GSIS v CA (G.R. No.
124275) January 28, 2008 look on the issue of compensability to those suffering Osteosarcoma or a similar disease whose cause is
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE vs CA
These two consolidated cases are petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA promulgated
on March 13, 1996, which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) dated September 7, 1995 denying private respondents’ claim for compensation benefits of the late
Abraham Cate under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended. The facts are as follows:
On March 6, 1974, Abraham Cate (Abraham) joined the military service as a Rifleman of the
Philippine Navy. In 1975, he was designated as Action Clerk. On February 22, 1986, he was transferred to
the now defunct Philippine Constabulary with the rank of Technical Sergeant and was later promoted to
Master Sergeant. On January 2, 1991, he was absorbed in the Philippine National Police (PNP) with the
rank of Senior Police Officer IV (SPO4). In 1993, Abraham complained of a mass on his left cheek which
gradually increased in size. A biopsy was done at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). The histopath
report revealed that he was suffering from Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma. He was admitted at the PGH
payward, and on October 28, 1993, he underwent "Total Maxillectomy with Orbital Exenteration," which
operation removed the mass on his left cheek. In April 1994, another biopsy revealed the recurrence of the
ailment. On June 9, 1994, Abraham underwent debulking of the recurrent tumor at the PGH. Post-operative
course was uneventful and he underwent radiotherapy.
On December 1, 1994, Abraham was compulsorily retired from the PNP. On December 20, 1994,
Abraham filed a claim for income benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under
P.D. No. 626, as amended. In a letter dated December 27, 1994, GSIS denied the claim on the ground that
Osteosarcoma is not considered an occupational disease under P.D. No. 626, and there is no showing that
his duties as SPO4 in the Armed Forces of the Philippines had increased the risk of contracting said
ailment. GSIS denied Abraham’s request for reconsideration of the decision in a letter dated March 22,
1995.
On May 2, 1995, Abraham died at the age of 45. He was survived by his wife, Dorothy Cate,
and two children. The heirs of Abraham appealed the decision of GSIS to the ECC.
In a Decision dated September 7, 1995, ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS and dismissed the case for lack
of merit. It ruled:
After a careful examination of the records of the instant claim, we concur with the decision of the respondent
system that appellant’s claim is bereft of merit. Definitely, the ailment of herein appellant is not included in
the list of occupational diseases, under the rules implementing PD 626, as amended. However, even if
appellant’s ailment is not an occupational disease, the present law on compensation allows certain diseases
to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting it is increased by the working
conditions. Unfortunately for Abraham Cate, he failed to present proofs that will establish that the
development of his ailment is traceable to his work and working conditions as a soldier of the defunct
Philippine Constabulary and later as member of the Philippine National Police.
Our conclusion is supported by the findings of the Commission’s Medical Division which show
that Osteosarcoma is the most common primary bone tumor. It is an aggressive tumor, characterized usually
by rapid growth and early pulmonary metastasis. In most common cases of osteogenic sarcoma, no definite
etiology can be determined. From the foregoing medical discussion, it is very clear that appellant’s
employment as member of the Philippine National Police had no direct nor causal relationship with the
contraction of appellant’s ailment. This being the case, the death benefits prayed for by herein appellant
under the Employees’ Compensation Law (PD 626, as amended), cannot be given due course.
The heirs of Abraham filed a petition for review of the decision of ECC with the CA. In a
Decision promulgated on March 13, 1996, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of ECC. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review
is GIVEN DUE COURSE and is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the respondent Employees
Compensation Commission dated September 7, 1975 is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered declaring the ailment of the late Abraham Cate compensable under PD 626, as amended. No
pronouncement as to cost.
The CA ruled that Osteosarcoma is compensable on the ground that the Employees
Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to our working men, and should,
therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the applicant. It stated that Abraham’s failure to present evidence
on the causal relation of the illness to his working conditions is due to the lack of available proof. To deny
compensation to Osteosarcoma victims who will be unable to produce such proof is unrealistic, illogical and
unfair. On a very exceptional circumstance, the rule on compensability should be relaxed. In the meantime
that the origin and cause of Osteosarcoma are unknown, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor
of the claim since employees’ compensation is based on social security principles. It hoped for a second
unascertained. The CA cited the dissenting opinions of former Supreme Court Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento
and Justice Edgardo L. Paras in the case of Raro v. Employees’ Compensation Commission 7 where Justice
Sarmiento opined that compassion is reason enough to grant compensation benefits to the petitioner therein,
a Mining Recorder at the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences, who suffered from cancer (brain tumor).
Justice Paras opined that doubts must generally be resolved in favor of the employee whenever
compensation for disease is concerned, and that it would be absurd to throw upon therein petitioner the
burden of showing that her work either caused or aggravated the disease, particularly when both the GSIS
and ECC profess ignorance of the causes of the disease.
The GSIS and ECC separately filed a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA.
The two petitions were consolidated per Resolution dated September 4, 1996. The main issue in this case is
whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the ailment of the late Abraham is compensable under the present
law on employees’ compensation.
Petitioners aver that the applicable law in Abraham’s case is the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation which is explained in Tanedo v. ECC,8 thus:
Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption,
but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial evidence
that the risk of contracting said disease is increased by the employee’s working conditions. Petitioners allege
that private respondents tried to establish a preliminary link between the illness and the employment of
Abraham by speculating that since Abraham did some dirty jobs during his stint as a rifleman in the
Philippine Navy, he was exposed to some elements like virus which could have contributed more or less to
the development of his ailment.
Petitioners argue that such allegation cannot be the basis of a finding that Abraham’s ailment
had a causal connection with his employment and working conditions. Nor can it be said that the nature of
his work had increased the risk of contracting his ailment. The illness is not prevalent in the Philippine Navy
or the PNP. Even under the less stringent evidentiary norm of substantial evidence obtaining in employees’
compensation proceedings, private respondents failed to adduce such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support their claim.
Art. 167 (l), Chapter 1, Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines, defines sickness as "any
illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the [Employees’ Compensation
Commission], or any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions." The same provision empowers ECC to determine and approve
occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar
hazards of employment.
Under Sec. 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, "[f]or the
sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex ‘A’ of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions." The decision of the ECC is instructive:
After a careful examination of the records of the instant claim, we concur with the decision of
the respondent system that appellant’s claim is bereft of merit. Definitely, the ailment of herein appellant is
not included in the list of occupational diseases, under the rules implementing PD 626, as amended.
However, even if appellant’s ailment is not an occupational disease, the present law on compensation allows
certain diseases to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contract it is increased by the
working conditions. Unfortunately, for Abraham Cate, he failed to present proofs that will establish that the
development of his ailment is traceable to his work and working conditions as a soldier of the defunct
Philippine Constabulary and later as member of the Philippine National Police.
In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant or private respondents to prove
by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting Osteosarcoma was increased by the working conditions
of the late Abraham. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. The records show that Abraham failed to present evidence to establish
that the development of his ailment was traceable to his working conditions in the Philippine Navy, the now
defunct Philippine Constabulary and the PNP. Further, private respondents’ allegation in their petition for
review with the CA that Abraham, as a rifleman in the Philippine Navy, may have been exposed to elements
like a virus which could have contributed to his ailment does not satisfy the requirement of substantial
evidence. The rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the
claimant must prove a positive thing. The application of the rules would mean that absent any proof that the
risk of contracting the ailment was increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham, private
respondents would not be entitled to compensation. Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed
that under the present state of science, the proof referred by the law to be presented by the deceased private
respondent claimant was unavailable and impossible to comply with, the condition must be deemed as not
imposed. For this reason, the CA held, thus:
In all due respect and with the least of intention of committing contempt and discourtesy but
rather solely moved by the time-honored principle that the Employees Compensation Act is basically a
social legislation designed to afford relief to our working men (Santos v. ECC, 221 SCRA 182 [1993] and
that labor, social welfare legislations should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant (Tira v. ECC,
208 SCRA 834 [1992]), We have to rule in favor of herein petitioners.
The plight of any cancer patient deserves some serious considerations. We were not to be told
that no one is a willing victim of cancer. Inflicted with this dreadful malady, the patient suffers from the
trauma of an impending death not to mention the high cost of medical attendance required, only to prolong
one’s agony and the hopelessness of any definite cure simply because the origin and cause of cancer are
farfetched unresolved.
The present case at bench is no different. Petitioners’ failure to present positive evidence of a
causal relation of the illness and his working conditions is due to the pure and simple lack of available proof
to be offered in evidence. Verily, to deny compensation to osteosarcoma victims who will definitely be
unable to produce a single piece of proof to that effect, is unrealistic, illogical and unfair. At the very least,
on a very exceptional circumstance, the rule on compensability should be relaxed and be allowed to apply
to such situations. To disallow the benefit will even more add up to the sufferings, this time, for the ignorance
of the inability of mankind to discover the real truth about cancer.
It is not the intention of this decision to challenge the wisdom of the Raro case. What is being hoped for is
to have a second look on the issue of compensability of those inflicted with osteosarcoma or like disease,
where the origin or cause is still virtually not ascertained. The protection of the stability and integrity of the
State Insurance Fund against non-compensable claims, is much to be desired. Nonetheless, to allow the
presumption of compensability to Osteosarcoma victims, will not adversely prejudice such state policy. In
fact, it will give more meaning to the very purpose and essence of the State Insurance Fund. Upon the other
hand, to deny the claim will not only defeat the very reason for its creation but will likewise turn down
benefits to the intended rightful beneficiary thereof. As employee’s compensation is based on social security
principles. We believe that in the meantime that osteosarcoma’s cause and origin are not yet unearthed, the
benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of the claim.
In main, We subscribe to the more compassionate and humane considerations contained in the dissenting
opinions of Justices Sarmiento and Paras in the same Raro case and We quote:
"It must be likewise be noted that the petitioner is suffering from cancer (brain tumor), whose cause medical
science is yet to unravel. It would then be asking too much to make her prove that her illness was cause by
work or aggravated by it, when experts themselves are ignorant as to what brings it about. I do not believe,
finally, that the question is a matter of legislation. Compassion, it is my view, is reason enough." (J.
Sarmiento)
"While ‘brain tumor’ is not expressly or specifically referred to as an occupational disease, and
while admittedly it precise causes are still unknown, We may say that the disease is akin to ‘cancer of the
brain’ and should therefore be regarded as either compensable or borderline case. At any rate, the precise
work of the petitioner at the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences consisted of the following: "As Mining
Recorded II, to record and file mining instruments and documents in the Mining Recorder’s Section and to
type correspondence and other documents pertaining to the same action. (See Petitioner’s Brief, Rollo, p.
13). It will readily be seen that her work required at times mental concentration. Whether this is specifically
causative of brain tumor is of course still unknown but doubts must generally be resolved in favor whenever
compensation for disease is concerned. It would certainly be absurd to throw upon petitioner the burden of
showing that her work either caused or aggravated the disease, particularly when both the GSIS and ECC
profess ignorance themselves of the causes of the disease." (Justice Paras).
Stated otherwise, before the amendment, the law simply did not allow compensation for the
ailment of respondent. It is under this set-up that the Raro case was decided. However, as the ECC decision
noted, the law was amended and now "the present law on compensation allows certain diseases to be
compensable if it is sufficiently proven that the risk of contracting is increased by the working
conditions."14 It, therefore, now allows compensation subject to requirement of proving by sufficient
evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the working conditions.
As earlier noted, however, in the specific case of respondent, the requirement is impossible to
comply with, given the present state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as an impossible
evidence must, therefore, be deemed void.15 Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent
with the social legislation’s intended beneficial purpose.
In fine, the Court sees no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE EDWIN B. DEAUNA vs. FIL-STAR MARITIME CORPORATION,
GREGORIO ORTEGA, CAPT. VICTOR S. MILLALOS and GRANDSLAM ENTERPRISES
CORPORATION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by the
legal heirs (collectively referred to as the petitioners) of the late Edwin Deauna (Edwin), represented by his
wife, Arlina Deauna, to assail the Decision dated July 15, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated March 8, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106199. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision
reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 28 October 2008 of Voluntary
Arbitrator Rene Ofreneo in AC 94-NCMB-NCR, is hereby, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one
entered absolving the petitioner[s] [herein respondents] from liability for the death benefits under the terms
and conditions of the POEA Contract and Article 29 pf (sic) the AMOSUP/JSU-CBA. SO ORDERED. The
assailed resolution denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
Respondent Fil-Star Maritime Corporation (Fil-Star) is a local manning agency, with respondent Captain
Victor S. Millalos (Capt. Millalos) as its general manager. Respondent Grandslam Enterprise Corporation
(Grandslam) is among Fil-Star's foreign principals. Grandslam owns and manages the vessel M/V Sanko
Stream (Sanko) which Edwin boarded on August 1, 2004 for a nine-month engagement as Chief Engineer.
As such, he was responsible for the operations and maintenance of the entire vessel's engineering equipment.
He also determined the requirements for fuel, lube oil and other consumables necessary for a voyage,
conducted inventory of spare parts, prepared the engine room for inspection by marine and safety authorities,
and took charge of the engine room during maneuvering and emergency situations.
Prior to Edwin's deployment, he underwent the customary Pre-employment Medical Examination (PEME)
and was found as "fit to work" as was repeatedly the case in the past 30 years since his first deployment by
Fil-Star in 1975.
Sometime in October 2004, Edwin experienced abdominal pains while on-board Sanko. He was
promptly referred to a doctor in Paranagua, Brazil. An ultrasound examination revealed that he had kidney
stones for which he was administered oral medications. Thereafter, he resumed his work on-board Sanko.
On April 3, 2005 or more or less 8 months from deployment, Edwin was repatriated. There were, however,
conflicting claims regarding the cause of his repatriation. The respondents claimed that Edwin requested for
an early termination of his contract in order to attend his daughter's graduation ceremony. On the other hand,
the petitioners averred that Edwin was repatriated due to the latter's "body weakness and head heaviness".
The petitioners likewise claimed that on April 4, 2005, they called Capt. Millalos to inform the latter that
upon arrival at the airport, Edwin was very sick, weak, disoriented, and merely wanted to immediately go
home to Daet, Camarines Norte. Edwin can neither physically report in Fil-Star's office nor board his next
vessel of assignment.
On April 27, 2005, Dr. Eduardo R. Mercado (Dr. Mercado), a neurosurgeon at the Cardinal
Santos Medical Center certified that: Mr. Edwin Deauna, 52 years of age, is presently under my care at the
Cardinal Santos Medical Center. He presented with (sic) behavioral changes associated with a left-sided
facial and upper extremity weakness. An MRI of the brain done [on] April 26, 2005 showed a large right-
sided brain tumor with involvement of his right temporal lobe, basal ganglia, corona radiate and insular
cortex. There is associated severe swelling and shift (mass effect) to the opposite side. He is undergoing
medical decompression to relieve pressure intracranially.
He will need stereotactic biopsy of his brain tumor for "grading purposes". Thereafter, treatment
options will be discussed with family but I can predict that he will need radiation treatment as well as
chemotherapy. This is necessary for palliation purposes and prolongation of life with good quality.(Citation
omitted). The petitioners sent the respondents two letters requesting for the conduct of a medical
examination and treatment of Edwin's brain tumor. The respondents averred that they provided Edwin with
medical assistance for him to be able to promptly undergo a biopsy.
On May 4, 2005, Dr. Mercado found out from the pathology report that Edwin was suffering
from "Glioblastoma WHO Grade 4" (GBM), a malignant and aggressive form of brain cancer. According
to Dr. Mercado, "it is logical/safe to surmise that the tumor has been existent and progressively growing for
a number of months".
On May 13, 2005, the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), opined that the
"etiology of GBM is unknown". Further, Edwin's "illness is work-related if he has history of exposure to
radiation, vinyl products and the likes and working in near proximity of power line, otherwise, it is not,"
and that "the tumor is already present even prior to embarkation but not detectable but (sic) ordinary PEME".
On August 22, 2005, or about four months after Edwin's repatriation, Dr. Cruz sent Capt.
Millalos a medical report stating that: The patient was repatriated because of body weakness and head
heaviness since October 2004. He had his consultation in Brazil, where he was evaluated to have "kidney
stones" after undergoing ultrasound. Patient then finished his contract. At the airport, upon his arrival last
April 03, 2005, he was noted to be drowsy and disoriented. On April 05, 2005, he was seen by a physician
in Daet. CT Scan was done and he was diagnosed to have hypertension and neurologic disease. He was seen
at the Cardinal Santos Hospital and on April 30, 2005, he underwent biopsy of the brain mass and the
pathology report revealed Glioblastoma Multiforme. He has completed his 1st period of radiotherapy.
The MRI of the brain showed slight reduction in the size of the tumor. He has weakness of the left foot
resulting to episodic foot drop. He also has facial edema secondary to steroid intake. He also complains of
occasional doubling of vision but he has no headache.
Submitting to you the monthly expenses for his chemotherapy.
DIAGNOSIS:
Glioblastoma Multiforme
Advised to come back on September 23, 2005.
The respondents claimed that out of compassion and intent to avoid legal battles, they extended
to Edwin an allowance of US$6,033.36. They also offered the payment of US$60,000.00 disability benefits
despite having no obligation to do so on their part as GBM can only be considered as work-related if a
person who suffers therefrom had exposures to radiation or vinyl products, or had worked in the vicinity of
power lines. The respondents claimed that Edwin did not have such exposure while under their employ.
Two demand letters seeking disability benefits were thereafter sent by the petitioners to the respondents.
The first, which was received by the respondents on November 21, 2005, sought the payment of
US$125,000.00 as allegedly provided under the International Bargaining Forum/Associated Marine
Officers’ and Seamen’s Union of the Philippines/International Mariners Management Association of Japan
Collective Bargaining Agreement (IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA). The second letter, dated December 8,
2005, reiterated the petitioners' claims for disability benefits. The respondents replied that they had already
aptly dealt with the illness under the respective employment agreement. Not long after, the petitioners again
wrote the respondents informing the latter that Edwin's condition was already critical. Hence, the possibility
that the claims for disability benefits would be converted to death benefits arose. The respondents denied
the petitioners' demand.
In December 2005, a complaint for disability benefits, medical and transportation
reimbursements, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees were filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Edwin died on April 13, 2006 during the pendency of the proceedings. He
was substituted therein by the petitioners who sought the payment of death benefits. After finding that there
was an arbitration clause in the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision
referring the complaint to voluntary arbitration. The case was thereafter docketed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) as AC 94-NCMB-NCR-39-01-13-07.
On October 28, 2008, Voluntary Arbitrator Rene Ofreneo (VA Ofreneo), invoking the provisions
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC) and
the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, awarded death benefits to the petitioners. VA Ofreneo ratiocinated that:
This Office has also taken cognizance of the following facts that were not questioned or contested by the
parties: One, that EDWIN DEAUNA was under the employ of the same company for roughly 25 years due
to repeated re-hiring from 1975 to 2005, and Two, that the RESPONDENTS made an earlier settlement
offer of US$60,000 as payment for disability benefits. On the repatriation of EDWIN DEAUNA and the
relationship of his ailment to his work as Chief Engineer of the vessel Sanko Stream, the medical report
dated 22 August 2005 by the company physician, DR. NICOMEDES G. CRUZ, to CAPTAIN VICTORIO
S. MILLALOS, General Manager of Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, does not need any other interpretation
other than observation that EDWIN DEAUNA's health status had been deteriorating on board.
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is abundantly clear that the ailment of EDWIN
DEAUNA was work-related and manifested while he was on board in his last sailing. This ailment
developed and progressed in the course of his employment, that is, during the long and continuous service
EDWIN DEAUNA rendered to the same manning company, which spanned a period of over 25 years. His
repatriation, recorded as made upon his request, was clearly unavoidable given his rapidly deteriorating
health situation as proven no less by the series of medical tests and treatment EDWIN DEAUNA was
subjected to with the help of private and Company physicians – and eventually by his death. The respondents
filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to challenge VA Ofreneo's
award. Before the CA could resolve the case, the petitioners filed a motion for execution which was granted
by VA Ofreneo over the respondents' vehement opposition. Consequently, the respondents paid to the
petitioners the sum of ₱5,603,026.00,15 but the former manifested that their act was without prejudice to the
outcome of the proceedings then pending with the CA.
On July 15, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed decision reversing VA Ofreneo's award
based on the following grounds: Under the Definition of Terms found in the Standard Contract, a work-
related illness is defined as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease
listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied". An illness not otherwise
listed in Section 32-A is disputably presumed work-related.
Glioblastoma multiforme is the most aggressive of the gliomas, a collection of tumors arising
from glia or their precursors within the central nervous system. Most glioblastoma tumors appear to be
sporadic, without any genetic predisposition. No links have been found between glioblastoma and smoking,
diet, cellular phones or electromagnetic fields. Recently, evidence for a viral cause has been discovered,
possibly SV40 or cytomegalovirus. There also appears to be a small link between ionizing radiation and
glioblastoma. Having one of the following genetic disorders is associated with an increased incidence of
glomas: neurofibromatosis, tuberous sclerosis, Von Hippel-Lindau disease, Li-Fraumeni syndrome, turcot
syndrome. These tumors manifest de novo, presenting after a short clinical history, usually less than 3
months.
The presumption was disproved by petitioner[s] [herein respondents] in its (sic) arguments.
Petitioner[s] presented the expert medical opinion of its (sic) company-designated doctor, opining that the
deceased seaman's Glioblastoma Multiforme was not work-related considering that he was never exposed
to factors that would cause the same during his employment with the petitioners. While opinions of
petitioner's (sic) doctor should not be given evidentiary weight as they are palpably self-serving and biased
in favor of the former, and certainly could not be considered independent, respondent[s] has (sic) used the
medical report of the very same physician to support their arguments, and is (sic) thus considered in estoppel.
Respondent's (sic) bare assertion, without any scientific or logical proof, that such employment
of the deceased seaman in the vessel of the petitioner[s], is the cause of his illness and eventual death, cannot
be upheld by this court. Under P.D. No. 626, if an ailment or sickness is not listed as an "occupational
disease", the claimant must prove that the risk of contracting the illness suffered was increased by his or her
working conditions. The degree of proof required is "substantial evidence". Jurisprudence defines
"substantial evidence" as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify the conclusion. It provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease,
reasonable proof and not direct proof of a causal connection between the work and the ailment is required.
To require proof of actual causes or factors which lead to the ailment would not be consistent with the liberal
interpretation of the social justice guarantee in favor of workers.
Thus, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded unless there is substantial evidence
showing that (a) the cause of Deauna's death was reasonably connected with his work; or (b) the sickness
for which he died is an accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions increased the risk of
contracting the disease for which he died. The deceased seaman's cause of death was not connected with his
employment on board the vessel as a Chief Engineer. A Chief Engineer is someone qualified to oversee the
entire engine department. He is also responsible for all operations and maintenance that has to do with any
and all engineering equipment throughout the entire ship. He also determines the fuel, lube oil, and other
consumables required for a voyage; [r]equired inventory for spare parts, oversees fuel, lube and slop oil
transfers, prepares the engine room for inspection by local marine/safety authorities, oversees all major
maintenance; is required to be in the engine room during maneuvering operations, and is in charge of the
engine room during emergency situations.
Glioblastoma Multiforme is not an accepted occupational disease of a Chief Engineer under the POEA-
SEC, Art. 32-A. It does not arise from known occupational hazards, such as being a Chief Engineer as in
this case, and its origin has not yet been pinpointed by any medical experts or organizations up to the present.
Furthermore, to say that his earlier illness of kidney stones, even if such was proven to have been caused by
the deceased seaman's occupation, lead to the development of the Glioblastoma Multiforme, which
eventually caused his death, is stretching the facts too far. We are not medical experts to be able to connect
such illness as the cause of GBM, which even the former has not yet discovered, and thus, warrant a new
discovery in the field of medicine and grant the death benefits prayed for by the respondents.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely
apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely
apparent. This Court finds that under the circumstances[,] respondents' bare allegations do not suffice to
discharge the required quantum of proof of compensability. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations or presumptions, like the one made by herein respondents. The beneficiaries must present
evidence to prove a positive proposition.
For the second argument, petitioner[s] argues (sic) that when the deceased seaman was
repatriated on April 3, 2005, whether it is due to finished contract or for medical reasons, this will have the
effect of terminating the employment of the said seaman. When the seaman died on April 16, 2006, he was
no longer under the employment of the petitioners. Petitioner[s] cited the case of Gau Sheng v. Joaquin,
[through which] the Highest Tribunal ruled that in order to give effect to the benefits granted under the (sic)
Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, it must be shown that the employee died during the effectivity
of the contract of employment. We rule in the affirmative.
Art. 29 of the said IBF AMOSUP-JSU IMMAJ CBA provides, in part, that:
"If a seafarer dies of any cause whilst in the employment of the company including death from natural
causes and death occurring whilst traveling to and from the vessel, or as a result of marine or other similar
peril, but excluding death due to willful act, the Company shall pay the sums specified xxx to a nominated
beneficiary and to each dependent child up to a maximum of four (4) under 21 years of age. The above
compensation shall include those Seafarers who have been missing as a result of peril of the sea xxx and
presumed to be dead three (3) months after the adversity xxx."
It is clear from the above provision that in order to come under the operation of the said CBA
agreement, it must be shown by the respondent[s] that the ailment must have been incurred while on the
employment with the petitioner[s]. Respondent's (sic) contention that since the origin or cause of the illness
was unknown, it is presumed to have been contracted during employment, is untenable. There is no such
correlation between the two to give rise to such presumption. The issuance of a clean bill of health to the
deceased seaman, made by the physicians selected/accredited by the petitioner[s] does not necessarily follow
that the illness for which the former died of was acquired during his employment.
Stated differently, for death of a seafarer to be compensable, the death must occur during the
term of his contract of employment. It is the only condition for compensability of a seafarer's death. Once it
is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable.
By provision of Section 20 (A) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, based on POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 055, series of 1996, payment of death benefit pension is mandated in case of death of a seafarer
during the term of his employment.
Section 20 (A) (1) and (4) (A, B and C) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:
"Section 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries
the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an
additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21)
but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury or illness during the term
of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this
Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at
employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not
permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be
handled or dealt with in accordance with the master's best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall
communicate with the manning agency to advice (sic) for disposition of seafarer's remains.
The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of
One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of
payment."
This is a similar, if not exact, provision of the CBA aforementioned. The law demands the same
requirements as it was in the latter. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the
employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died
during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. However, if the seaman dies after
the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits
enumerated above.
Finally, the Voluntary Arbitrator has erred in relying only on the medical report presented by the company
physician Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz in making his conclusion that the ailment of the deceased seaman was
work-related and it manifested while he was on board of (sic) the vessel in his last sailing. He did not
consider the other equally important points such as whether the death of the seaman was suffered during the
term of his employment or that assuming arguendo, that he was indeed repatriated due to medical reasons,
his death occurred after the term of his employment has already ceased.
That administrative quasi-judicial bodies like the Voluntary Arbitrator are not bound by technical
rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, does not mean that the basic rules on proving allegations
should be entirely dispensed with. A party alleging a critical fact must still support his allegation with
substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due
process. The liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic
requirements of due process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the provision for flexibility in
administrative procedure "does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative value."
Furthermore, as held in Uichico v. NLRC, this procedural rule should not be construed as a
license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.17 (Citations omitted)
The CA thereafter issued the assailed resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration to the
foregoing. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The petitioners submit the following for resolution:
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DO NOT CONFORM TO
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT POINTS
WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. HENCE, THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
A. THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AND LEGAL HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER ARE
ENTITLED TO DEATH COMPENSATION IN THE SUM OF US$121,000.00 UNDER THE
AMOSUP/JSU-CBA;
B. PETITIONER[S] [ARE] ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES FOR (sic) Php1,000,000.00,
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES [OF] Php200,000.00 AND TEN PERCENT (10%) OF THE AWARDS AS
AND BY WAY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The Petitioners' Arguments
The petitioners emphasize that under the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, a seafarer's death is
compensable regardless of its cause and its non work-relatedness as long as it occurs during the term of
the latter's employment. The only exception to compensability is when death is due to willful acts. In Edwin's
case, he had been under the respondents' employment for the past 30 years. Prior to boarding Sanko, he
passed the PEME but was thereafter medically-repatriated as stated in Dr. Cruz's report. He died of GBM,
the origin of which is unknown. Hence, it can be presumed that GBM had been contracted during his
employment with the respondents.
The petitioners also point out that the dictum that death must occur during the term of a seafarer's
employment is not even a hard and fast rule. In Carmelita C. Arambulo v. West Fleet Phil./Pandiman Phil.,
Inc./Pacific Maritime, Inc.,the NLRC declared that for an illness to be compensable, it is not necessary for
death to occur during the term of employment. What is merely required is for the connection between the
cause of repatriation and the cause of death to be duly established. In Seagull Shipmanagement & Transport,
Inc. v. NLRC, the Court similarly declared that "if the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death
for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and
recovery may be had for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease."
The petitioners also refute in detail the applicability of the doctrines invoked by the respondents
as the circumstances surrounding them do not obtain in the case at bar. In Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin,
employment was terminated upon the parties' mutual consent and the seafarer's claim was anchored on the
POEA SEC and not on the provisions of a CBA. In Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc., no evidence
was offered to prove the cause of the early termination of the seafarer's contract. In Spouses Aya-ay, Sr. v.
Arpaphil Shipping Corporation, the seafarer was repatriated due to an eye injury but he died of
cardiovascular arrest after his contract was already terminated. In Prudential Shipping and Management
Corporation v. Sta. Rita, the seafarer was repatriated due to umbilical hernia and he died ten days after with
cardiopulmonary arrest as the immediate cause, acute renal failure as the antecedent cause and
hepatocellular carcinoma as the underlying cause. In Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of
the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas, the seafarer was not medically repatriated. In the Estate of Posedio
Ortega v. Court of Appeals, the seafarer died of lung cancer and his heirs anchored their claim for death
benefits on the POEA SEC, which unfortunately does not list the said illness as an occupational disease.
The petitioners thus conclude that the contexts of the aforecited cases are different, hence, the doctrines
enunciated therein find no application.
The petitioners also allege that the respondents' prior actions indicated nothing less but an
admission of the latter's legal and moral obligation to pay Edwin the amounts he was entitled to. For one,
the expenses for the initial treatment administered to Edwin were shouldered by the respondents. Further,
the respondents paid Edwin a full sickness allowance as provided for under POEA SEC. Moreover, the
respondents repeatedly offered Edwin the amount of US$60,000.00 corresponding to the original claim for
disability benefits under the POEA SEC. This clearly meant that the respondents recognized that Edwin's
illness entitled him to benefits under the POEA SEC. The petitioners likewise aver their entitlement to moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees on account of the respondents' unjustified refusal to comply with
their contractual obligations.
The Respondents' Contentions
In their Comment with Manifestation, the respondents counter that Edwin's illness was not work-
related and his death occurred not during the term of his employment. Thus, the petitioners are not entitled
to the payment of any benefits. The mere circumstance that the manifestations of an illness appeared while
the seafarer is on-board does not necessarily render it as work-related. In the POEA SEC, the words "during
the term of contract" refer to the time when death occurs while "work-related" refers to the cause of death.
The two requisites must both be proven especially in view of the Court's declaration in Rivera v. Wallem
Maritime Services, Inc., that "in the absence of substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be presumed
to have increased the risk of contracting the disease".
In the case at bar, the petitioners' bare allegation, that GBM was work-related as can be inevitably
concluded from Edwin's lengthy and repeated employment with the respondents, deserves no probative
value unless corroborated by substantial evidence. Dr. Cruz, who had attended to Edwin's medical needs for
more than three months, opined that GBM was not work-related as the latter, in the course of his employment
with the respondents, was never exposed to factors which would have increased the risk of contracting the
illness.
Further, Articles 25 and 26 of the CBA provide for the entitlement of a seafarer to medical
treatment and sick wages for a maximum period of 130 days from repatriation. In Edwin's case, he died on
April 13, 2006 or more than a year after his repatriation. Hence, when he died, he was no longer under the
respondents' employ. Moreover, his repatriation, regardless of its cause, already terminated his employment.
This is in consonance with Section 18 of the POEA SEC, which in part expressly provides that a seafarer's
employment ceases when he signs off from the vessel and arrives at the point of hire due to medical reasons.
Besides, even Article 29 of the CBA states that death is only compensable if it occurs to the seafarer "whilst
in the employment of the company". The respondents likewise deny that in effect, they admitted their
liability when they made repeated offers to pay the petitioners US$60,000.00. The respondents state that the
offers were made sans prejudice to the defenses they were raising. Further, they withdrew the offers during
the pendency of the proceedings before the LA and VA Ofreneo. In Escarcha v. Leonis Navigation Co.,
Inc.,29 the heirs of a deceased seafarer were ordered to return the amount paid to them pursuant to the
execution of an award favorable to them but which was subsequently reversed by the Court. In Edwin's case,
equity dictates that the proper reimbursement be effected as well by the petitioners.
Our Ruling
While generally, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the instant petition falls among the exceptions in the light of the conflicting
factual findings of the VA and the CA.
The instant petition ascribes misappreciation of facts on the part of the CA, which if allegedly reconsidered,
would yield a conclusion favorable to the petitioners. As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact,
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.30 The Court is thus generally bound by
the CA's factual findings. There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing, among which is when the CA's
factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions from which the action originated.31 The instant petition falls under the aforementioned exception
in the light of the divergent factual findings of the VA and the CA.
Anent the substantive arguments, we find the instant petition partially impressed with merit.
The petitioners insist their entitlement to the payment of death compensation benefits not pursuant to the
provisions of the POEA SEC but under Article 29 of the CBA. According to them, the CBA merely focuses
on the fact of death occurring during the term of a seafarer's employment, regardless of its cause. They
further claim that even if death occurs beyond the term of a seafarer's employment, compensation should
still be awarded as long as a connection can be established between the causes of repatriation and death.
On the other hand, the respondents' denial of the petitioners' claims rests on the (1) circumstance that Edwin
died after the termination of his employment contract or more than a year after he was already repatriated;
and (2) argument that GBM was supposedly not work-related in the absence of proofs of exposure of a
seafarer to vinyl, radiation or power lines while in the work place.
The IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provisions govern the relations of the parties especially since the
issue of the VA's jurisdiction was never challenged in the proceedings below.
It bears noting that the petitioners' complaint was initially filed with the NLRC which referred the same to
the NCMB for voluntary arbitration. VA Ofreneo took cognizance and ruled on the complaint. Thereafter,
the respondents assailed before the CA, through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
the notice of award issued by VA Ofreneo. In the said petition, the parties never raised the issue of the VA's
jurisdiction. In effect, it was an admission on the part of both the petitioners and the respondents that the
controversy involves the interpretation of CBA provisions relative to the claims for death compensation
benefits. Stated otherwise, in the proceedings below, the contending parties both impliedly acquiesced to
the applicability of the CBA provisions and not of the POEA SEC over the claims of the petitioners.
More importantly, the special clauses on collective bargaining agreements must prevail over the standard
terms and benefits formulated by the POEA in its Standard Employment Contract. A contract of labor is so
impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavored in favor of the laborer.
This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and full protection to labor
as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.32
We thus proceed to the inquiry on whether or not within the purview of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA,
Edwin's death on April 13, 2006, or more than a year from his repatriation, can be considered as one
occurring while he was still in the employment of the respondents.
Under the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provisions, Edwin's death a little more than a year from his
repatriation can still be considered as one occurring while he was still under the respondents' employ.
Articles 22 (Termination of Employment), 25 (Medical), 26 (Sick Pay) and 29 (Loss of Life – Death in
Service) and Appendix 3 of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA state in part:
22.1 The employment shall be terminated:
xxxx
(b) when signing off owing to sickness or injury, after medical examination in accordance with Article 25,
but subject to the provision of Article 29.
xxxx
25.3 A seafarer repatriated to their port of engagement, unfit as a result of sickness or injury, shall be entitled
to medical attention (including hospitalisation) at the Company's expense:
(a) in the case of sickness, for up to a minimum of sixty (60) days and a maximum of one hundred and thirty
(130) days after repatriation, subject to the submission of satisfactory medical reports.
xxxx
26.1 When a seafarer is landed at any port because of sickness or injury, payment of their basic wages shall
continue until they have been repatriated at the Company's expense.
26.2 Thereafter[,] the seafarers shall be entitled to sick pay at the rate equivalent to their basic wage while
they remain sick up to a minimum of sixty (60) days and a maximum of one hundred and thirty (130) days.
xxxx
26.4 Proof of continued entitlement to sick pay shall be by submission of satisfactory medical
reports, endorsed where necessary, by a Company[-] appointed doctor. If a doctor appointed by or in behalf
of the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be nominated jointly between the Company
and the Union and the decision of this doctor shall be final and binding on both parties.
xxxx
29.1 If a Seafarer dies through any cause whilst in the employment of the Company including death
from natural causes and death occurring whilst travelling to and from the vessel, or as a result of marine
or other similar peril, but excluding death due to willful acts, the Company shall pay the sums specified in
the attached APPENDIX 3 to a nominated beneficiary and to each dependent child up to a maximum of four
(4) under 21 years of age. x x x
xxxx
29.4 For the purpose of this clause[,] a seafarer shall be regarded as "in the employment of the
company" for so long as the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 apply and provided the death is directly
attributable to sickness or injury that caused the seafarer's employment to be terminated in
accordance with Article 22.1(b).
Appendix 3
xxxx
Loss of Life – Death in Service
Death in service benefits as provided in Article 29 of this Agreement shall, unless more favourable benefits
are negotiated, be:
To the nominated beneficiary ….............. US$75,000.00
To each dependent child (maximum four (4) under 21 years of age)
…...............................................................US$15,000.00
(Emphasis and underlining supplied)
Article 22.1(b) considers an employment as terminated if a seafarer signs off from the vessel due to sickness,
but subject to the provisions of Article 29.
Article 29.1 of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provides that the death of a seafarer, for any cause, is
compensable when it occurs while he is in the employment of the company. Article 29.4, on the other
hand, clarifies that the seafarer shall be considered as in the employment of the company "for so long
as the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 apply and provided the death is directly attributable to sickness
or injury that caused the seafarer's employment to be terminated in accordance with Article 22.1(b)".
Under Article 25.3, a seafarer repatriated to the port of his engagement, unfit as a result of sickness, shall
be entitled to medical attention at the company's expense for up to a maximum period of 130 days after
repatriation, subject to the submission of satisfactory medical reports. Article 26.2 further states that a
seafarer shall likewise be entitled to sick pay at the rate equivalent to his basic wage while he remains sick
up to a maximum of 130 days. Article 26.4 allows continued entitlement to sick pay beyond the 130 day
period, reckoned from repatriation, provided satisfactory medical reports shall be submitted and endorsed
where necessary, by a company-appointed doctor.
We now apply the provisions of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA to the circumstances surrounding Edwin's
death.1âwphi1
On August 22, 2005, or more or less 130 days from Edwin's arrival in the Philippines, the company-
designated physician, Dr. Cruz, indicated in a medical report 33 addressed to Capt. Millalos that Edwin's
repatriation was due to "body weakness and head heaviness since October 2004". Dr. Cruz also stated that
upon Edwin's arrival at the airport on April 3, 2005, the latter was noted to be "drowsy and disoriented". Dr.
Cruz diagnosed Edwin to be suffering from GBM and submitted the monthly expenses for the latter's
chemotherapy to Capt. Millalos. Edwin was advised to come back on September 23, 2005. Edwin eventually
died of GBM on April 13, 2006.
We note that body weakness, head heaviness, drowsiness and disorientedness are among the symptoms
associated with GBM. Dr. Cruz indicated that these symptoms were exhibited by Edwin since October 2004
while he was still on board Sanko and were notable even when the latter was repatriated on April 3, 2005.
Prior to repatriation, Edwin had only been diagnosed in Brazil to be suffering from kidney stones, but no
exhaustive examination was conducted on him and no finding was rendered declaring that he had GBM.
Nonetheless, the symptoms previously referred to were the cause of Edwin's repatriation more or less than
a month before his contract was about to expire. On May 4, 2005 or about a month after repatriation, Dr.
Mercado found that Edwin was afflicted with GBM and that the tumor had been progressively growing for
months.34 Further, the medical report, dated August 22, 2005, addressed to Capt. Millalos, submitting to him
the monthly expenses for Edwin's chemotherapy and advising the latter to come back on September 23,
2005, was an implied admission on the part of Dr. Cruz that medical assistance and sick pay should indeed
be extended to Edwin even beyond the 130-day period prescribed by Articles 25 and 26 of the
IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA.
From the foregoing, we can thus conclude that at the time of Edwin's death on April 13, 2006 due to GBM,
he was still in the employment of the respondents. While it is true that Article 22.1 of the
IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA considers a seafarer as terminated when he signs off from the vessel due to
sickness, the foregoing is subject to the provisions of Article 29. Under Article 29, a seafarer remains under
the respondents' employ as long as the former is still entitled to medical assistance and sick pay, and
provided that the death which eventually occurs is directly attributable to the sickness which caused the
seafarer's employment to be terminated. As discussed above, the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz,
in effect admitted that Edwin was repatriated due to symptoms which a person suffering from GBM
normally exhibits. Further, he recommended to Capt. Millalos Edwin's entitlement to medical assistance
and sick pay for a period beyond 130 days from repatriation. Edwin subsequently died of GBM, the
symptoms of which were the cause of his earlier repatriation. Hence, since Edwin's death is reasonably
connected to the cause of his repatriation, within the purview of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, he
indubitably died while under the respondents' employ, thus, entitling the petitioners to death benefits as
provided for in Appendix 3 of the said CBA.
The petitioners are, however, not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
We find that the acts of the respondents hardly indicate an intent on their part to evade the payment of their
obligations so as to justify the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees to the petitioners.
The respondents extended medical assistance and allowances to Edwin while he went through his treatment.
Further, the respondents offered an amount of US$60,000.00 as disability benefits even when the petitioners'
claims had not been conclusively established yet.
http://textbook.ncmm.no/maritime-occupational-medicine/339-112-chemical-hazardsWHEREFORE, IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July
15, 2009 and Resolution dated March 8, 2010 of the Court of Appeals, absolving the respondents from
liability for death benefits pertaining to the petitioners by reason of Edwin Deauna’s death, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 28, 2008 of the Voluntary Arbitrator, awarding the amount
of US$121,000.00 to the petitioners in accordance with Appendix 3 of the International Bargaining
Forum/Associated Marine Officers’ and Seamen’s Union of the Philippines/International Mariners
Management Association of Japan Collective Bargaining Agreement, is REINSTATED. However, interests
on the award shall no longer be imposed in view of the execution of the said decision already made on May
28, 2009.
ROBERTO D. DEBAUDIN vs SSS and ECC
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules on Civil Procedure seeks to review the August 17,
1999 Decision1 and May 18, 2001 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 44670
which affirmed respondents Social Security System (SSS) and Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) in denying petitioner’s claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as
amended.
Petitioner is a seaman by profession. He joined the United Philippine Lines (UPL) on April 13, 1975 and
was separated from his employment on May 21, 1993 at the age of 62.3
During his eighteen (18) years of service with UPL, he boarded various foreign ocean-going vessels4 while
performing his duties and responsibilities that included cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging,
and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank.
Petitioner’s medical record shows that his illness started in May 1993 when he experienced episodes of
bilateral blurring of vision. While in Singapore then, he consulted Dr. Richard F.T. Fan, an ophthalmic
surgeon, and he was diagnosed to be suffering from advanced glaucoma.5 His condition recurred even after
his separation from service, prompting him to seek further eye consultations and treatments in the
Philippines.6 His eye disease was finally diagnosed as chronic open angle glaucoma.7
On account of his ailment, petitioner filed before the SSS a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No.
626, as amended. The application, however, was denied on the ground that there is no causal relationship
between the illness and his job as a seaman.8 When his motion for reconsideration was also denied, petitioner
elevated the case to the ECC which later on affirmed the assailed decision. The ECC ratiocinated, thus:
Following a careful review of the documents on record, the Commission is inclined to rule against the
compensability of [petitioner’s] ailment. The present employees compensation program, which is embodied
in P.D. 626, as amended, requires[,] and we quote, that:
"For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of
an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions" (Rule III, Section 1[b] of the Implementing Rules of P.D. 626, as amended)
Definitely, [petitioner’s] Chronic Open Angle Glaucoma is not an occupational disease under the law. Thus,
he is required to show by substantial evidence that the nature of his job as a Seaman had increased the risk
of contracting the disease. However, appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof required by the law.
Based on medical findings, Open Angle Glaucoma arises as a complication of chronic obstruction of
aqueous humor reabsorption in the trabecular meshwork. It is usually asymptomatic and only rarely causes
ocular pain or corneal edema. The treatment is primarily medical. Surgery to prevent permanent visual loss
is necessary in only a minority of patients (Ref.: Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th edition, p.
71).
As suggested by the foregoing medical findings, the cleaning of chemical-spill-oil on deck and the spraying
of [naphtha] chemical inside the tank were not predisposing factors in the contraction of Open Angle
Glaucoma. Thus, we believe that the respondent System correctly ruled against the compensability of
[petitioner’s] ailment.9
An appeal from the adverse decision was filed before the CA. 10 On August 17, 1999, however, the petition
was denied due course and the CA accordingly dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner failed to
adduce substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the working conditions as a seaman increased
the risk of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma.11
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied;12 hence, this recourse.
The lone issue presented for consideration is whether the work of petitioner as a seaman contributed even
in a small degree in or had increased the risk of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma. 13
While petitioner admits that chronic open angle glaucoma is not one of those listed as occupational diseases
under the law he nonetheless maintains that the cause of glaucoma is still unknown and predisposition
thereto is due to both physical and emotional factors. In his case, petitioner asserts that he had been exposed
to these elements for 18 years during his employment. He claims that as a utility staff he performed odd jobs
without fail such as cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and
washing dirt and rusts inside the tank. According to him, these strenuous tasks required climbing, bending
over and running for so many times – acts which a medical book considered as contributory factors that
would increase intraocular pressure which causes glaucoma. Aside from the physical demands of the job,
petitioner contends that he was also subjected to emotional strains of going through the perils of the sea and
homesickness for being away from his family during the entire duration of the contracts. He, thus, alleges
that his employment as a seaman contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of his ailment..
In fine, petitioner stresses that, as a social legislation, P.D. No. 626, as amended, should be interpreted to
give meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the 1987 Constitution and the Labor
Code. The petition lacks merit.
Under the Labor Code, as amended, an employee is entitled to compensation benefits if the
sickness is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees'
Compensation; or in case of any other illness, if it is caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.14 This is as it should be because for an illness
to be compensable, it must be (1) directly caused by such employment; (2) aggravated by the employment;
or (3) the result of the nature of such employment.15Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability
of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation is
required.16 It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. 17 Probability,
not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings 18 since in carrying out
and interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations the primordial
and paramount consideration is the employees' welfare.
In the present case, petitioner’s chronic open angle glaucoma is not listed as an occupational disease; hence,
he has the burden of proving by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, that the nature of his employment or working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the ailment or that its progression or aggravation was brought about thereby.
Perusal of the records, however, regrettably reveals petitioner’s failure to adduce any proof of a reasonable
connection between his work as a seaman and the chronic open angle glaucoma he had contracted. At the
most, he merely claims that he performed odd jobs without fail – cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat
dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank – strenuous tasks
which according to him required climbing, bending over and running for so many times. Adding thereto
were the perils of the sea and the homesickness he said he experienced which allegedly caused emotional
strains on his part.
Other than positing the foregoing, petitioner presented no competent medical history, records or physician’s
report to objectively substantiate the claim that there is a reasonable nexus between his work and his ailment.
Without saying more, his bare allegations do not ipso facto make his illness compensable. Awards of
compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The claimant must present concrete evidence to
prove a positive proposition.19
The necessity of establishing the supposed work connection is all the more crucial in the face of the fact that
the readily-available medical literature would appear to consistently indicate that open angle glaucoma is
brought about by several factors other than the purported "physical and emotional strains," such as aging,
race, family history, nearsightedness or farsightedness, prolonged corticosteroid use, nutritional
deficiencies, brain chemical abnormalities, injuries, infection or abnormalities in the eye, and medical
conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure or heart disease.20 Therefore, to easily attribute to the
"physical and emotional strains" allegedly attendant in petitioner’s job as a seaman the chronic open angle
glaucoma he is currently suffering is evidently to oversimplify an otherwise complex fact-finding process
that should have taken place to determine the true cause of the ailment.
In Sante v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,21 this Court ruled that "… a claimant must submit such
proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the
claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that
ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not
necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a
case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the
duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real … not merely apparent."
Moreover, petitioner cannot conveniently rely on the invocation that the Employees Compensation Act, as
a social legislation, must be liberally construed in favor of the ordinary working person. While the sympathy
of the law on social security is toward the employees or their beneficiaries, it is imperative to remember that
such compassion must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for
compensation benefits. Thus, GSIS v. CA22 held:
x x x [T]here is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon undeserving claims for
compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are
inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion
for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust
fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered
accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor
employee still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of
affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It
is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled
under the law. The employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is
spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment.
Moreover, the new system instituted by the new law has discarded, among others, the concept of
"presumption of compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security principles.
The new system is administered by social insurance agencies – the GSIS and the SSS – under the ECC. The
purpose of this innovation was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay
workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or
disability. Petition denied.
PABLO A. AUSTRIA, Petitioner, v. CA & ECC
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000 1 and its
Resolution dated September 8, 2000 2 in CA-G.R. No. 52688 entitled "Pablo Austria v. Employees
Compensation Commission (Social Security System), Central Azucarera de Tarlac." The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the Social Security System (SSS) and the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) denying petitioner’s request for conversion of his permanent partial disability benefit under PD 626
as amended 3 to permanent total disability benefit. The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Pablo A. Austria was employed as bag piler at Central Azucarera de Tarlac from June 1, 1977 to
July 20, 1997. As bag piler, his duties were to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library (1) carry and pile sacks of
refined sugar; (2) relocate and move stock piles for shifting or return to the refinery; (3) assist the production
checker in random weighing of production; (4) clean the warehouse, piling conveyor and its surroundings;
(5) assist in the repair and maintenance work during off-season; and (6) do other related work assigned to
him from time to time by his superior.
In 1994, petitioner began to feel severe back pain. On November 18, 1994, petitioner underwent an MRI
which revealed a small disc protrusion at L4 and L5 level. Petitioner underwent Laminectomy on March 17,
1995 at the Ramos General Hospital in Tarlac, Tarlac. The x-ray photographs taken on May 23, 1997,
September 3, 1998, and September 28, 1998 revealed osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine.
On account of his osteoarthritis, petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for compensation benefits under PD
626 as amended. The claim was granted and petitioner was awarded permanent partial disability benefits
for eight (8) months starting September 1, 1995, a second release for seven (7) months starting May 10,
1996, and a third release for fifteen (15) months starting April 1, 1997.
Petitioner thereafter requested the SSS for conversion of his permanent partial disability benefit to
permanent total disability benefit. The SSS denied the request. It reasoned: "Based on clinical records
submitted, there is no progression of your illness which was already granted under previous EC disability.
Granting of extension on your claim cannot be based solely on the findings on your lumbo-sacral X-ray
hence they are not related to each other or of different disease entity."
On appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The ECC held that considering the degree of his
disability at the time he was separated from the service, petitioner has already availed of the maximum
benefits to which he is entitled on account of his osteoarthritis. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via petition for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition, ruling that the law does not
allow the conversion of permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. Petitioner filed a petition
before this Court to review the decision of the CA. Petitioner raises the sole issue:
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the claim for additional benefits in favor
of the petitioner and not allowing the conversion of his (petitioner) permanent partial disability to permanent
total disability." We find merit in the petition.
PD 626 as amended provides three types of disability benefits to qualified employees: (1) temporary total
disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. In the case at bar, petitioner
was granted by the SSS, as affirmed by the ECC, permanent partial disability benefit, but he seeks to avail
of permanent total disability benefit. Under Section 2 Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, a disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is
unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days; and a disability is
partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee suffers a permanent partial loss
of the use of any part of his body. We held in Vicente v. Employees’ Compensation Commission 9 that:
". . . the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the
capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus,
if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for
more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total
disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Disability is intimately related to one’s earning
capacity. It should be understood less on its medical significance but more on the loss of earning capacity.
10 In Gonzaga v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 11 the Court characterized permanent total
disability as: ". . . disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar
nature that she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her
mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean an absolute helplessness but rather an incapacity to
perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. Total disability does not require that the employee
be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that she cannot
pursue her usual work and earn therefrom."
Applying the foregoing standards, we find petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit under the
law. Petitioner has been employed as bag piler for twenty (20) years at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac. His
duties require him to carry heavy loads of refined sugar and to perform other manual work. Since his work
obviously taxes so much on his back, his illness which affects his lumbar spine renders him incapable of
doing his usual work as bag piler. Hence, his disability to perform his regular duties may be considered total
and permanent. Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the law 12 that prohibits
the conversion of permanent partial disability benefit to permanent total disability benefit if it is shown that
the employee’s ailment qualifies as such. Furthermore, the grant of permanent total disability benefit to an
employee who was initially compensated for permanent partial disability but is found to be suffering from
permanent total disability would not be prejudicial to the government to give it reason to deny the claim.
The Court has in fact allowed in the past the conversion of permanent partial disability benefit to permanent
total disability benefit. 13 These rulings are consistent with the primary purpose of PD 626, that is, to provide
meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies
resulting in the loss of income, 14 as well as the Constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor.
Petition granted.
ALEXANDER B. GATUS, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
[Petitioner Alexander B.] Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac beginning on January 1, 1972.
He was a covered member of the SSS (SS No. 02-0055015-6). He optionally retired from Central Azucarera
de Tarlac upon reaching 30 years of service on January 31, 2002, at the age of 62 years. By the time of his
retirement, he held the position of Tender assigned at the Distillery Cooling Tower.
In the course of his employment in Central Azucarera de Tarlac, he was certified fit to work on October 21,
1975 and was accordingly promoted to a year-round regular employment.
He suffered chest pains and was confined at the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac City on August
12, 1995. Upon discharge on August 17, 1995, he was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary Artery
Disease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina. His medical records showed him to be hypertensive
for 10 years and a smoker.
On account of his CAD, he was given by the SSS the following EC/SSS Permanent Partial
Disability (PPD) benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective September 1, 1994 and (b) 4 monthly pensions
effective January 3, 1997. He became an SSS retirement pensioner on February 1, 2002. Sometime in 2003,
an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid to him on the ground that his CAD,
being attributed to his chronic smoking, was not work-related. He was notified thereof through a letter dated
July 31, 2003. Convinced that he was entitled to the benefits, he assailed the decision but the SSS maintained
its position. The SSS also denied his motion for reconsideration.
He elevated the matter to the ECC, which denied his appeal on December 10, 2004, essentially
ruling that although his CAD was a cardiovascular disease listed as an occupational disease under Annex A
of the Implementing Rules on Employees’ Compensation, nothing on record established the presence of the
qualifying circumstances for responsibility; that it was incumbent upon him to prove that the nature of his
previous employment and the conditions prevailing therein had increased the risk of contracting his CAD;
and that he had failed to prove this requisite. The ECC concluded:
As explained medically, the development of IHD or otherwise termed as Coronary Artery
Disease (CAD) is caused by atherosclerosis, the hardening of the inner lining of arteries. One of the risk
factors considered by medical science for the development of atherosclerosis is smoking. Appellant had
been documented to be a chronic smoker and such factor which is not in any way related to any form of
employment increased his risk of contracting heart disease.
Hence, this recourse, wherein he contends that he had contracted the disease due to the presence of harmful
fuel smoke emission of methane gas from a nearby biological waste digester and a railway terminal where
diesel-fed locomotive engines had "spew(ed) black smoke;" and that he had been exposed for 30 years to
various smoke emissions that had contained carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur, oxide of nitrogen and
unburned carbon.3(Emphases added.)
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner is not entitled to compensation benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, affirming the Decision of the Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC), which was likewise a confirmation of the audit conducted by the Social Security
System (SSS).
Thus, this petition wherein, even without assistance of counsel, petitioner comes to this Court contending
that "the appellate court’s decision is flawed [and] if not reversed will result in irreparable damage to the
interest of the petitioner."4
Petitioner lists the following as errors in the questioned Decision:
I. The appellate court’s decision is against existing jurisprudence on increased risk theory of rebook
condition and progression and deterioration of illness that supervened during employment and persisted
after optional retirement.
II. Violation of due process.5
The Court of Appeals agreed with the ECC’s findings that based on his medical records, petitioner has been
hypertensive for ten (10) years and smokes 20 packs of cigarettes a year. 6 His medical condition was
explained in the following manner by the ECC:
Ischemic Heart Disease (IHD) is the generic designation for a group of closely related syndromes resulting
from ischemia – an imbalance between the supply and demand of the heart for oxygenated blood. Because
coronary artery narrowing or obstruction owing to atherosclerosis underlies MI, it is often termed coronary
artery disease (CAD). Atherosclerosis which is primarily due to smoking, diet, hypertension and diabetes is
the main culprit in the development of CAD. (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Robbins, 5th edition.)
Petitioner claims that he was in good health when he first entered the Central Azucarera de Tarlac
as a factory worker at the Alcohol Distillery Plant in 1972.8 He alleges that in the course of his employment
he suffered "essential hypertension" starting 1995, when he experienced chest pains and was confined at the
Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac City; that he was diagnosed as having "Coronary Artery Disease
(CAD) [Triple] Vessel and Angina Pectoris" and hypertension; that he was initially granted disability
benefits by the SSS but his request for additional benefits was denied; and that the ECC denied his appeal
due to allegations of smoking. He asserts that he has cited "technical, scientific and medical authorities to
bolster his claim" including the exposure he experienced for thirty (30) years from the alcohol distillery to
"hydrocarbons and [locomotives]," carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, sulfur, phosphorous, nitrogen oxides
and soot (particulate matter).
Petitioner uses various references, including encyclopedia and medical books, to discuss the general effects
of pollution, mostly caused by the burning of fossil fuels, to people with cardiovascular diseases; and the
aggravation of coronary artery diseases brought about by exposure to carbon monoxide.10 Petitioner claims
that "air pollution (carbon monoxide and lead from gasoline) contributed to the development of essential
hypertension and its complications: [c]oronary artery disease, hypertensive cardiovascular disease and
stroke."11
Petitioner insists that the allegation of cigarette smoking was not proven and that the ECC did not present a
document signed by competent medical authority to back such claim. Petitioner claims that there is no
showing that the ECC records were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and that the latter had completely
ignored his evidence.
In its Comment12 dated December 11, 2006, respondent SSS alleges that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Decision of the ECC was in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence.
Respondent SSS further alleges that as viewed from the records of the case, the petitioner failed to show
proof by mere substantial evidence that the development of his disease was work-related;13 that petitioner’s
heart ailment had no causal relation with his employment; and that "[as] viewed from by his lifestyle, he
was a chain smoker, a habit [which had] contributed to the development of his heart ailment."14
Respondent further alleges that medical findings have revealed that nicotine in cigarette smoke damages the
blood vessels of the heart, making them susceptible to the hardening of the inner lining of the arteries. As
to petitioner’s contention that there were harmful fuel and smoke emissions due to the presence of methane
gas from a nearby biological waste as well as a railway terminal where diesel-fed locomotive engines
spewed black smoke, respondent counters that these were mere allegations that were not backed by scientific
and factual evidence and that petitioner had failed to show which harmful emissions or substances were
present in his working environment and how much exposure thereto had contributed to the development of
his illness. Respondent points out that petitioner’s "bare allegations do not constitute such evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship
between his working conditions" and his sickness and that "the law is clear that award of compensation
cannot rest on speculations or presumptions."15
The sole issue to be determined is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the finding of the ECC that petitioner’s ailment is not compensable under Presidential Decree No.
626, as amended.
The grounds for compensability are set forth in Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation (the "Amended Rules"), the pertinent portion of which states:
RULE III: Compensability
Sec. 1. Grounds — x x x
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result
of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
Further, under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules,
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following
conditions must be satisfied:
1. The employee's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the employee's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract
it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
Cardiovascular diseases are considered as occupational when contracted under any of the following
conditions:
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute
exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed
within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
(c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain at work showed signs
and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted,
it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.16
The burden of proof is thus on petitioner to show that any of the above conditions have been met in his case.
The required proof is further discussed in Ortega v. Social Security Commission 17 :
The requisite quantum of proof in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence. In this type of cases, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence abounds. 18
As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence that might have shown
that he was entitled to the benefits he had applied for. We thus affirm in toto the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals in the questioned Decision and quote with approval the following pronouncements
of the appellate court:
The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Accordingly, the claimant
must show, at least by substantial evidence, that the development of the disease was brought about largely
by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection,
not a direct causal relation.
Gatus was diagnosed to have suffered from CAD; Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina, diseases or conditions
falling under the category of Cardiovascular Diseases which are not considered occupational diseases under
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. His disease not being listed as an occupational disease,
he was expected to show that the illness or the fatal disease was caused by his employment and the risk of
contracting the disease was increased or aggravated by the working conditions. His proof would constitute
a reasonable basis for arriving at a conclusion that the conditions of his employment had caused the disease
or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting the illness or the fatal disease.
Under ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977, cardiovascular disease is deemed compensable under
any of the following conditions, viz:
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an
acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work.
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed
within 28 hours of the clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
xxxx
Gatus did not discharge the burden of proof imposed under the Labor Code to show that his ailment was
work-related. While he might have been exposed to various smoke emissions at work for 30 years, he did
not submit satisfactory evidence proving that the exposure had contributed to the development of his disease
or had increased the risk of contracting the illness. Neither did he show that the disease had progressed due
to conditions in his job as a factory worker. In fact, he did not present any physician’s report in order to
substantiate his allegation that the working conditions had increased the risk of acquiring the cardiovascular
disease.
Verily, his mere contention of exposure to various smoke emissions in the working environment for a period
of time does not ipso facto make the resulting disability compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest
on speculations or presumptions, for the claimant must prove a positive proposition. As pronounced in Sante
v. Employees’ Compensation Commission:
x x x What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not
necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a
case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the
duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real… not merely apparent…
Moreover, he failed to show the presence of any of the conditions imposed for cardio-vascular diseases by
Sec. 18. Hence, the affirmance of the SSS decision was properly made.
The petitioner’s plight might call for sympathy, particularly in the light of his 30 years of service to the
company, but his petition cannot be granted on that basis alone. The policy of extending the applicability of
P.D. 626 as many qualified employees as possible should be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying
undeserving claims for compensation.
In fine, Gatus was not qualified for the disability benefits under the employees compensation law.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED. 19
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated August 7, 2006, which states:
Finding nothing cogent and persuasive in the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated June 20, 2006,
we DENY the motion.
We point out that our decision of May 24, 2006 has fully explained the bases for the ruling we have made,
including the matters being discussed by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. We consider it
repetitious and redundant to discuss them herein again.20
The questioned Decision deemed as established fact that petitioner is a cigarette smoker; but petitioner
vehemently denies this, saying there is no competent evidence to prove he had that habit. What petitioner
would like this Court to do is to pass upon a question of fact, which the ECC, the SSS, and the Court of
Appeals have used to deny his claim for compensation. This is not allowed under Section 1 of Rule 45,
which states that "[t]he petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."21 Hence,
questions of fact may not be taken up in a petition for review on certiorari such as this case now before us.
As we have held previously:
A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts while a question
of law exists if the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. There is a question of fact if the
issue requires a review of the evidence presented or requires the re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses.
However, if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of
the evidence, the question is one of law.22
This was emphasized in La Union Cement Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, 23 thus:
As an overture, clear and unmistakable is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Just as well
entrenched is the doctrine that pure issues of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. We
therefore take this opportunity again to reiterate that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be
raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court
cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the lower courts and analyze, assess
and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court were correct in their appreciation of
the evidence.24
The matter of petitioner’s cigarette smoking, established by two competent government agencies and the
appellate court, is thus a matter that cannot be questioned before us via petition for review.
There is no doubt that petitioner deserves sympathy because even the benefits already given to him were
questioned after the SSS found that he was a chronic cigarette smoker. For humanitarian reasons, as he
pursued his claim all the way to the Court as an indigent litigant, and due to his advancing age, we would
like to clarify that what had already been given him should no longer be taken away from him. But he is not
entitled to further compensation for his condition.
We have once more put great weight to the factual findings of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, namely the SSS and the ECC, as they have acquired expertise in all matters relating to employee
compensation and disability benefits. As we have held in Ortega v. Social Security Commission 25 :
It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and accords great weight to the factual findings of lower
courts or agencies whose function is to resolve factual matters. It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all
over again. Moreover, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO MARIANO
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the decision,1 dated July 26, 1999, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR SP No. UDK-2898. It reversed the decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission
(ECC), dated October 23, 1998, in ECC Case No. MS-9677-498, which had affirmed the ruling of the Social
Security System (SSS) denying herein respondent Pedro Mariano’s claim for compensation benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626.2
The pertinent facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), are as follows:
For an eleven-year period starting January 1983, respondent Pedro Mariano was an employee of LGP
Printing Press. During his employment, Mariano worked in various capacities, including that of a machine
operator, paper cutter, monotype composer, film developer, and supervisor of the printing press.3
Sometime in February 1994, Mariano’s service abruptly ended when he could no longer perform any work
due to a heart ailment. An electrocardiograph test revealed that he was suffering from "Incomplete Right
Bundle Branch Block.
Mariano filed a claim for employee’s compensation benefit with the SSS. In its medical evaluation dated
April 15, 1997, SSS denied his claim on the ground that there was no causal connection between his ailment
and his job as film developer. On July 1, 1997, the SSS forwarded the record of respondent’s case to the
ECC. In a letter dated September 12, 1997, the ECC remanded respondent’s case to the SSS for reception
of additional documentary evidence.
On February 9, 1998, the SSS directed respondent to submit the following: (1) complete clinical
abstract if he was confined; and (2) records of consultation due to hypertension. Meanwhile, respondent had
consulted Dr. Rogelio Mariano, whose diagnosis showed he was suffering from Parkinson’s disease and
hypertension, as per the medical certificate dated April 20, 1998. The SSS once again submitted
respondent’s case records to the ECC for review.
On October 23, 1998, the ECC, through Executive Director Teofilo E. Hebron, dismissed
respondent’s claim. Hebron ruled that the respondent had failed to establish a causal connection between
Parkinson’s Disease and the working conditions at the printing press.8 On respondent’s claim for
compensation for Essential Hypertension, the ECC found that respondent had failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to establish that his ailment had caused impairment of any of his body organs, which in turn could
permanently prevent him from engaging in a gainful occupation. Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter
to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2898.
On July 26, 1999, the appellate court rendered a judgment reversing the decision of the ECC,
decreeing as follows: "WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, respondents Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) and Social Security System (SSS)
are ordered to pay petitioner’s claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626."
In holding for the respondent, the Court of Appeals found that the nature of petitioner’s work at
LGP resulted in his exposure to various toxic chemicals, which is a possible cause of Parkinson’s Disease.
As to his hypertension, the appellate court ruled that the respondent’s duties as machine operator and paper
cutter involved physical pressure and restlessness, since he was required to meet urgent deadlines for rush
print orders. This in turn caused respondent to suffer from stress and anxiety. In sum, the appellate court
held that respondent had substantially established the connection between the cause of his ailments and the
nature of his work. Hence, the instant petition, anchored on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, PARTICULARLY SECTION 1 (B), RULE III OF THE RULES
IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE II, BOOK IV OF THE LABOR CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE EXISTS A CAUSAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN RESPONDENT’S PARKINSON’S DISEASE AND THE WORKING
CONDITIONS AT THE PRINTING PRESS.
The sole issue for our resolution is: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the ECC decision and in
ordering petitioner to pay respondent his claim for compensation benefits?
For the petitioner, the OSG contends that the rule implementing P.D. No. 626 does not list Parkinson’s
Disease as an occupational ailment, hence, it is not compensable. The OSG takes the view that the evidence
on record does not establish that the risk of contracting said ailment was increased by the nature of
respondent’s work. Thus, said the OSG, it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare the ailment
compensable. Additionally, the OSG avers that private respondent failed to submit the documents that the
ECC required to support his claim for disability benefits.
Respondent counters that the nature of his functions at LGP clearly brought about the onset of Parkinson’s
Disease. Moreover, assuming arguendo, that Parkinson’s Disease is non-compensable, his other ailment -
Essential Hypertension – is covered by P.D. No. 626. He contends that the risk of contracting Essential
Hypertension was increased by his job at LGP.11
Workmen’s Compensation cases are governed by the law in force at the time the claimant contracted his
illness.12 In the instant case, the applicable rule is Section 1 (b),13 Rule III, of the Rules Implementing P.D.
No. 626. Under said Rule, for the sickness to be compensable, the same must be an "occupational disease"
included in the list provided, with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, the claimant must show
proof that the risk of contracting it is increased by the working conditions.14 What kind and quantum of
evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to
reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis.15 For reasons
herein elaborated, we agree with the appellate court that respondent Pedro Mariano has substantially proved
his claim to compensability.

First, as to Parkinson’s disease, while it is true that this disease is not included in the list of compensable
diseases under the law then prevailing, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the conditions prevailing
at LGP largely led to the progression of the ailment. The respondent’s functions entailed constant exposure
to hazardous or toxic chemicals such as carbon disulfate, carbon monoxide, or manganese. As the ECC itself
admitted in its judgment, the exposure to these toxic substances is among the possible causes of this
disease.16 Where it was established that the claimant’s ailment occurred during and in the course of his
employment, it must be presumed that the nature of the claimant’s employment is the cause of the disease.17
Second, even if we were to assume that Parkinson’s Disease is not compensable, there can be no question
that Essential Hypertension is a compensable illness, following our ruling in Government Service Insurance
System v. Gabriel,18 that hypertension and heart ailments are compensable illnesses. The respondent herein
was diagnosed to have developed Incomplete Right Bundle Branch Block,19 a disease caused by a delay in
the depolarization of the right ventricle.20 Right Bundle Branch Block is an intraventricular conduction
defect common in individuals with otherwise normal hearts as well as in many diseased processes, including
ischemic heart disease, inflammatory disease, infiltrative disease, cardiomyopathy, and postcardiotomy.21
We note that respondent was also diagnosed as having hypertension and a medical certification was issued
to that effect.
In Ijares v. Court of Appeals,22 which involved a claim for disability benefits due to hypertension, this
Court gave probative value to the medical findings of the examining physician. A doctor’s certification as
to the nature of the claimant’s disability normally deserves full credence. No medical practitioner will, in
the normal course of things, issue certifications indiscriminately, considering the doctor’s awareness of the
serious and far-reaching effects that a false certification would have on a claim filed with a government
agency and of its implications upon his own interests as a professional.23
In upholding respondent Mariano’s claim, the Court of Appeals found that among the various jobs the
respondent performed were those of a machine operator, paper cutter, monotype composer,24 and later as
supervisor, most of which are physical and stressful in character. In established cases of Essential
Hypertension, the blood pressure fluctuates widely in response to emotional stress and physical activity.25
Given the nature of his assigned job and the printing business, with its tight deadlines entailing large amounts
of rush work, indeed the emotional and physical stress of respondent’s work at the printing press caused,
and then exacerbated, his hypertension. On this score, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in
liberally construing the rules implementing P.D. No. 626. In matters of labor and social legislation, it is well
established that doubts in the interpretation and application of the law are resolved liberally in favor of the
worker and strictly against the employer.
While the SSS and ECC may be commended for their vigilance against sustaining unjustified claims that
would only drain funds meant for deserving disabled employees, respondent Mariano’s case does not fall in
that class. Said agencies ought to realize, in our view, that strict interpretation of the rules should not result
in the denial of assistance to those in need and qualified therefor. Workers whose capabilities have been
diminished, if not completely impaired, as a consequence of their service, ought to be given benefits they
deserve under the law. Compassion for them is not a dole-out, but a right. Petition denied.
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR WASTFEL-LARSEN MANAGEMENT
A/S*, PETITIONERS, VS. OBERTO S. LOBUSTA
Petitioners appeal the Decision dated August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
74035 and its Resolution dated April 19, 2007, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The CA
declared that respondent is suffering from permanent total disability and ordered petitioners to pay him
US$2,060 as medical allowance, US$60,000 as disability benefits and 5% of the total monetary award as
attorney’s fees. The facts follow: Petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation is a domestic corporation and
the local manning agent of the vessel MV “Fossanger” and of petitioner Wastfel-Larsen Management A/S.
Respondent Oberto S. Lobusta is a seaman who has worked for Magsaysay Maritime Corporation since
1994. In March 1998, he was hired again as Able Seaman by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation in behalf of
its principal Wastfel-Larsen Management A/S. The employment contract[5] provides for Lobusta's basic
salary of US$515 and overtime pay of US$206 per month. It also provides that the standard terms and
conditions governing the employment of Filipino seafarers on board ocean-going vessels, approved per
Department Order No. 33 of the Department of Labor and Employment and Memorandum Circular No. 55
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA Standard Employment Contract), both
series of 1996, shall be strictly and faithfully observed.
Lobusta boarded MV “Fossanger” on March 16, 1998. [6] After two months, he complained of breathing
difficulty and back pain. On May 12, 1998, while the vessel was in Singapore, Lobusta was admitted at
Gleneagles Maritime Medical Center and was diagnosed to be suffering from severe acute bronchial asthma
with secondary infection and lumbosacral muscle strain. Dr. C K Lee certified that Lobusta was fit for
discharge on May 21, 1998, for repatriation for further treatment.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was referred to Metropolitan Hospital. The medical coordinator, Dr. Robert Lim,
issued numerous medical reports regarding Lobusta’s condition. Lobusta was first seen by a Pulmonologist
and an Orthopedic Surgeon on May 22, 1998.[8] Upon reexamination by the Orthopedic Surgeon on August
11, 1998, he opined that Lobusta needs surgery, called decompression laminectomy, [9] which was done on
August 30, 1998.[10] On October 12, 1998, Dr. Lim issued another medical report stating the opinion of the
Orthopedic Surgeon that the prognosis for Lobusta’s recovery after the spine surgery is good. However, the
Pulmonologist opined that Lobusta’s obstructive airway disease needs to be monitored regularly and that
Lobusta needs to be on bronchodilator indefinitely. Hence, Lobusta should be declared disabled with a
suggested disability grading of 10-20%. The suggestion was not heeded and Lobusta's treatment continued.
On February 16, 1999, Lobusta was reexamined. Dr. Lim reported that Lobusta still complains of pain at
the lumbosacral area although the EMG/NCV test revealed normal findings. Lobusta was prescribed
medications and was advised to return on March 16, 1999 for re-evaluation. On February 19, 1999, Dr. Lim
reported that Lobusta has been diagnosed to have a moderate obstructive pulmonary disease which tends to
be a chronic problem, such that Lobusta needs to be on medications indefinitely. Dr. Lim also stated that
Lobusta has probably reached his maximum medical care. Petitioners “then faced the need for confirmation
and grading by a second opinion” and “it took the parties time to agree on a common doctor, until they
agreed on Dr. Camilo Roa.” Dr. Roa’s clinical summary states that Lobusta's latest follow-up check-up was
on December 16, 1999; that Lobusta is not physically fit to resume his normal work as a seaman due to the
persistence of his symptoms; that his asthma will remain chronically active and will be marked by
intermittent exacerbations; and that he needs multiple controller medications for his asthma.
As the parties failed to reach a settlement as to the amount to which Lobusta is entitled, Lobusta filed on
October 2, 2000, a complaint for disability/medical benefits against petitioners before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). Sometime in October 2000, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation suggested
that Lobusta be examined by another company-designated doctor for an independent medical examination.
The parties agreed on an independent medical examination by Dr. Annette M. David, whose findings it was
agreed upon, would be considered final. On November 17, 2000, Dr. David interviewed and examined
Lobusta. Pertinent portions of Dr. David’s report read:
xxx Based on the Classes of Respiratory Impairment as described in the American Medical Association's
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, this is equivalent to Class 2 or Mild Impairment
of the Whole Person (level of impairment: 10-25% of the whole person). Given the persistence of the
symptoms despite an adequate medical regimen, the impairment may be considered permanent.
The determination of disability and fitness for duty/return-to-work is more complex. During asymptomatic
periods, Mr. Lobusta could conceivably be capable of performing the duties and responsibilities of an Able
Seaman as listed in the memos provided by Pandiman (Duties of an Able Seaman on board an average
vessel, January 26, 2000; and Deck Crew general Responsibilities, 95.11.01). However, consideration needs
to be given to the following:
o During the personal interview, Mr. Lobusta reported the need to use a self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) for “double bottom” work. While the use of these
devices may not appreciably increase the work of breathing, an individual who
develops an acute asthmatic attack under conditions requiring the use of an SCBA
(oxygen-poor atmospheres) may be at increased risk for a poor outcome.
o When out at sea, the medical facilities on board an average vessel may not be
adequate to provide appropriate care for an acute asthmatic exacerbation. Severe
asthmatic attacks require life-sustaining procedures such as endotracheal intubation
and on occasion, mechanical ventilation. Asthma can be fatal if not treated
 immediately. The distance from and the time required to transport an individual
having an acute asthmatic attack on a vessel at sea to the appropriate medical facilities
on land are important factors in the decision regarding fitness for duty.
o Several of the duties listed for an Able Seaman require the use of a variety of
chemical substances (e.g. grease, solvents, cleaning agents, de-greasers, paint, etc.),
many of which are known or suspected asthma triggers in sensitized individuals. The
potential for an Able Seaman's exposure to these asthma triggers is considerable.
Taken altogether, it is my opinion that Mr. Lobusta ought not to be considered fit to return to work as an
Able Seaman. While the degree of impairment is mild, for the reasons stated above, it would be in the
interest of all parties involved if he were to no longer be considered as capable of gainful employment as a
seafarer. It is possible that he may perform adequately in another capacity, given a land-based
assignment.[19] (Stress in the original by Dr. David.)
As no settlement was reached despite the above findings, the Labor Arbiter ordered the parties to file their
respective position papers. On April 20, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioners to
pay Lobusta (a) US$2,060 as medical allowance, (b) US$20,154 as disability benefits, and (c) 5% of the
awards as attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Lobusta suffered illness during the term of his contract. Hence, petitioners are
liable to pay Lobusta his medical allowance for 120 days or a total of US$2,060. The Labor Arbiter held
that provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, on permanent total disability do not apply to overseas
seafarers. Hence, he awarded Lobusta US$20,154 instead of US$60,000, the maximum rate for permanent
and total disability under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract. The
Labor Arbiter also awarded attorney’s fees equivalent to 5% of the total award since Lobusta was assisted
by counsel.
Lobusta appealed. The NLRC dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The NLRC
ruled that Lobusta’s condition may only be considered permanent partial disability. While Dr. David
suggested that Lobusta’s prospects as seafarer may have been restricted by his bronchial asthma, Dr. David
also stated that the degree of impairment is mild. Said qualification puts Lobusta's medical condition outside
the definition of total permanent disability, said the NLRC. [22] Later, the NLRC also denied Lobusta’s
motion for reconsideration. Unsatisfied, Lobusta brought the case to the CA under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. As aforesaid, the CA declared that Lobusta is suffering from permanent
total disability and increased the award of disability benefits in his favor to US$60,000, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the NLRC
dated 20 June 2002 is MODIFIED, declaring [Lobusta] to be suffering from permanent total disability.
[Petitioners] are ORDERED to pay [Lobusta] the following:
a) US$2,060.00 as medical allowance,
b) US$60,000.00 as disability benefits, and
c) 5% of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees
The CA faulted the NLRC for “plucking only particular phrases” from Dr. David’s report and said that the
NLRC cannot wantonly disregard the full import of said report. The CA ruled that Lobusta's disability
brought about by his bronchial asthma is permanent and total as he had been unable to work since May 14,
1998 up to the present or for more than 120 days, and because Dr. David found him not fit to return to work
as an able seaman. Hence, this petition which raises two legal issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE POEA CONTRACT CONSIDERS THE MERE LAPSE OF MORE THAN
ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) DAYS AS TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO AWARD RESPONDENT LOBUSTA
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Labor Code instead of the provisions
of the POEA contract in determining Lobusta’s disability, and in ruling that the mere lapse of 120 days
entitles Lobusta to total and permanent disability benefits. The CA allegedly erred also in holding them
liable for attorney’s fees, despite the absence of legal and factual bases. The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard Employment Contract that must be considered in
determining Lobusta's disability. In Palisoc v. Easways Marine, Inc.,[25] we said that whether the Labor
Code’s provision on permanent total disability applies to seafarers is already a settled matter. In Palisoc, we
cited the earlier case of Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission[26]where we said (1) that the
standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under
Executive Order No. 247[27] “to secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract
workers and ensure compliance therewith,” and “to promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers
overseas”; (2) that Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract itself provides that all
rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the
Philippines is a signatory; and (3) that even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with
public interest that the Civil Codeexpressly subjects it to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar
subjects.[28] In affirming the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability, Remigio further stated:
Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers.
In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from
congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the company-accredited
physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v.
CA, and Bejerano v. ECCthat “disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on
the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in
the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any
kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute
helplessness.” It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which
is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.
The same principles were cited in the more recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad. In addition,
the Court cited GSIS v. Cadiz and Ijares v. CA that “permanent disability is the inability of a worker to
perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his
body.”
These facts clearly prove that petitioner was unfit to work as drummer for at least 11-13 months – from the
onset of his ailment on March 16, 1998 to 8-10 months after June 25, 1998. This, by itself, already constitutes
permanent total disability. In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., we also said that the standard
terms of the POEA Standard Employment Contract agreed upon are intended to be read and understood in
accordance with Philippine laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, as amended, and the
applicable implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or grievance. Thus, the CA was
correct in applying the Labor Code provisions in Lobusta’s claim for disability benefits. The Labor Arbiter
erred in failing to apply them. Article 192(c)(1) under Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended,
reads: ART. 192. Permanent total disability. (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and
permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days,
except as otherwise provided in the Rules;
Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended, or
the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC Rules), reads:
Sec. 2. Disability. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee
is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise
provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
Section 2, Rule X of the ECC Rules reads:
SEC. 2. Period of entitlement.— (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such
disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days
from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the
System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total
disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as
determined by the System.
 Thus, we affirm the award to Lobusta of US$60,000 as permanent total disability benefits, the maximum
According to Vergara, these provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, and implementing rules are to be award under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract. We also affirm the
read hand in hand with the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment award of US$2,060 as sickness allowance which is not contested and appears to have been accepted by the
Contract which reads: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to parties.
sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician[,] but in no case shall this period exceed On the matter of attorney’s fees, under Article 2208[33] of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees can be recovered
one hundred 120 days. in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer’s liability laws.
Attorney’s fees are also recoverable when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
Vergara continues: incur expenses to protect his interest.[34] Such conditions being present here, we affirm the award of
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company- attorney’s fees, which we compute as US$3,103 or 5% of US$62,060.
designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally
Before we end, we note petitioners’ repeated failure to comply with our resolutions, as well as the orders
unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary
issued by the tribunals below. We remind petitioners and their counsels that our resolutions requiring them
disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is
to file pleadings are not to be construed as mere requests, nor should they be complied with partially,
defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days
inadequately or selectively. Counsels are also reminded that lawyers are called upon to obey court orders
initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical
and willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as
attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject
well.[35] We may also dismiss petitioners’ appeal for their failure to comply with any circular, directive or
to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already
order of the Supreme Court without justifiable cause.[36] In fact, we actually denied the instant petition on
exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
July 9, 2008 since petitioners failed to file the required reply to the comment filed by Lobusta.[37] On
medical condition.
reconsideration, however, we reinstated the petition. [38] But when we required the parties to submit
As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the
memoranda, petitioners again did not comply.[39] As regards the proceedings below, they did not file their
company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-
position paper on time, despite the extensions granted by the Labor Arbiter.[40] Nor did they file the comment
day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent
and memorandum required by the CA.
disability.
Finally, we note that the Labor Arbiter improperly included Miguel Magsaysay as respondent in his
To be sure, there is one Labor Code concept of permanent total disability, as stated in Article 192(c)(1) of
decision. It should be noted that Lobusta sued Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Wastfel-Larsen
the Labor Code, as amended, and the ECC Rules. We also note that the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3)
Management A/S in his complaint. He also named them as the respondents in his position
of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract was lifted verbatim from the first paragraph of Section
paper.[44] Petitioners are the proper parties. WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition.
20(B)(3) of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract, to wit:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. EDNA A. AZOTE
to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by
The Antecedents: On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security
the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
System (SSS), were married in civil rites at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City, Albay
(RTC). Their union produced six children4 born from 1985 to 1999. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted
Applying the foregoing considerations, we agree with the CA that Lobusta suffered permanent total
Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter or on
disability. On this point, the NLRC ruling was not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children
as additional beneficiaries.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was first examined by the Pulmonologist and Orthopedic Surgeon on May 22,
On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death
1998. The maximum 240-day (8-month) medical-treatment period expired, but no declaration was made
benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that
that Lobusta is fit to work. Nor was there a declaration of the existence of Lobusta’s permanent disability.
Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries,
On February 16, 1999, Lobusta was still prescribed medications for his lumbosacral pain and was advised
namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), as dependent, born on
to return for reevaluation. May 22, 1998 to February 16, 1999 is 264 days or 6 days short of 9 months.
October 9, 1982. Consequently, Edna’s claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and
she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. The benefits, however, would be stopped
On Lobusta’s other ailment, Dr. Roa’s clinical summary also shows that as of December 16, 1999, Lobusta
once a child would attain the age of 21.
was still unfit to resume his normal work as a seaman due to the persistence of his symptoms. But neither
On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum
did Dr. Roa declare the existence of Lobusta’s permanent disability. Again, the maximum 240-day medical
and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the
treatment period had already expired. May 22, 1998 to December 16, 1999 is 19 months or 570 days.
SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was
In Remigio, unfitness to work for 11-13 months was considered permanent total disability. So it must be in
published in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the
this case. And Dr. David’s much later report that Lobusta “ought not to be considered fit to return to work
publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default. In the Resolution,
as an Able Seaman” validates that his disability is permanent and total as provided under the POEA Standard
dated December 8, 2010, the SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. Citing Section 24(c) of the
Employment Contract and the Labor Code, as amended.
SS Law, it explained that although Edgardo filed the Form E-4 designating Edna and their six children as
beneficiaries, he did not revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary, and Rosemarie was
In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work again as a seaman and that his disability is
still presumed to be his legal wife.
permanent “as he has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the present or for more than 120 days.”
The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics Office (NSO) records revealed that the
This period is more than eight years, counted until the CA decided the case in August 2006. On the CA
marriage of Edgardo to one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it
ruling that Lobusta’s disability is permanent since he was unable to work “for more than 120 days,” we have
opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had
clarified in Vergara that this “temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240
been annulled or dissolved. The SSC stated that there must be a judicial determination of nullity of a previous
days.”
marriage before a party could enter into a second marriage.
 In an order, dated June 8, 2011, the SSC denied Edna’s motion for reconsideration. It explained
that it was incumbent upon Edna to prove that her marriage to the deceased was valid, which she failed to
do. It further opined that Rosemarie could not be merely presumed dead, and that death benefits under the
SSS could not be considered properties which may be disposed of in a holographic will. In the assailed
August 13, 2013 Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the resolution and the order of the SSC. It held
that the SSC could not make a determination of the validity or invalidity of the marriage of Edna to Edgardo
considering that no contest came from either Rosemarie or Elmer.
The CA explained that Edna had established her right to the benefits by substantial evidence,
namely, her marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates of her children. 14 It ruled that Edgardo made
a deliberate change of his wife-beneficiary in his 1994 E-4 form, as such was clearly his voluntary act
manifesting his intention to revoke his former declaration in the 1982 E-4 form.15 The 1994 E-4 form
submitted by Edgardo, designating Edna as his wife, superseded his former declaration in his 1982 E-4 form.
It further opined that the Davac case cited by the SSC was not applicable because there were two
conflicting claimants in that case, both claiming to be wives of the deceased, while in this case, Edna was
the sole claimant for the death benefits, and that her designation as wife-beneficiary remained valid and
unchallenged. It was of the view that Rosemarie’s non-appearance despite notice could be deemed a waiver
to claim death benefits from the SSS, thereby losing whatever standing she might have had to dispute Edna’s
claim. In the assailed October 29, 2013 Resolution,18 the CA denied the SSC’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
GROUNDS: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
COMMISSION IS BEREFT OF AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OR
INVALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND MEMBER
EDGARDO AZOTE; RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING
THE PETITION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND FINDING HER ENTITLED TO THE
SS BENEFITS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS WIFE-BENEFICIARY IS
VALID.
The SSC argues that the findings of fact of the CA were not supported by the records. It submits that under
Section 5 of the SS Law, it is called upon to determine the rightful beneficiary in the performance of its
quasi-judicial function of adjudicating SS benefits. In fact, it cited a number of cases,21 where the SSC had
passed upon the validity of marriages for the purpose of determining who were entitled to SS benefits. 22
The SSC contends that Edna was not the legitimate spouse of deceased member Edgardo as the CA failed
to consider the NSO certification showing that Edgardo was previously married to Rosemarie. With the
death certificate of Rosemarie showing that she died only on November 6, 2004, it proved that she was alive
at the time Edna and Edgardo were married, and, therefore, there existed a legal impediment to his second
marriage, rendering it void. Edna is, therefore, not a legitimate spouse who is entitled to the death benefits
of Edgardo.23
The SSC claims that the right to designate a beneficiary is subject to the SS Law. The designation of a wife-
beneficiary merely creates a disputable presumption that they are legally married and may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary. Edna’s designation became invalid with the determination of the subsistence
of a previous marriage. The SSC posits that even though Edgardo revoked and superseded his earlier
designation of Rosemarie as beneficiary, his designation of Edna was still not valid considering that only a
legitimate spouse could qualify as a primary beneficiary.24
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282,25 the amendatory law of
R.A. No. 1161 or the “Social Security Law.” It is a tax-exempt social security service designed to promote
social justice and provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of
disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial
burden.26 As a social security program of the government, Section 8 (e) and (k) of the said law expressly
provides who would be entitled to receive benefits from its deceased-member, to wit:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates
otherwise, have the following meanings:
(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is
congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the
member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the
share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the
dependent legitimate, legitimated children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be
entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be
the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all the foregoing, any other person designated
by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of the deceased-
member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof
that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage
contract. Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating
Rosemarie as his spouse.
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the Family
Code was already in force. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly states:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that
there was no impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that “whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law
should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.”28 Edna could not adduce evidence to prove
that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of
Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the
second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of
a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of
Edgardo.
The Court does not subscribe to the disquisition of the CA that the updated Form E-4 of Edgardo was
determinative of Edna’s status and eligibility to claim the death benefits of deceased-member. Although an
SSS member is free to designate a beneficiary, the designation must always conform to the statute. To
blindly rely on the form submitted by the deceased-member would subject the entire social security system
to the whims and caprices of its members and would render the SS Law inutile.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages, it is required by
Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available statistical and economic data to ensure that the
benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries. As held in Social Security Commission vs. Favila,30
SSS, as the primary institution in charge of extending social security protection to workers and their
beneficiaries is mandated by Section 4(b)(7) of RA 8282 to require reports, compilations and analyses of
statistical and economic data and to make an investigation as may be needed for its proper administration
and development. Precisely, the investigations conducted by SSS are appropriate in order to ensure that the
benefits provided under the SS Law are received by the rightful beneficiaries. It is not hard to see that such
measure is necessary for the system’s proper administration, otherwise, it will be swamped with bogus
claims that will pointlessly deplete its funds. Such scenario will certainly frustrate the purpose of the law
which is to provide covered employees and their families protection against the hazards of disability,
sickness, old age and death, with a view to promoting their well-being in the spirit of social
justice. Moreover and as correctly pointed out by SSC, such investigations are likewise necessary to carry
out the mandate of Section 15 of the SS Law which provides in part, viz:
Sec. 15. Non-transferability of Benefits. – The SSS shall pay the benefits provided for in this Act to such [x
x x] persons as may be entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The existence of two Form E-4s designating, on two different dates, two different women as his spouse is
already an indication that only one of them can be the legal spouse. As can be gleaned from the certification
issued by the NSO,31 there is no doubt that Edgardo married Rosemarie in 1982. Edna cannot be considered
as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the existence of a previously contracted
marriage. For said reason, the denial of Edna’s claim by the SSC was correct. It should be emphasized that
the SSC determined Edna’s eligibility on the basis of available statistical data and documents on their
database as expressly permitted by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282.
It is of no moment that the first wife, Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Edna’s claim. Rosemarie’s
non-participation or her subsequent death on November 11, 2004 32 did not cure or legitimize the status of
Edna. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILIPPINES, v. HEIRS OF RICARDO S. GANAL
On September 16, 2011, herein petitioners employed Ricardo Ganal (Ganal) as an oiler aboard
the vessel MV Stadt Hamburg in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-Standard Employment Contract, which was executed by and between the parties.
On September 20, 2011, he commenced his employment. Around 7 o'clock in the evening of April 15, 2012,
a party was organized for the crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship was anchored at Chittagong,
Bangladesh. After finishing his shift at 12 midnight, Ganal joined the party. Around 3 o'clock in the morning
of April 16, 2012, the ship captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk so he directed him to return to his
cabin and take a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's order. Thus, a ship officer, a security watchman and
a member of the crew were summoned to escort Ganal to his cabin. The crew members attempted to
accompany him back to his cabin but he refused. They then tried to restrain him but he resisted and, when
he found the chance to escape, he ran towards the ship's railings and, without hesitation, jumped overboard
and straight into the sea. The crew members immediately threw life rings into the water towards the direction
where he jumped and the ship officer sounded a general alarm and several alarms thereafter. Contact was
also made with the coast guard and the crew members searched for Ganal, to no avail. Ganal was later found
dead and floating in the water. The subsequent medico-legal report issued by the Philippine National Police
showed that the cause of his death was asphyxia by drowning.
Subsequently, Ganal's wife, Gemma Boragay (Boragay), for herself and in behalf of their minor
children, filed a claim for death benefits with petitioners, but the latter denied the claim. Thus, on October
29, 2012, Boragay, filed with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of death and other benefits, unpaid salaries
for the remaining period of Ganal's contract, as well as moral and exemplary damages. On July 26, 2013,
the LA rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The LA held that respondents'
allegations are self-serving and hearsay; they failed to present evidence to substantiate their allegations; on
the other hand, petitioners were able to present documentary evidence, consisting of affidavits of Ganal's
fellow crew members who have direct and actual knowledge of what occurred on board the MV Stadt
Hamburg and who attested to the fact that Ganal willfully jumped overboard. Nonetheless, the LA ordered
herein petitioners to pay respondents the amount of US$5,000.00 as financial assistance. Aggrieved by the
Decision of the LA, respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC.
On October 21, 2013, the NLRC issued a Resolution denying respondents' appeal and affirming
the Decision of the LA. The NLRC ruled that petitioners have duly proven that Ganal's death is not
compensable as it was the result of the deliberate and willful act of Ganal and, thus, is directly attributable
to him. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in its November 21, 2013
Resolution. Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
On February 25, 2015, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which reversed the October 21,
2013 and November 21, 2013 Resolutions of the NLRC. The CA held that Ganal jumped into the sea while
he was overcome by alcohol and completely intoxicated and deprived of his consciousness and mental
faculties to comprehend the consequence of his own actions and keep in mind his own personal safety.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 18, 2015.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds, to wit:
I. PETITIONERS DULY PROVED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT SEAFARER GANAL
VOLUNTARILY JUMPED INTO THE OPEN SEA. THUS, CONTRARY TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS' FINDINGS, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS SHIFTED TO THE RESPONDENTS TO SHOW
THAT SEAFARER GANAL WAS NOT IN HIS OWN MENTAL FACULTIES WHEN HE
COMMITTED SUCH ACT.
II. THE RULINGS OF THE LOWER LABOR TRIBUNALS, UNANIMOUSLY HOLDING THAT
SEAFARER GANAL COMMITTED SUICIDE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN UPHELD TO DENY THE
RESPONDENTS' CLAIM FOR DEATH BENEFITS. INTOXICATION ALONE DID NOT SERVE TO
RENDER INUTILE SEAFARER GANAL AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS FULL MENTAL FACULTIES
EQUIVALENT TO INSANITY. SEAFARER GANAL, DESPITE HIS INTOXICATION,
DELIBERATELY JUMPED INTO THE OPEN SEA CAUSING HIS INSTANTANEOUS DEATH.7
Petitioners' basic contention is that respondents are not entitled to death and other benefits, as well as
damages, they are claiming by reason of the demise of their predecessor-in-interest during the effectivity of
his contract of employment, because his death is directly attributable to him and was a result of his willful
act.
The Court finds the petition meritorious. At the outset, it bears to reiterate that in a petition for
review on certiorari, this Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of any
showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly
erroneous.8 This Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases.9 Findings of
fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even
finality.10 They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where
it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record.
However, it is equally settled that one of the exceptions to the above rule is when the factual findings of the
quasi-judicial agencies concerned are conflicting or contrary with those of the CA. Considering that the
factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are opposed to those of the CA, it behooves this Court to look into
the evidence presented to resolve the present petition.
It is settled that the employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by
the contracts they sign at the time of their engagement.13 As long as the stipulations in said contracts are not
contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, they have the force of law between the
parties.14 Nonetheless, while the seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the
POEA Rules and Regulations require that the POEA-Standard Employment Contract be integrated with
every seafarer's contract. Thus, in case of death of the seafarer, Section 20(B) of the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as
amended in 2010, provides as follows:
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000)
and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-
one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
2. Where death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a declared war zone or war risk area, the
compensation payable shall be doubled. The employer shall undertake appropriate war zone insurance
coverage for this purpose.
3. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from, and will
be in addition to whatever benefits which the seafarer is entitled to under Philippine laws from the Social
Security System, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Employee's Compensation Commission,
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation and Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund).
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness
during the term of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this
Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at
employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not
permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be
handled or dealt with in accordance with the master's best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall
communicate with the agency to advise for disposition of seafarer's remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount
of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time
of payment.
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as amended, the death of a
seafarer by reason of any work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment is compensable.
On the other hand, Section 20(D) of the same Standard Terms and Conditions states that:
D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of
the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however,
that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the
seafarer.
Also, under Article 172 of the Labor Code, which may also be made applicable to the present
case, the compensation for workers covered by the Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund are
subject to the limitations on liability,16 to wit:
Art. 172. Limitations of liability. - The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for the compensation to the
employee or his dependents except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's
intoxication, willful intent to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence, or otherwise provided
under this Title.
As defined under the above-cited Standard Terms and Conditions, work-related injury, or in this
case, death, is any injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The words "arising out of" refer
to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of"
refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. 17 By the use of these words,
it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries
which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising
from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of work in the scope of the workmen's employment
or incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or
hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment.18 Risks to which
all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular
employment are excluded.
In the present case, it may be conceded that the death of Ganal took place in the course of his
employment, in that it happened at the time and at the place where he was working. However, the accident
which produced this tragic result did not arise out of such employment. The occasion where Ganal took
alcoholic beverages was a grill party organized by the ship officers of MV Stadt Hamburg. It was a social
event and Ganal attended not because he was performing his duty as a seaman, but was doing an act for his
own personal benefit. Even if the Court were to adopt a liberal view and consider the grill party as incidental
to Ganal's work as a seaman, his death during such occasion may not be considered as having arisen out of
his employment as it was the direct consequence of his decision to jump into the water without coercion nor
compulsion from any of the ship officers or crew members. The hazardous nature of this act was not due
specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board the MV Stadt Hamburg,
such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into
the sea, as Ganal had. The necessary question that follows then is whether Ganal's act was willful.
Considering his apparent intoxication, may Ganal's death, which resulted from his act of jumping overboard,
be considered as directly attributable to him? Contrary to the findings of the CA, both the LA and the NLRC
found and ruled in the affirmative. After a careful review of the records of the case, this Court agrees with
the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC.
The Court agrees with the LA and the NLRC that the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners,
consisting of the testimony of the crew members present at the time of the unfortunate incident, 20 as well as
the accident report made by the master of the vessel,21 prove the willfulness of Ganal's acts which led to his
death. The term "willful" means "voluntary and intentional", but not necessarily malicious. 22 In the case
of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,23the seaman, in a state of
intoxication, ran amuck and committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter,
so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman. This Court held that
the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own
life directly attributable to him. In the same manner, in the instant case, Ganal's act of intentionally jumping
overboard, while in a state of intoxication, could be considered as a deliberate and willful act on his own
life which is directly attributable to him.
Moreover, contrary to respondents' contention, petitioners took the necessary precautions when:
(1) the ship captain advised Ganal to proceed to his cabin and take a rest; (2) Ganal was assisted by no less
than three crew members who tried to persuade him to return to his cabin; (3) when he refused, the crew
members tried to restrain him but he escaped and immediately ran away from them and, without warning,
jumped into the sea. As earlier discussed, the law does not intend for an employer to be the insurer of all
accidental injuries befalling an employee in the course of the latter's employment, but only for those which
arise from or grow out of the risks necessarily associated with the workman's nature of work or incidental
to his employment. Ganal's act of jumping overboard was not, in any way, connected with the performance
of his duties as ship oiler. Neither could petitioners have reasonably anticipated such act on the part of Ganal.
Thus, having proven their defense, the burden now rests on the shoulders of respondents to overcome
petitioners' defense.
In its presently assailed Decision, the CA agreed with herein respondents and concluded that
prior to jumping overboard, Ganal "was no longer in control of his actions because of excessive alcohol
intake."24 The Court, however, finds that this conclusion is not based on substantial evidence. The Court
agrees with the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that there was no competent proof to show that Ganal's state
of intoxication during the said incident actually deprived him of his consciousness and mental faculties
which would have enabled him to comprehend the consequences of his actions and keep in mind his personal
safety. Respondents failed to present evidence to overcome the defense of petitioner and show that, prior to
and at the time that he jumped overboard, Ganal was deprived of the use of his reason or that his will has
been so impaired, by reason of his intoxication, as to characterize his actions as unintentional or involuntary.
In fact, there is not even a post mortem report to indicate Ganal's blood alcohol concentration level at the
time of his death as to give the lower tribunals or the courts an idea of how much alcohol Ganal was able to
imbibe. Neither was there anything in the PNP medico-legal report which would indicate such blood alcohol
content. There was also no affidavit from any of the ship officers or crew members, who witnessed the
unfortunate incident, which would show that Ganal appeared to be distraught or out of his mind. Ganal may
have become unruly by reason of his inebriation but such recalcitrant behavior does not necessarily prove
that his subsequent act of jumping overboard was not willful on his part. Stated differently, the fact alone
that he refused to be escorted to his cabin, that he resisted efforts by other crew members to restrain him and
that he jumped overboard without hesitation or warning does not prove that he was not in full possession of
his faculties as to characterize his acts as involuntary or unintentional.
This Court has held that even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating liquor, it is
incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that said person was extremely
drunk, as a person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still
remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. 25 It must be shown that the intoxication was the
proximate cause of death or injury and the burden lies on him who raises drunkenness as a defense. 26 In the
present case, the Court agrees with the LA and the NLRC that respondents failed in this respect. Neither
does the Court agree with the ruling of the CA that while herein petitioners were able to prove that Ganal
jumped into the open sea while in a state of intoxication, they failed to meet the burden of proving that Ganal
intended to terminate his own life. Petitioners do not carry the burden of establishing that Ganal had the
intention of committing suicide. Petitioners' only burden is to prove that Ganal's acts are voluntary and
willful and, if so, the former are exempt from liability as the latter becomes responsible for all the
consequences of his actions.
Indeed, Ganal may have had no intention to end his own life. For all we know he was just being
playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious negligence. Notorious negligence has been defined as
something more than mere or simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of
the employee to disregard his own personal safety.27 In any case, regardless of Ganal's motives, petitioners
were able to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners should not be held
responsible for the logical consequence of Ganal's act of jumping overboard.
As a final note, it is true that the beneficent provisions of the Standard Employment Contract are
liberally construed in favor of Filipino seafarers and their dependents.28 The Court commiserates with
respondents for the unfortunate fate that befell their loved one; however, the Court finds that the factual
circumstances in this case do not justify the grant of death benefits as prayed for by them as beneficiaries.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

GSIS vs. APOLINARIO C. PAUIG
Respondent Apolinario C. Pauig (Pauig) was the Municipal Agriculturist of the Municipality of
San Pablo, lsabela. He started in the government service on February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer on
casual status. Later, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977. On July 19, 1977,
he became a permanent employee, and on August 1, 1977, he became a GSIS member, as indicated in his
Information for Membership. Thereafter, on November 3, 2004, he retired from the service upon reaching
the mandatory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years old. But when he filed his retirement papers with the
GSIS-Cauayan, the latter processed his claim based on a Record of Creditable Service (RCS) and a Total
Length of Service of only twenty-seven (27) years. Disagreeing with the computation, Pauig wrote a letter-
complaint to the GSIS, arguing that his first fourteen (14) years in the government service had been.
erroneously omitted.
The GSIS ratiocinated that Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in the government were excluded in
the computation of his retirement benefits because during those years, no premium payments were remitted
to it. Under the Premium-Based Policy of the GSIS which took effect on August 1, 2003, only periods of
service where premium payments were made and duly remitted to the System shall be included in the
computation of retirement benefits. Aggrieved, Pauig filed a case before the RTC of Cabagan, Isabela.
On July 15, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. Declaring the Premium-Based Policy under Resolution No. 90 and Policy and Procedural Guidelines No.
171-03, both dated April 2, 2013, of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) as in accordance
with law and thus lawful, valid, binding and effective.
2. Directing the GSIS to credit under Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 171-03 the casual/temporary
service from February 10, 1964 to July 18, 1977 in government of the plaintiff Apolinario C. Pauig as
creditable service for retirement purposes upon payment of the premium contributions and interest thereon
in accordance with the provisions thereof. No pronouncement as to Damages and Cost. SO DECIDED, this
15th day of July 2013 at the Judge's Chamber, Cabagan, Isabela. GSIS then filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was later denied. Thus, the instant petition. The main and sole issue to be resolved
is whether or not the GSIS should include Pauig's first fourteen (14) years in government service for the
calculation of the latter's retirement benefits claim.
The Court rules in the negative. Retirement benefits are given to government employees to
reward them for giving the best years of their lives to the service of their country. This is especially true
with those in government service occupying positions of leadership or positions requiring management skills
because the years they devote to government service could be spent more profitably elsewhere, such as in
lucrative appointments in the private sector. Hence, in exchange for their selfless dedication to government
service, they should enjoy security of tenure and be ensured of a reasonable amount of support after they
leave the government. Pauig insists that retirement laws must be liberally construed in favor of the retirees
because the intention is to provide for their sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when they no longer
have the stamina to continue earning their livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to public
service, Pauig asserts that he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed
in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity,
he argues, is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the
weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to savor
the fruits of his toil. However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in this case, where the
law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction. To uphold Pauig's
position will contravene the very words of the law, and will defeat the ends which it seeks to attain. Pauig
claims that his service in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 should be credited for
the purpose of computing his retirement benefits. The RTC, in ruling in his favor, relied on Policy 2 of
Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 171-03 dated February 2, 2003, which states:
2. Services, for purposes of computing all the benefits that a member may secure from GSIS shall mean
only such services rendered by a member in any government agency, whether national, local or government-
owned or controlled corporation under the following conditions: The member was receiving a fixed basic
monthly compensation for such services. The corresponding monthly premium contributions were timely
and currently remitted or paid to the GSIS. The RTC explained that it is clear from the aforequoted provision
that the word "service" is not qualified and does not refer only to service with a permanent status. What is
simply required is that the member was receiving a fixed basic monthly compensation for his services and
the corresponding monthly premium contributions were timely remitted to the GSIS.
In order to bring life to the true intention of the law, however, Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 171-
03 must be read together with other laws pertinent at the time of the contested period of service. Section 4
of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186, or the Government Service Insurance Act of 1936 provides:
SEC. 4. Scope of Application of System. - Regular membership in the system shall be compulsory
upon -
(a) All regularly and permanently appointed employees of the Government of the Commonwealth;
(b) All regular and permanent employees of the National Assembly;
(c) All members of the judiciary;
(d) All officers and enlisted men of the Regular Force, Philippine Army;
(e) All regular and permanent employees of the Metropolitan Water District;
(f) Regular and permanent employees of other Government boards or agencies, except the University of the
Philippines and the Governmentowned or controlled business corporations; and
(g) Those subject to the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty hundred and fifty, as amended, excluding the
persons employed to take the place of teachers on maternity or sick leave, or otherwise employed
temporarily: Provided, That any provincial, city or municipal government, or the University of the
Philippines or any other corporation owned or controlled by the Government, shall have the option of joining
the System, and if it so joins, the membership shall be compulsory upon all its permanent and regular
employees, and it shall pay its share of the contribution of three per centum per annum of its employees'
basic annual salaries or compensation, plus the extra premiums, if any, due to extra hazards of the member's
occupation: Provided, further, That it shall be compulsory for the municipal, city and provincial
governments to pay the required government contributions corresponding to the employees now subject to
the provisions of Act Numbered Three thousand and fifty, as amended: And provided, finally, That
membership shall not include (a) officers or personnel detailed from the Army, the Navy, or the Civil Service
of the United States, and (b) employees who are not citizens of the United States or of the Philippines.7
Likewise relevant are Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 4968 and 660, amending C.A. No. 186, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope of application of System.-
(a) Membership in the System shall be compulsory upon all regularly and permanently appointed
employees, including those whose tenure of office is fixed or limited by law; upon all teachers except only
those who are substitutes; and upon all regular officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines: Provided, That it shall be compulsory upon regularly and permanently appointed employees
of a municipal government below first class only if and when said government has joined the System
under such terms and conditions as the latter may prescribe.
(b) Membership in the System shall be appointed with an elective official of the National Government or of
a local government that is a member of the System: Provided, That if he desires to come within the purview
of this Act, he must notify the System in writing to that effect: Provided, Further, That he complies with the
requirements of the System and that he is in the Government service when his insurance takes effect: And
provided, finally, That after his admission into the System he shall be entitled to life insurance benefit for
which he shall pay either one per centum or three per centum of his monthly salary, depending on the kind
of insurance selected by him, and his employer shall likewise pay for him the same amount. 8
Section 2. Subsection (a) of Section four of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows: "(a) Membership in the System shall be compulsory upon all appointive officers and
employees in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, including those whose
tenure of office is fixed or limited by the Constitution or by law; upon all regular employees of the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society and the Philippine National Red Cross, and other employees of the
government-owned or controlled corporations; upon all regular officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines; and upon all elective officials receiving compensation as defined in this
Act: Provided, That casual, substitute, or temporary employees and substitute or temporary teachers
shall be hereby covered for purposes of term insurance for two thousand seven hundred and fifty pesos
if appointed for a period of not less than two months, the term insurance to be effective in the month next
following the month in which the premium prescribed in Section five hereof has been paid: And provided,
further, That said casual, substitute or temporary employees and substitute or temporary teachers
shall not be covered by the retirement insurance plan provided for in this Act: Provided, finally, That
the term 'appointive officer and employee' as used herein shall include those extended permanent
appointments and provisional appointments as used in the civil service law but excluding those without any
kind of civil service eligibility when so required. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146 also
mentions the employees covered by the compulsory membership in the GSIS, thus:
B. COVERAGE OF THE SYSTEM
Section 3. Compulsory Coverage. Membership in the System shall be compulsory for all permanent
employees below 60, years of age upon appointment to permanent status: Provided, That upon approval by
the President of the Philippines and subject to the availability of funds, compulsory coverage may be
extended to non-permanent employees of national government agencies and local governments, either
simultaneously in phases or by groups; Provided, Further, That nonpermanent employees of government-
owned or control corporations may be covered upon approval by the System upon request of their respective
Governing Boards; Provided, Finally, that the coverage of temporary employees under R.A. No. 4968 shall
remain in force.
Indubitably, compulsory coverage under the GSIS had previously and consistently included
regular and permanent employees, and expressly excluded casual, substitute or temporary employees from
its retirement insurance plan. A permanent appointment is one issued to a person who has met the
requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Service Act and the Rules and Standards, while temporary appointment is made in the absence of appropriate
eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy. Casual employment, on the other
hand, is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature. Based on the records,
Pauig began his career in the government on February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer on a casual status.
Then, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977. However, the Court notes that
it was not until 1997 that the compulsory membership in the GSIS was extended to employees other than
those on permanent status, to wit:
B. MEMBERSHIP IN THE GSIS
SEC. 3. Compulsory Membership. - Membership in the GSIS shall be compulsory for all
employeesreceiving compensation who have not reached the compulsory retirement age, irrespective of
employment status, except members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police, subject to the condition that they must settle first their financial obligation with the GSIS, and
contractuals who have no employer and employee relationship with the agencies they serve. Except for the
members of the judiciary and constitutional commissions who shall have life insurance only, all members
of the GSIS shall have life insurance, retirement, and all other social security protections such as disability,
survivorship, separation, and unemployment benefits. Pauig cited the case of GSIS v. CSC, where the Court
ruled that the basis for the provision of retirement benefits is service to the government. Indeed, while a
government insurance system rationalizes the management of funds necessary to keep this system of
retirement support afloat and is partly dependent on contributions made by the thousands of members of the
system, the fact that these contributions are minimal when compared to the amount of retirement benefits
actually received shows_ that such contributions, while necessary, are not absolutely determinative in
drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as recipients of the retirement benefit system.
Unfortunately, Pauig's reliance on the aforecited case is misplaced. True, in GS/S v. CSC, the
Court allowed the claimants to avail of their retirement benefits although no deductions were made from
their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis. However, unlike in the
case at bar, deductions were actually made from claimant's fixed salary before and after the short
controversial period. She assumed in all good faith that she continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance
benefits considering that, in fact and in practice, the deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all
government employees on an essentially involuntary basis. More importantly, neither of the claimants in
this case of GSIS v. CSC was a casual or temporary employee like Pauig, both of them being elective
officials. Here, the primordial reason why there were no deductions during those fourteen (14) years was
because Pauig was not yet a GSIS member at that time. There was thus no legal obligation to pay the
premium as no basis for the remittance of the same existed. And since only periods of service where
premium payments were actually made and duly remitted to the GSIS shall be included in the computation
of retirement benefits, said disputed period of fourteen (14) years must corollarily be removed from Pauig's
creditable service.
The Court must deny Pauig' s appeal to liberal construction since the applicable law is clear and
unambiguous. The primary modality of addressing the present case is to look into the provisions of the
retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this consideration, the Court finds that
the language of the retirement law is clear and unequivocal; no room for construction or interpretation exists,
only the application of the letter of the law. 15 Therefore, Pauig' s casual and temporary service in the
government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 must necessarily be excluded from the creditable
period of service for retirement purposes.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES
AND SETS ASIDE the Decision dated July 15, 2013 and Order dated December 4, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 22-1035 insofar as it directs the
Government Service Insurance System to include Apolinario C. Pauig's casual and temporary service in the
government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 as creditable service for purposes of computing his
retirement benefits.
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC v. RHUDEL A. CASTILLO
On June 6, 2008, respondent was hired by petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management on behalf of
its foreign principal, petitioner Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., to serve as Security Guard on board the vessel
MV Norwegian Sun under the Contract of Employment 6 of even date. The POEA-approved contract was
for a period of ten (10) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$559.00. On June 16, 2008, respondent
boarded the ship MV Norwegian Sun.7 Prior to his deployment, respondent underwent a Pre-employment
Medical Examination (PEME) and was pronounced fit to work. While on board the vessel, respondent
suffered from difficulty of breathing and had a brief seizure attack causing him to fall from his bed. He was
immediately treated by the ship doctor. When the ship docked at the port of Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico,
respondent was brought to a hospital where he was immediately admitted. He was confined at the hospital
from September 24, 2008 to October 5, 2008 as evidenced by the medical reports issued by Dr. Jesus Aguilar
of Hospital Clinica Siglo XXI in Mazatlan, Mexico. It was found that respondent was suffering from "right
parietal hemorrhage" of the brain and was given medications to prevent seizures. Respondent was repatriated
on October 7, 2008. He was referred to the company-designated physicians, Dr. Susannah Ong-Salvador
(Dr. OngSalvador) and Dr. Antonio A. Pobre (Dr. Pobre), at Comprehensive Marine Medical Services for
further treatment, evaluation and management. He underwent a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) on
October 20, 200811 with the following findings: "T1 and T2 weighted hyperdensity over cortico-white
matter junction of the right parietal lobe." After a series of examinations, respondent was initially diagnosed
as suffering from "arterio-venous malformation, right parietal" and was found to have "intracerebral
hemorrhage over the superior parietal at right due to small arterio-venous malformation or angioma."
On December 16, 2008, respondent was admitted at the Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical
Center where he underwent a "4-Vesssel Carotid Angiogram" at petitioners' expense. The result revealed
that there was a "small local venous channel or venous pooling in the right anterior parietal lobe13 of
respondent's brain. He was then referred to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Alfred Tan, for further medical treatment
and management. Subsequently, two (2) follow-up reports were issued by Dr. Pobre on January 9,
200914 and February 9, 200915 wherein it was stated that Dr. Alfred Tan explained to him that surgery is
suggested to be performed on the respondent to prevent recurrent "intracerebral hemorrhage." Respondent
made follow-up visits on March 9, 200916 and March 17, 2009 as shown in the follow-up reports of Dr.
Pobre of even dates.
On April 16, 2009, a Medical Progress Report was issued by Dr. Ong-Salvador stating that
respondent is suffering from "right parietal cavernoma" and the condition is deemed to be idiopathic, thus,
it is not work-related. A recommendation was, likewise, made for respondent to undergo a Steriotactic
Radiosurgery or an Open Surgery to prevent further seizure attacks. On April 30, 2009, Dr. Pobre issued a
Certification19 indicating that respondent is suffering from Cavernoma and the illness is a congenital
disorder and not work-related. Petitioners shouldered all the expenses in connection with respondent's
medical treatment. Respondent was, likewise, paid his sickness wages as evidenced by the receipts duly
signed by respondent for the period from September 25, 2008 to April 30, 2009.
On December 16, 2009, respondent filed a Complaint for permanent and total disability benefits,
damages and attorney's fees. Respondent alleged that he is entitled to a maximum disability compensation
of US$120,000.00 under the Norwegian Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent further
alleged that even after all the examinations, he is still suffering from the illnesses and is disabled up to the
present. On September 6, 2010, Labor Arbiter (LA) Elias H. Salinas dismissed the complaint. The LA opined
that while the illness of respondent is disputably presumed to be work-related, petitioners have substantially
disputed the presumption of work-connection with the submission of a certification from the company
physicians categorically stating that respondent's illness is idiopathic and congenital in etiology, and as such,
could not have been caused by working conditions aboard the vessel. Also, the LA noted that no copy of the
alleged Norwegian CBA was shown by respondent.
Moreover, as opposed to the unequivocal declaration of the company-designated physicians, the
LA stated that respondent did not submit any evidence or certification that his illness is work-related or
work-aggravated. The LA ratiocinated that the fact that the illness may have manifested during the period
of respondent's contract is inadequate to justify the grant of disability compensation. The POEA- SEC
mandates that the causal connection between the illness and nature of work performed should also be proven.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Thereafter, respondent elevated the case before the
NLRC. On January 25, 2011, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the LA.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent, but the same was denied by the NLRC on
April 19, 2011. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. In a Decision dated
February 12, 2013, the CA reversed the Decision of the NLRC. The CA held that petitioners have not
overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the disease due to the conflicting statements
of the petitioners' physicians as to the cause of respondent's illness. The fallo of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed 25 January 2011 Decision and 19 April 2011
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay the petitioner permanent and total disability benefits
of US$60,000.00 and attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award, both at its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners which
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated July 10, 2013. Hence, this petition raising the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI, IN THAT:
A. THE FINDINGS, DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE NLRC, AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DIVESTED WITH QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS ARE
GIVEN GREAT RESPECT BY THE HIGHER COURTS.
B. THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAVERNOMA IS NOT WORK-RELATED. THE SAID
ILLNESS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESSES IN THE
POEA-SEC.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED THE SUPREME COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT IN
THE CASE OF MAGSAYSAY V. CEDOL27WHERE IT WAS CATEGORICALLY HELD
THAT THE BURDEN TO PROVE THAT AN ILLNESS IS WORK-RELATED
BELONGS TO THE SEAFARER.
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIANS' CERTIFICATION STATING
THAT THE SEAFARER'S CAVERNOMA IS NOT WORK-RELATED.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' AWARD OF PERMANENT/TOTAL
DISABILITY BENEFITS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION
THAT INCAPACITY FOR MORE THAN 120 DAYS HAS AUTOMATICALLY RENDERED
HIM PERMANENTLY UNFIT FOR SEA DUTIES, IS TOTALLY ERRONEOUS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN AWARDING THE
PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Petitioners argued in their petition that in order to overturn the opinion and findings of the company-
designated physician, the opinion of respondent's physician must be supported by a third doctor's opinion
without which, the company-designated physician's opinion shall prevail. They also argued that the burden
to prove that an illness is work-related belongs to respondent. And considering that the illness is not work-
related, the same is not compensable whether or not respondent is not able to work for more than 120 days.
Petitioners declared that respondent failed to establish by substantial evidence that his illness was caused by
any risks to which he was exposed to while working as Security Guard on board the vessel. The only
evidence that was presented to justify the work-relatedness of the illness is the mere statement by the
personal doctor of respondent that the illness is work aggravated/related without any further explanation.
Petitioners averred that that the disability of respondent was neither assessed by the company-designated
physicians nor by his own doctor as having a disability grading of 1 for his illness, such that, respondent
cannot be entitled to permanent total disability benefits. In the Comment of respondent, he stated that he
was presumed fit at the time he entered into a contract with the petitioners as revealed by the results of the
PEME. He argued that he is entitled to total permanent disability benefits because he was found and declared
as unfit to work by his private physician and that there is a disputable presumption that his illness is work--
related. He also argued that he is considered total and permanently disabled as he was unable to work for
more than 120 days.
The main issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent is entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits. Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter
governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The material statutory provisions are
Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided
under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the parties'
CBA bind the seaman and his employer to each other.
Considering that respondent was hired in 2008, the 2000 POEA-SEC applies. The 2000 POEA-
SEC defines work-related illness as: Definition of Terms:
12. Work-Related Illness - any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.
The illness of respondent, cavernoma, is not included in the list of occupational diseases under Section 32-
A of the POEA-SEC. However, Section 20(B)(4)32 of the contract provides that those illnesses not listed in
Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. In interpreting the aforesaid definition, this Court has
held that for disability to be compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, it is not sufficient
to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must
also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for
which he had been contracted.
In determining the work-causation of a seafarer's illness, the diagnosis of the company-
designated physician bears vital significance. After all, it is before him that the seafarer must initially report
to upon medical repatriation. In the case at bar, petitioners' physician, Dr. Pobre, declared that the illness of
respondent which is cavemova is not work-related as the same is congenital in nature, while petitioners'
other physician Dr. Salvador-Ong declared the same as idiopathic in its causation and, thus, not work-
related. The certification of Dr. Ong-Salvador dated April 16, 2009 states:
REPLY TO MEDICAL QUERY
This is in reference to your query regarding the case of Mr. Rhudel Castillo, 30 y/o, security with the working
impression of Right parietal cavernoma. Your query concerns whether his condition is deemed to be work--
related or not.
Cavernoma is a brain tumor with a vascular origin. It is a dangerous condition as it may cause
exacerbated brain hemorrhage and seizure episodes. There is no known risk factor as the condition is deemed
to be idiopathic thus it is non-work related. While the certification of Dr. Pobre dated April 30, 2009
provides:
ANSWER TO QUERY: This 30 yr old male SECURITY OFFICER from "NORWEGIAN SUN" alleged
that he had a brief seizure attack causing him to fall from his bed landing at the right side of his face. When
the ship docked at Mazatlan, Sinaloan, Mexico, he was confined in a hospital for a week where he was
worked up. Finding was "Right Parietal Hemorrhage" as the cause of the seizure. He was discharged from
the hospital and medically repatriated to the Philippines for further evaluation and management. Upon
arrival in the Philippines, repeat MRI which showed "T1 and T2 weighted hyperdensity over the cortico-
white matter junction of the right parietal lobe". An intracerebral hemorrhage over the superior parietal at
the right could be due to small Arterio-Venous Malformation or angioma. The patient was admitted at
Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical Center on December 16, 2008 under the service of Dr. Renato Carlos,
a neuroradiologist. A 4-Vessel carotid Angiogram was done. Result: Small local venous channel or venous
pooling in the right anterior parietal lobe. This may represent a portion of thrombosed venous angioma or
venous pooling in a cavaernous hemangioma. The patient was referred to neurosurgeon, Dr. Alfred Tan, for
further management. He explained that the surgery is indicated to prevent recurrent intracerebral hemorrage
that could be fatal. However, the gammaknife surgery proposed is preventive in nature. Besides, he
explained that the condition is NOT WORK-RELATED. Neurologist, Dr. Amado San Luis, said that illness
is a congenital disorder.
The CA found the two certifications conflicting, thus: We, however, do not agree. We find public
respondent NLRC's accession to the certification of company-designated physicians that petitioner Castillo's
medical condition (Cavernoma) as "not work-related" resting on a quag of conflicting bases: Dr. Pobre
declared it to be congenital in nature; whereas Dr. Salvador-Ong considered the same as idiopathic in its
causation, that is, the cause is unknown. We are, thus, convinced in the finding of public respondent of "non-
work-relatedness" based on the two physicians' certification, they being conflicting, or the cause of the
illness being uncertain; for what could be the basis therefor (of declaring the same not work-related)? Hence,
the certification of the physicians being infirm and insubstantial, We cannot be in accordant with public
respondent in having found the same to have overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of
the herein subject medical condition, Cavernoma, and resultantly dismissing the petitioner's appeal.
Having now presumed that the medical condition of petitioner Castillo is work-related, and his
inability to perform his usual work due thereto was indisputably found to have extended beyond 120 days,
We, therefore, regard his resulting disability to be total and permanent. Petitioners argue that there is no
conflict on the findings of their two physicians. They stated that medical researchers have confirmed that
the illness cavernoma may be congenital or present since birth as the same is genetically-related or may be
inherited. At the same time, the development of the illness is spontaneous in nature, thus, idiopathic.
However, according to petitioners, it cannot be denied that both the physicians are in unison in declaring
that the respondent's illness is not work-related. Petitioners' physicians differ in their view on the causation
of respondent's illness, but both are one in declaring that the illness is not work-related, as opposed to the
statement of respondent's physician Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) that the illness is work-related. The
certification of Dr. Vicaldo dated May 1, 2010 provides as follows:
- This patient/seaman presented with history of sudden onset of difficulty in breathing when he
was awaken (sic) from sleep feeling as though he had a nightmare. He fell on the floor hitting
his right face followed by loss of consciousness for approximately 20 minutes. This was noted
on September 24, 2008 while on board ship. He was seen by the ship medical officer who
referred him for consult at Clinica de Diagnosticio at Masatian, Sinaloa Mexico. He underwent
cranial CT scan and he was confined for one week. He was prescribed Dilantin and other
unrecalled medications.
- He was repatriated on October 7, 2008 and had subsequent check up at University of Santo
Tomas where he underwent another MRI which revealed intracerebral hemorrhage consisting
of blood products in different stages probably secondary to avascular anomaly. He underwent
cerebral angiogram which revealed small focal venous channel or venous pooling in the right
anterior parietal lobe. He was maintained on Dilantin and was advised brain surgery.
- When seen at the clinic his blood pressure was 120/90 mmHg; PE of the heart and lungs were
unremarkable. He presented with a 4/5 motor deficit on the left upper and lower extremities.
He also reported bilateral blurring of vision noted since last year.
- He is now unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity.
- His illness is considered work aggravated/related.
- He requires maintenance medication consisting of Dilantin to prevent recurrence of seizures
secondary to his brain injury.
- He may require surgical intervention to evacuate the blood clot in his brain.
- He is not expected to land a gainful employment given his medical background.
The conflicting findings of the company's doctor and the seafarer's physician often stir suits for disability
compensation. As an extrajudicial measure of settling their differences, the POEA-SEC gives the parties the
option of agreeing jointly on a third doctor whose assessment shall break the impasse and shall be the final
and binding diagnosis.39 The POEA-SEC provides for a procedure to resolve the conflicting findings of a
company designated physician and personal physician, specifically:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
3. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
In Transocean Ship Management (Phils.), Inc., et al. v. Vedad, the reason for the third-doctor referral
provision in the POEA Standard Employment Contract is that: In determining whether or not a given illness
is work-related, it is understandable that a company-designated physician would be more positive and in
favor of the company than, say, the physician of the seafarer's choice. It is on this account that a seafarer is
given the option by the POEA-SEC to seek a second opinion from his preferred physician. And the law has
anticipated the possibility of divergence in the medical findings and assessments by incorporating a
mechanism for its resolution wherein a third doctor selected by both parties decides the dispute with finality,
as provided by Sec. 20 (B) (3) of the POEA-SEC quoted above.
In the instant case, respondent did not seek the opinion of a third doctor. Based on jurisprudence,
the findings of the company-designated physician prevail in cases where the seafarer did not observe the
third-doctor referral provision in the POEA-SEC. However, if the findings of the company-designated
physician are clearly biased in favor of the employer, then courts may give greater weight to the findings of
the seafarer's personal physician. Clear bias on the part of the company-designated physician may be shown
if there is no scientific relation between the diagnosis and the symptoms felt by the seafarer, or if the final
assessment of the company designated physician is not supported by the medical records of the seafarer.
Petitioners' company-designated physicians, Dr. Ong-Salvador and Dr. Pobre, monitored
respondent's case from the beginning. They were the ones who referred the respondent's case to the proper
medical specialists Dr. Renato Carlos (neuroradiologist), Dr. Alfred Tan (neurosurgeon) and Dr. Amado
San Luis (neurologist) whose medical results are not essentially disputed. Petitioners' physicians monitored
respondent's case and issued the certifications on the basis of the medical records available and the results
obtained. From the time of his repatriation on October 7, 2008, respondent had been under the care of the
company-designated physicians, and the said physicians should be considered to be fully familiar with the
illness of respondent. Company-designated physicians Dr. Ong-Salvador and Dr. Pobre were able to closely
monitor respondent's condition from the time he was repatriated until the date of his last check-up in March
17, 2009.
In the case of Vergara G.R. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., We stated that: more weight
should be given to the assessment of degree of disability made by the company doctors because they were
the ones who attended and treated petitioner Vergara for a period of almost five (5) months from the time
of his repatriation to the Philippines on September 5, 2000 to the time of his declaration as fit to resume sea
duties on January 31, 2001, and they were privy to petitioner Vergaras case from the very beginning, which
enabled the company-designated doctors to acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity with petitioner
Vergaras medical condition which thus enabled them to reach a more accurate evaluation of the degree of
any disability which petitioner Vergara might have sustained. These are not mere company doctors. These
doctors are independent medical practitioners who passed the rigorous requirements of the employer and
are more likely to protect the interest of the employer against fraud.
As previously stated, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of
assessing the seaman's disability. Their declaration should be given credence, considering the amount of
time and effort they gave to monitoring and treating the respondent's condition. It bears emphasizing that
the respondent has been under the care and supervision of the company physicians since his repatriation on
October 7, 2008 to March 17, 2009, or almost five (5) months. The medical attention they had given the
respondent undeniably enabled them to acquire familiarity and detailed knowledge of the latter's medical
condition. On the other hand, We note that the certification of Dr. Vicaldo was replete with details justifying
the conclusion that the illness of respondent is work-related.
In the case of Cagatin v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, We ruled in favor of the company-
designated doctors, thus: This lack of forthrightness on the part of petitioner impels this Court to favor the
earlier report of the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, over that of petitioner's chosen physician, Dr.
Collantes. There are other cogent reasons, however. First, it is obvious in the report of Dr. Collantes that he
only saw petitioner once, or on August 6, 2002, while Dr. Cruz and his team examined and treated petitioner
several times, for a period of five (5) months. Second, Dr. Collantes did not perform any sort of diagnostic
test or examination on petitioner, unlike Dr. Cruz before him. It has been held in cases of disability benefits
claims that in the absence of adequate tests and reasonable findings to support the same, a doctor's
assessment should not be taken at face value. Diagnostic tests and/or procedures as would adequately refute
the normal results of those administered to the petitioner by the company-designated physicians are
necessary for his claims to be sustained.
While it is true that medical reports issued by the company-designated physicians do not bind
the courts, Our examination of Dr. Ong-Salvador's certification leads Us to agree with her findings. The
respondent was evaluated by a specialist, neurosurgeon Dr. Alfred Tan. The series of tests and evaluations
show that Dr. Ong-Salvador's findings were not arrived at arbitrarily; neither were they biased in petitioner's
favor. Respondent had undergone a series of tests from the time he was repatriated on October 7, 2008 until
April 30, 2009, when the company-designated doctor issued a medical report. On the other hand, it is
obvious in the report of Dr. Vicaldo that he only saw respondent once, or on May 1, 2010. Dr. Vicaldo did
not perform any sort of diagnostic test or examination on respondent. Respondent did not allege how he was
examined and treated by Dr. Vicaldo, and how the latter arrived at the conclusion that respondent's illness
is work-related.
In the case of Dalusong v. Eagle Clare Shipping Philippines, Inc., We ruled that "the findings of
the company-designated doctor, who, with his team of specialists which included an orthopedic surgeon and
physical therapist periodically treated petitioner for months and monitored his condition, deserve greater
evidentiary weight than the single medical report of petitioner's doctor, who appeared to have examined
petitioner only once." This Court also affirmed and gave greater weight to the findings of the company-
designated physician in the case of Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement48 which involved a claim for
disability benefits. The company-designated physician and the personal physician had different findings but
We ruled that "as between the company-designated doctor who has all the medical records of petitioner for
the duration of his treatment and as against the latter's private doctor who merely examined him for a day
as an outpatient, the former's finding must prevail."
Thus, in the instant case, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo was not based on results
from medical tests and procedures. While Dr. Ong-Salvador and Dr. Pobre are familiar with respondent's
medical history and condition, thus, their medical opinion on whether respondent's illness is work-
aggravated/-related deserve more credence as opposed to Dr. Vicaldo's unsupported conclusions. This Court
had already noted the unsubstantiated nature of medical certifications issued by Dr. Vicaldo and had warned
the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC to keep guard against his medical findings in the case of Monana v. MEC
Global Shipmanagement and Manning Corporation: This court notes that in several cases filed before this
court on seafarer's disability claims, Dr. Vicaldo's findings have not been given due merit due to their
unsubstantiated nature.
It, therefore, behooves the National Labor Relations Commission, perhaps, to cause an
investigation on why, in spite of the unsupported nature of Dr. Vicaldo's submissions, Labor Arbiters still
give him credence. This unnecessarily clogs their administrative dockets, and the dockets of the Court of
Appeals and this court. Judicial efficiency requires that Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations
Commission keep guard against these types of doctors and their medical findings. From the foregoing,
considering that the company-designated physicians closely monitored respondent from his repatriation, and
considering further that respondent did not observe the third-doctor referral provision, We adopt the ruling
of the NLRC, thus: Such a bare statement that "His illness is considered workaggravated/related", without
any explanation as to the same, much less how such conclusion was arrived at, could not even begin to prove
that complainant's illness is work-related, much less overcome the findings of the company-designated
physicians which were arrived at after a considerable period of treatment. On the other hand, it is apparent
from Dr. Vicaldo's certification that, just as in the aforecited Magsaysay case, he examined complainant
only once.
Likewise, the mere fact that complainant's disability exceeded 120 days, by itself, is not a ground
to entitle him to full disability benefits. Such should be read in relation to the provisions of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract which, among others, provide that an illness should be work-related.
Without a finding that an illness is work-related, any discussion on the period of disability is moot.
Furthermore, while the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be work-related, the
seafarer or the claimant must still show a reasonable connection between the nature of work on board the
vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated.
In Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc., Quizora argued that he did not have the
burden to prove that his illness was work related because it was disputably presumed by law. This Court
ruled that Quizora "cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mention in Section 20 (B)
(4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC." This Court further discussed that: At any rate, granting that the provisions of
the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to
just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption
of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to
be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that
it must have existed during the term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of
proof belongs to respondent company.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements
must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must
have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to
compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or
injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal
connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
The 2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as "injury[ies] resulting in disability or death
arising out of and in the course of employment" and "work-related illness" as any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 3 2-A of this contract with the
conditions set therein satisfied. The rule on the burden of proof with regard to claims for disability benefits
was also discussed in Dohle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc., et al. v. Heirs of Gazzingan:
[T]he 2000 POEA-SEC has created a presumption of compensability for those illnesses which
are not listed as an occupational disease. Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) states that "those illnesses not listed
in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." Concomitant with this presumption
is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at
least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct
causal relation is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational
diseases.
The said ruling was reiterated in the case of Nonay vs. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc., We held:
In this case, however, petitioner was unable to present substantial evidence to show the relation between her
work and the illness she contracted. The record of this case does not show whether
petitioner's adenomyoma was pre-existing; hence, this court cannot determine whether it was aggravated by
the nature of her employment. She also failed to fulfill the requisites of Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-
SEC for her illness to be compensable, thus, her claim for disability benefits cannot be granted.Petitioner
argues that her illness is the result of her "constantly walking upward and downward on board the vessel
carrying loads"95 and that she "acquired her illness on board respondents' vessel during the term of her
employment contract with respondents as Casino [Attendant][.]" However, petitioner did not discuss the
duties of a Casino Attendant. She also failed to show the causation between walking, carrying heavy loads,
and adenomyoma. Petitioner merely asserts that since her illness developed while she was on board the
vessel, it was work-related.
In Cagatin v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, et al., Cagatin was hired as a cabin steward. He
alleged that his injuries were due to the hazardous tasks he was made to perform, which were beyond the
job description in his contract. This court held that since Cagatin did not allege what the tasks of a cabin
steward were, there was no means by which the court could determine whether the tasks he performed were,
indeed, hazardous. In the same manner, this court has no means to determine whether petitioner's illness is
work-related or work-aggravated since petitioner did not describe the nature of her employment as Casino
Attendant.
Here, assuming that cavernoma is not idiopathic, respondent did not adduce proof to show a
reasonable connection between his work as Security Guard and his cavernoma. There was no showing how
the demands and nature of his job vis-a-vis the ship's working conditions increased the risk of contracting
cavernoma. It must be stressed that respondent was hired by petitioners on a 10-month contract on June 6,
2008. While on board the vessel, he suffered from difficulty of breathing and other symptoms of his current
illness. When respondent got sick, he was on board only for three (3) months. Because of this short span of
time, then the presentation of evidence showing the relation between respondent's work as Security Guard
and his illness becomes all the more crucial. Respondent argued that his illness is work-related invoking the
rulings in the cases of Philimare, Inc., et al. v. Suganob, Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et
al., and Tibulan v. Inciong. The argument is baseless.
 In the case of Philimare, Inc., et al. v. Suganob, the medical certificate issued by the company
physician did not conflict with that issued by the physician chosen by Suganob. The medical certificate
issued by the company physician which stated that Suganob was fit to return to work was conditional
because Suganob still has to maintain his medications. On the other hand, the medical certificate of the
physician chosen by Suganob indicated that Suganob's illness recurred and continued which rendered him
unfit to continue his work. In both medical certificates, it is clear that Suganob was not considered as totally
cured and fit to return to work.
In the case of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., it cannot be denied that there was
at least a reasonable connection between the seafarer's job and his lung infection, which eventually
developed into septicemia and ultimately caused his death. As utilityman on board the vessel, the seafarer
was exposed to harsh sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts, etc., all of which invariably contributed to his
illness.
Lastly, in the case of Tibulan v. Inciong, Tibulan had worked for the company for almost thirty-
five (35) years up to his death. His having served as Barge Patron had some connection with the emergence
and development of the disease which caused his death. The barge to which the deceased was assigned was
being used to transport heavy cargoes up and down and around the Pasig River and had under his supervision
only two (2) sailors. The said conditions led this Court to the inference that while the position of the deceased
was not one requiring mainly manual labor, nonetheless, Tibulan could not have avoided strenuous physical
activity in carrying out his duties. Certainly, the captain or patron of a cargo barge was not expected to, and
would not have been allowed to, live his life behind a desk. Since respondent's illness is not work-related,
this Court need not labor on respondent's argument that his illness must be deemed total and permanent
since he was unable to work for more than 120 days. Such should be read in relation to the POEA-SEC
which, among others, provide that an illness should be work-related.
Let it be stressed that the seafarer's inability to resume his work after the lapse of more than 120
days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the
grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor. Both law and evidence must be on his side.
Moreover, respondent argued that he was presumed fit at the time he entered into a contract with the
petitioners as revealed by the results of the PEME. The fact that respondent passed the company's PEME is
of no moment. We have ruled that in the past the PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to
be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. The PEME merely
determines whether one is fit to work at sea or fit for sea service; it does not state the real state of health of
an applicant. In short, the fit to work declaration in the seafarer's PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to
show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. Thus, we held in NYK-FIL Ship
Management, Inc. v. NLRC: While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether
a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer's true
state of health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent's illness considering that the examinations
were not exploratory.
As the Court has previously ruled, a PEME is not exploratory in nature and cannot be relied upon
to arrive at a seafarer's true state of health. While a PEME may reveal enough for the company to decide
whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform the company of a
seafarer's true state of health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent's illness considering that the
examinations were not exploratory. It was only after respondent was subjected to extensive medical
procedures including MRI that respondent's illness was finally diagnosed as a case of cavernoma. For
respondent to, thus, claim that the issuance of a clean bill of health to a seafarer after a PEME means that
his illness was acquired during the seafarers employment is a non sequitur. In the case of NYK-FIL Ship
Management Inc. v. NLRC,68 We held: We do not agree with the respondents claim that by the issuance of
a clean bill of health to Roberto, made by the physicians selected/accredited by the petitioners, it necessarily
follows that the illness for which her husband died was acquired during his employmentas a fisherman for
the petitioners.
The pre-employment medical examination conducted on Roberto could not have divulged the
disease for which he died, considering the fact that most, if not all, are not so exploratory. The disease of
GFR, which is an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function test. In pre-
employment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally included measures only the
creatinine, the presence of which cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure. The Court is wary of
the principle that provisions of the POEA-SEC must be applied with liberality in favor of the seafarers, for
it is only then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into effect. However, on several occasions
when disability claims anchored on such contract were based on flimsy grounds and unfounded allegations,
the Court never hesitated to deny the same. Claims for compensation based on surmises cannot be allowed;
liberal construction is not a license to. disregard the evidence on record or to misapply the laws. However,
we emphasize that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to
oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining
the employer when it is in the right. We should always be mindful that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence.
In sum, we hold that the respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits for
his failure to refute the company designated physicians' findings that his illness was not work-related. The
CA, thus, erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when the latter affirmed the
LA's Decision not to grant permanent and total disability benefits to the respondent despite insufficient
evidence to justify this grant.72 We note that petitioners shouldered all the expenses in connection with
respondent's medical treatment, and respondent was, likewise, paid his sickness wages. WHEREFORE,
the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
HENRY DIONIO v. TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY
Antecedents: Henry Dionio (Dionio) was engaged by Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. (Trans-Global)
as Bosun on board the vessel MIT "Samco Asia" for and in behalf of Goodwood Shipmanagement, PTE,
Ltd. (Goodwood). His Contract of Employment with Trans-Global provided that he shall earn a basic
monthly salary of US$730.00. He embarked on February 2, 2011. On February 25, 2011, Dionio
experienced dizziness, slurred speech, chest pain, difficulty in breathing, repeated vomiting and minor loss
of strength in his right hand. He was brought to a hospital in Cape Town, South Africa on March 7, 2011
where he was diagnosed with a "possible transient Ischaemic Attack/Labyrinthitis." On March 8, 2011, he
was repatriated to the Philippines and was referred to the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) for further
evaluation and treatment.
The initial evaluation conducted on March 9, 2011 considered "Transient Ischemic Attack." He
was later referred to a neurologist and an ear, nose and throat specialist. He received medical attention and
treatment as reflected in Medical Reports dated March 28, April 18, 2027, May 10, 18, June 8, 9, and
September 5, 2011 issued by Dr. Frances Hao-Quan. Dionio's last diagno is was "Bilateral Cerebellar
Infarct" with a disability grading of 10. On November 10, 2011, Dionio filed a complaint against Trans-
Global, Goodwood and Michael Estaniel (hereafter "respondents") for permanent disability benefits, as well
as actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees. On March 14, 2012, Dionio consulted Dr.
Antonio Pascual of the Philippine Heart Center who diagnosed him with "S/P Cerebrovascular Disease,
Bilateral Cerebellar Infarct" and concluded that he was medically unfit to work as seaman. Dionio also
consulted Dr. Enrique Puentespina of The Lord's Hospital in Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan whose undated
neurological assessment stated that Dionio had "Vertebro Bassilar Insufficiency."
LA Ruling
On August 29, 2012, the LA ordered respondents to jointly and severally pay Dionio US$10,075.00
representing disability benefits based on a grade 10 disability rating. The claims for actual, moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees were denied for lack of basis.
NLRC Ruling
Dionio elevated the case to the NLRC on appeal, which rendered its Decision on November 29, 2012,
reversing the LA and awarding total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$89,100.00, plus
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award.
The NLRC held that: (1) permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform;
(2) Dionio's work as "bosun" was at risk because of the probability of another stroke; (3) the two medical
reports issued by authority and under note of the Medical Coordinator of MMC opine that the prognosis to
return to sea duties is guarded due to risk of another cerebrovascular event; (4) there was inconsistency in
the disability grading and the detailed medical assessment of complainant's attending physicians; (5) Dionio
is rendered unable to fully perform his job because the strenuous effort required by the nature of his work
could trigger another cerebrovascular attack; (6) the disability grading is not reflective of Dionio's actual
physical condition; and (7) there is no mention whether or not they are adopting the grading of 10. According
to the NLRC, respondents' failure to issue an assessment grading before the 120-day period meant that the
disability is permanent and total. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
NLRC on January 22, 2013.
CA Ruling
Dissatisfied, respondents Trans-Global/Goodwood filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
asserting that the NLRC erred in reversing the LA and in giving weight to the findings of Dionio's doctors.
Respondents claimed that the findings of the company doctor as to the extent and severity of the seafarer's
disability must be sustained.
On September 25, 2014, the CA rendered its Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2012 and the Resolution dated January 22, 2013 of the
Second Division of the National Labor Relations Commission in LAC No. 09-000797-12 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The August 29, 2012 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case (M) 11-16849-
11 is REINSTATED. Dionio filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA on March 5,
2015.
Issues before the Court
Dionio is now before the Court raising the issues of:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner [failed] to appoint
a third physician to resolve the conflicting opinions of the company-designated physician and
his doctor's second opinion's [sic] disability assessment?
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the self-serving and fraudulent
assessment of the company-designated physician of grade 10 even if the said physician expressly
prohibits petitioner from resuming further sea service due to risk of cerebrovascular attack?
3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying the law on permanent and total
disability cited under Articles 191-193 of the Labor Code, as amended?
4. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in misapplying the CBA to accident
resulting to disability even if the existing CBA also covers work-related illness resulting to
disability?
5. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees
even if respondents committed gross negligence, which is tantamount to bad faith when they
failed to accord petitioner of immediate medical intervention on 25 February 2011 and waited
until 07 March 2011 when he totally sustained stroke that resulted to permanent and total
disability?
Dionio argues that the CA erred in ruling that it is mandatory to appoint a third physician to resolve a conflict
of findings between the company-designated physician and the doctor chosen by the seafarer. According to
Dionio, the assessment of a company-designated physician may be disputed by the opinion of a physician
chosen by the seafarer. The option of engaging the opinion of a third doctor is merely directory and not
mandatory. He adds that the CA erred in setting aside the opinion of the company-designated doctor who
stated that he was expressly prohibited to return to work. The company doctor noted that he needed "regular
medical check-ups and [should] continue his medications to probably prevent another stroke episode." The
company doctor further said that "prognosis to return to sea duties is guarded due to risk of another
cerebrovascular event."
Dionio cites the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency's (POEA) Contract which recognizes
the prerogative of a seafarer to request a second opinion and consult a physician of his choice. In this case,
Dionio's chosen doctor, Dr. Pascual, found him "medically unfit to work in any capacity as a seaman."
Following the Department of Health's Medical Guidelines, Administrative Order No. 2007-005, July 27,
2007, Dionio is automatically disqualified to resume further sea service as he is permanently unfit for work
at sea.
Dionio argues that the Resolutions of the CA are contrary to the test of permanent total disability,
which is the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar nature
that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainment can do. He failed to be gainfully employed from February 25, 2011 until November 9, 2011,
based on his "convalescing or recuperation period" as certified by the company-designated physician in a
Medical Certificate dated October 5, 2011 which was submitted before the Social Security System (SSS).
There were 257 days from the onset of his illness on February 25, 2011 up to November 9, 2011. Thus,
following the rulings in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. 13and Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v.
Munar, his disability assessment of partial disability of grade 10 was converted or made permanent after the
lapse of 240 days.
Dionio also assails the CA's finding that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is
applicable only to accidents resulting to disability despite the fact that it also expressly provides for
permanent disability as a result of work-related illness. He, likewise, questions the deletion of attorney's
fees in his favor, given that he was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect his interests under the
law.15
In their Comment, respondents maintain that the CA correctly ruled that the company doctor is the one who
is tasked with the determination of a seafarer's disability or fitness. Dionio filed a complaint even before
seeking a second opinion, thus, he contested the findings of the company doctor even without any substantial
basis. The report of Dionio's doctor was also based on a one-time examination as opposed to the company
doctor who treated him for six months.
Respondents further contend that contrary to petitioner's assertion, a seafarer is not entitled to
disability benefits if he did not comply with the procedure on appointment of a third doctor under the
employment contract. The CA ruled that in the POEA Contract, as well as the CBA of the parties, it is the
company-designated doctor who is mandated to determine the degree of disability or fitness to work of a
seafarer. As held in OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc. v. Pellazar, since the seafarer was responsible for
the non-referral to a third doctor, with his failure to inform the manning agency that he would be consulting
his own doctor, he should suffer the consequences of the absence of a binding third opinion, and the
disability assessment issued by the company-designated doctors should be upheld against the seafarer's
physician of choice. Respondents argue that supposing the CBA is indeed applicable in this case, based on
Sec. 20.1.4 thereof, the seafarer must be certified permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity
by the company doctor for the medical unfitness clause to apply. They also assert that mere inability to work
does not justify total and permanent disability compensation.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit. It is settled that the company-designated physician will have the first
opportunity to examine the seafarer and, thereafter, issue a certification as to the seafarer's medical status.
On the basis of the said certification, seafarers would be initially informed if they are entitled to disability
benefits. The seafarers, however, are not precluded from challenging the diagnosis of the company-
designated physicians should they disagree with such findings. They have the option to seek another opinion
from a physician of their choice and, in case the latter's findings differ from that of the company designated
physician, the conflicting findings shall be submitted to a third-party doctor, as mutually agreed upon by the
parties.
Following Sec. 20(A) of the POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), as revised,
should the seafarer's appointed doctor disagree with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed upon by
the employer and the seafarer. The latter's decision shall be final and binding between the parties. When
there is conflict between the findings of the company-designated doctor and the doctor chosen by the
seafarer, the latter is bound to initiate the process of referring the findings to a third-party physician by
informing his employer. The referral to a third doctor has been held by the Court to be a mandatory
procedure as a consequence of the provision in the POEA-SEC that the company-designated doctor's
assessment should prevail in case of non-observance of the third-doctor referral provision in the contract.
Failure to comply with the requirement of referral to a third-party physician is tantamount to
violation of the terms under the POEA-SEC, and without a binding third-party opinion, the findings of the
company-designated physician shall prevail over the assessment made by the seafarer's doctor. It should be
clarified, however, that the failure to refer the conflicting findings to a third doctor does not ipso facto render
the conclusions of the company-designated physician conclusive and binding on the courts. As explained
in CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Castillo: Based on jurisprudence, the findings of the company-
designated physician prevail in cases where the seafarer did not observe the third doctor referral provision
in the POEA-SEC. However, if the findings of the company-designated physician are clearly biased in favor
of the employer, then courts may give greater weight to the findings of the seafarer's personal physician.
Clear bias on the part of the company designated physician may be shown if there is no scientific relation
between the diagnosis and the symptoms felt by the seafarer, or if the final assessment of the company-
designated physician is not supported by the medical records of the seafarer. Thus, while failure to refer the
conflicting findings between the company-designated physician and the seafarer's physician of choice gives
the former's medical opinion more weight and probative value over the latter, still, it does not mean that the
courts are bound by such doctor's findings, as the court may set aside the same if it is shown that the findings
of the company-designated doctor have no scientific basis or are not supported by medical records of the
seafarer.
Indeed, the rule that the company-designated doctor's findings shall prevail in case of non-
referral of the case to a third doctor is not a hard and-fast rule as labor tribunals and the courts are not bound
by the medical findings of the company-doctor. Instead, the inherent merits of the respective medical
findings shall be considered. Here, Dionio was treated by the company-designated doctor from March 9,
2011 to September 5, 2011. On June 9, 2011, that is before the lapse of the 120-day period, the company
doctor issued a Medical Report. As noted by the CA in its Decision: On June 9, 2011, the company-
designated physician issued a Medical Report, which states that "The specialist opines that prognosis for
return to sea duties is guarded due to risk of another cerebrovascular event." The attached comment
of the internist-neurologist states, "Suggested disability grading is Grade 10 - slight brain functional
disturbance that requires little attendance or aid and which interferes to a slight degree with the working
capacity of the patient."
Thus, while the company-designated physician suggested a disability grading of "Grade 10," the
company-doctor also opined "that prognosis for return to sea duties is guarded to risk of another
cerebrovascular event."Dionio also cited the Medical Certificate dated October 5, 2011 issued by the
company-designated physician and submitted to the SSS, which gave a final diagnosis of "Bilateral
Cerebellar Infarct." It also stated that the convalescing or recuperation period shall be from March 9 to
November 9, 2011. Dionio's allegation that he was unable to work for 257 days is uncontroverted as
respondents merely argued that it is immaterial whether or not a seafarer actually returned to work within
120 days or even 240 days, since he was already assessed with Grade 10 disability on June 9, 2010 which
was within the 120-day period. Again, while much weight is given to the company-doctor's assessment, in
view of the seafarer's failure to initiate the referral to a third doctor, the Court is not bound to accept, in its
entirety, the company doctor's findings, where the circumstances surrounding the fit-to-work assessment
show otherwise.
It is the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and full protection to labor. Thus, the
Court has applied the Labor Code concept of disability to Filipino seafarers. Case law has held that "the
notion of disability is intimately related to the worker's capacity to earn, and what is compensated is not his
injury or illness but his inability to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity. Thus, disability
has been construed less on its medical significance but more on the loss of earning capacity."
It has been held that there is total disability when the employee is unable to earn wages in the
same kind of work or work of similar nature that he or she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or
any kind of work which a person of his or her mentality and attainments could do. Meanwhile, there is
permanent disability when the worker is unable to perform his or her job for more than 120 or 240 days, as
the case may be, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his or her body. In this case,
while much weight is given to the company-designated doctor's findings, as a result of Dionio's failure to
initiate the referral to a third doctor, an assessment of the medical certificate issued by the company doctor
itself shows that Dionio's claim for permanent and total disability is in order. WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED.
JOSE JOHN C. GUERRERO v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS
The case traces its roots to a Complaint3 filed by petitioner Jose John C. Guerrero (Guerrero) for permanent
and total disability benefits, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees
against respondents Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI), Celebrity Cruises (CC), and/or Carlos
Salinas (Salinas) [collectively, respondents]. A series of conferences between Guerrero and respondents
were held before the Labor Arbiter (LA), but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Hence, the
LA required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
In his Position Paper,4 Guerrero alleged that on August 15, 2011, he was employed by PTCI,
represented by its President, Carlos Salinas, on behalf of its principal, CC, as a Casino Dealer on board the
vessel GTS Constellation for a period of six (6) months with a basic monthly salary of US$255.00. Prior to
embarkation, he underwent pre-employment medical examination at Metrics Center, Makati City, and was
declared "fit to work as a seaman." He boarded the vessel on October 12, 2011. His duties and
responsibilities as a casino dealer include having an understanding of all the games he will operate, dealing
cards, distributing dice, operating game apparatus such as roulette wheel or baccarat wheel, as well as
keeping an eye on patrons to make sure they are not cheating, and the gamblers are having a good time.
Guerrero averred that: sometime in January 2012 during a gastro-intestinal outbreak in the ship,
he and other crew members were tasked and ordered to bring elderly guests out of the ship through
wheelchairs; since the platform was not levelled with the ship's door exit, and the bridge connecting the
platform and the door exit was too steep, they decided that the best way to move and transfer the elderly
passengers was by pulling the wheelchairs; while he was pulling a wheelchair with a passenger, a sudden
motion occurred which caused him to lose his balance but managed to prevent the wheelchair, the passenger
and himself from falling; in order to keep the passenger safe, he had to push the wheelchair really hard to
gain control over it; after said incident, he started experiencing back pains which he just ignored due to the
demands of his work as a casino dealer; to manage his back pain, he took mefenamic acid tablets and applied
pain relieving liniment and hot water on the painful area; and later, his back pain became unbearable
prompting him to consult the doctor of the vessel who prescribed him pain reliever medication and sleeping
pills.
While his vessel was docked at a port in the Caribbean, Guerrero underwent a Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) procedure at the Isle Imaging Center of St. George, Caribbean, and after which,
the attending physician made the following Impression: Findings revealed changes of Lumbar Spondylosis
involving L2-3, L3-4, L4-5 disc causing of compression of left L5 and bilateral L4 roots as described. No
cords conus abnormality seen.5 In view of his medical condition, he was recommended for medical
repatriation. Upon his arrival in Manila on March 26, 2012, Guerrero immediately reported to respondents
and was referred to the Manila Doctors Hospital and the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for post-
employment medical examination and for further treatment. He underwent a series of physical therapy
sessions at the Orthopedics Department of the PGH under the supervision of the company-designated
physician/surgeon, Dr. Adrian Catbagan (Dr. Catbagan). On October 19, 2012, a major surgery called
Transforaminal Lumbar Interbody Fusion L3-L4 & L4-L5 was performed on Guerrero by Dr. Catbagan at
the Manila Doctors Hospital. On November 19, 2012, Dr. Catbagan issued a Medical Certificate6 stating
that Guerrero was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital on October 19, 2012 and was discharged on
November 9, 2012 with the following final diagnosis: Degenerative Disc Disease & Disc Herniation L3-L4
& L4-L5 Moyamoya Disease, resolved. After Guerrero's surgery, he continued his therapy sessions with Dr.
Catbagan until January 15, 2013.
Guerrero alleged that since the pain still persisted notwithstanding the medical procedures
performed on him, he consulted, on January 17, 2013, Dr. Cesar H. Garcia (Dr. Garcia), an orthopedic
surgeon/bone and joint disease, who issued on even date a medical certificate7 declaring him "UNFIT for
further sea service in whatever capacity as a SEAFARER." Guerrero alleged that despite his permanent
unfitness for further sea service as determined by his physician, respondents failed to compensate him of
permanent and total disability benefits. He maintained that he sustained a spinal injury due to an accident
arising out, and in the course of, his employment. In their Position Paper, respondents maintained that
Guerrero is not entitled to disability benefits because he sustained the alleged injury during an incident at
the crew gym. Respondents adduced in evidence documents denominated as Crew Injury Statement,10 dated
March 22, 2012, and Personal Injury Illness Statement11 in support their submission.
Respondents alleged that the essential duties of Guerrero as a Casino Dealer are reflected in the
Job Description Manual. They contended that going to the gym and the use of gym facilities are not part of
Guerrero's job and could not have any relation to his duties as a Casino Dealer. Respondents theorized that
disability benefits are compensable only when the seafarer, such as Guerrero, suffers work-related injury or
illness during the term of his contract. They posited that Guerrero's injury is not compensable since it has
not arisen from a work-related incident. Respondents alleged that Guerrero's claim for damages and
attorney's fees are bereft of any factual and legal basis stressing that they had faithfully complied with their
contractual obligation to him and had even provided him with extensive medical attention for humanitarian
consideration. By way of counterclaim, respondents alleged that the filing by Guerrero of a baseless
complaint tarnished their reputations and were constrained to engage the services of an attorney to protect
their rights. For these reasons, they prayed that they should be awarded damages of P200,000.00 attorney's
fees and cost of litigation in the sum of P400,000.00.
The LA Ruling
On February 28, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision13 declaring that PTCI and CC are
solidarily liable for disability compensation to Guerrero. The fallo of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents PHILIPPINE
TRANSMARINE CARRIERS [INC.]/CELEBRITY CRUISES, jointly and severally, liable to pay JOSE
JOHN GUERRERO the amount of US DOLLARS: SIXTY THOUSAND (US$60,000.00) or its peso
equivalent at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing his total permanent
disability benefits and attorney's fees. Mr. Carlos Salinas is hereby EXCLUDED/DROPPED as party-
respondent in this case. All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
The LA ruled that although Guerrero's injury had resulted from a gym incident, the same would not release
respondents PTCI and CC from their liability for disability benefits. It held that Guerrero's medical condition
has rendered him permanently incapacitated to be a seafarer, as found by his chosen physician, Dr. Garcia.
Lastly, it observed that Guerrero has been incapacitated to work for more than 120 days from the date he
was repatriated and seen by the company-designated physician. Not in conformity, respondents PTCI and
CC filed a joint appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying for the reversal
and nullification of the February 28, 2013 Decision of the LA .and for the dismissal of Guerrero's complaint
for lack of merit.
The NLRC Ruling
On July 31, 2013, the NLRC rendered a Decision15 reversing February 28, 2013 Decision of the
LA. The NLRC disposed the case as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case DISMISSED for UTTER LACK OF MERIT. The
NLRC ruled that Guerrero is not entitled to disability benefits and payment of his other monetary claims
because his injury is not work-related or not an injury sustained while working on-board the vessel. The
NLRC added that apart from Guerrero's assertion, no other evidence was adduced to support and corroborate
his "wheelchair theory," which incident allegedly caused his injury. Guerrero's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the NLRC in its September 13, 2013 Resolution. Aggrieved, Guerrero assailed the NLRC
Decision and Resolution via a petition for certiorari filed before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC in denying his claim for permanent and total disability benefits and for attorney's
fees.
The CA Ruling
In its September 10, 2015 Decision, the CA resolved to deny the petition for certiorari based on the same
ratiocinations the NLRC had rendered. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated 31 July 2013 and Resolution dated 13 September 2013 issued by public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, Second Division, in NLRC LAC No. 05-000495-13 are hereby AFFIRMED. The
CA held that the challenged decision of the NLRC was in accordance with law and prevailing jurisprudence
and that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can be imputed against said
labor tribunal. Guerrero filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its January
14, 2016 Resolution. Unfazed, Guerrero filed the present petition insisting that he is entitled to disability
benefits as well as to the award of damages and attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit. From a perusal of the arguments raised by Guerrero, it is quite
apparent that this petition is raising a question of fact inasmuch as this Court is being asked to revisit and
assess anew the uniform factual findings of the CA and the NLRC that his injury was not work-related.
Guerrero is fundamentally assailing the findings of the CA and the NLRC that the evidence on record does
not support his claim for disability benefits. In effect, he would have us sift through, calibrate and re-examine
the credibility and probative value of the evidence on record so as to ultimately pass upon whether or not
there is sufficient basis to hold PTCI and CC accountable for refusing to pay disability benefits to him under
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's (POEA's) "Amended Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels," which is deemed written
in his contract of employment. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the determination of which is the
statutory function of the NLRC.
Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater
force in labor cases; only errors of law. are generally reviewed in petitions for review
on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA. Factual questions are for the labor tribunal to
resolve.20 Moreover, findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are
generally conclusive on this Court.21Accordingly, the instant petition' must be dismissed outright as it raises
a question of fact. Even if the Court is willing to overlook this procedural lapse, the present petition would
just the same fail. We carefully examined and evaluated the records of this case. Try as we might, however,
this Court failed to identify any error committed by the CA in declaring that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Guerrero's complaint. Likewise, the Court sees no reason to disturb the
similar factual findings of the CA and the NLRC regarding the non-work relatedness of the subject injury
of Guerrero.
For disability to be compensable, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related;
and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment
contract.22 Work-related injury pertains to injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of, and in
the course of, employment.23 Jurisprudence elucidates that the words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the
time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a matter of general proposition, an
injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is
engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
Work-relatedness of an injury or illness means that the seafarer's injury or illness has a possible
connection to one's work, and thus, allows the seafarer to claim disability benefits therefor. The oft-repeat
d. rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right
thereto by substantial evidence. Thus, the burden is placed upon Guerrero to present substantial evidence,
or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that
there is a causal connection between the nature of his employment and his injury. The onus probandi fell
on Guerrero to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence that would
serve as basis for the grant of the relief.
Unfortunately, Guerrero utterly failed to prove a reasonable connection between his work as a
Casino Dealer and his alleged lumbar disc injury. Apart from his bare allegation that he sustained an injury
sometime in January 2012 while assisting an elderly passenger on a wheelchair to disembark from the vessel
in compliance to an order from the management, no other competent and independent evidence was
proffered to substantiate and to corroborate his foregoing claim. We cannot overemphasize that self-serving
and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case where the quantum of proof required to
establish as fact is substantial evidence. Awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and
presumptions.
On the other hand, respondents were able to expose the falsity of Guerrero's story when they
submitted in evidence the Crew Injury Statement dated March 22, 2012, which contained Guerrero's
admission to the effect that the subject injury resulted from his gym workout. For clarity, we hereto quote
Guerrero's relevant narration of the gym incident which was written entirely in his own handwriting, thus:
On JAN 22, I went to the gym to do my usual workout after that I felt pain on my lower back. I went to see
a doctor on that day and gave me 24 hrs. to rest after that I go back to work, but everytime I bend, I felt
something painful on my left buttock so I decided to see the doctor again on March 4 after that the pain
keeps coming back ever since.
Were you on duty at the time of the injury? No. It's my long break. I decided to go to gym to keep myself fit
& healthy.
Please state what you could have done to avoid the accident? Do proper workout.
The occurrence of the aforesaid incident was confirmed in a document denominated as Personal Injury
Illness Statement which provided, inter alia, the following:
Brief Desc: Persistent painful lower back since heavy lifting in crew gym
Incident cause: SPORTS RELATED
Primary Factor: HUMAN ERROR
Lighting Type: Artificial Light-Bright
Location Condition: Clean
Involved Equipment Desc: gym
Equipment Condition: Good Working Order
Protective Gear Desc: Did Not Wear
These documentary evidence effectively belied Guerrero's insistence that he incurred the injury during the
wheelchair incident. Guerrero's strenuous physical activity consisting of frequent bending and improper
lifting of heavy objects during his routine workout at the crew gym on January 22, 2012 produced extreme
torsional stress on his back which caused his subject injury. As aptly contended by the respondents, there is
nothing in the Job Description Manual which states that part of Guerrero's duty as a Casino Dealer is to go
to the crew gym and use its facility for his physical workout. Verily, Guerrero failed to prove work-causation
of the subject injury. It may not be amiss to state at this juncture that the LA, the NLRC and the CA have
similarly concluded that Guerrero's injury resulted from his crew gym workout on January 22, 2012.
Guerrero's contentions that his disability is permanent and total because Dr. Catbagan, the company-
designated physician, failed to issue a medical certificate as to his fitness for work resumption or disability
within the 240-day maximum period, and because his chosen physician, Dr. Garcia, issued a medical
certificate finding him unfit for further service as a seafarer, would not advance his cause against the
respondents.
To begin with, these arguments offered by Guerrero via the present petition were not raised before the labor
tribunal and, thus, cannot be considered on appeal. It is well settled that matters that were neither alleged in
the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal and
are barred by estoppel.29 Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. To consider the alleged fact and argument belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic
principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
Further, the Court finds that the declaration of Dr. Garcia in the medical certificate that Guerrero
is "UNFIT for further sea service in whatever capacity as a SEAFARER" leaves much to be desired. Said
medical certification was not supported by any relevant and necessary diagnostic tests and/or procedures.
No medical records or other sufficient proof was adduced to justify the above-mentioned
pronouncement/diagnosis. It bears stressing that Dr. Garcia issued the medical certificate on the very same
day that he was consulted by Guerrero. It is undisputed that the recommendation of Dr. Garcia was based
on a single medical report which outlined the alleged findings and medical history of Guerrero despite the
fact that said physician examined Guerrero only once. In the absence of adequate tests and reasonable
findings, Dr. Garcia's assessment should not be taken at face value. At best, Dr. Garcia's medical certificate
was merely concerned on the examination of Guerrero for purposes of diagnosis and treatment and not for
the determination of whether the latter incurred a disability.
At any rate, any further discussion as to whether Guerrero suffered a permanent and total disability which
entitles him to disability benefits, would be a mere surplusage. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Garcia
and the alleged failure of Dr. Catbagan to issue the pertinent medical certificate within the maximum period
of 240 days, are of no use and will not give Guerrero that cause of action he sorely lacked at the time he
filed his complaint. His injury is not work-related, hence, not compensable.
Lastly, the Court observes that Guerrero proffered varying narrations/versions as to how he allegedly
incurred his injury. In his Position Paper, Guerrero alleged that he sustained his injury when he lost his
balance while assisting an elderly passenger on a wheelchair to get off the vessel as required by the
management, but was able to regain equilibrium by pushing the wheelchair really hard. However, he gave
Dr. Catbagan a different account by stating that he started feeling the back pain "after doing exercise at the
gym" and this was reflected in the Medical Abstract/Discharge Summary.31 Meanwhile, in his
Comment/Opposition to Respondents-Appellants' Memorandum of Appeal,32 Guerrero modified his version
of the incident by adding that he heard a snap on his back while trying to maneuver the wheelchair and that
"the gym incident was only the aggravating factor to complainant's severe back pain."33 But in this present
petition, Guerrero alleged: Sometime in January 2012, he was involved in a medical call due to gastro-
intestinal problem of an elderly. Together with a fellow crew, they placed the elderly on a wheelchair, but
due to big waves, the vessel suddenly swayed before they could pass the platform of the bridge. As a
consequence, petitioner was out of balanced and fell with his back landed first on the metal floor.34
Nowhere in any of his pleadings filed before the labor tribunals and the CA was there any mention that
Guerrero accidentally fell with his back hitting the metal floor during the wheelchair incident. His
conflicting and inconsistent statements cast serious doubt on the veracity of his wheelchair theory.
Obviously, Guerrero willfully made such false statements in his futile attempt to deceive the labor tribunals,
the CA and this Court that he suffered a work-related injury so as to obtain a favorable judgment. Thus, for
not coming to court with clean hands and in order to prevent him from profiting from his own deception,
basic rules of fair play dictate that we should deny his claim for disability benefits all the more.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the NLRC in dismissing Guerrero's complaint. The special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion
must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction. In the case at bench, Guerrero failed to demonstrate that the dismissal of
his complaint by the NLRC was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or that the NLRC had no jurisdiction
to order the same. On the contrary, the dismissal was proper and warranted since Guerrero has no cause of
action against the respondents. We are so mindful that the respondents have exerted real efforts to extend
medical assistance and even paid for all the expenses incurred in the course of the treatment of Guerrero.
There is nothing on record that would justify a compensation on top of the aid and assistance already
extended to him. Let it be underscored that the constitutional policy to afford full protection to labor is never
meant to be a sword to oppress employers. While the Court is committed to the cause of the labor, the same
would not deter us from sustaining the employer when it is correct and proper. It must be emphasized that
justice is, in every case, for the deserving and must be dispensed with after a thorough scrutiny and
circumspect evaluation of the established facts, the applicable law/s and the prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 10, 2015 and Resolution dated January 14, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 132711 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT v. JOWELL P. SANTOS
The Antecedents
Jowell P. Santos (respondent) was hired as an environmental operator by C.F. Sharp Crew Management,
Inc., (CF Sharp) for and in behalf of its principal, Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., collectively known as
petitioners, on board the vessel "MIS Norwegian Gem" for a period of nine (9) months. He was deployed
on September 9, 2011. Sometime in December 2011, respondent experienced dizziness, over fatigue,
frequent urination and blurring of the eyesight. He was brought to the ship's clinic for initial medical
examination and was found to have elevated blood sugar and blood pressure. He was immediately referred
to Cape Canaveral Hospital in Miami, Florida, USA, where he was found to have a history of diabetes and
has been smoking a pack of cigarettes daily for ten (10) years.
On January 12, 2012, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines. The next day, or on January
13, 2012, he was immediately referred to CF Sharp's company-designated physicians at the Sachly
International Health Partners Clinic (SIHPC). The physicians subjected respondent to different tests and
treatments, which were recorded in several medical reports. It was confirmed that he had Diabetes Mellitus
II and hypertension. Respondent was advised to continue his medications. On May 4, 2012, respondent was
examined by a nephrologist who noted that he was asymptomatic with a blood pressure (BP) of 120/70. His
urinalysis and serum creatinine were normal. Thus, he was cleared from a nephrological standpoint and was
again advised to continue his maintenance medications. Thereafter, after 118 days from repatriation, the
company-designated physicians issued a certification stating that respondent's condition was not work-
related and that his final disability grading assessment for hypertension and diabetes was Grade 12.
Unconvinced, respondent consulted Dr. May S. Donato-Tan (Dr. Donato-Tan), a specialist in Internal
Medicine and Cardiology. In her medical certificate, Dr. Donato-Tan noted that respondent had high blood
pressure and uncontrolled diabetes mellitus. She also opined that respondent's condition was work-related
due to the pressure in the cruise ship, which elevated his blood pressure, and that the food therein was not
balanced, which elevated his blood sugar. She concluded that respondent was permanently disabled to
discharge his duties as a seafarer. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for disability and sickness benefits
with damages before the LA.
The LA Ruling
In its decision dated November 23, 2012, the LA ruled in favor of respondent. It found that
respondent suffered from permanent and total disabilities due to his hypertension and diabetes. The LA also
awarded the maximum benefits provided by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between
petitioners and respondent. The dispositive portion of the LA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering respondents
C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc., and/or Norwegian Cruise Line LTD., to pay, jointly and severally,
complainant Jowell P. Santos the aggregate amount of NINETY ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE AND 66/100 US DOLLARS (US$91,633.66) or its Philippine peso equivalent at the time
of actual payment, representing permanent disability benefits and sickness wages, plus ten percent (10%)
thereof as and for attorney's fees. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit. Aggrieved, petitioners
appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In its decision dated July 30, 2013, the NLRC modified the decision of the LA. It held that
respondent did not suffer from a permanent and total disability because he failed to prove that the diabetes
and hypertension he suffered were work-related. The NLRC gave credence to the medical assessment and
finding of the company-designated physicians, which stated that respondent only suffered a partial disability
of Grade 12. It also found that respondent was entitled to a sickness pay. The NLRC disposed the case in
this wise: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appeal is partly GRANTED. The decision dated 23
November 2012 is MODIFIED. The grant of total and permanent disability benefits is set aside but the
award of sickness pay in the sum of One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Three US Dollars and 66/100
(US$1,633.66) remains. In addition, appellants are ordered to pay appellee the sum of Five Thousand Two
Hundred TwentyFive US Dollars (US$5,225.00) as financial assistance for his illness. SO ORDERED.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
September 24, 2013. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA arguing that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
The CA Ruling
In its decision dated May 20, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling and reinstated
the LA ruling. It held that respondent suffered from permanent and total disabilities because of his
hypertension and diabetes. The CA opined that respondent's diseases were work-related because these were
caused by the unhealthy working conditions in petitioners' ship. It also ruled that respondent had the right
to consult his independent physician of choice to determine the degree of his disability. The CA concluded
that since 120 days had passed but respondent had not returned to work, he is entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits. The fallo of the CA decision states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 30, 2013 and the resolution dated September 24, 2013
of the National Labor Relations Commission (Fifth Division) in NLRC NCR-OFW-M-04-06542-12, NLRC
LAC No. 01-000071-13 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision dated November 23,
2012 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the
CA in its resolution dated July 30, 2014. Hence, this petition, chiefly anchored on the following issues:
I: WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA) STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT (SEC) WERE
COMPLIED WITH BY THE PARTIES.
II: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY
BENEFITS DUE TO HIS HYPERTENSION AND DIABETES.
Petitioners argue that the medical certificate of respondent's physician of choice should not have
been considered because the conflicting medical assessments were not referred to a third doctor under the
POEA-SEC. They also assert that diabetes is not listed as a work-related illness under Section 32-A of the
POEA-SEC, hence, not compensable. Petitioners further claim that respondent's hypertension was not
compensable because it does not involve an end organ damage for essential hypertension. They likewise
highlighted that the mere lapse of the 120-day period does not result in the grant of total and permanent
disability benefits because the timely medical findings of the company-designated physicians must be
respected. As the said physician only gave a Grade 12 disability, petitioners conclude that respondent is only
entitled to US$5,225.00.
In his Comment,8 respondent countered that the petition raises questions of fact, which cannot be entertained
by the Court. He also argued that diabetes is a compensable disease, which was aggravated by his
hypertension. Respondent claimed that his diseases were presumed to be work-related and petitioners failed
to prove that there was no reasonable casual connection with the illnesses sustained and the work performed.
In their Reply, petitioners reiterated that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does not
automatically entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits. They argued that respondent's
allegation that his work conditions in their cruise ship aggravated his condition was completely
unsubstantiated. Petitioners concluded that, at best, respondent is only entitled to a Grade 12 disability
benefit under the POEA-SEC.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious. The law that defines permanent and total disability of laborers
would be Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code, which provides that:
ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability - (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules;
On the other hand, the rule referred to - Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, which implemented Book IV of the Labor Code (IRR) states:
Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such
disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days
from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the
System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime after 120 days of continuous temporary total
disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as
determined by the System.
These provisions should be read in relation to the POEA-SEC wherein Sec. 20(A) (3) states:
In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also
receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the
time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness
allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis,
but not less than once a month.10
In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad11 (Crystal Shipping), the Court ruled that "[p]ermanent disability is
the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the
use of any part of his body."12 Thereafter, litigant-seafarers relied on Crystal Shipping to claim permanent
and total disability benefits because they were incapacitated to work for more than 120 days.
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.13 (Vergara), however, the Court declared that the doctrine
in Crystal Shipping - that inability to perform customary work for more than 120 days constitutes permanent
total disability - is not absolute. By considering the law, the POEA-SEC, and especially the
IRR, Vergara extended the period within which the company-designated physician could declare a
seafarer's fitness or disability to 240 days. Further, the disability grading issued by the company-designated
physician was given more weight compared to the mere incapacity of the seafarer for a period of more than
120 days.
Recently, in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr.14 (Elburg), it was confirmed that the
Crystal Shipping doctrine was not binding because a seafarer's disability should not be simply determined
by the number of days that he could not work. Nevertheless, it was held that the determination of the fitness
of a seafarer by the company-designated physician should be subject to the periods prescribed by
law. Elburg provided a summation of periods when the company-designated physician must assess the
seafarer, to wit:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability
grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without
any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a
sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then
the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove
that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240
days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification. 15
Finally, in Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Osias,16 the Court reaffirmed: (1) that mere inability to
work for a period of 120 days does not entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits; (2) that
the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the company-designated
physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law; (3) that the company-designated physician has an initial
120 days to determine the fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the period of treatment may only
be extended to 240 days if a sufficient justification exists such as when further medical treatment is required
or when the seafarer is uncooperative.
The company-designated physicians timely gave their medical assessment within the 120-day period
The CA found that since respondent was unable to work as a seafarer for more than 120 days, he is deemed
to have a permanent and total disability. The Court disagrees. While a seafarer is entitled to temporary total
disability benefits during his treatment period, it does not follow that he should likewise be entitled to
permanent total disability benefits when his disability was assessed by the company-designated physician
after his treatment. He may be recognized to have permanent disability because of the period he was out of
work and could not work, but the extent of his disability (whether total or partial) is determined, not
by the number of days that he could not work, but by the disability grading the doctor recognizes
based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages.18
It is the doctor's findings that should prevail as he or she is equipped with the proper discernment,
knowledge, experience and expertise on what constitutes total or partial disability. The physician's
declaration serves as the basis for the degree of disability that can range anywhere from Grade 1 to Grade
14. Notably, this is a serious consideration that cannot be determined by simply counting the number of
treatment lapsed days.19
Accordingly, the timely medical assessment of a company-designated physician is given great significance
by the Court to determine whether a seafarer is entitled to disability benefits. Indeed, the mere inability of a
seafarer to work for a period of 120 days is not the sole basis to determine a seafarer's disability.
In this case, respondent was repatriated in the Philippines on January 12, 2012. The next day, or on January
13, 2012, he was immediately referred to CF Sharp's company-designated physicians. He was then subjected
to different tests and treatments, which were recorded in several medical reports. It was confirmed that he
had Diabetes Mellitus II and hypertension. On May 4, 2012, respondent was cleared from the nephrology
standpoint and was advised to continue his maintenance medications. Thereafter, after 118 days from
repatriation, the company-designated physicians issued a certification stating that respondent's condition
was not work-related and that his final disability grading assessment for his hypertension and diabetes was
Grade 12.20
Verily, the company-designated physicians suitably gave their medical assessment of respondent's disability
before the lapse of the 120-day period. It was even unnecessary to extend the period of medical assessment
to 240 days. After rigorous medical diagnosis and treatments, the company designated physicians found that
respondent only had a partial disability and gave a Grade 12 disability rating.
As the medical assessment of the company-designated physicians was meticulously and timely provided, it
must be given weight and credibility by the Court. The medical assessment of the company-designated
physician was not validly challenged
Sec. 20(A) (3) of the POEA-SEC provides for a mechanism to challenge the validity of the company-
designated physician's assessment:
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
The referral to a third doctor is mandatory when: (1) there is a valid and timely assessment by the company-
designated physician and (2) the appointed doctor of the seafarer refuted such assessment.
In INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Rosales, the Court stated that to definitively clarify how a conflict situation
should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company doctor's assessment based
on the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarer's own doctor, the seafarer shall then
signify his intention to resolve the conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a third
doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon notification, the
company carries the burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed
between the parties. Further, in Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Constantino, it was declared that: In the
absence of any request from Constantino (as shown by the records of the case), the employer-company
cannot be expected to respond. As the party seeking to impugn the certification that the law itself recognizes
as prevailing, Constantino bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctor's findings are correct,
as well as the burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been made by his own physician.
Upon such notification, the company must itself respond by setting into motion the process of choosing a
third doctor who, as the POEA-SEC provides, can rule with finality on the disputed medical situation.
In this case, petitioner's chosen physician, Dr. Donato-Tan, issued a medical certificate indicating a total
and permanent disability because of hypertension and uncontrolled diabetes, which conflicted with the
assessment of the company-designated physicians. Glaringly, respondent only presented a lone medical
certificate from Dr. Donato-Tan, which was in contrast with the extensive and numerous medical assessment
of the company-designated physicians. Consequently, the credibility and reliability of Dr. Donato-Tan's
medical certificate is doubtful.
More importantly, respondent never signified his intention to resolve the disagreement with petitioners'
company-designated physicians by referring the matter to a third doctor. It is only through the procedure
provided by the POEA-SEC, in which he was a party, can he question the timely medical assessment of the
company-designated physician and compel the petitioners to jointly seek an appropriate third doctor. Absent
proper compliance, the final medical report of the company-designated physician must be upheld. Ergo, he
is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
Hypertension and diabetes does not ipso facto result into a permanent and total disability
Even if the medical assessment of respondent's physician of choice is considered on the substantive aspect,
the Court finds that the hypertension and diabetes of respondent do not warrant a grant of permanent and
total disability benefits.
Essential hypertension is among the occupational diseases enumerated in Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC.26 To
enable compensation, the mere occurrence of hypertension, even as it is work-related and concurs with the
four (4) basic requisites of the first paragraph of Sec. 32-A, does not suffice. The POEA-SEC requires an
element of gravity. It speaks of essential hypertension only as an overture to the impairment of function of
body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain. This impairment must then be of such severity as to be
resulting in permanent disability. Sec. 32-A, paragraph 2,27 thus, requires three successive occurrences: first,
the contracting of essential hypertension; second, organ impairment arising from essential hypertension; and
third, permanent disability arising from that impairment.28 In keeping with the requisite gravity occasioning
essential hypertension, the mere averment of essential hypertension and its incidents do not suffice. 29
On the other hand, diabetes is not among Sec. 32-A's listed occupational diseases. As with hypertension, it
is a complex medical condition typified by gradations. Blood sugar levels classify as normal, prediabetes,
or diabetes depending on the glucose level of a patient. 30 Diabetes mellitus is a metabolic and a familial
disease to which one is pre-disposed by reason of heredity, obesity or old age.31 It does not indicate work-
relatedness and by its nature, is more the result of poor lifestyle choices and health habits for which disability
benefits are improper.
In this case, the company-designated physicians found that respondent had Diabetes Mellitus II
and hypertension. However, they opined that respondent's hypertension was not essential or primary, hence,
it was not severe. Thus, the company-designated physicians concluded that respondent's hypertension was
only a partial disability. As stated earlier, the mere occurrence of hypertension does not suffice because the
POEA-SEC requires that it be severe or grave in order to become a permanent and total disability.
Similarly, the company-designated physicians' observed that respondent's diabetes, aside from
not being listed as an occupational disease, was also not severe, thus, merely a partial disability. The
nephrologist even noted that respondent's BP was 120/70 and his urinalysis and serum creatinine were
normal. Thus, he was cleared from the nephrology standpoint and was advised to continue his maintenance
medications.
On the other hand, respondent's physician of choice simply stated that respondent had
hypertension and uncontrolled diabetes because of the unhealthy food in the cruise ship and the stress of
work therein. However, the said physician failed to validate her findings with concrete medical and factual
proofs and simply based her conclusions on a single medical check-up. Compared to the thorough medical
procedure conducted by the company-designated physicians, the findings of respondent's chosen physician
were unsubstantiated.
Manifestly, hypertension and diabetes do not ipso facto warrant the award of permanent and total
disability benefits to a seafarer. Notably, Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC recognizes that a seafarer can still be
employed even if he has hypertension and/or diabetes provided that he shows compliance with the
prescribed maintenance medications and doctor-recommended lifestyle changes. As the company-
designated physicians opined that respondent only had a Grade 12 disability, then he is only entitled to
US$5,225.00 as partial disability benefit.33 The sickness pay of US$1,633.66 during respondent's period of
treatment is also affirmed. Lastly, pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the Court imposes on the monetary
awards an interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until full satisfaction. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE v. MICHAEL PADERES ATRAJE
The third doctor rule does not apply when there is no final and definitive assessment by the
company-designated physicians. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 against the Court of Appeals
August 5, 2016 Decision and January 5, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 141333. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the May 15, 2015 Decision of the Office of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board granting Michael Paderes Atraje (Atraje) permanent total disability
benefits in the amount of US$95,949.00 and 10% attorney's fees. It also denied Magsaysay Mol Marine,
Inc. (Magsaysay Mol) and Mol Ship Management (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.'s (Mol Ship) Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows: On February 11, 2014, Atraje
entered into a Contract of Employment with Mol Ship, through its local manning agent, Magsaysay Mol, to
work on board the vessel Carnation Ace as Second Cook. The employment contract was for nine (9) months
with a basic monthly salary of US$599.00. It was his seventh (7th) contract with the company. Atraje boarded
the vessel on February 28, 2014.
On March 4, 2014, at around noontime, Atraje slipped and fell while holding a casserole
containing water and sliced vegetables. His head hit the stainless disposer and the floor. He had seizure and
lost his consciousness for about five (5) hours. The incident was witnessed by the messman who was with
him at that time. When the vessel reached Singapore on March 8, 2014, he was brought to Singapore General
Hospital, where he underwent brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), electroencephalogram (EEG), and
brain computed tomography (CT) scan. He was diagnosed to have suffered Epileptic Seizure with post-fit
neurological deficit. He was declared unfit to work and recommended to be repatriated.
Atraje arrived in the Philippines on March 12, 2014, and was referred to Shiphealth, Inc.
(Shiphealth)12for further medical evaluation and treatment. He was noted to have left-sided hemiparesis. He
underwent repeat brain CT scan, electrocardiography (ECG), EEG, and brain MRI, which showed normal
results. He was advised to undergo physical therapy for motor function and muscle strength improvements.
Atraje likewise underwent cervical spine MRI showing "mild desiccation at C3-4, C4-5, C5-6 with
impression of mild cervical spondylosis with multi-level disc disease." He was still advised to undergo
physical therapy.
On April 4, 2014, Atraje was examined by an Orthopedic Spine Surgeon wherein the assessment
was Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament. He was advised to continue with the physical therapy and
oral medications for the next two (2) weeks, and to undergo laminoplasty, C3-C6, if the left-sided weakness
persisted or worsened. On April 25, 2014, Shiphealth issued a medical report stating that the Neurologist
service's reassessment was single seizure episode. There was no indication for Atraje to undergo further
diagnostic or treatment intervention neurology-wise. Hence, Atraje was discharged from Neurology service,
although referral to Orthopedic Spine Surgery was recommended. On May 12, 2014, Atraje completed his
12 sessions of physical therapy. However, persistence of gait instability and weakness on his left side were
still noted. Additionally, he reported intermittent recurrences of lower back pain. Shiphealth opined that "the
current symptoms of weakness and spasticity of the left upper and lower extremities could be secondary to
the [Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament]." Surgery was contemplated or, as an alternative, physical
therapy for an indefinite period of time. The company-designated physicians further stated that the cervical
Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament may be pre-existing. "However, slight trauma to the neck may
cause symptoms which may qualify it as work-aggravated."Atraje continued to suffer from shoulder and
neck pain, and had difficulty in using his upper extremities. He complained of tenderness on the paracervical
area and was not restored to his pre-injury health status. He consulted an independent specialist, Dr. Manuel
Fidel M. Magtira (Dr. Magtira), who issued on June 19, 2014 a Medical Report, which stated that Atraje
was "permanently unfit in any capacity to resume his sea duties as a seaman."
On June 25, 2014 or 105 days from disembarkation, Shiphealth issued an Interim Disability
Grading of Grade 10: "Head, moderate paralysis of two (2) extremities producing moderate difficulty in
movements with self-care activities."Atraje was referred to Ygeia Medical Center, Inc. (Ygeia Medical
Center) for second opinion. In a letter24dated October 2, 2014, Dr. Lourdes A. Quetulio (Dr. Quetulio), the
Medical Director of Ygeia Medical Center, stated that Atraje's illnesses, namely, "Herniated Nucleus
Pulposus L3-4, L4-5, LS-S1 with Spondylosis and Radiculopathy, Bilateral Cervical Radiculopathy C5-C6
with degenerative changes; and Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Left, Moderate, are not work-related."Atraje
sought payment of disability benefits from Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship, invoking Article 28 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between All Japan Seamen's Union/Associated Marine Officers' and
Seamen's Union of the Philippines, and Mol Ship, represented by Magsaysay Mol. This Agreement is
otherwise known as the IBF JSU/AMOSUP-IMMAJ CBA. However, Atraje's demands proved futile. Thus,
he filed a Complaint against Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship for payment of total and permanent disability
benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. On November 17, 2014, the parties agreed to terminate the mediation
and to convene a Voluntary Arbitration Panel. Not reaching an amicable settlement, the parties were directed
to submit their respective pleadings.
In its May 15,2015 Decision, the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board awarded disability benefits of US$95,949.00 plus 10% of this amount as attorney's fees in
favor of Atraje. Finding that his injuries were work-related, it held that there was sufficient evidence to
establish that he indeed suffered a fall while on board the ship, which caused injury to his neck area and his
wrist. However, preexistence of epileptic seizure has not been proven. The Panel of Voluntary Arbiters
further gave credence to the Grade 1 assessment of Atraje's physician over the company-designated
physician's interim assessment of Grade 10. It further noted that while Atraje initiated submitting to
examination by a third doctor, there was silence on the part of Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship. Hence, it held
that Atraje could not be faulted anymore if the appointment of a third physician was deemed waived in this
case. Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Panel of
Voluntary Arbiters' July 3, 2015 Resolution. Atraje filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted by the
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship paid Atraje the amount of US$95,949.00 plus
10% of this amount as attorney's fees, without prejudice to the outcome of their Rule 65 petition before the
Court of Appeals. A Deed of Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment dated September 24, 2015 was executed
between the parties and submitted to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. In its August 5, 2016
Decision and January 5, 2017 Resolution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators'
decision and denied Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship's subsequent motion for reconsideration. On March 1,
2017, Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court.
Petitioners maintain that respondent is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits because
his illnesses are not work-related, according to the letter of Dr. Quetulio on October 2, 2014. They add that
respondent's repatriation was not due to his alleged accident but due to a single episode of seizure, the cause
of which was unknown per the medical report of the same company-designated doctor.53 Finally, petitioners
argue that referral to a third doctor in case of conflicting findings of the company-designated doctor and the
seafarer's personal doctor is mandatory. Since respondent failed to comply with this requirement, the
assessment of the company-designated doctor should prevail.
In his Comment, respondent counters that his medical conditions are compensable under the
governing Collective Bargaining Agreement and that the Court of Appeals did not err in granting him
permanent and total disability benefits. The statements of Messman Francisco M. De Guzman (Messman
De Guzman)58 and Chief Cook Alvin Bartolome (Chief Cook Bartolome) show clearly that respondent
suffered an accidental fall while on duty. Respondent adds that petitioners have not presented a Master's
Report to prove their allegation that no accident occurred that time. Moreover, the Certification of Capt. Igor
Pisarenko (Capt. Pisarenko) that there was no record of an accident involving respondent in the ship's official
logbook is not the best evidence of this fact; rather, it is the logbook itself. Respondent contends that
"[p]etitioners' unjustifiable failure to present the 'Carnation Ace' logbook is tantamount to willful
suppression of evidence, adverse to them if presented." Respondent further contends that Dr. Quetulio's
October 2, 2014 letter relied upon by petitioners does not discount but even lends support to his claim that
his medical conditions are work-related. Dr. Quetulio's opinion that his injury is not work-related is negated
by the Grade 10 assessment given by the other company-designated physicians at Shiphealth, which
constituted "an admission that [respondent's] disabling conditions are work-related nothing less."
Finally, respondent counters that non-referral to a third doctor is not a drawback to his complaint.
In the first place, the medical assessment and opinion of the company-designated doctors were not disclosed
to him. He came to know about them only after his complaint had been filed. As of April 21, 2014, the
company stopped providing for his treatment and he was, since then, left on his own. He could not have
complied with the third doctor rule since he was not given any assessment by the company-designated
physicians even after his treatment had been supposedly terminated. If at all, it was petitioners who
committed a breach of contract by withholding and concealing his medical records. This Court resolves the
issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of permanent and total disability
benefits in favor of respondent Michael Paderes Atraje. This Court denies the Petition.
I
Petitioners insist that respondent's illnesses are not work-related. They anchor their position on Dr.
Quetulio's declaration in her October 2, 2014 letter that without any past medical results or examinations, it
was difficult to trace the causes of the illnesses, thereby concluding that they were not work-related.68
However, the same letter relied upon by petitioners likewise acknowledged that "Herniated Nucleus
Pulposus is considered work-related if there is history of trauma or carrying of heavy objects. Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome is considered work-related if there is history of repetitive movement of the involved
wrist/hand."69 Shiphealth's earlier report also declared that a "slight trauma to the neck may cause symptoms
which may qualify [respondent's injuries] as work[-]aggravated."70
In this case, it has been established that there was history of trauma at work involving respondent while on
board the vessel. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators held that substantial evidence 71 exists showing that
respondent indeed suffered a fall while on board the ship, which caused injury to his neck area and his wrist.
[E]xtant from the uncontested statement of Chief Cook Alvin Bartolome, that he together with Messman De
Guzman saw [respondent] had a sudden fall which incident they immediately reported to their superiors . .
. [W]hen [respondent] regained his consciousness, he was asked why and he answered that he was not able
to sleep due to the noise of the air-conditioning unit in his cabin. Such recorded event of [respondent] having
suffered a fall and/or lost consciousness while in the course of performing duties as Second Cook aboard
has gained prominence as the starting point of the medical condition . . .
It does not require a rocket scientist to ascertain the fact that a person who suffers from lack of
or without sleep has weakened systems with tendency to pass out and/or prone to accident. Hence, the
sudden fall experienced by [respondent] at work which resulted to the disabling injury on his neck area and
aggravated by the injury on his wrist otherwise known as Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. The Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators further found no evidence to prove that respondent's condition "merely arose from wear and tear
or degeneration," or that he was suffering from a preexistent illness. These factual findings of the Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and will not be disturbed
absent any showing that they were made arbitrarily or were unsupported by substantial evidence. Petitioners
would insist, however, that there was no accident involving respondent. They point to the Certification of
Capt. Pisarenko, which stated as follows:
CERTIFICATION
I, Capt. Igor Pisarenko, am the custodian of the logbook of the ship Carnation Ace. The ship's logbook is a
repository of all the ship's activities, including incidents of accidents or injuries onboard. I do certify that
upon review of the ship's official logbook, there appears no record of an accident involving Mr. Michael P.
Atraje. Mr. Michael P. Atraje was engaged as 2nd Cook onboard Carnation Ace from 28 February 2014 until
08 March 2014. This Court is not persuaded.
As a rule, a Rule 45 review by this Court in labor cases does not delve into factual questions or
to an evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties.77 This Court is tasked to merely determine the
legal correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators in awarding full disability benefits to respondent.78 Even so, this Court
finds Capt. Pisarenko's Certification proffered by petitioners insufficient to prove their claim that Atraje did
not incur an accident. Capt. Pisarenko's Certification lacks probative value. First, it was not authenticated
by Philippine consular officials. Second, the vessel's logbook, which is the official repository of the daily
transactions and occurrences on board the vessel,79 is the best evidence of its contents.80 In Haverton
Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC,81 this Court declared that entries made in the vessel's logbook, when "made by a
person in the performance of a duty required by law[,] are prima facie evidence of the facts stated [in
it]."However, the logbook itself or authenticated copies of pertinent pages of it must be presented and not
merely "typewritten excerpts from the 'logbook' [that] have no probative value at all."
In C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Legal Heirs of Repiso,84 this Court rejected an
employer's claim that a seafarer was merely repatriated at a convenient port and not due to medical illness,
and held: The burden was thus shifted to petitioners to prove that Godofredo was only repatriated at a
convenient port. However, aside from their bare allegations, petitioners did not present any other proof of
their purported reason for Godofredo's repatriation. Petitioners explain that they no longer presented in
evidence the ship's logbook or master's report since Godofredo did not complain of or suffer any illness on
board M/T Umm Al Lulu, hence, there was no such entry in the ship's logbook or any master's report of such
incident. The Court notes though that petitioners had possession of and access to all logbooks and
records of M/T Umm Al Lulu, and presentation of the said logbooks and records would have been
material to prove the actual absence of any entry or report regarding Godofredo's health while he was
on board.Moreover, it is difficult to believe that petitioners had absolutely no log entry or record regarding
Godofredo's repatriation, whether for medical or any other reason. Godofredo could not have disembarked
from M/T Umm Al Lulu without express authority or consent from the master of the ship or petitioners as
Godofredo's employers, and such authority or consent would have most likely stated the justifying cause for
the same. That petitioners did not present such logbooks and records even gives rise to the
presumption that something in said logbooks and records is actually adverse to petitioners'
case.85 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners should have presented the vessel's logbook instead of a mere unauthenticated Certification of a
certain Capt. Pisarenko, who was not even shown to be the ship captain during respondent's employment.
Moreover, even if no record of the accident is reflected in the logbook, this does not constitute conclusive
proof that it did not happen, especially in light of the positive declarations of Chief Cook Bartolome and
Messman De Guzman that respondent suffered a fall while at work. To be compensable, reasonable proof
of work-connection, not direct causal relation, is sufficient. "Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of
certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings."86This Court agrees with the Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators and the Court of Appeals that respondent's illnesses are work-related.
II
Neither did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators' award of permanent
total disability benefits. The facts of this case show that respondent was never issued any medical assessment
or progress report by the company-designated physicians, from his initial check up on March 13, 201487 until
his last consultation on October 2, 2014, spanning a total of 204 days. Neither the interim disability rating
issued on June 25, 2014 nor Dr. Quetulio's letter dated October 2, 2014 was given to respondent. In fact,
respondent came to know about the reports only after his Complaint had been filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board. By legal contemplation, Atraje's disabilities are conclusively presumed
to be permanent and total.
Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC), it is the primary responsibility of the company-designated doctor to determine the disability
grading or fitness to work of seafarers. To be conclusive, however, the medical assessment or report of the
company-designated physician must be complete and definite to give the seafarer proper disability benefits.
As explained by this Court:
A final and definite disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the true extent of the
sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such. Otherwise, the
corresponding disability benefits awarded might not be commensurate with the prolonged effects of the
injuries suffered (Emphasis in the original) Furthermore, while the assessment of the company-designated
physician vis a vis the schedule of disabilities under the POEA-SEC is the basis for compensability of a
seafarer's disability, it is still subject to the periods prescribed in the law.
Article 192(c)(l) of the Labor Code provides that temporary total disability lasting continuously
for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the Implementing Rules or the Amended Rules on
Employee Compensation of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, shall be deemed total and permanent. Rule
X, Section 2(a) of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation in turn provides that:
Section 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such
disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240
days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the
System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total
disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as
determined by the System.94 (Emphasis supplied)
In Talaroc v. Arpaphil Shipping Corp., this Court summarized the rules regarding the duty of the company-
designated physician in issuing a final medical assessment, as follows:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's
disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days,
without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days
with a sufficient justification (e.g, seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period
of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any
justification.96
Here, the company-designated physicians clearly breached their duty to provide a definite assessment of
respondent's condition. While the records show that reports were regularly issued to update respondent's
medical condition, the particular treatment administered, and the medicines prescribed to him, they were
correspondences between the company-designated physicians and petitioners only. There was no indication
that respondent was furnished these reports.
Significantly, the interim disability rating of Grade 10 issued on June 25, 2014, or 105 days from
respondent's repatriation, was never given to respondent. Also, as an interim disability grade, it does not
fully assess respondent's condition and cannot provide sufficient basis for the award of disability benefits in
his favor. In fact, the company doctors recommended that respondent undergo MRI of the lumbosacral
spine97 and surgery. Respondent was, instead, referred by petitioners to Ygeia Medical Center for a second
medical opinion.
Dr. Quetulio's October 2, 2014 letter, on the other hand, stated that "without any past medical results or
examinations from Mr. Atraje, . . . it would be difficult to trace the cause of the illnesses. Therefore,
concluding, that Mr. Atraje's illnesses are not work-related."98 This report lacked a final assessment of
respondent's medical condition, of his disability, or of his fitness to work. On the contrary, it is noted from
the report that physical therapy was recommended by the Neuro-Psychiatrist for further management of
respondent's condition. Similar to the June 25, 2014 interim disability rating, respondent also did not have
a copy of this report.
Through all his check-ups and tests, respondent did not receive any medical assessment of his
fitness to resume work from the company-designated physicians. Respondent's shoulder and neck pain
persisted such that he was forced to consult an independent physician, Dr. Magtira. After evaluating
respondent's previous MRI and physical examination, and after giving a brief description of respondent's
disease, Dr. Magtira issued his Medical Report on June 19, 2014. He stated that respondent "should refrain
from activities producing torsional stress on the back and those that require repetitive bending and
lifting" and that his work activities must be restricted. He further stated that respondent does not have the
physical capacity to return to his previous work and is "permanently unfit in any capacity to resume his sea
duties."
Evidently, his illnesses disabled him to continue his job on board the vessel. Despite medication
and physical therapy, he was not restored to his pre-injury health status. Moreover, there was no declaration
from the company-designated doctors about his fitness to return to work, while his own physician advised
him to refrain from undergoing strenuous activities. This Court has held that:
[P]ermanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness but the inability to do substantially
all material acts necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and
without material injury or danger to life. In disability compensation, it is not the injury per se which is
compensated but the incapacity to work. Respondent's inability to perform his customary sea duties, coupled
with the company-designated physicians' abdication of their primary duty to declare his fitness or unfitness
to work within the prescribed period, transforms his disability to permanent and total by operation of law.
III
Finally, petitioners' contention on non-compliance with the third doctor rule is untenable. Under Section
20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, "If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a
third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall
be final and binding on both parties." The assessment refers to the declaration of fitness to work or the
degree of disability, as can be gleaned from the first paragraph of Section 20(A)(3). It presupposes that the
company-designated physician came up with a valid, final, and definite assessment on the seafarer's fitness
or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120- or 240-day period.
In this case, the third doctor-referral provision does not apply because there is no definite
disability assessment from the company-designated physicians. In Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar:
In addition, that it was by operation of law that brought forth the conclusive presumption that Munar is
totally and permanently disabled, there is no legal compulsion for him to observe the procedure prescribed
under Section 20-B (3) of the POEA-SEC. A seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes
that the company-designated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to
work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification
from the company-designated physician, the seafarer had nothing to contest and the law steps in to
conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent.
Respondent was kept in the dark about his medical condition. It is the height of unfairness,
bordering on bad faith, for petitioners to demand from respondent compliance with the third doctor rule
when they and their designated physicians, in the first place, did not fulfill their obligations under the law
and the POEA-SEC. Given the company-designated physicians' inaction or failure to disclose respondent's
medical progress, the extent of his illnesses, and their effect on his fitness or disability, respondent was
justified in seeking the medical expertise of the physician of his choice.
In Sharpe Sea Personnel, Inc. v. Mabunay, Jr., a company's belated release of the disability rating
and its attempt to discredit the findings of a seafarer's doctor for non-compliance with the third doctor rule
was considered by this Court as acts of bad faith, which justified the award of damages in favor of the
seafarer. It held: By not timely releasing Dr. Cruz's interim disability grading, petitioners revealed their
intention to leave respondent in the dark regarding his future as a seafarer and forced him to seek diagnosis
from private physicians. Petitioners' bad faith was further exacerbated when they tried to invalidate the
findings of respondent's private physicians, for his supposed failure to move for the appointment of a third-
patty physician as required by the POEA-SEC, despite their own deliberate concealment of their physician's
interim diagnosis from respondent and the labor tribunals. Thus, this Court concurs with the Court of
Appeals when it stated:
We also grant petitioner's prayer for moral and exemplary damages. Private respondents acted
in bad faith when they belatedly submitted petitioner's Grade 8 disability rating only via their motion for
reconsideration before the [National Labor Relations Commission]. By withholding such disability rating
from petitioner, the latter was compelled to seek out opinion from his private doctors thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings, thus, entitling him to moral damages of P50,000.00.
Too, by way of example or correction for the public good, exemplary damages of P50,000.00 is awarded.
In this case, however, respondent no longer questioned the denial of his claims for moral and exemplary
damages. Neither did he raise before the Court of Appeals or this Court the issue of whether he was entitled
to these damages. Instead, he sought the execution of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators' May 15, 2015
Decision while petitioners' Rule 65 petition was pending before the Court of Appeals. Hence, this matter
will no longer be tackled here. Furthermore, as noted by the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, non-referral of
the case to a third doctor was attributable to petitioners. For while respondent initiated to be submitted to
examination by a third doctor, there was silence on the part of petitioners,112 who did not respond by setting
into motion the process of choosing a third doctor who could rule with finality the disputed medical
situation.113
Lastly, petitioners were adamant in their position that respondent's disabling medical conditions are not
work-related. The third doctor rule covers only conflicting medical findings on the fitness to work or degree
of disability. It does not cover the determination of whether the disability is work-related or not. As this
Court held in Leonis Navigation Co. v. Obrero:114
[U]nder Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA-SEC, referral to a third physician in case of contrasting medical
opinions (between the company-designated physician and the seafarer-appointed physician) is a mandatory
procedure that must be expressly requested by the seafarer. As a consequence of the provision, the company
can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another physician, unless the seafarer
signifies his intent to submit the disputed assessment to a third physician. We clarify, however, that Section
20 (B) (3) refers only to the declaration of fitness to work or the degree of disability. It does not cover
the determination of whether the disability is work-related. There is nothing in the POEA-SEC which
mandates that the opinion of the company-designated physician regarding work-relation should prevail or
that the determination of such relation be submitted to a third physician.115 (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted)
Under the circumstances of this case, non-referral to a third doctor will not prejudice respondent's claim.
The rigorous process for disability claims prescribed in the POEA SEC seeks a balance between a seafarer's
right to receive a just compensation for his or her injuries116 and an employer's interest to determine the
veracity of disability claims against it. In line with this policy, the third doctor rule was added to enable the
parties to expeditiously settle disability claims117 in case of conflict between the findings of the company-
designated physicians and the seafarer's doctor. It was not to be construed to mean that "it is only the
company-designated physician who could assess the condition and declare the disability of
seamen."118 Certainly, it cannot be used by employers to limit or defeat the legitimate claims of seafarers.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
LORNA B. DIONIO v. ND SHIPPING AGENCY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC.
The Antecedents
On May 9, 2006, Gil T. Dionio, Jr. (Gil), the husband of Lorna B. Dionio (petitioner), was
hired by ND Shipping Agency and Allied Services, Inc. (ND Shipping), for its foreign principal,
Caribbean Tow and Barge (Panama), Ltd., collectively referred as respondents, to serve as a Second
Engineer on board the vessel MT Caribbean Tug. He had a basic monthly salary of US$772.00 and the
period of his employment contract was six (6) months.5 Before assuming his employment, Gil had a clean
bill of health evidenced by his Medical and Laboratory Examination Result. Upon the expiration of his
employment contract, respondents and Gil mutually consented to extend the latter's contract until February
13, 2007.
On January 30, 2007, while in the course of his extended employment, Gil suffered from a
Urinary Tract Infection (UTI) and prostate enlargement. While the vessel was in Turk and Caicos Islands,
he was examined by Dr. Victoria Smith (Dr. Smith). In the Medical Report8 dated January 31, 2007, Dr.
Smith confirmed that Gil indeed suffered UTI and an enlarged prostate. She declared him unfit for work
and recommended his repatriation. Dr. Smith also advised that Gil be assessed by another physician
specializing on surgery and prostate examination. On February 13, 2007, Gil was medically repatriated.
On February 14, 2007, Gil arrived in the Philippines. He immediately went to ND Shipping's office where
he was issued a Referral Slip9 for medical examination at the Micah Medical Clinic and Diagnostic
Laboratory. The referral slip, however, stated that the expenses shall be paid for by Gil.
On the same day, a representative of the ND Shipping sent an email to K. Arnesen Shipping,
the owner of the vessel, requesting for the medical check-up of Gil at the ship owner's expense. The
request was denied and stated that Gil must arrange for his own medical check-up. Thus, Gil was never
examined by the company-designated physician. Gil's health condition became worse. Sometime in
February 2007, he went for a medical examination at Biñan Doctor's Hospital in Biñan, Laguna at his own
expense.
On April 2, 2007, Gil signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim11 in favor of respondents and he
received the total amount of P31,200.00. It stated that he was discharging ND Shipping, its stockholders,
directors and/or its employees from any and all actions in connection with his employment with respondents.
According to petitioner, her husband was in a hapless condition when he signed the waiver. As Gil's health
was deteriorating, he went home to his hometown in Iloilo. On June 5, 2007, he was admitted at the Iloilo
Doctor's Hospital. In the Medical Certificate dated June 20, 2007, Dr. Glenn Maclang (Dr. Maclang)
diagnosed Gil with "Prostatic Cancer Stage IV with wide spread metastasis." He also remarked that Gil
undergo bilateral orchiectomy. Due to his worsening condition, on March 12, 2008, Gil was again
hospitalized at the Seamen's Hospital - Iloilo. In the Medical Certificate dated March 24, 2008, Dr. Suset
Gargalicana (Dr. Gargalicana) diagnosed him with "Prostatic Cancer with Bone Metastasis." She
recommended the treatment of blood transfusion. Nonetheless, Dr. Gargalicana could not determine the
period of his healing.
On March 26, 2008, Gil was again admitted at the West Visayas State University Medical Center.
In the Medical Certificate14 dated April 12, 2008, Dr. Elma Marañon (Dr. Marañon) diagnosed Gil with
"Prostatic Cancer Stage IV with Bone Metastasis and Cord Compression Anemia Secondary" which caused
the paralysis of his lower extremities. On May 4, 2008, after more than a year of battling cancer, Gil
succumbed to his illness. In the Death Certificate issued by Dr. Rhodelyn Almenana (Dr. Almenana), it was
stated that Gil died due to cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to multiple organ failure. The underlying cause
of his death was due to prostatic malignancy with pulmonary metastasis while other significant conditions
contributing to his death were pneumonia in the immunocompromised host and UTI. Thus, petitioner, the
legal wife of Gil, filed a complaint before the LA for payment of death benefits, sickness allowance, burial
expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. For their part, respondents denied any liability.
They contended that Gil's death is not compensable because he did not die during the term of his contract
and his illness is not one of those listed as an occupational disease under Section 32 of the 2000 Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration – Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Respondents also
argued that Gil failed to submit himself for a post-employment medical examination within three (3) days
after repatriation even though he was issued a referral slip to the company-designated physician.
The LA Ruling
In its decision dated May 29, 2009, the LA ruled in favor of petitioner. It held that it was clear that Gil was
declared unfit for work on January 31, 2007 and he was medically repatriated on February 13, 2007, hence,
he was entitled to sickness allowance. The LA held that respondent was wrong when it turned down the
request of Gil to be medically evaluated and treated. It emphasized that Gil was forced to submit himself to
further medical examination at his own expense. The LA observed that the illness of Gil was work-related
because he was medically repatriated due to his prostate ailment and his cause of death was prostatic
malignancy with pulmonary metastasis. It ruled that it is not required that the seafarer's ailment be acquired
during his employment for it is sufficient that his employment contributed, even in a small measure, to the
development of the disease. The fallo of the LA ruling states: WHEREFORE, premises considered[,]
respondent is hereby directed to pay complainant the following:
1. Sickness allowance US$3,088.00
2. Death Benefits US$50,000.00
[3.] Additional Compensation for Two children of the deceased Below 21 US$14,000.00
years old
4. Burial Expenses US$1,000.00
US$68,088.00
Or its Philippine peso equivalent of Php3,234,180.00
5. Attorney's fees 323,418.00
Total Php3,557,598.00
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.16
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In its decision dated September 29, 2009, the NLRC granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the LA
ruling. It held that Gil failed to submit himself to the medical examination of the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from repatriation, hence, he violated the POEA-SEC. The NLRC stated
that Gil was given a referral slip but he did not go to the company-designated physician. It also found that
petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Gil's illness was work-related. The dispositive
portion of the NLRC ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of ELA Danilo C. Acosta is hereby vacated and set
aside. A NEW Decision is entered dismissing this case for lack of merit. The monetary award in the
assailed decision is hereby deleted for lack of legal and factual basis. SO ORDERED. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated November 27, 2009.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
In its resolution dated October 26, 201 0, the CA dismissed the petition for not having been filed within
the 60-day reglementary period. In its resolution dated June 21, 2011, the CA declared that the October
26, 2010 resolution had attained finality.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and recall of entry of judgment. In its February 29, 2012, the
CA recalled its June 21, 2011 resolution. However, in its February 1, 2013 resolution, the CA eventually
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration because it was not persuaded to relax the procedural rules.19
Unconvinced, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court, docketed as G.R. No.
206063, entitled Lorna B. Dionio v. NLRC. In its resolution dated October 8, 2014, the Court found
compelling reasons to relax the procedural rules and required the CA to tackle the case on the merits. The
dispositive portion of the Court's resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 26, 2010 and February 1, 2013 Resolutions of the
Court of Appeal (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 05007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition of the merits of the case. 20
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court in its resolution dated
March 16, 2015.21 Hence, the case was remanded to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its decision dated February 21, 2017, the CA denied the petition on the merits. It held that petitioner
failed to prove with substantial evidence that the illness of Gil was work-related. The CA ruled that
petitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption that the illness of a seafarer is work-related.
Further, it opined that Gil failed to comply with the mandatory post-employment medical examination
within three (3) days upon repatriation. The CA observed that petitioner did not sufficiently establish that
ND Shipping refused to pay for Gil's medical examination. It disposed the case in this wise:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
September 29, 2009 and the Resolution dated November 27, 2009 of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Seventh Division, in NLRC Case No. OFW-VAC-08-000046-09, dismissing the complaint
for payment of death benefits and other money claims filed by petitioner Lorna B. Dionio, are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON CA-
G.R. CEB SP No. 05007 FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REPORTING
REQUIREMENT PROVIDED UNDER THE POEA-SEC.
Petitioner argues that Gil complied with the mandatory post-employment medical examination within
three (3) days upon repatriation but the company-designated physician ignored him because ND Shipping
did not heed his request to shoulder the medical expenses. Thus, Gil was forced to seek medical
examination to different hospitals at his own expense. Petitioner also underscored that a seafarer is
allowed to seek the opinion of his physician of choice.
Further, petitioner avers that Gil's illness was work-related. She highlighted that while on board
respondents' vessel, her husband Gil was already diagnosed with UTI and prostate enlargement and he
later died of prostate cancer. Petitioner emphasized that UTI and prostate enlargement are symptoms of
prostate cancer and he should have been immediately treated by respondents upon repatriation. She also
contends that by the nature of Gil's work on board the vessel, he was naturally exposed to stress and
strains that are calculated to have affected his health and, even on a small degree, contributed to the
development of his disease. In their Comment, respondents countered that petitioner raises issues that
would require an examination of the records and that the Court cannot entertain questions of fact. They
also alleged that Gil's illness was not work related because petitioner failed to prove that his work on
board the vessel was the cause of his illness or that his work aggravated his condition. Respondents further
averred that Gil failed to comply with the mandatory post-employment examination with the company-
designated physician. They are also doubtful that Gil's health was deteriorating because he was still able to
travel from Biñan, Laguna to Iloilo City for his medical examinations. Respondents insisted that the
findings of the CA must be given due respect. In her Reply, petitioner reiterated that Gil complied with the
mandatory post-examination requirement because he immediately reported to ND Shipping upon his
arrival in the Philippines. However, ND Shipping refused to shoulder his medical expenses as evidenced
by the referral slip to the company-designated physician.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Generally, a question of fact cannot be entertained by the Court; exceptions
Petitioner chiefly raises the issue of whether Gil complied with the mandatory post-
employment examination and work-relatedness of his illness. The questions posited are evidently factual
because it requires an examination of the evidence on record. Well-settled is the rule that the Court is not a
trier of facts. The function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing errors
of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several
exceptions to this rule: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no
citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts
are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of
the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the
case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. Here, two of the exceptions
exists – the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record and the
findings of the CA and the NLRC are contrary to those of the LA. They had different appreciations of the
evidence in determining the propriety of petitioner's claim for death benefits. To finally resolve the factual
dispute, the Court deems it proper to tackle the factual question presented.
Post-employment medical examination of seafarers
Sec. 20(B) (3) of the 2000 Amended POEA-SEC (Sec. 20(B) (3), lays down the procedure in order for a
seafarer to claim disability benefits, to wit:
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of
his contract are as follows:
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty
(120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is
deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement
shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the
seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (emphases supplied)
The rationale for this requirement is that reporting the illness or injury by the seafarer within three (3)
working days from repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness
or injury. Ascertaining the real cause of the illness or injury beyond the period may prove difficult. To
ignore the rule might set a precedent with negative repercussions, like opening floodgates to a limitless
number of seafarers claiming disability benefits, or causing unfairness to the employer who would have
difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness because of the passage of time. The employer
would then have no protection against unrelated disability claims.28
Moreover, the provision mandated a period of three (3)-working day period within which the seafarer
should report so as to ensure that the medical diagnosis can be promptly arrived at. It must be underscored
that the company-designated physician has either 120 or 240 days, depending on the circumstances, within
which to complete the medical assessment of the seafarer; otherwise, the disability claim shall be granted.
Nevertheless, in De Andres v. Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc. (De Andres), the
Court stated that there are exceptions to the mandatory post-employment examination, to wit:
First, Section 20 (B) (3) expressly provides that a seafarer is not required to submit himself to post-
employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three (3) working days from
repatriation when he is physically incapacitated to do so. In such event, a written notice to the agency
within the same period is deemed as compliance.
Second, another exception is when the seafarer failed to timely submit himself to post-employment
medical examination due to the employer's fault. xxx [This exception was established by jurisprudence in
response to an employer's unscrupulous practice of) deliberately or inadvertently refusing to refer
the seafarer to the company-designated physician to deny his disability claim.31 (emphasis supplied)
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo, the seafarer therein reported to the employer for post-
employment medical examination. The employer, however, did not refer him to a company-designated
physician because he allegedly signed a quitclaim. The Court ruled that the absence of post-employment
medical examination should not be taken against the seafarer because the employer declined to provide the
same pursuant to an invalid quitclaim, which lacks sufficient consideration.
Similarly, in Apines v. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al.,33 the repatriated seafarer reported
to the employer, however, he was not referred to the company-designated physician. The Court
emphasized that the employer, and not the seafarer, has the burden to prove that the seafarer was referred
to a company-designated doctor. It was also ruled therein that without the assessment of the said doctor,
there was nothing for a seafarer's own physician to contest, rendering the requirement of referral to a third
doctor as superfluous.
Finally, in De Andres, the seafarer immediately reported to the employer after repatriation. However,
before he could even commence the post-employment medical examination, the employer pre-empted him
and stated that it would not entertain any of his claims and that he should find a lawyer instead. Thus, the
seafarer was not anymore given an opportunity to submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician.
In the same case, the Court ruled that the onus of establishing that the seafarer was referred to a company-
designated physician is on the employer. The burden to prove with evidence whether the seafarer was
referred to a company-designated doctor rests on the employer as the latter has custody of the documents,
and not the seafarer. Accordingly, a seafarer has done his duty under Sec. 20(B) (3) once he reported to
the employer within three (3) working days from repatriation. Consequently, upon the timely reporting,
the employer has the duty to refer the seafarer to a company-designated physician for a post-employment
medical examination knowing fully well that he has a claim for disability benefits. 34
To recapitulate, a seafarer claiming disability benefits is required to submit himself to a post-employment
Subject: SV: CARIBBEAN TUG – REPAT 2/E GIL T. DIONIO FOR MEDICAL CHECK-UP
medical examination by a company-designated physician within three (3) working days from repatriation.
Failure to comply with such requirement results in the forfeiture of the seafarer's claim for disability
benefits. There are, however, exceptions to the rule: (1) when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the
employer upon his repatriation; and (2) when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit
the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.35 Moreover,
it is the burden of the employer to prove that the seafarer was referred to a company-designated doctor. To: "Naido Duldulao" < ndship@yahoo.com.ph >

Respondents failed to properly refer Gil to the company-designated physician He must arrange for his own medical now.
In this case, petitioner argues that Gil sufficiently complied with the mandatory post-employment medical If his check up proves that he has a sickness which can be related to the vessel, then obviously he will be
examination under the POEA-SEC. When Gil was medically repatriated to the Philippines, he covered under vessels P and I cover. Kjell38 (emphasis supplied)
immediately went to the office of ND Shipping on February 14, 2007, for his post-employment medical Evidently, when the ship owner replied to ND Shipping that Gil must arrange for his own medical check-
examination. However, ND Shipping did not heed his request for an extended medical check-up at the up, it did not anymore heed the request of Gil to have a post-employment medical examination at the
ship owner's expense and the company-designated physician did not conduct the said medical expense of the ship owner. On the other hand, the referral slip states:
examination. Thus, he was forced to seek medical assistance at his own expense elsewhere. Instruction To Worker:
The argument has merit. 1. You are scheduled for Medical Examination on_____________, 20____ at MICAH MEDICAL
Records show that when Gil was repatriated on February 13, 2007, respondents were fully aware that he CLINIC & DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY
was medically repatriated and that he was requesting for an extended check-up at the ship owner's xxxx
expense. The medical repatriation was due to the earlier medical report, which stated that Gil should see 3. The Examination to be performed and the rates to be paid are indicated at the back of this page.
another doctor. The email of the representative of the respondents reads: PLEASE ASK FOR AN OFFICIAL RECEIPT FOR ANY PAYMENT GIVEN.
Type of payment: (please check) [ x ] Applicant paid [ ] Billed Agency
DATE : WED 14 FEBRUARY 2007 xxxx39 (emphases supplied)
TO : K. ARNESEN SHIPPING A/S [ship owner] Clearly, the referral slip given to Gil provides that he will pay for the expenses of his post-employment
ATTN : KJELL medical examination at the company-designated physician. Glaringly, respondents did not even state when
CC : NDS – DAVAO Gil should visit the company-designated physician, raising doubts on their sincerity to medically assess
FROM : NDS – MANILA and treat him. Respondents left Gil to fend for himself. As he could not secure the medical assistance from
SUBJECT : CARIBBEAN TUG – REPAT 2/E GIL T. DIONIO respondents, Gil had no choice but to seek medical treatment elsewhere at his own expense.
FOR MEDICAL CHECK-UP Respondents argue that Gil should first shoulder his medical expenses with the company-designated
physician. If proven that his illness was work related, only at that moment will respondents shoulder his
KJELL, medical treatment.
REPAT 2/E DIONIO REPORTED AT NDS-MANILA THIS MORNING DIRECT FROM [THE] This argument is wrong and unjust.
AIRPORT. Sec. 20(B) (2) of the POEA-SEC states:
HE IS REQUESTING FOR [AN] EXTENDED MEDICAL CHECK UP BECAUSE OF HIS 2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be
ILLNESS AT THE [SHIP OWNER'S EXPENSE]. liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and
ACCORDING TO HIS MEDICAL REPORT[,] HE SHOULD SEE ANOTHER DOCTOR. lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the
WE AWAIT FOR YOUR COMMENT AND APPROVAL. seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at
THANK YOU & BEST REGARDS, cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been
CAPT. SOLOMON36 (emphasis supplied) established by the company-designated physician. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, the Referral Slip to the Micah Medical Clinic & Diagnostic Laboratory37 dated February 14, 2007 It is clear from the cited provision that it is the employer that shall shoulder the cost of the seafarer's
proves that Gil indeed immediately reported to the office of ND Shipping upon his repatriation in the medical treatment after his repatriation until such time that he is declared fit to work or the degree of his
Philippines. The Court is of the view that petitioner established with substantial evidence that Gil disability has been established by the company-designated physician. The POEA-SEC is the law between
complied with the reportorial requirement. Accordingly, pursuant to De Andres, Gil has performed his the seafarer and his or her employer, thus, its provisions must be respected. A seafarer who had just been
duty under Sec. 20(B) (3) to immediately report to the employer within three (3) working days from medically repatriated is already burdened with the obligation to immediately report to his employer in
repatriation. Consequently, at that moment, it was the duty of respondents to refer Gil to a company- spite of his illness or injury. His failure to report forfeits his right to claim disability benefits. Thus, the
designated physician for a post-employment medical examination. POEA-SEC deemed it proper not to impose any financial burden to the seafarer until such time that he is
However, respondents did not perform their duty because they refused to refer Gil to the company- fit to work or until his degree of disability is established by the company-designated physician.
designated physician at their expense. The email-reply of the ship owner to ND Shipping states: The importance of respecting the provision regarding post employment medical examination cannot be
overemphasized. The reporting of the seafarer to the employer from his repatriation initiates the procedure
for the determination of the disability or fitness of the seafarer. Upon his reporting, he shall then be
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2007 13:21:14 +0100
referred by the employer to the company-designated physician for medical diagnosis and treatment, at the
employer's cost.40 The company-designated physician has 120 or 240 days, depending on the
circumstances to complete the medical assessment and to determine whether the seafarer is fit to work or
to establish the degree of disability.41 The seafarer may avail the separate medical assessment of his
physician of choice. If there is a difference between the medical assessment of the company-designated
From: "Kjell Arnesen" < kjell@kas-shipping.com >
physician and the seafarer's physician of choice, the seafarer's medical condition shall be referred to a third
doctor, whose medical assessment shall be deemed final.42
Evidently, the first step in the procedure provided by the POEA-SEC is essential. Any improper act of the
parties that causes the non-compliance with the said procedure should not be tolerated by the Court. In this
case, since respondents unreasonably denied the request of Gil to be referred to the company-designated
physician at the former's expense, in spite of his timely reporting, they should be held liable.
Gil was forced to seek
medical assistance elsewhere
As respondents refused to answer the medical treatment of Gil upon his repatriation, contrary to the
provisions of the POEA-SEC, Gil was never examined by the company-designated physician. A fortiori,
respondents could not present any medical report prepared by the company-designated physician on the
medical condition of Gil. They could not state whether Gil was fit to return to work or the specific grading
of his disability.
It is the doctor's findings that should prevail as he or she is equipped with the proper discernment,
knowledge, experience and expertise on what constitutes total or partial disability. The doctor's declaration
serves as the basis for the degree of disability that can range anywhere from Grade 1 to Grade 14. Notably,
this is a serious consideration that cannot be determined by simply counting the number of treatment
lapsed days.43 Absent the company-designated physician's medical assessment, respondents could only
present unsupported allegations and suppositions regarding Gil's medical condition.
On the other hand, as respondents completely ignored the medical needs of Gil upon his repatriation, he
had no choice but to seek medical attention from other physicians at his own expense. In February 2007,
Gil's health became worse and he went for a medical examination at Biñan Doctor's Hospital in Biñan,
Laguna.
As Gil's health was deteriorating, he went home to his province in Iloilo and on June 5, 2007, was
admitted at the Iloilo Doctor's Hospital. In the medical certificate dated June 20, 2007, Dr. Maclang
diagnosed Gil with "Prostatic Cancer Stage IV with wide spread metastasis." On March 12, 2008, Gil was
again hospitalized at the Seamen's Hospital - Iloilo. In the medical certificate dated March 24, 2008, Dr.
Gargalicana diagnosed him with "Prostatic Cancer with Bone Metastases." Notably, Dr. Gargalicana could
not determine the period of healing for Gil's condition.
On March 26, 2008, Gil was again confined at the West Visayas State University Medical Center. In the
medical certificate dated April 12, 2008, Dr. Marañon diagnosed Gil with "Prostatic Cancer Stage IV with
Bone Metastasis and Cord Compression Anemia Secondary" which caused the paralysis of his lower
extremities. On May 4, 2008, Gil died and the death certificate, issued by attending physician Dr.
Almenana, stated that the underlying cause of his death was prostatic malignancy with pulmonary
metastasis.
Gil consulted four physicians, namely: Dr. Maclang, Dr. Gargalicana, Dr. Marañon and Dr. Almenana. All
of them issued medical findings contained in a certificate. They consistently found that Gil had prostatic
cancer. At one point, Dr. Gargalicana noted in her medical certificate that she could not determine the
period of healing of Gil's disease.
Between the non-existent medical assessment of a company-designated physician of respondents and the
medical assessment of Gil's physicians of choice, the latter evidently stands.44 Respondents were obliged
to refer Gil to a company-designated physician and shoulder the medical expenses, but they reneged on
their responsibility and simply ignore the plight of their seafarer.
Petitioner properly invokes the
disputable presumption that an illness
of a seafarer is work-related
The POEA-SEC defines work-related injury as injury resulting in disability or death arising out of and in
the course of employment and as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Sec. 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. Sec. 32-A thereof
provides:
Section 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following
conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to
contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
However, the list of illness/diseases in Sec. 32-A does not exclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed
from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that
render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties. So much so that Sec. 20(B) (4) of the same explicitly
provides that the liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during
the term of his contract are as follows: those illnesses not listed in Sec. 32 of this Contract are
disputably presumed as work-related. In other words, a disputable presumption is created in favor of
compensability. Illnesses not listed in Sec. 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that
even if the illness is not listed under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it
will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the
presumption.45
Nevertheless, this disputable presumption is made in the law to signify that the non-inclusion in the list of
compensable diseases/illnesses does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits. In other
words, the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits
claim; the seafarer must still prove his entitlement to disability benefits by substantial evidence of his
illness' work-relatedness.
It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the
illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.47
In Licayan v. Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc.,48 the Court ruled that the seafarer was able to establish
with substantial evidence that his illness of panic disorder was work-related. Thus, there was a disputable
presumption that his disease was work-related. On the other hand, it was found therein that the employer
failed to overcome the said disputable presumption because it failed to substantiate its argument that panic
disorder was not work-related because the company-designated physician did not consider the varied
factors to which the seafarer was exposed to while on board the vessel.
In this case, Gil suffered from prostate cancer. Petitioner argues that the said disease was contracted while
on board the vessel or, at the very least, was a pre-existing condition. The stress and strains that Gil was
exposed to on board the vessel contributed, even to a small degree, to the development or deterioration of
his disease. Moreover, Gil was already suffering from UTI and prostate enlargement, which are symptoms
of prostate cancer, while on board the vessel. Petitioner presented the medical findings of the doctor that
attended to him during the period of his employment. She also presented the different medical certificates
of Gil's physicians until his demise. Thus, she concludes that Gil's disease was work-related and
respondent failed to overcome the disputable presumption under the POEA-SEC.
The Court finds the argument impressed with merit.
Prostate cancer or carcinoma of prostate is the development of cancer in the prostate gland in the male
reproductive system.49 Prostate cancer is an age related male problem, with high incidence and mortality
in the USA, Europe and low prevalence in Asia. Early diagnosis and treatment has better prognosis. 50 The
primary risk factors are obesity, age and family history. Prostate cancer is very uncommon in men younger
than 45, but becomes more common with advancing age. Men with high blood pressure are more likely to
develop prostate cancer. There is a small increased risk of prostate cancer associated with lack of
exercise.51
Prostate cancer symptoms can include erectile dysfunction, blood in the semen, pain in the lower back,
hips, and/or upper thighs, urinary problems, or enlargement of the prostate. Enlargement of the
prostate can lead to obstruction with reduced flow, hesitancy, post-micturition dribbling, or even retention,
bleeding, and/or infection.52
In the case at bench, during Gil's employment contract and while the vessel was in Turk and Caicos
Islands, he was examined by Dr. Smith. In the medical report dated January 31, 2007, Dr. Smith
confirmed that Gil indeed suffered UTI and an enlarged prostate. She declared him unfit for work and
recommended his repatriation. Dr. Smith also advised that Gil must be assessed by another physician
specializing on surgery and prostate examination. Thus, on the basis of such medical finding, Gil was
medically repatriated on February 13, 2007.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, Gil was already suffering from UTI and enlargement of the prostate
while on board the vessel. These are symptoms of prostate cancer. Thus, Dr. Smith advised that Gil be
treated by another physician and recommended his repatriation. Further, at the time of his employment,
Gil was already 54 years old.53 He was already within the age group that is susceptible to prostate cancer.
To add to his dilemma, Gil was exposed to the stress and strains on board the vessel that every seafarer
faces. Respondents should have been mindful of the health condition of Gil, especially when Dr. Smith
already found him to be suffering from UTI and an enlarged prostate during his employment.
As discussed-above, early diagnosis and treatment of prostate cancer has better prognosis or probability of
recovery. However, instead of immediately addressing the illness of Gil upon his repatriation, respondents
simply ignored his request for extensive medical examination at the expense of the ship owner, contrary to
the provisions of the POEA-SEC. Gil was left on his own.
Due to the indifference of respondents to the medical condition of Gil, it was only on June 5, 2007, when
Gil went to his hometown in Iloilo and was admitted at the Iloilo Doctor's Hospital, that he was able to
receive extensive medical treatment at his own expense. In the medical certificate dated June 20, 2007, Dr.
Maclang diagnosed Gil with "Prostatic Cancer Stage IV with wide spread metastasis." From the time of
his repatriation, it took almost four (4) months before the illness of Gil was confirmed; regrettably, it was
already at the later stage of cancer and it was already spreading.
The medical certificates of his chosen physicians, Dr. Maclang, Dr. Gargalicana, Dr. Marañon and Dr.
Almenana, consistently found that Gil suffered from prostate cancer. Notably, Dr. Gargalicana attested to
the severity of his illness as she could not determine its period of healing. Consequently, the illness of Gil
was already permanent and total, and resulted to his death.
Based on these pieces of evidence, the Court finds that petitioner proved with substantial evidence that the
illness of Gil was work-related. Thus, she can invoke the disputable presumption that her husband's
decease was worked-related. It is now the burden of respondent to overcome such disputable presumption
by presenting their own evidence.
However, respondents miserably failed to overcome the said disputable presumption of the work-related
illness. They did not present a scintilla of proof to establish the lack of casual connection of the Gil's
disease with his employment as a seafarer. No medical finding of a company-designated physician was
presented because respondents did not observe Gil's plea for an extensive medical check-up at the ship
owner's expense. The said medical findings of the company-designated physician could have been the
proper avenue to determine the seafarer's illness, whether it was, indeed, work-related or its specific
grading of disability.
This case is similar to the case of Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater,54 where the seafarer was
diagnosed with colon cancer during the period of his employment. Although colon cancer was not listed as
an occupational disease, the Court found that there was a disputable presumption of compensability. It
noted that the seafarer's age of 58, where the incidence of colon cancer is more likely, and the lack of food
choice in the vessel contributed to the development of his disease. On the other hand, the employer therein
failed to overcome the disputable presumption of compensability because it was not able to present any
medical explanation.
The Release, Waiver and Quitclaim signed by Gil deserves scant consideration
In their last ditch attempt to escape liability, on April 2, 2007, respondents entered into a
release, waiver and quitclaim with Gil. It stated that he was discharging ND Shipping, its stockholder,
director and/or its employees from any and all actions in connection with his employment with
respondents. The Court finds that the said waiver must be set aside.
To be valid, a deed of release, waiver and/or quitclaim must meet the following requirements:
(1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (2) that the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Courts
have stepped in to invalidate questionable transactions, especially where there is clear proof that a waiver,
for instance, was obtained from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, or where the agreement or settlement
was unconscionable on its face. A quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a
worker's rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. Moreover, a
quitclaim in which the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to the
pursuit of a worker's legitimate claim.
In this case, the release, waiver and quitclaim did not state the specific consideration that Gil
received from respondents. Nevertheless, petitioner stated that respondents gave Gil a total amount of
P31,200.00, which was confirmed by the court and tribunals a quo. Manifestly, this consideration is
greatly disproportionate to the illness that Gil suffered. He already had prostate cancer and respondents
still refused to grant him medical treatment as provided under the POEA-SEC. The gravity of his illness
deteriorated his health, which eventually lead to his death on May 4, 2008. In spite of the severity of his
illness, respondent only gave Gil P31,200.00 and he had to shoulder the expense of his own medical
treatment. The compensation is not even equivalent to the basic salary he receives as a seafarer.
Further, it was not proven that the contents of the waiver were explained to him by respondents or their
representatives. As argued by petitioner, Gil was in a worsening and hapless condition when he signed the
said waiver. He was not even given any medical assistance by respondents. Thus, he had no other option
but to sign the document in favor of respondents in order to receive a meager compensation for his
medical needs. Verily, the release, waiver and quitclaim dated April 2, 2007, must be struck down because
it did not have a valid consideration, the contents were not explained to Gil, and his deteriorating health
forced him to sign the same. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his
master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of agreements and writings
should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the applicability to a greater number of
employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of
the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
Final Note
The Court acknowledges the arduous and protracted legal battle that petitioner endured to uphold the right
of her deceased husband. These proceedings could have been avoided had respondents provided Gil with
the proper medical treatment upon his repatriation, pursuant to the provisions of the POEA-SEC.
Sec. 20(B) specifically outlines the procedure in determining the proper compensation of a seafarer's
disability. The rigorous process therein aims to provide a fair and definitive assessment on the seafarers'
medical condition and to ensure that they will receive a just compensation for their injuries. At the same
time, it protects the interest of the employer by ensuring that only genuine disability or injuries shall be
entitled to compensation.57 The Court shall rectify any unlawful deviations from the procedure laid down
by the POEA-SEC and ensure that social justice is observed. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESA G. FAVILA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary
beneficiary under the Social Security Law must establish two
qualifying factors, to wit: (1) that he/she is the legitimate spouse; and
(2) that he/she is dependent upon the member for support.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision2 dated May
24, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82763 which
reversed and set aside the Resolution3 dated June 4, 2003 and
Order4 dated January 21, 2004 of the Social Security Commission
(SSC) in SSC Case No. 8-15348-02. Likewise assailed is the CA
Resolution5 dated October 17, 2005 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On August 5, 2002, respondent Teresa G. Favila (Teresa) filed a
Petition6 before petitioner SSC docketed as SSC Case No. 8-15348-02.
She averred therein that after she was married to Florante Favila
(Florante) on January 17, 1970, the latter designated her as the sole
beneficiary in the E-1 Form he submitted before petitioner Social
Security System (SSS), Quezon City Branch on June 30, 1970. When
they begot their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her husband
likewise designated each one of them as beneficiaries. Teresa further
averred that when Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension
benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at that
time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age 21. Believing
that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to receive
Florante’s pension benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for
said benefits before the SSS. The SSS, however, denied the claim in a
letter dated January 31, 2002, hence, the petition.
In its Answer,7 SSS averred that on May 6, 1999, the claim for
Florante’s pension benefits was initially settled in favor of Teresa as
guardian of the minor Florante II. Per its records, Teresa was paid the
monthly pension for a total period of 57 months or from February
1997 to October 2001 when Florante II reached the age of 21. The
claim was, however, re-adjudicated on July 11, 2002 and the balance
of the five-year guaranteed pension was again settled in favor of
Florante II.8 SSS also alleged that Estelita Ramos, sister of Florante,
wrote a letter9 stating that her brother had long been separated from
Teresa. She alleged therein that the couple lived together for only ten
years and then decided to go their separate ways because Teresa had
an affair with a married man with whom, as Teresa herself allegedly
admitted, she slept with four times a week. SSS also averred that an
interview conducted in Teresa’s neighborhood in Tondo, Manila on
September 18, 1998 revealed that although she did not cohabit with
another man after her separation with Florante, there were rumors
that she had an affair with a police officer. To support Teresa’s non-
entitlement to the benefits claimed, SSS cited the provisions of
Sections 8(k) and 13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 1161, as amended
otherwise known as Social Security (SS) Law.10
Ruling of the Social Security Commission
In a Resolution11 dated June 4, 2003, SSC held that the surviving
spouse’s entitlement to an SSS member’s death benefits is dependent
on two factors which must concur at the time of the latter’s death, to
wit: (1) legality of the marital relationship; and (2) dependency for
support. As to dependency for support, the SSC opined that same is
affected by factors such as separation de facto of the spouses, marital
infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse
under the law. Thus, although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of
Florante’s designated beneficiaries, the SSC ruled that she is
disqualified from claiming the death benefits because she was
deemed not dependent for support from Florante due to marital
infidelity. Under Section 8(k) of the SS Law, the dependent spouse
until she remarries is entitled to death benefits as a primary
beneficiary, together with the deceased member’s legitimate minor
children. According to SSC, the word "remarry" under said provision
has been interpreted as to include a spouse who cohabits with a
person other than his/her deceased spouse or is in an illicit
relationship. This is for the reason that no support is due to such a
spouse and to allow him/her to enjoy the member’s death benefits
would be tantamount to circumvention of the law. Even if a spouse
did not cohabit with another, SSC went on to state that for purposes
of the SS Law, it is sufficient that the separation in-fact of the spouses
was precipitated by an adulterous act since the actual absence of
support from the member is evident from such separation. Notable in
this case is that while Teresa denied having remarried or cohabited
with another man, she did not, however, deny her having an
adulterous relationship. SSC therefore concluded that Teresa was not
dependent upon Florante for support and consequently disqualified
her from enjoying her husband’s death benefits.
SSC further held that Teresa did not timely contest her non-
entitlement to the award of benefits. It was only when Florante II’s
pension was stopped that she deemed it wise to file her claim. For
SSC, Teresa’s long silence led SSS to believe that she really suffered
from a disqualification as a beneficiary, otherwise she would have
immediately protested her non-entitlement. It thus opined that
Teresa is now estopped from claiming the benefits. Hence, SSC
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
As Teresa’s Motion for Reconsideration12 of said Resolution was also
denied by SSC in an Order13 dated January 21, 2004, she sought
recourse before the CA through a Petition for Review14 under Rule 43.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the CA, Teresa insisted that SSS should have granted her claim
for death benefits because she is undisputedly the legal surviving
spouse of Florante and is therefore entitled to such benefits as
primary beneficiary. She claimed that the SSC’s finding that she was
not dependent upon Florante for support is unfair because the fact
still remains that she was legally married to Florante and that her
alleged illicit affair with another man was never sufficiently
established. In fact, SSS admitted that there was no concrete
evidence or proof of her amorous relationship with another man.
Moreover, Teresa found SSS’s strict interpretation of the SS Law as
not only anti-labor but also anti-family. It is anti-labor in the sense
that it does not work to the benefit of a deceased employee’s primary
beneficiaries and anti-family because in denying benefits to surviving
spouses, it destroys family solidarity. In sum, Teresa prayed for the
reversal and setting aside of the assailed Resolution and Order of the
SSC.
The SSC and the SSS through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed their respective Comments15 to the petition.
SSC contended that the word "spouse" under Section 8(k) of the SS
Law is qualified by the word "dependent". Thus, to be entitled to
death benefits under said law, a surviving spouse must have been
dependent upon the member spouse for support during the latter’s
lifetime including the very moment of contingency. According to it,
the fact of dependency is a mandatory requirement of law. If it is
otherwise, the law would have simply used the word "spouse"
without the descriptive word "dependent". In this case, SSC
emphasized that Teresa never denied the fact that she and Florante
were already separated and living in different houses when the
contingency happened. Given this fact and since the conduct of
investigation is standard operating procedure for SSS, it being under
legal obligation to determine prior to the award of death benefit
whether the supposed beneficiary is actually receiving support from
the member or if such support was rightfully withdrawn prior to the
contingency, SSS conducted an investigation with respect to the
couple’s separation. And as said investigation revealed tales of
Teresa’s adulterous relationship with another man, SSS therefore
correctly adjudicated the entire death benefits in favor of Florante II.
To negate Teresa’s claim that SSS failed to establish her marital
infidelity, SSC enumerated the following evidence: (1) the letter16 of
Florante’s sister, Estelita Ramos, stating that the main reasons why
Teresa and Florante separated after only 10 years of marriage were
Teresa’s adulterous relationship with another man and her propensity
for gambling; (2) the Memorandum17 dated August 30, 2002 of SSS
Senior Analysts Liza Agilles and Jana Simpas which ran through the
facts in connection with the claim for death benefits accruing from
Florante’s death. It indicates therein, among others, that based on
interviews conducted in Teresa’s neighborhood, she did not cohabit
with another man after her separation from her husband although
there were rumors that she and a certain police officer had an affair.
However, there is not enough proof to establish their relationship as
Teresa and her paramour did not live together as husband and wife;
and (3) the field investigation report18 of SSS Senior Analyst Fernando
F. Nicolas which yielded the same findings. The SSC deemed the
foregoing evidence as substantial to support the conclusion that
Teresa indeed had an illicit relationship with another man.
SSC also defended SSS’s interpretation of the SS law and argued that
it is neither anti-labor nor anti-family. It is not anti-labor because the
subject matter of the case is covered by the SS Law and hence, Labor
Law has no application. It is likewise not anti-family because SSS has
nothing to do with Teresa’s separation from her husband which
resulted to the latter’s withdrawal of support for her. At any rate, SSC
advanced that even if Teresa is entitled to the benefits claimed, same
have already been received in its entirety by Florante II so that no
more benefits are due to Florante’s other beneficiaries. Hence, SSC
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
For its part, the OSG likewise believed that Teresa is not entitled to
the benefits claimed as she lacks the requirement that the wife must
be dependent upon the member for support. This is in view of the
rule that beneficiaries under the SS Law need not be the legal heirs
but those who are dependent upon him for support. Moreover, it
noted that Teresa did not file a protest before the SSS to contest the
award of the five-year guaranteed pension to their son Florante II. It
posited that because of this, Teresa cannot raise the matter for the
first time before the courts. The OSG also believed that no further
benefits are due to Florante’s other beneficiaries considering that the
balance of the five-year guaranteed pension has already been settled.
In a Decision19 dated May 24, 2005, the CA found Teresa’s petition
impressed with merit. It gave weight to the fact that she is a primary
beneficiary because she is the lawful surviving spouse of Florante and
in addition, she was designated by Florante as such beneficiary. There
was no legal separation or annulment of marriage that could have
disqualified her from claiming the death benefits and that her
designation as beneficiary had not been invalidated by any court of
law. The CA cited Social Security System v. Davac20 where it was held
that it is only when there is no designation of beneficiary or when the
designation is void that the SSS would have to decide who is entitled
to claim the benefits. It opined that once a spouse is designated by an
SSS member as his/her beneficiary, same forecloses any inquiry as to
whether the spouse is indeed a dependent deriving support from the
member. Thus, when SSS conducted an investigation to determine
whether Teresa is indeed dependent upon Florante, SSS was
unilaterally adding a requirement not imposed by law which makes it
very difficult for designated primary beneficiaries to claim for
benefits. To make things worse, the result of said investigation which
became the basis of Teresa’s non-entitlement to the benefits claimed
was culled from unfounded rumors.
Moreover, the CA saw SSS’s conduct of investigations to be violative
of the constitutional right to privacy. It lamented that SSS has no
power to investigate and pry into the member’s and his/her family’s
personal lives and should cease and desist from conducting such
investigations. Ultimately, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed
Resolution and Order of the SSC and directed SSS to pay Teresa’s
monetary claims which included the monthly pension due her as the
surviving spouse and the lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six
times the monthly pension.
SSC filed its Motion for Reconsideration21 of said Decision but same
was denied in a Resolution22 dated October 17, 2005. Impleading SSS
as co-petitioner, SSC thus filed this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security
Law as to be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of
Florante?
Petitioners’ Arguments
SSC reiterates the argument that to be entitled to death benefits, a
surviving spouse must have been actually dependent for support
upon the member spouse during the latter’s lifetime including the
very moment of contingency. To it, this is clearly the intention of the
legislature; otherwise, Section 8(k) of the SS law would have simply
stated "spouse" without the descriptive word "dependent". Here,
although Teresa is without question Florante’s legal spouse, she is not
the "dependent spouse" referred to in the said provision of the law.
Given the reason for the couple’s separation for about 17 years prior
to Florante’s death and in the absence of proof that during said
period Teresa relied upon Florante for support, there is therefore no
reason to infer that Teresa is a dependent spouse entitled to her
husband’s death benefits.
SSC adds that in the process of determining non-dependency status of
a spouse, conviction of a crime involving marital infidelity is not an
absolute necessity. It is sufficient for purposes of the award of death
benefits that a thorough investigation was conducted by SSS through
interviews of impartial witnesses and that same showed that the
spouse-beneficiary committed an act of marital infidelity which
caused the member to withdraw support from his spouse. In this
case, no less than Florante’s sister, who does not stand to benefit
from the present controversy, revealed that Teresa frequented a
casino and was disloyal to her husband so that they separated after
only 10 years of marriage. This was affirmed through the interview
conducted in Teresa’s neighborhood. Hence, it is not true that
Teresa’s marital infidelity was not sufficiently proven.
Likewise, SSC contends that contrary to the CA’s posture, a member’s
designation of a primary beneficiary does not guarantee the latter’s
entitlement to death benefits because such entitlement is
determined only at the time of happening of the contingency. This is
because there may have been events which supervened subsequent
to the designation which would otherwise disqualify the person
designated as beneficiary such as emancipation of a member’s child
or separation from his/her spouse. This is actually the same reason
why SSS must conduct an investigation of all claims for benefits.
Moreover, SSC justifies SSS’s conduct of investigation and argues that
said office did not intrude into Florante’s and his family’s personal
lives as the investigation did not aggravate the situation insofar as
Teresa’s relationship with her deceased husband was concerned. It
merely led to the discovery of the true state of affairs between them
so that based on it, the death benefits were awarded to the rightful
primary beneficiary, Florante II. Clearly, such an investigation is an
essential part of adjudication process, not only in this case but also in
all claims for benefits filed before SSS. Thus, SSC prays for the setting
aside of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution.
Respondent’s Arguments
To support her entitlement to the death benefits claimed, Teresa
cited Ceneta v. Social Security System,23 a case decided by the CA
which declared, viz:
Clearly then, the term dependent spouse, who must not re-marry in
order to be entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death
of his/her spouse, refers to the legal spouse who, under the law, is
entitled to receive support from the other spouse.
Indubitably, petitioner, having been legally married to the deceased
SSS member until the latter’s death and despite his subsequent
marriage to respondent Carolina, is deemed dependent for support
under Article 68 of the Family Code. Said provision reads:
‘The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support’
Based on said law, petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the claimed
death benefits. Her marriage to the deceased not having been
lawfully severed, the law disputably presumes her to be continually
dependent for support.
No evidence or even a mere inference can be adduced to prove that
petitioner ceased to derive all her needs indispensable for her
sustenance, and thus, she remains a legal dependent. A dependent
spouse is primary beneficiary entitled to the death benefits of a
deceased SSS member spouse unless he or she remarries. A mere
allegation of adultery not substantially proven can not validly deprive
petitioner of the support referred to under the law, and
consequently, of her claim under the SSS Law.
Thus, being the legal wife, Teresa asserts that she is presumed to be
dependent upon Florante for support. The bare allegation of Estelita
that she had an affair with another man is insufficient to deprive her
of support from her husband under the law and, conversely, of the
death benefits from SSS. Moreover, Teresa points out that despite
their separation and the rumors regarding her infidelity, Florante did
not withdraw her designation as primary beneficiary. Under this
circumstance, Teresa believes that Florante really intended for her to
receive the benefits from SSS.
Teresa also agrees with the CA’s finding that SSS unilaterally added to
the
requirements of the law the condition that a surviving spouse must
be actually dependent for support upon the member spouse during
the latter’s lifetime. She avers that this could not have been the
lawmakers’ intention as it would make it difficult or even impossible
for beneficiaries to claim for benefits under the SS Law. She stresses
that courts (or quasi-judicial agencies for that matter), may not, in the
guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include
therein situations not provided nor intended by lawmakers. Courts
are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in
it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if
its attention had been called to the omission. Hence, Teresa prays
that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution be affirmed in toto.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
The law in force at the time of Florante’s death was RA 1161. Section
8 (e) and (k) of said law provides:
Section 8. Terms Defined. For the purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the
following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependent – The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and not over twenty-one
years of age, or over twenty-one years of age, provided that he is
congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or
mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the
covered employee for regular support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries – The dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and
illegitimate children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the
absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated by the
covered employee as secondary beneficiary. (Emphasis ours.)
From the above-quoted provisions, it is plain that for a spouse to
qualify as a primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she
must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined
under paragraph (e), that is, one who is dependent upon the member
for support. Paragraphs (e) and (k) of Section 8 of RA 1161 are very
clear. "Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of
statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis,
derived from the maxim index animo sermo est (speech is the index of
intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed
by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."24
Thus, in Social Security System v. Aguas25 we held that:
[I]t bears stressing that for her (the claimant) to qualify as a primary
beneficiary, she must prove that she was ‘the legitimate spouse
dependent for support from the employee.’ The claimant-spouse
must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the
legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member
for support. x x x
Here, there is no question that Teresa was Florante’s legal wife. What
is at point, however, is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante
for support in order for her to fall under the term "dependent
spouse" under Section 8(k) of RA 1161.
What the SSC relies on in concluding that Teresa was not dependent
upon Florante for support during their separation for 17 years was its
findings that Teresa maintained an illicit relationship with another
man. Teresa however counters that such illicit relationship has not
been sufficiently established and, hence, as the legal wife, she is
presumed to be continually dependent upon
Florante for support.
We agree with Teresa that her alleged affair with another man was
not sufficiently established. The Memorandum of SSS Senior Analysts
Liza Agilles and Jana Simpas reveals that it was Florante who was in
fact living with a common law wife, Susan Favila (Susan) and their
three minor children at the time of his death. Susan even filed her
own claim for death benefits with the SSS but same was, however,
denied. With respect to Teresa, we quote the pertinent portions of
said Memorandum, viz:
SUSAN SUBMITTED A LETTER SIGNED BY ESTELITA RAMOS, ELDER
SISTER OF THE DECEASED STATING THAT MEMBER WAS SEPARATED
FROM TERESA AFTER 10 YEARS OF LIVING IN FOR THE REASONS THAT
HIS WIFE HAD COHABITED WITH A MARRIED MAN. ALSO, PER
ESTELITA, THE WIFE HERSELF ADMITTED THAT THE MAN SLEPT WITH
HER 4 TIMES A WEEK.
TERESA SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED BY NAPOLEON AND
JOSEFINA, BROTHER AND SISTER (IN) LAW, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE
DECEASED THAT TERESA HAS NEVER RE-MARRIED NOR COHABITED
WITH ANOTHER MAN.
BASED ON THE INTERVIEW (DATED 9/18/98) CONDUCTED FROM THE
NEIGHBORHOOD OF TERESA AND BGY. KAGAWAD IN TONDO,
MANILA, IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT TERESA DID NOT COHABIT
WITH ANOTHER MAN AFTER THE SEPARATION ALTHOUGH THERE
ARE RUMORS THAT SHE AND A CERTAIN POLICE OFFICER HAD AN
AFFAIR. BUT [NOT] ENOUGH PROOF TO ESTABLISH THEIR
RELATIONSHIP SINCE THEY DID NOT LIVE-IN AS HUSBAND AND
WIFE.
BASED ON THE INTERVIEW WITH JOSEFINA FAVILA, MEMBER AND
TERESA WERE SEPARATED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AND THAT SHE
HAD NO KNOWLEDGE IF TERESA COHABITED WITH ANOTHER MAN
ALTHOUGH SHE HEARD OF THE RUMORS THAT SAID WIFE HAD AN
AFFAIR WITH ANOTHER MAN. NAPOLEON WAS NOT INTERVIEWED.
(Emphasis ours)
While SSC believes that the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence
of Teresa’s amorous relationship, we, however, find otherwise. It is
not hard to see that Estelita’s claim of Teresa’s cohabitation with a
married man is a mere allegation without proof. Likewise, the
interviews conducted by SSS revealed rumors only that Teresa had an
affair with a certain police officer. Notably, not one from those
interviewed confirmed that such an affair indeed existed. "The basic
rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise
cannot be given credence."26 "Mere uncorroborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."27 Remarkably, the
Memorandum itself stated that there is not enough proof to establish
Teresa’s alleged relationship with another man since they did not live
as husband and wife.
This notwithstanding, we still find untenable Teresa’s assertion that
being the legal wife, she is presumed dependent upon Florante for
support. In Re: Application for Survivor’s Benefits of Manlavi,28 this
Court defined "dependent" as "one who derives his or her main
support from another [or] relying on, or subject to, someone else for
support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything
without the will, power or aid of someone else." Although therein,
the wife’s marriage to the deceased husband was not dissolved prior
to the latter’s death, the Court denied the wife’s claim for
survivorship benefits from the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) because the wife abandoned her family to live with other men
for more than 17 years until her husband died. Her whereabouts was
unknown to her family and she never attempted to communicate
with them or even check up on the well-being of her daughter with
the deceased. From these, the Court concluded that the wife during
said period was not dependent on her husband for any support,
financial or otherwise, hence, she is not a dependent within the
contemplation of RA 829129 as to be entitled to survivorship benefits.
It is worthy to note that under Section 2(f) RA 8291, a legitimate
spouse dependent for support is likewise included in the enumeration
of dependents and under Section 2(g), the legal dependent spouse in
the enumeration of primary beneficiaries.
Under this premise, we declared in Aguas that "the obvious
conclusion is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be ‘dependent for support’ upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is
proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the
time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was
dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is
capable of providing for herself."30 Hence, we held therein that the
wife-claimant had the burden to prove that all the statutory
requirements have been complied with, particularly her dependency
on her husband at the time of his death. And, while said wife-claimant
was the legitimate wife of the deceased, we ruled that she is not
qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof
to show that at the time of her husband’s death, she was still
dependent on him for support even if they were already living
separately.
In this case, aside from Teresa’s bare allegation that she was
dependent upon her husband for support and her misplaced reliance
on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and then
subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not presented sufficient
evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was dependent
upon her husband for support at the time of his death. She could
have done this by submitting affidavits of reputable and disinterested
persons who have knowledge that during her separation with
Florante, she does not have a known trade, business, profession or
lawful occupation from which she derives income sufficient for her
support and such other evidence tending to prove her claim of
dependency. While we note from the abovementioned SSS
Memorandum that Teresa submitted affidavits executed by Napoleon
Favila and Josefina Favila, same only pertained to the fact that she
never remarried nor cohabited with another man. On the contrary,
what is clear is that she and Florante had already been separated for
about 17 years prior to the latter’s death as Florante was in fact, living
with his common law wife when he died. Suffice it to say that
"[w]hoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence."31 Hence,
for Teresa’s failure to show that despite their separation she was
dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his death, Teresa
cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary.1âwphi1 Hence, she is not
entitled to the death benefits accruing on account of Florante’s
death.
As a final note, we do not agree with the CA’s pronouncement that
the investigations conducted by SSS violate a person’s right to privacy.
SSS, as the primary institution in charge of extending social security
protection to workers and their beneficiaries is mandated by Section
4(b)(7) of RA 828232 to require reports, compilations and analyses of
statistical and economic data and to make an investigation as may be
needed for its proper administration and development. Precisely, the
investigations conducted by SSS are appropriate in order to ensure
that the benefits provided under the SS Law are received by the
rightful beneficiaries. It is not hard to see that such measure is
necessary for the system’s proper administration, otherwise, it will be
swamped with bogus claims that will pointlessly deplete its funds.
Such scenario will certainly frustrate the purpose of the law which is
to provide covered employees and their families protection against
the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death, with a view to
promoting their well-being in the spirit of social justice. Moreover and
as correctly pointed out by SSC, such investigations are likewise
necessary to carry out the mandate of Section 15 of the SS Law which
provides in part, viz:
Sec. 15. Non-transferability of Benefits. – The SSS shall pay the
benefits provided for in this Act to such [x x x] persons as may be
entitled thereto in accordance with the provisions of this Act x x x.
(Emphasis ours.)
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May
24, 2005 and October 17, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 82763 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Teresa G. Favila is declared to
be not a dependent spouse within the contemplation of Republic Act
No. 1161 and is therefore not entitled to death benefits accruing from
the death of Florante Favila.
SO ORDERED.
ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For failure to remit the Social Security System (SSS) premium
contributions of employees of the Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc.
(SATII) of which he was president, Romarico J. Mendoza (petitioner)
was convicted of violation of Section 22(a) and (d) vis-à-vis Section 28
of R.A. No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997 by the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4. His conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.1
The Information against petitioner2 reads:
xxxx
That sometime during the month of August 1998 to July 1999, in the
City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the proprietor of Summa Alta
Tierra Industries, Inc., duly registered employer with the Social
Security System (SSS), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail and/or refuse to remit the SSS premium contributions
in favor of its employees amounting to ₱421, 151.09 to the prejudice
of his employees.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d) in relation to Sec. 28
of Republic Act No. 8282, as amended (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The monthly premium contributions of SATII employees to SSS which
petitioner admittedly failed to remit covered the period August 1998
to July 19993 amounting to ₱421,151.09 inclusive of penalties.4
After petitioner was advised by the SSS to pay the above-said
amount, he proposed to settle it over a period of 18 months5 which
proposal the SSS approved by Memorandum of September 12, 2000.6
Despite the grant of petitioner’s request for several extensions of
time to settle the delinquency in installments,7 petitioner failed,
hence, his indictment.
Petitioner sought to exculpate himself by explaining that during the
questioned period, SATII shut down due to the general decline in the
economy.8
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, as reflected above,
convicted petitioner, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Romarico J.
Mendoza, guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, he
is hereby meted the penalty of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years.
The accused is further ordered to pay the Social Security System the
unpaid premium contributions of his employees including the
penalties in the sum of ₱421, 151.09.
SO ORDERED. 9 (emphasis supplied)
And as also reflected above, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision, by Decision of July March 5, 2007,10 it noting that
the Social Security Act is a special law, hence, lack of criminal intent or
good faith is not a defense in the commission of the proscribed act.
The appellate court brushed aside petitioner’s claim that he is merely
a conduit of SATII and, therefore, should not be held personally liable
for its liabilities. It held that petitioner, as President, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of SATII, is the managing head who is liable for
the act or omission penalized under Section 28(f) of the Social
Security Act.
Petitioner contended in his motion for reconsideration that Section
28(f) of the Act which reads:
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an
association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its
managing head, directors or partners shall be liable for the penalties
provided in this Act for the offense.
should be interpreted as follows:
If an association, the one liable is the managing head; if a partnership,
the ones liable are the partners; and if a corporation, the ones liable
are the directors. (underscoring supplied)
The appellate court denied petitioner’s motion, hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner maintains, inter alia, that the managing head or president
or general manager of a corporation is not among those specifically
mentioned as liable in the above-quoted Section 28(f). And he calls
attention to an alleged congenital infirmity in the Information11 in
that he was charged as "proprietor" and not as director of SATII.
Further, petitioner claims that the lower courts erred in penalizing
him with six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment
considering the mitigating and alternative circumstances present,
namely: his being merely vicariously liable; his good faith in failing to
remit the contributions; his payment of the premium contributions of
SATII out of his personal funds; and his being economically useful,
given his academic credentials, he having graduated from a prime
university in Manila and being a reputable businessman.
The petition lacks merit.
Remittance of contribution to the SSS under Section 22(a) of the
Social Security Act is mandatory. United Christian Missionary Society
v. Social Security Commission12 explicitly explains:
No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the
enforcement of the law’s mandate that the employer who fails to
comply with his legal obligation to remit the premiums to the System
within the prescribed period shall pay a penalty of three 3% per
month. The prescribed penalty is evidently of a punitive character,
provided by the legislature to assure that employers do not take
lightly the State’s exercise of the police power in the implementation
of the Republic’s declared policy ‘to develop, establish gradually and
perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of
the people throughout the Philippines and (to) provide protection to
employers against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and
death.’[Section 2, Social Security Act; Roman Catholic Archbishop v.
Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10, January 20, 1961] In this
concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the law
makes no distinction between an employer who professes good
reasons for delaying the remittance of premiums and another who
deliberately disregards the legal duty imposed upon him to make
such remittance. From the moment the remittance of premiums due
is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to the delayed premium
payments by force of law. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Failure to comply with the law being malum prohibitum, intent to
commit it or good faith is immaterial.13
The provision of the law being clear and unambiguous, petitioner’s
interpretation that a "proprietor," as he was designated in the
Information, is not among those specifically mentioned under Sec.
28(f) as liable, does not lie. For the word connotes management,
control and power over a business entity.14 There is thus, as Garcia v.
Social Security Commission Legal and Collection enjoins,15
. . . no need to resort to statutory construction [for] Section 28(f) of
the Social Security Law imposes penalty on:
(1) the managing head;
(2) directors; or
(3) partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person. (emphasis
supplied)
The term "managing head" in Section 28(f) is used, in its broadest
connotation, not to any specific organizational or managerial
nomenclature. To heed petitioner’s reasoning would allow
unscrupulous businessmen to conveniently escape liability by the
creative adoption of managerial titles.1avvph!1
While the Court affirms the appellate court’s decision, there is a need
to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s imposition of penalty on the basis of Sec.
28(e) of the Social Security Act which reads:

Sec. 28. Penal Clause. ─ (e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with
the provisions of this Act or with the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission, shall be punished by a fine of not
less than Five thousand pesos (₱5,0000.00) nor more than Twenty
thousand pesos (₱5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00), or imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day nor more than twelve (12) years or both, at the discretion of
the court. x x x
The proper penalty for this specific offense committed by petitioner
is, however, provided in Section 28 (h) of the same Act which reads:
Sec. 28. Penal Clause – (h) Any employer who after deducting the
monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his employee’s
compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the SSS within
thirty (30) days from the date they became due shall be presumed to
have misappropriated such contributions or loan amortizations and
shall suffer the penalties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen
[Art. 315] of the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty in this
case should be
x x x prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be;
x x x x.
Since the above-quoted Sec. 28 (h) of the Social Security Act (a special
law) adopted the penalty from the Revised Penal Code, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law also finds application.16
Taking into account the misappropriated ₱421,151.09 and the Court’s
discourse in People v. Gabres17 on the proper imposition of the
indeterminate penalty in Article 315, the appropriate penalty in this
case should range from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 27630 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Costs against petitioner.
YOLANDA SIGNEY, petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA
SERVANO, representative of GINALYN and RODELYN
SIGNEY, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
We are called to determine who is entitled to the social security
benefits of a Social Security System (SSS) member who was survived
not only by his legal wife, but also by two common-law wives with
whom he had six children.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assails the 31 March 2004 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals affirming the resolution of the Social Security
Commission (SSC),3 as well as the 23 July 2004 Resolution4 of the
same court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his
member’s records, he had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as
primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary
beneficiaries. On 6 July 2001, petitioner filed a claim for death
benefits with the public respondent SSS.5 She revealed in her SSS
claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina),
with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn Servano
(Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn), born
on 20 April 2000.6
Petitioner’s declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim
for the same death benefits on 13 July 2001 in which she also
declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the
deceased and that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.
In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death
benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the
deceased.7
The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001,8 denied the death
benefit claim of petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and
Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary
beneficiaries under the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March
1992 marriage between petitioner and the deceased was null and
void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October
1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local
Civil Registry of Cebu City.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition9 with the SSC in which she
attached a waiver of rights10 executed by Editha whereby the latter
waived "any/all claims from National Trucking Forwarding
Corporation (NTFC) under the supervision of National Development
Corporation (NDC), Social Security System (SSS) and other (i)nsurance
(b)enefits due to the deceased Rodolfo Signey Sr., who died intestate
on May 21, 2001 at Manila Doctors," and further declared that "I am
legally married to Mr. Aquilino Castillo and not to Mr. Rodolfo P.
Signey Sr."11
In a Resolution12 dated 29 January 2003, the SSC affirmed the
decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to the SSS field
investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage showing
that the deceased was married to Editha on 29 October 1967, than to
the aforestated declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights. It found
that petitioner only relied on the waiver of Editha, as she failed to
present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the
confirmed marriage certificate. The SSC also found, based on the SSS
field investigation report dated 6 November 2001 that even if Editha
was the legal wife, she was not qualified to the death benefits since
she herself admitted that she was not dependent on her deceased
husband for support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a certain
Aquilino Castillo.13
Considering that petitioner, Editha, and Gina were not entitled to the
death benefits, the SSC applied Section 8(e) and (k) of Republic Act
(RA) No. 8282, the SSS Law which was in force at the time of the
member’s death on 21 May 2001, and held that the dependent
legitimate and illegitimate minor children of the deceased member
were also considered primary beneficiaries. The records disclosed
that the deceased had one legitimate child, Ma. Evelyn Signey, who
predeceased him, and several illegitimate children with petitioner and
with Gina. Based on their respective certificates of live birth, the
deceased SSS member’s four illegitimate children with petitioner
could no longer be considered dependents at the time of his death
because all of them were over 21 years old when he died on 21 May
2001, the youngest having been born on 31 March 1978. On the other
hand, the deceased SSS member’s illegitimate children with Gina
were qualified to be his primary beneficiaries for they were still
minors at the time of his death, Ginalyn having been born on 13 April
1996, and Rodelyn on 20 April 2000.14
The SSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in
an Order15 dated 9 April 2003. This order further elaborated on the
reasons for the denial of petitioner’s claims. It held that the mere
designation of petitioner and her children as beneficiaries by the
deceased member was not the controlling factor in the determination
of beneficiaries. Sections 13, 8(e) and 8(k) of the SSS Law, as
amended, provide that dependent legal spouse entitled by law to
receive support from the member and dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children of the
member shall be the primary beneficiaries of the latter.16 Based on
the certification dated 25 July 2001 issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, the marriage of the deceased and Editha
on 29 October 1967 at the Metropolitan Cathedral, Cebu City was
duly registered under LCR Registry No. 2083 on 21 November 1967.
The SSS field investigation reports verified the authenticity of the said
certification.17
The SSC did not give credence to the waiver executed by Editha,
which manifested her lack of interest in the outcome of the case,
considering that she was not entitled to the benefit anyway because
of her admitted cohabitation with Aquilino Castillo. Moreover, the
SSC held that considering that one of the requisites of a valid waiver is
the existence of an actual right which could be renounced, petitioner
in effect recognized that Editha had a right over the benefits of the
deceased thereby enabling her to renounce said right in favor of
petitioner and her children. The declaration by Editha that she was
not married to the deceased is not only contrary to the records of the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City which state that they were married
on 29 October 1967 but also renders nugatory the waiver of right
itself, for if she was not married to the deceased then she would have
no rights that may be waived.
Petitioner had argued that the illegitimate children of the deceased
with Gina failed to show proof that they were indeed dependent on
the deceased for support during his lifetime. The SSC observed that
Section 8(e) of the SSS Law, as amended, provides among others that
dependents include the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted,
and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
has not reached 21 years of age. The provision vested the right of the
benefit to his illegitimate minor children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn,
irrespective of any proof that they had been dependent on the
support of the deceased.18
Petitioner appealed the judgment of the SSC to the Court of Appeals
by filing a Petition for Review19 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the SSC
in its 31 March 2004 Decision. Resolving the determinative question
of who between petitioner and the illegitimate children of the
deceased are the primary beneficiaries lawfully entitled to the social
security benefits accruing by virtue of the latter’s death, it held that
based on Section 8(e) of R. A. No. 8282, a surviving spouse claiming
death benefits as a dependent must be the legal spouse. Petitioner’s
presentation of a marriage certificate attesting to her marriage to the
deceased was futile, according to the appellate court, as said
marriage is null and void in view of the previous marriage of the
deceased to Editha as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City.
The appellate court also held that the law is clear that for a child to be
qualified as dependent, he must be unmarried, not gainfully
employed and must not be 21 years of age, or if over 21 years of age,
he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
And in this case, only the illegitimate children of the deceased with
Gina namely, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, are the qualified beneficiaries as
they were still minors at the time of the death of their father.
Considering petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and the
absence of any legitimate children of the deceased, it follows that the
dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased should be
entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries, the Court of
Appeals concluded.20
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner in a Resolution21 dated 23 July 2004. It found that there
was no new matter of substance which would warrant a modification
and/or reversal of the 31 March 2004 Decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner raises issues similar to the ones which have been
adequately resolved by the SSC and the appellate court. The first
issue is whether petitioner’s marriage with the deceased is valid. The
second issue is whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the
SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the
deceased.
There is no merit in the petition.
We deemed it best not to disturb the findings of fact of the SSS which
are supported by substantial evidence22 and affirmed by the SSC and
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, petitioner ought to be reminded of
the basic rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.23
It is a well-known rule that in proceedings before administrative
bodies, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
binding.24 The important consideration is that both parties were
afforded an opportunity to be heard and they availed themselves of it
to present their respective positions on the matter in dispute.25 It
must likewise be noted that under Section 2, Rule 126 of the SSC
Revised Rules of Procedure, the rules of evidence prevailing in the
courts of law shall not be controlling. In the case at bar, the existence
of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha is
supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner, who has fully availed of
her right to be heard, only relied on the waiver of Editha and failed to
present any evidence to invalidate or otherwise controvert the
confirmed marriage certificate registered under LCR Registry No. 2083
on 21 November 1967. She did not even try to allege and prove any
infirmity in the marriage between the deceased and Editha.
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death
benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 828227 is very clear. Hence,
we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory
construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from
the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention),
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or,
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.28
Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined.—For the purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the
following meanings:
xxx
(e) Dependents — The dependent shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the
member;
2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate
child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached
twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of
age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally;
and
3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
xxx
(k) Beneficiaries — The dependent spouse until he or she remarries,
the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the
member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be
entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the
absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall
be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their
absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing,
any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary
beneficiary.
SEC. 13. Death Benefits. — Upon the death of a member who has paid
at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of
death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the monthly
pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly pension. If he has not
paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit
equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly
contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly
pension, whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since
petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the
deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent
illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the
death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a
minor child to qualify as a "dependent,29" the only requirements are
that he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully
employed.30
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were
born on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the
legitimate child of the deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a
dependent under the SSS Law, Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been
entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of the share of the said
legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased
predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary
beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioner.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution
dated September 28, 20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2,
20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social Security
Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the
present petition for review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice)
contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition 7 to
declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition
notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of
succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead
or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque
(respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security
System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July
1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was
granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death
benefits13 which was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon
and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to
respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon
contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the
second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of
whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s
medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by
respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez
(Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February 13, 199915 averring
that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited
as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their
right to file the necessary court action to contest the marriage
between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is
"still very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming
to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a
claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death,17 he further
attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed
Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death
benefits as Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster,
Naga City recommended the cancellation of payment of death
pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999
representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the
ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during
his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year
guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the order of
preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously
paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the
Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled
by misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as
presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz
Presumptively Dead," did not become final. The presence of Aliz [sic]
Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic]
Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse, his
remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse
and who remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the
second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as
there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a
voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16,
2000,22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones
who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised
respondent of the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that
her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the
latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December 10,
1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the
order. It thus requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000
representing the total amount of monthly pension she had received
from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for
death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999.24 In a
subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension,
asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any
court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon
designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21,
2000,26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the discontinuance
of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was
not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for
the restoration to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was
returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000 representing the
funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her
siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any
amount during Bailon’s wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the
parties filed their respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an
Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting
that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know
of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is
not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her,
she having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon
after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and
Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of
respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she was "just a
common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner
Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and primary
beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the
amount of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit she received
therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as well
as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the
appropriate death benefit arising from the demise of SSS member
Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and
regulations and to inform this Commission of its compliance
herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this
Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that the petitioner is
not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the
declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the
first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in
bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the
SSS contained in its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32revealing
that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her
separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the
deceased member using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the
unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the
marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage
on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties
thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation conducted by
the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz
Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the
petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased member, it
necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to
the latter’s death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate
surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it
behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May
1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed
the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return
the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as
funeral benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by
Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for review35 before the
Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April
2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus
ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her.
Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of
whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice
Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can
validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the
latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can
respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage
subsisting and the second marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively
dead never attains finality as the finding that "the person is unheard
of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second
marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until
annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second
marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may
be filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that
respondent SSS may validly declare the second marriage null and void
on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the
decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without
basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review
the decision of the regular courts under the pretext of determining
the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members. Notwithstanding
its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should
extend due credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any
judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the
authority to declare the decision of the RTC to be without basis, the
procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play and
thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner
Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present evidence for and
her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of
Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no longer practical under the
premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as the
marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already
terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is there a second
marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise
dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of
the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry where parties to
the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS
has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and
consequently declare the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for
Reconsideration37 which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored
on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY
TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the
findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage
between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death
benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 540 of the Social
Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent
due process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI
proceedings are of no moment to the present controversy, as the
same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSC’s
finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between
Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right to the
death benefits."41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS
coverage, benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so
exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse,
decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it
declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through
fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making its own
findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on
the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage
on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually
acted as an appellate court. The law does not give the SSC unfettered
discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its
authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to
the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by
a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent
marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal
and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional
circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these
exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases
rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15
consecutive years45 when Bailon sought the declaration of her
presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a
presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage,
and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is
not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that
it had not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The
presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or
wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the
presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the
continuance of the marital relation with such first
spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is
terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent
marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to
the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by
the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the
filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the
spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted because and is made good ab initio.56
of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with
continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in
by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by Bailon.
law.51 In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an raised has been rendered unnecessary.
affidavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of
either spouse, the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise.
The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised,
because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot
be questioned except in a direct action for
annulment.52(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but
only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because
the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having
been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been
generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died,
as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any
one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any
conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings
of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly