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Publication Information: Article Title: Cultural Representation And Ideological Domination. Contributors:
Richard Harvey Brown - author. Journal Title: Social Forces. Volume: 71. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 1993. Page
Number: 657.

Cultural Representation and

Ideological Domination
RICHARD HARVEY BROWN, University of Maryland

Abstract
This essay shows how logical classifications -- such as good-bad, high-low, black-white
-- become ordered into moral hierarchies that help create and legitimate social hierarchies of
domination. It extends labeling theory and discourse analysis to macrosocial and
intercivilizational phenomena, focusing on how classifications make what they pretend merely
to describe. I examine devices by which cultural representation becomes ideological
domination in specific cases: colonial encounters in the Americas, Africa, and India; parallel
discourses of slavery in medieval Islam and the early United States; how British colonial
ethnography in Afghanistan created an Other appropriate to the needs of exploration, frontier
management, and imperial bureaucracy. Discourses of domination also dominate the masters,
because the constitution of a colonized Alter requires reconstitution of the colonial Ego.
Discourses of domination can also become rhetorics of resistance, inverting the master
categories and reclassifying them into more embracing conceptions of the human

In the animal kingdom the rule is,

eat or be eaten;
in the human kingdom,
define or be defined.

Thomas Szasz ( 1974 :20)

Courageous are you, Spaniard and

courteous as well as courageous you conquer also with the tongue
as well as with the sword you conquer

Calderòn de la Barca ( 1975 :1:xi:705-706, said of

Cortés)

Practitioners of various disciplines tend to work in isolation from

each other. Even when scholars look toward different fields, the
otherness they see turns their often hostile gaze back toward familiar
turf. Other jargon, other methods, other research sites. Such
differences become distinctions, hierarchies, op-

____________________
*
Some paragraphs of this article appear in my essay "Moral Mimensis and Political
Power: Toward a Rhetorical Understanding of Deviance, Social Control, and Civic Discourse."
1993 . Pp. 501-22 in Reconsidering Social Constructionism, edited by Gale Miller and James
Holstein. Aldine de Gruyter. Direct correspondence to Richard Harvey Brown, Department of
Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

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positions, and stigmas. But if we can cross boundaries, and sort

through the shifts of terms and focus, we often learn from our
neighbors, and become able to use the resources of one discipline to
advance the agenda or criticize the pieties of another. In these ways
academic disciplines are not unlike ethnic or national groups, which
also define themselves in terms of boundaries, exclusions, and
hierarchies.

In the spirit of overcoming such boundaries, I attempt here to

conjoin ideas on racism and stigma with perspectives on knowledge
and power. My purpose is to elucidate relations between cultural
representation and ideological domination. I contend that ordered
representations of the world also present moral and political orders.
The purpose of such a critical analysis of practices of (re)presentation
is not merely to elaborate the "text" for the "reader" but, more, to
show the conditions and methods of the construction of texts and,
thence, their ideological thrust. For this I draw on Kenneth Burke's
distinction between pious and impious representations -- that is,
statements or images that disclose their constructivist methods, and
those that conceal them. Impious representations are both self-
reflective and subversive. By self-reflectively revealing their own mode
of representation, they imply that reality can be fashioned differently.
They thereby undermine absolutist assumptions.

Impious criticism can treat pious texts as productions of ideology.

A text usually carries within it certain contradictions or absences, the
"unconscious" or "not-said" of which the text is not, and cannot be,
aware. Ideology is present in the text precisely in these silences -- the
structure and construction of which pious texts do not speak. Thus, the
task of impious criticism is "to install itself in the very incompleteness
of the work in order to theorize it -- to explain the ideological necessity
of those not-saids which constitute the very principle of its identity"
( Eagleton 1976 :89; see Stam 1987 :134; Coward & Ellis 1977; Mannheim 1936; Sampson
1983).

I begin with a general discussion of cultural representation and

ideological domination and then try to show how systems of
classification may function as systems of domination, using examples
from colonial and imperial incursions of other societies by Western
nations. Codes of control have varying degrees of local lability and
cross-cultural and historical consistency. This can be seen in the
semantics of slavery in Islamic and Euro-American cultures, and in
British colonial writings on the Pathans of Afghanistan. Paradoxically,
efforts to resist domination can readily re-enforce it, if such resistance
is cast in the code of the dominator. Thus, anti-colonialists can become
like the mutely submissive colonized and like the colonialists
themselves. Liberation may reproduce domination in the very act of
overthrowing it. Thus, fuller emancipation would seem to require new
forms of cultural, as well as political, representation.

Cultural Representation as
Ideological Legitimation
Sociologists of deviance and critics of ideology have shown how
naming is a form of social control. To be called a son and not a lover
implies a different role and identity, different rights and duties,
different norms and sanctions. Such categories and their use as labels
do not only describe a prevailing reality. They

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also constitute that social reality, insofar as societies are discursively

enacted. Membership categories are not discovered as manifestations of a
predefined social reality, but are apprehended in and through the very
process by which they are deployed.

Systems of classification provide ways to socially perceive and ignore, to

recognize and misrecognize, to be and to act ( Bourdieu 1977). Such
classifying and such naming not only are ways to make others do what one
wants, but also to get them to be what one wants. To describe a
membership category is to attribute a moral character to its
incumbents. If, on occasion, Mary dresses loudly, steals, and borrows
but does not repay money from her boyfriends, she is rendered +ACI-
the kind of person+ACI- who could do that sort of thing. Attributes and
expectable actions are intersubjectively projected onto her, thereby
essentializing Mary as, say, a +ACI-loose woman,+ACI- despite her
unique circumstances and bioU+-00AD graphy. In short, once cast into
a category, the incumbents are conventionally regarded as being
governed not by experiential contingencies, but by maxims of conduct
inherent in the categories themselves. Thus, classifications -- such as
true or false, good or bad, legal or criminal, sane or mad -- also are
definitions of personhood, hierarchies of value, and forms for power.

Put slightly differently, certain traits and not others are invested
with social significance and attributed to or claimed by persons whose
group identity is thereby constituted. In this way, a set of logical
distinctions becomes homoU+-00AD logous to a hierarchy of social
distinctions. This hierarchy is not only a system of signification, but
also a structure of domination ( Kress 1979). A key instruU+-00AD
ment of this process of description/domination is the +ACI-list+ACI- -- a
set of elements selected and assembled to form a coherent gestalt.
Thus unified, the listed features constitute a generic description and
thus render the category available for application. However, the
boundaries and contents of social categories are inherently contestable
because every listing is accompanied by the problem of translating it
into practical applications. That is, in each case of use, the behavior to
which listed items refer needs to be specified, and this process in
principle can be negotiated by the participants, whoever these may be.
Hence, legitimated domination always is inherently open to righteous
defiance. Dialectically, such defiance can even reinforce the system of
domination, as long as it is articulated in the categories of the
dominant code.

Because categories are used not as mere labels but as methods

for organizing perceptions, knowledge, and moral relationships,
modification of the category in which a person is placed alters the
meaning of his or her behavior. For example, a Mexican peasant
woman may say to her husband when he comes home drunk and
smelling of another woman, +ACI-What kind of father are you+ACE-?
+ACI- to which he may reply, +ACI-I am a man+ACEAIg- Thus,
everyday moral judgments cannot be adequately explained in terms of
universal moral codes. One also has to look at specific instances of
application. To ignore these enactments is ideological, since it leads us
to incorporate our own position into a definition of what is moral that
presumes to be nonlocal. Instead of attempting to say what Morality is
in general terms, if we look at moral reasoning itself in concrete social
and historical settings we discover that it is eminently practical, and
that practical reasoning is always morally organized ( Jayyuse
1984+ADs- see Sacks 1963 Schwartz 1985).

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These processes of naming by which persons form images of

themselves as members of a certain group are reciprocal, collective
and discursive. They are reciprocal in the sense that, in characterizing
others as different, one also characterizes one's own group as different
from it. +ACI-This is equivalent to placing the two groups in relations to
each other or defining their positions vis-U+-00E0-vis each other+ACI-
( Blumer 1988 :198).

This relational and structural character of group prejudices and

relations can be highlighted by thinking of various personal feelings
not as psychological attitudes but as expressions of the position of
one's own group in relation to others. For example, the feelings of
snobbism or superiority in one group place members of subordinate
groups below+ADs- feelings of alienation place other groups
beyond+ADs- feelings of moral right in relation to group privileges
place others outside+ADs- feelings of fear place others too close. This
topographical character of prejudice is captured in the attribution to
most subordinated groups, that these +ACI-others+ACI- are all right
+ACI-in their place+ACI- ( Blumer 1988 :199). This approach often is
recognized explicitly by the rulers, at least the more perceptive among
them, as has been the case in South Africa:

No one ever dreams, in the ordinary course, of the employment of

white unskilled labour . . .it is rigidly tabooed. It is socially dis-
countenanced. It is condemned outright as calculated to lower the
general standard and status of the whites in the eyes of the Blacks,
and so to menace that prestige which is the only real support of the
white man's presence in the country. ( The Chinese Labour Question
16/17, quoted by Meer 1987 :61)

In sum, notions of cultural difference readily become systems of

judgment and coercion by which one group marks off and dominates
others. These ideas and practices are discursive. That is, +ACI-through
talk, tales, stories, gossip, anecdotes, messages, pronouncements,
news accounts, orations, sermons, preachments, and the like
definitions are presented and feelings are expressU+-00AD+00Aed . . .
and a sense of group position is set+ACI- ( Blumer 1988 :202-203).

Classification Stratification, and

Colonization
This relation between classification and stratification can be seen
in writings on cultural differences within and between societies and
civilizations throughout recorded history. Much of this writing is
devoted to assigning specific cultures or cultural traits to their proper
category, such as Greek versus barbarian, Christian versus infidel,
civilized versus primitive, or modern versus traditional. To justify their
domination, the dominators establish categories, then moral
hierarchies, that distinguish the pure and the impure, the kafirs and
the moshredks, the yavanas and the mlecchas. Relative cultural
differences are turned into absolute natural oppositions. Though
writers may disagree as to the nature and boundaries of particular
categories, nearly all believe that such categories and their members
exist and can be identified.
 My question is how power relations infuse such categories and
how instances of difference are adjudicated ( Root 1989). Within the
recent colonial situation, for example, the system of judgment
produces differences that become visible as such within the system of
power. In such a system, each instance of difference is fitted into a
hierarchy of values that has been established in

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advance. Differences are recognized as traits that mark the culture as

infidel or savage or otherwise in need of Christian civilization or Western
assistance. Thus, the system of judgment is legitimated by the politically
generated empirical evidence, and the political system is legitimated by the
logical cohesion of the system of judgment ( Root 1989). An example is
provided by Lord Frederick Lugard (1922, in Carnoy 1974, front piece),
Governor of British Nigeria:

As Roman imperialism laid the foundation of modern civilization, and led the wild
barbarians of these islands +AFs-Britain+AF0- along the path of progress, so in Africa today we
are repaying the debt, and bringing to the dark places of the earth -- the abode of barbarism
and cruelty -- the torch of culture and progress, while ministering to the material needs of our
own civilization . . . we hold these countries because it is the genius of our race to colonize, to
trade, and to govern.

In this manner, cultural difference becomes political deviance, and

cultural representation becomes ideological legitimation. The +ACI-
genius+ACI- of the British, the +ACI-barbarism and cruelty+ACI- of Africans,
the use of an essentializing +ACI-the+ACI- for groups, the invocation of the
idea of progress, the analogy between ancient and modern civilizers and
barbarians -- all this turns logical distinctions into moral hierarchies and
orders them into a temporal development crowned by British rule. Of course
the text also falsifies its own explicit intent: How could Lugard possibly be
civilizing people in African villages by telling his fellow Britons to compare
themselves with imperial Romans, in a tome published in English in Britain?

These ideological functions do not necessarily contradict the +ACI-truth value+ACIof the
cultural markings. On the contrary, the more that such markings are generated in consistency
with the accepted system of representation that guarantees their truth, the more they are
seen as natural and inhering in the persons or practices so marked. Most of these categories
are organized as binary racial, ethnic, or religious distinctions. +ACI-Through various
institutions and precepts, these categories come to be naturalized and made to appear as
absolute, 'true' entities+ACI- ( Root 1989 :6+ADs- Goffman 1967). Indeed, the classifications
and their members, or the stigmas and the persons who bear them, may be so fully enmeshed
that the acts and functions of labeling go unnoticed. The artifactuality of the classification
system is reduced to the factuality of its contents, and these facts are viewed as mere things
rather than as things made. By such processes of objectification, the hierarchy of
classifications becomes less available to people's awareness. This unawareness enhances the
hierarchy's ideological power, as is suggested by the naturalization of apartheid in South Africa
in terms of the +ACI-biological fact+ACI- of race:

Colour . . . is in the natural order of things, the actual, the only, and the ultimate arbiter
and determinant of the white mans' role and its limitations in South Africa. The white who
attempts to ignore that declasses himself. He degenerates socially ipso facto. He is ostracized.
He sinks and loses self-respect. ( T.G. 13, 1908 :16, quoted by Meer 1987 :62)

In South Africa this Manichean racial order draws strength from Calvinistic notions of
predestination, original sin, and a highly polarized view of salvation

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and damnation ( Moodie 1975). Other societies deploy other resources for the more
general purpose of articulating and justifying logical classifications as social hierarchies.

There are many techniques for creating/ representing the other, but in all of them the
people to be othered are homogenized into a collective they, which is distilled even further
into an iconic he (the standardized adult male specimen) or she (like the +ACI-Fatmas+ACI-
who worked in French Algerian households). This abstracted +ACI-they+ACI- is the subject
observed in a timeless present tense, in which anything +ACI-he+ACI- is or does is
characterized as an instance of a pregiven custom or trait ( Burshatin 1985+ADs- Fabian
1983+ADs- Pratt 1985). The features of the other are represented as fixed and unchangeable,
an endlessly repeated element in a given natural order of differences. This textually produced
other has no explicit anchoring either in an observing self or in a particular encounter in which
contact with the other takes place. +ACI-He+ACI- is sui generis, the +ACI-mark of the
plural+ACIas Memmi ( 1967 ) put it, often only a list of features set in a temporal order
different from that of the perceiving and speaking subject. A magistrate in South Africa in
1852 constructed such an iconic Other.

On a farm, he +AFs-the native+AF0- does almost everything -- he herds the cattle,

milks the cows, churns the butter, loads it on the wagons, the oxen of which he inspans and
leads. He cuts wood and thatch, digs slots, and makes bricks and reaps the harvest, and in
the house, invariably cooks.

This Manichean Other serves the interests of the idealized self. Thus, colonial discourses
are likely to constitute an Other that is amenable to governance and available to serve.
Examples are provided by a Royal Order of the Spanish Crown, and later by Sir Rudolf Slatin
of the Sudan.

Because of the excessive liberty the Indians have been permitted, they flee from
Christians and do not work. Therefore they are to be compelled to work, so that the kingdom
and the Spaniards may be enriched, and the Indians Christianized. (1503, quoted in Fagan
1984 :70)

The nigger is a lazy beast, and must be compelled to work -- compelled by the
government. . . . With a stick. (Quoted in Kiernan 1969 :242)

A similar example of the creation of otherness lies in the first contact between the
Spanish and the Indians. Spaniards accorded Indians an otherness so outside their own moral
universe of human selves that they could commit genocide on a massive scale without
discomfort or regret ( Hulme 1986+ADs- Todorov 1984). This particular creation of otherness
perhaps began with Columbus, who asserted that he fully understood the Arawaks he met,
while at the same time insisting that the people he meets speak no language at all. This is
expressed in his Journal entry of October 12, 1492, in which he promises: +ACI-If it please
our Lord, at the moment of my departure I shall take from this place six of them to Your
Highness, so that they may learn to speak+ACI- (quoted by Todorov 1984 :30). On the one
hand, colonizers saw Indians as lacking or defective in speech+ADs- on the other, they viewed
natives as speaking essentially the same tongues as Europeans (and thus fully understandable
to Columbus). Yet these two
 -662-

positions are not so far apart as they seem: They both reject the simultaneous
perception of sameness and difference, the view that +ACI-others+ACI- could be radically
different from +ACI-us+ACI- and still be +ACI-human+ACI- ( Greenblatt 1976).

Another example of such either/or thinking is provided by Captain Pedro de Alvarado

( 1978). In a letter to CortU+-00E9s he stated the Spanish imperialists' understanding of their
actions:

After having sent my messengers to this country, informing them of how I was to come
to conquer and pacify the provinces that might not be willing to place themselves under the
dominion of His Majesty, I asked of them as his vassals . . . the favor and assistance of
passage through their country+ADs- that by so doing, they would be greatly favored and
supported in all justice by me and the Spaniards in my company+ADs- and if not, I threatened
to make war on them as on traitors rising in rebellion against the service of our Lord the
Emperor and that as such they would be treated, and that in addition to this, I would make
slaves of all those who should be taken alive in the war. (53-54)

In the Spanish discursive economy, difference is corrupted into inequality and equality
into identity. That is, Spaniards either conceived Indians as human and, therefore, as fully like
themselves, with the same rights and ready for assimilation. +ACI-Or else he +AFs-the
Spaniard+AF0- starts from the difference, but the latter is immediately translated into terms
of superiority and inferiority. What is denied +AFs-in both cases+AF0- is the existence of a
human substance truly other, something capable of being not merely an imperfect state of
oneself+ACI- ( Todorov 1984 :42+ADs- see Shapiro 1988).

Colonization colonizes minds and emotions as well as bodies, land, and labor. One
example of this is the way the peoples of the preconquest, preEuropean period in the Americas
were enfolded into Christian iconography as the Antichrist. That is, what was suppressed got
reincorporated within the new, official cosmos of both the colonizers and those who resisted
colonization. Hence the Bishop Pena Montenegro, supervising the Franciscan missions from his
lofty station in Quito in the mid 1600s, could write that:

It was easy for the devil to set up his tyrannical empire among . . . the Indians in their
pagan state . . . for they are people, brutish and ignorant, whom it is easy to deceive. And
thus when the Spanish first came to this land, they found that these barbarians since time
immemorial had been worshiping the devil . . . This evil seed planted such deep roots in the
Indians that it appeared to become their very flesh and blood so that. . . . today, although
they have had preachers, teachers, and priests, for 135 years trying to erase their errors, they
have not been able to erase them from their hearts. ( Pena Montenegro +AFs-
1668+AF01971+ADs- see Rumazo 1946)

What the Bishop did not realize, however, is that the church itself had named the +ACI-
Indians+ACI- and taught them the very demonology in which they were to preserve their
earlier beliefs and practices. The concept of the devils' evil seed with such deep roots was read
into the past by the Bishop as part of the ideological struggles of the present, a concept used
by Christianized Indians and colonists alike in their participation in the hegemonic discourse of
the church. +ACI-The momentous irony of this is that in struggling to extirpate all traces of
these 'memories' +AFs-of their satanic rites+AF0-, the church and the new culture of conquest
were in fact strengthening them as a new social force, ensuring the transmission of myth into
reality and of memory into the future+ACI- ( Taussig 1984 :98). The

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 European's unwillingness to engage in dialogue, and the problems of interU+-00AD
cultural communication generally, were attributed to the Indians incapacity to understand and
to speak and this incapacity, this lack of essential humanity, was then deployed as a
justification for domination.

The Lability of Codes of Control:

States and Slavery
The qualities that might mark a group as deviant are labile, and can shift from one
group to another or be invoked alternately for the same group by different institutions of
control. For example, as Root ( 1989 ) noted in documents of imperial Spain, a single negative
quality could be used in one text to define Muslims, in another to define Castilian peasants, in
another to define unruly women, in still another to define Mexican idolaters, and on and on as
more deviants were revealed as such to the authorities. Indeed, the categories used to
marginalize various groups in Spain were easily shifted to refer to a specifically Mexican type
of deviance, treason, or betrayal. Similarly, in contemporary Western societies, the idea of the
primitive has authorized the control of societies outside the West, and of women, poor people,
and minorities within it ( Duvignaud 1973 :ch.1+ADs- Street 1975+ADs- Tihang U+-0026
Adams 1985+ADs- Torgovnick 1990).

For example, explorers, novelists and anthropologists employed the same metaphors
and polar opposition to contrast the virgin, primitive, exotic New World with literate,
hierarchical, commercial, property-owning European society. Thus the metaphor for America
was a virgin female there for the taking. Amerigo Vespucci, for example, portrayed Indian
women in the New World as +ACI-libidinous+ACI- creatures just waiting for male favors.
Jean-Louis Castilhon wrote a libertine novel published in 1769 entitled Zingha, Queen of
Angola, which later served as a model for de Sade ( Sever U+-0026 Wainhouse 1965).
Likewise, both the explorer, Sir Walter Raleigh, and the novelist Auberon Waugh, wrote of the
land of Guyana and the bodies of women as potential property ready to be ravaged and
subdued by adventurous white men.

Such images and metaphors of plunder and colonization shifted back and forth between
tribal peoples of the New World and women of the Old. Sometimes semantic shifts in
definitions of difference were expressed in plays. For example, John Stedman ( 1796 )
Narrative of a Five Year's Expedition Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam recorded the
love story between its white male hero and his female mulatto slave. This gave rise to a
German play, Die Sklavin in Surinam. Both these plays are directly parallel to their European
originals -dramas of romance between young noblemen and peasant girls, wherein the virgin
resists in the first act, submits in the second, and suffers in the third ( Benjamin 1977).

However, at another level it is unclear that any state +ACI-actually+ACI- fears

difference insofar as it needs continually to produce this category as a way of constructing and
consolidating its authority ( Root 1989 :13). Of course, it does appear that the state destroys
difference to assert its power. But this perspective turns our views to the what of difference,
when we could more fruitfully focus on its hows -- the operative mechanisms of its
construction. In other words, there is a risk in losing the moment when difference is marked,
when it was

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decided that this was different (and hence subversive) and that was not. The state
constructs its authority precisely through its ability to produce and identify differences as such,
that is, through its articulation of its right to name and define and thereby to universalize its
system of judgment ( Root 1989).
 This labeling process also goes on between states, and is applied to cultural violence
itself. For example, what the U.S. calls a +ACI-peace-keeping mission+ACI- is called an +ACI-
imperialist attack+ACI- by its rivals. Such differences between nations can be created by
highlighting incidents of extreme violence, such as ritual human sacrifices by the Aztecs or,
conversely, the massacres or enslavements of whole villages by Spaniards. These extremes of
violence are made to appear either as typical or as aberrations, depending on the rhetorical
resources of the groups trying to impose or evade a negative label. For example, whereas
Europeans have tended to see the Aztecs as inherently violent, they generally have viewed
their own colonial enterprise as an orderly business punctuated by some regrettable (and
aberrant) instances ( Root 1989). Among competing colonizers, however, the +ACI-
aberrant+ACI- and the +ACI-normal+ACI- are likely to be reversed. For example, the
Leyenda Negra, or Black Legend, of Spanish atrocities in the New World became a way for
English imperialists to distinguish their supposedly benign project from the destructive one of
the Spanish. In a similar nationalistic appropriation of the Legend, a Dutch tract published in
1603 marks a parallel between Spanish atrocities in the New World and its outrages in the
Old.

This Spanish monster slyly attacks you. As they murdered the Indian lords, they have
also killed many of your princes. . . . As long as you keep the Spaniards in the nest . . . as
long as you quench the bloodthirsty Spanish desire, so long you remain like the Indians,
unfree. So, drive away the Spanish tyranny+ACE-

Anthropology has replaced theology and even biology as a major means of labeling.
And, like the Leyenda Negra, it is used selectively. As an example we can compare the
writings of Evans-Pritchard on the Azande of the Sudan, which was then part of the British
Empire, and his work on The Sanusi of Cyrenaica ( 1949 ) in Lybia, which had been held by
Italy. In the latter work, EvansPritchard foregrounds and is clearly sympathetic to the
antifascist and anticolonialist (that is, anti-Italian) movement. By contrast, his writing on
people under the civilizing rule of the British focuses on Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among
the Azande ( 1938 , see Ahmen 1973 +ADs- James 1973 :49).

The transmission of ideologies of racism and slavery between Islamic and Christian
European peoples also illustrates the transferability of discourses of domination from one
culture or population to another. Both Christianity and Islam arose in relatively color-blind
environments, and both affirmed theoU+-00AD logically the unity of mankind. Yet both
produced slave-holding societies that shared remarkably similar discourses of domination
( Davis 1990+ADs- Lewis 1990).

Black Africans, ibn-Khaldun said, +ACI-have little +AFs-that is essentially+AF0- human

and have attributes that are quite similar to those of dumb animals.+ACI- Magdisi referred to
the despised Zanj as +ACI-people of black color, flat noses, kinky hair, and little
understanding or intelligence.+ACI- In fact, the Arabic word for slave, abd, came to mean only
a black, whether slave or free. In 1855 Arabs of western Arabia rebelled against their Ottoman
overlords because the latter banned the

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slave trade. Shaykh Jamal, the ruler of Mecca, denounced the ban +ACI-as contrary to
the holy law of Islam. Because of this anti-Islamic act . . . the Turks had become apostates
and heathens+ACI- and therefore subject to legal killing or enslavement ( Lewis 1990+ADs-
Toledano 1982). As late as 1960, Muslims on pilU+-00AD grimage to Mecca were reported to
sell African slaves on arrival, +ACI-using them as living traveler's cheques+ACI- (Lord
Shakleton, quoted in Davis 1984 : 317, 362+ADsalso see Miers 1989).

The European slave trade had its origins in the traffic by light-skinned Arabs, Berber,
and Persians of sub-Saharan Africans. More curious, and less easy to explain, is the
remarkable parallelism between medieval Islamic and later Western racist discourse. For
example, Bernard Lewis ( 1990 ) quotes depictions of the Zanj by Muslim writers from the
eighth to the fifteenth centuries -- a list that characterized Africans as ugly, stupid, dishonest,
frivolous, foul smelling, filled with music and rhythm, inclined to simple piety, and dominated
by animal lust. In his study of the stereotyped +ACI-Sambo personality+ACI- of American
slavery, Stanley Elkins ( 1976 ) noted exactly the same features. Two quotations may
illustrate this similarity of characterization, one from Ibn Butlan, the other from Thomas
Jefferson:

. . . The blacker they are the uglier their faces . . . Dancing and rhythm are ingrained in
them . . . they can endure hard work . . . but the smell of their armpits . . . (Ibn Butlan,
quoted in Davis 1990 :38).

They +AFs-have+AF0- a very strong and disagreeable odor . . . +AFs-They+AF0-

proceed from want of foreU+-00AD thought, . . . they are more ardent after their female . . .
Their griefs are transient . . . +AFs-They+AF0- participate more of sensation than reflection . .
. Comparing them to the whites. . . in reason +AFs-they are+AF0- much inferior . . . In music
they are more generally gifted ( Jefferson 1964 , Query XIV:133-35).

How might we explain this remarkable parallelism? One source might be cultural
borrowing, beginning with European scholars who learned the Greek and Latin classics in the
Middle East from Arabic translations, to European slave merchants and their apologists who
had direct dealings with Arab slave traders. Another, more sociological account is provided by
Stanley Elkins. Elkins compared Africans in slavery in America to free African groups in Africa,
and both of these to Jews who were alternately free and later enslaved by Nazis in Europe. He
found that neither the free Africans nor the free Jews display the +ACI-Sambo
personality+ACI- of the racist stereotype, whereas both Africans and Jews in slavery did so,
despite the great difference between these two cultural groups on other dimensions. Thus, in
addition to cultural borrowing or transmission, it seems that the discourse and practice of
slavery itself creates the +ACI-Sambo personality,+ACI- both as a stereotype held by
slaveholders to legitimate their domination, as well as a tactic of adaptation used by the
oppressed to survive psychically and to limit exploitation.

Difference and Deviance in Colonial

Ethnography
Anthropologists among others have engaged in the deconstruction of colonial discourses.
Drawing heavily on the research of Jon Anderson ( 1992 ), some of these processes of
subordination through discourse can be seen at work in the

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British colonial ethnographies of Afghanistan. For more than a century, Afghanistan was
British India's wild west, peopled by the Pakhtun tribes and their occasional British
administrators. With Pakhtun tribes both inside and outside the Empire, the British struggled
to influence Afghanistan, to control ceded tribal areas, and to enforce Imperial law and order
in directly administered zones. These limits were reflected in studies, surveys, and reports of
tribal dispositions ( Anderson 1992). These materials were in turn gathered into handbooks
and gazetteers, vast compendia of information about the geography and ethnography of each
particular district under British control.

At a practical level, it was important to know with whom to deal in both Persian and
Pakhtu and how to collect and evaluate information in order to influence events. Cultural
fluency also was essential to understand what the British termed Pakhtun character, which
became a major topic of British interpretations. Early interpretations often showed a nuanced
appreciations of social relations. In time and with repetition, however, more subtle earlier
interpretations were generalized and abstracted into lists of traits of persons and groups. An
extreme example is from the preface of the Handbook of Kandahar Province, ( 1933 )
prepared and regularly updated by the General Staff of India for guidance in the event of
military operations:

The Afghan character is a strange blend of virtue and vice. . . . Plausible and specious in
their arguments, they often succeed in imposing on Europeans with their protestations of good
faith and honorable intentions, but experience . . . impresses on us the fact that no Military
Commander should ever rely on their good faith alone for the fulfillment of any promises they
may make. It is in short useless to make any terms with them unless the observance of such
terms can be enforced. (7-8)

Another summary paints a similar portrait:

The true Pathan is perhaps the most barbaric of all the races with which we are brought
into contact in the Punjab . . . he is bloodthirsty, cruel and vindictive in the highest
degree. . . . At the same time he has a code of honour which he strictly observes+ADs- and
there is a charm about him, especially about the leading men, which almost makes one forget
his treacherous nature. . . . He leads a wild, free, active life in the rugged fastnesses of his
mountains, and there is an air of masculine independence about him which is refreshing in a
country like India. ( Bonarjee 1899 :11-12)

Such texts condensed situated experience into generalized stereotypes that affected and
were affected by debates on strategies throughout the Imperial period. Drawn from friend and
foe, such composites fixed on +ACI-character+ACI- as a natural fact, read with an eye to
military concerns.

As the Raj was consolidated, cultural representations moved further from personal
interpretation toward bureaucratic objectification. From the beginning, a significant number of
British Frontier officers were Scots. Such early colonial writers identified subtleties of Pakhtun
comportment, interpersonal relations, and values when presenting and evaluating information
about Pakhtun people. Their understanding of clan, lineage, and honor reflects direct
knowledge of the Pakhtun, albeit put in eighteenth-century classicist prose forms. But as the
colonial administration developed, these sensibilities become muted and finally disappear
toward the end of the nineteenth century. Later writings are objectivistic, classificatory, and
bureaucratic. They rationalize subtle accounts of

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first-hand experiences into indicators of one-dimensional +ACI-traits+ACI- that reflect a

more basic +ACI-nature+ACI- or +ACI-character+ACI-, cast now in the Victorian frameworks
of racialism and evolutionism. +ACI-Thus, although they went through many revisions, a
striking feature of the handbooks is that, from the late nineteenth century until Indian
independence, there is virtually no change in these characterizations -- the characterizations
of each race remains remarkably fixed+ACI- ( Des Chene 1991 :7, n.7).

In sum, the intellectual technology of the Frontier service evolved with the development
of the Empire. +ACI-In comparison to the adventurous and misU+-00AD cegenous John
Company which proceeded it, the hallmarks of the empire were racialism, . . . social distance,
and bureaucratization, forms of +ACI-rationalization+ACIthat typically try to deal with things
in fewer dimensions than they have in life ( Anderson 1992 :106). Subtle evaluations of social
relations by the first case officers were overtaken by more stereotyped, categorical
assessments of character as somehow inherent and presocial. Abstracted and
decontextualized, these assessments came to be objects of their own analysis, with the result
that Pakhtun became a kind of tribal Everyman at the frontier of civilization.
 In British colonial anthropology, the identity of Afghans was no longer a +ACI-style,
+ACI- something that +ACI-assumes choice and allows for change+ACI- ( Royce 1982 :9).
Instead, it was transmuted into +ACI-national character.+ACI- In linguistic terms the ethnic
shifters became fixed designators ( Galaty 1982+ADs- Herzfeld 1984). The terms for cultural
identity came to assume a certainty hitherto denied them by the exigencies of social life. The
colonialists' reification of these terms reversed their earlier sensitivity to local contexts that is
necessary to their use as terms of personal experience. Instead, terms of Afghan identity
became the technical vocabulary of a fixed political order.

The Colonization of the Colonizer

It is not just the colonized, however, who are defined by colonial discourse. Those who
propagate discourses of domination are defined by such discourses as much as the persons
whom they were intended to dominate. This is because the civilized colonizers must always
resist contamination by the impure barbarian. They repress the Other not only in the colony
but also in themselves. They become victims of their own categories of colonization. In this
sense, codes and systems of domination not only represent encounters between rulers and
ruled, or even between self and Other. They also are struggles between the colonizers'
dehumanized self and the objectified enemy, the macho bureaucrat and his effeminate victim,
the rulers and their fearsome other selves projected onto their subjects. As a French
imperialist in Africa tried to convince himself,

I know that I must take pride in my blood. When a superior man ceases to believe
himself, he actually ceases to be superior . . . When a superior race ceases to believe itself a
chosen race, it ceases to be a chosen race. (quoted in Cesaire 1977 :29)

Thus, efforts to put and keep both whites and native South Africans in their respective
places did not flow from differences but rather strove to make them. It is not simply that Arab,
African, or Indian laborers are culturally or otherwise different from whites but that, for the
purpose of legitimating domination and

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policing it without disruptive violence, white people were compelled to be different not
only in physical appearance but also in manner, thought, and conduct -- regardless of their
personal inclinations or economic needs. The very existence of admonitions such as the one
above suggests that cultural whiteness had to be created. And it was created not only against
the inclinations of "natives" who wished to don shoes and shirts to become teachers or clergy,
but also against the wishes of those white people who were willing to fraternize with the
"natives" for pleasure and instruction, and to dig ditches or carry water if that was necessary
to eat. The fact that such admonitions are commonplace in colonial tracts shows that
"crossing" and "mixing' also was commonplace, and that the Manichean oppositions described
by Fanon and others were fragile, historical creations, in constant need of reconstruction.

In these processes of creating difference, the dominant group not only marks off the
dominated as different and thereby inferior; it also marks itself as different and thereby
superior ( Bhabha 1984; Cesaire 1972; Rabasa 1990). The dominators must continually
construct authority internally, or else become subject to the same negative labeling that
marks their subordinates. Furthermore, any trait or behavior can readily come to be identified
as deviant or treasonous, and any member of the dominant group or any internal minority can
suddenly seem dangerous to the authorities ( Root 1989). Thus, both the dominators and the
dominated must be subjected to constant supervision.
 In actual practice, of course, such absolute categorical differences become malleable and
porous. Thus, the dominators' task of constructing categories and exhibiting authority is never
finished. Each further instance of cultural difference has to be adjudicated as such. In this
process of noting and adjudicating differences, the colonial authority reproduces itself.
Colonists attempts to exercise control by constantly announcing their right to rule and by
marking their difference from the colonized. Cultural and racial differences are identified and
compared to a universalized, ideal physique, language, or religion. This identification and
comparison involves more than a desire for profit. It also permits various dreams of power and
identity to be played out, with the constructed Other providing a surface onto which this
dream is inscribed ( Root 1989; see Jan Mohammed 1985; Taussig 1987 :27).

This power and identity can be seen in John Masters' Bugles and a Tiger, the story of his
life in the Raj. Masters dreamed of leading a regiment of one of the "fighting races" of India.
He found the Gurkhas to be "small and cheerful and they had the air of so many gamboling
bullpups." Seen as tough and happy dogs, Gurkhas were dressed in kilts and taught to play
the bagpipes. As fightermascots, they serenaded guests with Beethoven Fifth and The Roast
Beef of Old England at regimental dinners ( Des Chene 1991). Although he was "determined to
go to Gurkhas," Masters' true desire was to partake of the mystique of martial maleness, a
brotherhood of British men made possible by their colonial project.

I could see myself in the new anteroom -- in it and of it, this time -- talking easily. I was
one of that group of men in embroidered dark green mess jackets, tight green trousers, and
stiff white shirts . . . With them I would share in cold-weather maneuvers, and as one of them
I would see the dawn lend a short-lived beauty to the plain of battle or silver

-669-

the water where we waited for the wild duck to flight. With them I would stand parades
and drills and audit boards, and share evenings of brandy and cigars and argument. ( Masters
1956 : 16, 24)

Resistance, Reproduction and

Liberation: Transformations of
Discourses of Domination
The anticolonialists, the rebels, they too are colonized, because in their resistance they
too use the very categories of the colonial order. Many Indian nationalists, for example,
perceiving the West as materialist and efficient, sought to resist the West by becoming
warriors and scientists, forming a powerful state, and building their atom bomb. Or,
conversely, they often became "spiritual" in order to resist the West by asserting the
uniqueness of their own "higher" tradition. In both versions of resistance, however, the
colonialists' dichotomies of masculine-feminine, scientific-spiritual have been accepted as the
appropriate code for self definition and, so, the colonialist wins even if defeated.

Thus, all those who espouse theories of liberation in the language of their oppressors
indirectly admit the superiority of the oppressors and collaborate with them, for they construe
the colonizer as a god-like creature who stands above, and is not constituted by, the very
language that he uses and defends ( Nandi 1983). Hence, liberation from domination requires
more than beating the dominators at their own games, or asserting a counter-game that is
defined by its opposition to that of the dominators. It also requires the dominated to make
sense of themselves and their situations in terms of categories that emerge from, yet
somehow transcend, their own experience. This experience is partly one of suffering. But it
cannot be only that, or else the dominated is entirely a creature of his or her master. Nor can
it be only a uniquely "authentic" experience, since this would deny the ways in which the
culture of the colonizer has irreversibly modified that of the colonized.

These issues are central in cultural debates in formerly colonized societies, such as those
of North Africa where many prominent authors continue to write in French. Some critics insist
that this is a submission to the cultural hegemony of the former colonizer. By contrast, the
Moroccan author, Abdelkebir Khatibi argues that North African writers can use French to
produce an "irony which would not only be a form of revenge . . . but would also allow the
francophone North African writer to distance himself with regard to the language by inverting
it, destroying it, and presenting new structures such that the French reader would become a
stranger in his own language" ( Khatibi 1979 :70, quoted in Harlow 1986 :xviii). Irony,
however, depends on its audience for completion. And if the audience fails to understand it,
the anticolonialists who use the colonists' language, even in resistance, may be inadvertently
reproducing a colonial order.

Such a negation/reproduction also is expressed in the concept of "negritude," espoused

as a cultural doctrine by the very elites of Africa who were most avid for economic
development. This was noted by the delegate from Ghana to the first and only Pan-African
Cultural Festival held in 1970 in Algiers: "They wanted the lower classes to be in charge of
preserving indigenous culture, . . . to be the niggers while [the elites] try to be Westerners"

-670-

( Marieme, quoted in Chapkis 1986 :73). Dulali Nag observed a similar process of
intromission and transformation of colonial ideology in contemporary Calcutta. For Nag
however, the axis is not elite/lower class, but female/male. As in Ghana, Indian nationalists
sought to gain the efficiencies of "modern" Western ways even while pursuing "traditional"
Indian values. In this project, however, the earlier, more androgynous iconography of gender
was replaced by a new equation -- male:modern::female:tradition.

The feminine and the woman came to be the signifier of an essence of Indianness. It
thus became necessary for the nationalist-modernist project to define femininity so that it is
adequately differentiable from what was considered "Western." The moral and civil
responsibilities of a modern citizen of the nation-state could then be carried out in the confines
of the space outside of the "home" -- the space for the masculine -- while nationalist identity
could be safeguarded inside the "home" -- the space for the feminine. A control over the
definition of the feminine attributes -- and thereby a power to objectify the woman -- became
one of the necessities for the nationalist-modernist discourse. "True" feminine attributes came
to be defined as those that would not threaten the difference between the "home" and the
"world." The nationalist-modernist ideology secured its own identity by appropriating the
identity of the woman. ( Nag 1989 :11)

From the confluence of such contrary forces, however, new amalgams can be forged,
new versions of one's own tradition can be shaped or discovered, and alternate universalisms
can be created. For example, science need not be rejected in favor of spirituality, nor need
Indians become superscientists to compete with the West. Instead, the absolute bifurcation
between science and spirituality can be relativized, and both made to fit within a more copious
definition of the Indian tradition.

As consensus for an alternate universalism grows, the colonizers' latent fears that the
colonized will reject their version of the world becomes manifest, and the colonizers begin also
to doubt the absolute priority of the colonial discourse and, with it, the natural moral
superiority of themselves, their culture, and their civilizing mission. They are secure as long as
the anticolonists seek to redeem their 'masculinity' by becoming the counterplayers of the
rulers according to the established rules. But the colonizer becomes fearful if the colonized
discover an alternate frame of reference within which the oppressed do not seem weak,
degraded and distorted persons trying to break the monopoly of the rulers on a fixed quantity
of machismo. Gandhi created such a universalism in his conception that freedom is indivisible,
not only in the popular sense that the oppressed of the world are one, but also in the
unpopular sense that the oppressor too is enslaved by the culture of oppression ( Nandi
1983).

Although colonized groups often accept the ideology of the colonizers, they also can
redenominate the language of the oppressor as a means of liberation. Menchu ( 1984 )
illustrated this redenomination when she stated that a "Christian" kingdom "will exist only
when we all have enough to eat" (160). Similarly, the word "Hindu" was once used by Muslim
invaders to describe all Indians who had not converted to Islam. Only later was it used to
express a national cultural identity ( Madan 1977). In a like fashion, the written language that
is used today and commonly known as "Bengali" was developed in the nineteenth century by
British missionaries who, in their proselytizing zeal, wanted to learn

-671-

"the" language of the local people. In collaboration with Indian scholars, these
missionaries produced a unified grammar and script that over time came to be accepted as the
official version. Despite many varieties of the language spoken to this day in West Bengal,
their language of the texts has a unified form that is called Bengali. A hegemonic
textual/cultural order, controlled by the "educated" and more Westernized urban elite, was
constituted along with the language ( Nag 1989).

Soon however, this new discourse, itself partly a product of colonialism, became the
vehicle and expression of a uniquely Indian and often explicitly anticolonialist culture.
Aurobindo Ghose, for example, was forbidden to speak Indian languages by his nationalist but
anglophile father. But after he had learned Bengali from an English orientalist in Great Britain,
that is, after his return and conversion to India, he made Bengali into a language of national
liberation. Colonial officials were disturbed and puzzled by the activities of such Indian
revolutionaries, especially because many of them belonged to the Bhadralok -- those highly
educated, Westernized Bengalis from whom the British Government recruited candidates for
further education in England ( Broomfield 1975; Gordon 1974; Hartnack 1987).

Another striking appropriation and inversion of the master's language for the purposes
of liberation is the redenomination of anthropology, truth, and objectivity achieved by Jomo
Kenyatta, leader of Kenya's independence movement. Kenyatta learned anthropology at
Malinowski's seminars in London in the 1930s. Later, addressing a mainly white British public,
he used anthropology and the techniques of objectivity to present a "record of facts" that
advanced an Afrocentric perspective. Indeed, merely speaking as an African for Africans was
at that time a revolutionary act. Thus, Kenyatta insists that,

My chief object is not to enter into controversial discussion . . . but to let the truth speak
for itself. I am well aware that I could not do justice to the subject without offending those
"professional friends of the African" who are prepared to maintain their friendship for eternity
as a sacred duty, provided only that the African will continue to play the part of an ignorant
savage so that they can monopolize the office of interpreting his mind and speaking for him.
To such people, an African who writes a study of this kind is encroaching on their preserves.
He is a rabbit turned poacher. ( 1938 :xvii-xviii)

In such ways discourses of domination may become rhetorics of resistance. The process
is fraught with pain. In gaining voice one's self is also changed. In speaking for one's people
one articulates a world one no longer fully shares. In mastering the master's language one
risks becoming a new master, or creating an antilanguage that remains encapsulated in that
which it resists. Yet such struggles also are struggles for a more embracing conception of the
human, for a concept and practice of justice that are larger than those invented by elites. Any
ruling class humanism, any humanism that ignores or covers up relations of domination, is
already largely bankrupt. More global conceptions of human community must start with
questions of domination. And, despite their anguish and contortions, this is exactly where
rhetorics of resistance begin. That is why they command our moral attention.

Thus we should stand with the dominated not only because they have suffered, not only
because slaves know more of work than masters, and surely

-672-

not because the slave may one day become a master. But mainly because the
dominated may create and embody a community of discourse, a sensibility and praxis, that
includes everyone as human, whereas for the masters to master the dominated, they can
treat them only as a thing.

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Photography, and Policy Analysis. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Stam, Henderkas J. 1987 . "The Psychology of Control: A Textual Critique." Pp. 131-56
in The Analysis of Psychological Theory: Meta-psychological Perspectives, edited by H. J.
Starn, T. B. Rogers , and K. J. Gergen Hemisphere.

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Street, Brian V. 1975 . The Savage in Literature. Representation of "Primitive" Society in

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Szasz, Thomas. 1974 . The Second Sin. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Taussig, Michael. 1987 . Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man. University of
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Tihang, Sharon W., and Kathleen J. Adams. 1985 . The Wild Woman: An Inquiry into the
Anthropology of an Idea. Schenkman.

Todorov, Tzvetan. 1984 . Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, translated by
Richard Howard . Harper & Row.

Toledano, Ehud R. 1982 . The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression.

Torgovnick, Marianna. 1990 . Gone Primitive. Savage Intellects, Modern Lives. University
of Chicago Press.

Voltaire. 1961 . Candide, Zadig and Selected Stories. Trans. by Donald M. Frame. New
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