Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 1996

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Some textbooks and other recommended general sources:

 The online Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/


 Miller, Alex. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Polity, 2003
 Zimmerman, Aaron. Moral Epistemology. New Problems of Philosophy. New York:
Routledge, 2010.
 Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Mark Timmons. Moral Knowledge? New Readings in
Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 1996.

COURSE SCHEDULE AND READINGS


The readings listed below are mandatory unless specifically noted as recommended

Week 1: 16 January
Introduction: The Problem of Moral Knowledge
- Mackie, J. L., selection from Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 1977.
- Harman, G “Ethics and Observation” from The Nature of Morality, 1977.
- Jones, Karen. “Moral Epistemology.” In The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy,
edited by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, 63–85. Oxford University Press, 2005.

Week 2: 23 January
Reflective Equilibrium: Narrow and Wide
- Daniels, Norman. “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics.” The Journal
of Philosophy 76, no. 5 (May 1979): 256–282.
Recommended:
- Scanlon, Thomas M. “Rawls on Justification.” In The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 139–167.
Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Week 3: 30 January
Reflective Equilibrium and Credibility
- Kelly, Thomas, and Sarah McGrath. “Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?” Philosophical
Perspectives 24, no. 1 (2010): 325–359.

Week 4: 6 February
Moral Intuitionism
- Audi, Robert. “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics.” In Moral Knowledge?,
edited by Walter Sinnot-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, 101–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996.

Week 5: 13 February
Moral Perception
- Cowan, Robert. “Perceptual Intuitionism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , Online
First 2013.

Week 6: 20 February
Experimental Challenges
- Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology.” In Metaethics
After Moore, edited by Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, 339–365. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2006.

Week 7: 27 February
Experimental Challenges (contd.)
- Greene, Joshua D. “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul.” In Moral Psychology: Vol. 3. The
Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development, edited by Walter Sinnot-
Armstrong, 35–79, 2007.

Week 8: 6 March
Experimental Challenges (contd.)
- Berker, Selim. “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37,
no. 4 (2009): 293–329.
Recommended:
- Greene, “Notes on 'The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience' by Selim Berker”

Week 9: 13 March
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
- Street, Sharon. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies 127,
no. 1 (January 2006): 109–166.
Recommended:
- Joyce, Richard. “Metaethics and the Empirical Sciences.” Philosophical Explorations 9 (March
2006): 133–148.

Week 10: 20 March


Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (contd.)
- Kahane, Guy. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” Noûs 45, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 103–125.
Recommended:
- Enoch, David. “The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How Best to
Understand It, and How to Cope with It.” Philosophical Studies 148, no. 3 (April 1, 2010): 413–
438.

Week 11: 27 March


Moral Testimony
- Driver, Julia. “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.” Philosophical
Studies 128, no. 3 (April 1, 2006): 619–644.
Recommended:
- Hills, Alison. “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology.” Ethics 120, no. 1 (October 1, 2009):
94–127.

Week 12: 3 Apr


Moral Testimony (contd.)
- Enoch, David. “A Defense of Moral Deference,” Forthcoming in Journal of Philosophy.
Recommended:
- McGrath, Sarah. “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.” Journal of
Philosophy 108, no. 3 (2011): 111.

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