EN BANC
(1) On September 12, 2005, respondents filed an action
A.C. No. 10557 (Formerly CBD Case No. 07-1962), July 10,
2018
JERRY M. PALENCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. PEDRO L.
LINSANGAN, ATTY. GERARD M. LINSANGAN, AND ATTY.
GLENDA M. LINSANGAN-BINOYA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint1 filed by Jerry M. Palencia (complainant)
against Attorneys (Attys.) Pedro L. Linsangan, Gerard M.
Linsangan2 and Glenda Linsangan-Binoya (respondents) for
disciplinary action.
Complainant was an overseas Filipino worker seafarer who was
seriously injured during work when he tell into the elevator shaft of
the vessel M/T "Panos G" flying a Cyprus flag.3 After initial
treatment in Singapore, complainant was discharged and flown to
the Philippines to continue his medical treatment and rehabilitation.
While confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, one "Moises," and
later Jesherel L. Millena (Jesherel), paralegals in respondents' law
office, approached complainant. They convinced him to engage the
services of respondents' law office in order to file a suit against his
employers for indemnity.4After several visits from the paralegals
and respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan, complainant executed (1)
an Attorney-Client Contract,5 and (2) a Special Power of
Attorney,6 where he engaged the legal services of respondents and
Gurbani & Co., a law firm based in Singapore, and agreed to pay
attorney's fees of 35% of any recovery or settlement obtained for
both.
After execution of the contract, complainant, through the efforts of
respondents, was paid by his employer the following amounts:
US$60,000.00 as indemnity and US$20,000.00 under their
collective bargaining agreement. From these amounts,
respondents charged complainant attorney's fees of 35%.7
Respondents and Gurbani & Co. also filed a tort case against the
owners of "Panos G" before the High Court of Singapore
(Singapore case). For this case, respondents engaged the services
of Papadopoulos, Lycourgos & Co., a law firm based in Cyprus, to
draft a written opinion on the issues involving Cyprus law, among
others.8 They also engaged the services of retired Justice Emilio
Gancayco (Justice Gancayco) for his expert opinion regarding
various issues raised by defendant's lawyer and representatives. 9
Thereafter, negotiations led to a settlement award in favor of
complainant in the amount of US$95,000.00. Gurbani & Co.
remitted to respondents the amount of US$59,608.40. 10 From this
amount, respondents deducted: (l) US$5,000.00 as payment to
Justice Gancayco; (2) their attorney's fees equivalent to 35%; and
(3) other expenses, leaving the net amount of US$18,132.43 for
complainant.11
Respondents tendered the amount of US$20,756.05 (representing
the US$18,132.43) to complainant, which the latter refused. 12 As
complainant contested the amount comprised of the expenses and
attorney's fees deducted, the following civil actions ensued
between complainant and respondents:
for preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case No.
05113475) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila to compel complainant to receive the amount
tendered.13 This case was dismissed by the RTC, and
the dismissal was eventually upheld by this Court on
July 7, 2008.14
(2) On September 22, 2005, complainant filed with the
RTC of Ligao City an action for accounting, remittance
of settlement amounts and damages (Civil Case No.
2401 or accounting case).15 On June 16, 2011, the
RTC ruled in favor of complainant and ordered
respondents to make proper accounting, among
others.16 Although the RTC upheld the stipulated
attorney's fees as binding between the parties, it
determined that the fees are lumped for both
respondents and Gurbani & Co.17 On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC's Decision but reduced the rate of
attorney's fees to 10%.18 This Court affirmed the CA
Decision in our Resolution dated February 20, 2013 in
G.R. No. 205088. An Entry of Judgment was issued
on August 8, 2013.
On March 28, 2007, complainant also filed the subject letter--
Complaint19 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). He requested that an
investigation be conducted and the corresponding disciplinary
action be imposed upon respondents for committing the following
unethical acts: (1) refusing to remit the amount collected in the
Singapore case worth US$95,000.00, and in offering only
US$20,756.05; (2) depositing complainant's money into their own
account; and (3) engaging in "ambulance chasing" by deploying
their agents to convince complainant to hire respondents' services
while the former was still bedridden in the hospital.
In their answer,20 respondents explained that complainant retained
respondents and Gurbani & Co.'s services in 2004 for purposes of
filing a claim against the ship owner, its agents and principals. This
led to the filing of a claim before the Singapore High Court. They
averred that on April 29, 2005, Gurbani & Co. advised respondents
of the settlement of the claim in Singapore for US$95,000.00.21 On
June 20, 2005, respondents sent a letter to complainant informing
him that they already received the settlement amount and
requested him to come to the former's office to get his net
share.22 Complainant went to respondents' law office on June 28,
2005 where respondents tendered to the former his net share of
US$20,756.05.23 However, complainant unjustly refused to accept
the amount. Complainant also refused their tender of payment in
their letter dated August 3, 2005.24 On September 12, 2005,
respondents even filed a "consignation case" (Civil Case No.
05113475) before the RTC of Manila.25
Respondents denied that they deposited the amount to their own
account. They claimed that the amount of US$20,756.05 has been
placed for safekeeping in a vault located inside their office ever
since.26 On May 3, 2007, after their receipt of the complaint and the
IBP-CBD's Order dated April 3, 2007, they decided to deposit the
money with Bank of the Philippine Islands in an interest savings
account, in trust for complainant.27
As to the allegations of ambulance chasing, respondents averred
that they provide free legal advice to the public. It was in the course
of this public service when they met complainant.28
After proceedings, the IBP-CBD in its Report and
Recommendation29 ruled that respondents violated the canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR): ( l) in soliciting legal
business through their agents while complainant was in the
hospital; (2) in failing to account for, and deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand; and (3) in hiring
the services of a foreign law firm and another lawyer without prior
knowledge and consent of complainant of the fees and expenses
to be incurred.30 The IBP-CBD found that all three respondents
connived and thus recommended that all respondents be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. It also
directed respondents to comply with the Decision in the accounting
case (Civil Case No. 2401) in favor of complainant. 31
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and
Recommendation.32 After respondents' motion for
reconsideration33 and complainant's opposition34 thereto, the IBP
Board of Governors modified the penalty and increased
respondents' suspension from the practice of law to two years with
warning, and ordered respondents to return the 5% of the amount
assessed to complainant as attorney's fees. 35
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondents Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and, Gerard M. Linsangan.
We, however, absolve respondent Atty. Glenda M. Linsangan-
Binoya for lack of any evidence as to her participation in the acts
complained of.
I
36
The practice of law is a profession and not a business. Lawyers
are reminded to avoid at all times any act that would tend to lessen
the confidence of the public in the legal profession as a noble
calling, including, among others, the manner by which he makes
known his legal services.
II
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary.46 This relationship holds a lawyer to a great degree of
fidelity and good faith especially in handling money or property of
his clients.47 Thus, Canon 16 and its rules remind a lawyer to: (1)
hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession;48 (2) deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand subject to his retaining lien; 49 and (3)
account for all money or property collected or received for or from
his client.50
Money collected by a lawyer on a judgment rendered in favor of his
client constitutes trust funds and must be immediately paid over to
the client.51 As he holds such funds as agent or trustee, his failure
to pay or deliver the same to the client after demand constitutes
conversion.52 Thus, whenever a lawyer collects money as a result
of a favorable judgment, he must promptly report and account the
money collected to his client.53
It is the lawyer's duty to give a prompt and accurate account to his
client. Upon the collection or receipt of property or funds for the
benefit of the client, his duty is to notify the client promptly and,
absent a contrary understanding, pay or remit the same to the
client, less only proper fees and disbursements, as soon as
reasonably possible.54 He is under absolute duty to give his client
a full, detailed, and accurate account of all money and property
which has been received and handled by him, and must justify all
transactions and dealings concerning them.55 And while he is in
possession of the client's funds, he should not commingle it with
his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his
client's consent.56
Here, respondents claim that they promptly accounted for the total
award of US$95,000.00, and after deducting their fees, tendered
the amount of US$20,756.05. Complainant, however, refused to
accept the amount because he contested both the expenses and
the separate deduction of attorney's fees by respondents and
Gurbani & Co.

We find that while respondents gave prompt notice to complainant

A lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a
of their receipt of money collected in the latter's favor, they were
dignified manner.37 They are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
amiss in their duties to give accurate accounting of the amounts
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
due to complainant, and to return the money due to client upon
brokers.38 The CPR explicitly states that "[a] lawyer shall not do or
demand.
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business."39 Corollary to this duty is for lawyers not to encourage
any suit or proceeding for any corrupt motive or interest. 40 Thus, The Attorney-Client Contract between the parties states: "We/I
"ambulance chasing," or the solicitation of almost any kind of hereby voluntarily agree and bind ourselves, our heirs and assigns
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to pay Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan and his collaborating Singapore
to gain employment, is proscribed.41 counsels, the sum equivalent to thirty-five [35%] percent of any
recovery or settlement obtained."57Clearly, the stipulated rate
referred to the combined professional fees of both respondents and
Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that respondents violated
their collaborating Singapore counsel, Gurbani &
these rules. No less than their former paralegal Jesherel admitted
Co.58 Nevertheless, respondents proceeded to deduct separate
that respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan came with her and another
fees on top of the amount already deducted by Gurbani & Co.
paralegal named Moises, to Manila Doctors Hospital several times
Complainant contested this deduction and refused to accept the
to convince complainant to hire their services.42This is a far cry from
amount being tendered by respondents. Since a claim for
respondents' claim that they were merely providing free legal
attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which
advice to the public. Moreover, while respondents deny Jesherel 's
the services of a lawyer had been rendered, or in a separate
connection with their law firm, this was sufficiently rebutted by
action,59 respondents, instead of forcibly deducting their share,
complainant when he presented Jesherel's resignation letter as
should have moved for the judicial determination and collection of
received by respondents' firm.43 In employing paralegals to
their attorney's fees. The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for his
encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his employers,
attorney's fees on money in his hands collected for his client does
respondents indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the
not entitle him to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for
filing of suit. These constitute malpractice44 which calls for the
himself.60
exercise of the court's disciplinary powers and warrants serious
sanctions.45
Worse, respondents allegedly kept the money inside the firm's vault
for two years until they were made aware of the disciplinary
complaint against them before the IBP-CBD. However, as noted by
the IBP-CBD in its Report and Recommendation:
[T]he defense of respondents that they kept in their office vault the
share of complainant as computed by them in the amount of
US$18,132.43, hence, they forgot the same and remembered it
only when they received the Order of this Commission for them to
file an Answer to complainant's Complaint [which is more than 2
years] is rather highly incredible considering that it involves a
substantial amount, the series of communications between the
parties, and the Civil cases subsequently filed.61 (Italics in the
original.)
Even if we give credence to this explanation, it is improper for the
lawyer to put his client's funds in his personal safe deposit
vault.62 Funds belonging to the client should be deposited in a
separate trust account in a bank or trust company of good repute
for safekeeping.63
It is apparent from the foregoing that respondents failed to handle
their client's money with great degree of fidelity. Respondents also
showed their lack of good faith when they appropriated for
themselves more than what is allowed under their contract. They
have demonstrated that the payment of their attorney's fees is more
important than their fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting and
returning what is rightfully due to their client. More, they also failed
to observe proper safekeeping of their client's money.
Respondents violated the trust reposed in them, and demonstrated
their lack of integrity and moral soundness.64 Respondents' flagrant
and malicious refusal to comply with the CPR amounts to gross
misconduct.65 This warrants the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions.66
III
The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and
who possess good moral character.67 Thus, the violation of the
lawyer's oath and/or breach of the ethics of the legal profession
embodied in the CPR may, depending on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts, result in the
suspension or disbarment of a member of the Bar.68
While we find respondents Attys. Pedro Linsangan and Gerard
Linsangan to have violated Rule 1.03, Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.03 of the CPR, the records do not
support respondent Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya's participation
in their unethical activities. Complainant himself admits that he only
dealt with respondents Attys. Pedro and Gerard Linsangan.69 Thus,
we hold that the case against Atty. Glenda Linsangan-Binoya be
dismissed.
For his violation of the proscription on ambulance chasing, we have
previously imposed the penalty of suspension of one year. 70 We
find no reason not to impose the same penalty here.
On the other hand, the penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the CPR
usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for
one year, or two years, and even disbarment depending on the
amount involved and the severity of the lawyer's misconduct. 71 In
addition, the penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure
or refusal, despite demand, of a lawyer to account for and to return
money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from
the practice of law for two years.72 Complainant, who was impaired
for life, was constrained to file this complaint and the action for
accounting because of his lawyers' lack of fidelity and good faith in
handling the award he received. We recognize, however,
respondents' efforts in tendering payment, albeit of an improper
amount, to complainant, as well as the fact that this is their first
offense. The imposition of a one year suspension is sufficient under
the circumstances.73
This penalty of one year suspension for the second infraction is
justified, and does not deserve a further reduction. The fact that it
is respondents' first administrative case cannot serve to mitigate
the penalty. In Cerdan v. Gomez,74 respondent there was still
suspended for a period of one year, after already taking into
account that it was his first offense. More, there are several
decisions which support the imposition of the one year suspension
for similar violations.75 In Viray v. Sanicas,76 the court imposed a
one year penalty for the same infraction even after exercising its
"compassionate judicial discretion."77
More importantly, respondents' acts do not merely constitute a
violation of Canon 16 and its rules, but already amounts to gross
misconduct.78First, respondents breached the trust reposed in
them when they betrayed the express language of their Attorney-
Client Contract that they are only entitled to a single 35% attorney's
fees together with the Singapore counsels. In the process,
respondents have also unjustly retained for themselves the 35% of
the settlement award amounting to US$95,000.00—which is more
or less US$33,250.00 or roughly around P1.5 million pocketed, and
also immensely disparaging to the US$20,756.05 they tendered to
complainant. Second, their actions following complainant's
objection manifests their disregard of their fiduciary duties. For two
years, respondents insisted on, and forcibly deducted the amount
when there are alternative avenues to determine the correct
amount of attorney's fees. They instead treaded to a path where
they advanced their own interests ahead of their client's. Third,
respondents also mishandled their client's money when they did
not exercise proper safekeeping over it; they failed to deposit it in
a separate trust account in a bank or trust company of good repute
for safekeeping but co-mingled it with their own funds.
Undoubtedly, the gravity of these acts amounts to gross
misconduct that warrants, at the very least, a suspension.79
For both violations, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors of the imposition of two-year suspension for
respondents Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and Gerard M. Linsangan.
We emphasize that this penalty of two years of suspension
corresponds to the compounded infractions of the violations of Rule
1.03, Rule 2.03, Canon 3, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.03
of the CPR: (1) the penalty of suspension of one year is imposed
for the violation of the proscription on ambulance chasing; and (2)
the penalty of one year suspension for gross misconduct consisting
in the failure or refusal, despite demand, of a lawyer to account for
and return money or property belonging to a client.
To reiterate, there is no basis, and would even be unjust under the
circumstances, to reduce the penalty imposed on respondents.
Quite the contrary, respondents should find themselves so
fortunate that for all their exploits, including their ambulance
chasing, this Court would only impose a two-year suspension.
Finally, we note that this Court, in G.R. No. 205088, has already
affirmed the CA's ruling as to the issue of how much respondents
can collect from complainant as attorney's fees. This judgment has
long attained finality and, in fact, appears to be set for execution.
For this reason, we do not adopt the IBP Board of Governors'
recommendation for respondents to return to complainant 5% of
the amount assessed. The principle of immutability of judgments
behooves us from making any further statements on this particular
issue
WHEREFORE, we find respondents Attys. Pedro L. Linsangan and
Gerard M. Linsangan GUILTY. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondents Attys. Pedro Linsangan and Gerard
Linsangan from the practice of law for TWO YEARS effective upon
finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The complaint against Atty. Glenda M. Linsangan-Binoya
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10267, June 18, 2018
HELEN GRADIOLA,*Complainant, v. ATTY.
ROMULO A. DELES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Complaint1 for disbarment filed by Helen
Gradiola (Helen), charging respondent lawyer Atty.
Romulo A. Deles (respondent lawyer) with violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule
9.01 and Rule 9.02 of Canon 9; and Rule 10.1 and Rule
10.02 of Canon 10 thereof.2
Helen claimed that respondent lawyer was her counsel
in a civil case then pending before the Court of Appeals
(CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 63354.3
Helen asserted that respondent lawyer abetted the
unauthorized practice of law when he assigned or
delegated his professional duties as her lawyer to "Atty.
Ernesto S. Araneta" ("Atty. Araneta"). Helen alleged
that instead of attending full time to her case,
respondent lawyer allowed "Atty. Araneta" to do the
legal research works and the preparation of various
pleadings relative to the civil case.
Moreover, Helen averred that she was assured the case
was in "good hands" because respondent lawyer and
"Atty. Araneta" have a "contact" in the CA in Cebu City.
Helen narrated that she was told that the CA in Cebu
City had reconsidered its April 28, 2005 Decision, as
she was shown a photocopy of a November 13, 2006
Resolution4 of the CA in Cebu City which, this time,
declared her and her spouse as the owners of the four
lots subject-matter of the said CA-G.R. CV No. 63354.
Helen added that respondent lawyer nonetheless
cautioned that their adversaries in the case had
appealed to the Supreme Court, hence they had to
prepare their own "position paper"5 to support the
appeal before this Court. And, that naturally, this would
inevitably entail monetary expenses.
"Atty. Araneta" soon billed Helen for these expenses
and issued her all the receipts6 for these payments.
These receipts all bore the signatures "Atty.
Ernie/Ernesto Araneta." From May 2005 until October
26, 2006, Helen paid this "Atty. Araneta" a total of
P207,500.00. Helen claimed that this "Atty. Araneta"
split the attorney's fees with respondent lawyer.
However, to her chagrin and dismay, Helen discovered
that this "Atty. Araneta" had not only been disbarred
from the practice of law; but worse, the
aforementioned November 13, 2006 CA Resolution was
a total fabrication, even as the "position paper" that
was supposedly filed with this Court was an utter
simulation. With this discovery, Helen went herself to
the CA in Cebu City, and there found out, as a matter
of fact, that she and her husband had lost their case,
as shown in a genuine copy of the February 10, 2006
CA Resolution,7 which denied their Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as their Supplemental
Manifestation in Support of their Motion for
Reconsideration in said CA-G.R. CV No. 63354. And,
even more distressing, the records likewise revealed
that this genuine Resolution had become final and
irrevocable, thereby forever foreclosing their right to
pursue further reliefs in the case.
Whereupon, Helen immediately filed with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City a criminal complaint8 for
estafa through falsification of public document against
respondent lawyer and "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta." The
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City found Helen's criminal
complaint well grounded, and instituted a criminal
information therefor, now pending before Branch 53 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.9
Helen likewise filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against respondent lawyer before the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). This is the case at bench.
The IBP issued its Order10 directing respondent lawyer'
to submit his Answer. In a Manifestation,11 John P.
Deles (John), respondent lawyer's eldest son, informed
the IBP, that about three weeks before receipt of the
IBP's Order, his father suffered a stroke and underwent
a brain surgery. John implored the IBP to hold in
abeyance this administrative case until his father is
finally able to physically and intelligently file an Answer
to Helen's complaint. John claimed that at that time,
his father could hardly move and could not talk. He
submitted pictures of his father and a medical
certificate.
Helen, however, asserted that the proceedings could
not be indefinitely suspended considering that
respondent lawyer could very well hire his own
counsel.12
John then filed a Supplemental
Manifestation13 informing the IBP that his father was
"in a vegetative state" and committing to update the
IBP of his father's medical condition.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, denied
John's request and directed respondent lawyer to file
his Answer.14
Atty. Carlito V. Mampang Jr. (Atty. Mampang) tendered
the required Answer15 to the administrative complaint,
which was signed by John, and not by respondent
lawyer. Atty. Mampang qualified in the Answer that it
was his friend John who secured his services pro bono.
The counsel averred, that as of the date of filing the
Answer, respondent lawyer, dependent on his
children's help, could not communicate to explain his
side as he remained in a vegetative' state, unable to
speak, and had lost his motor skills.
Notably, the Answer filed on respondent lawyer's behalf
relied chiefly on (a) "Atty. Araneta's" counter-
affidavit16 dated August 21, 2008 which the latter
submitted to the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City; and
(b) "Atty. Araneta's" letter17 addressed to Helen's
counsel dated June 4, 2008.
The Answer further painted respondent lawyer as a
victim too of the chicanery perpetrated by "Atty.
Araneta," and that respondent lawyer was not Helen's
counsel of record; that although respondent lawyer's
name appeared in the fictitious pleadings, the
signatures appearing thereon were not by respondent
lawyer. To substantiate this claim, Atty. Mampang
submitted for comparison machine or xerox copies of
respondent lawyer's alleged pleadings18 in some cases
whereon he signed as counsel of record.
Report and Recommendation19of the Investigating
Commissioner and the Board of Governors
On February 23, 2010, the Investigating
Commissioner, Oliver A. Cachapero, recommended
respondent lawyer's suspension from the practice of
law for one year for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, and
Rule 10.1 and Rule 10.2 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rejecting the defense that respondent lawyer was in no
way at all involved in CA-G.R. CV No. 63354, the
Investigating Commissioner found that Helen had
consistently maintained that she directly employed and
dealt solely with respondent lawyer as her counsel; and
that, indeed, the pleadings that Helen submitted in
evidence before the IBP showed that these were signed
and subscribed by respondent lawyer as Helen's
counsel.
Furthermore, based on "Atty. Araneta's" counter-
affidavit which, among others, mentioned "Carlo
Sanchez" as "contact man" in Cebu City, the
Investigating Commissioner had reasonable grounds to
believe that "Atty. Araneta" (as well as respondent
lawyer) was part of a wide-ranging racket that plagued,
and even extended to the CA at Cebu City - a racket
which enabled Ernesto (and by extension respondent
lawyer) to bilk and milk unsuspecting litigants of huge
sums of money in exchange for the "successful" follow-
up of cases, which in this case, turned out to be nothing
else but a fly-by-night hustle and swindle. The
Investigating Commissioner also gave short shrift to
respondent lawyer's claim that Helen in fact knew of
"Atty. Araneta's" scheme, especially of the fact that he
had a "contact man" in the CA in Cebu, and pointed to
the fact that Helen had never ever mentioned this
"Carlo Sanchez" in her complaint. The Investigating
Commissioner even doubted the existence of "Carlo
Sanchez," and suggested that "Carlo Sanchez" could be
a mere lure or decoy to divert attention away from the
committed shenanigans. Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner concluded:
With the foregoing disquisition, the performance of a
series of odious acts which saw the hapless
Complainant being extorted huge amount of money
and the participation of Respondent are all too evident.
Respondent's participation and knowledge of the same
in every stage can be traced from his willfull
introduction of Araneta into the defense panel of
Complainant.20
The IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XX-2013-
511,21 adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's findings and recommendation.
The Court's Ruling
There seems to be truth that "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta"
was not a lawyer at all as Helen was made to believe.
His name does not appear in the Law List,22 and there
seems to be truth to the information Helen gathered
that this "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" was disbarred
because in A.C. No. 1109 (which this Court
promulgated on April 27, 2005), this Court ordered the
disbarment of a certain "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" due
to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
While "Atty. Araneta" admitted of his involvement in a
fraudulent scheme in defrauding litigants that included
Helen, we cannot immediately conclude that
respondent lawyer himself was likewise part of this
racket that duped Helen. It must be stressed that,
because of his medical condition, respondent lawyer
could not yet explain his side. While indeed, an Answer
was filed, it was John who signed the same and not
respondent lawyer. As such, we cannot consider
respondent lawyer to have been adequately
represented.
A full-dress investigation involving a careful evaluation
of evidence from both of the parties is necessary to
resolve factual issues. The serious imputations hurled
at respondent lawyer warrant an observance of due
process, i.e., to accord him the opportunity to explain
his side of the story. We explained:
Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts
of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process. x x x The
standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other
words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative
of due process for an administrative agency to resolve
a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as
affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.23
We note that Atty. Mampang candidly declared that it
was John who consulted him and sought his legal
services, and, thus, it cannot be said that respondent
lawyer voluntarily and intelligently accepted Atty.
Mampang to represent him. Respondent lawyer, with
his condition, could not even communicate with Atty.
Mampang regarding the case at the time of filing of the
Answer, which compelled the counsel to merely rely on
the available documents. In effect, Atty. Mampang
substituted his judgment for that of respondent lawyer.
Significantly, the Answer contained the following
disavowals by Atty. Mampang:
5. That the Respondent as of now may
be said to have lost most of his
essential human faculties, such as
speech, motor, even his bowel
movement, and he eat[s] only
through the help of his children.
Literally, he is in vegetative state, and
his life is dependent only on the help,
both physical and financial, of his
children. He was discharged from the
hospital, not because he has
recovered but rather because his
children do not have money anymore
to pay for his hospital bills. As of now,
the only "medical development" is
that the tube used in feeding him was
removed, and he is feeding through
the help of his daughter, the yow1ger
sister of John P. Deles;
6. That it is on this premise that this
counsel has to rely solely on the
documents available, such as those
annexed in the complaint filed by the
complainant, as Respondent cannot
convey any idea pertinent to the
actual incidents of this case that would
explain his side on the allegations
contained in the complaint.
xxxx
7. That [neither] this counsel [nor
Respondent's son John Deles] have in
[their] possession, neither [do they
have] other relevant documents x x x
so that this answer for the Respondent
is simply couched on facts, documents
and records available, [primarily] the
Affidavit-Complaint of Helen
Gradiola[. This] counsel cannot in
anyway relate, comprehend or
decipher [communication] from
[Respondent], as he is incapable of
uttering, communicating or
responding to any question[s] ask[ed]
of him;24
With respondent lawyer not yet in a position to factually
dispute the accusations and defend himself, and
considering that there was no established lawyer-client
relationship at all between him and Atty. Mampang,
albeit the latter acted for respondent lawyer's best
interest, proceeding with the investigation of the
administrative case against him would amount to a
denial of a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard.
This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys
the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges
against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an
officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed
his duties in accordance with his oath.25 "For the Court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent [lawyer] must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering
the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held
that a clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty."26 "The burden of proof in disbarment and
suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders
of the complainant."27
Under the circumstances, both duty and conscience
impel us to remand this administrative case for further
proceedings. Fairness cannot be ignored.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-511 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for further investigation, report and
recommendation. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is hereby instructed to: 1) require respondent lawyer's
son, John P. Deles, to provide an update on his father's
health condition and, on the basis of such update: 2)
to hold the case in abeyance if respondent lawyer's
stroke aftermath has significantly impaired his
cognitive ability and speech that he is not capable of
presenting his defense or 3) to direct respondent
lawyer to file his Answer and continue with the
proceedings if he is found to be medically fit and his
condition having improved over time, having regained
his cognitive and communication skills.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro,**(Acting Chairperson), Jardeleza,
Tijam, and Gesmundo,***JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10267, June 18, 2018
HELEN GRADIOLA,*Complainant, v. ATTY.
ROMULO A. DELES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Complaint1 for disbarment filed by Helen
Gradiola (Helen), charging respondent lawyer Atty.
Romulo A. Deles (respondent lawyer) with violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule
9.01 and Rule 9.02 of Canon 9; and Rule 10.1 and Rule
10.02 of Canon 10 thereof.2
Helen claimed that respondent lawyer was her counsel
in a civil case then pending before the Court of Appeals
(CA) docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 63354.3
Helen asserted that respondent lawyer abetted the
unauthorized practice of law when he assigned or
delegated his professional duties as her lawyer to "Atty.
Ernesto S. Araneta" ("Atty. Araneta"). Helen alleged
that instead of attending full time to her case,
respondent lawyer allowed "Atty. Araneta" to do the
legal research works and the preparation of various
pleadings relative to the civil case.
Moreover, Helen averred that she was assured the case
was in "good hands" because respondent lawyer and
"Atty. Araneta" have a "contact" in the CA in Cebu City.
Helen narrated that she was told that the CA in Cebu
City had reconsidered its April 28, 2005 Decision, as
she was shown a photocopy of a November 13, 2006
Resolution4 of the CA in Cebu City which, this time,
declared her and her spouse as the owners of the four
lots subject-matter of the said CA-G.R. CV No. 63354.
Helen added that respondent lawyer nonetheless
cautioned that their adversaries in the case had
appealed to the Supreme Court, hence they had to
prepare their own "position paper"5 to support the
appeal before this Court. And, that naturally, this would
inevitably entail monetary expenses.
"Atty. Araneta" soon billed Helen for these expenses
and issued her all the receipts6 for these payments.
These receipts all bore the signatures "Atty.
Ernie/Ernesto Araneta." From May 2005 until October
26, 2006, Helen paid this "Atty. Araneta" a total of
P207,500.00. Helen claimed that this "Atty. Araneta"
split the attorney's fees with respondent lawyer.
However, to her chagrin and dismay, Helen discovered
that this "Atty. Araneta" had not only been disbarred
from the practice of law; but worse, the
aforementioned November 13, 2006 CA Resolution was
a total fabrication, even as the "position paper" that
was supposedly filed with this Court was an utter
simulation. With this discovery, Helen went herself to
the CA in Cebu City, and there found out, as a matter
of fact, that she and her husband had lost their case,
as shown in a genuine copy of the February 10, 2006
CA Resolution,7 which denied their Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as their Supplemental
Manifestation in Support of their Motion for
Reconsideration in said CA-G.R. CV No. 63354. And,
even more distressing, the records likewise revealed
that this genuine Resolution had become final and
irrevocable, thereby forever foreclosing their right to
pursue further reliefs in the case.
Whereupon, Helen immediately filed with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City a criminal complaint8 for
estafa through falsification of public document against
respondent lawyer and "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta." The
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City found Helen's criminal
complaint well grounded, and instituted a criminal
information therefor, now pending before Branch 53 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.9
Helen likewise filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against respondent lawyer before the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). This is the case at bench.
The IBP issued its Order10 directing respondent lawyer'
to submit his Answer. In a Manifestation,11 John P.
Deles (John), respondent lawyer's eldest son, informed
the IBP, that about three weeks before receipt of the
IBP's Order, his father suffered a stroke and underwent
a brain surgery. John implored the IBP to hold in
abeyance this administrative case until his father is
finally able to physically and intelligently file an Answer
to Helen's complaint. John claimed that at that time,
his father could hardly move and could not talk. He
submitted pictures of his father and a medical
certificate.
Helen, however, asserted that the proceedings could
not be indefinitely suspended considering that
respondent lawyer could very well hire his own
counsel.12
John then filed a Supplemental
Manifestation13 informing the IBP that his father was
"in a vegetative state" and committing to update the
IBP of his father's medical condition.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, denied
John's request and directed respondent lawyer to file
his Answer.14
Atty. Carlito V. Mampang Jr. (Atty. Mampang) tendered
the required Answer15 to the administrative complaint,
which was signed by John, and not by respondent
lawyer. Atty. Mampang qualified in the Answer that it
was his friend John who secured his services pro bono.
The counsel averred, that as of the date of filing the
Answer, respondent lawyer, dependent on his
children's help, could not communicate to explain his
side as he remained in a vegetative' state, unable to
speak, and had lost his motor skills.
Notably, the Answer filed on respondent lawyer's behalf
relied chiefly on (a) "Atty. Araneta's" counter-
affidavit16 dated August 21, 2008 which the latter
submitted to the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City; and
(b) "Atty. Araneta's" letter17 addressed to Helen's
counsel dated June 4, 2008.
The Answer further painted respondent lawyer as a
victim too of the chicanery perpetrated by "Atty.
Araneta," and that respondent lawyer was not Helen's
counsel of record; that although respondent lawyer's
name appeared in the fictitious pleadings, the
signatures appearing thereon were not by respondent
lawyer. To substantiate this claim, Atty. Mampang
submitted for comparison machine or xerox copies of
respondent lawyer's alleged pleadings18 in some cases
whereon he signed as counsel of record.
Report and Recommendation19of the Investigating
Commissioner and the Board of Governors
On February 23, 2010, the Investigating
Commissioner, Oliver A. Cachapero, recommended
respondent lawyer's suspension from the practice of
law for one year for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, and
Rule 10.1 and Rule 10.2 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rejecting the defense that respondent lawyer was in no
way at all involved in CA-G.R. CV No. 63354, the
Investigating Commissioner found that Helen had
consistently maintained that she directly employed and
dealt solely with respondent lawyer as her counsel; and
that, indeed, the pleadings that Helen submitted in
evidence before the IBP showed that these were signed
and subscribed by respondent lawyer as Helen's
counsel.
Furthermore, based on "Atty. Araneta's" counter-
affidavit which, among others, mentioned "Carlo
Sanchez" as "contact man" in Cebu City, the
Investigating Commissioner had reasonable grounds to
believe that "Atty. Araneta" (as well as respondent
lawyer) was part of a wide-ranging racket that plagued,
and even extended to the CA at Cebu City - a racket
which enabled Ernesto (and by extension respondent
lawyer) to bilk and milk unsuspecting litigants of huge
sums of money in exchange for the "successful" follow-
up of cases, which in this case, turned out to be nothing
else but a fly-by-night hustle and swindle. The
Investigating Commissioner also gave short shrift to
respondent lawyer's claim that Helen in fact knew of
"Atty. Araneta's" scheme, especially of the fact that he
had a "contact man" in the CA in Cebu, and pointed to
the fact that Helen had never ever mentioned this
"Carlo Sanchez" in her complaint. The Investigating
Commissioner even doubted the existence of "Carlo
Sanchez," and suggested that "Carlo Sanchez" could be
a mere lure or decoy to divert attention away from the
committed shenanigans. Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner concluded:
With the foregoing disquisition, the performance of a
series of odious acts which saw the hapless
Complainant being extorted huge amount of money
and the participation of Respondent are all too evident.
Respondent's participation and knowledge of the same
in every stage can be traced from his willfull
introduction of Araneta into the defense panel of
Complainant.20
The IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XX-2013-
511,21 adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's findings and recommendation.
The Court's Ruling
There seems to be truth that "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta"
was not a lawyer at all as Helen was made to believe.
His name does not appear in the Law List,22 and there
seems to be truth to the information Helen gathered
that this "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" was disbarred
because in A.C. No. 1109 (which this Court
promulgated on April 27, 2005), this Court ordered the
disbarment of a certain "Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta" due
to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
While "Atty. Araneta" admitted of his involvement in a
fraudulent scheme in defrauding litigants that included
Helen, we cannot immediately conclude that
respondent lawyer himself was likewise part of this
racket that duped Helen. It must be stressed that,
because of his medical condition, respondent lawyer
could not yet explain his side. While indeed, an Answer
was filed, it was John who signed the same and not
respondent lawyer. As such, we cannot consider
respondent lawyer to have been adequately
represented.
A full-dress investigation involving a careful evaluation
of evidence from both of the parties is necessary to
resolve factual issues. The serious imputations hurled
at respondent lawyer warrant an observance of due
process, i.e., to accord him the opportunity to explain
his side of the story. We explained:
Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts
of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process. x x x The
standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other
words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative
of due process for an administrative agency to resolve
a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as
affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.23
We note that Atty. Mampang candidly declared that it
was John who consulted him and sought his legal
services, and, thus, it cannot be said that respondent
lawyer voluntarily and intelligently accepted Atty.
Mampang to represent him. Respondent lawyer, with
his condition, could not even communicate with Atty.
Mampang regarding the case at the time of filing of the
Answer, which compelled the counsel to merely rely on
the available documents. In effect, Atty. Mampang
substituted his judgment for that of respondent lawyer.
Significantly, the Answer contained the following
disavowals by Atty. Mampang:
5. That the Respondent as of now may
be said to have lost most of his
essential human faculties, such as
speech, motor, even his bowel
movement, and he eat[s] only
through the help of his children.
Literally, he is in vegetative state, and
his life is dependent only on the help,
both physical and financial, of his
children. He was discharged from the
hospital, not because he has
recovered but rather because his
children do not have money anymore
to pay for his hospital bills. As of now,
the only "medical development" is
that the tube used in feeding him was
removed, and he is feeding through
the help of his daughter, the yow1ger
sister of John P. Deles;
6. That it is on this premise that this
counsel has to rely solely on the
documents available, such as those
annexed in the complaint filed by the
complainant, as Respondent cannot
convey any idea pertinent to the
actual incidents of this case that would
explain his side on the allegations
contained in the complaint.
xxxx
7. That [neither] this counsel [nor
Respondent's son John Deles] have in
[their] possession, neither [do they
have] other relevant documents x x x
so that this answer for the Respondent
is simply couched on facts, documents
and records available, [primarily] the
Affidavit-Complaint of Helen
Gradiola[. This] counsel cannot in
anyway relate, comprehend or
decipher [communication] from
[Respondent], as he is incapable of
uttering, communicating or
responding to any question[s] ask[ed]
of him;24
With respondent lawyer not yet in a position to factually
dispute the accusations and defend himself, and
considering that there was no established lawyer-client
relationship at all between him and Atty. Mampang,
albeit the latter acted for respondent lawyer's best
interest, proceeding with the investigation of the
administrative case against him would amount to a
denial of a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard.
This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys
the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges
against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an
officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed
his duties in accordance with his oath.25 "For the Court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent [lawyer] must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering
the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held
that a clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty."26 "The burden of proof in disbarment and
suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders
of the complainant."27
Under the circumstances, both duty and conscience
impel us to remand this administrative case for further
proceedings. Fairness cannot be ignored.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-511 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for further investigation, report and
recommendation. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is hereby instructed to: 1) require respondent lawyer's
son, John P. Deles, to provide an update on his father's
health condition and, on the basis of such update: 2)
to hold the case in abeyance if respondent lawyer's
stroke aftermath has significantly impaired his
cognitive ability and speech that he is not capable of
presenting his defense or 3) to direct respondent
lawyer to file his Answer and continue with the
proceedings if he is found to be medically fit and his
condition having improved over time, having regained
his cognitive and communication skills.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro,**(Acting Chairperson), Jardeleza,
Tijam, and Gesmundo,***JJ., concur.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9000, January 10, 2018
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. HAIDE V.
GUMBA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint 1 filed by
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba
(respondent), and for which respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for six months. The issues now ripe for resolution
are: a) whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court
by not abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether
respondent deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation.
Factual Antecedents
According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained
from him a P350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per
annum. Incidental thereto, respondent executed in favor of
complainant an undated Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105-square
meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 20553 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio
Vista. Attached to said Deed was a Special Power of
Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent's parents authorizing her
to apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the subject
property. Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed that if
the latter failed to pay the loan in or before August 2000,
complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Register of Deeds (RD).5
Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite
repeated demands, she failed to settle her obligation. Complainant
attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of
Naga City but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered
the authority of respondent to mortgage the property to a bank, and
not to sell it.6
Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation,
be would not have approved her loan. He added that respondent
committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral
ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that
respondent be sanctioned for her infraction.7
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated February 9, 2009,
Commissioner Jose I. de la Rama, Jr. (Commissioner de la Rama)
faulted respondent for failing to file an answer, and participate in
the mandatory conference. He further declared that the SPA
specifically authorized respondent to mortgage the property with a
bank. He stressed that for selling the property, and not just
mortgaging it to complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent
acted beyond her authority. Having done so, she committed gross
violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1,9 Rule 1.01,10 and
Canon 711 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-44612 dated August 28, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner de la Rama.
Action of the Supreme Court
Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution13 dated October 5, 201
1, which sustained the findings and conclusion of the IBP. The
Court nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper,
pursuant to its sound judicial discretion and on the facts of the case.
Accordingly, it suspended respondent from the practice of law for
six months, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition
of same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October
5, 2011 Resolution upon respondent because its previous copy
sent to her was returned unserved. 14 In its August 13, 2012
Resolution,15 the Court considered the October 5, 2011 Resolution
to have been served upon respondent after the March 14, 2012
Resolution was also returned unserved. In the same resolution, the
Court also denied with finality respondent's motion for
reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution.
Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Naga City, Branch 2 wrote a
letter16 inquiring from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
whether respondent could continue representing her clients and
appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision relating
to respondent's suspension, which was downloaded from the
internet, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in
courts for the period of her suspension.
According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent
represented a party in a case pending in her court; and, the counsel
of the opposing party called Judge Armea's attention regarding the
legal standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea
added that respondent denied that she was suspended to practice
law since she (respondent) had not yet received a copy of the
Court's resolution on the matter.
In her Answer/Comment17 to the query of Judge Armea,
respondent countered that by reason of such downloaded decision,
Judge Armea and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III
(Judge Formaran III) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City
disallowed her appearance in their courts. She insisted that service
of any pleading or judgment cannot be made through the internet.
She further claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of
the Court's October 5, 2011 Resolution.
On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
referred the October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation
to all courts.18 In response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA issued
OCA Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts,20 the Office
of Chief State Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
and the IBP informing them of the October 5, 2011 and August 13,
2012 Resolutions of the Court.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-35921 dated
March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the
Report and Recommendation22 of Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero (Commissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint
against respondent. According to Commissioner Cachapero, there
is no rule allowing the service of judgments through the internet;
and Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time
when they implemented the suspension of respondent even before
the actual service upon her of the resolution concerning her
suspension.
Statement and Report of the OBC
In its November 22, 2013 Statement,23 the OBC stressed that
respondent received the August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her
motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) on
November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus,
the effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12,
2012 until May 12, 2013. The OBC also pointed out that suspension
is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension.
It is necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the
suspension to enable the concerned lawyer to resume practice of
law.
The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report24 that
respondent has no authority to practice law and appear in court as
counsel during her suspension, and until such time that the Court
has lifted the order of her suspension. Thus, the OBC made these
recommendations:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is
respectfully recommended that:
1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion
to lift order of her suspension, attaching therewith certifications
from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where she
practices[h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is
affiliated, that she has ceased and desisted from the practice of law
from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately; and
2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they
should not be sanctioned for disciplinary action for issuing said
Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359, dated 21 March 2013,
purportedly dismissing this case for lack of merit.25
On February 19, 2014, the Court noted26 the OBC Report, and
directed respondent to comply with the guidelines relating to the
lifting of the order of her suspension as enunciated in Maniago v.
Atty. De Dios.27
Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC
issued a Certification,28 which stated that respondent had been
ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, and as
of the issuance of said certification, the order of her suspension had
not yet been lifted.
Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso
On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified
Complaint29 for nullity of clearance, damages, and preliminary
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order
against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty.
Paraiso). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2015-0007.
Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of
suspending her from the practice of law even if the administrative
case against her was still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted
the OBC for requiring her to submit a clearance from its office
before she resumes her practice of law after the suspension. In
turn, she argued that Atty. Paraiso benefited from this supposed
"bogus suspension" by publicly announcing the disqualification of
respondent to practice law.
30
In its Answer, the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the action, which seeks reversal, modification or enjoinment
of a directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that respondent
should raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in
the administrative case, instead of filing a complaint with the RTC.
It also stated that the issuance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was
in compliance with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the
CSP, the PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.
For its part, the OBC declared in a Report31 dated March 24, 2015
that during and after the period of her suspension, without the same
having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in
courts in the following cases:
x x x (1) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City
Assessor of Naga City, et. al.), (2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063
(Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3) Other Spec.
Proc. No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City
v. Danilo O. Laborado).32
The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March
24, 2015 Report, the Court had not yet lifted the order of
suspension against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, respondent deliberately
ref1tsed to obey a lawful order of the Court. Thus, it recommended
that a stiffer penalty be imposed against respondent.
On June 42015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil
Case No. 2015-0007 for lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution
was respondent's motion for reconsideration.33
Issue
Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of
law during the period of her suspension and prior to an order of the
Court lifting such suspension?
Our Ruling
Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the
practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the
inherent regulatory power of the [Court],"34 It is a "privilege
burdened with conditions."35 As such, lawyers must comply with its
rigid standards, which include mental fitness, maintenance of
highest level of morality, and full compliance with the rules of the
legal profession.36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De
Dios,37 the Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order
of suspension, to wit:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from
the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the
penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within
which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent
shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of
the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the
period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondent's compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the
lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.38
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution dated October 5, 2011 suspending respondent from the
practice of law for six months effective immediately. Respondent
filed her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012,
she received the notice of the denial of such motion per Registry
Return Receipt No. 53365.
While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done
only personally or by registered mail,39and that mere showing of a
downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent
is not a valid service, the fact however, that respondent was duly
informed of her suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated
above, she filed a motion for reconsideration on the October 5,
2011 Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of
said motion. It thus follows that respondent's six months
suspension commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion
for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
In Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,40 despite having received
the Resolution anent her suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued
to practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel
in courts. For which reason, the Court suspended her from the
practice of law for six months in addition to her initial one month
suspension, or a total of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,41 respondent therein,
Atty. Lozada, appeared and signed as counsel, for and in behalf of
her husband, during the period of her suspension from the practice
of law. For having done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in
unauthorized practice of law. The Court did not give weight to Atty.
Lozada's defense of good faith as she was very well aware that
when she represented her husband, she was still serving her
suspension order. The Court also noted that Atty. Lozada did not
seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended
Atty. Lozada for six months for her wilful disobedience to a lawful
order of the Court.
Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her
suspension. However, she continued to engage in the practice law
by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the
period of her suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of
a lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions which require the application of legal
knowledge within the period of his or her suspension. 42 To stress,
by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are
characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of
service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.”43 In fine, it will amount to unauthorized practice, and a
violation of a lawful order of the Court if a suspended lawyer
engages in the practice of law during the pendency of his or her
suspension.44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during
and even after the period of her suspension and without filing a
sworn statement for the lifting of her suspension, respondent
signed pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such
acts of respondent are in violation of the order of her suspension to
practice law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is
necessary that there is an order from the Court lifting the
suspension of a lawyer to practice law. To note, in Maniago, the
Court explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the
expiration of one’s suspension, file a sworn statement with the
Court, and that such statement shall be considered proof of the
lawyer’s compliance with the order of suspension.
In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent
to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order
against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However,
respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil
Case No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty.
Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a
lawful order of the Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for
the lifting of the order of suspension against her.
To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the
Court is two-fold: 1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as
counsel during the period of her suspension, and prior to the lifting
of such order of her suspension; and 2) she did not comply with the
Court's directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with
the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.
Under Section 27,45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from practice of law for
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among
other grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's
lawful orders by failing to comply with the order of her suspension,
and to the Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting
thereof. Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for
six (6) months from the practice of law against respondent is in
order.46
WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional
period of six (6) months (from her original six (6) months
suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date
of her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point
when her suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant
is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to the record of
respondent as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen,
and Martires, JJ., concur.