HAZOP Case Study of Boiler PDF

HAZOP STUDY REPORT OF THE
TURBINE HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT,
BOILER UPGRADE AND LOW NOX
BURNERS AS PART OF THE ERARING
ENERGY POWER STATION UPGRADE
PROJECT
Prepared for: Eraring Energy

Document Number: ERAPOW\12-B177
Revision B
Prepared by: Karin Nilsson

14 July 2009
PO Box 248
Berowra Heights NSW 2082
Telephone: [02] 9985 1056
Facsimile: [02] 9427 7851
Email: Planager@bigpond.net.au
HAZOP Study Report of the Turbine Hydraulic Power
Unit, Boiler Upgrade and Low NOx Burners as Part of
the Eraring Energy Power Station Upgrade Project
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank the HAZOP review team and in particular Ian
O’Brian, Phil Fenney, Steve Shawcross, Graeme Hankin and Frank Mieszala
for organising the HAZOP Studies and providing input and reviews of minutes
and report.
Disclaimer
This report was prepared by Planager Pty Ltd (Planager) as an account of work
for Eraring Energy. The material in it reflects Planager's best judgement in the
light of the information available to it at the time of preparation. However, as
Planager cannot control the conditions under which this report may be used,
Planager and its related corporations will not be responsible for damages of any
nature resulting from use of or reliance upon this report. Planager's
responsibility for advice given is subject to the terms of engagement with
Eraring Energy.
Rev Date Description Prepared By Authorised By
A 19/06/2009 Draft for Comment Karin Nilsson Frank Mieszala
B 14/07/2009 Final Report Karin Nilsson Frank Mieszala
HAZOP Study Report Of The Turbine Hydraulic c:\erapow\12-b177\HAZOP Report Upgrade Project Rev B.Doc
Power Unit, Boiler Upgrade And Low Nox Burners Revision B 14 July, 2009
As Part Of The Eraring Energy Power Station
Upgrade Project
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 6
1.1 Background...................................................................................... 6
1.2 Aim of This Report .......................................................................... 6
1.3 Location of EPS ............................................................................... 7
1.4 Project Description.......................................................................... 7
1.5 Scope of HAZOP Study ................................................................... 7
1.5.1 Boiler Upgrade................................................................................... 8
1.5.2 Turbine Hydraulic Power Supply ....................................................... 8
1.5.3 Low NOx Burners ............................................................................... 8
2 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 9
2.1 Introduction...................................................................................... 9
2.2 Details of the HAZOP Study Procedure ......................................... 9
2.3 HAZOP Study Guidewords ........................................................... 10
2.4 Risk Ranking Tools ....................................................................... 12
3 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................... 13
3.1 Presentation of Risk Results ........................................................ 13
3.2 Risk Levels of the Boilers Design ................................................ 14
3.2.1 Level 4 Risks Boilers ....................................................................... 14
3.2.2 Level 3 Risks Boilers ....................................................................... 15
3.2.3 Level 2 and Level 1 Risks Boilers .................................................... 18
3.3 Risk Levels of the Turbine Hydraulic Power Unit Design .......... 18
3.3.1 Level 4 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit ................................................. 18
3.3.2 Level 3 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit ................................................. 18
3.3.3 Level 2 and Level 1 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit ............................. 19
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3.4 Risk Levels of the Low NOx Burner Design ................................. 19
3.4.1 Level 4 Risks Low NOx Burners....................................................... 19
3.4.2 Level 3 Risks Low NOx Burners....................................................... 19
3.4.3 Level 2 and Level Low NOx Burners ................................................ 19
3.5 Risk Profile of Plant Assuming HAZOP Recommendations in

Place ........................................................................................................ 20
4 CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 21
5 REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 222
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1 – HAZOP Study Minutes
Appendix 2 – Approval as HAZOP Leader
Appendix 3 – Eraring Energy Risk Tools
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REPORT
PROJECT TITLE: Power Station Upgrade Project
LOCATION: Eraring Energy Power Station.
HAZOP MINUTES: Appendix 1
HAZOP Leaders: Karin Nilsson (DoP Approved)
Mark Wyburn (Eraring Energy, second

half day of Boiler HAZOP.
Methodology used and outcome
reviewed by Karin Nilsson)
HAZOP SCOPE AND DATES FOR STUDY:
- Boiler Upgrade 8 April and 5 May 2009 (1½ days)
- Turbine Hydraulic Power Supply 23 March 2009 (one day)
- Low NOx Burners 22 April 2009 (one day)

RECORD OF ATTENDANCE
Name Company Position
Boiler Upgrade
Eraring Energy Project Manager, Boiler
Ian O’Brian
Upgrade Project
Ray Ansell Eraring Energy Senior Tradesman
Eraring Energy Boiler Team Leader and Asset

Chris Brucki
Management
Shaun Edwards Eraring Energy Project Change Manager
Gary Craig Eraring Energy Project Manager, CCP Project
Eraring Energy Project Manager, Low NOx

Phil Fenney
Burners
Mark Wyburn (part Eraring Energy Chemical Asset Team Leader
time)
Charlie Grima Aurecon Boiler Operations Consultant
Power Unit, Boiler Upgrade And Low Nox Burners 4 Revision B 14 July, 2009
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RECORD OF ATTENDANCE
Turbine Hydraulic Power Unit
Eraring Energy Project Manager Turbine
Steve Shawcross
Upgrade Project
Graham Hankin Eraring Energy Turbine Asset
Phil McWilliam PPI – DPPA Rep Project Manager
Daniel McNally Eraring Energy E&I Technician
Keith Clark Eraring Energy Operator
Ian Dawson Eraring Energy Projects Engineer
Steve Wheeler Eraring Energy Operations Team Leader

Steve Gambrill (part Eraring Energy Environment
time)
Gemma Keith Eraring Energy Secretarial Support
Low NOx Burner
Project Manager, Low NOx
Phil Fenney Eraring Energy
Burners
Steve Wheeler Eraring Energy Operations Engineer
Eraring Energy Boiler Team Leader and Asset

Chris Brucki
Management
John Harris Eraring Energy Plant Owner
Tarkel Larson Siemens Field Services Manager
Siemens Project Manager, Low NOx

Kenneth Tichy
Burners
Meg Trewhella Eraring Energy Secretarial support
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The Energy Directions Green Paper (Ref 1) prepared by the NSW Government
identified that if the current trend of increased electricity demand continues,
additional generation capacity or demand management would be required by
2010.
Eraring Energy (EE), one of three State-Owned Corporations that manages a

diverse set of electricity-generating assets located throughout NSW operates a
coal-fired power station (at Eraring), known as Eraring Power Station (EPS).
EE has put forward a proposal to undertake capacity increase and performance

improvements to the existing EPS to increase the capacity of each of the four
660 MW generating units (which are capable of generating at an equivalent
rating of around 700 MW) to enable the units to operate up to a maximum
continuous rating of 750 MW.
EE has obtained Project Approval, subject to a number of Consent Conditions,

for the capacity increase project under section 75J of the EP&A Act in
accordance with the provisions of Part 3A of the EP&A Act. The Minister for
Planning is the approval authority for the application.
One of these Consent Conditions requires a HAZOP Study to be undertaken for

the proposed development, as follows:
.....a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) for the power station
upgrade, chaired by an independent, qualified person or team. The
independent person or team shall be approved by the Director-
General. The Study shall be carried out in accordance with the
Department’s publication Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory
Paper No. 8 – HAZOP report. If the Proponent intends to defer the
implementation of a recommendation, justification must be included.
1.2 AIM OF THIS REPORT
Eraring Energy has commissioned Planager Pty Ltd to lead a multidisciplinary

team through the HAZOP Study of a number of sub-projects which form part of
the EPS’ Upgrade Project.
Planager’s principal risk engineer, Karin Nilsson, has received approval from
the Department of Planning to lead the HAZOP Study. The letter of approval for
Karin Nilsson as HAZOP study leader is included in Appendix 2.
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The aim of the HAZOP study is to review a design of a technological system to
identify hazards or significant obstacles to operability, which could arise,
particularly through deviations from the design intent.
1.3 LOCATION OF EPS
EPS’s site comprises approximately 1,200 hectares of land and is located in a

natural dip on the western shore of Lake Macquarie. The site falls within the
Lake Macquarie Local Government Area, near the township of Dora Creek,
within the Morisset Planning District. The power station and associated
infrastructure covers a footprint of approximately 150 hectares, with the
remaining area including the CCP management facility, water canals, and
ancillary power station facilities.
The surrounds of the EPS consist largely of natural vegetated areas with
development dedicated primarily to the extractive industries, such as coal
mining. Some semi-rural areas exist to the south on the shores of Lake
Macquarie.
1.4 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
The key objective of the project is to upgrade the infrastructure at EPS. By

replacing existing aging components of plant and equipment within the EPS
operating units, EE would be able to maintain operational capacity and the
replacement/renewal program would enable improved efficiency of operations
and the environmental and safety performance of EPS.
The upgrade would allow the four existing 660 MW generating units to operate
at a MCR of up to 750MW. This improved performance would be used to meet
the increasing demands of the NEM, particularly during peak periods.
Aged components of the Boiler and Turbine Generating Plant would be

refurbished to achieve a MCR of 750 MW generated at a Power Factor of 0.9 at
rated conditions (Generator 833 MVA rating). This would include:
 “Steam Path Upgrade” of high pressure, intermediate pressure and low
pressure stages of the turbine;
 Upgrade of generator;
 Upgrade of generator transformer cooling system;
 Additional tubing inside boiler;
 Replacement of 28 boiler burners with low NOx burners; and
 Other miscellaneous work.
1.5 SCOPE OF HAZOP STUDY
EE has identified the following three operations which would benefit from a
HAZOP Study:
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 Boiler Upgrade
 Turbine Hydraulic Power Supply

 Low NOx Burners
The HAZOP study sessions were all carried out By Difference with the existing
plant operation, i.e. the HAZOP focussed on the implication of the changes to
plants and processes which result from the proposed changes to boilers,
hydraulic unit and burners. As such, the HAZOP did not attempt to cover the
whole of the Power Station operation and design. The scope of each HAZOP
study is as follows:
1.5.1 Boiler Upgrade
 Included: The scope of the Boiler HAZOP includes the design and
operation of the actual boilers.
 Excluded: The scope excludes the new (Low NOx Burners, see below),
including the burner management, flame stability and wind box.
1.5.2 Turbine Hydraulic Power Supply
 Included: The scope includes the design and operation of pumps, fans,
piping, valving, instrumentation etc. which form part of the hydraulic
power unit.
 Excluded: The scope excludes the control system and the main oil
pump and the auxiliary pump. The Emergency Trip Device is also
outside the scope of this HAZOP. Further, outside the scope is the
extractor relay dump valve operation, the Turbine protection and control
module, the mechanical steam path upgrade.
Note that at the time of the HAZOP the exact composition of the
hydraulic oil was not known (it was believed to be some type of
phosphate ester). The HAZOP team took into account that it could be
potentially hazardous to people handling the material. As such the
HAZOP of the turbine hydraulic power unit is regarded as a Preliminary
HAZOP and further engineering investigation will be required (whether it
be in the form of supplementary HAZOP studies or other risk
management techniques).
1.5.3 Low NOx Burners
 Included: The scope of the Burner HAZOP included the new Low NO x
Burners, including burner management, flame stability and wind box.
 Excluded: The control system was not part of the scope of this HAZOP.
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2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The HAZOP study is based on engineering line diagrams (P&ID's) and outline
operating procedures. The consequences and deviations are identified, the
existing safeguards are highlighted and, where necessary, appropriate
corrective actions initiated.
A HAZOP study is a form of design review which concentrates on how the plant
will cope with abnormal conditions, rather than on how it will perform under
normal conditions. The study comprises consideration of each process line and
vessel, examining for each the possible causes and consequences of a wide
range of process abnormalities. While some of the postulated abnormalities
may be inapplicable for a particular process line, they are all probed with the
objective of identifying any significant route to a process upset, operating
problem or hazardous incident. It is, in effect, a very thorough but mainly
qualitative approach.
HAZOP is the method recommended for identifying hazards and problems

which prevent efficient operation of a processing plant. It is a technique which
provides opportunities for people to think creatively and examine all possible
ways in which hazards or operating problems might arise. To reduce the
chance that something is missed it is done in a systematic way - each pipeline
and each type of hazard being considered in turn. The study is carried out by a
team so that they can stimulate each other and build on each other’s ideas.
The results of a HAZOP depend more upon the experience and attitudes of the
participants and on the leadership style adopted, than on the procedures
themselves. The participants were selected to provide the necessary
experience, knowledge, skills and authority to approve the actions decided
upon. The Study leader needs to be very experienced in HAZOP studies and
Hazard Analysis techniques and capable of performing as an independent and
unbiased leader. This person needs to be familiar with other related techniques
and to know when other techniques would be beneficial compared to the
HAZOP technique.
2.2 DETAILS OF THE HAZOP STUDY PROCEDURE
The HAZOP study was conducted according to ICI's traditional HAZOP

methodology, corresponding to established engineering practices. The study of
each step in the operation of the plant followed the pattern outlined below:
 A brief outline of the purpose of the step in the operation and of the lines
involved with the operation is provided by one of the team members (usually
by the designer). The lines are highlighted on the P&ID with dotted lines
using a transparent coloured felt pen.
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 The purpose, design features, operating conditions, fittings, etc, are
explained.
 Any general questions about the lines are then answered.
 The detailed "line by line" study commences at this point. The discussion
leader takes the group through a series of guide words set out in a book
(see Section 2.3). Each card has a guide word or prompt on it, such as
"FLOW - HIGH", which identifies a deviation from normal operating
conditions. This is used to prompt discussion of the possible effects of flow
at an undesirably slow speed, and of the possible causes. If in the opinion
of the meeting, the combination of the consequences and the likelihood of
occurrence are sufficient to warrant action, then the combination is regarded
as a "problem" and minuted as such. Potential incidents with severe
consequences where the team judges that the risk management techniques
already designed into the process are sufficient are also minuted in order to
provide a record of the safeguards to be installed. Further, if a particular
item was subject to discussions then it would be minuted to record the
outcomes of these discussions.
 For major risk areas the need for action is assessed quantitatively. For less
important risks the need for action can be based on experience and
judgement. The person responsible for defining the corrective action is also
nominated.
 It should always be remembered that the main aim of the meeting is to find
problems needing solution, rather than determine actual solutions. If the
group becomes tied down by trying to resolve a problem it is better to
continue the discussion at a later date and proceed with the study.
 When each guide word requires no more consideration, the chairperson
turns that card down revealing the next guide word.
 Discussion for each guide word is confined to the line marked, the vessels or
other major equipment at each end and any equipment such as pumps or
heat exchangers in between. Any changes agreed at the meeting are
minuted, and where possible, marked on the P&I diagram or layout with red
pen.
 When all guide words have been covered, the line is fully highlighted
(instead of with a dotted line) to show that it has been covered, and the next
line is chosen.
 When all the lines in a plant sub-section have been reviewed, additional
guide words are used for review (overview) of the P&ID as a whole (see
below).
2.3 HAZOP STUDY GUIDEWORDS
The guidewords applicable for continuous operations were used for the most of
the designs under review. If the operation has critical sequencing conditions,
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such as for the Low NOx Burner project, then the continuous operation
guidewords were complemented with batch guidewords as listed below.
Line-By-Line Guidewords - Continuous Process

 High Level / High Flow
 Low Level / Low Flow
 Zero Flow / Empty
 Reverse Flow
 High Pressure - Venting, relief rate
 Low Pressure - Venting, relief rate
 High Temperature
 Low Temperature
 Impurities - gaseous, liquid, solid
 Change in concentration / Change in composition / Two phase flow /
Reactions
 Testing - equipment / product
 Plant Items - operable / maintainable
 Instruments - sufficient for control / too many / correct location
Overview Guidewords
 Toxicity
 Commissioning
 Start-up
 Shutdown (isolation, purging)
 Breakdown (including services failure)
 Effluent
 Fire and Explosion
 Safety Equipment
 Noise
 Materials of Construction
 Services required
 Electrical: area classification / isolation / earthing
 Quality and Consistency
 Output - reliability and bottlenecks
 Efficiency – losses
 Simplicity
Line-By-Line Guidewords - Batch Process
 Timing – start too early/late; stop too early/late
 Flow High / Low
 Level High / Low
 Zero Flow / Empty
 Reverse Flow
 None
 Pressure High / Low
 Temperature High / Low
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 Density High / Low
 Viscosity High / Low
 Static
 Effects on Existing Equipment
 Concentration High / Low
 Contamination / Extra Phase
 Duration – Delayed / Omitted
 Out of Sequence / Wrong Operation
 Not Complete
 Duplication
 Testing - equipment / product
 Plant Items - operable / maintainable
 Instruments - sufficient for control / too many / correct location
Overview Guidewords
 Operator Health
 Environment
 Electrical
 Services
 Materials of Construction
 Non-routine Conditions - Start-up/ Shutdown / Maintenance / Cleaning /
Commissioning
 Fire and Explosion
 Safety Equipment
 Quality and Consistency
 Output - reliability and bottlenecks
 Simplicity & Efficiency
2.4 RISK RANKING TOOLS
The HAZOP Study was complemented with a formal risk ranking of each
scenario using Eraring Energy’s risk ranking tool (Ref 2) presented in Appendix
3. This is as per Eraring Energy’s requirements for risk reviews of their
projects.
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3 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 PRESENTATION OF RISK RESULTS
Items were recorded on the HAZOP Study Record Sheets, which may be seen
in Appendix 1. The 3.5 days HAZOP generated a total of 115 issues and
recommendations.
As per the methodology, entries were made on the record sheets as follows:
 Where a hazard or an operational problem was recognised as requiring

further risk or operations controls;
 Where the potential consequences of an incident were severe even

though the management of the risk considered acceptable.
 Where a particular item was discussed in detail during the study and
hence required minuting to record the final outcome of these discussions.
HAZOPs are focussed on the engineering design of a particular plant or

equipment. Hence, trip, slip and fall type incidents were not recorded nor were
they discussed. These are better discussed in a Job Safety Assessment (or
similar) type forum.
The table in Appendix 1 shows the following columns:

 Risk Number,
 Guideword,
 Causes,
 Consequences
 Controls in place (a listing of the controls currently in place and approved
as part of the present project),
 Current risk rating (rating of the risk with the controls which are currently
in place or approved),
 Mitigating actions (further risk reduction recommendations aiming to
reduce the risk to ALARP1 levels),
 Residual risk rating (the risk rating of the scenario with the recommended
mitigating actions (above) in place,
Below is provided a listing of Levels 4 and 4 risk scenarios as identified and
evaluated for the existing design. The resultant risk level once the
recommendations arising out of the HAZOP Study have been implemented is
also discussed for each scenario. The table in Section 3.5 below presents the
1
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
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risk profile of the systems under study assuming all recommendations have
been implemented successfully.
3.2 RISK LEVELS OF THE BOILERS DESIGN
Below are listed the risk scenarios for each Risk Level (as per Eraring Risk
definition) for the Boiler Design. These risk levels are as per current design
without the additional risk reduction recommendations arising from the HAZOP
implemented.
3.2.1 Level 4 Risks Boilers
A. Risk of increased copper transportation (Scenario 5)

Increased copper transportation has largely got a financial effect to EE. Copper
would eventually carry-over through to turbine blades, reducing the efficiency of
the turbine operation and hence output capacity. It may cause flow restrictions
in superheater tubes and lead to a decreased life on low pressure heaters. The
copper transportation issue will require a change in the manner in which
maintenance is carried out on the superheaters and turbine rotors.
Current controls include ongoing routine copper transportation survey; a

Strategy Review which is being conducted on the merits of chemically cleaning
the superheaters versus foam clean of turbine; a review of the procedures for
boiler tube repairs have been reviewed; and new boiler chemical controls being
installed to reduce copper transportation from LP heaters.
Recommended additional controls are as follows:
Option a: Successful chemical clean carried out on super heaters which will be
carried out there-after as required need to review sliding pressure operation.
This would reduce the consequences of this event resulting in reducing the
overall risk level to a Level 3 risk.
Option b: Replacement of LP heaters to allow oxygenated treatment of the

boiler feed water. This would reduce the risk level to 1.
NB: Eraring Energy has engaged a contractor to complete superheater tube

cleaning commencing with unit four in November 2009.
B. Insufficient power supplies or access for operation during

construction (Scenarios 51 and 52)
Insufficient power supplies for construction purposes and insufficient access for
operations such as cranage due to other works (e.g. bottom ash hopper
crushing plant and boiler upgrade crane location) would lead to delays in
meeting program. The likelihood of such delays is seen as Very High leading to
a Level 4 risk.
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It is recommended to place these risk scenarios on the Electrical Project Teams
(#51) and Site Operations Managers (#51 and #52) agenda. This would reduce
the risk to a Level 1 and Level 2 for scenarios 51 and 52 respectively.
3.2.2 Level 3 Risks Boilers
A. Flow accelerated corrosion due to increase in normal operational

flow (Scenario 1)
Flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) is a temperature dependent corrosion
mechanism normally occurring after a bend or in a straight pipe after a flow
disturbance e.g. thermocouple probe, orifice plate etc. It may lead to pipe
failure and loss of containment of high pressure water, injury from burns,
possible fatalities. Existing controls are confirmation of adequate thickness of
piping etc. (thickness survey already conducted); planned thickness surveys 4
years after start up and the fact that there is no change in geometry as a result
of the project.
Further recommendations are to determine high risk areas in terms of FAC and
to perform thickness survey at targeted areas at first Combined Maintenance
Outage Program (CMOP2) outage on units 4 and 2 and correlate to the duration
above the original design flow. It is also recommended to record the extent of
flow above the original design (for use in thickness survey mentioned above)
and to confirm that FAC study by contractor has been completed and is valid for
current design.
Implementation of these recommendations would reduce the likelihood from a

Moderate to a Low. It would however not reduce the overall risk rating, which
remains a Level 3 risk due to the relatively High consequence rating.
B. Failure of new pressure parts (Scenarios 7, 15, 19, 26, 50)

Failure of new pressure parts for a number of reasons may lead to pipe failure
and loss of containment of high pressure steam / water, injury from burns, and
possible fatalities.
Current and approved controls include the fact that the design and construction
will adhere to Australian Standards including inspection; 100% radiography on
all site tube welds; all other site welds to be NDT in compliance with Australian
Standards; testing, including Non Destructive Testing (NDT); Asset Strategy
defined field test for creep life of welds.
Provided that these controls are successfully implemented and maintained the
team concluded that the risk of these scenarios are As Low As Reasonably
2
A term generally used for planned generating unit maintenance and often associated with
the phrase CMOP outage.
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Practicable (ALARP) and no further risk control measures were identified. The
risk scenarios remain however at Level 3 risk due to the relatively High
consequence should they occur even though the likelihood is considered as low
as reasonably practicable.
C. Increased maximum flow exceeds maximum capacity of

superheater safety valves (Scenario 14)
An increase in the maximum flow may exceed the maximum relieving capacity
of superheater safety valves. This would result in over pressurisation of the
superheater leading to pipe failure and loss of containment of high pressure
water, injury from burns, possible fatalities.
Current controls include the review carried out by contractors in this regards
which provides advice on the safe operation of safety valves.
Recommendations are to establish actual flows for overload and revise plant
control limits if necessary and to include (in the amended plant operating
manuals) the established plant limitation. This would have the effect of
minimising the likelihood of this event. However, due to the relatively High
consequence of the scenario the risk level remains 3.
NB: Review of flow rates from boiler designer indicates that operation to 750
MW will be achievable with installed safety valves. It is not expected that safety
valve replacement will be required however it will be assessed post upgrade.
D. Increase of velocities (Scenario 36)

Boiler operation at higher loads increases average flue gas velocity which
increases grit erosion. This could lead to tube failures and reduced boiler tube
life and would increase maintenance/costs.
Current and approved controls include Combined Maintenance Outage

Program (CMOP) inspections and shielding, as identified in surveys for current
known high wear area; existing baffling along the wall sections; and acoustic
detectors to minimise damage in the event of a failure. Further, tube wall
thickness design takes into account exposure to erosion and new economiser
panels have all bends enclosed out of gas flow.
Further recommendations from the HAZOP are for the design process to
evaluate the need for baffling, shielding and soot blower locations in primary
superheater and Reheater backpasses; the review to include rear wall
penetration and seal boxes as now in an area of historical high risk. Prior to
warranty expiration (12 months) take unit out of service for grit erosion survey
on new design items; cold air flow testing and smoke bombs to identify high
velocity areas and record high flow areas for targeted inspection - adjust baffling
or shielding as required; perform inspections on previously un exposed areas
while elements are removed during upgrade; and modify the boiler strategy to
reflect concerns and learnings from inspections.
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Provided these recommendations are implemented the risk level of this
scenario is reduced to a Level 2.
E. Higher gas temperatures in the backpass (superheater and

Reheater passes) (Scenario 42)
Higher flue gas temperatures after the air heater exit and attemperation point
will cause fabric filter bag failures due to excessive shrinkage. This could lead
to cell isolations and potential breach of the environmental licence if EPS load
not reduced. The failure may require long time to implement repairs if a stock
holding of replacement bags is not available due to long lead time (3-6 months)
on bags.
The risk exposure exists until 2015 when all PAN filter bags would have been
replaced. Currently EPS has excellent bag life with 6 to 7 year bag replacement
cycle.
Current and approved safeguards are using experience with this potential risk
(which exists also in the existing plant); the new attemperating air system which
initiates at 125 deg C, a High Alarm at 135 deg C and a High High Alarm at 140
deg C - for load reduction. Boiler flue gas design brief is 135 deg C at air
heater exit at 720 MW with a 32 degree ambient air temperature. Fabric filter
bag supply contract requires 8 cells of bags on site
Further recommendation are for documentation to be produced to implement an

operating limit of 135 deg C to manage bag life, with a nominal operating target
of less than 130 deg C; adjustment of operating limit down on subsequent units
if rapid multi cell failures occur; evaluating the need of attemperating air spray
system if operating need exists; stock holding costs versus risk to be assessed;
and investigation of stock holding limits with contracted supplier.
If the recommendation above are implemented the risk is reduced to a Level 2

(possibly to a Level 1 depending on the rigour of implementation).
F. Poor Access To Bottom Bank Reheater Tubes (Scenario 46)

Poor access to bottom bank Reheater tubes may mean that in the event of a
tube failure the outage may need to be extended to gain access to carry out
repairs.
There are currently no controls for this scenario (apart from a trained workforce
with adequate operating procedures and PPE).
Recommendation is if for a review to achieve workable access for maintenance.

Provided this is workable access is achieved adequately the risk of this scenario
is reduced to a Level 2.
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G. Change in boiler components (Scenario 53)
Change in boiler components would result in change in load distribution.
Currently structural review is being undertaken by contractor which also

includes earthquake and wind load code compliance. Further action is to
ensure that action resulting from design study to reflect latest Australian
Standards and Codes. This would result in a Level 1 risk scenario.
H. Changes to existing job sheets for boiler start up and shut down
(Scenario 56 and 57)
Changes to existing job sheets for boiler start up and shut down leading to plant
damage or injury. Current controls are that boiler project team work scope
includes procedural review. A tight control of the completion of plant
modification process would result in a Level 1 risk.
3.2.3 Level 2 and Level 1 Risks Boilers
There are a number Level 2 and Level 1 risks that were identified. These are
detailed in Appendix 1.
3.3 RISK LEVELS OF THE TURBINE HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT DESIGN
3.3.1 Level 4 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit
There are not Level 4 risks identified.
3.3.2 Level 3 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit
A. Removal of Pump MRP

Removal of Pump MRP causes Safety issue with 11MPa. Current controls are
primary isolation valve and the pressure gauge.
Recommended further controls are to ensure positive isolation to allow stand-by

pump removal and to ensure the main isolation valves can be locked out.
Provided these recommendations are implemented the risk level for this
scenario is reduced to a Level 2 risk.
B. Impact on fluid trip drain from valves back to tank causes pinching
Impact on fluid trip drain from valves back to tank causes pinching resulting in
an inability to trip turbine. This may, in adverse operating conditions, cause a
burst of drain pipe over 1.4MPa with injury potential to personnel from high
pressure event.
Upgrade Project
Current and approved controls are the appropriate layout of piping (very short
pipe) and protection of pipe between structures.
Further recommendations are to review the layout of drainpipe to rule out

impact; consult with contractor as to implications of a blocked drain line on
operation; and to ensure EE field surveillance officer approves pipe line layout
with attention to mechanical damage and weld inspection. The target is to
ensure that this scenario becomes incredible.
3.3.3 Level 2 and Level 1 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit
3.4 RISK LEVELS OF THE LOW NOX BURNER DESIGN
3.4.1 Level 4 Risks Low NOx Burners
There are not Level 4 risks identified.
3.4.2 Level 3 Risks Low NOx Burners
A. Pressure controller has been disabled or the Atomising air pressure

is high (Scenario 12)
If the pressure controller has been disabled or the atomising air pressure is high
while atomising air to the ignitor it is possible for the unit to fail to ignite causing
an operational upset and loss of power generation. Note that this is not a safety
concern.
It is recommended to review air pressure requirements with designers and

respond appropriately. This would reduce the risk of this scenario to a Level 2.
B. Inability to remove oil gun and spark rod on D level (Scenario 13)
New burner layout may result in an inability to remove oil gun and spark rod on
D level.
Provided the design change to relocate oil gun to allow removal this scenario is
reduced to a Level 1 risk.
3.4.3 Level 2 and Level Low NOx Burners
Upgrade Project
3.5 RISK PROFILE
The risk profile of the part of the plant assessed, assuming that the risk
reduction measures recommended during the HAZOP Studies are all
implemented successfully, is as follows:
Table 1 – Levels of Risk With HAZOP Recommendations Implemented
Risk Level Risk Scenario
Boilers
Level 4 No scenarios identified remain at Level 4
Level 3 FAC due to increase in normal operational flow (scenario 1)
Financial effect only: Risk of increased copper transportation

(scenario 5). Reduced to a Level 1 based on feasibility study.
Failure of new pressure parts (scenario 7, 15, 19, 26, 50)
Increased maximum flow exceeds maximum capacity of

superheater safety valves (Scenario 14). Reduced to a Level 1
based on commissioning data and plant control settings.
Level 2 Detailed in HAZOP Minute sheets in Appendix 1
Turbine Hydraulic Power Unit
Low NOx Burners
Upgrade Project
4 CONCLUSION
The formal HAZOP review process for major project is part of EE’s multilevel
risk management strategy and represents a clear commitment by EE as to the
management of risks for the business and for safety, health and environment.
This type of process allows for input by a number of experienced and senior
representatives from operations, design, maintenance, safety etc. at a defined
number of stages throughout the life of the project, from early conception
through to detailed design and to final operation.
It provides an opportunity for a multidisciplinary team to formally review a

proposal and to use their experience and corporate memory to improve this
proposal and wherever possible avoid any repeat of errors or issues that may
have occurred in the past.
The team that took part in the HAZOP reviews which are presented in the
present report participated freely and with a high degree of expertise.
This is apparent from the results from these HAZOP Study reviews which
provides for a solid understanding as to the risks associated with the projects.
Upgrade Project
Appendix 1
HAZOP Minutes
 Burner HAZOP
 Turbine Hydraulic Power HAZOP
 Low NOx Burner HAZOP
HAZOP Study Report of the Turbine Hydraulic

Power Unit, Boiler Upgrade and Low NOx Burners
as Part of the Eraring Energy Power Station
HAZOP Study Report Of The Turbine Hydraulic
Power Unit, Boiler Upgrade And Low Nox Burners
Upgrade
A1.1
Project
c:\erapow\12-b177\HAZOP Report Upgrade Project Rev B.Doc
Revision B 14 July, 2009
Upgrade Project
BOILER HAZOP
No Guide Word Causes Consequences Safeguards (Existing Further Mitigating

and Approved) Actions
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
1 General - -
Line: Feedwater from economiser inlet through to drum and furnace.
2 High Flow FAC due to May lead to pipe Thickness survey 4 2 3 a. Determine high risk 4 1 3
increase in failure and loss of already conducted. areas in terms of FAC.
normal containment of high Perform Thickness survey
operational flow. pressure water, Planned thickness at targeted areas at first
injury from burns, survey 4 years after CMOP outage on units 4
possible fatalities start up, and 2 and correlate to
duration above original
No change in design flow.
geometry b. Record the extent of flow
above original design (for
use in thickness survey
mentioned in action 1a
above)
c. Confirm that FAC study
by CW has been completed
and is valid for current
design.
Power Unit, Boiler Upgrade And Low Nox Burners A1.2 Revision B 14 July 2009
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
3 High Flow Inability of drum If drum unable to Design 2 2 2 Perform carry over test at 1 1 1
to effectively effectively separate commissioning of unit 4
separate water water form steam, and if carryover found
from steam at the possibility of engineer out (i.e.
higher flow rates carryover of water to replacement separators)
of upgraded superheater.
design. Deposition of
chemicals and
erosion of turbine
blades
4 High Flow Increased Over pressurisation Design review carried 1 1 1 No further action identified. 1 1 1
maximum flow of drum may cause out by Connell Wagner
exceeds failure. May lead to and the safety valves
maximum pipe failure and loss on the drum have
capacity of drum of containment of been confirmed to be
safety valves. high pressure water, adequate. (10%
injury from burns, margin above 750MW
possible fatalities. flow rate.) With this
safeguard in place this
scenario has
effectively been
eliminated.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
5 High Risk of Eventually carry-over Ongoing routine 4 4 4 a. Successful chemical 2 4 3
Pressure increased of copper through to copper transportation clean carried out on super
copper turbine blades. survey. heaters and turbine. Carry
transportation Copper affects the out routinely if cannot stop
efficiency of the Strategy Review being copper transportation.
turbine and may conducted on merits of brevier sliding pressure
cause blockage in chemically cleaning characteristic.
superheater tubes. the superheaters
versus foam clean of
The copper turbine.
transportation issue c. Replacement of LP 1 1 1
will also require a Procedures for boiler heaters to allow
change in manner of tube repairs have been oxygenated treatment (this
which maintenance reviewed. option is being considered).
is carried out on
superheaters. New boiler chemical
controls are being
Decrease life on LP installed to reduce
heaters. copper transportation
from LP heaters.
Improved start up and

shut down procedures.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
6 Low Flow Imbalance of Flow may be too low Design review carried 1 1 1 Install thermocouples on 1 1 1
flow between in front pass out. each outlet header of
front and back encroaching in Regular operational economisers.
pass steaming margin. inspections to confirm
economisers May cause pipe design review
damage and level outcomes.
stability issues in Hazard warning
drum (so called drum through noise.
swell). Mixing at T-
piece may be
unstable.
7 Low Flow Failure of new May lead to pipe Design and 4 1 3 No further action identified. 4 1 3
pressure parts failure and loss of constructed to
containment of high standards including
pressure water, inspection, testing and
injury from burns, NDT.
8 Low Design will Lowering of the Parameters have been 1 1 1 No further action identified. 1 1 1
Temperature lower feedwater given to designers as
economiser duty temperature to the part of design scope
by 35% drum which leads to and outcomes have
higher gas flows and been reviewed and
increased risk of accepted by Eraring.
erosion.
9 Impurities Construction Blockages, tube Construction 2 2 2 No further action identified. 2 2 2
debris left in starvation and methodology including
system. failure. Financial flush processes. Visual
effect. Impact on inspections, ITP's
human Safety low.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
10 Reaction Cooler Possible reduced Tube samples at 1 2 1 Issue to be reviewed by 1 1 1
temperatures in effectiveness of outages. Chemical Team.
economiser chemical dosing
regime (particularly Continuous chemical
at start up) monitoring.
Upgrade of Chemical
Control Room (CCR)
with respect to
instrumentation.
11 Operability New operating Potential mal Training requirements 1 2 1 New performance data 1 1 1
parameters operation impacting sheets to be compiled.
life and viability of
equipment.
12 Operability/ Obstruction to Poor access around Ensure adequate 1 1 1 No further action identified. 1 1 1
maintaina- galleries from and into boiler access around boiler
bility new economiser
feed pipe to
drum.
13 Instrumenta- inadequate Failure to understand Existing 1 1 1 Refer to action No.6 w.r.t. 1 1 1
tion information of plant condition instrumentation will be thermocouples
plant condition a guide to
requirements for new
equipment.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Line: Steam from the Heat Recovery Area outlet header through the Superheaters to the Main Steam Outlet
14 High Flow Increased Over pressurisation Designer review 4 2 3 a. Establish actual flows at 4 1 3
maximum flow of superheater may carried out by CW. commissioning for overload
exceeds cause failure. May Relieving capacity and revise plant limits if
maximum lead to pipe failure reduced from IHI necessary
capacity of and loss of design of 155.6 to b. Plant limitation to be
superheater containment of high 139.4 kg/s. Minimum included in amended plant
safety valves. pressure water, Aust Standard code operating manuals.
injury from burns, requirements (20% of
possible fatalities. steam flow relieving) 1 1 1
equates to max steam
flow rate of 695kg/s,
hence steady state c. Based on findings in (a)
750MW flow determine need to install
conditions of 624kg/s larger size safety valves to
within this margin. allow achievement of
Original design additional overload above
assessment allowed 633 kg/sec (being 22% of
for discharging 25% of the revised CW relieving
steam flow rate capacity).
through superheaters
and under this basis
622 kg/s is maximum
steam flow under
original IHI design or
557 kg/s under revised
CW capacity.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
16 High Higher steam Potential for thermal Original design and 3 2 2 Increase frequency of 3 1 2
Temperature temperatures fatigue failure of material selection. inspections of spray water
resulting in more spray water system system (currently 12-
frequent use of 12-yearly inspections yearly).
spray water of spray water
systems.
17 High Insufficient Accelerated creep Design parameter 1 1 1 No further action identified. 1 1 1
Temperature capacity of life usage. reviewed and
spray water to Material Failure. accepted by Eraring
control Energy.
superheater Metal temperature
steam operational limits and
temperatures. alarms (except SSH).
18 High Accelerated Reduced life of Software system to 2 2 2 Update/improve ODAS 2 1 1
Temperature creep life headers monitor header life
consumption of (ODAS).
headers
Field testing -
replication of headers
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
19 High Reduced creep Pressure part weld Asset Strategy defined 4 1 3 No further action identified. 4 1 3
Temperature life of welds failure. Loss of field test for creep life
containment of of welds
steam internal of
boiler, could be
external to boiler.
Burns.
20 High Burner Higher or lower To be covered in - - - To be covered in burner - - -
Temperature replacement temperatures burner HAZOP HAZOP
21 High Increased Higher steam Design review has 1 1 1 No further action identified. 1 1 1
Temperature primary temperature for indicated that
superheater stages 1,2 and 3 materials are suitable
surface area resulting in higher for duty
metal temperatures
causing metallurgical
failure.
22 Impurities Increased flow Salt leak tolerance Reduce load as 1 3 2 a. Implement actions from 1 1 1
rate increases reduced due to lack operating procedure. CW review on polishing
demand on of polishing plant Polishing plant plant capacity.
polishing plant, capacity. capacity review is
particularly carried out by CW OR
during periods Load reduction, 1 1 1
of salt leaks boiler damage b. Review the turbine
condenser life strategy
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
23 Impurities
Increased Blocked super heater Not an issue at current 2 2 2 Desk top review of 2 1 1
exfoliation of tubes or solid particle operating conditions. superheater metallurgy and
internal stable erosion of HP turbine susceptibility to the
oxide layer due phenomena
to the increase
flow rate and
heat fluxes
24 Instrumentati Inadequate Failure to understand TBA 1 1 1 Review instrumentation 1 1 1
on information of plant condition when it becomes available
plant condition from designers
Line: Steam from superheater outlet valve through the Reheater to IP Turbine
25 High Flow Increased Over pressurisation Design review carried 1 1 1 No further action identified. 1 1 1
maximum flow of Reheater may out and confirmed.
exceeds cause failure. See Maximum Reheater
maximum No. 1 above. flowrate of 646kg/s for
capacity of existing safety valves.
Reheater safety Hence superheater
valves. safety valves are the
first high flow limitation
with respect to boiler
safety valves.
High Flow Increased Reduced IP turbine Boiler turbine matching 1 3 2 No further action identified. 1 3 2
design flow and inlet pressure which review completed with
additional may lead to reduced outcome for boiler
surface area output designer to advise of
increases DP Reheater DP
across the
Reheater
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
27 High Increased Metallurgical failure Temperature control 2 2 2 Implement alarms on hot 2 1 1
Temperature surface area of tubing resulting in with back pass reheat steam outlet
enabling loss of generation dampers. ODAS temperature. Implement
Reheater to and revenue. system for creep life appropriate training.
exceed design Reduced Creep life monitoring. Field
temperatures on hot Reheater replications as per
header. strategy.
Note: Existing spray
water is
decommissioned
28 High Tube failure of Tube failure unit out Material review carried 1 1 1 No further action identified. 1 1 1
Temperature hot Reheater of service, loss of out by designers
elements due to revenue
achieving
design
temperatures
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
Line: Furnace Area/gas side - from Ash hopper throat to furnace rear wall screen tubes.
29 High Flow Increased firing Increased gas flow Outage 2 2 2 No further actions 2 2 2
causing increased inspections/condition
vibration/movement monitoring, acoustic
on superheater detectors will limit the
pendants leading to impact.
tube failure.
30 High Flow No erosion - - - No further actions - - -
issues identified
31 High Pressure Upgrade not - - - No further actions - - -
affecting
existing
32 Low Pressure Upgrade not - - - No further actions - - -
affecting
existing
33 High Refer to Low No further actions
Temperature NOx Burner
HAZOP
Slagging
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
34 High Increased time Increased rate of CMOP inspection for 1 1 1 Furnace flue gas 1 1 1
Temperature at higher metal creep life gap between pendants temperature
temperatures on consumption and nose measurements to
superheaters. requiring early confirm design
replacement. expectations. Consider
metal temperature
instrumentation on SSH
if flue gas temperatures
high.
35 High Increased Increased rate of CMOP inspection for 1 1 1 As per 6. 1 1 1
Temperature temperatures on creep life gap between pendants
superheaters consumption and nose
leading to requiring early
increased metal replacement.
temperatures
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
Line: Backpass (superheater and Reheater passes)
36 High Flow Overall average Tube failures, CMOP inspections and 3 3 3 a) Design process to 2 2 2
velocity increased shielding as identified consider baffling,
increases with maintenance/costs, in surveys for current shielding and soot blower
reduced bias shorter life known high wear locations in primary
from front to areas. superheater and
rear pass - Existing baffling along Reheater.
specifically the wall sections. b) Review to include rear
higher flow in Acoustic detectors to wall penetration and seal
boxes as now in an area
the superheater minimise damage in
of historical high risk.
compared to the event of a failure.
c) Prior to warranty
previously. Tube wall thickness expiration (12 months)
High flow design takes into take unit out of service for
causes grit account exposure to grit erosion survey on new
erosion erosion. New design items.
economiser panels d) Cold air flow testing
have all bends and smoke bombs to
enclosed out of gas identify high velocity
flow. areas and record high
flow areas for targeted
inspection - adjust baffling
or shielding as required.
e) Perform inspections on
previously un exposed
areas while elements are
removed during upgrade.
f) Modify the boiler
strategy to reflect
concerns and learnings
from inspections.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
37 High Flow Overall average Possible increased CMOP inspections to 1 1 1 Inspect at 12 month 1 1 1
velocity grit erosion on confirm if problem has warranty survey
increases with dampers, with increased from current
reduced bias increased
from front to maintenance costs -
rear pass - damper failure loss
specifically of temperature
higher flow in control
the superheater
compared to
previously.
High flow
causes grit
erosion
38 Low Pressure Higher DP ID fan capacity Soot Blowing 2 2 2 Review ID fan cut back 2 1 1
across finned margin is reduced set point with regards to
economiser. which may lead to the risk of duct implosion
forced load limitation limits.
particularly in
summer.
39 Low Pressure Higher DP More soot blowing to Shield soot blower 2 1 1 No further actions 2 1 1
across finned control dust build up steam impact areas.
economiser. in finn tubes,
potentially causing
higher rates of soot
blower steam erosion
on tubes leading to
tube failure.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
40 High Higher gas Affects uncooled CMOP inspections 1 3 2 Review material 1 2 1

Temperature temperatures. metal on backpass selection
including baffles,
soot blower openings
and nose sealing
causing metallurgical
degradation including
plastic deformation
and exfoliation
leading to early
replacement of
items.
41 High Higher gas Increased soot Existing plant limits 1 2 1 No further actions 1 2 1
Temperature temperatures. blowing to prevent air and alarms, soot
heater seizing (365 C blowing
max).
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
42 High Higher gas Fabric filter bag Using PAN/PPS bags 4 2 3 a) Documentation to be 2 2 2
Temperature temperatures. failures due to since 2008 to increase produced to implement
excessive shrinkage operating temperature an operating limit of 135
leading to cell range from 125 to 135. C to manage bag life, 1 1 1
isolations and Attemperating air with a nominal operating
potential system initiates at 125 target of less than 130
environmental deg C. deg C..
licence accidence if High Alarm at 135 deg b) Adjust operating limit
load not reduced. C with High High alarm down on subsequent
Long time to at 140 degree - for units if rapid multi cell
implement repairs load reduction failures occur.
due to long lead time Doosan Design brief c) Consideration of
(3-6 months) on basis is 135 C at air attemperating air spray
bags. Risk exposure heater exit at 720 MW system if operating need
exists until 2015 with a 32 degree exists.
when all PAN filter ambient air d) Stock holding costs
bags would have temperature. versus risk to be
been replaced. Fabric filter bag supply assessed.
Currently Eraring has contract requires 8 e) Investigate stock
excellent bag life with cells of bags on site holding limits with
6 to 7 year bag contracted supplier.
replacement cycle.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
43 Low Actual low load Modelling indicates Has not been an issue 1 1 1 Additional baskets in air 1 1 1
Temperature operation insufficient heat at Eraring. heater if required.
available for hot Existing temperature If identified as an
primary air at Ok hence model operational issue bid unit
300MW load accuracy at low load higher.
resulting in mill outlet may be less precise
temperature drop of than the design brief
10 deg C to 70 deg C control range of
during winter at 500MW +.
300MW - poor burner
performance. Refer
to Low NOx Burner
HAZOP.
44 Low Actual low load Air heater cold end Boiler modelling study 1 1 1 No further actions 1 1 1
Temperature operation acid attack and indicates acceptable
plugging due to dew minimum temperature.
point resulting in SAH bypass allows
additional regulation in winter at
maintenance low load.
outages and reduced
life of air heater
baskets.
45 Impurities Excessive tube High boiler back end Review of boiler 2 2 2 a) Review operational 2 2 2
fouling due to temperatures leading design with regard to performance.
improper soot to issues above for soot blower locations. b) Use contract to
blower locations high temperature. Performance pursue performance
guarantee statement in short falls.
boiler contract.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
46 Plant Items Poor access to In the event of a tube None 3 3 3 Currently being 2 2 2
bottom bank failure the outage discussed in design
Reheater tubes may need to be review to achieve
extended to gain workable access for
access to carry out maintenance
repairs
47 Plant Items Poor access to Difficult access for None 2 3 2 Currently being 1 1 1
economiser feed operators and discussed in design
main and maintainers leading review to achieve
Reheater inlet to possible injuries or workable access for
pipework extensions of outage maintenance
periods.
48 Instruments Changed Primary superheater None 1 2 1 Review alarm limits after 1 1 1
conditions temperatures hotter initial operation or during
due to larger surface commissioning.
area meaning
redefinition of plant
limits.
Line: Overview
49 Materials for Poor quality or Tube failure or QA system, warranty, 2 1 1 No further actions 2 1 1
construction incorrect shortened life third party inspector
materials due to and inspections.
manufacture or Experienced boiler
transportation manufacturer.
50 Construction Site weld failing Tube failure and 100% radiography on all 4 1 3 No further actions 4 1 3
injury site tube welds, all other
site welds to be NDT in
compliance with
Australian standards.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
51 Construction Insufficient Delays in meeting None 3 4 4 Place on Electrical 1 1 1

power supplies program project teams and Site
for construction Operations Managers
purposes agenda
52 Construction Insufficient Delays in meeting None 3 4 4 Place on Site Operations 2 2 2
access for program Managers agenda
operations such
as cranage due
to other works
eg bottom ash
hopper crushing
plant and boiler
upgrade crane
location
53 Loads on Change in boiler Change in load Separate structural 4 2 3 Action resulting from 1 1 1
structures components distribution review being design study to reflect
undertaken by latest Australian
Aurecon which also Standards and Codes
includes earthquake
and wind load code
compliance.
54 Commissioning New Plant Operators not aware Training of operators. 3 2 2 Confirm designer 1 1 1
of issues or Contractor to provide actively involved and
performance of new expected performance present at
plant data sheets. commissioning.
Eraring Energy
commissioning team to
communicate change
boiler performance.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
55 Commissioning New Plant Superheater control Existing control will 1 3 2 Post commissioning 1 1 1
system requires provide initial safe optimisation tuning
retuning to suit new operation.
plant to prevent Eraring Energy
header design commissioning team to
material limits being communicate change
exceeded and poor boiler performance.
operational
performance
56 Start Up New Plant Changes to existing Boiler project team 4 2 3 Completion of plant 2 1 1
job sheets for boiler work scope includes modification process
start up leading to procedural review
plant damage or
injury
57 Shut down New Plant Changes to existing Boiler project team 4 2 3 Completion of plant 2 1 1
job sheets for boiler work scope includes modification process
shut down leading to procedural review
plant damage or
injury
58 Breakdown New Plant Unidentified tube None 3 2 2 Locations being 2 1 1
leaks causing considered as part of
extensive failure due design review
to incorrect location
of acoustic detectors.
59 Breakdown New Plant DNB leading to water Modelling indicates 2 1 1 Install heat flux probes 1 1 1
wall failure DNB is not an issue at and alarm package to
750 MW. ICMS
Money budgeted to
purchase heat flux
probes.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Target
60 Safety Crane operation Injuries Boiler Upgrade Risk No further actions

and lifting Review Stage 2 -
conducted 24th
September 2008 TRIM
doc09/15023 covers
this issue.
61 Safety Installation of Injuries to personnel existing safeguards No further actions
Equipment new plant under OHS legislation
and corporate policy
62 Output Higher firing rate Increased air Has been reviewed - 1 2 1 Review plant 1 1 1
demand FD and ID confirmed performance during and
with suitable margin. after commissioning.
63 Output Higher firing rate Capacity of hoppers Current operating 2 3 2 Review plant 1 1 1
and resultant regime for emptying performance during and
overflow to air hoppers after commissioning.
heaters increasing
DP and causing
potential load
restrictions
64 Output Higher firing rate Insufficient milling Modelling indicates 2 2 2 Review plant 1 2 1
capacity resulting in marginal capacity if performance during and
load restriction one mill unavailable for after commissioning.
overload above 720 Review classifier revised
MW design if marginal.
Upgrade Project
TURBINE HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT HAZOP
No Guide Word Causes Consequences Safeguards Further Mitigating Actions
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
1 General Location of Security and integrity To be determined - - - Location of HPU to be reviewed - - -

HPU (cleaning of operations against security and integrity
aspects, fire (cleaning aspects, fire from nearby
from nearby facilities/equipment, potential energy
facilities/equip - impact from items dropping from
ment, potential above, welding etc. etc.) Compliance
energy - with the Fire Safety Report to be
impact from checked
items dropping
from above,
welding etc.
etc.)
Line: Fluid Actuator Supply (FAS)
2 High Pump fails to Pump dead heading, Relief valve FV-3 2 1 1 a) Provide detection and alarm for 2 1 1
Pressure cut out Pipe failure, pump back to tank; high pressure situation on manifold.
failure, Unit out of Pressure sensors b) Provide Eraring tag names on
service. Loss of (x3) on manifold. contractor's drawings.
electricity generation.
Financial impact.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
3 General Work on Injury to personnel Permit to Work 3 2 2 a) Ensure lines are depressurised b) 3 2 1
actuators system Ensure PPE is used when contact
with hydraulic fluid is possible
4 Low pressure Blocked inlet Loss of pressure to Stand-by pump cut- 2 1 1 No further improvements identified. 2 1 1
to pipe, or unit, inability to open in on low pressure;
blocked valves. Loss of trip on low
strainer electricity generation. pressure; system to
Financial impact. close valves;
pressure switch
across strainer with
alarm.
5 Low pressure Stand-by Loss of pressure to Alarm entry trip on 2 3 2 Provide adequate logic to ensure 2 1 1
pump set on unit, inability to open low pressure; stand-by pump is available to cut in
manual valves. Loss of system to close automatically on low pressure.
electricity generation. valves
Financial impact.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
6 Low pressure Pipe broken Loss of containment Stainless Steel and 3 2 2 a) More detail on pipe selection (is it 3 1 2
due to of ester, oil would welded pipework; seamless?)
mechanical escape (small spray Low level alarm b) Request MSDS for ester.
damage or failure through to and trip on tank. c) Ensure layout of all pipework
fatigue large loss); associated with the HPU prevents
environmental impact from moving machinery.
damage; possibly d) Dangerous Goods and Hazardous
operator injury from substances assessment to be
high pressure and implemented in accordance with the
from harmful Codes
properties; unit shut- e) Provide identification on Stainless
down. Financial steel lines eg coloured labels with
effect. directional symbols.
f) Site installation to comply with
AS4861.
g) Provide rate of change alarm on
oil tank to indicate an unusual
(unscheduled) loss of oil supply.
7 Low Loss of Loss of pressure to Alarm trip on low 2 1 1 No further action recommended 2 1 1
Pressure pressure unit; Inability to open pressure; System
through failure valves. Loss of to close valves;
of NRV on the electricity generation. Contractor to
out-of-service Financial impact. supply a
pump maintenance
regime in OP and
Maint manuals
8 Low Stand-by Loss of pressure to Pressure switches 2 2 2 ICMS logic to prevent shut-down of 2 1 1
Pressure pump switched unit, inability to open 280A and 280B; running pump before confirmation of
on but fails to valves. Shut-down of Pump start switches adequate running of stand-by pump
operate. Unit. Financial impact. and running switches.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
9 Low pressure Low level in Loss of oil to valves, Low level alarm, 2 2 2 a) Ensure appropriate job sheeting, 2 1 1
tank due to unit shut-down. Loss Contaminated PRIs.
drain valve left of electricity water drain b) Training and documentation to
open or hole in generation. Financial captures spill. define criticality of system c)
tank impact. Containment of fluid required to
prevent entry into contaminated
drains
10 Reverse Malfunction of Loss of system Unknown 2 ? ? Ask contractor if the failure is 2 ? ?
Flow servo leading pressure possibly possible and what are the safeguards
to excessive leading to trip on low
flow to one pressure. Loss of
server. electricity generation.
Financial impact.
11 High High Possible burns if Maximum 2 2 2 No further improvements identified.
Temperature Temperature system temperature temperature 49
of oil piping increases above degrees before
due to failure normal; Shorten automatic switch on
of cooling service life of of cooling system,
system equipment; Possible High temperature
degradation of oil alarm above 66
and seals; System degrees.
malfunction. Loss of
Financial impact.
12 Low Low oil Low flow, Low temperature 1 2 1 a) Contractor to advise minimum oil 1 1 1
Temperature temperature unpredictable protection on start; temperature interlock before starting
after outage operation. Ability to heat oil after outage.
B) Job sheets for cold start flow
chart.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
13 Impurities Contamination Valves stuck, high Automatic and 2 2 2 a) Routine oil sampling. 2 1 1
during wear, unpredictable continuous b) Determine spare parts
maintenance, operation, possible polishing filter; requirements.
construction shut-down. Loss of Sealed system c) Routine maintenance as per OEM
Filters not electricity generation. except for opening recommendations.
maintained; Financial impact. for dryer; D) How long can unit continue
Equipment Maintenance for operating without the continuous
failure. regime as per polishing filter? - Check with
Hydroscopic contractor contractor.
nature of ester specifications; A
- water in oil number of trips and
alarms for system
malfunction (e.g.
Low pressure trips).
14 Testing Failure to Loss of redundancy. Routine Testing of 2 1 1 a) Set up routine testing in 2 1 1
maintain Shut-down. Loss of Stand-by Plant accordance with contractor's
equipment electricity generation. recommendations.
redundancy - Financial impact.
failure of plant
items.
15 Testing Failure of Plant damage or Routine Testing of 2 1 1 a) Set up routine testing in 2 1 1
protective shut-downs. Loss of protection devices. accordance with contractor's
devices electricity generation. Fault tolerances. recommendations.
Financial impact. Redundancies for B) Routine calibrations of
critical items. instrumentation.
16 Operability Visibility of Failed ability to n/a 2 2 2 a) Ensure all instrumentation can be 2 1 1
Maintena- instrumentatio troubleshoot. easily read from ground level.
bility n Restricted access
unless safety rail.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
17 Operability Filters and Unable to easily n/a 2 2 2 a) Review design to optimise ease of 2 1 1
Maintena- other items access filters while access for items that require
bility requiring complying to OHS maintenance eg filters
access for guidelines.
maintenance.
18 Instruments No secondary Inability to isolate Primary isolation 3 2 2 a) Consult with Eraring to provide 3 1 2
isolation pressure gauge for valve additional isolation and venting for
provided on removal in case of instrument testing. b) the design
pressure failure of primary is to be reviewed once the
gauges PI- isolation valve. Risk equipment has arrived on site
280A, B, C of injury during the
removal of blanking
plug. Injury to
personnel
19 Operability Removal of Safety issue with Primary isolation 3 3 3 A) Ensure positive isolation to allow 3 1 2
Maintenance Pump MRP high pressure (11 valve. Pressure stand-by pump removal. (As per
Map) gauge. (Non-return Eraring Energy requirements- EPS to
valve) mark drawings)
B) Ensure main isolation valves can
be locked out.
Line: two parallel FAS supply from tank - BY DIFFERENCE WITH ABOVE HAZOP OF FAS
No additional
scenarios
identified
Line: fluid emergency trip supply from tank through ETD towards valves (Hasp ETD as graybox) - BY DIFFERENCE WITH ABOVE HAZOP OF FAS
No additional
scenarios
identified
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
Line: fluid trip drain from valves back to tank

20 High Impact on line Inability to trip Appropriate layout 4 1 3 A) Review layout of drainpipe to rule 3 1 2
pressure causes turbine. Burst of of piping (very short out impact.
pinching drain pipe. Injury to pipe). Protection of B) Consult with contractor as to
personnel pipe between implications of a blocked drain line on
structures. operation.
C) Ensure EE field surveillance
officer approves pipe line layout with
attention to mechanical damage and
weld inspection D)EE emergency
procedures to be implemented to
contain hydraulic fluid
Line: fluid drain - BY DIFFERENCE WITH ABOVE HAZOP OF FAS
21 High Impact on line Inability to position Appropriate layout 3 1 2 A) Review layout of drainpipe to rule 3 1 2
pressure causes valve. Burst of drain of piping. Self out impact.
pinching pipe. Injury to draining. B) Consult with contractor as to
personnel implications of a blocked drain line on
operation.
C) Ensure EE field surveillance
officer approves pipe line layout with
attention to mechanical damage and
weld inspection. D)EE emergency
procedures to be implemented to
contain hydraulic fluid
E) Review material selection of drain
line to handle full system pressure in
the event of a blockage (current
design is 1.4 MPa versus supply pipe
all pipework which is 11MPa)
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
Line: Oil circulation loop through transfer and filtering pump, conditioning filter and polishing filter.
22 High Blocked filter Thermal overload on Pressure relief 1 2 1 Refer action number 13d) regarding 1 2 1
pressure transfer pump motor valve, discharges how long unit can operate without
into tank. Routine polishing system.
filter maintenance.
Local pressure
gauges
23 Low pressure Mal-operation Potentially drain the Protection devices. 2 2 2 a) Proper job sheeting 2 1 1
of valves or tank and trip unit on Drain directed to b) Training
valve leak eg low oil tank level contaminated water c) Ensure ICMS logic trips transfer
drain valve and/or low oil system. pump on tank low level and tank high
FV-79 or pressure. Loss of high.
sample valve containment,
FV-75 or valve environmental Also refer to action 6g) regarding
FV-78 or FV- pollution. alarming on rate of change.
80
24 Low flow Pump failure Failure to polish. . Operator rounds 2 1 1 a) Refer action regarding how long 2 1 1
Loss of electricity unit can operate without polishing
generation. Financial system
impact. b) Set-up operator routine to inspect
oil system operations.
25 Impurities Filters in Functional spec - - - - a) Specifications calls for filters in - - -
series rather refers to filters in parallel. Drawing shows filters in
than parallel parallel series - Contractor to clarify.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
26 Testing Failure to test Blockages and oil Condition 2 1 1 a) Communication required with 2 1 1
oil in tank degradation. monitoring group condition monitoring group
Maintenance exists on site b) Query whether phosphate ester is
problems leading to subject to organic growth
needing to overhaul
all servos. Loss of
Financial impact.
27 Operable Access to Inability to maintain Work from heights 2 3 2 No further action required 2 3 2
and conditioning filters. Injury risk from procedure. PTW.
maintainable filter fall from heights.
28 Operable Poor Safety and Isolation valves 2 2 2 a) Adequate PRIs 2 1 2
and maintenance operability. exist. b) Lockable isolation valves and
maintainable of oil Possibility of draining Drain directed to switches to conform with EE
conditioning oil out of tank. contaminated water standards.
system Environmental system where it is
pollution. Loss of contained.
Financial impact.
29 Electrical Location of Unable to operate Not yet defined 2 2 2 a) Determine EE requirements and 2 1 1
emergency and stop HPU locally advise contractor with respect to ta targ
stop location of start and stop buttons. rg et
et
Line: Oil addition from drum through transfer and filtering pump, conditioning filter and polishing filter (BY DIFFERENCE)
30 Reverse flow FV -70 open Reverse flow of oil Operator vigilance. 2 1 1 a) Additional check valve down 2 1 1
during drum back to drum Contain spill stream of FV-78
transfer or unloading area.
leaky FV-70 Environmental b) Hydraulic fluid containment
pollution. required
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
31 Impurities Contaminated Overwhelmed filter, Labelling of drums. 2 2 2 a) Filling and draining procedures 2 1 1
oil, wrong oil, stop polishing unit, required.
dirty hose degradation of fluid, b) Quality control of oil supply.
total hydraulic oil
system shut-down,
damage to hydraulic
components. Loss of
Financial impact.
32 Operability Leakage of oil Slippery surface, Housekeeping 2 2 2 a) Oil containment mitigation 2 1 1
and from tank environmental methods to be investigated. ta targ
Maintaina- valving, field pollution, loss of oil b) Implement emergency response rg et
bility devices, requiring more top- procedures et
drums, servos ups, hazardous
substance (?)
Line: Cooling and heating systems
33 Low Flow Blocked High oil temperature. Pressure relief 2 1 1 a) Fix up drawing referring to TS- 2 1 1
Hydraulic fluid Degradation of oil. valve FV-34. High 2808 (temperature switch no longer
cooler Increase in oil temperature alarm. there)
pressure. Loss of Duty stand-by
electricity generation. cooler.
Financial impact.
34 Reverse flow Failure of the Leads to excessive Automatic shut- 1 1 1 a) Ensure manual override of 1 1 1
solenoid cooling down of heating solenoid valve.
and cooling pump.
Temperature
transmitter.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
35 Reverse flow Solenoid valve Overheating leading High temperature 2 1 1 No action. 2 1 1

stuck in to degradation of oil. alarm. Duty stand-
energised Loss of electricity by cooler. Refer to action regarding how long
position generation. Financial the Unit can run without the
impact. polishing.
36 Low pressure Failure of Oil spill, trip on low Trips. 2 2 2 a) Routine inspections and 2 1 1
flexible pressure or on low replacements.
connection tank level. Refer to action rate of change 6g).
37 Low pressure Pump failure Inability to cool or Duty stand-by. 2 1 1 a) Provide pump failure alarm 2 1 1
heat Temperature alarm. (general for all pumps)
38 High Failure of Overheating leading Duty stand-by 1 2 1 a) Routine test operation of stand-by 1 1 1
temperature cooling fan to degradation of oil. cooler. system.
Loss of electricity Temperature alarm. B) Suggest routine switchover of
generation. Financial duty-stand-by systems.
impact.
Overview
39 Commissioni Commissionin Commissioning - - - - a) Contractors to supply - - -
ng g program and program and ITP commissioning program and ITP for
ITP required to ensure EE approval.
safe and smooth
commissioning
40 Start-up and Start up after Damage to plant. Contractors - - - Job sheets to be completed by the - - -
shut-down outage and Personnel hazard responsible for first start-up.
start-up of new commissioning and
unfamiliar handover. Plan is
plant. Routine 50% of operators will
Shutdown be trained prior to
first start-up. Plant
modification
checklist completed.
Upgrade Project
Likelihood
Likelihood
Raw Risk
Raw Risk
(Existing and
Impact
Impact
Rating
Rating
Approved)
41 Commissio- Construction, Procedures required. - - - - a) EE to review procedures for - - -

ning commissioning EE required to carry construction, commissioning and
and handover out checks. handover of new plant items.
of new plant B) EE to carry out 100% interlock
items. and protection testing
42 Breakdown Power failure Plant failure, possible Redundant power - - - a) EE and contractor to finalise - - -
unit shutdown supply to HPU. electrical schematics to ensure
redundancy and fault tolerance
43 Breakdown Vents Blockages and oil Routine - - - No further improvements identified. - - -
degradation. replacement
44 Breakdown ICMS failure Logic error - 2 2 2 Enquire about CHAZOP or other 2 1 1
review of control logic. ta targ
rg et
et
45 Fire and Combustible Fire damage. - 2 2 2 Contractor to supply details of 2 1 1
explosion nature of hydraulic fluid ta targ
Esther rg et
unknown (it is et
not a
flammable
material)
46 Extreme a) Flexible Scenarios identified Scenarios identified - - - No further improvements identified. - - -
limitation hoses above. No new above. No new
b) Servos scenarios identified scenarios identified
contamination here. here.
of fluid
Upgrade Project
LOW NOX BOILER HAZOP
Upgrade Project
Upgrade Project
Upgrade Project
Upgrade Project
Upgrade Project
Appendix 2
Approval for HAZOP Leader
Report of the Preliminary HAZOP Study for the Hydrogen Circuit at the New
Hydrogen Plant at Eraring Energy, Eraring, NSW

Upgrade Project
Power Unit, Boiler Upgrade And Low Nox Burners A3.1 Revision B 14 July, 2009
Upgrade Project
Phone: 02 9228 6108
Fax: 02 9228 6433
Email: derek.mullinsa@planning.nsw.gov.au
Ms Karin Nilsson Our ref:

Planager Pty Ltd Your ref:
PO Box 248 File: Eraring power station upgrade
HAZOP Chair.doc
Berowra Heights NSW 2082
4 May 2009
Dear Ms Nilsson
Subject: Eraring Eneregy Power Station Upgrade

HAZOP
I refer to your letter, dated 27 April 2009, seeking approval
for you to lead the HAZOP for the above project.
On the basis of the information previously supplied on your
qualifications and experience, you are approved to conduct
the HAZOP. You should note that the approval is specific to
the current project and that separate approvals will need to
be sought for any future HAZOPs.
If you have any further queries, please don’t hesitate to
contact me.
Yours sincerely
Dr Derek Mullins
Director, Major Hazards
Upgrade Project
Appendix 3
Eraring Energy Risk Tool
Report of the Preliminary HAZOP Study for the Hydrogen Circuit at the New
Hydrogen Plant at Eraring Energy, Eraring, NSW
Upgrade Project
Overall Risk Rating
CONSEQUENCES
Low Medium High Very High
1 2 3 4
LIKELIHOOD
Very High 3 4
3 4
4
High
2 2 3 4
3
Medium
1 2 2 3
2
Low
1 1 2 3
1
Table 2 –Risk Rating Classification
Risk Rating of Risk Rating of Risks rated 3 and 4 are defined as “material” and are
3 4 summarised in the Project Management Plan, Form
PMF2-1 for presented to the Sponsor and the Steering
Committee.
Risk Rating of Risk Rating of Risks rated 1 and 2 should be identified and included in
1 2 the Risk Register worksheet of the Risk Management
Plan, Form PMF2-4 to allow appropriate monitoring.
Table 3 – Likelihood and Frequency Rating
Low Medium High Very High

1 2 3 4
Probability of
10% 30% 60% 90%
occurrence
Almost Certain
Likelihood of Remote Possible Probable
Almost certain
occurrence Unlikely to occur Could occur Likely to occur
to occur

Upgrade Project
Upgrade Project
Table 4 – Consequence Rating
DRAFT Indicative
Corporate Risk project risks that Low Medium High Very High
Category fall under this 1 2 3 4
corporate category
Operating Profit Budget overruns Impacts operating profit Impacts operating profit Impacts operating profit Impacts operating profit
Forecasted benefit between $0.5m - $2m between $2m - $5m in between $5m - $10m in excess of $10m
shortages
Contractor insolvency
Inaccurate estimates
Procurement delays
Insurance claims
Trading - Gross Impacts energy trading Impacts energy trading Impacts energy trading Impacts energy trading
Margin gross margin between gross margin between gross margin between gross margin by more
0.5% - 2.0% (between 2.0% - 5.0% (between 5.0% - 10.0% (between than 10% (greater than
$2.4 and $9.5 million) of $9.5 and $23.8 million) $23.8 and $47.5 million) $47.5 million) of
budgeted annual gross of budgeted annual of budgeted budgeted annual gross
margin gross margin margin
Generation Unscheduled outages Minimal impact on Moderate impact on Significant impact on Detrimental impact on
Operations Delays in plant achieving operational achieving operational achieving operational achieving operational
completion objectives objectives objectives objectives
Short term Minor loss of
plant function with minor Generation capacity Generation capacity Generation capacity
impact on production reduced by 1 unit for less reduced by 1 unit for reduced for more than
than 7 days or MW/hr more than 7 days or 14 days or MW/hr
equivalent MW/hr equivalent or loss equivalent or the loss of
OR of 2 or more units 3 or more units
Loss of Kangaroo Valley simultaneously. simultaneously.
Units for less than 7 OR
days Loss of Kangaroo Valley
Units for more than 7
days
Upgrade Project
DRAFT Indicative
corporate category
IT Systems System outages Short term loss of critical Loss of critical IT Loss of critical IT Loss of critical IT
Loss of data applications with minor Systems having a Systems having a Systems having a
business operational business operational business operational business operational
impact impact for < 1 day impact for > 1 day but < impact for > 2 days
2 days
Telecommunications Short term loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of
telecommunication telecommunication telecommunication telecommunication
services with little impact services for <1 day services having a services having a
as alternative service having a minimal business operational business operational
capability is available operational business impact for >1 day but <2 impact for >2 days.
impact. days.
Media Minimal complaints. Several complaints. Multiple complaints Multiple serious
complaints
Readily respond to local Local media coverage. State media coverage
forums National media coverage
Significant impact to
relationship with Eraring Significant impact to
Energy major relationships with
stakeholders multiple Eraring Energy
major stakeholders
Upgrade Project
DRAFT Indicative
corporate category
Environment Spills Nuisance / Localised Short term issue, Medium Long term/serious
Waste disposal impact reportable to DECC but term/environmental environmental incident,
Contractor practices no environmental impact. impact issue, reportable DECC involvement
Environmental to DECC.
breaches (e.g. Minor compliance issue Emergency response
oil/chemical/noise) or improvement notice Possible emergency required from external
issued response by external services
services required
Definite prosecution or
Definite prosecution or fine > $100,000
fine < $100,000
Safety Risk of injuries Minor injury – first aid Loss Time Injury (LTI) < WorkCover (WC) WorkCover (WC)
Workcover claims required / Medical 7 days Notifiable Event Prosecution
treatment injury (MTI)
LTI Incident > 7 days Serious injury or fatality
No lost time or multiple injured
persons.
Regulatory and Changes in Minor breach not Breach requiring non- Prosecution by Prosecution by
Legislative legislative required to be reported compliance to be Regulator Regulator or regulators
requirements requirements to Regulator reported to Regulator involving multiple
Sanctions (eg fines) persons
Incident involving imposed by Regulator
investigation by Sanctions (eg fines)
Regulator imposed by Regulator on
multiple persons
Sanctions (eg.) fines
possible
Upgrade Project
5 REFERENCES
1 NSW Government, Energy Directions Green Paper, December 2004
2 J Gaillard, Project Management Risk Assessment Guidelines, Guideline

PMF2-4a, Eraring Energy, 8 May 2009
Power Unit, Boiler Upgrade And Low Nox Burners 22 Rev B : 14 July, 2009
Upgrade Project

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HAZOP STUDY REPORT OF THE

TURBINE HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT,

BOILER UPGRADE AND LOW NOX

BURNERS AS PART OF THE ERARING

ENERGY POWER STATION UPGRADE

Prepared for: Eraring Energy

Prepared by: Karin Nilsson

Rev Date Description Prepared By Authorised By

A 19/06/2009 Draft for Comment Karin Nilsson Frank Mieszala

B 14/07/2009 Final Report Karin Nilsson Frank Mieszala

1.2 Aim of This Report .......................................................................... 6

1.3 Location of EPS ............................................................................... 7

1.4 Project Description.......................................................................... 7

1.5 Scope of HAZOP Study ................................................................... 7

1.5.1 Boiler Upgrade................................................................................... 8

1.5.2 Turbine Hydraulic Power Supply ....................................................... 8

1.5.3 Low NOx Burners ............................................................................... 8

2.2 Details of the HAZOP Study Procedure ......................................... 9

2.3 HAZOP Study Guidewords ........................................................... 10

2.4 Risk Ranking Tools ....................................................................... 12

3 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................... 13

3.1 Presentation of Risk Results ........................................................ 13

3.2 Risk Levels of the Boilers Design ................................................ 14

3.2.1 Level 4 Risks Boilers ....................................................................... 14

3.2.2 Level 3 Risks Boilers ....................................................................... 15

3.2.3 Level 2 and Level 1 Risks Boilers .................................................... 18

3.3.1 Level 4 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit ................................................. 18

3.3.2 Level 3 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit ................................................. 18

3.3.3 Level 2 and Level 1 Risks Hydraulic Power Unit ............................. 19

3.4.1 Level 4 Risks Low NOx Burners....................................................... 19

3.4.2 Level 3 Risks Low NOx Burners....................................................... 19

3.4.3 Level 2 and Level Low NOx Burners ................................................ 19

3.5 Risk Profile of Plant Assuming HAZOP Recommendations in

5 REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 222

Appendix 1 – HAZOP Study Minutes

Appendix 2 – Approval as HAZOP Leader

Appendix 3 – Eraring Energy Risk Tools

LOCATION: Eraring Energy Power Station.

HAZOP MINUTES: Appendix 1

HAZOP Leaders: Karin Nilsson (DoP Approved)

Mark Wyburn (Eraring Energy, second

HAZOP SCOPE AND DATES FOR STUDY:

- Boiler Upgrade 8 April and 5 May 2009 (1½ days)

- Turbine Hydraulic Power Supply 23 March 2009 (one day)

- Low NOx Burners 22 April 2009 (one day)

Eraring Energy Boiler Team Leader and Asset

Gary Craig Eraring Energy Project Manager, CCP Project

Eraring Energy Project Manager, Low NOx

Phil McWilliam PPI – DPPA Rep Project Manager

Daniel McNally Eraring Energy E&I Technician

Keith Clark Eraring Energy Operator

Ian Dawson Eraring Energy Projects Engineer

Steve Wheeler Eraring Energy Operations Team Leader

Eraring Energy Boiler Team Leader and Asset

Tarkel Larson Siemens Field Services Manager

Siemens Project Manager, Low NOx

Eraring Energy (EE), one of three State-Owned Corporations that manages a

EE has put forward a proposal to undertake capacity increase and performance

EE has obtained Project Approval, subject to a number of Consent Conditions,

One of these Consent Conditions requires a HAZOP Study to be undertaken for

1.2 AIM OF THIS REPORT

Eraring Energy has commissioned Planager Pty Ltd to lead a multidisciplinary

1.3 LOCATION OF EPS