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The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis
LIN ALEXANDRA MORTENSGAARD, JUL 19 2015, 18712 VIEWS
THIS CONTENT WAS WRITTEN BY A STUDENT AND ASSESSED AS PART OF A

UNIVERSITY DEGREE. E-IR PUBLISHES STUDENT ESSAYS & DISSERTATIONS
TO ALLOW OUR READERS TO BROADEN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS
POSSIBLE WHEN ANSW ERING SIMILAR QUESTIONS IN THEIR OWN STUDIES.
The Spratly Islands are located in the so-called South China Sea and consist of a number of
small islands, reefs, atolls and rocks. These islands have been disputed with varying degrees of
intensity for more than 50 years. They continue to be a point of dispute between six different
states to this day. The Spratly Islands are claimed in whole or part by The People’s Republic of
China (PRC), The Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan), The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and
Brunei.
This essay proceeds in a number of sections. Firstly, the dispute is introduced in detail and in
combination with this, the existing research is reviewed and evaluated. This will expose the
limited theoretical approaches that have so far been taken in analyzing the dispute. As is
shown, the Spratly Islands dispute has been viewed through mostly realist and structural realist
lenses and to a lesser extent through liberal ones. This essay argues that taking a constructivist
approach through discourse analysis as described by Lene Hansen[1] will highlight essential
and previously neglected dynamics of the dispute. The second section of the essay therefore
applies discourse analysis to the dispute. This section first introduces Lene Hansen’s
methodology and then goes on to apply it to the specific case. Due to the relative brevity of the
essay, the analysis will focus on the discourses of two of the claimant states, namely the PRC
and the Philippines. The analysis looks at the discourses of the two states towards the dispute
in general, but also at the discourses used specifically towards the other state. This will highlight
major Chinese and Filipino attitudes and identities in the dispute and will thus examine how
these discourses construct and reproduce the dispute. Finally, the conclusion sums up the
findings of the essay by explaining how the two states’ conflicting perceptions and identities
serve to reproduce the conflict in irreconcilable terms. Note that the Spratly Islands issue is
generally conceptualized as a dispute rather than a conflict due to the overall absence of violent
confrontation and the low-intensity character of the dispute.
Background and Literature Review
The South China Sea, where the Spratly Islands are found, borders many states and is very
tellingly also known as the West Philippine Sea and the East Sea in Vietnam[2]. There is some
confusion as to the number of islands, reefs, rocks and atolls that the Spratly Islands consist of.
Some academics claim up to 230[3] while others speak of 150 “named landforms”[4] and some
only include 40-50 islands and reefs[5]. Even the CIA seems uncertain in its estimate when
writing that the Spratlys consist of “100 or so islets”[6].
Three of the claimant states, Vietnam, the ROC and the PRC, base their claims on historical
‘facts’ while the three other states, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia, refer mainly to
international law and conventions when justifying their claims. This essay focuses on the PRC
and the Philippines and the bases of their claims are therefore examined in detail below.[7]
The PRC bases its claims on historical evidence of Chinese presence on some of the islands.
These claims go back to the Xia Dynasty (21st-16th centuries B.C.). The PRC claims that they
were the first to “name, map, study, use and patrol the South China Sea and the islands
therein”.[8] The PRC refers to different types of evidence of occupancy such as old maps
depicting the Spratly Islands, the discovery of old Chinese coins on the islands and the referral
to the islands in ancient Chinese history books.[9] Thus according to the PRC argument, the
Spratlys have not been terra nullius[10] for about 2000 years at least. The PRC today occupies
9 reefs, however, claim all of the Spratly Islands.
In contrast to this, the Philippines bases its claims mainly on international law through the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The initial claim of the Philippines
stems from the ‘discovery’ of some of the islands by a Filipino citizen named Thomas Cloma in
1956. The 1978 formal Filipino claim, which today comprises 7 islands and 3 reefs, is thus
based on two main principals. First, the Philippines asserts that the islands that it claims (also
1
known as the Kalayaan Group) were terra nullius prior to Cloma’s discovery and that his
discovery therefore put them under Filipino sovereignty. Secondly, and more importantly, the
Philippines refers to UNCLOS’ concept of a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
when justifying its claims. Most of the Filipino-claimed islands and reefs thus fall within the
Philippines’ EEZ.[11]
One major definitional issue impacts the dispute; what constitutes and island? According to
UNCLOS, an island has an EEZ of its own, while rocks or reefs do not. UNCLOS’ Article 121
defines an island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water
at high tide. (…)Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”[12] The PRC claims that all of its
occupied features are islands with individual EEZs, despite not all of them being naturally above
sea-level at high tide.[13]
But why are a number a tiny reefs and islands disputed by six different nations? The existing
literature tends to focus on two main reasons for the dispute: resources and strategic concerns.
Most existing explanations apply realism to describe and explain the dispute. Realism assumes
that the world is anarchic and made up of sovereign states that have national interests that they
must protect through mechanisms of self-help.[14]
One such national interest that much of the literature focuses on is possible oil or gas reserves
underneath the Spratlys.[15] The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that
the South China Sea as a whole contains 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas. However, the EIA also claims that the Spratly Islands in particular have “virtually no
proved or probable oil reserves.”[16] Nonetheless, many claimant states have already been in
contact with major oil exploration companies. In addition to this, the global decrease in fishing
stocks and growing populations mean that the fishing rights and stocks that the Spratlys hold
are very attractive to the claimant states.[17]
Some scholars such as Min Gyo Koo have also focused on the strategic importance of the
Spratlys. The South China Sea is the second busiest sea lane in the world and much of the
world’s trade passes through it. Further to this, the South China Sea is a militarily important
passage; countries controlling the Spratlys could potentially prevent enemy navies from passing
and the Spratly Islands themselves represent important observation posts.[18]
Other scholars focus on more structural realist explanations such as arms build-ups and power
balances. De Castro has thus focused on the PRC’s use of what he calls “power politics
tactics”[19] such as pressing for a bilateral approach to the dispute in order to avoid a PRC vs.
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) dynamic and utilizing its naval capabilities to
obtain its interests. De Castro also gives a long account of the PRC’s naval arms build-up and
focuses on the balance of power in the area. Along the same lines, Marlay[20] describes both
the Philippines’ and the PRC’s military capabilities and Stanley Meyer focuses on issues such
as the possibility of a regional arms race[21].
Along the same vein, David Scott has focused on the power vacuum left in Southeast Asia after
the fall of the Soviet Union and the possibility of states like the US, Japan or Australia becoming
involved as stabilizing powers. Scott explains that the Philippines could balance against the
PRC by allying with the US in order to maintain status quo and he concludes that “The benefits
of such balancing may become apparent because balancing is itself a stabilizing
process.”[22] This statement is as if taken out of structural realist Kenneth Waltz’ ‘Man, the
State, and War’ from 1959.
Much of the scholarship on the Spratly Islands dispute, explains the dispute in realist terms, but
suggests solutions of a liberal or liberal institutionalist character. Liberalism focuses on the
possibility of abolishing war and conflict through trade and diplomatic ties and through
intergovernmental organizations.[23] Meyer states that “The Spratly Islands issue is most likely
to be resolved in a regional forum”[24] such as ASEAN or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
Likewise, Michael Gallagher, in a more classical liberal way, advocates for increased trade
relations and diplomatic ties in order to prevent a possible conflict over the South China
Sea.[25]Others focus more on international law and the UN. Xavier Furtado for example
2
examines UNCLOS’ limitations with regards to the dispute, but also suggests improvements to
the use of UNCLOS.[26]
Some scholars have taken a more constructivist approach to the dispute by looking at how
identities are developed and transformed through interaction.[27] Chen Jie has gone some way
by focusing on the role of history, perception and emotion in the PRC’s approach to the dispute
by analyzing for example the effect of ‘the long century of humiliation’-thinking in the PRC,
which means that “China regards itself as a victim of regional countries’ aggression and
encroachment.”[28] Jie, however, only take this approach in her first section and then turns to
describing the PRC’s Spratly policy in structural realist terms.
Chun Leung Jacky Li takes a more consistent approach when looking at Filipino internet
discourse regarding the dispute. She identifies internet discourses portraying the Philippines as
the “Small Brave Kid vs. the Big Bully”[29] Li, however, seems to mix in official discourse from
figures such as Filipino presidents. The article thus adds valuably information to existing
debates, however remains slightly inconsistent.
Evidently there are large gaps in the existing literature, which has mostly focused on the dispute
through realist and liberalist lenses. This essay moves along the same lines as Chen Jie and
Jacky Li’s research, however, takes a purely constructivist approach by looking at the identities
and perceptions as portrayed in PRC and Filipino official discourses on the dispute. This is done
in an attempt to discover previously ignored dynamics that construct and reproduce the conflict
in certain terms. This essay thus seeks to add to the existing research, rather than discard it.
This is done through poststructuralist discourse analysis as explained in the next section.
Discourse Analysis
Poststructuralist discourse analysis focuses on the link between foreign policy and identity. It
assumes that “policies are dependent upon representations of the threat, country, security
problem or crisis it seeks to address. Foreign policies need to ascribe meaning to the situation
and to construct the objects within it”[30]. This meaning and these objects are constructed by
drawing on specific identities and representations articulated through language. As Hansen
notes, language is political, meaning that it is a “site for the production and reproduction of
particular subjectivities and identities while others are simultaneously excluded.”[31] But
identities and policies do not exist in simple causal relationships, rather they are mutually
constitutive and reproductive thus it is “through the discursive enactment of foreign policy (…)
that identity comes into being, but this identity is at the same time constructed as the
legitimization for the policy proposed.”[32] This is why discourse analysis makes language its
ontological focus and the articulation of identities and policies its epistemological
focus.[33] Thus in this analysis the discourse (i.e. the language) is analyzed in order to reveal
how identities construct policies and vice versa.
More specifically, the analysis includes two so-called ‘selves’ (the PRC and the Philippines) in
order to examine to what extent these selves differ in their construction of identities in the
dispute and in their perception of it. Hansen identifies three intertextual models that a discourse
analysis can base itself on. Due to the brevity of this essay only the first intertextual model,
namely official discourse, will be analyzed here. The sources that are analyzed therefore come
directly from the PRC or Filipino governments. The aim is to show how PRC and Filipino
officially-articulated identities constitute and are constituted by the dispute. One specific ‘event’
is analyzed (the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff) as well as the general official PRC discourse
between 2007 and 2014 and general official Filipino discourse between 2010 and 2014. The
difference in time scale is due to the lack of Filipino sources from the years prior to 2010. The
analysis therefore assumes that the Filipino discourse did not change substantially from 2007-
2010. The criteria for choosing these sources are as follows 1) the source includes clear
articulations of identities and policies; 2) is widely read and attended to; 3)comes from a formal
authority that defines the political position.[34]
The discourse analysis included 26 items from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC and 4
items from the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC and on the Filipino side, 12 items from
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines and 2 items from the Department of
National Defense of the Philippines. The items include speeches, communiques, press
3
conference transcripts and official notifications. The unequal number of Chinese and Filipino
items is due to the large amount of PRC sources available online. Despite the smaller number
of Filipino items, these were actually more concentrated on the Spratly Islands than the Chinese
ones – this is probably due to the fact that the Chinese items focused on multiple of its South
China Sea disputes. Naturally, only those statements pertaining to the Spratly Islands or the
South China Sea in general were analyzed.
The PRC Discourse: the Peace-Loving PRC and History as a Way of Knowing
Much of the Chinese discourse focuses on the cooperation and stability of the region. Among
the most used words in the Chinese discourse are ‘peace’, ‘stability’ and ‘prosperity’. This is
visible in sentences such as “we should (…) enhance unity and cooperation among us,
overcome difficulties and meet challenges and promote peace, stability and prosperity of the
region”[35] These words and phrases are present both in documents relating to regional events
such as ASEAN, ARF or East Asian summits, but are also present to a lesser extent in
documents specifically regarding Sino-Filipino relations such as joint statements regarding the
dispute and in quotes from the Minister of Defense. Alongside its pressing for peaceful
cooperation and development, the PRC discourse often refers to specific policies such as its
‘Good Neighbour Policy’ and the famous ‘Win-win cooperation’. Moreover, this ‘peace, stability
and prosperity’ discourse leads the PRC to urge the other claimant states to settle disputes
“peacefully through bilateral friendly consultations”[36]. The PRC thus sees the dispute as a
potential obstacle to regional peace, stability and prosperity and presses for peaceful
negotiations and solutions. The PRC speaks in ‘we’ terms rather than ‘us and them’ terms. In
this way the PRC is portraying itself as a force for regional peace, but also conveying the notion
that China cannot be peaceful on its own.
This self-image induces the PRC to portray any aggression by other states as a disturbance to
regional stability. During the Scarborough Shoal Standoff in 2012 where a Filipino navy ship
was sent to the Scarborough Shoal due to a Filipino surveillance plane having spotted Chinese
fishing vessels in the area, the PRC called the Filipino ships “warships”[37]. Furthermore, the
PRC portrayed the Philippines’ actions as “harassment of Chinese fishing boats”[38] and as
going “against the two countries’ consensus to maintain peace and stability of the South China
Sea.”[39]Underlining its peaceful nature, the PRC stated that “[c]ompetent Chinese authorities
have sent public service ships rather than warships to waters of the Island with the aim of
protecting the safety of the Chinese fishermen”.[40] The PRC later stated that “some Philippine
senior officials misled public opinion”[41] regarding the standoff. Thus the PRC portrays itself as
a peaceful state, whereas the Philippines is portrayed as an aggressive warship-sending state
that goes against the consensus for peace and purposely misleads public opinion. Clearly in this
image the PRC is acting morally correct, whereas the Philippines is acting unacceptably.
Another type of discourse is, however, also discernible. It is best described as realist discourse
grounded in a history-focused narrative. This is visible in the following statement, recounting a
Chinese explorer’s travels 600 years ago:
“The Chinese brought with them tea, ceramics, silk and craftsmanship. They did not occupy a
single inch of land. As long-time victims of foreign aggression and humiliation, the Chinese
people are keenly aware of the meaning of national independence, sovereignty, security and
world peace. We will never inflict such sufferings upon other nations.”[42] [the author’s
emphasis added]
This shows how important concepts such as sovereignty and territory are to the PRC, which
only sees itself as upholding its “territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests”[43] in
the South China Sea. The PRC called the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff a “violation of
China’s sovereignty”[44] and reiterated that “the Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal] is an
integral part of China. China has indisputable sovereignty over the Island.”[45] The discourse
surrounding the Scarborough Shoal standoff also shows the use of realist terms in reference to
history:
“[T]he Huangyan Island is China’s inherent territory (…). China has ample jurisprudential
evidence supporting its sovereign rights over the Island. China was the first to discover and
name the Huangyan Island and also the first to include it into China’s territory and exercise
sovereign jurisdiction over it. The waters surrounding the Huangyan Island has been a
traditional fishing ground for Chinese fishermen. Since ancient times, Chinese fishermen have
been fishing in waters surrounding the Island.”[46]
4
Thus the PRC is using very modern-day realist language, but justifying its claim in historical
terms. The past is extremely important to the PRC and to its conception of itself. To some extent
the PRC views history as a way of determining what is true and regards it as outweighing all
other arguments. This high regard of history might be linked to its fear of forgetting history and
repeating past mistakes. The PRC’s resolve not to forget history is visible in statements such as
“The Chinese people, after suffering tremendously from foreign aggression and colonialism in
modern times, and having eventually regained independence and liberation, would by no means
bring the same suffering to people of other countries.”[47]
Moreover, the PRC discourse not only uses history to justify its claims, it also uses history to
support the abovementioned ‘peace, stability and prosperity’ discourse. A combination of the
two discourses is thus visible in sentences such as “China’s historical and cultural tradition
determines that the Chinese are a peace-loving nation”[48] and “China knows deeply from
history and its own experience that peaceful development is the right and successful path, a
path that serves best China’s fundamental interests and the interests of the people in the
world.”[49] This discourse conveys the idea that it is possible to ‘know from history’ and that
‘historical and cultural tradition’ can ‘determine’ something. History is thus a way of knowing for
the PRC and ignoring it “would be going against history and not being responsible to
mankind.”[50] History is seen as an instrument for improving the world we live in by learning
from it, but it is also a way of knowing in itself. This is why the PRC knows that the Spratly
Islands belong to them. History provides all the proof that is needed.
The Filipino Discourse: International Law as the Only Way Forward
The most dominant Filipino discourse focuses on international law and in particular UNCLOS.
The Philippines convey a strong belief that international law can solve the dispute. President
Aquino III stated that “rules and norms anchored on international law are fundamental in
promoting trust and confidence among nations, and in ensuring stability and peace in the
international community.”[51]The Philippines, like the PRC, seem intent on regional peace and
stability. The Philippines, however, underline that making use of international law is the only way
to ensure this peace – this was underlined when the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings
under Article 287 of UNCLOS against the PRC, challenging its claims in the South China
Sea.[52] The Philippines argues that “the clarification of maritime entitlements under UNCLOS
would assure peace, security, stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. We
truly believe that the arbitral proceedings would bring this dispute to a durable
solution.”[53] According to the Philippines a durable and just solution is possible through
international law because it sees international law as “objective, impartial and non-
discriminatory”[54] and states that it “ought to be respected by all”[55]. This is also why the
Philippines do not perceive the arbitration as a threat to the PRC; “Arbitration is as peaceful and
amicable process to settle a dispute between and among friends.”[56]
The Philippines believes that what ultimately counts is international law and that it overrules
other approaches to the dispute. This is visible in its discourse regarding the Scarborough Shoal
standoff, which continuously justifies the Filipino claim of the Shoal through different UNCLOS
articles whilst also delegitimizing the PRC’s historic claim by subjecting it to international law;
“[U]nder public international law, for a historic claim to mature into a historical title, a mere
showing of long usage is not enough.”[57] This is how the Philippines has come to view the
PRC’s actions regarding the Shoal as a “serious violation of the Philippines’ sovereignty and
maritime jurisdiction”[58] whilst its own occupation of the Scarborough Shoal is legal and
justified under UNCLOS. In this way the Filipino discourse engages with the PRC’s historic
claim, however, evaluates it according to ‘objective and impartial’ international law rather than
as historical ‘facts’. Consequently, the PRC’s historic claim must adhere to the specifics of
international law to be legitimate in the eyes of the Philippines. To some extent then, the Filipino
way of knowing in relation to the dispute is through international law. The Philippines believes
that international law points to what constitutes right from wrong. Much like the PRC, the
Philippines also think that we can learn from the past. However, the Philippines, rather than
believing in the lessons of history, believes that we can learn from past cases in international
law. The Filipino discourse for example refers to the Palmas Island Case as a precedent to the
Spratly one.[59] Hence, it is through international law rather than history that the Philippines
knows that the Spratly Islands (i.e. the Kalayaan Group) belong to them. International law
provides all the proof that is needed.
5
The Filipino self-perception might be what led it to see the dispute through legal terms. To some
extent, the Philippines views itself as the less powerful actor, however, believes that the law is
the way to challenge the PRC. This thinking is visible in statements such as the Department of
Foreign Affairs’ call for Filipinos to “unite to support the President’s constitutional mandate [i.e.
the arbitration initiation] to protect Philippine territory and national interest”[60]. This exhibits a
certain sense of the Philippines being the underdog, who can nevertheless overcome the bigger
powers by uniting in playing the game that we are all equal in; the law. The Philippines thus
remind us that “[t]he law must apply both to the mighty and to the weak, to the rich and to the
poor alike.”[61]
The perception of the PRC as the physically stronger part is also visible from the Filipino
discourse. The PRC is viewed as a rigid hardliner who make the continuation of negotiations
impossible – this according to the Philippines is the main reason for the initiation of the
arbitration.[62] Moreover, the PRC is seen as the aggressor projecting “an overwhelming naval
and maritime presence far beyond its maritime shores thereby raising regional
tensions”.[63] The PRC is also seen as ‘harassing’ Filipino ships – the exact same word was
used by the PRC about the Philippine actions. Moreover, it comes as no surprise that the
Philippines, much like PRC, sees itself as a calm and rational, peace-loving nation, exhausting
“almost all political and diplomatic avenues for a peaceful negotiated settlement of its maritime
dispute with China. Our last resort (…) was to utilize the legal track”.[64] The PRC, not the
Philippines, has made progress via dialogue impossible according to the Philippines.
Conclusion
This essay has sought to identify and explain the major dynamics of the Spratly Islands dispute.
It has done so by first recounting the background of the dispute and reviewing the existing
literature on the dispute. As shown, most of the literature identifies the major dynamics of the
dispute through realist lenses whilst suggesting solutions to the dispute in liberalist terms. A
limited amount of constructivist approaches exist, none of these, however, undertake a thorough
analysis of the underlying identities and perceptions of the dispute. The essay therefore
attempted to fill a gap in the existing research by taking a constructivist approach to the dispute
through Hansen’s poststructural discourse analysis. The analysis focused on the official
discourse of the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines towards the dispute and each
other by analyzing the official general discourse and the discourse surrounding one specific
event, the Scarborough Shoal standoff.
The analysis revealed that the two states’ perceptions of themselves, the other and the dispute
in general, differ extensively. The PRC identifies itself as a peace-loving state, working for
regional stability whilst perceiving the Philippines as an aggressor, who works against the
PRC’s peaceful efforts. Moreover, the PRC discourse revealed a certain type of epistemology
used by the PRC; utilizing history as a way of knowing and thus as a way of telling right from
wrong. The PRC thus emphasizes the importance of learning from the past in order to improve
the world we live in. Contrastingly, the Philippines perceives itself as a peaceful state, acting
within the boundaries prescribed by international law. It identifies itself as less powerful than the
PRC, however, understands international law as a way to stand up to the PRC. The PRC is,
perceived as an aggressive hardliner who has made dialogue impossible. The Filipino discourse
shows that it has come to view international law, and particularly UNCLOS, as the only way to
objectively tell right from wrong in the dispute. For the Philippines international law is thus the
only way to know who the Spratly Islands belong to.
At the heart of the dispute therefore, lie two fundamentally different epistemological foci. One
state believes in the power of history to determine who has sovereignty over what, whereas the
other state believes that applying the law is the only way to determine this. It is as if the PRC
and the Philippines are speaking two different languages with very different grammatical rules,
therefore not understanding each other. Furthermore, each state perceives itself as the good
guy and the other as the aggressor. This, combined with the two incompatible understandings of
how to determine what the right solution is, serves to reproduce the dispute in irreconcilable
terms and drives it into a deadlock of conflicting identities and perceptions.
References
Primary Sources
6
PRC Texts
Bingguo, Dai, ’China is Committed to the Path of Peaceful Development’,

15/09/2011 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t860218.shtml accesse
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Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, ‘Press Conference by Chinese Embassy on Philippine’s

Submission of a Memorial to the Arbitral Tribunal on disputes of the South China Sea with
China’,
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d 05/04/2007
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20thAnniversary of China-ASEAN Relations’,
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7
Jiechi, Yang, ‘Address by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at The 14th ARF Foreign
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Ministers’ Meeting’,
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Ambassadors of ASEAN Countries’,
ed on 05/04/2014
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ed on 05/04/2014
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10/04/2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t925181.shtml
8
Zhenmin, Liu, ‘Remarks by Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin At the Opening Ceremony of
the Workshop on “Implementing the DOC: Maintaining Freedom and Safety of Navigation in the
South China Sea”’,
d on 05/04/2014
Filipino Texts
Aquino, Beningno S., ’President Aquino Calls for Adherence to Rule of Law to Ensure Peace
and Stability in the South China Sea’, 10/10/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-
21-50-36/dfa-releases/991-president-aquino-calls-for-adherence-to-rule-of-law-to-ensure-peace-
and-stability-in-the-south-china-sea accessed on 05/04/2014
Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Notification and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea’,
22/01/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos accessed on
05/04/2014
Department of Foreign Affairs, ’Q&A on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China to
Achieve a Peaceful and Durable Solution to the Dispute in the West Philippine Sea’,
05/04/2014
Department of Foreign Affairs, ’Response of the DFA Spokesperson to the Recent Statement of
the Chinese Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the West Philippine Sea Issue’,
15/07/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/332-response-
of-the-dfa-spokesperson-to-the-recent-statement-of-the-chinese-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-on-
the-west-philippine-sea-issue accessed on 05/04/2014
Department of Foreign Affaris, ‘ASEAN and China Launch Official Consultations on the Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea; Phl Calls for Deliberate and Rules-Based Process in Moving
Forward’, 16/09/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/783-
asean-and-china-launch-official-consultations-on-code-of-conduct-in-south-china-sea-phl-calls-
for-deliberate-and-rules-based-process-in-moving-forward accessed on 05/04/2014
Department of Foreign Affairs, ’Phl Reiterates Rules-Based Approach to Maintain Peace and
Stability in the South China Sea’, 04/10/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-
50-36/dfa-releases/955-phl-reiterates-rules-based-approach-to-maintain-peace-and-stability-in-
the-south-china-sea accessed on 05/04/2014
Department of National Defense of the Philippines, ‘ASEAN Defense Ministers Meet for the 7th
Time’ http://www.dnd.gov.ph/asean-defense-ministers-meet-for-the-7th-time.html accessed on
11/04/2014
Department of National Defense of the Philippines, Japanese Defense Minister Onodera pays
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visit-to-manila.html accessed on 11/04/2014
Official Gazette, ‘The Presidential Spokesperson makes clarifications on Reed Bank and
Kalayaan Islands issue’, 23/05/2011 http://www.gov.ph/2011/05/23/the-presidential-
spokesperson-makes-clarifications-on-reed-bank-and-kalayaan-islands-issue/ accessed on
05/04/2014
Official Gazette, ’Philippine position on Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and the Waters
within its vicinity’ 18/04/2012 http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/18/philippine-position-on-bajo-de-
masinloc-and-the-waters-within-its-vicinity/ accessed on 05/04/2014
Rosario, Albert F. del, ‘Secretary Del Rosario Expresses Concern Over the “Militarization” of the
South China Sea’, 30/06/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-
releases/197-secretary-del-rosario-expresses-concern-over-militarization-of-the-south-china-
seaaccessed on 05/04/2014
Rosario, Albert F. del, ‘Secretary Del Rosario Says Phl Recourse to Arbitration a Friendly
Attempt for Durable Solution to the South China Sea Tension’,
02/07/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/217-secretary-
9
del-rosario-says-phl-recourse-to-arbitration-a-friendly-attempt-for-durable-solution-to-south-
china-sea-tensionaccessed on 05/04/2014
Rosario, Albert F. del, ’Managing the South China Sea and other Regional Security Issues’,
09/07/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/306-managing-
the-south-china-sea-and-other-regional-security-issues accessed on 05/04/2014
Rosario, Albert F. del, ‘Secretary Del Rosario Calls for Unity on the South China Sea Issue at
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat’, 17/01/2014 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-
21-50-36/dfa-releases/1936-secretary-del-rosario-calls-for-unity-on-the-south-china-sea-issue-
at-asean-foreign-ministers-retreat accessed on 05/04/2014
Secondary Sources
Beckman, Robert, ’Islands or Rocks? Evolving Dispute in the South China Sea’ RSIS
Commentaries 75, 2011, pp.1-2
Chang, Teh-Kuang,’China’s Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical
and Legal Perspective’ in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 23(3), 1991, pp.
399-420
de Castro, Renato Cruz, ’The Risk of Applying Realpolitik in Resolving the South China Sea
Dispute: Implications on Regional Security’ in Pacific Focus 27(2), 2012, pp.262-289
Furtado, Xavier, ’International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither UNCLOS?’
in Comtemporary Southeast Asia 21(3), 1999, pp.386-404
Gallagher, Michael, ’China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea’ in International Security
19(1), 1994, pp.169-194
Hansen, Lene, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (Routledge,
2006, e-book)
Jacky Li, Chun Leung, ‘Filipino Nationalist Discourse and the Spratly Islands Dispute’ in Asian
Politics and Policy 4(1), 2012, pp.130-134
Jie, Chen, ’China’s Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia’
in Asian Survey 34(10), 1994, pp.893-903
Koo, Min Gyo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia – Between a Rock
and a Hard Place, (Springer, New York, 2010)
Marlay, Ross, ’China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands’ in Asian Affaris 23(4), 1997,
pp.195-210
McManus, John and Szu-Yin Lin, Kwang-Tsao Shao, ’Toward Establishing a Spratly Islands
International Marine Peace Park: Ecological Importance and Supportive Collaborative Activities
with an Emphasis on the Role of Taiwan’ in Ocean Development & International Law 41, 2010,
pp.270-280
Meyer, Lieutenant Colonel Stanley E., ‘Incident at Mischief Reef: Implications for the
Philippines, China, and the United States’ Strategic Research Paper, U.S. Army War College,
1996, pp.i-30
Molloy, Seán, The Hidden History of Realism, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, New York)
Scott, David, ‘Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea’ in Asian Survey 52(6), 2012,
pp.1019-1042
van de Haar, Edwin, ’Classical Liberalism and International Relations’ in Policy 25(1), 2009,
pp.35-38
Zehfuss, Maja, Constructivism in International Relations, (Cambridge University Press, 2002, e-

book)
Websites
10
The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/pg.html, accessed on 26/03/2014
United Nations,
UNCLOS, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf acces
sed on 27/03/2014
S. Energy Information Administration, Report on the South China Sea,

Overview, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS accessed on 27/03/2014
[1] Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (Routledge,
2006, e-book)
[2] David Scott, ‘Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea’ in Asian Survey 52(6), 2012,
p.1019
[3] Michael Gallagher, ’China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea’ in International Security
19(1), 1994, p.171
[4] John McManus and Kwang-Tsao Shao Szu-Yin Lin, ’Toward Establishing a Spratly Islands
International Marine Peace Park: Ecological Importance and Supportive Collaborative Activities
with an Emphasis on the Role of Taiwan’ in Ocean Development & International Law 41, 2010,
p.271
[5] Chun Leung Jacky Li, ‘Filipino Nationalist Discourse and the Spratly Islands Dispute’ in Asian
Politics and Policy 4(1), 2012, p.130
[6] The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/pg.html, accessed on 26/03/2014
[7] For account of the remaining states’ claims, see: Lieutenant Colonel Stanley E. Meyer,
‘Incident at Mischief Reef: Implications for the Philippines, China, and the United
States’ Strategic Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, 1996, pp.2-4
[8] Xavier Furtado, ’International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither
UNCLOS?’ in Comtemporary Southeast Asia 21(3), 1999, p. 388
[9] Teh-Kuang Chang, ’China’s Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A
Historical and Legal Perspective’ in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 23(3),
1991, section III
[10] Territory which has never been subject to the sovereignty of any state
[11] Furtado, Op.cit., p.392
[12] United Nations,

UNCLOS, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf p. 66,
article 121 accessed on 27/03/2014
[13] Robert Beckman, ’Islands or Rocks? Evolving Dispute in the South China Sea’ RSIS
Commentaries 75, 2011, p.2
[14] See Seán Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, New York)
[15] See Gallagher, John McManus and Kwang-Tsao Shao Szu-Yin Lin, Marlay
[16] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Report on the South China Sea,
Overview, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS accessed on 27/03/2014
[17] Ross Marlay, ’China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands’ in Asian Affaris 23(4), 1997,
p.200
11
[18] Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia – Between a
Rock and a Hard Place, (Springer, New York, 2010), p.138
[19] Renato Cruz de Castro, ’The Risk of Applying Realpolitik in Resolving the South China Sea
Dispute: Implications on Regional Security’ in Pacific Focus 27(2), 2012, pp.262-289
[20] Marlay, Op.cit., pp.197-198
[21] Meyer, Op.cit., pp.1-30
[22] Scott, Op.cit., p.1042
[23] See Edwin van de Haar, ’Classical Liberalism and International Relations’ in Policy 25(1),
2009, p.35
[24] Meyer, Op.cit., p.11
[25] Gallagher, Op.cit., pp.193-194
[26] Furtado, Op.cit., pp.386-404
[27] See Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations, (Cambridge University Press,
2002, e-book)
[28] Chen Jie, ’China’s Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia’
in Asian Survey 34(10), 1994, p.893
[29] Jacky Li, Op.cit., pp.130-134
[30] Hansen, Op.cit., p.5
[31] Ibid., p.16
[32] Ibid., p.19
[33] Ibid., p.20
[34] Hansen, Op.cit, pp.65-82
[35] Address by Wen Jiabao, ’Work in Partnership to Promote Win-win Cooperation’,

ed on 05/04/2014
[36] Tang Jiaxuan, ‘Keynote Speech by Tang Jiaxuan at the First Singapore Global Dialogue’,
d on 05/04/2014
[37] Liu Weimin, ’Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press Conference’,
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
843.shtmlaccesed on 05/04/2014
[42] Tang Jiaxuan Op.cit.
12
[43] Yang Jiechi, ’Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice Under New
Conditions’,
ed on 05/04/2014
[44] Liu Weimin, 11/04/2014, Op.cit
[45] Liu Weimin, 11/04/2014, Op.cit.
[46] Liu Weimin, 18/04/2014, Op.cit
[47] Dai Bingguo, ’China is Committed to the Path of Peaceful Development’,

d on 05/04/2014
[48] Tang Jiaxuan Op.cit.,
[49] Tang Jiaxuan Op.cit.,
[50] Le Yucheng, ’China’s Relations with the World at a New Starting Point’,
ed on 05/04/2014
[51] Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), ’President Aquino Calls for Adherence to Rule of Law
to Ensure Peace and Stability in the South China Sea’,
17/01/2014 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/991-president-
aquino-calls-for-adherence-to-rule-of-law-to-ensure-peace-and-stability-in-the-south-china-
sea accessed on 05/04/2014
[52] See DFA, ‘Notification and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea’,
05/04/2014
[53] Albert F. del Rosario, ’Managing the South China Sea and other Regional Security Issues’,
09/07/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/306-managing-
the-south-china-sea-and-other-regional-security-issues accessed on 05/04/2014
[54] DFA, ’Phl Reiterates Rules-Based Approach to Maintain Peace and Stability in the South
China Sea’, 04/10/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-
releases/955-phl-reiterates-rules-based-approach-to-maintain-peace-and-stability-in-the-south-
china-seaaccessed on 05/04/2014
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Official Gazette, ’Philippine position on Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and the
Waters within its vicinity’ 18/04/2012 http://www.gov.ph/2012/04/18/philippine-position-on-bajo-
de-masinloc-and-the-waters-within-its-vicinity/ accessed on 05/04/2014
[58] Ibid.
[59] Official Gazette, Op.cit.
[60] DFA, ’Q&A on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China to Achieve a Peaceful and
Durable Solution to the Dispute in the West Philippine Sea’,
05/04/2014
[61] Del Rosario, Op.cit.
[62] DFA, ’Response of the DFA Spokesperson to the Recent Statement of the Chinese Foreign
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the West Philippine Sea Issue’,
15/07/2013 https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/332-response-
13
of-the-dfa-spokesperson-to-the-recent-statement-of-the-chinese-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-on-
the-west-philippine-sea-issue accessed on 05/04/2014
[63] Del Rosario, Op.cit.
[64] Ibid.
https://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/19/the-spratly-islands-dispute-a-discourse-analysis/
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xkB6dH8GQ_Y
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XBaMktVTW2c
The historical arbitration case of Manila

What is an arbitration?
An arbitration is a fast way to get a decision when you are in a dispute, It is more flexible and
less formal than a court proceeding and could also be scheduled faster a court trial.
> The case was filed in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, the Netherlands on
March 30, following the standoff between the two countries. The Philippine team were often
described as a powerhouse by few news articles. It is led by Paul Reichler, a famous lawyer
known for his case that forced US to pay a hefty amount to Nicaragua. Nicaragua accused US
of funding the contra force to topple the Latin American country’s Sandinista government.
Members from the three branches of the Philippine government were also present in the
hearings.
> Here are the arguments presented by the Philippines, first the historical claim of China,
second the so called 9-dash line, third the rocks vs islands argument, fourth the breach of the
law of the sea, and lastly its damage to the environment.
> China questioned the tribunal’s jurisdiction towards the case and repeatedly refused to
participate in the said cases. China pointed out as its core argument was the nature of the case,
itself. They insisted that the basic issue was about the disputed islands therefore the case is not
in the scope of UNCLOS since they also said that it’s about the land and not about the
surrounding body of water.
> UNCLOS or the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Seas was used as the basis for
the Philippines to file its case in the said Court of Arbitration. But what is UNCLOS? It is an
agreement that defined the limits of the territorial seas of nations and the areas in which they
could exploit maritime resources. The so called 9 dash line that China claimed crosses the EEZ
(exclusive economic zone) of the Philippines thus prohibiting Filipino fishermen to do their living.
The said line covered most of the West Philippine Sea and it is one of the reasons why
Philippines would want the tribunal to declare the line as illegal.
> On October 29 the court released to the media it unanimous decision. The tribunal asserted
its right to hear the case. They clarified that the decision only concerns whether the Tribunal
was jurisdiction to consider the claims and whether such claims are admissible. When the said
decision was known to the public, China through Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin said that
they’ll not participate and will not accept the arbitration. The Minister added, that the ruling and
the result will not affect China’s position.
When did the territorial dispute between Beijing and Manila start?
The tension between the two countries started when the PH Navy had a standoff with few
Chinese ships in the disputed territory, the Scarborough Shoal. The incident was recorded on
April 11, 2012. The standoff started when PH Navy tried to arrest some Chinese fishermen who
were engaging in illegal fishing in the said shoal then the several Chinese maritime surveillance
ships prevented the arrest of the erring Chinese fishermen. Even if there was a standoff that
happened in the said area, both countries underwent bilateral talks but never settled anything
that would somehow cease the growing tension and uneasiness from both sides. Things
escalated quickly when Manila filed an arbitration case against Beijing.
14
Where is the West Philippine Sea? by Kate Caseres
Internationally known as the South China Sea, the name West Philippine Sea was used way
back September 2012 under President Aquino’s Administrative Order No. 29. The said Order
was a mandate to all government agencies to refer South China Sea as West Philippine Sea
within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the country. Islands such as the Scarborough
Shoal, Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands are among the disputed territories within the said
sea.
West Philippine Sea

indiohistorian:
It’s official guys. Don’t ever.. ever, ever call it South China Sea. It’s the West Philippine Sea.
That is, according to the Aquino administration announcing today that we have to assert our
sovereignty.
The Aquino government has apparently made it settled doctrine to use “West Philippine Sea” to
refer to the waters west of the country where the Philippines has overlapping territorial claims
with five other nations, instead of the all-embracing tag of “South China Sea.”
Tellingly, Malacañang yesterday used “West Philippine Sea” for the first time in a statement
reacting to China’s warning on Thursday, issued through Ambassador Liu Jianchao, to rival
claimants to the disputed Spratlys island group to stop searching for oil in the contested region
without permission from China.
“The Republic of the Philippines has stated its position on the various territorial issues in the
West Philippine Sea. We are committed to dialog with other claimants,” presidential
spokesperson Edwin Lacierda told a news briefing yesterday.
“We call on all parties to refrain from inflammatory statements that would make it more difficult
to reach a mutually agreeable solution,” he said.
In the past two weeks, the Philippines has publicly accused Chinese forces of being behind
seven confrontations with Filipinos in the Spratlys in less than four months.
However, Liu said the reported incidents were mere “rumors” or exaggeration, even as he
asserted China’s claim to the reputedly oil-rich Spratlys island chain.
The islands are claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan
and Vietnam.
Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer
Although I’m quite encouraged as to how we are FINALLY asserting our sovereignty on our
seas, it is one thing for a nation to assert it by words, it is another to assert it by action. If there
are inhabitants in the Spratlys, I don’t think they would want the Philippines to claim them even if
we have the legitimacy. First of all, look at ARMM, the poorest of the regions in the southern
part of the Philippines. Many Badjaos are escaping to Malaysia simply because we have
Ampatuans running about. Or how about our claims on Sabah, which by the way is ours and not
Malaysia’s? For the longest time we have been scared of a possibility of war, not having the
guts to push it forward to the UN simply because it would disturb the peace. And up to now
Malaysia is paying a measly $1,500 rental per year despite the fact that Sabah has a vast
resource of oil. On the other hand, have we gained legitimacy in the eyes of our fellow Filipinos
who are Muslim?
I’ve gone to Muzium Negara in Kuala Lumpur and I was shocked that the Sultanate of Sulu is
being claimed by Malaysia. The reason? The Philippines never bothered to take care of the
Tausugs and many ethnic groups of the south simply because they’re different. The people of
Sulu, we were told, were much similar to Malaysians, and thus, we should let them go, so they
can join the Malaysian federation.
I’m not siding on either sides here. But if we want to claim something as ours, we have to prove
it by (1) investing on our own undisputed territory with our scientists, engineers, historians for us
to know what the Philippines can yield for Filipinos and by (2) believing that we still have
something (a mineral, a historical riddle, a plant as cure for grave illnesses, etc.) that we can
offer to the world. Finally (3) we have to take care of our people, and hold each life, each ethnic
15
group in high regard– preserving their culture and history, and empowering them to have a
voice in national matters.
Recently, there were 300 new species discovered in the Philippines. Good right? But then, who
will benefit the discovery? Of course, the foreigners who discovered them. Have we really
exercised our sovereignty in our own soil?
But some of you would mutter, “walang pondo eh, walang pera.” Tell that to South Korea 5
decades ago, or Thailand 5 years ago. If you assert something, and believe that it is your own,
even budget constraints won’t stop us. The Philippines is ours. It is more abundant than the
rocky terrains of Japan and Korea, or the landlocked countries of Thailand and Vietnam.
Can I repeat that? The Philippines is OURS. No one should ever take it from us. Our heroes
fought for our land with blood and tears.
If we possess that conviction, then that is real sovereignty.
Risk on Security by Shayna May Dagelet

As we all know the Philippines’ main interest isn’t building up their military capability. Their
main focus is on education and agriculture. But should that be changed with the on-going
dispute in the West Philippine Sea? The Philippines has stated that the tension with China
over the islands in the West Philippine Sea is the most pressing security concern. This
issue also brought upon the tension between China and the US, if there’s one wrong move, the
Philippines would be in the middle of it. As stated by the Philippines’ undersecretary for foreign
affairs policy, Evan Garcia last May, “"We are focusing immediately on acquiring and building up
our capabilities that we should have done before … so we can protect what’s ours.“ I honestly
believe that the Philippines should step up and plan to be able to defend what’s rightly theirs.
China has already started building artificial lands and military bases in the West Philippine
Sea; they have been deploying their ships and guarding it. For more info on that you can
visit: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/tensions-and-territorial-claims-in-the-south-
china-sea-the-guardian-briefing. The Philippines has only deployed it’s coastguards and that is
not enough for the Philippines to show that they can defend themselves. US has deployed it’s
ships but are calling it back because of China’s threats of war for interfering.
President Noynoy Aquino has acquired 4 fighter jets out of 12 from South Korea that cost
about P18.9 Billion, and that’s a good start, but PNoy should also focus on acquiring defense
ships that can guard their shoals instead of the US doing it. If the Philippines can shell out the
money for beefing up their defense systems then they would stand a chance in defending what
the Philippines rightly own.
PNoy has also stated that he is willing to negotiate and would less likely go into war with
China, but the Chinese Government isn’t too keen with making amends to that negotiation.
So is it a threat to the security of the Philippines, I would say it’s a positive yes. The
Philippines should be more vigilant in when it comes to China. China is an economically growing
country and it’s developing allies with countries that are also very powerful. Although the
Philippines are allied with the US, it is under constant strain with other world problems.
What is Territorial Dispute? by Marius Verdan

We may define a territorial dispute as a conflict over the ownership or control over a particular
land between two or more regional bodies. Territorial disputes are often linked to possession of
natural resources such as bodies of water, land, minerals, and even oil resources. Factors such
as the culture and religion may also be considered as a cause. Territorial disputes are often
major cause of wars as countries try to maintain their ownership over a territory through
encroachment. But usually, to solve the dispute, involved actors comes up with an agreement
that sets up the genuine boundary.
Most popular examples of Territorial Disputes:
1. The Dispute between Palestine & Israel
2. The dispute between Central Tibetan Administration and Peoples Republic of China
16
3. The dispute in the West Philippine Sea
TOP 10 things YOU should know about the Scarborough Shoal

inhenyero:
Here are 10 things we all need to know about the disputed Scarborough Shoal, now the site of a
standoff between Manila and Beijing.
1. First, the Philippine government does not call it Scarborough. Based on recent government
press releases, its Pinoy name is Panatag Shoal, which ironically means calm. In the 2009
Philippine Baselines Law, it is referred to as Bajo de Masinloc.
2. It’s really just a rocky sandbar, but its location holds huge political and economic significance.
Located in the South China Sea, it is a strategic staging area for military operations. As if that’s
not enough enticement, scientists are also optimistic about the area’s potential oil resources.
3. Don’t confuse it with the Spratlys Islands located off the coast of Palawan. Incidentally, the
government refers to the portion of the Spratlys it is claiming as the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG).
4. The Panatag Shoal and the Kalayaan Island Group are both located in the South China Sea.
The Philippine government has already renamed the South China Sea to West Philippine Sea.
(Vietnam calls it the East Sea.)
5. The Philippines bases its claim on discovery, occupation and administration. The Philippines
controls Panatag Shoal and also 8 of the islands in the Kalayaan Island Group. China,
according to most media reports, is claiming the whole of the South China Sea and also controls
several islands in the Kalayaan Island Group. Filipino diplomats however insist that China has
not been explicit about what waters it is claiming.
6. A total of 6 countries are laying claim to various areas in the West Philippine Sea—
Philippines, China, Vietnam, Taiwan (not recognized by countries that adopt a one-China
policy), Malaysia, and Brunei.
7. The controversial Republic Act 9522 or the 2009 Philippine Baselines lawtreats the Panatag
Shoal and the Kalayaan Island Group as “regime of islands under the Republic of the
Philippines.“
8. Citing old maps, University of the Philippines College of Law professors petitioned the
Supreme Court to declare R.A. 9522 unconstitutional because it results in the loss of 15,000
square nautical miles of territorial waters. It also supposedly weakens the country’s claim over
the disputed islands. But the Supreme Court junked the petition and declared R.A. 9522
constitutional.
9. The Baselines Law enacted in 2009 defines the archipelagic baselines of the country as
those around the main archipelago and, invoking Article 121 of the United Nations Convention
on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), claims a part of the Spratlys and all of what is referred to as
Panatag Shoal.
10. In 2002, the Asean-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC) was signed in Phnom Penh. It envisions, among others, the formulation of a Code of
Conduct, which has yet to happen.
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The Spratly Islands Dispute – A Discourse Analysis

LIN ALEXANDRA MORTENSGAARD, JUL 19 2015, 18712 VIEWS

THIS CONTENT WAS WRITTEN BY A STUDENT AND ASSESSED AS PART OF A

Background and Literature Review

The Filipino Discourse: International Law as the Only Way Forward

Bingguo, Dai, ’China is Committed to the Path of Peaceful Development’,

Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, ‘Press Conference by Chinese Embassy on Philippine’s

Chinese Ministry of Defense, ‘Chinese FM slams Philippine president’s comments on territorial

Chinese Ministry of Defense, ‘Chinese FM expounds South China Sea policies’,

Chinese Ministry of Defense, ‘China’s defense minister vows no territorial compromise’,

Jiabao, Wen, ‘Work together to Open a New Chapter in China-ASEAN Relations’,

Jiabao, Wen, ’Work in Partnership to Promote Win-win Cooperation’,

Yi, Wang, ‘Embark on a New Journey of China’s Diplomacy’,

Zehfuss, Maja, Constructivism in International Relations, (Cambridge University Press, 2002, e-

S. Energy Information Administration, Report on the South China Sea,

[6] The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

[11] Furtado, Op.cit., p.392

[12] United Nations,

[20] Marlay, Op.cit., pp.197-198

[21] Meyer, Op.cit., pp.1-30

[22] Scott, Op.cit., p.1042

[24] Meyer, Op.cit., p.11

[25] Gallagher, Op.cit., pp.193-194

[26] Furtado, Op.cit., pp.386-404

[29] Jacky Li, Op.cit., pp.130-134

[30] Hansen, Op.cit., p.5

[31] Ibid., p.16

[32] Ibid., p.19

[33] Ibid., p.20

[34] Hansen, Op.cit, pp.65-82

[35] Address by Wen Jiabao, ’Work in Partnership to Promote Win-win Cooperation’,

[42] Tang Jiaxuan Op.cit.

[44] Liu Weimin, 11/04/2014, Op.cit

[45] Liu Weimin, 11/04/2014, Op.cit.

[46] Liu Weimin, 18/04/2014, Op.cit

[47] Dai Bingguo, ’China is Committed to the Path of Peaceful Development’,

[48] Tang Jiaxuan Op.cit.,

[49] Tang Jiaxuan Op.cit.,

[59] Official Gazette, Op.cit.

[61] Del Rosario, Op.cit.

[63] Del Rosario, Op.cit.

The historical arbitration case of Manila

West Philippine Sea

Risk on Security by Shayna May Dagelet

What is Territorial Dispute? by Marius Verdan

Most popular examples of Territorial Disputes:

1. The Dispute between Palestine & Israel

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