAFEEGTED SHALL VOTE IN THE PLEBISCITE eee ee Umali v. Comelec. GAR. No. 203974, April 22, 2014 VELASCO, JR,, I FACTS: i +. f The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuaa.-City’"paseed .0" tesclution, requesting the Prosident to declare the conversion of Cabapatyan:Ciifrogh a component city of the province of Nueva Ecije into a Highly UrbanizediGty (HUG): Aéceding ‘giithe request, the President issued @ Presidential Proclamation proclaiming the’ Cily,of Cabanatuan as an HUG subject to ralification in a plebiscite by the qualified: voters therein, as /prayidled for in Section 453 of the Local Govemment Code of 1991." Se ASE “(Voie The COMELEC then issued 4 MiniteiResoiution stalihg-tHakonly those registered residents of Cabanatuan Ciy should paniipate in theliidipleBeleseiGivever, peljonee Aurelie 8, Ural Governor of Nueva Ecija, fled 3 Verified Motion Yar Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion ini question will “necessarily and directly affect” the mother province of Nueva Ecija, As such, ihe residents of the said province must also participate in the said plebiscite as provided under Sec. 10 Art, X of the Constitution Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phiase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voiers in the province are qualified to cast their voles in resolving the proposed conversion af Cabanatuan City On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to suppor their claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting since it constitutes the “quaiified voiers” required. 6g SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2026 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS,| | | ISSUE: Whether or not the residents of the province of Nueva Ecija are entitled to vote in the plebiscite necessary to convert Cabanatuan City as an HUC. HELD: ‘Yes, the residents of Nueva Ecija are entitled to vote. Sec. 453 of the, LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. First, the SC’s pronouncement in the earlier case of Miranda vs. Aguirre is apropos and may be applied by analogy. While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as in the present case, of an independent. companenticityzintoxexcamponent city, its application to the case at bar is nonetheless malenalapentceltainin fageRRatment of conversions. in that seminal case, the SC held that du inca Babdent component city into a component city comes within the’putview of Sec. 10, Ar. Second, while conversion tg an ADM Ai) PETG > Si BED A + Ip ol, excl! provided Jin Si fig. art X of the Constitution, the SC‘neverthelessLobstnveck that ‘thel'comuarsion ‘ot a’épmipgnent city into an HUC is substantial alteration ,of.poundaries., As. the.phragésimplies, “substantial alteration of boundaries” involves and necessarily-entalls 2 instne?Geographical configuration’ of a focal government unit’or.units; However, the pbira: jaftiatie’s” should: fot be limited to the more physical one, referring to Wecmotes aiidibeh Ne LGU;-out also to its political boundaries, It also connotes modification “sof 4ihe\identarcation ‘lines between political subdivisions, where the-LGU'siexercise of co:porstessowelends andthat of the other begins. And as a qualifer, the,alteration must be *sustaabapetatile to bs vwithin the ambit of the onstitutional provision. Bee at ‘As such, the conversion fo an HUC)israisubsténtialialfernation of boundaries governed by See 10, Ar. X and resultantly; said piavisionjapplies,: gaverns jand prevails over Sec. 453 of the lee. Esters Me) Pe DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING AN'EGUIS own“lorghbiz JONAL STRUCTURE AND STAFFING PATTERN" IMPLIES, HE.POWER'TO REVISEJAND REORGANIZE et DOUBT ON ANY PROVISION ON-THESROWERSOR“AN-TGU SHALL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF DEVOLUTION OF POWERS: City Of General Santos v. Commission on Audit R. No, 199439, April 22, 2014 ONEN, J L FACTS: This is @ special civit action for cartiorari where the city of General Santos asks the SC to find Grave abuse of discretion an the part of the Commission on Audit (COA). Ordinance No. 8, enlitled "An Ordinance for Valued Employee: Security (Gen Santos, e Establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement San SERVES)’, was enacted by the City of General Sursuant to its organization development program embodied under Executive Order No. 13, (2008). The Ordinance aims to provide early retirement incentives, as embodied under SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF Lay 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATION 5 7Section 5, arising from reorganization pursuant to the organization development program. On the other hand, Section 6 thereof states post-retirement incentives such as cash gifts and lifetime free medical consultation at General Santos City Hospital The city’s audit team leader sent a query on the legality of the Ordinance to Commission on Audit (COA). The matter was forwarded to the Legal Services Sector (LSS) of COA, which held the legality of the Ordinance. COA affirmed the decision of LSS, maintaining that it is in Violation of Commoriwealth Act No. 186 which prohibits government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or pension plans from the time GSIS charter took ffect: COA also maintained, among others, that the Ordinance was in the nature of an Early Retirement Program of the City, thus,-a law is. ae passed by Congress but mereljieg Panlungsod-and:Executive Orders Government Code does not piavideta i Jemment upit ta an early retirementprogram. er — Ze ? SAN BEDA 2 As a result, the Cily tenets Sng eta pee Ev The ‘Laat for certidtaetBsking the Court if to find grave abuse of discretion’ on thé part’of COA Contended that/Ordinance No. 08 was designed to entice employees "Whose incentives by way ofan early setirefrient pa distinct from the GSIS retirement package; ape City’s power Io reorganize, in accordance with gel :Caverment Code, issuers Ee 1. Whether or not the-City of General Santas ower to" create organizational development program a 2. Whether ornot mie Cty of General Sahioas aut the care of the sick Augen 3. Whether or not Ordinance No. B1s/inV: a ied tofeppreve.ordinances to provide for Spauprpevce ys o a= a es HELD poe 1. Yes, Sections 16 (The“Géneral WellaeiGlausef“an the Local Government Code embody the local autonomy’granited to local Gover ibich provides the latter's power to streamline and reorganize*However, for reordapigétionto be valid, badges of bad faith embodied in Section 2 of RA-COsS™thugRmatMbE™hEESEnt namely: 1.) where there is a signiticent increase in the number of-ppsition inthe, new staffing pattem of the department or agency concerned, 2.) where an office Is abolishécand another performing substantially the same function is created; 3.) where incumbents are replaced. by those, Jess qualified in terms of stats ‘of appointment, perlormance and ment; 4.}-vhere there is a reclassification of ffices in ihe depariment or agency concerned’ and the reciassifies offices perform substantia the same functions as the original offices; and, 5. where the removal violated the order of separation provided in Section 3 of RA 6656. ‘The Court found none of these indicia existed in the present case. Furhermore, designing ana implementing a local government unit's: own “organizational structure and staffing pattern” implies the power to :evise and reorganize. The rationale for this is that, in the absence of such power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents. 70 SAN BEDACOLLEGE OF Law 206 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS2 Yes, Ordinance No. 08 was consistent with the constitutional mandate for 2 comprehen sive Gporeach to health development, with rioniy for the needs of the sick, as nmibodied by ‘Mticis iii Section 17 of the Constitution. ‘Thus, the cash git forthe sick employees, lifetime fee medical consultation in the City's hospital and other similar benefits embodied under Section 6 of the Ordinance are valid. 3. No. the City argues that Sections 16 and 76 of the Local Government Code imply its authority to provide retirement benefits and other incentives to those affected by the reorganization. On the other hand, COA counters the Ordinance was invalid-due to’ ihe absence of a law passed by the Congress, authorizing the enactment of an ordinance granting an early retirement sg caine {COA was true, but only insofar as Section 5 of the sad ora Hespe uae guides for the post-retirement incentives of qualified omplaies iS et ac 4. Yes, Commonwealth Act No. 185, hich prohibits-gayemment agenciésfiom establishing supplementary. ratirement of penein lans fareetne NgbKetfect, does not apply to Section’ 6’ of the Oidinan ge CTHE-otihgnied pySyides thatgfly those who have tendered service-to the city Government for at least 15 Years may abply-Consequenty, this provision falls undet the definition, of a rellgiai FeS@(etisiibich is afoitn of reward for an employee's loyaltyand service {0 the cittsigoueenirmant: employee enjoy’ the’.remainingsyearseof worries, Consequently’ COA acted wittt'gravé ordinance void and of no effect’: APPROVAL BY CITY/AND MUNIE FOR SUBDIVISION - THROUGH sat RECLASSIFICATION-ORTHE Kasamaka-Cantubang, Inév eto indnt Corporation GR.No, 200494, Jus pee PERALTA, J. A } wt nt FACTS: Méf ee 4 Md EP, ACL On June 4, 1979, Laguna EstatéiDebeloninent ComparntGiILEDC) was granted the order of conversion of ten parcels of lande-fohtgrEMNGAP(G teSldential ond, Genoese eset conditions are complied with, one of whichwas thattite development of the site shall commence within two (2) years from receipt of the'ofder of conversion. KASAMAKA-Canlubang, Inc. sought with the DAR the re alleging that LEDC failed to develop the subject parcels o} Pangandaman issued an-Order partial vocation of the conversion order f land. DAR Secretary Nasser C. ly revoking the conversion order as to eight out of the ten ining two parcels of land excluded from the revocation by LEDC fled @ motion for reconsideration, alleging that the fight parcels of land in question are outside the ambit of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) on the basis of zoning ordinances issued by the municipalities cones:neo reclassitying said lands as non-agricultural SAN BEDA COLLEGE oF Law 2016 CenTmauizeD Bar Operations — 72Ocular inspection of the -subject lands revealed that out of the eight parcels of land, two femained undeveloped. Nevertheless, DAR's Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPP!) Committee-A declared that, with the exception of one (1) parcel of land, LEDC failed to substantially comply with the condition of the conversion order to develop the eight subject parcels of land. Thereafter, DAR Secretary Pangandaman affirmed his previous order. Office of the President granted the LEDC’s appeal and held the subiect parcels of land exempt from the coverage of the CARL. Kasamaka-Canlubang’s motion for reconsideration was denicct by the OP. On appeal at the CA, Kasamaka-Canlubang alleged that the OP erred in approving LEDC's appeal in light of the findings, of. the DAR ach dismissed the petition for lack of s Q sion merit eae s See : Kasamaka-Canlubang.averred hav theta Tailed W corsi@emtbesindings of the, DAR, that there are significant areas of the subjectsparcels, of-|and,whichr remain. undevelaped. More so, it argues that the municipal zoning ordinahées classifyingétite disputed lands to“fon-agricultural did not change the nature a’id;charaptekofSald landg-irom beiag\ggrioultyral, much less affect the legal relationship ‘of the farmers ‘and’ warkérs of the Canlubang Sugar Estate then existing ror to the granting of the order"ot’conveHIoNIRUMEEBReSage of the municipal zoning ordinances: uasut ISSUE: ‘ Be Did the municipal zoning reclassification 6 the’ and HELD: oo Spans Yes. The power of the cities and’municipailties, such"a’s the Municipality of Calamba, to adopt zoning ordinances or regulations ‘converti ti nds inte: ndnagricultural cannot be denied. When city and municipal boards.and counciis 3 3a ofdinagce delineating an area or district in their cities or municipalities .as residential commercial’ oF inddistrial zone, they were, at the same time, reciassifying any-agricultural withif*theSzonerfor non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the implementation; ofyand * llance with,their zoqj99. ordinances. The logic and ‘hore evident whergénsidering the approval by local Y h8,{7he. Approval by city and municipal boards and councils of an applicalitin.for subdivision, (an ordinance should already be understood to-include approval SNE Scares oree Neo, covered by said apptication, from agricultural to the intended non-agricultural use>Qtherwise, the approval of the subdivision application would serve no practical “ffect, for as long as the property covered by the application remains classified as agricultural, it could not be subdivided and developed for non- agricultural use Lands already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before the effectivity of the CARL, or Jufé15, 1988, ard outside the coveragé thereof. 1 cannot be denied that the disputed lands are likewise outside the ambit of the CARL. By virtue of zoning ordinances issued by the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna, as accepted by the Sangguniang Sayan of Cabuyao and approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, the subject lands were effectively converted into residential areas. These ordinances were issued snd accepted before the effetvity of the CARL, It necessarily follows, therefore, that the properties herein can no longer be subject to compulsory coverage of the CARL. 72 SANBEDA COUEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRAL’ 220 BAR OPERATIONSi i i AN ORDINANCE IS A LAW BY ITSELF AND P\ CHARACTER; A RESOLUTION IS A MERE. OPINION OF THE LAW-MAKING BODY OSSESSED A GENERAL AND PERMANENT. DECLARATION OF THE SENTIMENT OR LAND ON WHICH ‘NO AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY IS BEING CONDUCTED IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE COVERAGE OF EITHER PD 27 OR RA 6657 (CARL) Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corporation V. Dela Cruz FACTS: sas lene G.R. No, 200454, October 22, 2014 ae, A parcel of land was sold to pet iaettetcianecg oes into a residential subdivision "a Hiumigipal resolytidy-~was passed, BERSAMIN, J and established his field office*therein. Thereater reclassifying the_lois belonging to ‘neers pil os. The resp, wo claim : fulnte to be the tenants"of the property, seek It peu i Qf the property, Oiythe- ground that the same is an agricultuiraMandicoveréd. by tfie-Colfiprehensive.Acrarian Reforrh aw, The respondents claim that even af the SASSSNS TNE IGa Recolution=the property was an agricultural land, and that there was.no valid-elissi- slinsbecause fine Local Government Code required an ordinance, not avresolution. (Petienataversithat the respondent-grantees of emancipation patents from DAR, are’ not‘leaitimate SOF the property as its bona fide tenants have validly surrandered' thew tenangyerahisiinc vor of pelitioner’s predecessor-in- interest, and that the said property was no longersu ture, its actual use being already residential : i ISSUE: 1. Is there a valid reclassification: Resolution No, 16-982 2. Is the property an agricultural iad subj HELO: ne se 7 1. No, there is no valid réclassification’ofithé propefty undér the Municipal Resolution. Under RA. No. 7160 otherwise:knownias the Local Governigigrit-Code, local government units, Such as the Municipality of Malolos Bulacan, ard Vestéckwith the power to reclassify lands. However, Section 29, Chapter, Title? afstheSaid law ordains that a city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed, by:the Sasggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be Sconomically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as delemmined by the Sanggunian Concemed. Clearly, an ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be passed after the conduct of public hearings. The resolution was ineffectual for the purpose of reclassification fer it was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the law-making body on a specific miller that was temporary in nature. It differed from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and Possessed’ a general and permanent character. Fuither, the petitioner did not show if the requisite public hearings were'conducted at all. In the absence of any valid and complete SaN BEDA CaLLeGe OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ireclassification, therefore, the Dakila property remained under the category of an agricultural land. 2. No, the property was not an agricultural land subject to the coverage of RA. No. 6657 despite the fact that there was no valid reclassification. Before a land may be placed under the coverage of R.A. No. 66&7, two requisites must be.met; namely: (1) thal the land must be devoted to agricultural activity; and (2) that the land must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, comrn::cial or industrial land, Considering that the property has not been classified as mineral, forest, residential ‘commercial or industrial, the second.requis aligfied. For the first requisite to be met, however, there must be agshowinig trate cae (ca) @cilygis, undertaken on the property. Here, no:evidence was submittedfo seowrthat fie \ctivity was being performed on the Dakila property in ordarto-stibjéct it to the Coveragega@R.A. No. 8657..The previous tenants had themselves declared tha they were-velyntarily surrendering thet tenancy rights because the land was not conducive’ towfatmngéby reason of its,‘elevation, among others. Also notable is ‘the sécondswvhersas#Cldised offMyfiicipal- Resoliition No. 16-98. which mentioned that the property was not fit for agriéullural use" due to lack of sufficient CONSTITUTION HAS.ENTRUSTED:TO/THE EXECDTIVE/DEPARTMENT THE CONDUCT Cul ‘CLAIMS Vinuya v. Romulo R, No, 162230, August 12, 2014! BERSAMIN, J. FACT! Petitioners are all members ol the “Malaya Lolas,” a non-stock, non-profil_ organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during Second World War. This case is @ resolution on the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration on the April 28, 2010 SC Decision, ‘which dismissed their cause of action, Petitioners prey that the Court reconsider its April 28, 20° 0 ‘decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual vivlence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of 74 SANBEDACOLLEGEOF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSthe claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign. Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the. issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents Executivé Secretary Romulo, et at, Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology, legal Compensatiois aid other forms of reparation from Japan, Respondents hold that the Waiyef au: ith Japan, being valid, bound the Republic of the Philippigesisp: a jaw principle of pacia sunt servanda, The validity of the TAty"o1 SHE ratificatiofw Iwo mutually consenting parties. Furthermore, respondents ete neither the TredlygogPeace nor the Reparations Agreemient, the relevant agreement tig’ herein petitionesS;"provided for the reparation of petitioners’ claitis }inallV= fesslondept evened, Wat the fornial apology by the Government of Japanyand the,reparationstinasGoy pkofvapan hasiprovides through the Asian Women’s Fund-(AWF) are sufficient lo reeain petite ISSUE: eae and other forms of reparations against{Japan betel international tribunals, thereby entitling the pei HELD: a Nk No. ‘The Court cannot grant’ petitioners" prayer for.the whit Of preliminary mandatory injunction As an auxili 'Y remedy, the writ of: preliminary: mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the orincipial action Sage “. Ok ‘The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Departmentlha‘conduct of foreign relations for {he Philippines. Whether or notto espouse petitionérs’ claim Against the Government of Japan 's left to the exclusive determination, and judgmeniyGA the Exeéutive Deparment. The Court Canriot interfere with or question the-wisdom,of these fdutofforeign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, the Court cannot direct. the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, ta conduct our fordign relationsuiith Japan in a certain manner. {Cis well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by {he Constitution to the executive and legislative - the political - departments of the government, and the propricly of what may be cone in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision: The Executive Department has aiready decided that it is to the best interest of waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not fer the courts to question. Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, intermatioval settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby tenninaling any recourse under domestic law. the country to SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS feADDITIONAL CASES: PUBLISHED ELECTION SURVEYS HAVE A SIMILAR NATURE AS ELECTION PROPAGANDA WHICH MAY BE REGULATED UNDER THE FAIR ELECTION ACT Social Weather Stations, Inc. and Pulse Asia v. COMELEC G.R. No. 208062, April 07,2015 LEONEN, J FACTS: The case was brought before the SC through. a Peti 64, in relation to Rule 65 praying. tates e eri and set aside and that respi eh ent Resolution, as well as prosecuting? pet ees for violating # or otherwise compelling arRMEa Ee n for certiorari and prohibition under Rule Resolution No. 9874, be nullified 4 from enforcing the same ns, Inc. ang Bylse Asia, Inc a ne ss Ve Resolution No. 9674 directed. petitioners.< s-well’as. ares Survey firms of simijar circumstance" to submit to COMELEG the-names-of{ail -eeiasaama = ot all-surveys published trom February 12, 2013 to April 23:2048; includ nec soribers.” arities, haying been issued ultra in requiring the submission of information on suuscribers, isin excess of whit a os gijon Act requires. They maintain that the Fair Election Act "as it was wi ‘8 Respondent on the other hand gyair lof eote: Is a valid “regulation in ae exercise of police powérand care Se of opportunities for public service. ISSUES: eh i. Whether Resolution No. 9674 is ‘malas that i oes “subscribers” of election sunveys Bove Au (iliac 2. Whether the rights of petiticner ynasoppabaanbe the names of their subscribers 3. Whether Resolution No. 9674 constitutes prior restraint for it makes an election offense for a survey fir not to disclose the names of subscribers who have paid substantial amounts to them, even if the survey portions provided ta them have not been published HELD: 1. No, Resoiution No. 9674 is valid. Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act, requires the disclosure of two (2) classes of persons: "{first,] those who commissioned or sponsored the survey; and [second,] those who paid for the survey.” 76 SANBEDA COLLEGE oF Law 2016 CenrRauizeo BAR OPERATIONSThe second class makes no distinction between those who pay for a specific survey and those who pay for election surveys in general. Indeed, subscribers do not escape the burden of paying for the component articles comprising a subscription. They may pay for them in aggregate, but they pay for them just the same. From the text of Section 6.2(a), the legislative intent or regulatory concem is clear: "those who have financed, one way or another, the [published] survey" must be disclosed. Resolution No. 9674 addresses the reality that an election survey is formative as it is descriptive. It can be a means to shape the preference of voters and, thus, the outcome of Slections. in the hands of thosequex Faota oe ea such end.and partakes of herd “fair electisns impels their Sn E No, the rghtsofpetitioners to tee Specth iP hakeb Mailed by the featgment to submit the names of thelr! subsghibars, |yhiet ih Fsaid Hesd\usOy Woes regulate” expression (ie., petitioners’ publicatién of election, surveys ges far asto”suppress desired Bgepecifically” aimed at election expression. There “is neither prohibition & ally BAll Resaltion No. 9674 does is si sulveys. The freedoin,to publish dlection those who commissioned andier paid‘or, surveys must he made: cl ud Faibt. Prior restraint refers to official ips, offexpression in advance of actual ‘9674)/Bdses no zprohibition or censorship it froiai? Fegtilating-the“manner of publication, petitioyers remain free to publishieiaetion:sivelsxeOMELECsorretlly points out that “t]he sisclosure requiernent Kicks in onl upofy ot B62 tg bunte A Seog SAN BEDA CotLece oF Law 7 2016 NeNTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS =JBC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO SET THE STANDARDSICRITERIA IN CHOOSING ITS NOMINEES FOR EVERY VACANCY IN THE JUDICIARY GUIDELINES SET BY THE JBC FOR DETERMINING COMPETENCE OF APPLICANTS FOR MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY MUST.BE PUBLISHED Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council GR. No, 211833, April 07, 2015 7 REYES, J. Facts: the policy of the JBC, requir : fiveyes 1 Seales 4 judges offfirsttevel goiftis before they can qualify.as applicant to second-level’ , or negate thatitis uneanstitdtional, and was issued with graveabuse of digdrlion? CSE OOF LAMY Judge ofthe Municipal Circuit poste! ae Province, Region XI, which ao ihe vacant-position of Presiding hid Agusan Del Sur . it decided nctto include his lcy_ of opening the chance for Pelilioner was appointed on SepteribererZouseiney ‘Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Pobiacior - name in the lst of applicants dye to the JBC'Si6 promotion to second-level courtsitO si current postion for atleastfive Years andi ie be see has'been’a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded frome oa ye z ‘SeaBlygar requirement violates the equal protection and due process” clausag colts and, that: the Coristitution already nd the JBC cg no more. ISSUE: at wet UR Whether or not the policy FBR sopra five mae ice as judges ot first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant: bemsseanoSeT eenetuiona HELO: Yes, the policy of JBC requiring five yéars of service ‘as judges of first-level courts before they car qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. The JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JSC in a list officially {ransmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standardsicriteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. The consideration of experience by JBC as ‘one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal 7— _ SANBEDACOWEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS“omega” protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of yéars of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors. Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it vic.~, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Nonetheless, the J8C's ‘atures private interest, Petitioner hagin list of nominggs for judicial vacancies sincé-the possession’ot oiggjualificatiorigy{SF appointment to the Judiciary may not be used te:jadally.etrigddl tigtiene's name. be,incdded in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy... i pt prejudiced the petitioner's REGULATION OF A FRANCHISE OR PERMITE MATTERS AFFECTING ITS OPERATION, Tee COMELEC DOES NOT HAVE THE! CONSTIIUTION TRANSPORT TERMINALS OWNED BY PRIVATE:PEI 4-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) VCOMELEC, GR, No. 206020, Aprih14; 2015 5 REYES, J: FACTS: | ne" The case involves a pettion'fot certidfati under Rule 64,and Rille/65-ied by petitioner 1-United Transport Koalisyon, a party-list organization iassailing' Section, J(g) tems (5) and (8), in relation to Section 7(, of Resolution: No:.9645 of tie COMELEC whickdrohibited the posting of election materials in, among others, publictransport terminalsacipubile-Gtfty vehictes. Petitioner, sought clarification fromthe COMREEESC vegards the application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section 7(g) items (64nd (6), in.telation to Section 7(f), vis-3-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport ferminals, Petiticner explained that the Prohibition stated in the aforementioned provisions impedes the right to free speech of the Private owners of PUVs and transport terminals. The petitioner also claims that there is no ‘Substantial public interest threatened by the posting of political advertisements on PUVs and transpor terminals to warrant the prohibition imposed by the COMELEG. COMELEC argues that privately owned PUVs and transport terminals are public spaces that are Subject to its regulation, it explains that under the Constitution, the. COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an. election, including the power to reyulats the enjoyment or utilization of ail franchises and permits for the operation oftranspoation utilities. SANBEDACOUEGEOF LAW 5g 2016 CENTRALIZED Bar OPERATIONS (See ee eee eee eee ere Eee‘nase ISSUES: 1. Whether Resolution no. 9615 violates the right to free-speech of the owners of the PUVs and public transport terminals 2. Whether such PUVs and public transport terminals are within the power of regulation of the COMELEC HELD: 1. Yes, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution ‘No. 9615 violates the right to tree speech. Pursuant to the assailed provisions, posting an election ‘campaign material during the election period in PUYs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the., and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense prior restraint on the tight to free expression of the owners int refers to official governmental rest actual publication or dissemination. i Neither can said provisions be peniticdac'a! Vald-d@hi@htneuiral regulation which is constitutionally permissible even it réstigteineigglpates speech, provided that the following requisites conour: fist, the aovemnirienErSgUlzkons within the: constitutional power * of the Government Second, it furthers an. iipatiant 6risubstantial governmental interest Third, the governmental interest is unrolatéd t0"the;sUppression of free expression and fourth, the incidental restriction on rcedom’sfléxpiessioneis no. greater than fs essential to ‘the furtherance of that interest. There is abgolutely'neageessity to restrict the right to ire speech of the owners-of PUVs and:transportierminais: Hence is not a valid contentneuiral regulation, Se en 4rAnicle IG. “of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory:and regulate! “enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for tation and other public utilities ‘The COMELEC's consti iugnally ‘delegated one oe pervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per'se of PUVsrandatransgoitterinals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the same. 7 Franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations affecting the operation of the PUV as such, @.9., safety of the passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality, Thus, a government issuance, which purports to regulate a franchise or Permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations affecting ils operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle used for public transport. Hence, such subject matters are not within the constitutionally ‘elegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. 20 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CenTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSADMINISTRATIVE RULES OF PROCEDURE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THEIR OBJECT TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN OBTAINING A JUST, ‘SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION HAS NO APPLICATION WHEN DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED. Besaga v. Spouses Acosta G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015 BRION, J. FACTS: ee Es Petitioner Emelié L, Besaga appliég'or a Special La iK(SLUP) gvappércels of land Respondents Spouses Felipe and Luzilininoa Acbstatikéwise applied fon SUP over the same parcels of lard claiming they: adquire Tt r icticl of Braun ea. Aficavit BE-Weiver of Rights. executed by the registered survey claimants of said its, ce oo. protésty rejected the SLUP lead! execiltory for failure of the respondents to file a Notice of: Appeal. However, écision was reversed by the Office of tne President. I! held that the drdefs of the RED, did hndtbecome final because there Is no fale oF regulation prohibiting an’ appellant to file anvappedt memmoranddm, appeal, to the office concerned;:the appeal meinorendues intention to elevate the case to avhigher authority The DENR Regional Executive application of respondents. Said such id net , A stead of a notice of ‘Slag a sufficient notice of the party's ISSUE: eee ECTS hy Whether or not the orders of.the RED: have’ attainecsfindlily Because of respondents’ act of filing 2 Memorandum of Appeal directly to'the DENR Secretary instead /of-aNotice of Appeal to the RED, Eat mE go HELD: . Koen NNo, the orders of the RED did-ndt attain finality “Strict.eethplidties with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not requiredby law. Adrhjbistiative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order for the pacliés torébtaiit@\ wet, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.” - ‘The Hberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the requirements of due process which entails reasonable opportunily to be heard. in the present case, itis clear that petitioner p: Proceeding. Her right to be heard was not cor availed by respondents. Hence, liberality = considered to have allained fi articipated in every stage of the administrative promised despite the wrong mode of appeal be applied and the orders of the RED cannot be SANBEDACOLLEGEOF LAW gy 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSVESTED RIGHTS INCLUDE NOT ONLY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF A DEMAND, BUT ALSG AN EXEMPTION FROM NEW OBLIGATIONS AFTER THE RIGHT HAS VESTED Carolin v. General Senga, et al GR. No, 189649, April 20, 2015 PERALTA, J: FACTS: til the same was withheld by Of Filipino citizenship caused roll effective March 5, 2005. aoe J Aye Such decision was in consonance ‘wittitnesbispositiog! fem where the AFPaJiidge Advocate General opined that'under the provisions: ghSections ; 5 any §,of)RA-No.40, retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving "pension™benefits’ once ‘incapable’ to render military rac as 9 res of is having sor Sle EMAAR Gout twas also mentioned that termination of retirement benefits of pensio Seehee pou be.done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD).No.,,,] 6358 which provides thal the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citzenship shall be removediirare dhesretired Jist and. his retirement benefits, terminated upon such loss. It being’ in-consenance tWitfisithe policy consideration that all retirement laws inconsistent vwth the:provisionsyeFAPB No 1538-are repealed and modified accordingly. Jeremias sought reinstatement of hig hamevtin. thelist of tne AFP retired officers and the payment of his retirement benefits, throligh.@ Petition foPWiandamus before the RTC, which was subsequently grantad but was revokedb¥ he CA.Mfhe GA found that while it is true that Jeremias retired in 1976 under the’ provisicastof RACNG/340, it sas’ effectively repealed by PD No. 1638, which was signed in 1979}Sectiank27“okWhich provides thal the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship stidlifbeetemoved from the Yetired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss, waayggirectiysttade, applicable to Jeremias’ retirement benefits hp ms AG eae Issue: > Whether or not PD 1636 should be applied-and usid.against Jeremias’ retirement and pension which wore granted to him by the AFPunder RA 340") HELD: No, the due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. A state may rot impair vested rights by legislative enaciment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by @ change in the constitution of the Stale, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of service. Undeniably, petitioner's husbaiid had complied with the conditions of eligibilay to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it. was terminated, Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a 92 SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BaR OPERATIONSvesied right to the benefits that is protected property interest whenever existing law. protected by the due ‘process clause. Retirees enjoy a they acquire a right to immediate payment under pro- Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but aiso an exemption from new obligations after the right has vested. Hence PD 1638 cannot be mada to apply to petitioners Husband to deprive the latter of the retirement and pension already granted by RA 340, Bishop Pabillo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 216098, April 21, 20155 PERLAS-BERNABE, J FACTS: a AB) wees, Brought before the SC are consdldatedtpetiotist-fof Scertiorarl_andSpiShiition assailing respondent COMELEC's decision ‘approvigtr avdirpct |sentragting gagrangeméat with respondent Smarimatic-TIM Corporation (Sinattniatic-TIMy forte digGnéstics, maigtenance, repair, and replacement of the COMELEC's Precinct CatinsOpticaNSEENYPCCS) machines, as well as the resuling contract thereof, the Extended Warranty Contract Pragiam : ey eee : Jo jusity the direct contracting arrergement, COMELEC'6fiseadithe following reasons: First, the Commission and the Bids and Awards, Commilige/aie egiistiained bythe tight time schedule if Public bidding are to be conducted! in theifvefurbichmentAnd/onirepair of the machines consklering all the procurement activities lined: tipi Seebid et 3 Give the'refurbishment and/or the Fepair of the PCOS Machines to‘arivithird iparty provider othérthan.SMARTMATIC, the original manulaciurer will be too great a tisk. Thitdgiven tnat:no public bidding will be conducted, it is still legal under RA 9184 for the COMELEGitol sort todireet,Contracting in the present case. Fak et tay ase 8 & SEC. 80. Direct Contracting. ~Okecti@ontracting may, following conditions: i ' Sagflon 60, Aisle XVI of the GPRA on a \ ees 8) Procurement of Goodstot-pioprietary natigathichrZan be obtained erly from the proprietary source, i.e. whentBatentstatiade™ Secrets and copyrights prohibit others from manufacturing the sameritem, 5 5) When the Procurement of critical compenents from a specific manufacturer, supplier oF distributor is @ condition precedent to hold a contractor to guarantee its project Performance. in accordance with the provisions of this contract: or, ©} Those sold by an exclusive deeler or manufacturer, which does not have sub-dealers Selling at ower prices and for which ro suitable substitute can be obtained at more advantageous termns to the Government. (Emphasis supplied) SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW 2016 CentaauzeD BarOperaTions — ©Respondent insists that The Extended Warranty Contract meets the’ requirements of the procurement law on direct contracting, particularly, a) the goods procured are of propriety nature, which can be obtained only from the proprietary source of the PCOS licensed technologies and from the exclusive manufacturer, which in the case of the PCOS is SMARTMATIC; b) The ‘procurement’ of ofitical’ component of the AES solution from SMARTMATIC-TIM is a condition precedent to hold it to guarantee the project performance in accordance with the provisions of the contract; and c) The PCOS is exclusively manufactured in ‘the Philippines by SMARTMATIC, which does not have sub-dealers and there is no direct substitute for the product. ISSUE: Whether of not the conditionsgf {ection 0, Article XVI of the PRA were complied with HELD: No, the conditions for direct contradiing’Stateu Under Gddbn 50, anticie ayigitie GPRA were nol complied with. First, itis pfarengsthat the ¢Gppas} silajéch,6f the ‘srrahgement neither pfogram but.to the services’for the machines’ repair and refurbishment, which in itself consti jstigeweontract ‘object that is susceptible fo governinent procurement. through compel E20iddings: ‘Second, repair and refurbishment services, are not “Criticai'icon/pOnek frastruclure project, whose manufacture andor supply may be solely, avail (Siartmatic-TIM. A component is ehiealiwhen. it has,a decisive or crucial importance in the success, failure, or ce (ihile it may be argued that repair and refurbishment are critical to the’ sungtionality’bF the” ‘existing PCOS machines, they cannot be considered as “components” thereof. abrthey) ete. nobélemental paits that make up the machine but are auxiliary services that pertains, airouiput pifhag’ already been completed. Lastly, “ while Smartmatic-TIM may be the exclisi na wlactarerantl distributor of the PCOS machines and’ Software in the Philippines, there! Si: aed how thabitis-the sole entity capable of fepairing and/or refurbishing the sarti Sn oi pear ion, — aside from being self. serving and, thus, of doubtful-probat lenge ‘of the company's exclusive capability. we A % 50, Article XVi of the GPRA. " gq SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSPURPOSE OF JUST COMPENSATION IS NOT TO REWARD THE OWNER FOR THE PROPERTY TAKEN BUT TO COMPENSATE HIM FOR THE LOSS THEREOF. Secretary of DPWH v. Spouses Tecson GR. No. 179334, April 21, 2015, PERALTA, J. FACTS: In 1940, the DPWH took respondents’ subject property without the benefit of exnmpriation Proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. On December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment, Of,therfaitemarket value of the subject parcel of land, and was offered to be compensated) waleyGr lyeGaiitaves (PO.70) per square meter. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondehtsid@i ti jer property, or the payment of compensation’atthe current faifefti i ie Sekiah Ah damages 7 respondents : lsigiig 0 thie Redional Trial Sih (RT) ao ths Court of Appeals (CA), with ‘the subjeét progerly valued at’One Thousand:#ive Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meters withinterest at SRERBEAUGMEBer annum. However, the SC in its earlier decision ruled.that just compensationShot JasE0,on the. value of the property at the time of taking in'1940, which is Seventy, Cem jer square meter. ; ss Hence, the complaint. for recovery 4ok4j Respondents were-able to obtaimfavprabig’ ISSUE: i Whether or not an equitable midule arauiial domain Suet HELD: aay No, just compensation due‘respondent time of taking in 1840 whichis Sey si ‘Thousand Five Hundred PesosP1,500,00)) S wh ANGE While disparity in the amounts*is,obvjous and Way anpearApediiitable to respondents as they would be receiving such outdatedWaldation after seers, it shouid be noted that the purpose of just compensation “iS HOttawE Seamer for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As“Suéh, thevtrye measure of the property is the market value athe tine of he taking, when Wetoss resulta Hence, respondent is entitled only to the value of said property at the time of taking subject to 6% interest untit fully paid SAM BEDACOUEGEOF LAW gg 2016 CENTRALIZED Bar OPERATIONSIN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, FILING OF CHARGES ANU REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER THE ACCUSATIONS CONSTITUTE THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS Office of the Ombudsman v. Castro GR. No. 172637, April 22, 2015 BRION, J. FACT! A polition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner Ofice of the Ombudsman-Visayas against respondent Assistant City Pros su es T. Castro assailing the decision of the CA finding respondent guilty olga ee: = On September 26; 2002, an anit ME nglant BPOSRIBRE Republic Agro. 6713 (the Code of Conduct ‘and Ethical Standards for Publ -Ofigials and Employees) was filed against respondent. Said’ case. was filed following the-acts ‘of Fe8pondent, going, fo-the premises of private petitioner Emily:Ros®"KO' picts Spitboaith S7PNP,SYUAT ‘vehicleFend threatening the latter with lawsuits... 7, Beret Petitioner found thé respondent ‘oul of conduct pr ie best interest of the service, and imposed on her the: penalty.o! irom. the.-service without pay However, CA found the respondent igtionly, thus reducing the penalty imposed. Ombudsman argued thatthe respondent's ac! of tsi eaeiiico's Influence to use the PNP- SWAT for a purely personal matter cantiies ‘ andl rere to. the best interest of the nee the act of calling eee 3 ISSUE: SoS . se eto: oy Ces No, respondent was not denied of'die"proesseuneHne Impuled act was not one of the specific acts cited in the complaint. Due process..is’ satisfiec.when @ person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reascnable opportunity for the person charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Due process is simply the opportunity given to expiain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek 2 reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of In the present case, respondent refuted Emily's allegations in her counter affidavit. The respondent cannot now feign ignorance of the fact that her act of calling for police assistance and riding on board the SWAT vehicle, were not among those included in the charge against her. The mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as the respondent was giver the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with 86 SANTIEDA CoUEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS‘SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE CONTRACT. AND UPON THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS IN GOVERNMENT PROJECTS, : ISSUANCE OF THE NOTICE OF AWARD IS THE RECKONING POINT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE OF A PROJECT Jacomilte v. Sec. Abaya G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015! MENDOZA, J. FACTS: A The present case,was broughtitie : under Rule 65 assails the legalify’of the propure Vehidle License Plate Standardization Bfogre LIVER for certiorari and prohibition Gand: Transportatiin Office Motor The LTO formutatéd: the Motor. Meicie-cehte MEE dtaftatdizitick supply the new license’plates for.hoth.oldandae a. ir gram (MVPSP) to ij jstrants..The-BOTC, on February Waders lation’ to¥Bid for the supply and 20, 2013, published in newspapers of. general eit wa delivery of motor vehicle license plates for the M\ Se On March 11, 2044, the Senate.Committes,on Public Sémices conducted an inquiry in aid of legisiation on the reported delays.in.thelielease of motor vehicle license plates, stickers and fags by the LTO. iy PS i As the only eligible bidders, JkG/Rower Plate: despite the notice of award, theicontract Pelitioner instituted the present texpayér-suittcohtending, among others, that the MVPSP was not sufficiently funded at the commencement of: theyprocurement “process, rendering it void. According to the said agreement the. sourGe.of fundigg in the.amount of P3,851,600,100.00 would be the General Appropriations AGi{GAA). A perusal (ERACNo. 10382 or the General Appropriations Act of 2013-(GAA,2013)-"hiduideshow,tHatyCangress appropriated only the amount of P187,293,000.00 indefthelspecific reading Snstevencie Plate-Making Project. Also, petitioner posits that the DOTC TIREGREB onthe required Multi-Year Obligational Authority (MYOA) from the DBM. Giverf‘trat MVPSRWould entail the delivery of plates within a period of five (5) years, petitioner maintained that if wad a multiyear project (MYP) which would Recessilate an MYOA as a jurisdictional requirement under R.A. No, 9206, or the General Appropriations Act of 2009, ISSUES: 1. Whether the law requires the availabilty of funds before the procuring entity commences the procurement of a government project 2. Whether an MYOA must be secured before the commencement of the procurement process ofthe MVPSP SAN BEDACOLLEGEOFLAW gy 2016 CenTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS ial iidaiaiia ieee ieee eee eee eee HeHELD: Yes, the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract. ‘Second there must be a certification by the proper accounting official and auditor, attached to the contract, attesting that funds have been appropriated by Jaw and such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void Furthermore, R.A. 9184 requires, not only the sufficiency of funds at the time of the signing of the contract, but also upon the commencement of the procurement process. In the present case, the iquttall MVPSP was. P3.851 billion age an appropriation of P18%293: ct is clgedyly-itinderfunded, However, the'said issue has been rendered.maot aga,academic by the dpptGpriation for the full amount of the project fund in-GAA 20414 Sata fSpriation "cured, whatever defect the process had. 7 et, GAA Ga only provided 2. Yes, MYOA must be secuféd Berere"ne’ wenn MVPSP. When the: government eplered inti/a! to annually pay a’given amount.to:the, contra government planning for its payment. Thus; the mp assurance that the ‘financial commitments sincleded | #MYC. are considered in the succeeding proposed budget submitted to Congress! Withithe issuance of MYOA, the DBM commits to recommend to Congress the fundigisfithe, INP untilits completion. Evicentiy, without MYOA, the: government-runs. the: isk" of Breach of contractual obligations if its financial commitments are not mel feHBCKof funigitig, pe proburement process of the tract {MYG), it was committed TiSi the project, even without the Weslor MYOA arose, which gave an However, although MYPSP is. ial it rmayiinol ipvolvea-Multiyear Contract if the appropriations for the:project wesiavallable infil. doring itsfigst jeer of iimplemeniation in 2014, thus, there was no need to/secufe:the MYCAeThe Gotirt holds that the first year of impiementation of MVPSP. was 2073 whensthe notice of ‘was issued. The issuance of the notice of award ignites'the'implemepiation stage of e'pi@jert; and the procuring agency must ensure that funds are-tully/allotted theréin. An aGeqyeean only issue a notice of award once the DBM has released-a'SARO or ABM forith-fitegst of the project. If the funds are not fully allotted to the project.al thewivieitnetRBLCe Gf award was issued, then MYOA will guarantee that the DBM commits to.r¢commiend’to, Congress the funding of the project until its completion. Thus, MYESP is MYP, vihich invalves MYC and requires MYOA ag SANBEDA COLLEGE OF Law 2016 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONSPROHIBITION ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS APPLIES ONLY TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS NOT TO APPOINTMENTS MADE BY LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES APPOINTEE REMAINS ENTITLED TO HIS OR HER SALARIES DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNTIL THE APPOINTMENT IS FINALLY DISAPPROVED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco GAR. Ne, 292331, April 22, 2015. LEONEN, J Aes FACTS: % A Petition for Review on Centiorariiog A i © appeal of petitioner Provincial Government of Aurora was filed betore“tet’ appealed the Resolution of the Civil Service COmmnigsioni

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