Are There True Contradictions?

A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's "Beyond the Limits

of Thought"
Author(s): Jürgen Dümont and Frank Mau
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine
Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1998), pp. 289-299
Published by: Springer
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 DISCUSSIONS

ARE THERE TRUE CONTRADICTIONS?

A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's Beyond the limits of

thought*

JURGENDUMONT AND FRANKMAU

SUMMARY. The present article critically examines three aspects of Graham Priest's
dialetheic analysis of very important kinds of limitations (the limit of what can be expressed,
described, conceived, known, or the limit of some operation or other). First, it is shown
that Priest's considerations focusing on Hegel's account of the infinite cannot be sustained,

mainly because Priest seems to rely on a too restrictive notion of object. Second, we discuss
Priest's treatment of the paradoxes in Cantorian set-theory. It is shown that Priest does not
address the issue in full generality; rather, he relies on a reading of Cantor which implicitly
attributes a very strong principle concerning quantification over arbitrary domains to Can
tor. Third, the main piece of Priest's work, the so-called "inclosure schema", is investigated.
This schema is supposed to formalize the core of many well-known paradoxes. We claim,
however, that formally the schema is not sound.

Key words: dialetheism, paraconsistent logic, paradox, infinity, quantification, domain prin
ciple, Priest, Hegel, Cantor, Cartwright

1. INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, Graham Priest is one of the most important advocates of a

paraconsistent (or dialetheic) position whose core thesis is that there are
true contradictions, that both a statement, ~ a,
i.e., say a, and its negation,
hold at the same time. In a series of highly influential logico-philosophical
publications (see Priest [1979], [1984], [1987], and Priest et al. [1989])
he has developed and defended a variety of paraconsistent (or dialetheic)
approaches all sharing the main concession that there are true contradic
tions. In contrast to the aforementioned contributions which are more or
less technical treatments belonging to the field of formal logic, Priest, in

Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29: 289-299, 1998.

? 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

 290 JURGENDUMONT AND FRANKMAU

his new book Beyond the limits of thought (Priest [1995]), discusses the
question of whether there are true contradictions in a less technical but
rather genuine philosophical setting. In this book he is concerned with a
number of very important kinds of limitation. More precisely, he deals with
"the limit of what can be expressed; the limit of what can be described or
conceived; the limit of what can be known; the limit of iteration of some

operation or other, i.e. infinite in the mathematical sense" (p.3).1 Priest

maintains of this kind provide boundaries
that "[l]imits beyond which cer
tain conceptual processes (describing, knowing, iterating, etc.) cannot go;
a sort of conceptual neplus ultra" (p.3, Priest's emphasis). The main thesis
which he wants to defend in his book is "that such limits are dialetheic;
that is, that they are the subject, or locus, of true contradictions" (p.3).
Here, "true contradiction" is to be understood as follows (cf. p.5): a con
tradiction is true if and only if a and ~a are both true and false (at
a8c~a
the same time). According to Priest, true contradictions and the kinds of
limits (or boundaries) which were mentioned above are closely related to
one another. He writes:
The contradiction, in each case, is simply to the effect that the conceptual processes in

question do cross these boundaries. Thus, the limits of thought are boundaries which
cannot be crossed, but yet which are crossed. In each of the cases, there is a totality (of
all things expressible, describable, etc.) andan appropriate operation that generates an

object that is both within and without the totality. I will call these situations Closure and

Transcendence, respectively, (pp. 3f, Priest's emphasis)

Priest that instances or examples

holds of this interplay between Tran
scendence on the one hand and true contradictions,
and Closure which are
caused by it, on the other hand can be traced through the whole history of
western philosophy. In the first part of his book (pp. 9-77) he discusses
examples of limits of thought in pre-Kantian philosophy (Plato, Aristotle,
Sextus, Anselm, Aquinas, Cusanus, Leibniz, and Berkeley). The second
part (pp. 79-121) is entirely devoted to a treatment of the limits of thought
in Kant and Hegel. The third part consists of a tour de force through
modern approaches to the set-theoretic and the (semantic) paradoxes (pp.
123-194). Finally, philosophizing in the era after the linguistic turn, Priest

spends the fourth part of his book (pp. 195-245) discussing his main thesis
in the context of (natural) language. Here he treats relevant issues in Frege,

Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, and Derrida.

Already this brief overview of contents indicates that Priest's book is
far too comprehensive to be dealt with here in full detail. Therefore, we
confine ourselves to highlighting what we believe to be the main problems
of Priest's discussion.
Our critique will focus on what we consider to be the heart of Priest's
book which consists of two ventricles: the left ventricle, which is essentially
 ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 291

Hegelian in nature, and the right ventricle, which is beating for Cantorian
set-theory and Priest's Inclosure Schema. In the following sections we
shall examine these two ventricles in order to determine the cardiac fitness
of Priest's position.

2. THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT IN HEGEL

According to Hegel, or at least to Priest's reading of Hegel, we have the fol

lowing: "Since there are perfectly sound... arguments to the effect that the
World (that is the infinity generated in each Antinomy) has contradictory
properties, it does have contradictory properties"(p. 114).
This statement has to be understood in the light of Hegel's account of
the infinite. Hegel distinguishes between the finite, the spurious or false
infinite, and the genuine or true infinite (cf. p. 116). "[S]omething is finite
if it is determinate ... , that is, is limited or bounded else"
by something
(p. 116). "Something is infinite (in the false sense) if it is not finite" (p.
117). In a more recent terminology one would say that the false infinite
is the "potential "the true infinite is the corresponding
infinite".
Finally,
completed infinity" (p. 119), or as Priest calls it "the generated infinity"
or "actual infinity". This account of infinity leads to three problems which
are best described in Priest's own words:

(1) [I]f an object is infinite it falls in the category infinite, and this is to set a bound on
it. In this sense, to conceive an object as infinite is a contradiction in terms ... To be
bounded and to be truly conceived are, in a sense, the same thing. For if something is
bounded it can be conceived as that which lies within the boundary; and if something
is conceived it is bounded by the terms of the conception. Hence, an unbounded

object is essentially the same as an inconceivable object. And we are back with the
contradiction at the limit of conceivable, (p. 117, Priest's emphasis)
(2) [A] potential infinite, at any stage of its existence, is, after all, never more than finite.
Hence it is not truly infinite ... The notion of the potential infinite does not deliver
an understanding of the way the infinite behaves; it delivers an understanding of the

way that certain finitudes behave, (p. 118)

(3) The true infinite is the notion of an object whose finitude is its infinitude, and which
is therefore both finite and infinite, (p. 119)

We shall now turn to the discussion of (l)-(3):

ad (1): Put into a very condensed form the general point of (1) seems to
be this: an object is categorized or conceived by setting a bound or at least
a conceptual bound on it, and setting a bound on it amounts to making or

conceiving it as finite.2 Hence, so the argument continues, categorizing or

conceiving an object always implies that it is finite.

 292 JURGENDUMONT AND FRANKMAU

This argument is not very

compelling for two reasons: first, there are
convincing counterexamples of objects which can be categorized or con
ceived without setting a bound on them. Consider, for example, objects
like our world, or the universe. Certainly, physicists can develop whole
theories about (parts of) our world or the universe without even raising
the question of whether these objects have boundaries, or whether they are
finite or infinite. Consequently, we can make sensible claims about these

objects without setting bounds on them.

Second, we believe, that problem (1) hinges upon a certain understand
ing of "object" which is unjustly restrictive. In Priest's discussion the
underlying concept of "object" seems to be nothing but the common sense
notion can roughly be captured by "everyday macro
of "object" which
physical object". Examples are cups, tables, and books. However, if this
is the assumed meaning of "object", what are we to make of entities like
fictional, abstract, very large, and theoretical objects? Priest does
vague,
nowhere deny their existence. He simply seems to appeal to our common
sense notion of "object" which is unsurprisingly of no help in cases where
we are dealing with questions about entities like Sherlock Holmes, clouds,
infinite (or transfinite) sets, the world, the universe, or electrons.
In order to make good his general claim that to conceive or categorize
an object is to set a bound on it, Priest would have to convince us that
this holds not only for everyday macro-physical objects but also for fic
tional, vague, abstract, very large, and theoretical objects. Unfortunately,
he neither provides us with convincing reasons for this claim nor with a
careful philosophical analysis or explanation of "object", let alone with an
elaborate theory thereof.

ad (2): We can see nothing wrong with this explanation of the nature of
the potential infinite. Instead, we think that this is a very clear account of
the potential infinite. But, in contrast to Priest, we do not see where this
conception could cause any problems; in particular, we cannot see that this
conception could by itself lead to contradiction.

ad (3): Here, we can simply repeat our objection which we raised against
(1). For here again, Priest has to require that in order to conceive or

categorize something as an object it has to be bounded or finite. Certainly,

if this requirement were met, Priest could derive the desired contradiction.
For then he could argue, that the conceivability of an infinite object implies
its boundedness or finitedness, and that would, of course, be contradictory.
However, as before, we doubt that the notion of "object" or "conceiving or

categorizing an object" implies boundedness or finiteness.

 ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 293

We want to close by looking at an example

this section that Priest uses
to illustrate the relation the false (potential,
between incompleted) infinity
and the true (actual, completed) infinity. Priest's example (p. 119) that he
borrowed from Hegel goes a follows: Consider the following infinite sum:

l+a+a2+a3+... (-l<a<l)

According to Priest and Hegel this sum has to be regarded as a false

(potential) infinity. By adding the successive terms it gets closer and closer
to some number but will never reach it. In contrast to that, Priest and Hegel
hold that the limit of this sum, i.e. (1-a)"1, is the true (actual) infinity.
This example which is perfectly in the spirit of Priest's (and Hegel's)
general view on infinity seems to lead to a problem, if we write:

l+a+a2+a3+... =
(i) (l-a)"1 (-Ka<l)

For, as was mentioned above, the expression "l+a+a2+a3+..." denotes a

potential infinite whereas the term "(1-a)-1" denotes an actual infinite.

Therefore, it appears as if we could show that the potential infinite is
identical with the actual infinite. And that is clearly absurd. However, as
the following considerations show, there is no real problem here.
First, observe that no finite (or partial) sum of the form "l+a+...+an" is
ever equal to the limit (l-a)_1. In this sense we are dealing with a potential
infinite on the left side of the equality sign. But obviously, no partial sum
is identical with the completed sum, which is denoted by "l+a+a2+a3+...".
Second, it should be clear that we can rewrite (i) in a more precise form.
We then obtain:
lim ?JL
= -
(ii) (i -? oo)?(an) (1 a)"1 (-K a < 1)

Written in this official form, we can immediately see that we are dealing
with completed sums on both sides of the equality sign. The expression
lim
-
(i oo)

essentially says that we must not stop at some i, but that we have to go on
until oo. Thus we have to consider the sum on the left side as completed.
Therefore Priest's claim that the expression "l+a+a2+ a3+..." denotes a

potential infinite is clearly false. Hence, there is no mystery to be explained

and also no contradiction to be resolved here. In conclusion, we can say
that neither the discussion of (l)-(3) nor the discussion of Priest's example
has lent credit to the thesis that we get unavoidably tangled up with true
contradictions once we get to certain limits.
 294 JURGENDUMONT AND FRANKMAU

3. THE ABSOLUTE INFINITY IN CANTORIAN SET THEORY

After having presented Hegel's account of the finite, the false infinite, and
the true infinite, Priest turns to the work of Georg Cantor, the founder of
contemporary set-theory. Here again, Priest attempts to show, that even in
celebrated Cantorian set-theory the conception, conceivability, or expres
sion of the "absolute infinity" leads to contradiction. Following M. Hallett,
Priest (p. 128) distinguishes between two sorts of actual infinity:

(1) the transfinite, which is the increasable actual-infinite.

(2) the Absolute, which is the unincreasable actual-infinite.

The following quote from Cantor shows that this distinction is really Can
torian in spirit. Cantor wrote (p. 128):

The transfinite with its plenitude of formations and forms necessarily indicates an Absolute,
a 'true infinite' whose magnitude is capable of no increase or diminuation, and therefore to
be looked upon quantitatively as an absolute maximum. (Cantor's emphasis)

As is well-known to experts, Cantorian set-theory leads to a number of

serious problems. One of them is the Burali-Forti-Paradox which we shall
now briefly review. Assume there were a set of all ordinal numbers, i.e.

ON={0,l,2,...,a;,...,a;2,...,C4;3,...,a;2,...}

Following Cantor, for sets (ormore precisely: for every increasing unbound
ed sequence) of ordinal numbers we always have the following limit
operation: every unbounded succession of ordinal numbers generates a
new greater!) ordinal which
(strictly is the limit of the succession.
An application of this limit-operation to ON which is itself such an
unbounded succession, generates a new ordinal ON+. Obviously, ON+
cannot be contained in ON it is strictly greater than all elements
since of
ON. Therefore we have: ON+? But by assumption,
ON. ON is the set of
all ordinals; hence, the ordinal ON+ must be contained in ON. Therefore
we also have: ON+E ON. Thus, we have obtained a contradiction:
ON+<?ON andON+G ON.
It is not difficult to see that arguments of the same form can be applied
to V, the set of all sets, or R, the set of all well-founded sets, in order to get
further contradictions, like V? V and VeV, or R?R and RgR.
For Priest these contradictions are all versions of the "contradiction at
the heart of the Absolute" (p. 132). Consequently, in Priest's interpretation,
these contradictions show that even set-theory does not provide a consistent
formal account of Cantor's view of the Absolute.
Here, it is important to note that Cantor, too, was well aware of these
problems. Confronted with these inconsistencies he introduced two kinds
 ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 295

of collections: consistent and inconsistent. In a letter to Dedekind, Cantor

wrote:

If we start from the notion of a definite multiplicity (a system, a totality) of things, it is

necessary, as I discovered, to distinguish two kinds of multiplicities... For a multiplicity can

be such that the assumption that all of its elements 'are together' leads to a contradiction,
so that it is impossible to conceive of the multiplicity as a unity, as 'one finished thing'.
... If on the other
Such multiplicities I call absolutely infinite or inconsistent multiplicities
hand the totality of the elements of a multiplicity can be thought of without contradiction as

'being together', so that they can be gathered together into 'one thing', I call it a consistent

multiplicity or a 'set'... (p. 135, Cantor's emphasis)

Despite this agreement, that the conception of the Absolute as "one finished

thing" causes inconsistencies, there is also an important difference between

Priest and Cantor concerning the interpretation of these problems. Where
Priest recognizes another example of a true contradiction caused by the
Absolute, Cantor takes the contradiction as a compelling reason to deny
the existence of the Absolute as "a unity" or as "one finished thing".
This, however, is not the end of the dispute because Priest is convinced
that the resolution of the contradictions is not a matter of choice. Accord
ing to Priest, Cantor cannot escape contradiction. More precisely, Priest
maintains that Cantor's solution presupposes the existence of the Absolute
as a unity, meta-theoretically.
In order to develop Priest's argument we have to introduce the so
called "domain principle" (pp. 136-140). into a very condensed
Put form
the domain principle says this: in order for the variables of a given for
mal language (and therefore also for the quantified statements) to have
a determinate meaning (under a given interpretation) the variables must
range over a well-defined, pre-fixed domain of objects. In the extreme
case, where we want to quantify over everything there is, the domain has
to contain everything there is. So, if we assert "for all x" then "jc" ranges
over all objects in the domain, i.e., over everything there is. Obviously,
this domain of objects must be fixed in advance and stay fixed throughout
the interpretation, for otherwise the meaning of the variables would not be
determinate but could change with the change of the domain. In modern
model-theory such a domain plus an appropriately defined interpretation
function constitutes a model. Usually the domain is a set, which comes
under many labels: domain of interpretation, domain of quantification, or
universe of discourse. As Priest rightly emphasizes, this model-theoretic
understanding conceptualizes the domain as a unity, or as a finished thing
(p. 139).
Given the domain principle, Priest's argument against Cantor's denial
of the existence the Absolute
of goes as follows: If Cantor denies the
existence of the Absolute, or the existence of ON, V, and R as unities he is
 296 JURGENDUMONT AND FRANKMAU

thereby himself asserting universally quantified statements: for all objects

jc, x is not the Absolute; for all sets (well-founded sets, or ordinals) jc,
x is not V, (R, or ON). These statements have, according to the domain
principle, only a determinate meaning if there is a pre-fixed, completed
domain of quantification which contains everything there is, or all sets
(or well-founded sets, or ordinals), respectively. But now, we have the
problem that the variable in phrases like "for all objects jc", and "for all
sets jc" range over the Absolute, or V etc., respectively. And since these

phrases only have a determinate meaning if there is a pre-fixed, completed

domain containing all objects, all sets, all well-founded sets, or all ordinals,
Cantor is committed, contrary to his denial, to the assumption that these
inconsistent multiplicities exist as unities. For if he did not, he could not
even assert that the Absolute (V, R, ON) is not a unity. Therefore, if Cantor
subscribed to the domain principle, and Priest presents enough evidence
(cf. p. 138) that he did, Cantor cannot escape contradiction. Consequently,
his position is untenable.
So far we have seen that Priest is right in maintaining that one cannot
escape contradiction if one subscribes to the domain principle. However,
Priest does not address the question of whether one has to subscribe to the
domain principle. Nowhere does he present compelling reasons that one
has to. Moreover, he does not discuss the more general question of what
is presupposed by the domain principle itself. As has been very carefully
established by Richard L. Cartwright, the domain principle presupposes
what Cartwright calls the "All-in-One Principle" (cf. Cartwright 1994,
p. 7). According to this principle "to quantify over certain objects is to
presuppose that those objects constitute a 'collection' or a 'completed
- some
collection' something of which those objects are the members"
(Cartwright, 1994, p. 7).
If Cartwright's analysis is correct, the domain principle itself presup
poses a more general principle, the All-in-One Principle, which Cantor
wants to deny in the case of inconsistent collections. Therefore, we might

try to resolve the contradictions of the Absolute and other inconsistent mul
tiplicities by denying not only that the Absolute is a completed entity, but
by denying simultaneously that there is a domain that contains everything
there is, all sets, all well-founded sets, or all ordinals. If we adopt this posi
tion we can certainly escape Priest's argument against Cantor because then
the identification with a pre-fixed, completed domain and the Absolute,
V, R, or ON is not possible. Hence, the contradiction can no longer be
derived.
Here, of course, a careful evaluation of the benefits and costs of this
move is called for and in particular, one would have to present an alternative
 ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 297

(formal) account of quantification. Obviously, a thorough discussion of

these topics is beyond the scope of our paper.3 Our purpose was only to
indicate that Priest's argument is not fully decisive but leaves enough room
for a solution which saves the main idea of Cantor's solution: inconsistent
multiplicities need not be conceived as unities, or finished things.

4. THE INCLOSURE SCHEMA

We would like to close our discussion with a remark on Priest's so-called

"Inclosure Schema". In his view, it is not a mere accident that the kinds
of limits, which we have described above, generate true contradictions.
Rather, Priest holds, there is a close connection between these limits and
the corresponding contradictions that is open to a systematic analysis.
According to Priest this connection can formally be captured by his Inclo
sure Schema. In order to formulate this schema we need two properties
<j>and ij), and a function S (the diagonaliser) which satisfy the following
conditions (cf. pp. 142f;147):

(i) Q, = {y: </>(y)}

exists, and i/)(Ci)

(ii) if jcis a subset of fi such that ip(x)\ (a) 5(x)?x

(b)8(x)en
As one can easily see, are satisfied, one can derive a
if these conditions
contradiction. According to (i) we have that if)(Q) which allows us to take
fi as our jc.Now, with (ii.a) we obtain 8($l)& fi, and with (ii.b) we get
5(fi)EO. Thus, we have obtained a contradiction. Priest demonstrates for
a number of examples that the Inclosure Schema can be used to formalize
all important paradoxes (Russell's, Burali-Forti's, Mirimanoff's, Koenig's,
Berry's, and Richard's paradox). On the one hand this shows the great
importance of the Inclosure Schema. On the other hand it shows that these
are only genuine - in the sense of the Inclosure
paradoxes paradoxes
-
Schema if the Inclosure Schema is formally sound.

Unfortunately, the latter is not the case. In order to see this consider the
function S which is defined as a function from the power set of ?), i.e. the
class of all sub-classes of fi, symbolically "P(fi)'\ into fi:

5: P(fi) -> n

Now, since 6 is defined as a function, and Priest is obviously working with

the standard set-theoretic concept of "function", we have, by the definition
-
of 8, that for every element jc in the domain of 8 namely P(fi) - the value
 298 JURGENDUMONT AND FRANKMAU

-
S(x) of jchas to lie in the range of S namely ft, i.e. for all .xEP(ft): S(x)eQ.
But together with (ii.a) 5(x)?x this implies that we can only choose proper
subsets x of ft, i.e. xCft and jc^ft. For in case we chose ft for jc,we would
obtain J(jc)?ft, and that is not in accordance with the definition of S. Hence,
S would not be a well-defined function. In other words, we cannot choose
ft as x. Obviously, that blocks the derivation of the contradiction.
Confronted with this problem there seem to be two options: One could
hold that the Inclosure Schema does the underlying
capture structure of
the paradoxes. In this case the internal problem of the Inclosure Schema
would reveal that there must be an unsound element in the reasoning of
the paradoxes indicating that we are not dealing with genuine paradoxes.
Or one could maintain that the Inclosure Schema, because of its internal
problem, does not, as it stands, capture the underlying structure of the

paradoxes. In this case one could that we are dealing with

still claim
genuine paradoxes, but one would to give up or modify
have the Inclosure
Schema (at least one would have to redefine S). It is, of course, not possible
to pursue these complex issues any further in this paper. Here, our aim was
merely to point to an internal problem of the Inclosure Schema.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The upshot of our discussion is that Priest's treatment of his main thesis
leaves a number of important problems unsolved. Put very cautiously,
we can say that one does not have to believe in the existence of true
contradictions Priest fills in the missing
unless details. But despite these
reservations we want
to emphasize that Priest's work is without a doubt the
best book in print on these very fundamental and important issues. Beyond
a
the limits of thought is clear, systematic, and provocative work. Itmakes
a powerful case for Priest's main thesis, and contains a subtle analysis of
the cluster of all important issues and debates which are related to it.

NOTES

*)We would like to thank Donald W. Bruckner, Dirk Greimann and Lorenz B. Puntel for

helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1
All page references are to Priest's book, unless indicated otherwise.
2
It should be noted that a phrase like "setting bounds on objects and thereby making it
finite" carries strong anti-realist implications with it. In Hegel's case, this is, of course, no
real suprise, since Hegel was an idealist philosopher. But how about Priest's own position?
He does not seem to have a firm position since he never explicitly addresses the thorny
realism/anti-realism issue.
 ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 299

3
The interested should consult
reader the excellent article by Richard L. Cartwright [1994].
A very and treatment of these matters can also be found in Patrick
thorough comprehensive
Grim's book, The Incomplete Universe, in which Grim takes up many important issues
related to the domain principle, and alternative accounts of quantification.

REFERENCES

Richard L. Cartwright, "Speaking of Everything", Nous 28:1, 1994, 1-20.

Patrick Grim, The Incomplete Universe. Totality, Knowledge, and Truth. Cambridge MA,
The MIT Press, 1991.
Graham Priest, "The Logic of Paradox", Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, 1979, 219-241.
Graham Priest, "Logic of Paradox revisited", Journal of Philosophical Logic 13, 1984,
153-179.
Graham Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1987.
Graham Priest, Richard and Jean Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on
Routley,
the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989.
Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought. Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Jiirgen Dumont Frank Mau

Bruno-Walter Ring 24 Department of Philosophy
81927 Munchen University of Osnabriick

Germany Katharinenstr. 5
49074 Osnabriick
Germany