SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005]

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, petitioners, vs. HON. MONINA A.

ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76, QUEZON CITY, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded guilty and were
convicted and after they had applied for probation, may the information be amended and the accused
arraigned anew on the ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered with?
In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero dated 03 July
1996,[1] accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.

The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and raffled to Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16 July 1996 in this wise: [2]

On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the assistance of [their]
counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano entered a plea of GUILTY to the crime charged against them in
the information.

ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA,
GUILTY of Violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425 and they are hereby sentenced to suffer a jail
term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and the period during which said accused are under
detention is hereby deducted pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.

The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops is hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The Property Custodian is ordered to turn over said
evidences to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended.[3]
On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora
Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate motions, first, to admit amended Information, [4] and second, to set
aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996. [5] In
plaintiffs motion to admit amended information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic) Violation of Sec. 4, Art.
II, R.P. 6425.

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.

When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for transportation and delivery, with
intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing
42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.

2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it conformable to the

evidence on hand.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that the herewith attached
Amended Information against both accused be admitted and subsequently set for arraignment and
trial.[6] (Emphasis supplied)

Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September 1996,[7] held:

The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court has already decided
this case on the basis that the accused was arrested in possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and
it is too late at this stage to amend the information.

Another Order[8] of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the second motion in the
following manner:

The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the Decision dated July 16,
1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor is hereby GRANTED, it appearing from the published
resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 18, 1995, in G.R. No. 119131 Inaki Gulhoran and
Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon. FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by this court on August
20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, although under the statute of R.A. 7659 which took effect on December
31, 1993 the penalty for possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision
[correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction
the court which has jurisdiction over a criminal case is dependent on the maximum penalty attached
by the statute to the crime.

The amended Information reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and
there, willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting
tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.[9]

This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge
Monina A. Zenarosa,[10] docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572.
 Both accused filed a Motion to Quash [11] which was opposed[12] by the People in its
Comment/Opposition filed before the trial court. Subsequently, while the motion to quash before the
RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari[13] which they later moved to withdraw to pave the way for Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon
City to act judiciously on their motion to quash.[14] The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15
November 1996[15] noted the motion and considered the petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997,[16] the trial court denied accuseds motion to
quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the amended information. Accuseds
Motion for Reconsideration,[17] duly opposed by the prosecution,[18] was denied by the trial court in its
Order dated 16 April 1997.[19]Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order[20] based on the following grounds:[21]

A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT
CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; and

B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE

THAT THE RTC, BRANCH 103, HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DOCKETED AS
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-66799.[22]

In this Courts resolution dated 23 July 1997,[23] respondents were required to comment on the
Petition. They submitted their Comment on 18 November 1998. [24]Accused filed their Reply[25] on 02
March 2000. In compliance with the Courts resolution dated 29 March 2000, [26] accused and
respondents submitted their memoranda, respectively, on 26 May 2000[27] and 26 July 2000.[28]
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to
the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. [29]
The issues boil down to whether or not the first information is valid and whether or not the RTC,
Branch 103, where the first information was filed and under which Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was
tried, had jurisdiction to try the case.
On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents submitted opposing views --
accused insisting on its validity, whereas respondents asserted that the accused were arraigned under
an invalid information. Alleging that there being an alteration on the first information, hence it failed to
reflect the true quantity of drugs caught in possession of the accused, the prosecution insisted that the
first information under which accused were arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the accuseds motion to quash,
stating:[30]

. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information filed against the accused
appeared to be sufficient in form. It was discovered, however, that an alteration was made as to the
weight of the marijuana fruiting tops which was placed at only 42.410 grams when the correct
amount should have been in kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity of the
proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent
prosecution for the correct offense.

Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the prior proceedings must
have been valid, and the lack of any fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment
would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by accused by fraud and
collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial
for the same offense.

Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by collusion of the offender,

for the purpose of protecting himself from further prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, either on the ground that the conviction is void
because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a party to it and therefore not
bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 244-245)

It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful maneuvering which led to
the erasure of the true weight of the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in the information.

They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for which they were charged
before the information was tampered with.

They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when they pleaded guilty
upon arraignment.

Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased weight in the now altered
information which merited a much lighter penalty was irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be
considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in court which was tainted with fraud.

The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle with the courts by
participating in a grand deception of pleading guilty to a lesser offense knowing that they
participated/acquiesced to such tampering and then tell the court that they would be placed in
jeopardy for the second time.

We do not agree with the trial court.

FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings dated 03 July 1996
addressed to the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the
accused were apprehended for conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with each other in
facilitating and effecting the transportation and delivery . . . of fortyfive pieces of dried marijuana leaves
(already in bricks) and weighing approximately forty-five kilos.[31]
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and arresting officer SPOI
Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is stated that the accused were caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried
marijuana fruiting tops.[32] For some unknown reasons, however, the Information filed against the
accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under which the accused
were arraigned invalid.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:

Section 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an

offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,[33] this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed:[34]

It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as nothing more than an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the
court.
 An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof.[35]
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable
conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law. [36]
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as
it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that
is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,[37] Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial courts point of view that the accused cannot claim
their right against double jeopardy because they participated/acquiesced to the tampering, we hold that
while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof.[38] Worse, we cannot
overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first
information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does
not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged tampering/alteration
allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of another inquiry.
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,[39] the Court affirming the finality of a decision in a criminal
case, citing Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, stated:

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed a judgment
[of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing
his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies
procedural rules, the decision having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the
fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:

Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would
not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.

In Sanvicente v. People,[40] this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right
against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines
argues, citing the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan[41] that the trial was a sham. We do not agree with
the respondent as the trial in the Galman case was considered a mock trial owing to the act of a then
authoritarian president who ordered the therein respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the
trial and who closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure a predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and total absolution of the respondents-accused therein of all the charges.[42]
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears repeating that the accused had
been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were applying for
probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and
seek to try again accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the prosecution
and at the time when the accused had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and
violative of the rights of the accused.
FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v. Escano, Jr.,[43] upon
which both trial courts justified their claim of jurisdiction, was actually based on this Courts resolution
dated 18 October 1995 where this Court held:

The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts under Section 32 (2) of B. P. 129, as amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been
increased to cover offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective
of the amount of the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that the
imposable penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range of prision correccional, a
penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. It
follows that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges against petitioners.

If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the Metropolitan Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the case under the first Information. Following that argument, the decision dated
16 July 1996 of the RTC Branch 103 was rendered without jurisdiction, thus, accused may not invoke
the right against double jeopardy.
Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later resolution superseding the
resolution cited by the trial courts, specifically Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests
the RTC with jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572. The resolution provides:

RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS,

CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO. 7659

Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and efficient
administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional
Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING
FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659, committed
within their respective territorial jurisdictions:

...

11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR.
 Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clarification on the applicability
of Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, declared:

. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in Administrative Order No. 5-96, to
read:

Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy administration of
justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court
branches are hereby designated to exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A
BANKING OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.

This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
in People v. Velasco:[44]

. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable pursuant
to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted in People vs. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234
SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor modified this Section.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated 14
February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, are set
aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed. Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa
are forthwith ordered released from detention[45] unless there may be valid reasons for their further
detention.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1] Records, p. 41.

[2] Records, p. 45.
[3] Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefore And For Other Purposes.
[4] Rollo, p. 48.
[5] Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[6] Records, pp. 48-49.
[7] Records, p. 52.
[8] Records, p. 55.
[9] Records, p. 50.
[10] Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
[11] Rollo, pp. 26-39.
[12] Records, pp. 98-107.
[13] CA-G.R. SP No. 41932 raffled to Justice Hector L. Hofilena.
[14] Records, pp. 117-119.
[15] Rollo, p. 129.
[16] Records, pp. 137-142.
[17] Records, pp. 152-158.
[18] Records, p. 159.
[19] Records, p. 163.
[20] Rollo, pp. 4-18.
[21] Rollo, p. 10.
[22] Rollo, p. 10.
[23] Rollo, p. 61.
[24] Rollo, pp. 87-102.
[25] Rollo, pp. 131-146.
[26] Rollo, pp. 148-149.
[27] Rollo, pp. 163-189.
[28] Rollo, pp. 197-212.
[29] Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended; Reynaldo Dimayacyac v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, 28 May 2004, citing People v. Tac-an, G.R. No. 148000, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA
373, 380; Navallo v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 97214, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 175, cited in Potot v. People, G.R.
No. 143547, 26 June 2002, 383 SCRA 449.
[30] RTC Order, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[31] Records, pp. 5-6.
[32] Records, pp. 7-8.
[33] G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55.
[34] G.R. No. L-23654, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 808.
[35] People v. Alba, G.R. Nos. 131858-59, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 811.
[36] Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, 12 August 2004.
[37] Rules of Court.
[38] In Director, PNP Narcotics Command v. Judge Salazar (A.M. No. 96-9-332-RTC, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 8), a
complaint for gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency was filed against Judge Salazar relative to the
tampering/alteration of the information in Crim. Case No. 96-66788. However, while the court found that there was
indeed a tampering/alteration, the accused were not at all implicated or faulted for the act.
[39] G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456, 467.
[40] G.R. No. 132081, 26 November 2002, 392 SCRA 610.
[41] G.R. No. L-72670, 12 September 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
[42] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 118251, 29 June 2001, 360 SCRA 359.
[43] G.R. No. L-119135, 18 October 1995.
[44] G.R. No. 110592, 23 January 1996, 252 SCRA 135, 149.
[45] Records, p. 260.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143193. June 29, 2005]

MELBAROSE R. SASOT AND ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COURT OF OF APPEALS,
and REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 1,
Manila, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal prosecution against
petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147.[1]
Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation
pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI stated
that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the United States of
America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA basketball teams such
as USA BASKETBALL, CHICAGO BULLS, ORLANDO MAGIC, LOS ANGELES LAKERS, ROCKETS,
PHOENIX SUNS, BULLETS, PACERS, CHARLOTTE HORNETS, BLAZERS, DENVER NUGGETS,
SACRAMENTO KINGS, MIAMI HEAT, UTAH JAZZ, DETROIT PISTONS, MILWAUKEE BUCKS,
SEATTLE SONICS, TORONTO RAPTORS, ATLANTA HAWKS, CAVS, DALLAS MAVERICKS,
MINNESOTA TIMBERWOLVES, and LOS ANGELES CLIPPERS. These names are used on hosiery,
footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment products, which are
allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer. The Report
further stated that during the investigation, it was discovered that petitioners are engaged in the
manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit NBA garment products. Hence, it
recommended petitioners prosecution for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code.[2]
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President of NBA Properties,
Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the
companys attorney-in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and
administrative complaints, among others.[3] The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by Nicole
Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines,
New York, authenticated the certification.[4] Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12,
1998, before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.[5]
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez
recommended the filing of an Information against petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code.[6] The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT
of Allandale Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell
various garment products bearing the appearance of NBA names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public
to believe that the goods offered by them are those of NBA to the damage and prejudice of the NBA Properties,
Inc., the trademark owner of the NBA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following grounds:

I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE

II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED[8]

In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have dismissed Weltss complaint
because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record
appears to be only a fax transmittal.[9] They also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation not
doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws since it is not a
registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been using the business name ALLANDALE
SPORTSLINE, INC. since 1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to
complainants, and they do not use complainants logo or design.[10]
The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his Comment/Opposition
to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original copy of the complaint, and that complainant has
an attorney-in-fact to represent it. Prosecutor Guray also contended that the State is entitled to
prosecute the offense even without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged
is a public crime.[11]
The trial court sustained the prosecutions arguments and denied petitioners motion to quash in its
Order dated March 5, 1999.[12]
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 52151 which was dismissed per its Decision dated January 26, 2000. [13] According to the
CA, the petition is not the proper remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds
raised therein should be raised during the trial of the case on the merits.[14] The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent court is
hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the CA.[16]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with issues
raised as follows:

1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE (sic) TO DO

BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR
COMPETITION.

2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN BEHALF OF A

CORPORATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS AND WHOSE

EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS ENTITLED TO THE
PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.

4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSUMED

JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.

5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION. [17]
 Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the NBA Properties, Inc.,
is defective and should have been dismissed by the fiscal because it should have been personally sworn
to by the complainant before the investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts failed
to show any board resolution showing his authority to institute any action in behalf of the company, and
that the NBAs trademarks are not being actually used in the Philippines, hence, they are of public
dominion and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend that they have
not committed acts amounting to unfair competition.[18]
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its Amended Comment
to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the petition for reasons stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000. [19]
The petition must be denied.
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.[20] The proper procedure in such a case is for the
accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[21] Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special
civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterate the special
defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances [22] in
the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted.
Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the Information filed against
petitioners.
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
of the accused,[23] their arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal,
complainants capacity to sue and petitioners exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair
competition.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time
the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused;

c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses;

f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged.

Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before
the fiscal and the complainants capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to
before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All these have been
duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be
noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. [24] Want
of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the
merits.[25]
In this case, Weltss Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole
Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on February
12, 1998,[26] duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-
affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated that
complainants representative will present the authenticated notarized original in court,[27] and Prosecutor
Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand. [28] It is apt to state at this point that the
prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.[29]
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which the prosecutor
based his recommendation, to wit:

(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the investigation conducted from
April 30, 1997 to May 9, 1997, and the subsequent search and seizure of several items from
petitioners establishment;[30]

(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma &
Carbonell to the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping the illegal manufacture, distribution and sale
of fake products bearing the NBA trademark, and in prosecuting the proprietors of aforesaid
factory;[31] and

(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P. Bal-ot of the Pinkerton
Consulting Services (Phils.) Inc., which was certified to by Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez,
attesting to their findings that petitioners were found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and
distributing counterfeit NBA garment products.[32]

Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court
should respect such determination.[33]
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code[34] is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which principally
stands as the injured party. The complainants capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,[35] a case akin to the present dispute, as it involved the
crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of search
warrants issued against manufacturers of garments bearing the same trademark as that of the petitioner,
the Court succinctly ruled that:

More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this petition for certiorari was
a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189
of the Revised Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation
being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the
Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is
essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a
private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the
main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched
contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or
infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of
foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and
France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the
Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into because it is in
our national interest to do so.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, with regard to petitioners arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is not entitled to protection
under Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered patentee, that they have not committed acts
amounting to unfair competition for the reason that their designs are original and do not appear to be
similar to complainants, and they do not use complainants logo or design, the Court finds that these are
matters of defense that are better ventilated and resolved during trial on the merits of the case.
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of this case be REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 24) where Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently
assigned, for further proceedings with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] Per letter dated May 4, 2005 sent by Clerk of Court Rosalinda S. Medinaceli-Gepigon of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 1), this case is already assigned to Branch 24, which was designated under A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC (February
19, 2002) as the Intellectual Property Court of Manila.
[2] Records, pp. 6-8.
[3] Id., pp. 99-100.
[4] Id., p. 98.
[5] Id., pp. 108-110.
[6] Id., pp. 31-33.
[7] Id., p. 1.
[8] Id., p. 79.
[9] Id., p. 80.
[10] Id., pp. 81-82.
[11] Id., pp. 95-97.
[12] Id., p. 103.
[13] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Elvi John S. Asuncion,
concurring.
[14] CA Rollo, pp. 77-82.
[15] Id., p. 82.
[16] Id., p. 107.
[17] Rollo, p. 13.
[18] Id., pp. 13-27.
[19] Id., pp. 213-218.
[20] Raro vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000, 335 SCRA 581.
[21] Basa vs. People, G.R. No. 152444, February 16, 2005.
[22] Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000, 324 SCRA 321.
[23] Records, p. 79.
[24] People vs. Cayosa, G.R. No. L-24689, December 26, 1969, 30 SCRA 806.
[25] People vs. Historillo, G.R. No. 130408, June 16, 2000, 33 SCRA 615.
[26] Records, p. 85.
[27] Id., p. 33.
[28] Id., p. 96.
[29] People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 475.
[30] Records, pp. 6-9.
[31] Id., pp. 12-13.
[32] Id., pp. 18-19.
[33] People vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[34] Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code has already been repealed by the express provisions of Republic Act No. 8293 or
The Intellectual Property Code, which took effect on January 1, 1998.
[35] G.R. Nos. L-63796-97, G.R. No. 65659, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 373.
[36] Id., p. 386.