Good morning, your Excellencies. May it please this court.

I am Brigette Domingo counsel for the

defendant Colonel Rivia.

For 15 minutes, I will be discussing the 3rd and 4th submissions, that Col. Rivia Is Not Responsible
for The War Crime of Attacking Humanitarian Personnel; and that Directive 66 did not declare no
quarter will be given to the RLF.

IF THERE ARE NO PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS, I WILL NOW PROCEED TO MY FIRST SUBMISSION.

I. Col. Rivia Is Not Responsible for The War Crime of Attacking Personnel or Objects
involved in a humanitarian mission

LEGAL BASIS:

ROME STATUTE Art. 8(2)(b)(iii):

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The perpetrator intended such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles so involved to be the object of the attack.
4. Such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were entitled to that protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the
international law of armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protection.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict

a. There was no criminal attack on the convoy

(SAY ELEMENTS)
(NOT ALL ELEMENTS UNDER 82b3 are PRESENT)
i. The convoy is unrecognizable as the ICRC convoy. (4th ELEMENT IS
ABSENT)
1. AP 1 ART 18: IDENTIFICATION/EMBLEMS/WAR IS TAKING PLACE
2. ICRC COMMENTARY: EMBLEM EVIDENCE OF PROTECTION
3. APPLICATION:
a. The vehicles that were seen by Lt. Metz were covered in
mud making them unrecognizable as medical vehicles
entitled to protection. (par 29, 31)
b. These were the same vehicles Metz saw approaching the
Southern Quarter. (par 34)
ii. Lt. Metz is unaware that the convoy is engaged in a humanitarian mission
(5th element)
1. aside from the fact they were mudspayed, the convoy took an
alternative route in Unit 52 of the Southern Quarter instead of
proceeding to their expected destination that is supposed to be in
the Eastern Quarter in Unit 45 (par 330)
2. Prior to the approaching of the convoy, Unit 52 was placed on high
alert due to a surprise attack by the RLF. (par 30)
3. Only 6 vehicles were also seen by Metz instead of what should’ve
been 8. (par 32)
4. The convoy did not arrive at the expected time.
 5. Lastly, Metz was aware that the RLF previously entered the city
disguised as humanitarian personnel which supports the conclusion
that Metz could not have identified the vehicles as medical
vehicles entitled to protection (par 23)

b. Rivia is not responsible on the basis of Command responsibility

i. Command Responsibility (Art 28)
ii. Effective Control
1. Rivia could not have prevented the crime due to faulty
communications with the TAF. (par 31)
2. TAF did not inform Rivia of the whereabouts of the convoy
despite Rivia’s efforts to communicate with them from time to
time. (par 31)
3. Additionally, Metz’ report to Rivia upon the arrival of the
unidentified vehicles prompted Rivia for Metz to ascertain their
identity but Metz only gave incoherent sentences and he
immediately filed without orders by Rivia. Rivia could not have
prevented the vehicle for he did not have effective control over
Metz. (par 34)
4. Par 28, Rivia was taken into custody before the ICC July 15, 2016

(PAUSE) (PAUSE)(PAUSE)
NOW, I WILL NOW MOVE ON TO THE 3rd ARGUMENT

II. The language of Directive 66 could not be said to have declared that no quarter will be
given.

LEGAL BASIS:

No Quarter: The captured will not be given place of stay or residence and none therefore
shall be taken prisoners and so everyone captured will be killed.
Jurisprudence:
ICRC
Opportunity to Surrender:
i. main objective of the directive was merely to cut off RLF’s means of
fighting and not that no quarter shall be given
1. Directive 66 merely instructed the TAF “to take all necessary
measures to cut off the RLF’s means of fighting” (par. 20).
2. This cannot reasonably be construed to mean a declaration that
there shall be no survivors rather, it merely allows the TAF to do
what the situation requires them to do.
3. This includes performing actions helpful to the military objective
that is to destabilize the RLF.
ii. Directivee 66 was not given in order to threaten the RLF on the basis that
no quarter shall be given;
 1. point, that Directive 66 was not given to threaten RLF, emphasizes
that the statement “remember who we’re fighting, the RLF are
barbarians, they take no prisoners” only describes the RLF as their
enemy at most (par 20)
2. . If anything, it is intended to boost the TAF’s morale by mentally
preparing them for their fight against the RLF.
3. The blanket no-entry no-exit policy is aimed at maintaining peace
in Velen by keeping the RLF at bay and nothing more (par 21)
iii. there was an opportunity to surrender for the RLF.
1. there was an opportunity to surrender because the following the
issuance of Directive 66, information was also disseminated telling
the RLF to surrender in an attempt to pre-empt further conflict
(par. 20)
2. LEAFLETS WERE NOT FROM RIVIA HIMSELF; IT
COULDVE BEEN DISSEMINATED BY
3. “fight to the bitter end” NOT NECESSARILY MEAN DEATH.

WE PRAY THIS COURT TO DROP THE CHARGES

ICRC CONVOY/GENEVA CONVENTION (emblem, identification, red cross signal)

AP 1, ART 12 (protection of medical units)

1. Medical units shall be respected and protected at all times and shall not be the object of
attack.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to civilian medical units, provided that they:
a. (a) belong to one of the Parties to the conflict; (
b. b) are recognized and authorized by the competent authority of one of the Parties
to the conflict; or
c. (c) are authorized in conformity with Article 9, paragraph 2, of this Protocol or
Article 27 of the First Convention.
3. The Parties to the conflict are invited to notify each other of the location of their fixed
medical units. The absence of such notification shall not exempt any of the Parties from
the obligation to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1.
4. Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt to shield military
objectives from attack. Whenever possible, the Parties to the conflict shall ensure that
medical units are so sited that attacks against military objectives do not imperil their
safety.

AP 1, ART 18 (identification)
1. Each Party to the conflict shall endeavour to ensure that medical and religious personnel
and medical units and transports are identifiable.
2. Each Party to the conflict shall also endeavour to adopt and to implement methods and
procedures which will make it possible to recognize medical units and transports which
use the distinctive emblem and distinctive signals.
 3. In occupied territory and in areas where fighting is taking place or is likely to take place,
civilian medical personnel and civilian religious personnel should be recognizable by the
distinctive emblem and an identity card certifying their status.
4. With the consent of the competent authority, medical units and transports shall be marked
by the distinctive emblem. The ships and craft referred to in Article 22 of this Protocol
shall be marked in accordance with the provisions of the Second Convention.
5. In addition to the distinctive emblem, a Party to the conflict may, as provided in Chapter
III of Annex I to this Protocol, authorize the use of distinctive signals to identify medical
units and transports. Exceptionally, in the special cases covered in that Chapter, medical
transports may use distinctive signals without displaying the distinctive emblem.
6. The application of the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 5 of this article is governed by
Chapters I to III of Annex I to this Protocol. Signals designated in Chapter III of the
Annex for the exclusive use of medical units and transports shall not, except as provided
therein, be used for any purpose other than to identify the medical units and transports
specified in that Chapter.
7. This article does not authorize any wider use of the distinctive emblem in peacetime than
is prescribed in Article 44 of the First Convention.

PROTECTION/PROTECTED STATUS
ICRC Commentary on PROTECTION: it is essential for medical personnel, units, materials
and transports to be identified in order to ensure the protection to which they are entitled, which
is identical to that accorded the wounded, sick and shipwrecked
ICRC COMMENTARY: The right to respect and protection of medical personnel and
medical objects would be meaningless if they could not be clearly recognized
ART 8 AP I: Medical units are those engaged in humanitarian assistance; Distinctive
emblems the distinctive emblem of the Red Cross (Red crescent/lion on white background)
- This means that personnel should be provided with such emblems and cards, but that it is
not made a condition sine qua non of protection. Neither the identity card nor the
distinctive emblem create a right of protection as such, as one delegate clearly pointed
out: "protection was provided to medical personnel because of their function; the
distinctive emblem was merely evidence of protection". The fact remains that the
absence of such evidence - particularly the emblem - would make the safety of such
personnel very uncertain, and it is therefore desirable that this rule is in practice
generally observed

(Pictet) If enemy troops at a distance are really to be able to accord these persons,
objects or buildings-especially the latter-the respect required by the Convention, they must be in
a position to recognize them for what they are.

It is for this reason that we stated above that the emblem was a virtually constitutive element
of protection under the Convention. The second reason is that it will not always be physically
possible to mark an object with the emblem. Small surgical instruments are a case in point. But
such articles will form an integral part of a larger unit, which will be marked.
(art 44) It is clear, however, that the protection can be effective only in so far as the enemy has
recognized the unit for what it is-in case of occupation, for examp1e.(emblem of convention) IIn
the second case, the sign is purely indicatory. That it is used to denote that unit as being that of
the RED CROSS (emblem of red cross)

LEGAL BASIS:
ROME STATUTE ART 28(a)(i)
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be,
as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such
crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY:
REQS:
(i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
(ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or
had been committed;
(iii) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof. [Prosecutor v. Delalic (Celebici): Bosnian and
Croatian forces took over villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina wherein they took in prisoners in
the Celebici camp and subjected them to torture and cruelty.
UNDER STATUTE: failed to prevent/repress/submit

Effective Control as to Commander (Prosec. V. Jadranko PRLIC) To hold an accused responsible

for crimes committed by a subordinate, a superior-subordinate relationship must be
established, which results from the status of the superior, whether de jure or de facto. The
superior-subordinate relationship manifests itself in the exercise of effective control over
subordinates. That control has been defined as “the material ability to prevent or punish
criminal conduct” and pertains to every superior, whether a military chief or any civilian
person vested with authority within a hierarchy, even a leader of a paramilitary group

LEGAL BASIS:

ROME STATUTE Art 8(2)(b)(xii)

1. perpetrator declared or ordered that there shall be no survivors.
2. Such declaration or order was given in order to threaten an adversary or to conduct
hostilities on the basis that there shall be no survivors.
3. The perpetrator was in a position of effective command or control over the
subordinate forces to which the declaration or order was directed.
SIEGE OF STALINGRAD