EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the “battered woman syndrome” (BWS), which allegedly constitutes
self-defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and
unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.

Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance
and self-control. This “psychological paralysis” she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her
unborn child’s.

Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for
and be released from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.

The Case

For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-
0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

“The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and
another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.”[2]

The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:

“That on or about the 15 th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose,
[causing] the following wounds, to wit:

‘Cadaveric spasm.

‘Body on the 2 nd stage of decomposition.

‘Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
 ‘Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood
vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.

‘Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

‘Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.’

which caused his death.”[4]

With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution’s version of the facts in this wise:

“Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel,
Leyte. For a time, Ben’s younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at
Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

“On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo
would pass Ben’s house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went
inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but
on his way home passing the side of the Genosas’ rented house, he heard her say ‘I won’t hesitate to kill you’ to which Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent?’
That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas’ rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.

“On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because
she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had
no money to buy it.

“That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in
tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas’
rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to
him.

“On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there
to find out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with
a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went
inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket.
He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son’s
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.

“Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the
Genosas’ rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where
they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in
one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six
(6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.

“About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had
been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for
parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben’s death was ‘cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due
to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].’
“Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have
gone gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him
there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas’ house. Ecel went home despite appellant’s request for her to sleep in their house.

“Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were
doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire
to keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her
around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his
packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told
her ‘You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.’ Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have
the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, ‘smashed’ the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet.
Appellant then ‘smashed’ Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.

“Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly ‘distorted’ the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did
not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom.”[7] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:

“1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining
a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband’s death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc
City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.

“2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree
cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed
as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

“3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben’s parents, together with Ben’s brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic
and Ben ‘lived happily’. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.

“4. Ben’s brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic
quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen
knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben’s
forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben’s aid again and saw blood from Ben’s forehead and
Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben’s forgiveness.

“Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic’s mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in ‘1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.’ She
said as the marriage went along, Marivic became ‘already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic’s two sons, there were ‘three
(3) misunderstandings.’ The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic
struck Ben on the forehead ‘using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear’ and her husband went to Ben to help; and the
third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben’s hand was plastered as ‘the bone cracked.’

“Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.

“5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 ‘After we collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.’ They
stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to ‘Uniloks’ and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and
went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait ‘for the runner and the usher
of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet.’
On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one ‘Fredo’ who is used by Ben
to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas’ testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying ‘I will never hesitate to kill you’, whilst
Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent.’ Basobas thought they were joking.

“He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every
Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben ‘before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa’ that he should leave her and that Ben would
always take her back after she would leave him ‘so many times’.
“Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben ‘even had a wound’ on the right forehead.
He had known the couple for only one (1) year.

“6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.

“These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would
ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would
enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a
week.

“7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.

‘7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic.
Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses ‘grappling with each other’. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do
anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])

‘7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November
15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw ‘the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was
holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa’. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the
children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).

‘7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs.
Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn
items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified ‘if somebody
would come.’ He testified that while Ben was alive ‘he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, ‘Teody’ because that was
what he used to call me, ‘mokimas ta,’ which means ‘let’s go and look for a whore.’ Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben ‘would box his wife and I would see bruises
and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.’ Mr. Sarabia also said that
once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.

‘7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked
her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic
wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house ‘because she might be battered by her husband.’ When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening,
Miss Arano said that ‘her husband was already there and was drunk.’ Miss Arano knew he was drunk ‘because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his
face.’ Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home
drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple ‘were very noisy in the sala and I had
heard something was broken like a vase.’ She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn’t get in he got a chair and a knife and
‘showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.’ She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when
she left Marivic’s house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.

‘7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient ‘many times’ and had also
received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted
upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and
considered him an expert witness.’

xxx xxx xxx

‘Dr. Caing’s clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits ‘2’ and ‘2-B.’ The
OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked
as Exhibit ‘3.’

“On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is
only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, ‘whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.’
‘7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office
past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing ‘family troubles’. He told Marivic to return in the
morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed ‘that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that
her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as
she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

“Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile.
Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because ‘he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.’

“On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their
house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room,
and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias ‘Marvelous Isidro’; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe
delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.

‘Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to ‘smash him once’; that
she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was ‘whirled’ by Ben, he kicked her ‘ass’ and dragged her towards the drawer
when he saw that she had packed his things.’

“9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact
was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.

“10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such
was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She
merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw ‘some police
officer and neighbor around.’ She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.

xxx xxx xxx

“Dra. Cerillo said that ‘there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the head’ which she described as a ‘fracture’. And that based on
her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.

“Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.

“11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed ‘with intent to kill, with
treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard
deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.’

“12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998,
and 5 and 6 August 1998.

“13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc
City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance,
thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.

“14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivic’s trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant’s Briefs he had prepared for Marivic
which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.

“The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
 “15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G.
Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her ‘Brief without counsels’ to the Court.

“This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.

“16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-
opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

“Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the
description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit ‘A’) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.

“17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivic’s URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case ‘to the trial
court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the ‘battered woman syndrome’ plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and,
thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.’

“18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

“Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done
at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.

“Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University
as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de
Manila University and St. Joseph’s College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of
the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological
Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from
about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity cases. She
was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled ‘Energy Global Psychology’ (together with Drs. Allan Tan
and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.

“Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity
cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that ‘there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from
domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.’

“Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of ‘a lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also
sexual abuse.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, ‘the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics.
x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who
precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.’ Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes
from a dysfunctional family or from ‘broken homes.’

“Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, ‘also has a very low opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes
out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved
in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.’ The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and
makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so ‘there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.’

“Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence,
the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.

xxx xxx xxx

“Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back
triggering ‘physical violence on both of them.’ She said that in a ‘normal marital relationship,’ abuses also happen, but these are ‘not consistent, not chronic, are not
happening day in [and] day out.’ In an ‘abnormal marital relationship,’ the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and ‘even would cause hospitalization on
the victim and even death on the victim.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because
‘inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as
damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of
the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.

xxx xxx xxx

“19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

“Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry
Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial
Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to
the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his
medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the
Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.

“He authored ‘The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978’ which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored ‘The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000’, which was likewise published internationally and locally.
He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he
published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.

“Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged.
Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.

“Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case
in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon
City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.

“As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse,
battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ‘depends
on the vulnerability of the victim.’ Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the
psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, ‘it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress
disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.’

“In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the ‘anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.’ It is produced by ‘overwhelming brutality,
trauma.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Dr. Pajarillo explained that with ‘neurotic anxiety’, the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time.
She thinks ‘of nothing but the suffering.’

xxx xxx xxx

 “A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-
headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her ‘self-world’ is damaged.

“Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual’s illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to
the batterer, he normally ‘internalizes what is around him within the environment.’ And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all
the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong façade ‘but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that ‘even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the
trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and ‘primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any
weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household.’ He said a victim resorts to weapons when she
has ‘reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.’

xxx xxx xxx

“Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.

xxx xxx xxx

“On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband Marivic’c mental condition was that she was ‘re-
experiencing the trauma.’ He said ‘that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in
flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.’ At the time he interviewed Marivic ‘she
was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.’

xxx xxx xxx

“20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.”[9]

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was
killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.

The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.

Supervening Circumstances

On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3)
the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for
the lower court to admit the experts’ testimonies.

On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant’s Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings
taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court’s Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11]
supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before
finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case. [12]

The Issues

Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court’s consideration:

“1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.

“2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.

“3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.

“4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a
gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.

“5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.

“6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic’s flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to
save the life of her unborn child.

“7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.

“8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this
case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.”[13]

In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended
the killing of Ben Genosa.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Collateral Factual Issues

The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court,
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that could affect the outcome of the case. [14]

In appellant’s first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the
trial court’s disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.

First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated “an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.” We note that in
his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of
the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense
theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge’s conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence,
that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.

Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an “obviously hasty” manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14,
1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate
his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly
hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional
obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage
contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:

“The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered
by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.”

Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant’s deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her
marriage to Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission
was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.[19] Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the
defense offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.

Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben’s death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal
consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, “[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the
acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to
determine which of said acts actually caused the victim’s death.” Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.

Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic
review, appellant had not raised the novel defense of “battered woman syndrome,” for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the
crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.

Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant’s children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal
actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are
necessary to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as
witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.

Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of
her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court’s appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on
the final resolution of the case.

First Legal Issue:

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus

Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the
victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases,
self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]

The Battered Woman Syndrome

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized
in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with
the syndrome, foreign courts convey their “understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a
period of time.”[24]

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”[25]

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,”[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2)
the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries
to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused
in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be
double-edged, because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.

However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner
senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally.
But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence
“spirals out of control” and leads to an acute battering incident.[29]

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the
time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.

At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in
the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it
is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one
hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for
her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen
again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she loves.

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for
his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically.

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on
each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of “tension, violence and forgiveness,” each partner may
believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]

History of Abuse
in the Present Case

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:

“ATTY. TABUCANON

Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?

A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.

Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?

A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me.

Q How many times did this happen?

A Several times already.

Q What did you do when these things happen to you?

A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.

Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?

A He is following me, after that he sought after me.

Q What will happen when he follow you?

A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he said ‘sorry’.

Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who are these doctors?

A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who inflicted these injuries?

A Of course my husband.

Q You mean Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

[Court] /to the witness

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the
occurrence?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?

A Three times a week.

Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?

A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me.” [32]

Referring to his “Out-Patient Chart”[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this
manner:

“Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?

A I did.

Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.

A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;

2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;

3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;

5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and

6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.

Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?

A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force is applied.

Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?

A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.

Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized,
there is tenderness pain.

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

xxx xxx xxx

Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did she tell you?

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.

Q You mean, Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident happened?

A As per record, yes.

Q What was the date?

A It was on November 6, 1995.

Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?

A Yes, sir.

Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?

A Yes, sir.

Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?

A Eight (8) months pregnant.

Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings?

A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?

A Yes, sir.

Q For how many days?

A One day.
Q Where?

A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months
pregnant.

What is this all about?

A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had
a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.

Q For what?

A Tension headache.

Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?

A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response when the medication was given to her, because tension
headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.

Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?

A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So,
from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.

Q You mean problem in her household?

A Probably.

Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.

Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused?

A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.

Q Is this considered hypertension?

A Yes, sir, severe.

Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?

A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus.” [34]

Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that
on some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]

Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come
home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o’clock at night, because the couple “were very noisy … and I heard
something was broken like a vase.” Then Marivic came running into Ecel’s room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them
with a knife.

On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where
they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and
when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.

On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the
following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:

“ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?

A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I
immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my second child said, ‘he was not home yet’. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that
he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.

Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?

A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.

Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you come back to your house?

A Yes, sir.

Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?

A Bilwang.

Q Is this your house or you are renting?

A Renting.

Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?

A I went back around almost 8:00 o’clock.

Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?

A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he
would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.

Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.

Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?

A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.

Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

A Yes, 8 months.

Q How advance was your pregnancy?

A Eight (8) months.

Q Was the baby subsequently born?

A Yes, sir.

Q What’s the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?

A Marie Bianca.

Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time?

A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.

Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?

A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.

Q What was he yelling all about?

A His usual attitude when he got drunk.

Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any?

A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.

Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?

A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.

Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?

A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, ‘why did you switch off the light when the children were there.’ At that time I
was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a
bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?

A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.

Q What else happened after he cut the wire?

A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already holding the bolo.

Q How do you described this bolo?

A 1 1/2 feet.

Q What was the bolo used for usually?

A For chopping meat.

Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?

A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.

Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?

A I screamed for help and then he left.

Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?

A Yes, sir.

Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?

A Outside perhaps to drink more.

Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?

A I packed all his clothes.

Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?

A I wanted him to leave us.

Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?

A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.

Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that ‘you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.’

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(At this juncture the witness started crying).

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room,
and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?

A Outside.

Q In what part of the house?

A Dining.

Q Where were the children during that time?

A My children were already asleep.

Q You mean they were inside the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?

A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

Q Is it a flexible blade?

A It’s a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.” [38]

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met
with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter’s ordeal to the court a quo as
follows:

“Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman’s term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?

A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to
emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the
family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and
which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she
was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out.” [39]

In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:

“Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you
gather?

A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her
marital life.

Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of
the case?

A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of battering their wives?

A I also heard that from her?

Q You heard that from her?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering their wives?

A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.

Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that
room?

A She told me about that.

Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?

A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.

Q Several times in that room?

A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.

Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your
opinion?

A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also
believe that she became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person
who had lost she’s not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she
had experienced from her husband.

Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?

A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]

Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:

“Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?

A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.

Q What do you mean by that?

A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]

Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?

A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the data that I’m gathering from her are the truth.”[41]

The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and examination of
Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy --
until “Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his
barkada in drinking sprees.”

The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: “At first, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk.
It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;]
and practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.”

Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the Report, “[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives
and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe.
x x x.”[43]

From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court’s mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.

Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely
merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed
out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. “How can the mental state of
the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she
continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags
and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-
called ‘battered wife syndrome.’”[44]

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one’s viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a
person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar
experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.[45]

The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United
Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter’s “ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in
the relationship with no means of escape.”[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that “the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered
women are in greater danger of dying then.”[47]

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that “the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-
sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the
violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.”[48]

According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the
latter’s belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only
hope for her spouse to change.[49]

The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated
“probably ten to twenty thousand” violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience
with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe
domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50]

Dr. Pajarillo explained that “overwhelming brutality, trauma” could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of “anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.”[51]
After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons “may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute
battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim’s ability to muster an active
response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect.”[52]

A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that “even if a person has control over a situation, but believes
that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape.” He said that it was the cognitive aspect --
the individual’s thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as “learned helplessness.” “[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be
less important than the individual’s set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don’t attempt to leave the battering situation, even when
it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their
terrible circumstances.”[54]

Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her,
and that there is no escape. [55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available,
she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt
even more.[57]

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her
spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there
were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-
building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the
existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Ben’s relatively minor abuses?
What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother’s or
father’s house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common
abode.

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she
was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship?
Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics
of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her
partner or spouse. They corroborated each other’s testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed
to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack
supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.

BWS as Self-Defense

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense.[59]

From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the
offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.

Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided
must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]

“Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

“1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

 Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.”

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on
the life or safety of a person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children’s bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would
still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is
already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life “would amount to sentencing her to ‘murder by
installment.’”[65] Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of deadly force must be
shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-
defense may be appreciated.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense --
complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivic’s killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.

Mitigating Circumstances Present

In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and
appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on
any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.[69]

From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:

“This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation
which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her
husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of
violence on her part.” [70]

Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of “repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment”
as well as the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:

“Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?

A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the
prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support available to
the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....

xxx xxx xxx

Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?

A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually
the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating
the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is
pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic]
degree.

Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?

A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.

Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?

A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse,
restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.

Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?

A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six
(6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the
repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder.” [72]

Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:

“Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?

A Of course obfuscated.”[73]

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in “cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control,” “psychological paralysis,” and “difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.”

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power
without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust
or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1)
there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78]

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while
dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on
her life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79] His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child,
naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state
continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo’s testimony[80] that with “neurotic anxiety” -- a psychological effect on a victim of “overwhelming brutality [or] trauma” -- the
victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control “re-experiencing the whole thing, the
most vicious and the trauma that she suffered.” She thinks “of nothing but the suffering.” Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar
circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she
should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she
was eight months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception
naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.

Second Legal Issue:

Treachery

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably
as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of
the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]

Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely
from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an “open, depressed, circular” fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how
and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events
surrounding his death:

“Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that ‘you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me’

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER

(At this juncture the witness started crying)

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room,
and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?

A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.

Q It is a flexible blade?

A It’s a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?

A Yes, because I smashed him.

Q What happened?

A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.

Q What else happened?

A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood
pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?

A Considering all the physical sufferings that I’ve been through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and
the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.

COURT

/to Atty. Tabucanon

Q You shot him?

A Yes, I distorted the drawer.”[84]

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the victim’s position relative to appellant’s at the time of the
shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific
purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the
present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make.
To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the
absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this
Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]

Proper Penalty

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph
5[88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall
be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and
one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served
the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.[91]

Epilogue

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in
the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are
made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good
look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person.
Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant’s counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent
them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the
phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., join Justice Santiago in her dissent.

Vitug and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.

Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts
and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the
prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased,
was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August,
19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This
porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants,
as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and
window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of
the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing
that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person
who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the
room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow , the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition,
followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for
a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after
the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he
forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on
his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong
believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to
do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of
his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under
such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the
darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in
using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the
first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his
charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an
act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and
we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad
faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal;
except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even
though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit
vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given
of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions
subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to
commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent"
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of
them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal
shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the
crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has
been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or
another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that
which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies
and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870,
because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the
provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions
insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear
of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury.
(Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause
the injury which may be the object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law
as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes
clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first
paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the
actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to
designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse.
In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing
lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the
American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or
willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously"
"with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will
always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his
position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo
animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his
mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without
which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
 Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus
actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
—

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any
respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention;
or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when
vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the
mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an
upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far
from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these
facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first
in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1,
secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by
the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts
have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in
the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt
of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342;
Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say,
the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming
the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more
nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the
right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to
him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be
the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night
and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken
belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor.
No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal
liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination.
Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is
a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of
the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him,
although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide,
according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418,
Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent
menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head
before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who
hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine
which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from
the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck
him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he
had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head,
leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as
soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over
the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in
paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the
Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the
supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised
from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a
situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially
because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed
the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the
one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally
resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they
might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of
Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no
light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same
money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying,
"Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am
ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place.
Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances
defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two
of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused
to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused
was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the
darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I,
p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head
out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of
 which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who,
on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-
defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there
existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the
means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court
acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the
firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his
property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time,
he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the
facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and
his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was
done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by
the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred
responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of
prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both
instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be
expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our
minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a
government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts
are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute,
which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a
guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city
of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had
neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau
of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of
Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the
women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-
treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed
more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found
means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through
stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally
restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ
was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the
Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and
because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women
were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member
of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before
the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were
notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken
by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and
telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women
were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the
Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or
signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for
him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied
with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought
before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the
judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made
compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the
order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao,
was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On
January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who
had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account
for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in
bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find
them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of
the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in
contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be
struck from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the
feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the
constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by
duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens
after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction
and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have
been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of
being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion
leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the
city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American
constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more
power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts
within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the
liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these
officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as
much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold
the same club over the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official,
no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case,
"that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to
be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the
motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas
corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such
an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a
place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not
less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any
person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more
than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these
prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may
be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which
will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a
sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow
process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that
there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their
liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that
perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by
the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their
behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court
or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though
no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It
is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the
court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible
anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not
shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other
hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved
parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the
writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the
application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked
were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits.
At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas
corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila
continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take
a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and
claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if
the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should
be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to
Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has
lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the
authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme
Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained
in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and
Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed.
Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of
Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a
contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of
blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was
such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole
instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined,
but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the
prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode
of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not
important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The
difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The
important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac.
Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued
by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave
defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him
to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the
court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a
judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That
is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child.
If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no
longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not,
he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of
contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question
is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not
 producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re
Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of
Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the
city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then
beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and
refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due
course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged
in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb
vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of
habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found
that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the
court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As
far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.
According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought
before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court;
or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their
life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the
women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned
at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only
accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made
by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a
clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate
their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was
provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of
literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any
particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a
certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and
must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so,
is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible
exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only
followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal,
Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to
the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be
granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to
accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as
the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of
Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to
deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply
substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view.
Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and
embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once
command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz
are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five
days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of
January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the habeas corpus proceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.

There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.

We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street,
Sampaloc. For this reason, when more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer and transported to Davao, considering that
the existence of the said houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown,
acted without authority of any legal provision which constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city
of Manila.
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying with the order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the
necessity of taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated district or the
community formed by those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said women to return to their former residences in this city or in the provinces,
without the necessity of transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to
the places in which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.

As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find any apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the
steps taken by the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing the said women who were free at Davao
and presenting them before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the said women were living together in a given place. It was not
because they were really detained, but because on the first days there were no houses in which they could live with a relative independent from one another, and as
a proof that they were free a number of them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living separate from their companions who continued living together.

To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether he has acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said
community of prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the rights and interests of the said women and especially
of the patrons who have been directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights
and interests of the very numerous people of Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being more
than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated to
prostitution.

If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality are to be taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is
legal and permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for, although there were no positive laws prohibiting
the existence of such houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the
public administration, acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the
public, and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the
constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty, his individual rights, and his right to property.

A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot invoke in his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty
and individual rights, should the administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to free
from contagious the great majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good with respect
to the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the first persons named have contracted their diseases without
their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its
consequences, knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to
adopt, gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and
women, is still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious
diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.

If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put
herself under the will of another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates
herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it
possible for her to live within the community or society with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she
should therefore be comprised within that class which is always subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and
morality and to the conservation of public health, and for this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just
orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.

It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who have been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a
governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with due reflection the interests of the inhabitants
of this city in general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the authorities which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of
those who criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take care of their children.

For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence
not by a private citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and social morality, the latter could take the
step he had taken, availing himself of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting the immense majority of the population from the
social evils and diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true
center for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of
prostitution and the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty and the
individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily
renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting
prostitutes, considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such measures more humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter
in re et suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view the ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the community,
that is, putting an end to the living together in a certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they
adopt another manner of living which is better and more useful to themselves and to society.

In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present
found in Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who
should expressly make known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution must be
transmitted to the mayor within the shortest time possible for its due compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.

ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:

I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the
contempt committed, according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.

In the said decision, it is said:

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ
before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to
comply with the writ. As far as the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao
women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally
resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.

In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the respondents, for the purpose of complying with the order of the court,
could have, (1) produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said
women could not safely be brought before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their lawyers waived their right to be
present. According to the same decision, the said respondents ". . . did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not show
impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting
to show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this
time they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second
hearing by the respondents."

The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondent guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non production of the persons were far from
sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the return
did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents."

When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately
punished for contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before the
court, on January 13, 1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show that it was impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds
previously mentioned. With respect to this second order, the same decision has the following to say:

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were
dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it.

I do not agree to this conclusion.

The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of the issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same
month before taking the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of November, as the decision says, before he sent a
telegram to the provincial governor o f Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared
before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven of the
said women having returned to Manila at their own expense before the said second day of December and being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was
known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney for the respondents, were not produced before the court by the
respondents nor did the latter show any effort to present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this particular by the undersigned.

The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before
this court, presented technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to the city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the
respondents themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in
Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they desired to return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the
affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the
efforts made to find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women
who, as has been previously said, have been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will, only eight
(8) have been brought to Manila and presented before this court by the respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to
Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom were brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from
Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the other seven (7) women who
returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we have a total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by
the respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for their inability to present any of the said women that the latter
were content with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that the respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor
Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of
the first hearing of the case, as well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74) women already
indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count upon the
aid of the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of
the women before this court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said
respondent has substantially complied with the second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not complied with the mandate of this
court in its first and second orders; that neither of the said orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is,
according to the majority decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent with respect to the
second order confirms the contempt committed by non-compliance with the first order and constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with the second,
because of the production of only eight (8) of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue of his order and transported to
Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26) women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the
case which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be granted their liberty, the
respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he made any effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the said two
orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to the administration of
justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with the promptness
which the nature of the same required.

Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as
tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)

It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith.
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 502.)

It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person
hinders or prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as though he had
obstructed by some direct means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)

While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized
communities for establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the
courts and obedience to their orders and just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their
usefulness or efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for the courts as ministers of the law is
wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to remove an
unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)

The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the
contempt consisted of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts. In the American states the power to punish for
contempt, so far as the executive department and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as the legislative department is
concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost universally preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The power which the courts have of
vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not; and the authority for issuing attachments in a
proper case for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law.
. . . (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of the prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders,
which loss might have been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the respondent Justo Lukban; the damages which might have been
suffered by some of the women illegally detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court and of
the further fact that some of them were obliged to come to this city at their own expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the
petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition
interposed by the said petitioners and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are circumstances
which should be taken into account in imposing upon the respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty which,
according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or both such fine and
imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public
authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the city, and consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an example of
obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating from the courts of justice,
and in giving help and aid to the said courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.

I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos
(P500), and all the costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the records of this proceeding should be transmitted to
the Attorney-General in order that, after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of the
same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and
punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the
city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by reason of the same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will
be one of the means whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government
of laws and not a government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty
from illegal encroachments.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLU TION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required
by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed,
and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three
justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor
General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only
for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion
and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after
fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not
true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption
is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed
instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the
courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t
to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication
could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication
without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to
lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law.
As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it
exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by
the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further
comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny
and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their
lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective
thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees
bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on
every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine
citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at
the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my
understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to
come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the
statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of
general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported
and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in
fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective
thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees
bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax on
every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine
citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at
the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my
understanding of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to
come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the
constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the
statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of
general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported
and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in
fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

REYNALDO V. UMALI,
Petitioner,

G. R. No. 104037

May 29, 1992

-versus-

HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, SECRETARY OF FINANCE,

and HON. JOSE U. ONG, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondents.

______________________________________________

RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, MANUEL M. SUNGA,

PAUL D. UNGOS, BIENVENIDO T. JAMORALIN, JR., JOSE D.chanrobles virtual law library
FLORES, JR., EVELYN G. VILLEGAS, DOMINGO T. LIGOT,
HENRY E. LARON, PASTOR M. DALMACION, JR.,
and JULIUS NORMAN C. CERRADA,
Petitioners,

G. R. No. 104069

May 29, 1992

 -versus-

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

These consolidated cases are Petitions for Mandamus and Prohibition premised upon the following undisputed facts:

Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL AND ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME TAX
PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH [L], ITEMS (1) AND (2) [A] OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It provides as follows:

Sec. 1. The first paragraph of item [1], paragraph [1] of Section 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

[1] Personal exemptions allowable to individuals:

(1) Basic personal exemption as follows:
For single individual or married individual judicially decreed as legally separated with no qualified dependents
P9,000

For head of a family P12,000

For married individual P18,000

Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a personal exemption of P9,000 each.

Sec. 2. The first paragraph of item [2] (A), paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

(2) Additional exemption.

(a) Taxpayers with dependents. A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an additional exemption of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the total number of dependents for which additional exemptions
may be claimed shall not exceed four dependents: Provided, further, That an additional exemption of One Thousand Pesos
[1,000] shall be allowed for each child who otherwise qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980: Provided, finally, That the
additional exemption for dependents shall be claimed by only one of the spouses in case of married individuals electing to
compute their income tax liabilities separately.
Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved. [1]

The said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation.

On 26 December 1991, respondents promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

Sec. 1. Scope.- Pursuant to Sections 245 and 72 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7167, these Regulations are hereby
promulgated prescribing the collection at source of income tax on compensation income paid on or after January 1, 1992 under the Revised Withholding
Tax Tables [Annex "A"] which take into account the increase of personal and additional exemptions.

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 is amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-86 is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Section 8. Right to claim the following exemptions. -Each employee shall be allowed to claim the following amount of exemption with respect to
compensation paid on or after January 1, 1992.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Effectivity.- These regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992.

On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G. R. No. 104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang Bayan Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a Petition for Mandamus for
himself and in behalf all individual Filipino taxpayers, to compel the respondents to implement Rep. Act No. 7167 with respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers
earned or received on or after 1 January 1991 or as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991.

On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G. R. No. 104069 likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition on their behalf as well as for those other individual
taxpayers who might be similarly situated, to compel the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to implement the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the personal and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and to enjoin the respondents from
implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92.cralaw

In the Court's Resolution of 10 March 1992, these two [2] cases were consolidated. Respondents were required to comment on the petitions, which they did within the
prescribed period.cralaw

The principal issues to be resolved in these cases are: [1] whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took effect upon its approval by the President on 19 December 1991, or on 30
January 1992, i.e., after fifteen [15] days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation; and [2] assuming that Rep.
Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or received during calendar
year 1991.cralaw

In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that the Court in its resolution in Caltex [Phils.],, Inc. vs. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No. 97282, 26
June 1991, which is on all fours with this case as to the first issue, held:

The central issue presented in the instant petition is the effectivity of R. A. 6965 entitled "An Act Revising The Form of Taxation on Petroleum Products
from Ad Valorem to Specific, Amending For the Purpose Section 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code, As amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty
Seven Hundred Sixty Seven."
Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity clause which provides. "This Act shall take effect upon its approval."
R. A. 6965 was approved on September 19, 1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, on
September 20, 1990. Pursuant to the Act, an implementing regulation was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Revenue Memorandum
Circular 85-90, stating that R. A. 6965 took effect on October 5, 1990. Petitioner took exception thereof and argued that the law took effect on
September 20, 1990 instead.
Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code [as amended by Executive Order No. 200] which provides:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera [L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452], We construed Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid down the rule:
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event
be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended.
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for its effectivity and neither can it become effective upon its approval notwithstanding its express
statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra, R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after September 20,
1990, or specifically, on October 5, 1990.

Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after fifteen [15] days following its publication on 14 January 1992 in the
"Malaya."

Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation income earned or received during
calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
 Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more often than once every three years, the
personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare
subsistence levels.

As the personal and additional exemptions of individual taxpayers were last adjusted in 1986, the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
could have adjusted the personal and additional exemptions in 1989 by increasing the same even without any legislation providing for such adjustment. But the
President did not.

However, House Bill 28970, which was subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act 7167, was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1989 although its
passage was delayed and it did not become effective law until 30 January 1992. A perusal, however, of the sponsorship remarks of Congressman Hernando B. Perez,
Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill 28970, provides an indication of the intent of Congress in enacting Rep. Act 7167. The pertinent
legislative journal contains the following:

At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill provides for increased personal additional exemptions to individuals in view of the higher standard of
living.
The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income of individuals subject to income tax to enable them to spend for basic necessities and have more
disposable income.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the basic necessities and that it had been three years since the last exemption adjustment in 1986.
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity of passing the measure to mitigate the effects of the current inflation and of the implementation of the
salary standardization law. Stating that it is imperative for the government to take measures to ease the burden of the individual income tax filers, Mr.
Perez then cited specific examples of how the measure can help assuage the burden to the taxpayers.
He then reiterated that the increase in the prices of commodities has eroded the purchasing power of the peso despite the recent salary increases and
emphasized that the Bill will serve to compensate the adverse effects of inflation on the taxpayers. [Journal of the House of Representatives, May 23,
1990, pp. 32-33].

It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167, speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as adjustments "to the poverty threshold level." Certainly, "the poverty
threshold level" is the poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold levels in futuro, at which time there may be
need of further adjustments in personal exemptions. Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of the fact that these personal and additional exemptions are fixed
amounts to which an individual taxpayer is entitled, as a means to cushion the devastating effects of high prices and a depreciated purchasing power of the
currency. In the end, it is the lower-income and the middle-income groups of taxpayers [not the high-income taxpayers] who stand to benefit most from the
increase of personal and additional exemptions provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To that extent, the Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present
economic plight of the lower income taxpayers. It is intended to remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore existing personal and additional exemptions for individual
taxpayers.

And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions that it provides for shall be available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 shall have become
effective. In other words, these exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns which is, under the National Internal Revenue Code, done not
later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, as aforestated, on 30 January 1992, the
increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But these increased exemptions can be available on 15
April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.cralaw

The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year;
the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15 July 1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not been
enacted. To make Rep. Act 7167 refer back to income received during 1990 would require language explicitly retroactive in purport and effect, language that would
have to authorize the payment of refunds of taxes paid on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991: such language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167.cralaw

The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available only in respect of compensation income received during 1992, as the
implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 purport to provide. Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 would, in effect, postpone the availability of the increased exemptions
to 1 January-15 April 1993, and thus, literally defer the effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 to 1 January 1993. Thus, the implementing regulations collide frontally with Section
3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval." The objective of the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in postponing through Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 the legal effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 is, of course, entirely understandable, To defer to 1993 the
reduction of governmental tax revenues which irresistibly follows from the application of Rep. Act 7167. But the law-making authority has spoken and the Court
cannot refuse to apply the lawmaker's words. Whether or not the government can afford the drop in tax revenues resulting from such increased exemptions was for
Congress [not this Court] to decide.cralaw

WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income earned or received
from 1 January 1992 are hereby set aside. They should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991.cralaw
Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the increased exemptions on compensation income earned during calendar
year 1991 who may have filed their income tax returns on or before 15 April 1992 [later extended to 24 April 1992] without the benefit of such increased exemptions,
are entitled to the corresponding tax refunds and/or credits and respondents are ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits. No costs.cralaw

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. , Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J.,

Concurring and Dissenting:

I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned in this case by Justice Teodoro Padilla, because I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in the law should be
effective already with respect to the income earned for the year 1991. After all, even if We say that the law became effective only in 1992, still this can refer only to
the income obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be filed in 1992 is the income tax return of the income earned in 1991.

However, I wish to dissent from the part of the decision which affirms the obiter dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera [146 SCRA 446, 452] to the
effect that a law becomes effective not on the date expressly provided for in said law, but on the date after fifteen [15] days from the publication in the Official
Gazette or any national newspaper of general circulation. I say obiter dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not the actual issue in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera
[supra]. In that case, several Presidential Decrees of President Marcos were issued, but they were never published in the Official Gazette or in any national
newspaper of general circulation. The real issue, therefore, in said case was whether or not said Presidential Decrees ever became effective. The Court ruled with
respect to this issue [and not any other issue, since there was no other issue whatsoever], that said presidential decrees never became effective. In other words,
the ratio decidendi in that case was the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the statement as to which should be applied "after fifteen
[15] days from publication" or "unless otherwise provided by law" [Art. 2, Civil Code] was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling in the Resolution dated June 26, 1991 in
Caltex, Inc. vs. Comm. of Internal Revenue cannot likewise apply because it was based on the aforesaid obiter in Tanada v. Tuvera [supra]. In the instant tax
exemptions case, the law says effective upon approval, therefore, since this law was approved by the President in December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the
January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually immaterial.cralaw

Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.

It is very clear and needs no interpretation or construction.

CRUZ. J.,

Concurring:

As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, I should like to make these brief observations on my brother Paras' separate opinion. He says that "the ratio
decidendi in that case was the ruling that without publication, there can be no effectivity." Yet, while accepting this, he contends that pursuant to its terms, R. A. 7167
became effective upon approval [i.e., even without publication]. He adds that "since this law was approved by the President in December 1991, its subsequent
publication in the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.

Endnote

[1] Before the enactment of Rep. Act 7167, Executive Order No. 37, approved by the President on 31 July 1986, provided for the following personal and additional
exemptions for individual taxpayers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 (1) Personal exemptions allowable to individuals. (1) Basic personal exemption. For the purpose of determining the tax provided in Section 21(a) of this
Title, there shall be allowed a basic personal exemption as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For single individual or married individual
judicially decreed as legally separated with no qualified dependents P6,000
For head of a family P7,500
For married individual P12,000

Provided, That husband and wife electing to compute their income tax separately shall be entitled to a personal exemption of P6,000 each.

For purposes of this paragraph, the term "Head of Family" means an unmarried or legally separated man or woman with one or both parents, or with one or more
brothers or sisters, or with one or more legitimate, recognized natural or legally adopted children living with and dependent upon him for their chief support, where
such brothers or sisters or children are not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or where such children, brothers or
sisters, regardless of age are incapable of self-support because of mental or physical defect.

(2) Additional exemption

(A) Taxpayers with dependents.- A married individual or a head of family shall be allowed an additional exemption of Three thousand pesos (P3,000) for each
dependent: Provided, That the total number of dependents for which additional exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed four dependents: Provided, further, That
an additional exemption of One thousand pesos (P1,000) shall be allowed for each child who otherwise qualified as dependent prior to January 1, 1980; and Provided,
finally, That the additional exemption for dependents shall be claimed by only one of the spouses in the case of married individuals electing to compute their income
tax liabilities separately.

In case of legally separated spouses, additional exemptions may be claimed only by the spouse who was awarded custody of the child or children: Provided, That the
total amount of additional exemptions that may be claimed by both shall not exceed the maximum additional exemptions herein allowed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For purposes of this paragraph, a dependent means a legitimate, recognized natural or legally adopted child chiefly dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if
such dependent is not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if such dependent, regardless of age, is incapable of self-
support because of mental or physical defect.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165575 February 2, 2011

ADELIA C. MENDOZA and as Attorney-in-Fact of ALICE MALLETA, Petitioners,

vs.
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated July 2, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79796, and its Resolution dated September 9,
2004, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Appellants’ Brief filed by petitioners for failure to comply with the
requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

The facts are as follows:

On November 5, 2001, petitioner Adelia Mendoza, attorney-in-fact of petitioner Alice Malleta, filed a Complaint2 for annulment of titles, foreclosure proceedings and
certificate of sale with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Fourth Judicial Region.
In their Complaint, herein petitioners stated that on October 6, 1995, they entered into a Real Estate Mortgage Contract with respondent United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) in the amount of P4,925,000.00.3 On August 27, 1998, the properties were sold at public auction in the total amount of P31,300,00.00 to UCPB. On
September 17, 2001, an Affidavit of Consolidation was executed by UCPB.

Petitioners contended that the foreclosure proceedings violated due process and the legal requirements under Act No. 3135, as amended, on the following grounds:

a) There was no valid and legal notice to petitioner Adelia Mendoza of the foreclosure proceedings;

b) There was no valid and legal notice of the auction sale;

c) There was no valid and legal notice of the consolidation of ownership;

d) There was no valid publication and notice as required by law;

e) There was a violation of Republic Act No. 3765, "An Act to Require the Disclosure of Finance Charges in Connection with Extensions of Credit,"
specifically Section 6 of the law;

f) There was no clear and accurate financial statement showing the application of payments of the plaintiffs (petitioners herein); and

g) There was no valid letter of demand showing the clear finance charges.

Petitioners prayed that the foreclosure proceedings and Certificate of Sale be annulled, and that if ever any new title is issued in lieu of their Transfer Certificates of
Titles,4 the same should be cancelled and annulled; that respondent be ordered to pay petitioners attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of
P20,000.00.

In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,5 respondent UCPB denied that petitioners entered into a Real Estate Mortgage Contract with it in the amount of
P4,925,000.00, the truth being that petitioner Adelia Mendoza executed several promissory notes in the total principal amount of P27,500,000.00, and to secure
these obligations she executed, together with petitioner Alice Malleta, several real estate mortgages over several parcels of land in favor of UCPB.

Respondent denied that the foreclosure proceedings were legally defective, as the said proceedings were done in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as
amended. It countered that the law does not require personal notice to the mortgagor of the foreclosure proceedings and the auction sale, as the publication of the
notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. Moreover, there is no legal requirement of personal notice to
the mortgagor of the consolidation of ownership, as the registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes notice to the whole world that
the mortgagor or any interested party has one year from the date of such registration to redeem the foreclosed properties. Respondent claimed that it complied
with the posting requirements, and that it had also complied with the provisions of Republic Act No. 3765 and had regularly furnished petitioners with statements of
account pursuant to standard banking practice.

Respondent contended that petitioners knew that the foreclosure was forthcoming due to their default in the payment of their obligations. Petitioners had been sent
several verbal and written demands to pay their obligations and had been warned that failure to settle their obligations would result in the foreclosure of their
properties. Further, petitioners had one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale to redeem their property, but they failed to do so.

Respondent denied that there was "non-disclosure of finance charges without lawful and legal demand," since it had regularly sent petitioners statements of
account and had regularly given verbal and written notices to pay their obligations. It also denied the allegations of lack of reconciliation and verification of
accounts. In this regard, respondent stated that petitioners could have easily verified their account with the account officers of UCPB, but they failed to do so.

As special and affirmative defenses, respondent stated that on August 9, 1994, petitioner Mendoza applied for and was granted a credit line in the amount of P25
million, which is supported by a Loan Agreement. 6 On October 9, 1995, the credit line was increased by P2.5 million, as evidenced by a Loan Agreement. 7 Petitioner
Mendoza availed of the said credit line in the aggregate principal amount of Twenty-Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P27.5 million) and executed
promissory notes 8 therefor. Among other conditions, the promissory notes carried acceleration clauses, making these notes immediately due and payable even
before maturity in case an event of default occurred, including, but not limited to, payment of principal and interest amortizations.

Moreover, respondent stated that on August 10, 1995, as partial security for the promissory notes, petitioner Malleta, through her attorney-in-fact, petitioner Adelia
Mendoza, executed a real estate mortgage in favor of UCPB over several parcels of land registered under the name of Alice B. Malleta with the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City. Later, pursuant to petitioner Mendoza’s commitment with UCPB, the titles of the mortgaged properties were transferred under the name of Adelia B.
Mendoza upon release of the loan proceeds and the mortgage annotation was carried over to the new titles.
According to respondent, on October 6, 1995, petitioner Mendoza executed a real estate mortgage over 12 parcels of land,9 all registered in her name, as additional
security for the said promissory notes.

Respondent stated that petitioner Mendoza failed to discharge her obligations under the promissory notes, despite written and verbal demands made by UCPB upon
her, the latest of which was the demand letter dated January 29, 1998. 10 Hence, it had no other recourse but to initiate foreclosure proceedings on the
aforementioned securities.

Respondent averred that on May 6, 1998, it filed a Petition 11 for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the mortgaged properties before the Ex Officio Sheriff of Lipa City.

On July 21, 1998, the Sheriff prepared a Notice of Sale 12 and set the date of the public sale on August 27, 1998. 13 On July 28, 1998, the Sheriff posted the Notice of Sale
in three public places and the Notice was, likewise, published in Tambuling Batangas, a newspaper of general circulation, on July 22 and 29, 1998, and on August 5,
1998. The certificate of posting and publisher’s affidavit of publication were attached as Annexes "12,"14 and "13,"15 respectively.

The public sale was conducted on August 28, 1998. The mortgaged properties were sold in the amount of P31,300,000.00 to UCPB as the highest and winning bidder.
A Certificate of Sale16 was issued in favor of UCPB, which was duly registered in July 2000 at the back of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties with
the Register of Deeds of Lipa City.

Petitioners failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the one-year redemption period that expired on July 21, 2001. Consequently, UCPB consolidated its
ownership over the said properties and new certificates of title were issued under its name.

Respondent stated that on August 27, 1998, the date of the auction sale, petitioners’ outstanding obligation was P58,692,538.63, as evidenced by a Statement of
Account. 17

According to respondent, the proceeds of the foreclosure sale amounted to P31,300,000.00, leaving a deficiency of P27,392,538.63, an amount which it is entitled to
payment from petitioner Mendoza, together with penalties and interest due thereon.

Respondent prayed that, after hearing, judgment be rendered (1) dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit; (2) on the counterclaim, ordering petitioners to pay the
deficiency claim of P27,392,538.63, including the penalties and interests due thereon from August 27, 1998, and P1 million as attorney’s fees and P200,000.00 as
litigation expenses.

On March 25, 2003, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 18 for failure to prosecute. Respondent contended that petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of its
Answer on August 26, 2002, as shown by the photocopy of the registry return receipt. It stated that under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners have the positive duty to promptly set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading had been filed. It stated that the Answer was the last pleading, since
petitioners failed to file a Reply thereon within the reglementary period.

Respondent stated that since August 26, 2002, or almost a period of six months, petitioners had not taken steps to set the case for pre-trial as mandated by the
rules. Respondent submitted that the case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable period of time as provided by Section 3, Rule 17 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It asserted that failure to set the case for pre-trial for almost six (6) months is an unreasonable period of time, as a period of three
(3) months had been found to constitute an unreasonable period of time in Montejo v. Urotia. 19

Petitioners, through counsel Atty. Jose P. Malabanan, filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Set the Case for Pre-trial,20 and stated therein that
their counsel on record is Atty. Monchito C. Rosales, who died on December 22, 2002; that Atty. Jose P. Malabanan forgot the case because of the death of Atty.
Rosales (who is his law partner), and that he was setting the case for pre-trial. Petitioners prayed that the Opposition and motion to set the case for pre-trial be
granted.

On April 15, 2003, the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 12 issued an Order21 dismissing the case. The court found the Motion to Dismiss (for failure to prosecute) to be in
accordance with the rules. It stated that the records of the case showed that since August 20, 2002, the issues in this case had already been joined, and that Atty.
Monchito C. Rosales was still alive then, yet he did not take any step to have the case set for pre-trial. It found the claim of Atty. Jose P. Malabanan, that he forgot
about the case because of the death of Atty. Rosales, as unpardonable, flimsy and an invalid excuse.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 15, 2003 was denied for lack of merit by the trial court in an Order dated May 26, 2003.22

Thereafter, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Orders to the Court of Appeals, and filed an Appellant’s Brief on April 5, 2004.

On May 20, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the Appellant’s Brief failed to comply with the requirements under Section 13, Rule
44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent contended that the Appellant’s Brief contained only the following topics: (1) Prefaratory Statement; (2) Statement
of Facts and Antecedent Proceedings; (3) Parties; (4) Statement of the Case; (5) Issues; (6) Arguments/Discussion; and (7) Prayer. The Appellants’ Brief did not have
the following items: (1) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged,
textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited; (2) an assignment of errors; (3) on the authorities cited, references to the page of
the report at which the case begins and page of the report on which the citation is found; (4) page references to the record in the Statement of Facts and Statement
of the Case.

Respondent contended that the absence of a specific assignment of errors or of page references to the record in the Appellants’ Brief is a ground for dismissal of
the appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.23

On June 4, 2004, petitioners filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal. 24 They contended that the assignment of errors were only designated as "Issues" in
their Appellants’ Brief; and although the designation of the "Assignment of Error" may vary, the substance thereof remains. Moreover, petitioners stated that the
textbooks and statutes were cited immediately after the portion where they are quoted, which is more convenient and facilitates ready reference of the legal and
jurisprudential basis of the arguments. They claimed that the absence of a subject index does not substantially deviate from the requirements of the Rules of Court,
because one can easily go over the Appellants’ Brief and can designate the parts with nominal prudence. They pointed out that Section 6 of the Rules of Court
provides for a liberal construction of the Rules in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.

On July 2, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant-appellee UCPB’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby GRANTED. This appeal is ordered DISMISSED for failure to
comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.25

The Court of Appeals held that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules. It found that
the Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

In this case, the plaintiff-appellant’s brief failed to provide an index, like a table of contents, to facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready references to the
records and documents referred to therein. This Court has to thumb through the brief page after page to locate the party’s arguments, or a particular citation, or
whatever else needs to be found and considered. In so doing, the plaintiff-appellant unreasonably abdicated her duty to assist this Court in the appreciation and
evaluation of the issues on appeal.

Further, the statement of facts is not supported by page references to the record. Instead of reasonably complying with the requirements of the rules, plaintiff-
appellant annexed the plain photocopy of the documents being referred to in the statements of facts. Thus, if only to verify the veracity of the allegations in the brief
and the existence of the attached documents, this Court has to pore over the entire records of this case.

There is no merit in the plaintiff-appellant’s argument that the "Assignment of Error" was merely designated as "Issues" but the substance thereof remains and
should not cause the dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court categorically stated in De Liano vs. Court of Appeals that the statement of issues is not to be
confused with the assignment of errors because they are not one and the same, for otherwise, the rules would not have required a separate statement of each.26

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated September 9, 2004. The appellate court held that
petitioners merely reiterated the arguments raised in their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal, which arguments were already passed upon by the court.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted that despite ample opportunity, petitioners never attempted to remedy the deficiency in their Appellants’ Brief by filing another
brief in conformity with the rules, but obstinately maintained that their Appellants’ Brief substantially complied with the rules.

Hence, petitioners filed this petition raising the following issues:I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL NOTWITHSTANDING THE PETITIONERS’ SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE [WITH] SECTION 13, RULE 44
[OF] THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.II

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LIPA CITY, BRANCH 12 ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

III

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LIPA CITY, BRANCH 12 ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE POSTING REQUIREMENT
UNDER SECTION 3, ACT NO. 3135 IS FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS.
 IV

THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND AUCTION SALE OF THE SUBJECT REALTIES VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE CONTRACT OF
MORTGAGE ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT ON 06 OCTOBER 1995.

RESPONDENT UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK VIOLATED SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3765 ON THE REQUIREMENT OF FULL DISCLOSURE OF FINANCE CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE EXTENSIONS OF CREDIT.

VI

PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES. 27

The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that their Appellants’ Brief failed to comply with Section
13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the said brief did not have a subject index, an assignment of errors, and page references to the record in the
Statement of Facts.

Petitioners argue that the absence of a subject index in their Appellants’ Brief is not a material deviation from the requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and that each portion of the 12-page brief was boldly designated to separate each portion.

Moreover, petitioners contend that while the "assignment of errors" was not designated as such in their Appellants’ Brief, the assignment of errors were clearly
embodied in the "Issues" thereof, which substantially complies with the rules.

The petition is without merit.

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law.28 An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. 29

In regard to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals, such as this case, Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the contents of
an Appellant’s Brief, thus:

Sec. 13. Contents of appellant’s brief.—The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged,
textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited;

(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall be separately, distinctly and concisely stated without repetition and numbered
consecutively;

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed
rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy, with
page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in
controversy, together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the
record;

(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment;

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of error with page references to the record. The authorities relied
upon shall be cited by the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;

(g) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or judgment which the appellant seeks; and
 (h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant’s brief shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of the judgment or final order appealed from.

In this case, the Appellants’ Brief of petitioners did not have a subject index. The importance of a subject index should not be underestimated. De Liano v. Court of
Appeals30 declared that the subject index functions like a table of contents, facilitating the review of appeals by providing ready reference. It held that:

[t]he first requirement of an appellant’s brief is a subject index. The index is intended to facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready reference, functioning
much like a table of contents. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal memoranda filed before appellate courts. The
danger of this is the very real possibility that the reviewing tribunal will be swamped with voluminous documents. This occurs even though the rules consistently
urge the parties to be "brief" or "concise" in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other papers to be filed in court. The subject index makes readily available at one’s
fingertips the subject of the contents of the brief so that the need to thumb through the brief page after page to locate a party’s arguments, or a particular citation,
or whatever else needs to be found and considered, is obviated. 31

Moreover, the Appellants’ Brief had no assignment of errors, but petitioners insist that it is embodied in the "Issues" of the brief. The requirement under Section 13,
Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for an "assignment of errors" in paragraph (b) thereof is different from a "statement of the issues of fact or law" in
paragraph (e) thereof. The statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors, since they are not one and the same; otherwise, the rules would
not require a separate statement for each.32 An assignment of errors is an enumeration by the appellant of the errors alleged to have been committed by the trial
court for which he/she seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment, while the statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be resolved by the
appellate court.33

Further, the Court of Appeals found that the Statement of Facts was not supported by page references to the record. De Liano v. Court of Appeals held:

x x x The facts constitute the backbone of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the case, and consequently, will govern
the appropriate relief. Appellants should remember that the Court of Appeals is empowered to review both questions of law and of facts. Otherwise, where only a
pure question of law is involved, appeal would pertain to this Court. An appellant, therefore, should take care to state the facts accurately though it is permissible to
present them in a manner favorable to one party. x x x Facts which are admitted require no further proof, whereas facts in dispute must be backed by evidence.
Relative thereto, the rule specifically requires that one’s statement of facts should be supported by page references to the record. Indeed, disobedience therewith
has been punished by dismissal of the appeal. Page references to the record are not an empty requirement. If a statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page
reference to the record, it may be presumed to be without support in the record and may be stricken or disregarded altogether.34

The assignment of errors and page references to the record in the statement of facts are important in an Appellant’s Brief as the absence thereof is a basis for the
dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 (f), Rule 50, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. -- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:

xxxx

(f ) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of
Rule 44.

Rules 44 and 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals. 35 Rules of procedure
exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. 36 The Court of Appeals noted in its
Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration that despite ample opportunity, petitioners never attempted to file an amended appellants’ brief
correcting the deficiencies of their brief, but obstinately clung to their argument that their Appellants’ Brief substantially complied with the rules. Such obstinacy is
incongruous with their plea for liberality in construing the rules on appeal. 37

De Liano v. Court of Appeals held:

Some may argue that adherence to these formal requirements serves but a meaningless purpose, that these may be ignored with little risk in the smug certainty
that liberality in the application of procedural rules can always be relied upon to remedy the infirmities. This misses the point. We are not martinets; in appropriate
instances, we are prepared to listen to reason, and to give relief as the circumstances may warrant. However, when the error relates to something so elementary
as to be inexcusable, our discretion becomes nothing more than an exercise in frustration. It comes as an unpleasant shock to us that the contents of an appellant’s
brief should still be raised as an issue now. There is nothing arcane or novel about the provisions of Section 13, Rule 44. The rule governing the contents of
appellants’ briefs has existed since the old Rules of Court, which took effect on July 1, 1940, as well as the Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1,
1964, until they were superseded by the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provisions were substantially preserved, with few revisions. 381avvphi1
In fine, the Court upholds the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of petitioners on the ground that their Appellants’ Brief does not comply with
the requirements provided in Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the dismissal is supported by Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and jurisprudence.39 With the dismissal of the appeal, the other issues raised by petitioners need not be discussed by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Resolutions dated July 2, 2004 and September 9, 2004, in CA-G.R. CV No. 79796, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B"
(of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
 Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of
Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona , 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and
(6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective
position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines :

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis
"legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government
agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP
has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking
highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical
clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice,
which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition,
the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically
removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal
services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services"
and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general public of the
services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the
Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a
cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the
place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers
legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of
the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public
good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized
legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there
can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the
protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made available
exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not
be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized
or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it
cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for
profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such
practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen,
through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right
and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation
employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds
out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who
have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a
personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons
who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized
practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law
practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from
the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences
course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there are in thos e jurisdictions,
courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being exploited by
those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal
services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in
the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should
be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services.
8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not
help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent
is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an
insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines :

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the
above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces
that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country.
While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills
to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has
yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee,
when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should
ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements,
is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by
lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . .
. .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . .
Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must
be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect
in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations
field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man.
But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business
agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the
practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen
for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent
for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person
appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may
be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his
 men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations
Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative'
one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in
the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his
client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law.
However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard
Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then
it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports to say what
the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that
the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under
the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
 office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce
and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course
of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice
of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the
services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA
submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret
marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine
marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On
this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by
which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients
to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments,
where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation
to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions
may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing,
storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or
witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications,
obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and
other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for
the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With
its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action
to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor,"
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.
N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists
in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot
afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask
you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of
minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the
residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her
sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate
taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property,
and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a
one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only
a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the
practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The
practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only
those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect
to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not
in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law
profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations
of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons
not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only
from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple
of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result
of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily
paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes
in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the
fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously
not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition
against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as
that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in
the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack
lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt
and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present
proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum,
since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction,
just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse
thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24735 October 31, 1969

CONSOLACION P. MANGILA, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE JOSE T. LANTIN, and THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF TARLAC, TARLAC, Respondents.

Moises Sevilla Ocampo and Maximino Q. Canlas for petitioner.

Provincial Fiscal Bartolome P. Arboleda for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, we are asked to strike down respondent judge's order sustaining his jurisdiction to hear and determine a criminal case
for serious slander in which petitioner is the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The present case has its beginning in a verified criminal complaint filed with the Fiscal's Office on October 8, 1963 by the spouses Naciensena Santos de Dazo and
Mariano T. Dazo, charging petitioner Consolacion P. Mangila with serious slander. Two days thereafter, on October 10, 1963, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Fernando M.
Bartolome, before whom the foregoing complaint was subscribed and sworn to, lodged an information signed by him for serious slander against Consolacion P.
Mangila before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. 1 The fiscal later registered on February 15, 1965 an amended information attaching thereto the complaint of the
offended spouses filed with the fiscal. The defamatory words claimed to have uttered by Concepcion P. Mangila in Concepcion, Tarlac, on or about September 30,
1963 consist of the following: "BAYU CO MIYASAWA MAGLANDI CA PANG CANG DAZO, PUTANG MALANDING PACARAT," which translated into English reads as follows:
"BEFORE YOU WERE MARRIED YOU HAD ILLICIT RELATIONS WITH DAZO. PROSTITUTE." Such defamatory words, it is averred, were directed against the spouses
Dazo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On February 12, 1965, petitioner herein, Consolacion P. Mangila, moved in the court below to quash the information. She claims lack of court jurisdiction because: (1)
the crime of serious slander falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Concepcion, Tarlac; and (2) the defamation charged consists in the
imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio, and yet, the criminal action was not brought at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by
the offended parties. Respondent judge's resolution of February 24, 1965 dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction of the court to try the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, on motion to reconsider filed by the prosecuting attorney, respondent judge, on May 10, 1965, reconsidered its order of dismissal, denied the motion to
quash and set a date for petitioner's arraignment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It was petitioner's turn to move for a reconsideration of the judge's May 10 order. Respondent judge, in his order of June 17, 1965, resolved to deny the
motion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner then came to this Court on certiorari and prohibition. On August 4, 1965, we issued a cease-and-desist order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

1. Petitioner's position is that the case of grave oral defamation below falls within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Concepcion, Tarlac. She
cites Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 2613 and 3828, the statute then in force. But we should not overlook another provision
of the same Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 44 (f), which should be considered in connection with Section 87 (c).It may perhaps aid understanding if we reproduce the
two in parallel columns:
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. - SEC. 87. Original jurisdiction to try
Courts of First Instance shall have criminal cases. - Municipal judges
original jurisdiction: and judges of city courts of chartered
cities shall have original jurisdiction
x x x over:chanrobles virtual law library

(f) In all criminal cases in which x x x

the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, (c) Except violations of election laws
or a fine of more than two hundred all other offenses in which the
pesos. penalty provided by law
is imprisonment for not more
than three years, or a fine of not more than
three thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment.

The case before us presents another occasion for reaffirming what has been elaborately discussed and repeatedly ruled upon in a number of cases.2 For, the
penalty for serious oral defamation ranges from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period - from four months and one day
to two years and four months. 3 Which, in passing, is clearly within the area of the penalty - for jurisdictional purposes - prescribed in Section 44(f) and 87(c)
aforementioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Expositor of the law is Esperat vs. Avila, supra. It gives a direct answer to the question here posed. Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Court, there said:

The fallacy in petitioner's argument lies in his failure to consider section 44(f) of the same Judiciary Act of 1948, in conjunction with its section 87(c). Note that
notwithstanding the various amendments received by section 87, section 44(f) remained unaltered, thereby indicating the intention of the legislators to retain the
original jurisdiction of the court of first instance in certain cases. The fact that the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts was enlarged in virtue of the
amendment of section 87(c), cannot be taken as a repeal or withdrawal of the jurisdiction conferred on the court of first instance . Not only is implied repeal
disfavored by the law, but also, it is a cardinal principle that a statute must be so construed as to harmonize all apparent conflicts, and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. 4

Indeed, we see no inconsistency between Sections 44(f) and 87(c), both of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The two can stand together. One does not displace the other. As
we reconcile and harmonize, we find that the two can be given a conjoint, not a discordant, effect. As we have said in a previous case,5 "[w]e have to take the
thought conveyed by the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each and every
provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute; and endeavour to make every part effective, harmonious, sensible."chanrobles virtual law library

There is, indeed, parity of jurisdiction in the municipal court and in the Court of First Instance over criminal cases - except violations of election laws - in which the
penalty imposable is more than six months' imprisonment or a fine of more than P200, but not exceeding three years' imprisonment, or a fine of P3,000, or both
such fine and imprisonment. Since Criminal Case 2923 for serious slander calls for a penalty (arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period) which is clearly within the range just mentioned, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac may not be shorn of its jurisdiction to try said
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2. Petitioner decries the fact that the criminal prosecution was not brought at the instance of and upon the complaint expressly filed by the offended parties. This
calls into focus the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 1289, which reads: "No criminal action for defamation which
consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the
offended party."chanrobles virtual law library

A cursory reading of the statute just quoted will yield the conclusion that the present defamation case is outside the restricted area therein provided. The indictment
alleges that petitioner uttered publicly and maliciously the defamatory words that the Dazos had illicit relations with each other before they were married, and that
the wife, Naciensena Santos de Dazo, was a prostitute. This is not an imputation which cannot be prosecuted de officio and which, by express provision in Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code, would require that the criminal action be brought "at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party." The
crimes which cannot be prosecuted de officio are with specificity enumerated in Title XI, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code, thus - adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness. 6 The slanderous imputation here certainly is not one of those just recited. The reason, we must say, is that
prostitution is a crime. But it is a crime against public morals and can be prosecuted de officio. The alleged premarital relations of the offended husband and wife
could be a vice or defect. And again, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply. Because, the law only exacts that a criminal action for defamation be filed
at the instance of or upon complaint expressly signed by the offended party where the crime imputed cannot be prosecuted de
officio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Having reached the conclusion that the criminal information filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac in Criminal Case 2923 (People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Consolacion P. Mangila, Accused) heretofore mentioned does not suffer from the defects pointed out by petitioner, the petition herein is hereby
dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court dissolved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Costs against petitioner. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]

TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J:

Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm.
Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct
committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent
District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the
Ombudsman.

Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his
official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.

Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may
be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.

On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera of their office.

Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman
discovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and
exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.

II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)i[1] pertinently provides that -

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),ii[2] when a respondent is
absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the
ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to
limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary to take an
alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own
rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of
procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."

Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court
on pure question on law.

xxx

Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers,
functions, and duties.

xxx

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent
with the due process. x x x

xxx

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice
shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

xxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.

Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure
formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or non-avalability of appeal
in administrative cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.

Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be
unavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the
differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis-à-vis Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.iii[3] and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al.iv[4] were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.v[5] was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,vi[6] Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., vii[7] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,viii[8] and Jao, et al. vs.
Vasquez,ix[9] which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.x[10] was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated
as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto, et al.xi[11] which was a special civil action for certiorari.

Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively
resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the
basis of a special original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the answers thereto appear to be.
Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at
this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative
diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from
an incident in a criminal action.

III

After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does appear to have been seriously considered before, that the
administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses
imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the
amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were
made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.

It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the
Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case
management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.

Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on
November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an
inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions,
the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the authority
vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgement.xii[12]

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings,xiii[13] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on
which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.xiv[14]

Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion.xv[15] The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where the fact is developed.xvi[16] The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.xvii[17]

The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the
following resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:

The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order
(Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A,
EDSA, Quezon City,' which absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among other."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto,
the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was
enacted on November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A.
No. 8770 in light of the provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994,
237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and in this case, and the foregoing legal consideration appear to impugn the
constitutionality and validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon and the issue be first
resolved before conducting further proceedings in this appellate review.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding
pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

IV

The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have
presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to
this Court of the aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is
the passage of law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases in which
only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court may
provide," said section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under
Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this Court already has jurisdiction.

We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari
under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court.xviii[18]
Also, the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgements and
orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the
legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific
provision to that effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate
procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution.

Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedurexix[19] preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari
to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:

SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law , may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition shall raise only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).

This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and
providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That
intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no
uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agenciesxx[20] are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies .xxi[21]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
"high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule
43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office
of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.

Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we
do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming
from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot
have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is
limited to jurisdictional questions.*

The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or
"acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of acquiescence as a
matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some
statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and
when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.

Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other
grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at
the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its
appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional
issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. xxii[22]

It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination
of private respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is
final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that
the Court should not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as earlier
explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because
of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the
question.

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. xxiii[23] was intended to give
this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court xxiv[24]

We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First Lepant o Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of
the difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits
of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.

Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
consent, private respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee
Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House
of Representatives.xxv[25] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 xxvi[26] and the same was thereafter enacted
into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this
Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal
sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted
this Court on the matter, thus:

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

xxx

Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to
Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution which requires its advice
and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the
matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be
appeals on certiorari.xxvii[27] There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent
.xxviii[28]

VI

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy
adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by
this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is
procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court.
This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power,
and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another.xxix[29] It is admitted that what is
procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.xxx[30] It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic
approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive
right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.xxxi[31] If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right
such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.xxxii[32]

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover,
relates to procedure only.xxxiii[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved.
Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy,
which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.xxxiv[34]

Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such
power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such
transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy.xxxv[35]

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such,
they are applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effectxxxvi[36] or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even
from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro
hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional
documents or records as it may deem necessary and proper.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima JJ., concur.

EN BANC
Attys. ROWENA V. GUANZON and PEARL R. MONTESINO of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City Prosecutor
ROSANNA SARIL-TOLEDANO, Bacolod City, and Atty. ERFE DEL CASTILLO-CALDIT,

Complainants, - versus -Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 52, Bacolod City,

Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038

(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2250-RTJ)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ

Promulgated:

October 19, 2007

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 For our resolution is the February 11, 2005 letter-complainti[1] filed by complainants Atty. Rowena V. Guanzon and
Atty. Pearl R. Montesino of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosanna Saril-Toledano, Bacolod City, and
Atty. Erfe del Castillo-Caldit against respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, same city, for
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rule on Gender-Fair Language, use of foul, or obscene and discriminatory
language, discrimination against women lawyers and litigants and unethical conduct.

In his commenti[2] dated January 20, 2006, respondent judge vehemently denied the charges.

On March 14, 2006, the Court referred the case to Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On July 13, 2006, Justice Salvador set the case for preliminary conference. Only complainant Guanzon and
respondent judge appeared. Because of the distance between Bacolod and Manila, the parties found it quite difficult and
expensive to attend subsequent hearings of the case. Respondent submitted a pre-trial brief proposing stipulation of facts.
Complainant Guanzon, for herself and in representation of complainant Montesino, filed a preliminary conference brief
enumerating the charges in their complaint and the probable witnesses and documentary evidence they intended to present in
support thereof. Later, complainant Guanzon submitted an affidavit of complainant Toledano, who was then a resident of the
United States, imputing bias and abuse of authority to respondent for granting bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-24800 and 03-
24801. Complainant Caldit executed a letter withdrawing her complaint against respondent.

In view of the parties’ failure to attend the proceedings, Justice Salvador resolved the case on the bases of the pleadings
and documents filed by the parties.

On March 5, 2007, Justice Salvador submitted her Report and Recommendation reproduced hereunder:

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT SUFFICIENT CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENT

ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR JUDGES AND THE RULE ON GENDER-FAIR LANGUAGE,
USE OF FOUL OR OBSCENE AND DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE,
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS AS
WELL AS UNETHICAL CONDUCT.

Findings and Conclusions

A careful scrutiny of the record shows sufficient ground for a reprimand and an admonition to
respondent to act with utmost temperance, sensitivity and circumspection in the discharge of his functions.

xxx xxx xxx

Concededly, complainants in administrative proceedings have the burden of proving by substantial

evidence the allegations in their complaint (Araos v. Luna-Pison, 378 SCRA 246). The fact that, owing to
the unavailability of the parties, no hearings were conducted in the case to thresh out the issues presented by
their various pleadings and incidents did not, however, totally discount the existence of factual bases for the
 charges leveled against respondent. In her November 8, 2006 affidavit (pp. 169-170, Rollo), Cynthia
Bagtas-Serios significantly gave the following account of respondent’s deportment which goes into the heart
of the complaint, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

In one of the first hearings of my case, when Atty. Rowena Guanzon was not
assisting me but another counsel, I was shocked when Judge Anastacio Rufon, inside the
court with so many people present, said to me “next time you see your husband, open
your arms and legs.” I felt humiliated and insulted, and was glad that the hearing did not
proceed because the respondent was not present.

The following day, I called Atty. Rowena Guanzon and reported Judge Rufon’s
foul language and intolerable conduct to her (p. 170, ibid.).

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent had, of course, taken great pains to refute the foregoing allegations (pp. 215-219, ibid.),
complete with transcript of stenographic notes taken in Civil Case No. 99-10985 (pp. 220-240, ibid.) as well
as the orders issued in the case (pp. 241-243, ibid.). In denying the charges leveled against him, however,
appropriate note may be taken of the fact that respondent’s January 20, 2006 comment admitted his use of
“frank language” in court when exhorting litigants to settle their differences and his resort to “strong and
colorful” words whenever he has had a drink or two, albeit after office hours (pp. 81-82, ibid.). Even more
significantly, the July 12, 2006 letter of complainant Caldit which was attached as Annex “4” to respondent’s
own Pre-Trial Brief contains the following tell-tale assertions, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent should bear in mind that a judge holds a position in the community that is looked up to
with honor and privilege (Ramos v. Barot¸ 420 SCRA 406). Although judges are subject to human
limitations (Misajon v. Feranil, 440 SCRA 298), it cannot be over-emphasized that no position is more
demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench
(Resngit-Marquez v. Llamas, Jr., 385 SCRA 6). Because a judge is always looked upon as being the visible
representation of law and, from him, the people draw much of their will and awareness to obey legal
mandates (Garcia v. Bueser, 425 SCRA 93), it has been rightfully ruled that moral integrity is more than a
cardinal virtue in the judiciary; it is a necessity (Office of the Court Administrator v. Sayo, Jr., 381 SCRA
659).

In closing, it would be remiss not to remind respondent of the fact that all judges should always
observe courtesy and civility (Fineza v. Aruelo, 385 SCRA 339) and also be temperate, patient and courteous
both in conduct and language (Fidel v. Caraos, 394 SCRA 47), especially to those appearing before him
(Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Yrastorsa, Sr.¸ 422 SCRA 26). The exacting standards of conduct demanded
from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
(Imbang v. Del Rosario, 421 SCRA 523). In view of the fact that public confidence in the judiciary is very
easily eroded by irresponsible and improper conduct of judges (Navarro v. Tormis, 428 SCRA 37),
respondent should remember to avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in all of his activities
(Veloso v. Caminade, 434 SCRA 7).

Recommendation

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the REPRIMAND of respondent is recommended

alongside a stern admonition that he should, henceforth, take care to act with utmost temperance, sensitivity
and circumspection in the discharge of his functions.

We sustain the finding of Justice Salvador that respondent judge uttered in open court intemperate and obscene
language injurious to the sensitivity and feelings of complainants who are all women.
 Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times temperate in his language,i[3] refraining from inflammatory or
excessive rhetoric or from resorting “to language of vilification.”i[4] It is very essential that they live up to the high standards
demanded by Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciaryi[5] which provides:

SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. x x x

In Fidel v. Caraos,i[6] we held that although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty,
his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded
to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.i[7]

Thus, we declare respondent judge guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct considered a light charge under Section
10(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, punishable under Section 11(C) of the same Rule, by:

1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or

2. Censure

3. Reprimand

4. Admonition with warning

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and is
FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992

MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992

HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,

vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLU TION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's
petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court,
however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good
moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his
assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap
Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously
excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent
had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC
No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the
community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty.
Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as
well as the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration
was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating
 that "the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character
and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must
have been that signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice,
dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter
Board of Officers of 1988-1989.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter,
to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the
lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required
to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4
August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify
him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the
Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural
Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per
complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of
land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has
not redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L.
Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog;
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been
convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does not
find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15
February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive
Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date
for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case
3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the
oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of
22 May 1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has
"already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant
Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes
make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal
profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which
also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
 Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is
enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable
Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or amend said final resolutions which are
already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be
considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency
or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge
Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12
December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him,
was already considered closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and
conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the
Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the
land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the
defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against
defendant Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia
and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that
Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26
February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action
on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M.
Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No.
3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to
oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar
examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his
good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we
aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about
because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in
order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC
dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the
government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" ( Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No.
3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in
accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time
said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court
motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become
a member of the Bar.

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over
property which he could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation
of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of
his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount
to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same
until the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the
pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack
of candor and truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him
and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can
not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is
of no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can
neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but
who are also known to possess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic
preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in
keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons
who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. . . . ( In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No.
376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* In Bar Matter No. 44 (Eufrosina Yap Tan and Nicolas El. Sabandal) Bar Matter No. 59 (Benjamin Cabigon v. Nicolas El Sabandal) & SBC 624
(Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes Agnis v. Nicolas El. Sabandal) [126 SCRA 60].
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that
an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is
the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a
"Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the
amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for
the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on
or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner
averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
 When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the
First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual
residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District
and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such
moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for
the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8,
1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's
Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling
her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First
Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is
Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for
seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead
implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is
curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual
and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8
in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme
Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a
matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be
elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought
by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since
childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the
respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on
January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,
Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred
to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August
1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's
contention that it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the
residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a
color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the
respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was
a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have
served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the
office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent
wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of
voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places
and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to
have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408)
the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2)
intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with
animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements
to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not
conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner
correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a
resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of
the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995
Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution
tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of
votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First
District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed
that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May
9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile,
the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in
one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention
of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to
reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives , 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition
given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as
seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down
the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when
herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the
same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had
jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the
second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such
fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in
the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter,
she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of
Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it
bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study
or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face
of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33
supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without
having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having
been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes
study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason,
he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications
to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This
may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to
 constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his
place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it
not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second
Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied
in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St.
Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office
in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte
and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived
with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came
home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last
four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in
Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in
different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting
well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by
merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being
born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte
contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of
all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and
one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil
Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place;
but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which
would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This
part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is
further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence,"
referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to
domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit
to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the
husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the
husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately
preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order
that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further
explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

 Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code
on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with
each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original
domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife
either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from
her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on
pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
(sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order
can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where
the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English
law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly,
in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment;
though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as
the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory
order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her
husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine
evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid
requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of
certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income,
rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does
not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences
that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order
would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan,
Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of
these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What
stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted
to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former
President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband
died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was
lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."
47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary

intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having
been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual
residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of
origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon
the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the
parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14)
days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-
compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference
between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in
Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less
injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree
may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity,
without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to
effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was
construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having
failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious
that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis
of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws
were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves
bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat
the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their
unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify
her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:

First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They
have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and
her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there
even after reaching the age of majority.

Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject
to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)

In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is
founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation,
the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where
union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."

Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I
respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right
to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile
remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña, 6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a
place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .

It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife
from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil
Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the
 domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are
contrary to law and public policy.

In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he
was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte . Since petitioner's Batac
domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she
registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family
domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses
her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends." 7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The
issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she
makes an actual change.

I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no
longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a
domicile of her own separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by
the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each
member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common
law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873
American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings
relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United
States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law
that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a
sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the
rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness . The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the
relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women
and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law ." 19
In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of
Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried
sister." 20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women, especially married women. I
submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as
follows: 21

xxx xxx xxx

Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives

Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife
cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without
her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called
fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or
if his income is sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for
objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.

xxx xxx xxx

 Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the Philippines Law
Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year
after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for
divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the
respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner
which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just
cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.

With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in common by the
married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who
shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the
conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.

And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.

Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The
watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to
their rights and responsibilities. 22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married
women are now given the joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint
parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the family; 25 the right to
jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the
case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the
wife, thus:

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons
for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-
Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus: 28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:

(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;

(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;

(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they
have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);

(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his
wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);

(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at
the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);

(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);

(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
 The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the husband , thus abandoning the parties'
theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center
gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement: 29

xxx xxx xxx

The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and
to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code.
They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their children.
This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning
the family. (Emphasis supplied)

In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason
in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory
support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect
it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead
husband.

Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently
discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a
constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly
commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes
the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of
this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her
husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of
petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the
Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from
her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her
husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law
should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.

But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample
evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:

xxx xxx xxx

36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by President Corazon C.
Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.

37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered
a threat to the national security and welfare.

38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences
there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.

39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a
house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.

40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my
negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
 40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents'
burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.

41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to —

. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us
the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.

xxx xxx xxx

42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8
Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:

Dear Col. Kempis,

Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered
properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the
sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not
authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not
reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.

xxx xxx xxx

43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after
repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.

It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house
of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City
and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she
more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.

The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed
with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6)
months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-
prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the
reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she
has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence
in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she
placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been
allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline
September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before
the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.

It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private
respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence — petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with
 Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the
people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.

Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against
petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she
averred: 36

xxx xxx xxx

10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein)
announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
(Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the
town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose
being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He
also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on
such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with
respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.

These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:

xxx xxx xxx

Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban
City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of
this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the
Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively
Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of
Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the
move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make
the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari
before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the
respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in
the Second District.

It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of
Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa
where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.

All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her
equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of
which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but
 one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject
in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.

Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District
of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot
satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received
Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes.
Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign
will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.

A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous
common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married
woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over
his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this
gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.

I vote to grant the petition.

Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish,
however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.

Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the
domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it
his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)

Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or
of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is
born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to
displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his
domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b)
intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226
SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence,
ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).

In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199
SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to
petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public
respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin
is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to
depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.

It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is
that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this
proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then
Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual
to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the
latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in
a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.

It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without even signifying her intention to that
effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must
show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an
original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of
convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.

The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned
to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other
properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position
of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her
residence certificate 2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to
move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation
of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this
sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of
her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after
the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had
more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification
required by the 1987 Constitution.

I vote to grant the petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the
event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its
decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24,
1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its
decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest
number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if
she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.

Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement
imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's
domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban,
where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos,
then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during
his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by
operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.

In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine
that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow
cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to
continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
stark realities of the present.

At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum
that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles
of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains
until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject to.

At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities.
This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of
according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than
men.

Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed
only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country
which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in
1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his
authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us,
namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also
empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the
purposes specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards the
property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers. 8
Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and
collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or
occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid
grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the
death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over
her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such
case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.

All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality
between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By
then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on
this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis
supplied)

It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded
as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the
Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to
the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).

CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of
which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its
bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights"
16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of
almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are
now given the right jointly to fix the family domicile ; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and duty of both
spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and mother
shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and
Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the same conditions as men;

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy
equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;

(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and

(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the
consent of their spouses.

As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights
are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself
a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting
struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun.

In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating
whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon
the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?

I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before.
Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban
and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a
domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the
one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.

In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks
back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A
constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy,
open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very
essence.

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions read:

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
 Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ."
(Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification
prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and
resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).

The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such
compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in
accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by
this Court.

I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable
length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place
of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law
is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2)
an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the
protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked
on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an
election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further
judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required
by law before a proclamation is properly done.

The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters
which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's
peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and
qualification" of its members.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
 BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by
reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.

I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the
principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in
Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136
SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994])
rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not
the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with
three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136
SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in
Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C. J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court
held:

. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do
not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if
 the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)

Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office
to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a
petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not
rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.

The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are
none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No.
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning candidates.

To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions
are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for
public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to
certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.

These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:

§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)

§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89,
95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws. (Emphasis added)

§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false . The petition may be filed at
any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)

the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):

§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election , the Court or Commission shall continue with the
 trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).

§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):

§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private
respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground
that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative, considering
that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's
Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that
petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding
that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.

Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but
essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under § 78 have for
their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding public
office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.

Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates
had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this
Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo warranto proceedings 5 filed after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if
the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending
beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.

By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being
conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to
provide in Rule 25, § 1 the following:

Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution
or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy
that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications
based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not
only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local Government Code and are for
the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as
a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed
in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.

Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies,
are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for
office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be
prevented from assuming office even though in end he prevails.

To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the
Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in
the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17)
There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases
against such candidates.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders,
are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April
24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the
First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the
ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.

The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.

Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.

As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by
what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that — "no person shall be a member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read
and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)

It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated
by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose
his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative
district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.

The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location
for not less than a year before the election.

A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course,
he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.

In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of
choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.

The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as
an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.

All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be elected.

To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the
candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a
definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence
in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.

In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as
affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied
in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St.
Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
 Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of
Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991,
she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein
she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157
of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On
August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that
she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).

On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to
be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:

7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker

8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months

10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the
obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein
are true to the best of my knowledge.

(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos

(Signature of Candidate) 2

Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer
under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."

It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for
the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."

Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec
can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.

I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid
down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
 . . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if
the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.

Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:

. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative
policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear
that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on
Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.

Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What
happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer
received the highest number of votes.

It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law
considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.

As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine
in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of
votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.

Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:

While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which
assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."

I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:

1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents
who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in
that city.
 2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new
domicile in that place in 1954.

3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator and then as
President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.

4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel,
Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin
in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.

6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she
eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.

7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a
registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San
Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed
this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in
Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the
therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.

10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein
she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.

11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original certificate of
candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed
or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."

The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less
than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I
understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so
understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws
whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.

Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the
standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as
understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.

My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until
abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938,
was what is now Tacloban City.

Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the
common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis , the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is
consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or
replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired
her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.

Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do
not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the
fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of
course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice. 5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no
showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.

We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a
domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been
replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the
contingencies of the case at bar.

To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on
Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.

It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac,
Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin . Because of her husband's
subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal
domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a
qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's
domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not
exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.

Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility
of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of
this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.

If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he
abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and
desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried
to do.

One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but
because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have
obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code,
which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.

Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will)
but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both
voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her
marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to
saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of
suspended animation.

Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the
last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's
domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is
that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place
was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife
now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her
children having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the
present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.

I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition
by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary
implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the
settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation
but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.

In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally
claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore,
correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original certificate
that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the
procedural issues raised by petitioner.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.

Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).

Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule
65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.

My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses
total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute
details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional
District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.

The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which
is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or
abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her
second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for
the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.

It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in
May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes
to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S.
Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was
Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:

Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the
family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may
engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it
at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the
wife may be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who
refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife,
and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol.
1, 1985 ed., 339).

Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually
lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her
domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).

It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now
a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the
spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and
its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).

The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of
the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to
elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the
husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his
death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.

Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their
residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties.
Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of
candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also
voted in the said elections in that place.

On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn
statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying
that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex
"2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to
on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E,"
attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared
that she was born in Manila.

The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for
disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or
residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record
and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district
is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that
such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.

I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that
absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of
such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of
one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or
air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original
residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the
intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of
origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.

This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I"
of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and
had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).

Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.

The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman
Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least
concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That
conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to
acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that
burden.

I vote to deny the petition.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their
unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify
her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:

First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They
have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and
her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there
even after reaching the age of majority.

Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject
to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)

In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is
founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation,
the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where
union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."

Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I
respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right
to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile
remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña, 6
 . . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a
place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .

It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife
from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil
Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the
domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are
contrary to law and public policy.

In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he
was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac
domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she
registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family
domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses
her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends." 7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The
issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she
makes an actual change.

I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no
longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a
domicile of her own separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by
the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each
member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common
law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873
American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings
relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United
States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law
that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a
sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the
rights of married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the
relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women
and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law ." 19
In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of
Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried
sister." 20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women, especially married women. I
submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as
follows: 21

xxx xxx xxx

Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives

Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife
cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without
 her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called
fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or
if his income is sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for
objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.

xxx xxx xxx

Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the Philippines Law
Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year
after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for
divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the
respondent in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner
which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just
cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.

With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in common by the
married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who
shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the
conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.

And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.

Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The
watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to
their rights and responsibilities. 22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others, married
women are now given the joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint
parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the support of the family; 25 the right to
jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the
case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the
wife, thus:

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons
for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-
Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband , thus: 28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:

(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;

(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;

(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they
have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);

(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his
wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
 (e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at
the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);

(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);

(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).

The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the husband , thus abandoning the parties'
theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center
gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement: 29

xxx xxx xxx

The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and
to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code.
They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their children.
This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning
the family. (Emphasis supplied)

In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason
in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory
support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect
it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead
husband.

Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave is patently
discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a
constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly
commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes
the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of
this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her
husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of
petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the
Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from
her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her
husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law
should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.

But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample
evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:

xxx xxx xxx

36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by President Corazon C.
Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.

37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government considered
a threat to the national security and welfare.

38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences
there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
 39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a
house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.

40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my
negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents'
burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.

41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to —

. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us
the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.

xxx xxx xxx

42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8
Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:

Dear Col. Kempis,

Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered
properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the
sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not
authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not
reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.

xxx xxx xxx

43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after
repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.

It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house
of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City
and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she
more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.

The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed
with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6)
months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-
prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the
reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she
has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence
in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she
placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been
allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

 The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline
September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before
the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.

It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private
respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence — petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with
Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the
people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.

Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against
petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she
averred: 36

xxx xxx xxx

10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein)
announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
(Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the
town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose
being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He
also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on
such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with
respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.

These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:

xxx xxx xxx

Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban
City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of
this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the
Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively
Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of
Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the
move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make
the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari
before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the
respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in
the Second District.

It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a " Decision," penned by Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of
Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
 Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa
where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.

All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her
equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of
which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but
one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject
in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.

Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District
of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot
satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received
Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes.
Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign
will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.

A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous
common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married
woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over
his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this
gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.

I vote to grant the petition.

Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish,
however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.

Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the
domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it
his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)

Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or
of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is
born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to
displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his
domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b)
intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226
SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence,
ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).

In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199
SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to
petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public
respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin
is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to
depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is
that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this
proposition quite untenable.

Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then
Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual
to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the
latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in
a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.

It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without even signifying her intention to that
effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must
show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an
original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of
convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.

The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned
to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other
properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position
of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her
residence certificate 2 and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to
move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6). 3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation
of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this
sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of
her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after
the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had
more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification
required by the 1987 Constitution.

I vote to grant the petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the
event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its
decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's
certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24,
1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its
decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should show that she obtained the highest
number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if
she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.

Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement
imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner's
domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban,
where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos,
then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during
his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by
operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine
that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow
cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.

It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to
continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
stark realities of the present.

At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum
that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles
of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains
until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject to.

At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities.
This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of
according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than
men.

Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed
only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country
which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in
1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his
authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us,
namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also
empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the
purposes specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. 7 As regards the
property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers. 8
Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and
collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or
occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid
grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the
death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over
her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such
case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.

All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality
between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By
then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on
this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis
supplied)

It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded
as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the
Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to
the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).

CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of
which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its
bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights"
16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of
almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are
now given the right jointly to fix the family domicile ; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and duty of both
spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and mother
shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.

Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and
Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the same conditions as men;

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy
equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;

(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and

(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the
consent of their spouses.

As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights
are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself
a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting
struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun.

In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating
whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon
the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?

I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before.
Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban
and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a
domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the
one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.

In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks
back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A
constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy,
open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very
essence.

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions read:

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of
the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
 district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ."
(Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification
prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and
resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).

The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue (whether or not there is here such
compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in
accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by
this Court.

I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable
length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place
of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law
is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2)
an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the
protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked
on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an
election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further
judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required
by law before a proclamation is properly done.

The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters
which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's
peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and
qualification" of its members.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by
reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.

I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the
principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in
Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136
SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994])
rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the
first Labo decision:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not
the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with
three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136
SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in
Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C. J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court
held:

. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do
not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
 The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if
the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)

Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office
to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a
petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not
rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.

The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an office before his election. There are
none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No.
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning candidates.

To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions
are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for
public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to
certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.

These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:

§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)

§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89,
95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws. (Emphasis added)

§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at
any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)

the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):

 § 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election , the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).

§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):

§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private
respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground
that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative, considering
that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's
Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that
petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding
that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.

Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but
essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under § 78 have for
their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding public
office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.

Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates
had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this
Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo warranto proceedings 5 filed after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if
the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending
beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers. 7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the
determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.

By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being
conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to
provide in Rule 25, § 1 the following:

Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution
or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy
that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications
based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not
only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local Government Code and are for
the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as
a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed
in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in § 4.

Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies,
are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or
resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for
office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be
prevented from assuming office even though in end he prevails.

To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to § 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the
Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in
the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17)
There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases
against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders,
are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April
24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the
First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the
ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered void.

The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.

Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.

As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by
what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that — "no person shall be a member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read
and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)

It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated
by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose
his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative
district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.

The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location
for not less than a year before the election.

A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course,
he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.

In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of
choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.

The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as
an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.

All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be elected.

To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the
candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a
definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence
in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.

In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as
affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —
 In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied
in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St.
Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of
Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991,
she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein
she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157
of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On
August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that
she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election
Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).

On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to
be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:

7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker

8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months

10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the
obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein
are true to the best of my knowledge.

(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos

(Signature of Candidate) 2

Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer
under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."

It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of representative for
the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."

Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec
can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid
down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:

. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if
the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.

Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:

. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative
policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear
that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on
Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.

Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What
happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer
received the highest number of votes.

It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law
considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.

As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine
in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of
votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.

Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:

While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which
assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."

I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
 1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents
who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in
that city.

2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new
domicile in that place in 1954.

3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator and then as
President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.

4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel,
Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin
in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.

6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she
eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.

7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a
registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San
Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed
this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in
Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the
therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.

10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein
she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.

11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original certificate of
candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed
or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."

The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less
than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I
understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so
understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws
whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.

Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the
standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as
understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.

My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until
abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place. 1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938,
was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the
common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis , the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is
consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or
replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.

When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired
her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.

Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila — do
not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the
fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of
course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice. 5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no
showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.

We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a
domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been
replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the
contingencies of the case at bar.

To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on
Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.

It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac,
Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin . Because of her husband's
subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal
domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a
qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's
domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not
exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.

Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility
of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of
this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.

If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he
abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and
desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried
to do.

One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor but
because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have
obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code,
which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will)
but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both
voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of her
marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to
saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of
suspended animation.

Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the
last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's
domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is
that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place
was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife
now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her
children having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the
present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.

I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition
by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary
implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the
settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation
but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.

In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally
claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore,
correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original certificate
that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the
procedural issues raised by petitioner.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.

Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).

Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule
65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.

My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses
total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute
details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional
District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.

The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which
is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or
abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her
second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for
the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in
May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes
to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S.
Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was
Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:

Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the
family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may
engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it
at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the
wife may be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who
refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife,
and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol.
1, 1985 ed., 339).

Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually
lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her
domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).

It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now
a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the
spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and
its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).

The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of
the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to
elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the
husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his
death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.

Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their
residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties.
Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of
candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also
voted in the said elections in that place.

On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn
statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying
that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex
"2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to
on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E,"
attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared
that she was born in Manila.

The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for
disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or
residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record
and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district
is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that
such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that
absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of
such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of
one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or
air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original
residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the
intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of
origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.

This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I"
of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and
had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).

Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.

The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman
Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least
concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That
conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to
acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that
burden.

I vote to deny the petition.