SISTER MA. ANGELINA M. FERNANDO, R.V.M v. HON. JUDGE CESAR D.

SANTAMARIA, CHUA PING HIAN, WILLIBALDO UY, LAUREANA P. BORRES, and

REGISTER OR DEEDS FOR MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 160730 | December 10, 2004

FACTS:
On three separate occasions, petitioner Sister Ma. Anglina Fernando
(Sister Angelina) obtained loans from private responding Chua Ping Hian (Chua) with a
total amount of P5.5 million. As a security for her obligations Sister Angelina executed a
real estate mortgage on her property in Makati City in favor to Chua. Before the third
loan was released, a Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by Sister Angelina with the
assurance from respondent Laureana Borres (Borres) that it is only for formalities. On
November 1995, the title of petitioner over the property was cancelled, and a new one
was issued in favor of Chua. Chua offered to sell the property in question back to Sister
Angelina for P10million, but it has come to her knowledge that it was sold by Chua to
respondent Willibaldo Uy (Uy) on December 1995 and a new transfer certificate of title
was executed to his favor.

On October 2000 Sister Angelina then filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint
against Chua, Uy and Borres praying for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale
and cancellation of the transfer certificates of title. A motion to dismiss was filed by the
respondents on the ground of prescription. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription, ratification, and abandonment of cause of action.

An appeal was filed by Sister Angelina with the Court of Appeals; the
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure of the former
to file a record on appeal within the prescribed period. The Court of Appeals granted the
motion to dismiss

A petition for certiorari with the appellate court was filed by the petitioner
contending that her complaint sees to hold all respondents solidarily liable for the
fraudulent conveyance of her property and that the RTC erred rendering several
judgments – separating the liability of Borres from Chua and Uy.; she also claims that
her appeal was perfected by mere filing notice of appeal and does not require the
record of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, stating that the liability of
Borres is distinct from the liability of the other respondents and that her appeal should
have been perfected under Sections 2(a) and 3, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the liability of the respondents are separate and distinct from
each other.
2. Whether or not Sister Angelina perfected her appeal within the
prescribed period.

HELD: YES, the respondents have separate and distinct liability from each other.
Hence the several judgement rendered by the RTC is not erroneous.

Section 4, Rule 36, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

“ Section 4. Several judgments. — In an action against several defendants, the court

may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them,
leaving the action to proceed against the others.”

Several judgments is proper only when the liability of each party is clearly separable
and distinct, such that the claims against them could have been the subject of separate
suits, and judgment for or against them will not necessarily affect the other.

2. NO, Sister Angelina did not perfect her appeal within the prescribed period.
Under Section 2(a) in relation to Section 3, of Rule 41, petitioner is
required to file a record on appeal within thirty days from November 15, 2001, ​19 ​her
date of receipt of the October 25, 2001 order. Considering that no record on appeal was
filed, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the order of the trial court dismissing her
appeal for failure to perfect the same within the reglementary period. A fundamental
precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly observed for
being considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly
discharge of judicial business. The strict compliance with such periods has more than
once been held to be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the
perfection of appeals. Upon expiration of the period without an appeal having been
perfected, the assailed order or decision becomes final and executory and the court
loses all jurisdiction over the case.
 The filing of record of appeal is necessary in cases of several judgment to enable
the appellate court to decide the appeal WITHOUT the original record which should
remain with the court when the pending disposal of the case with respect to the other
defendants.

Aguilar, et. al. vs Lightbringers Credit Cooperative

G.R. No. 209605, 1/12/2015

Topic; Civ Pro; Pre-Trial; Default by failure to appear;

Facts:

Lightbringers Credit Cooperative filed three (3) complaints for sum of money against
petitioners Aguilar and Calimbas, before the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Dinalupihan, Bataan. The complaints alleged that Tantiangco, Aguilar and Calimbas
were members of the cooperative who borrowed cash. Tantiangco, Aguilar and
Calimbas filed their respective answers they claimed that never borrowed the amounts
being collected and that no interest could be claimed because there was no written
agreement as to its imposition. On the scheduled pre-trial conference, only respondent
and its counsel appeared. The MCTC directed the counsels of the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the issue of whether or not a party who had been
declared "as in default" might still participate in the trial of the case. Only respondent,
however, complied with the directive. In its Order, the MCTC held that since the
proceedings were being heard ex parte, the petitioners who had been declared "as in
default" had no right to participate therein and to cross-examine the witnesses. The
court ruled in favor of the Bank, and only Tantiangco’s case was dismissed. Aguilar and
Calimbas appealed that the loan documents were bogus. The RTC denied the appeal,
and in the Court of Appeals yet again. Hence the petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the MCTC and the RTC failed to comply with Section 2 of
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
2. Whether or not the plaintiffs are in default.

Ruling:
1. ​Yes, the Court agrees with the petitioners that Section 2, Rule 42 does not require
that the entire records of the case be attached to the petition for review. The provision
states: xXx ​(d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies
of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk
of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support
the allegations of the petition.
Clearly, the Rules do not require that the entire records of the case be attached to the
petition for review. Only when these specified documents are not attached in the petition
will it suffer infirmities under Section 3, Rule 42.

2. The Court, however, clarifies that failure to attend the pre-trial does not result in
the "default" of the defendant. Instead, the failure of the defendant to attend shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be
dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to
present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from
the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present his own evidence.

The petition is ​PARTIALLY GRANTED​.

G.R. No. 196358. March 21, 2012.​*

​ RANETA CENTER, INC., respondents.

JANDY J. AGOY, petitioner, ​vs. A

Facts

Following affirmation of Court of Appeals of the dismissal of petitioner Agoy presumably

from employ of private respondent, the said petitioner filed a Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court.

The Court denied said petition through a minute resolution that read:

“​G.R. No. 196358 (​Jandy J. Agoy vs. Araneta Center, Inc.​).​—The Court resolves to

GRANT ​petitioner’s motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the

reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on ​certiorari.​ ”

Issue

Whether or not it was proper for the Court to deny Agoy’s petition through a minute

resolution.

Held

Yes.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Minute Resolutions; Minute resolutions are issued for

the prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court.​—Minute resolutions are issued for the

prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court. While they are the results of the

deliberations by the Justices of the Court, they are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or

his assistants whose duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by

quoting verbatim the resolutions adopted by the Court. Neither the Clerk of Court nor his

assistants take part in the deliberations of the case. They merely transmit the Court’s

action in the form prescribed by its Internal Rules.

Same; Same; Same; As the Court explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186

SCRA 1 (1990), no law or rule requires its members to sign minute resolutions that deny

due course to actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter his certification on the

same.​—As the Court explained in ​Borromeo v. Court of Appeals,​ 186 SCRA 1 (1990),

no law or rule requires its members to sign minute resolutions that deny due course to

actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter his certification on the same. The

notices quote the Court’s actual resolutions denying due course to the subject actions

and these already state the required legal basis for such denial. To require the Justices

to sign all its resolutions respecting its action on new cases would be unreasonable and

unnecessary.

Same; Same; Same; With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Supreme Court

itself has defined the instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed

resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution. Among those instances when a

minute resolution shall issue is when the Court “denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of

the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in

​ While the Constitution

the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below.”—

requires every court to state

in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based, the

Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a petition for review, merely to

state the legal basis for such denial. Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any

court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. ​No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the

court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis

therefor. ​(Emphasis supplied) With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court

itself has defined the instances when cases are to be adjudicated by decision, signed

resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution. Among those instances when a

minute resolution shall issue is when the Court “denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of

the [Rules of Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in

the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below.” The minute resolutions

in this case complied with this requirement.

Same; Same; Same; Minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute

actual adjudications on the merits. They are the result of thorough deliberation among

the members of the Court.​—The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions

dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the merits. They

are the result of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court. When the

Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the

petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means

that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. The decision

sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. It would be an exercise in redundancy

for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the petition the

conclusions that the CA reached.

-#-
 Obando v. Figueras
322 SCRA 148

FACTS: ​Defendant Eduardo is the stepson of the deceased espouses Figueras, that
after the death of the said spouses defendant Eduardo assumed their joint estate.
Before the intestacy begun Eduardo was served a petition for probate of what purported
to be Dona Alegria's Last will and testament filed by the Petitioner, the alleged Will
bequeathed to Petitioner two parcels of land in Gilmore, New Manila, Q.C., the case
was consolidated with the intestacy by the probate court, as a result Petitioner was
appointed as co-administrator. Eduardo insisted that the Will was a forgery which was
later found out to be true by the NBI. This resulted to the conviction of Petitioner for the
crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document. Eduardo sold the properties
to the Co-defendant Amigo realty. Petitioner in his capacity as co-administrator filed a
complaint against the defendant seeking to annul the sale. However, petitioner was
removed as co-administrator by the probate court. Respondents filed a joint Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of legal standing of the Petitioner after the latter rested its
case. The RTC grant the motion and dismissed the case. CA also affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the dismissal of the RTC on the ground of lack of capacity to
sue or legal standing after the Petitioner rested his case is proper.

HELD: ​In general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary period
for filing a responsive pleading. However, even after an answer has been filed, the
Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1)
lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery
during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal. Except for lack of
cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be
waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed
at all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules. Applying this principle to the case at bar, the respondents did not
waive their right to move for the dismissal of the civil case based on Petitioner Obando’s
lack of legal capacity. It must be pointed out that it was only after he had been convicted
of estafa through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of
the Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground became available to the
respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to
Dismiss filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to
sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant
should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary
period for filing a responsive pleading.

DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENCE

Philippine National Bank vs. San Miguel Corporation

G.R. No. 186063; January 15, 2014

Where the trial court rendered a decision finding the applicant of a letter of credit solely
liable to pay the beneficiary and omitted by inadvertence to insert in its decision the
phrase ‘without prejudice to the decision that will be made against the issuing bank,’ the
bank cannot evade responsibility base on this ground. The Independence Principle
assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt payment independent of any breach of
the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from determining whether the main
contract is actually accomplished or not.

Facts: ​San Miguel Corporation (SMC) entered into an Exclusive Dealership Agreement
with Rodolfo Goroza, wherein the latter was given by SMC the right to trade, deal,
market or otherwise sell its various beer products. Goroza applied for a credit line with
SMC. To comply with the credit line application requirement, he applied for and was
granted a letter of credit by PNB. Subsequently, Goroza availed of his credit line with
PNB and started selling SMC’s beer products.

An additional credit line with PNB was applied for by Goroza and his total credit line
reached P4,400,000. Initially, Goroza was able to pay his credit purchases with SMC,
but after sometime he started to become delinquent with his accounts.

SMC demanded Goroza and PNB to pay the amount of P3,722,440.88, but neither of
them paid. As a result, SMC filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money against
PNB and Goroza.

After summons, PNB filed its answer, while Goroza did not. Upon motion, Goroza was
subsequently declared in default. RTC later on rendered a decision in favor of SMC and
against Goroza.
In the meantime, trial continued with respect to PNB. AN Urgent Motion to Terminate
Proceedings was filed by PNB claiming that a decision was already rendered
finding Goroza solely liable. The RTC denied this motion and subsequently issued a
Supplemental Judgment stating that: “the phrase ‘without prejudice to the decision
made against the other defendant PNB which was not declared in default’ shall be
inserted in the dispositive portion of the decision.” PNB then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same. Aggrieved, PNB filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA, but was denied. A motion for reconsideration was filed,
but was again denied. Hence, the petition.

PNB argues that the RTC decision, finding Goroza solely liable to pay the entire amount
sought to be recovered by SMC, has settled the obligation of both Goroza and PNB.

Issue: Whether or not the issuing bank is released from its liability to pay the
beneficiary.

Ruling​: Petition Denied.

In the case of Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation:

“By definition, a letter of credit is a written instrument whereby the writer requests or
authorizes the addressee to pay money or deliver goods to a third person and assumes
responsibility for payment of debt therefor to the addressee. A letter of credit, however,
changes its nature as different transactions occur and if carried through to completion
ends up as a binding contract between the issuing and honoring banks without any
regard or relation to the underlying contract or disputes between the parties thereto.
Thus, the engagement of the issuing bank is to pay the seller or beneficiary of the credit
once the draft and the required documents are presented to it. The so-called
"independence principle" assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt payment
independent of any breach of the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from
determining whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not. Under this
principle, banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy,
genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents, or for the general and/or
particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon, nor do they
assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality,
condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any
documents, or for the good faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance or
standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person
whomsoever.”
In a letter of credit transaction, such as in this case, where the credit is stipulated as
irrevocable, there is a definite undertaking by the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary
provided that the stipulated documents are presented and the conditions of the credit
are complied with. Precisely, the independence principle liberates the issuing bank from
the duty of ascertaining compliance by the parties in the main contract. As the
principle's nomenclature clearly suggests, the obligation under the letter of credit is
independent of the related and originating contract. In brief, the letter of credit is
separate and distinct from the underlying transaction.

In other words, PNB cannot evade responsibility on the sole ground that the RTC
judgment found Goroza liable and ordered him to pay the amount sought to be
recovered by SMC. PNB's liability, if any, under the letter of credit is yet to be
determined.

Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk v. Spouses Sison

G.R. No. 191132, January 27, 2016

FACTS:

Spouses Ernesto and Elizabeth Sison and respondent Venancio Wadas filed a forcible
entry complaint against the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province represented by Fr.
Gerry Gudmalin who then ordered the forcible demolition of their respective perimeter
fences in order to expand the area of the Church. The priest dispossessed them of their
lands and began constructing a building that encroached on portions of their respective
lots.

The case was submitted for decision because the defendant failed to file its answer
despite service of summons. Thereafter, the MCTC decision became final and
executory. Hence, the Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc. (the Vicariate of Tabuk) filed an
urgent manifestation and motion before but the same was denied by the MCTC on the
ground that the latter treated the motion as a motion for reconsideration - a prohibited
pleading under Section 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It also stressed that in
ejectment cases, the basic issue is possession de facto, not ownership; the proper
defendant is the person who actually disturbed the complainant's possession over the
property. Thus, the respondents correctly impleaded the Vicariate of Mt. Province
(represented by Fr. Gerry Gudmalin).
Vicariate of Tabuk filed a Rule 47 petition for annulment of the MCTC judgment, and
argued that the MCTC rendered the decision without acquiring jurisdiction over its
person. Subsequently, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that: (1) the petition had no cause of action and (2) the Vicariate of Tabuk had no
juridical personality or legal capacity to sue because Vicariate of Mt. Province, through
Fr. Gerry Gudmalin was properly impleaded because the sole issue was prior
possession. They posited that since the Vicariate of Tabuk and Bishop Prudencio
Andaya were not impleaded, then they have no personality to file the petition for the
annulment of judgment.

RULING:

Ejectment suits are actions in personam wherein judgment only binds parties
who had been properly impleaded and were given an opportunity to be heard.—
The MCTC judgment was only rendered against Fr. Gudmalin and the Vicar Apostolic of
Mountain Province, not against the petitioner Vicariate of Tabuk. Hence, the petitioner
can only be bound by the MCTC judgment if it is shown to be: (a) a trespasser, squatter,
or agent of the defendants fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;
(b) a guest or other occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendants; (c)
a transferee pendente lite; (d) sub-lessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) a member of the family, a
relative, or other privy of the defendants.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of a cause of action are not the same.
— Failure to state a cause of action refers to an insufficiency of the allegations in the
petition/complaint. It is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
before the defendant or respondent files a responsive pleading. Notably, the dismissal
is without prejudice to the refiling of an amended complaint. On the other hand, the lack
of a cause of action refers to an insufficiency of factual or legal basis to grant the
complaint. It applies to a situation where the evidence failed to prove the cause of action
alleged in the pleading. It is a ground for dismissal using a demurrer to evidence under
Rule 33 after the plaintiff has completed presenting his evidence. The dismissal
constitutes res judicata on the issue and will bar future suits based on the same cause
of action.

In this case, The RTC dismissed the Vicariate of Tabuk's petition for annulment of
judgment because it allegedly failed to state a cause of action. However, upon
reviewing the RTC's order and examining the petition for annulment, we conclude that
the dismissal was actually due to lack of a cause of action. The petition for annulment of
judgment actually stated a cause of action: that the MCTC rendered a judgment against
the petitioner without acquiring jurisdiction over its person. If the RTC hypothetically
admitted this allegation, the petitioner becomes entitled to the relief prayed for: the
annulment of the MCTC judgment. Thus, the RTC erred when it stated that the
dismissal was for "failure to state a cause of action."

Nevertheless, Rule 47 authorizes the RTC to dismiss a petition for annulment of

judgment outright if it has no substantial merit:

“Section 5. Action by the court. — Should the court find no substantial

merit in the petition, the same may be dismissed outright with specific reasons for
such dismissal. x x x”

We affirm the RTC's dismissal of the petition, but ​this is not to say that the petitioner is
left without a remedy in law. The petitioner may still avail of the plenary action of ​accion
reinvindicatoria wherein the issue of its ownership may be thoroughly threshed out in a
full​ blown trial after which complete reliefs may be granted to the proper parties.

WHEREFORE, ​premises considered, the petition is ​DENIED ​for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.

PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK vs. FELIPE CHUA

G.R. No. 178899 November 15, 2010

FACTS​: Tomas Tan (Mr. Tan), a stockholder and director/treasurer of CST

Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a ​derivative suit against Philippine Business Bank (PBB)
and several others (including respondent Felipe Chua [Mr. Chua) before the RTC.

Mr. Tan alleged that he was informed by Mr. Chua that the ​CST’s
properties had been fraudulently used as collateral ​for loans without proper authority
from CST stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.

Mr. Tan also discovered that a Secretary’s Certificate was issued authorizing
John Dennis Chua (John) ​to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the
name of CST with PBB​. John took out loans with PBB worth P91.1M and used CST
properties as collateral. ​Felipe signed as a co-maker with John on 6 promissory notes to
PBB.
When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage, Tan filed the present complaint,
arguing that the ​loans/promissory notes and mortgage made out in CST’s name are
unenforceable, since they were entered by persons who are unauthorized.

In its Amended Answer, PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well as the
corresponding mortgage over CST properties, were all valid and binding since the loan
applications and documents were duly supported. In addition, the original copies of the
titles were offered to PBB as collaterals.

PBB’s Amended Answer also included a cross-claim against Felipe​, demanding

payment of the promissory notes he signed as co-maker. Felipe claimed that he never
applied for a loan and denied authorizing John to apply for any loans or the use of
properties. But Felipe admitted that he signed, as co-maker, those 6 promissory notes.

PBB filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgement​, claiming that since Felipe already
admitted the execution of the promissory notes merely to persuade John to pay off his
loan to PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Sec 29 of Act No.
2031, Negotiable Instruments Law.

RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBB’s cross-claim, finding Felipe liable as a
signatory to the promissory notes and ordering Felipe to pay PBB. RTC denies Felipe’s
Notice of Appeal that he should had filed a special civil action for certiorari but since the
period of filing a certiorari had already lapsed without respondent filing any petition, the
partial summary judgment had become final and executor. Thus, RTC ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the Partial Judgment in favor of
PBB.

Felipe filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA challenging the RTC
decision. CA partly affirmed the RTC order and CA held that Felipe could not appeal the
Partial Summary Judgment while the main case remained pending. CA held that RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that the Partial Judgment had become
final and executory when Felipe failed to avail of the proper remedy of certiorari within
the 60 day reglementary period. The writ of execution, as well as the subsequent
implementing proceedings, were void.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Partial Judgement had become final and executory when
Felipe failed to avail of the remedy of certiorari.
HELD: NO.

A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly

dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial.21 When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues
of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the
case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.

A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment, "as
it does not" put an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has
not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." The Rules provide for a partial
summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to
focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which
are not in dispute.

A final judgement or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court.
The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full
adjudication of all the issues raised in a case.

An order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the
Court, is "interlocutory".

There can be no doubt that the partial summary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an
interlocutory order that was never meant to be treated separately from the main case.

The partial summary judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB
against co-defendant, Felipe, based on Felipe’s admission that he signed promissory
notes as co-maker.

Clearly, this partial summary judgement did not dispose of the case as the main issue
raised in Tan’s complaint.
The judgment rendered by the RTC is only a Partial Summary Judgment on the
cross-claim. The main case which involves the claim of Tan is still pending and has not
yet been decided by the RTC.

Petition was DENIED for lack of merit and AFFIRMED the decision of the CA. Cost
against PBB.

RUBEN SAW v. CA, GR No. 90580, 1991-04-08

Facts:

A collection suit with preliminary attachment was filed by Equitable Banking

Corporation against Freeman, Inc. and Saw Chiao Lian, its President and
General Manager. The petitioners moved to intervene, alleging that (1) the
loan transactions between Saw Chiao Lian and Equitable Banking Corp. were
not approved by the stockholders representing at least 2/3 of corporate
capital; (2) Saw Chiao Lian had no authority to contract such loans; and (3)
there was collusion between the officials of Freeman, Inc. and Equitable
Banking Corp. in securing the loans. The motion to intervene was denied,
and the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals sustained the denial of the petitioners' motion for
intervention, holding that "the compromise agreement between Freeman,
Inc., through its President, and Equitable Banking Corp. will not necessarily
prejudice petitioners whose rights to corporate assets are at most inchoate,
prior to the dissolution of Freeman, Inc. x x x. And intervention under Sec.
2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court is proper only when one's right is
actual, material, direct and immediate and not simply contingent or
expectant

It also ruled against the petitioners' argument that because they had already
filed a notice of appeal, the trial judge had lost jurisdiction over the case and
could no longer issue the writ of execution.
The petitioners base their right to intervene for the protection of their
interests as stockholders on Everett v. Asia Banking Corp.
The well-known rule that shareholders cannot ordinarily sue in equity to
redress wrongs done to the corporation, but that the action must be brought
by the Board of Directors, x x x has its exceptions.

[If] the corporation [were] under the complete control of the principal...
defendants. Equitable contends that the collection suit against Freeman, Inc.
and Saw Chiao Lian is essentially in personam and, as an action against
defendants in their personal capacities, will not prejudice the petitioners as
stockholders of the corporation.

Equitable also argues that the subject matter of the intervention falls
properly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission

Equitable maintains that the petitioners' appeal could only apply to the
denial of their motion for intervention and not to the main case because
their personality as party litigants had not been recognized by the trial court.

Issues:

WON Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioners cannot intervene

Ruling:

The Court finds that the respondent court committed no reversible error in
sustaining the denial by the trial court of the petitioners' motion for
intervention.

To allow intervention, [a] it must be shown that the movant has legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or otherwise qualified; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether... the
intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not.

The interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other

parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment.
The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of
action as pleaded, and which would put the intervenor​ in a legal position to
litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which
plaintiff could not recover.

Here, the interest, if it exists at all, of petitioners-movants is indirect,

contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral. At the very
least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right in
the management of the corporation and to... share in the profits thereof and
in the properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the
corporate debts and obligations.

While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the

property of the corporation, it does not vest the owner thereof with any legal
right or title to any of the property, his interest in the corporate property
being equitable or beneficial in... nature. Shareholders are in no legal sense
the owners of corporate property, which is owned by the corporation as a
distinct legal person.

The petitioners' appeal could not have concerned the "whole" case (referring
to the decision) because the petitioners "did not appeal the decision as
indeed they cannot because they are not parties to the case despite their
being stockholders of respondent Freeman, Inc." They... could only appeal
the denial of their motion for intervention as they were never recognized by
the trial court as party litigants in the main case.

In the case at bar, there is no more principal action to be resolved as a writ

of execution had already been issued by the lower court and the claim of
Equitable had already been satisfied. The decision of the lower court had
already become final and in fact had already... been enforced. There is
therefore no more principal proceeding in which the petitioners may
intervene.
G.R. No. 175291 July 27, 2011
THE HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS vs. MELBA L. LIMBACO, et al.

Facts: ​Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles of various

parcels of land registered in the names of respondents. It was alleged in the
complaint that Lolita Cabigas and her late husband, Nicolas Cabigas
purchased two lots from Salvador Cobarde who purchased the said lots from
Ines Ouano.

Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and Cobarde, and because the two
lots remained registered in her name,Ouano was able to sell these same lots
to the National Airports Corporationfor its airport expansion project and later
had the titles registered in its name.

When the airport expansion project fell through, the legal heirs of Ouano,
succeeded in reclaiming title to the two lots through an action for
reconveyance filed with the lower court; the titles over these lots were
thereafter registered in their names.They then subdivided the two lotsand
sold them to New Ventures Realty Corporation, Eugenio Amores, Henry See,
Freddie Go, Benedict Que, Petrosa, and AWG. AWG, in turn, sold one of the
parcels of land to UCB. All the buyers registered the titles over their
respective lots in their names.

After the respondents had filed their individual Answers, respondents Henry
See, Freddie Go and Benedict Que filed a motion to set the case for hearing
on special affirmative defenses. On the other hand, respondents AWG,
Petrosa, and UCB filed a motion for summary judgment, admitting as true
the facts stated in the petitioners complaint, but claiming that the petitioners
had no legal right to the properties in question.

RTC granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
petitioners’ complaint rationing that that the National Airports Corporation
was a buyer in good faith and its registration of the properties in its name
effectively transferred ownership over the two lots, free from all the
unrecorded prior transactions involving these properties, including the prior
sale of the lots to Cobarde.Insofar as the respondents who filed the motion
for summary judgment is concerned, CA dismissed the petitioners appeal.
The petitioners assert that the RTC erred in rendering a summary judgment
since there were factual issues that required the presentation of evidence at
a trial.

Issue: W/N the rendition of summary judgment was proper

Ruling: ​YES. Under the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be

rendered where, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, except
as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The Court explained the concept of summary judgment in Asian Construction

and Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International Bank:

Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at

weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no

genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a
full-blown trial. E
​ ven if on their face the pleadings appear to raise
issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that
such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed
by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor,
therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of
a genuine issue as to any material fact.

A closer examination of the parties submissions makes it apparent that this

is not a genuine issue of fact because the petitioners do not have any legally
enforceable right to the properties in question, as their
predecessors-in-interest are not buyers in good faith.
 ​ ILMA MACEDONIO, petitioner, vs. CATALINA RAMO, YOLANDA S.
V
MARQUEZ, SPOUSES ROEL and OPHELIA PEDRO, SPOUSES JOEFFRY
and ELIZA BALANAG, and BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. 193516. March 24, 2014

Donna Mae B. Palengaoan-Rosario for petitioner.

Conrado P. Aoanan for respondent BPI Family Savings Bank.
Amado Orden for respondents Ramo, Sps. Pedro and Sps. Balanag.

DEL CASTILLO, J.: Ponente

Facts:

Respondent CATALINA RAMO was the applicant under a Townsite Sales

Application (TSA) with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Cordillera Administrative Region (DENR-CAR) for the award of a
637 square meters lot at Res. Sec. “A,” Baguio City.

On November 29, 2003, before an award from the DENR-CAR was issued,
she sold a portion of said land in the area of 240 square meters to Petitioner
Vilma Macedonio for the sum of P1,700,000.00, wherein Petitioner Vilma
Macedonio paid a partial amount of P850,000.00.

The transaction between Ramo and Macedonio was not consummated and
for which reason, the Petitioner Macedonio filed several cases against
Respondent Catalina Ramo.

On January 6, 2004, Vilma Macedonio (petitioner) filed with the Baguio RTC
a civil case for rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
with damages, against respondent Catalina Ramo (Ramo). In Civil Case No.
5703-R, the parties agreed however were unable to submit a compromise
agreement. Case was assigned to Baguio RTC branch 3 which dismissed the
case for failure to prosecute.

Meanwhile, it appears that Ramo was able to secure in her name a Sales
Patent, and on October 16, 2006, a certificate of title (Katibayan ng Orihinal
na Titulo Blg. P-3535 or OCTP-3535) over the subject property.
In June 2007, Ramo caused the subject property to be subdivided into three
lots, which she then transferred to herein respondents, spouses Roel and
Ophelia Pedro (the Pedros), Yolanda S. Marquez (Marquez), and spouses
Joeffry and Elisa Balanag (the Balanags). The transfer to the Pedros and
Marquez were through Acknowledgment Trusts, whereby Ramo admitted
that she was not the owner of the lots but merely held them in trust for the
true owners — the Pedros and Marquez. On the other hand, the transfer of
the remaining lot to the Balanags was through a deed of sale. No part of the
subject property was transferred to petitioner Macedonio.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Protest:

On December 2, 2009, petitioner filed a written Protest with the office of the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR Cordillera Administrative Region,
seeking an investigation into Ramo’s acquisition of the subject property, and
claiming that Ramo’s sales patent was issued despite her having committed
multiple violations of the law. Petitioner thus prayed for the DENR to 1)
nullify Ramo’s sales patent as well as the subsequent original certificate of
title and its derivative titles issued in the name of the other individual
respondents herein, and 2) allow her to bid and acquire the subject property
claiming that she possessed the qualifications that would entitle her to
become a beneficiary thereof.

It appears that to this date, no action has been taken on the protest.

On April 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Baguio RTC another civil case
against respondents for specific performance, annulment of documents and
titles, with damages. In Civil Case No. 7150-R assigned to Baguio RTC
branch 6, the petitioner prayed for specific performance and annulment of
documents and titles, alternative is refund. Baguio RTC branch 6 dismissed
the case on July 20, 2010 due to a) violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), that is, for failure to inform the court
of the existence of Civil Case No. 5703-R and the DENR Protest; b) forum
​shopping; and c) litis pendentia under Section 1(e), Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules.The trial court held that petitioner filed multiple cases based on the
same cause of action, although with different prayers for relief; that while
Civil Case No. 5703-R was for rescission and Civil Case No. 7150-R was for
specific performance and annulment of documents and titles, both cases are
premised on the same cause of action — Ramo’s purported wrongful conduct
in connection with the cancelled sale of the subject property; that rescission
and specific performance could not be prayed for in two separate cases
without violating the rule against splitting a cause of action; and that the
pending DENR Protest which seeks to nullify the sales patent and certificates
of title issued to Ramo and the other individual respondents is identical to
petitioner’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 7150-R for annulment of
documents and titles

In her pleadings, Ramo admitted and confessed her liability to petitioner:

that to this day, she owes petitioner the amount of P850,000.00 as a result
of the botched sale. A refund of the said amount is what petitioner prays for
in the alternative in her Complaint in Civil Case No. 7150-R. At the very
least, this is what she is entitled to, including interest and attorney’s fees for
having been compelled to litigate.

Issue:

1]W/N the trial court in Civil Case No. 5703-R committed grave abuse of
discretion in terminating or dismissing the case for failure of the parties to
submit a compromise agreement?

2] W/N the dismissal of Civil Case No. 7150-R was warranted due to
violation of forum shopping?

Held:

1] The trial court in Civil Case No. 5703-R committed grave abuse of
discretion in terminating or dismissing the case for failure of the parties to
submit a compromise agreement. A compromise agreement is a contract,
whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or
put an end to one already commenced. The Court held that dismissing the
action without allowing the parties to present evidence and after ordering
them to compromise is tantamount to deprivation of due process, and the
“dismissal of an action for failure to submit a compromise agreement, which
is not even required by any rule, is definitely a harsh action.” The Court
likewise held therein that ‘‘the fact that negotiations for a compromise
agreement persisted even up to the time of the dismissal of the case
strongly demonstrates their earnest efforts to abide by the trial court’s order
to settle their dispute amicably”; thus, “dismissing an action on account of
the failure of the parties to compromise, would be to render nugatory the
pronounced policy of the law to encourage compromises, and thus open the
floodgates to parties refusing to agree upon an amicable settlement by
simply railroading their opposing parties’ position, or even defeating the
latter’s claim by the expedient of an outright dismissal.”

2] The Court finds that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 7150-R was
unwarranted. It is true that while it was incumbent for petitioner to have
informed the trial court of Civil Case No. 5703-R and the pending DENR
Protest, this Court is inclined to forego petitioner’s failure to abide by the
requirements of the 1997 Rules regarding certifications against forum
shopping, in favor of deciding the case on the basis of merit, A judgment
may be considered as one rendered on the merits “when it determines the
rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective
of formal, technical or dilatory objections”; or when the judgment is
rendered “after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from
a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point.” seeing, as the Court does, that a rigid interpretation of the 1997
Rules would result in substantial injustice to petitioner. The circumstances
require that substance must prevail over form, that procedural rules are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; their application
should be relaxed when they hinder instead of promote substantial justice.
Public policy dictates that court cases should as much as possible be
resolved on the merits and not on technicalities. Besides, “the Rules of Civil
Procedure on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.”

SC set aside judgement of RTC 6 of Baguio and ordered said court to

continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 7150-R.
G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN,​ Petitioner,

vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN,​ Respondent.

FACTS:

​ n February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional
O
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny
failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally
deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had
convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation. Johnny
resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. On
August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he
was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit
in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the
motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.
On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil
action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the RTC. On September 17, 2007 the CA​3 denied
Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow the production of medical records,
then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may
have made to their physicians would be kept confidential.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication?

RULING:

No. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s
illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that
is inadmissible without the patient’s consent under Section 1 of Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing
them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent. ​But the above right to
compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not
privileged."Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged
since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section
24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient,
be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
People v. Montejo, GR no L-24154, October 31, 1967
FACTS:
In a petition dated February 4, 1965, it was alleged by the City Fiscal of Zamboanga
that on September 23, 1963, Criminal Case no. 3225 was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City against a certain Felix Wee Sit for double homicide and
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, the trial of the case having
commenced on November 7, 1963, and thereafter continued subsequently. After which,
it was stated that a certain Ernesto Uaje y Salvador, a permanent resident of
Montalban, Rizal, then a patrolman in the Montalban Police Department, "is a material
and important witness in the case" his affidavit having served as the basis for filing the
information as he "happened to be an eye-witness during the traffic incident wherein a
Private Jeep bearing Plate No. J-6172 driven recklessly by the accused Felix Wee Sit.

It was then alleged that at the time the case against the accused was called for trial in
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, then presided by respondent Judge, the
witness had returned to Montalban, Rizal; that pursuant to a formal request of the City
Fiscal, respondent Judge issued a subpoena to patrolman Uaje addressed at his known
address at Montalban, Rizal, for him to appear at the trial of the case set for
continuation on February 1, 1965; that such subpoena was served on Uaje the return
showing that he had received it on January 19, 1965, at Montalban, Rizal; that when the
case was called for continuation on February 1, 1965, he did not appear "and forthwith
the undersigned City Fiscal formally moved for an order of arrest" or in the alternative
"to cite him for contempt for willful failure to appear at the trial of the case as a material
witness Such a motion was formally presented on February 3, 1965 and denied on the
same day by the respondent Judge, with Rule 21 Section 9 as the basis, in the Order
sought to be annulled in this petition, contending that if a witness was not bound by a
subpoena since his residence was admittedly not less than 50 kilometers from the place
of trial, the failure to obey the same or to comply with it could not in any manner
whatsoever constitute contempt of court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Judge, in denying a motion for arrest of a material
witness, in a criminal case, relying upon Section 9 Rule 21 of the Rules of Court, acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
It was held by the Supreme Court that while the contention of the respondents
was not lacking, such contention failed to enlist the assent of a majority of the Supreme
Court. What applied in the case at bar was actually Section 5 Rule 135 , and not
Section 9 of Rule 21 that only applies to civil cases, which states that:
Every Court shall have power:

(e) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;

SPS. DE MESA vs SPS. ARCERO

FACTS:
This case involves a parcel of land covered by a TCT registered under the name of
Araceli Olivia-De Mesa (Araceli). The petitioners purchased the subject property and later
constructed a house which they occupied as their family home.
Araceli obtained a loan from Caludio Acero Jr.(Claudio), in the amount of PhP100,000,
which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check
drawn against a Bank payable to Claudio but it was dishonored. Petitioners then failed to heed
Claudio’s subsequent demand for payment.
Claudio then filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 against the petitioners. Information
was filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
RTC rendered a decision acquitting the petitioners but ordered them to pay Claudio the
amount of PhP 100,000 with legal interest.
A writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Samonte levied upon the subject property.
The property was sold on public auction; Claudio being the highest bidder a certificate of sale
was issued to him.
Caludio leased the property to the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito).
However, petitioners and Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent.
Unable to collect the rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina Acero (Rufina) filed a
complaint for ejectment with the MTC against the petitioners and Juanito. In their defense, the
petitioners claimed that Sps. Acero have no right over the property. The petitioners deny that
they are mere lessors; on the contrary, they are the lawful owners of the subject property and,
thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
MTC, giving due course to Sps. Acero’s complaint, ordered the petitioners and Juanito to
vacate the subject property. MTC dismissed the petitioner’s claim of ownership over the
property. The title belongs to Claudio as shown by a TCT.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC but it was dismissed.
Petition for review was filed with the CA but it was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping

RULING:
Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.
 There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than
an appeal or ​certiorari​. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same
transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject
matter, and issues.​16
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of ​litis pendentia a​ re present, and where a
final judgment in one case will amount to ​res judicata i​ n the other. The elements of
forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to ​res
judicata ​in the action under consideration.​17
There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the ejectment case and in the action
to cancel. Verily, the primordial issue in the ejectment case is who among the contending parties
has a better right of possession over the subject property while ownership is the core issue in an
action to cancel a Torrens title.
It is true that the petitioners raised the issue of ownership over the subject property in the
ejectment case. However, the resolution thereof is only provisional as the same is solely for the
purpose of determining who among the parties therein has a better right of possession over the
subject property.
Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building. Neither shall it be conclusive as to the facts
therein. This Court had previously clarified that a decision in an ejectment case is not ​res
judicata ​in an annulment of title case and vice-versa given the provisional and inconclusive
nature of the determination of the issue of ownership in the former.
DELTA MOTOR SALES vs. HON. JUDGE MANGOSING, JOSE LUIS PAMINTUAN
FACTS:
Jose Luis Pamintuan sued Delta Motor for the recovery of the damages and attorney’s
fees. The basis of the action was that Delta Motor, as the seller of an allegedly defective Toyota
car to Pamintuan, failed to fulfill its warranty obligation by not properly repairing the car.
The summons for Delta Motor was served on its employee, Dionisia G. Miranda who
acknowledges its receipt by signing.
Delta Motor did not answer the complaint within the reglementary period which expired. Then,
Pamintuan filed a motion to declare Delta Motor in default which was granted by the Manila
Court.
The lower court decided in favor of Pamintuan and ordered the Delta Motor to pay for the
PhP 45,000 damages.
Delta Motor’s counsel filed a petition to lift the order of default. They alleged that
Dionisia G. Miranda was not the corporate secretary but the secretary of Albert Ramos of the
personnel department; that Pamintuan is still indebted to Delta Motor an unpaid balance; that the
entity liable for breach of warranty was Toyota Motor Sales Company. Dionisia G. Miranda
alleged in her affidavit that she just kept the same “for reference” to her immediate superior,
Ramos.
The lower court denied the motion on the ground that Dionisia Miranda was a person of
suitable age and discretion who could receive summons for another person as contemplated
under The Rules of Court and they did not oppose the motion declaring them in default.
Delta Motor deposited an appeal bond and filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal.
Pamintuan countered with a motion for execution contending that the judgment was already
final.
The Manila Court refused to give due course to Delta Motor’s appeal and granted
Pamintuan’s motion for execution. The instant petition was filed levying upon a Toyota mini-bus
and a car to satisfy the judgment for damages against Delta Motor.
Pamintuan in his comment, Delta Motor was furnished with copy of the motion to declare
it in default, it sued Pamintuan in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the rescission of the sale
and the recovery of the car. A writ of replevin was issued in that case.
Pamintuan filed a motion to dismiss Delta Motor’s complaint in the Pasig court on the
ground of pendency in the Manila Court involving the same Toyota car. It was denied.
A petition for certiorati was filed by Pamintuan in the Court of Appeals to set aside the
Pasig court’s decision. The CA denied the petition ruling that Rizal court did not grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether the Delta Motor was properly served with summons.

RULING:
 No. Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. ​Service upoin private domestic corporation or partnership. — ​ If
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors.
For the purpose of receiving service of summons and being bound by it, a corporation is
Identified with it agent or officer who under the rule is designated to accept service of process.
"The corporate power to receive and act on such service, so far as to make it known to the
corporation, is thus vested in such officer or agent." (Lafayette Insurance Co. vs. French, 15 L.
Ed. 451, 453).
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the
court over a corporation. The officer upon whon service is made be one who is named in the
statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. So, where the statute required that in the case of a
domestic corporation summons should be served on "the president or head of the corporation
secretary treasurer, cashier or managing agent thereof".
In the instant case the Manila court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta Motor because
it was not properly served with summons. The service of summons on Dionisia G. Miranda, who
is not among the persons mentioned in section 13 of Rule 14, was insufficient. It did not bind the
Delta Motor.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant and of the subject-matter
of the action by virtue of the service of summons in the manner required by law. Where there is
no service of summons or a voluntary general appearance by the defendant, the court acquires no
jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment in the cause. (Syllabi Salmon and Pacific Commercial Co.
vs. Tan Cueco, 36 Phil. 556).
Consequently, the order of default, the judgment by default is void and should be set
aside.
In the interest of justice and to avoid conflicting decisions, the trial of the two cases
should be consolidated The Pasig case should be transferred to Branch XXI of the Court of First
Instance of Manila where Civil Case No. 97373 is assigned. Apparently, Delta Motor filed its
replevin case in Pasig because it was stipulated in the invoice covering the sale that any action
there under may be instituted in any competent court of Rizal.
 OTTO GMUR, INC.,​ petitioner,
vs.
EULOGIO P. REVILLA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, ET AL.,​ respondents.

Facts:

In November, 1926, Lim Cuan Sy & Co., doing business in the City of Manila under the
name of Lim Cuan Sy, took out six insurance policies in the aggregate sum of P70,000, covering
its stock of merchandise at No. 62 Calle Urbiztondo, Manila. On December 26, 1926, while the
policies were in full force and effect, the merchandise covered by the policies was destroyed by
fire. Thereafter, six civil actions, under the Nos. 31715, 31735, 31745, 31765, 31775, and 31785,
were begun in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the insurance companies, to recover
the loss suffered under the policies of insurance. On September 28, 1927, the parties to the
actions, through their respective attorneys, entered into and filed in the record of cases Nos.
31735, 31745, 31765, 31775, and 31785.

Judgment was entered therein in the lower court in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant insurance company, for the sum of P10,000, with interest and costs. On appeal to the
Supreme Court under record No. 31952, the judgment was affirmed on November 13, 1930. To
turn to another feature of the matter, it is admitted that on June 19, 1930, a petition for the
involuntary insolvency of the partnership Lim Cuan Sy & Co. was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. On October 17, 1930, the partnership was declared insolvent and Trinidad
Jurado Te Kim Juan was appointed the assignee.

Lim Cuan Sy & Co. assigned to F. E. Zuellig, Inc., the policy of fire insurance upon
which case No. 31735 was based. On December 27, 1929, Lim Cuan Sy & Co., assigned to Otto
Gmur, Inc., by means of a public document the fire insurance policy upon which civil case No.
31765 was based. On November 19, 1930, F. E. Zuellig, Inc., and Otto Gmur, Inc., through their
attorneys, prepared and filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, in cases Nos. 31735,
31745, 31775, 31785, and 31765, verified motions requesting permission to intervene in the
actions. Oppositions were entered by Jose P. Laurel and the assignee of the insolvent estate of
Lim Cuan Sy & Co.

Issue:

Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel a trial court to allow motions to intervene in
actions which, by stipulation of the parties, were to abide the result of the action in another case
after judgment in the test case had been rendered.
Held:

No. Section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the subject of intervention
and reads as follows:

SEC. 121. ​Intervention.​ — A person may, at any period of a trial, upon motion, be
permitted by the court to intervene in an action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both. Such intervening party may be permitted to join the plaintiff in claiming what is
sought by the claimant, or to unite with the defendant in resisting the claims of the
plaintiff, or to demand anything adverse to both the plaintiff and defendant. Such
intervention, if permitted by the court, shall be made by complaint in regular form, filed
in court, and may be answered or demurred to as if it were an original complaint. Notice
of motion for such intervention shall be given to all parties to the action, and notice may
be given by publication, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relating to
publication, in cases where other notice is impracticable.

In the Iowa case of Henry, Lee & Co. ​vs. Cass County Mill and Elevator Company
([1875], 42 Iowa, 33), it was said that, "when a verdict has been returned, or the parties have
agreed upon the judgment to be entered, then the action has been decided, and it is too late to
entertain the claim or determine the rights of an intervenor." It was held in the cited case that
when such an agreement has been made a third party, claiming an interest in the subject of the
litigation cannot intervene. It would be preferable thus to proceed rather than for this court to
substitute its discretion for that of the trial court and to force the trial court to permit
interventions so tardily interposed.

Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. UCPB General Insurance Company, Inc.
G.R. No. 146018. June 25, 2003.*
Facts:

December 11, 1991: Nestor Angelia (shipper and consignee) delivered to the petitioner EdgarC
okaliong Shipping Lines, Inc" (now Cokaliong Shipping Lines), a cargo consisting of one
(1)carton of Christmas decor and two (2) sacks of plastic toys, to be transported on board the '
*andag $rom Ceb+ Cit& $or *andag, S+rigao delS+r" *his cargo is +nder ill o$ ading No" -., inthe
amo+nt o$ /0,-""

1. Nestor Angelina and Zosimo Mercado delivered a cargo to the Edgar Cokaliong
Shipping Lines, Inc. (now Cokaliong Shipping Lines), cargo consisting of one (1) carton
of Christmas decor and two (2) sacks of plastic toys, to be transported on board the M/V
Tandag on its Voyage No. T-189 for Tandag, Surigao del Sur. This cargo is under Bill of
Lading no. 58.

2. Zosimo Mercado (another shipper and consignee) likewise delivered cargo to petitioner
consisting of two (2) cartons of plastic toys and Christmas decor, one (1) roll of floor mat
and one (1) bundle of various or assorted goods". This is under bill of lading No 59,
valued in the amount.
3. Feliciana Legaspi (owner of the goods) insuredthe cargo, covered by 6 Nos 59 and No
58, with the UCPB General Insurance Co,Inc, respondent No 59 was insured for
P100,000 while No 58 for P50,000, (Note that both amounts are far from the actual and
declared value in the BOLs issued bu Cokaliong.
4. After [respondent] rested its case, [petitioner] prayed for and was allowed, by the Court a
quo, to take the depositions of Chester Cokaliong, the Vice-President and Chief
Operating Officer of [petitioner], and a resident of Cebu City, and of Noel Tanyu, an
officer of the Equitable Banking Corporation, in Cebu City, and a resident of Cebu City,
to be given before the Presiding Judge of Branch 106 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City.
5. The engine room of the M/V Tandag caught fire after it passed the Mandaue/Mactan
Bridge resulting in the total loss of the vessel and its cargo; an investigation was
conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard which rendered
a Report, dated February 13, 1992 absolving [petitioner] of any responsibility on account
of the fire, which Report of the Board was approved by the District Commander of the
Philippine Coast Guard.
6. Felicidad Legazpi filed claim, with repondent for the value of crgos insured. The latter
approved the claim.
7. UCPB as subrogee of Legazpi filed a complaint against petitioner due to negligence.

Issue:
The extent of liability of the petitioner.

Held:
The records lost goods contain the stipulation that in case of claim for loss or for damage to the
shipped merchandise or property, „[t]he liability of the common carrier x x x shall not exceed the
value of the goods as appearing in the bill of lading.

A stipulation that limits liability is valid as long as it is not against public policy.

The Court therein considered this declaration as the basis of the carrierÊs liability and ordered
payment based on such amount. Following this ruling, petitioner should not be held liable for
more than what was declared by the shippers/consignees as the value of the goods in the bills
of lading.

PHILIP S. YU, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 154115 November 29, 2005

Facts:

This involves an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the
grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse filed by Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent)
against petitioner Peter Yu.

On trial, Viveca Yu moved for issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum
to certain officers of life insurance company, Insular life to compel them to produce the
insurance policy and application for life insurance of a person suspected to be Peter Yu's
illegitimate child.

Private respondent contends that the information on the insurance policy and application for
insurance are crucial on the issue of the petitioner's infidelity and financial capacity to support
her and their children.

Trial court denied Viveca Yu motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
testificandum, instead trial court issued order that insurance contract is inadmissible evidence
pursuant to circular issued by Insurance Commission which prevents insurance companies/agents
to divulge confidential and privileged information about insurance policies. In addition, the
production of application of insurance and contract violates provision on Civil code and civil
registry law which prohibits unauthorized identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.
Respondent moved for motion for reconsideration but is likewise denied.
Aggrieved, Viveca Yu filed petition for certiorari before CA imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction against RTC Judge Hernandez.

CA set aside the order of RTC and declared that petitioner’s objection to admission of
documents was premature because the production of insurance application and contract was not
offered as part of respondent’s evidence.

Issue: Whether or Not the RTC Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered that
policy contract and insurance application were inadmissible as evidence before it was offered?

Ruling:

The court ruled that trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when
the evidence has been formally offered. ​The
private respondent was merely asking for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed
Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial
court was not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point.

When the trial court barred the production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its
probable worth the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the admissibility of evidence; it was,
more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.

Thus, in declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even before they were
formally offered, much less presented before it, the trial court acted in excess of its discretion.

Petition is denied and the Decision and Resolution of CA are affirmed.

CHAN KENT vs MICAREZ

GR No. 185758
March 9, 2011

DOCTRINE : Pre- Trial; Mediation Proceedings: AM No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards

mediation as part of pre-trial where parties are encouraged to personally attend the
proceedings-AM NO. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial where parties
are encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. The personal non-appearance, however, of
a party may be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, has been duly
authorized to enter into possible amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution.
Courts;Pleadings and Practice; Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible,
contumacious, or dilatory as for non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the
courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end. - Unless the
conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for
non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider lesser
sanctions which would still achieve the desired end. The Court has written “inconsiderate
dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion
of court dockets. while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of the individual
judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties

FACTS :

- This petition draws its origin from a complaint for recovery of real property and
annulment of title filed by petitioner, through her younger sister and authorized representative
MANALANG before the RTC
- Petitioner is a naturalized American citizen now permanently residing in the US
- Petitioner claimed that the residential lot she purchased in 1982 was clandestinely
and fraudulently conveyed and transferred by her parents in favor of her youngest brother.
- Petitioner prayed that she be declared as the true and real owner of the subject lot
and that the TCT be cancelled, and that a new one be issued in her name
- Considering that all the respondents are now also permanent residents of the
USA, summons was served upon them by publication per RTC Order dated May 17, 2007.
- Respondets executed SPA authorizing their counsel, ATTY MIGUEL fo file their
answer., which ATTY MIGUEL timely filed denying the material allegations in the complaint.
- RTC explored the possibility of an amicable settlement among the parties by
ordering the referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center.
- The Mediator issued a Mediator’s Report and returned the case to the RTC
allegedly due to the non-appearance of the respondents. Acting on said report, RTC issued an
order allowing petitioner to present her evidence ex parte
- Later, the Mediator clarified, that it was petitioner who did not attend the
mediation proceedings. Thus, RTC dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to
appear during the mediation proceedings
- Petitioner filed directly with the SC.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in dismissing the case due to the failure of the
plaintiff to appear during the mediation proceeding

RULING :

Yes. The court ruled that unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible,
contumacious, or dilatory as for non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the
courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end. The Court has
written “inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
solution to the congestion of court dockets. while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to
records of the individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the
parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a
brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.