Macasaet vs People (453 SCRA 255)

o In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
o The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined
in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.
o In Agbayani v. Sayo, we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
o 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
o 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
o 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
o 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense.
o It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or information. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is
that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are. The exception to this rule
is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash such as when the
ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused.
In these instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of
the motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions,
the trial court correctly dismissed this action.
o The OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it
only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts.
o When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of
course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him. As explained by our former colleague,
Justice Florenz Regalado – . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the
case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal
in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial
court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to
do so for all the parties.

GR No. 147406 July 14, 2008

Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes, petitioner
vs
People of the Philippines, respondent

Facts:

On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his appeal before
the CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time the RTC’s jurisdiction.

CA, however, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the
jurisdiction of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.

[Sidenote: While not an issue, the SC clarified that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation
of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691. And so as the imposable penalty for the crime
charged is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (imprisonment for 2 years 4 months and 1 day,
to 6 years), jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on MTC. Therefore, the RTC does not have jurisdiction
over the case.]
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General
acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of
estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, the trial went on
for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The
petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any
time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be
applicable.

Issue:

Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC,
notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue during the trial and the alleged laches in relation to
the doctrine in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.

Held: YES. SC dismissed the case without prejudice.

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is the exception rather than the general rule. For it to be
invoked, laches should clearly be present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

SC clarified that in its past decisions concerning the same issue, it wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and
expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in
exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the
subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially
true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any
advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that
time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not
sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought
to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot
be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of
equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy,
the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up
their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No.
2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

Lutgarda Cruz vs. People Case Digest

0

If the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the crime was committed
within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the
court to resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real property
located in another province.

Facts:
Cruz was charged with the crime of estafa though falsification of public documents before the RTC of Manila.
Allegedly, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjucation of a parcel of land when she knew that there were other
surviving heirs. The offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action. Hence, it was tried together
with the criminal case. The RTC acquitted Cruz but on the civil aspect, it court ordered the return of the parcel of land
to the surviving heirs. CA upheld the RTC decision.

Petitioner appealed contending that the CA erred in finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on
the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of
land in Bulacan which is outside the trial court's territorial jurisdiction.

Issue:

Does the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case involving a
property in Bulacan?

Held:

Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the
civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.

There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the
court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where
the offense was committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. In the instant
case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear
and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over
the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired
jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the courts authority.

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law
requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x includes restitution.

The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the offended
party. In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted
in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on
reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the civil
aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.

Case remanded for further proceedings. (Lutgarda Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002)

Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

SEPTEMBER 12, 2018

FACTS:

On 18 May 1995, 11 members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, were killed along Commonwealth Ave., QC by the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Supt. Jewel Canson of PNP. One of the
components of ABRITG is the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission-Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Supt. Panfilo Lacson.
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes told the media that what happened was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG.

Omb. Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Omb. for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel found that the incident was a legitimate police operation. However,
a review board led by Overall Deputy Omb. Francisco Villa recommended the indictment for multiple murder against
26 respondents, including Lacson.

Lacson was among those charged as principal in information for murder before the Sandiganbayan. All the accused
filed separate motions questioning its jurisdiction.

Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the QC RTC which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under RA
7975 (An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that
Purpose PD 1606, as Amended), as none of the principal accused has the rank of PNP Chief Supt. or higher
(Lacson is NOT a PNP Chief Supt.)
The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration. While it is pending, RA 8249 (An Act Further
Defining thr Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose PD 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes) was enacted to law which deletes the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused”. Thus, the Sandiganbayan takes cognizance again of the case.

Lacson now questions the constitutionality of Secs. 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 because the provisions are: (a) introduced
by the Congress in bad faith, (b) ex post facto legislation and (c) misleading as to the law’s title. The OSG asserts
otherwise.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 8249 is constitutional. (YES)

2. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. (NO)

HELD:

1. RA 8249 is constitutional.

The Court mainly stresses that the provisions are CONSTITUTIONAL because: (a) there is presumption of validity of
laws and no showing that the Congress pinpointed solely the petitioners which would amount to a violation of the
Constitution’s Equal Protection clause, (b) using the doctrine in Calder v. Bull, the same is not an ex post facto
legislation and lastly, (c) law’s title is comprehensive enough to fit in the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution.

2. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.

It’s QC RTC that has jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of
that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.
Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information,and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.

The multiple murder charge falls under Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249, which requires that the offense charged must be
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.

An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is ‘intimately connected’ with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.

While the information states that Lacson, et al committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is,
however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately
related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does NOT
indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

While there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense “in relation
to office as officers and members of the (PNP),” the Court do not see the intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accused’s official functions. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual
averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s
official duties.

What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime
as having been committed in relation to public office.

CAWALING

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in
bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among
those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that
what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the
panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation,
the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
“principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said
law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to
acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to
the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law
is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this
case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument,
the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws.
R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that
define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of
facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge
set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected
with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases
is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.

Agustin vs Pamintuan (467 SCRA 601)

o Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
o The rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
o 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
o 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
o 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
o 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense.
o The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is
required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of
something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had
a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The
actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently
or for an indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club,
the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was
actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private
complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and
spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or
own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in
a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
Mobilia Products Inc vs Umezawa (452 SCRA 736)

o All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the
 prosecution of the offense. In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, we held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel,
who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.
o The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public
prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge
thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success
since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. The prosecution of offenses is a
public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused.
o The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his
discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the
public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it
cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.
o In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the
public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant
or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such
dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing,
the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court
denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition
for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the
aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
o It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after
trial or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty
which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in
the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the
complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
Crespo vs Mogul (151 SCRA 462)

o The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
o The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure
the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the
duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the
Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.
The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under
such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is
to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the
private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
Pecho vs People (262 SCRA 518)

o For double jeopardy to exist, there must be such new information and the accused must be able to show that
(1) he has been previously brought to trial, (2) in a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) upon a valid complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance, (4) for the same offense or an attempt to or frustration thereof as
that charged in the new information, and that (5) the case has been dismissed or terminated without his
consent or after he had pleaded to the information but therefore judgment was rendered.
o The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1) personally represented
himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of any of the public and
commercial documents in question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of all or some of the said documents.
o Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the petitioner
and Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents.
Neither is there evidence of petitioner’s active participation in the commission of the crime. The con-cordant
combination and cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the prosecution’s evidence fails to
satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
And since his constitutional right to be presumed innocent unit proven guilty can be over-thrown only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted.
People vs Ave GR 137274-75 Oct 18, 2008

o The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,[51] is reclusion perpetua to death while the penalty prescribed for aggravated illegal possession of
firearm, i.e., the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, under P.D. No. 1866, is death.
o On June 6, 1997, however, Congress approved Republic Act No. 8294. It provides that “if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.”[54] In People v. Molina,[55] we held that “where murder or
homicide is committed, the separate penalty for illegal possession shall no longer be meted out inasmuch as it
becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.”
o The trial court applied R.A. No. 8294 in the murder case at bar and in line with our ruling in Molina held that
the use of the unlicensed firearm in the killing of Pedro aggravated the commission of the crime. He then
meted the maximum penalty of death to the appellant.
o After Molina, however, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure was promulgated by this Court and became
effective on December 1, 2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the complaint or information must specify
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of the offense if they are to be appreciated. In the case at bar,
the special aggravating circumstance of “use of unlicensed firearm” was not alleged in the informations. The
two (2) informations at bar, for murder and frustrated murder, merely alleged that the appellant used a “long
firearm.” They did not allege that the firearm used was unlicensed. The failure of the prosecution to allege in
the Information the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in committing the crime of murder
prevents us from imposing the death penalty on the appellant even if the same was proved at the trial. The
appellant should, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People vs Costales, et al, GR 141154-56, Jan 15, 2002

o On the third issue, accused-appellant decries the Decision of the court a quo in qualifying the crimes of
murder and attempted murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time convicting him for
violation of PD 1866, as amended.
o We agree. Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under PD
1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the decree and now considers the
use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and not as a
separate offense.
o As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and 9 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now require the qualifying as well as
aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise
the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during the trial. Withal, in the absence of any
allegation in the Information in Crim. Case No. T-2057 that accused-appellant committed murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing the proper penalty.
o Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform observations on how the malefactors carried
out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was strangled by both intruders and
 almost simultaneously shot on the head, that one of them sprayed a chemical on the other occupants of the
house and after a split second fired at Crispina. Such consistency and uniformity may be irregular at first blush,
but accused-appellant failed to take into account the following factors which account for the “near flawless”
statements of the prosecution witnesses: (a) the one-room shanty was very small with no substantial
obstruction to impede the vision of the occupants; (b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient
enough for the occupants to recognize accused-appellant and his cohort, especially so since the assailants
were prominent and venerated leaders of their church; and, (c) at the time of the incident the Marcelo spouses
and their children were lying very near each other because of the very limited space of their shanty such that
every perceived action could be seen, felt, or at least sensed, by all of them.
o In Crim. Case No. T-2056, accused-appellant was charged by the trial court with frustrated murder but was
convicted only for attempted murder. In its Decision, the trial court explained that the failure of the prosecution
to present a medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence showing that Crispina would have died from
her wound without medical intervention, justified the accused’s conviction for attempted murder only.
o We call to mind People v. De La Cruz11 where this Court ruled that the crime committed for the shooting of
the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason that “his injuries, though no doubt
serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical intervention, they would have caused his
death.” In fact, as early as People v. Zaragosa,[12] we enunciated the doctrine that where there is nothing in
the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is
doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be
declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.
People vs Villar GR 132378 Jan 18, 2000

o We find no competent evidence showing that the victim exhibited no unusual behavior during the one-year
period that she was being sexually abused by accused-appellant. The lack of concrete evidence of any
unusual behavior on record does not prove that there was in fact no such unusual behavior. If
accused-appellant wanted the court to consider such an allegation, it was incumbent upon him to prove the
same with competent evidence. The fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof.
He cannot simply rely on the lack of evidence showing the contrary.
o The commission of rape was concededly “improbable but not impossible. In People vs. Ignacio, we took
judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families living in small quarters,
copulation does not seem a problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the
cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing
modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances,
it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor
incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is
being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are
not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellant’s
contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can
be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that “lust is no respecter of time and place,” and
rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places.
o In People vs. Dela Cuesta (G.R. No. 126134, March 2, 1999), we held: The seven modes of committing rape
introduced under R.A. 7659 and R.A. 4111 which warrant the automatic imposition of death penalty partake of
the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since it increases the penalty or rape to
one degree. As such, this qualifying circumstance, that the child is under eighteen (18) and the offender is a
guardian, should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such.
o Although the circumstances to qualify simple rape to the heinous crime of rape, namely: (a) victim under 18
years old (the certificate of live birth – exhibit “A” was admitted by the defense), and (b) the offender being a
guardian, were duly proven in the present case, these circumstance cannot considered for purposes of
imposing the extreme penalty of death unless these were alleged in the information. An examination of the two
informations in the present case reveals that only the qualifying circumstance that the child is under 12 was
alleged. There was no allegation that the offender was a guardian of the victim. To consider said circumstance
as qualifying, would constitute denial of the right of accused-appellant to due process and to be informed of
the charges against him. At best, such circumstance may only be treated as a generic aggravating
circumstance, which, in the case of simple statutory rape, however, is inconsequential because the imposable
penalty is the singular indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People vs Camerino 108 Phil 79
o Under section 2 of this Rule, the Court may deny or sustain the motion to quash but may not defer it till the
trial of the case on the merits. In sustaining the motion, the court may order the filing of a new information or
may dismiss the case. In the new information, the defects of the previous information may be cured. For
instance, if the motion to quash is sustained on the ground that more than one offense is charged in the
information, the court may order that another information be filed charging only one offense. But the court may
or may not issue such order in the exercise of its discretion. The order may be made if the defects found in the
first information may be cured in a new information. If the order is made, the accused, if he is in custody,
should not be discharged, unless otherwise, admitted to bail. But if no such order is made, or, having been
made, the prosecuting attorney fails to file another information within the time specified by the court, the
accused, if in custody must be discharged, unless he is also in custody for another charge, or if is out on bail,
the bail must be exonerated. In such event, however, the fiscal is free to institute another criminal proceeding
since such ground of objection is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1957 ed., Vol. II, pp. 778-779).
o In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more than one offense but only
that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and different criminal acts attributed to the defendants, it was
not the purpose or intention of the Government to hold them criminally liable in the present proceedings, but
merely to complete the narration of facts, though specifying different offenses which as a whole, supposedly
constitute the crime of sedition. Consequently, we believe that the information is valid.